#and a state is a material not ontological solution

[dizzymoods]

The grift is so easy 🤧 he has to be getting a fat stack by that new israeli paper (ie mossad) he writes for bc this is twitter blue levels of bait without the check mark

[psychotrenny]

As much as I agree with that post that talks about how Zionists and Radfems view victimhood as Ontological rather than Situational, I don't think it goes far enough. I think that nearly all derivatives of Liberal ideology suffer from viewing many (if not all) aspects of the current world as Ontological rather than Situational. Which I suppose is a natural consequences of discarding Dialectical Materialism and other similar analytical methods. If you can't explain the current state of the world in a way that's rooted in material reality and takes into account the long and complex history of interactions that proceeded it, then sooner or later you're gonna fall back on the explanation that things are the way that they are due to their inherent unchanging nature.

This implies that therefore there's nothing we can do about it and just have to live with these things, which is pretty convenient to those who want to preserve the Status Quo. Of course this sort of thing leaves a lot of gaps, which is where the more openly perverse and incoherent derivatives of Liberalism slip through. Explaining the causes and solutions for various problems in ways that to many seem more sensible and satisfying than those of the true mainstream. Lacking an adequate lens to explain the Situational nature of phenomena like Antisemitism and Misogyny, many people are gonna be attracted to an Ontological one and especially one that affirms their own innate moral high ground. This can be used to justify all sorts of cruel and self-serving behaviour. Rather than actually trying to challenge and dismantle the systems of oppression one suffers under, it's usually much easier to hurt and exploit those even weaker than you while using your own suffering as a ready source of moral exoneration. It's the sort of thing that's ultimately self-sabotaging in the end(at least on a class level) but offers tantalising prospects of advancement for the individual, hence the persistence of these sorts of thoughts and behaviours. Overcoming these trends certainly isn't easy, but a good place to start is remembering that the world wasn't always like this, that it turned out like this through historical processes grounded in the material world, and that it doesn't have to stay this way forever; a better world is possible

[razistoricharka]

Imaginary evil is romantic and varied; real evil is gloomy, monotonous, barren, boring. Imaginary good is boring; real good is always new, marvelous, intoxicating.

I've come to really dislike this quote. It pins down the ideal and material, aesthetical and political ontological states as immutable boundaries of possibility. It would be better to refer to these states as "aesthetical/material evil" and "aesthetical/material good". If "aesthetical evil" is seductive, it ought to be in service of "material good".

That said, I do not believe it provides a solution to much, given the support enjoyed by entities both materially and aesthetically evil. We'll simply have to kill all the guys who think dubai, gold watches and tesla are dope.

[thevividgreenmoss]

A Nietzschean sense of the ‘modern’ also informs the work of the most influential of American deconstructionists, Paul de Man, though with an added twist of irony. For ‘active forgetting’, de Man argues, can never be entirely successful: the distinctively modernist act, which seeks to erase or arrest history, finds itself surrendered in that very moment to the lineage it seeks to repress, perpetuating rather than abolishing it. Indeed literature for de Man is nothing less than this constantly doomed, ironically self-undoing attempt to make it new, this ceaseless incapacity ever quite to awaken from the nightmare of history: ‘The continuous appeal of modernity, the desire to break out of literature toward the reality of the moment, prevails and, in its turn, folding back upon itself, engenders the repetition and the continuation of literature.’ footnote3 Since action and temporality are indissociable, modernism’s dream of self-origination, its hunger for some historically unmediated encounter with the real, is internally fissured and self-thwarting: to write is to disrupt a tradition which depends on such disruption for its very self-reproduction. We are all, simultaneously and inextricably, modernists and traditionalists, terms which for de Man designate neither cultural movements nor aesthetic ideologies but the very structure of that duplicitous phenomenon, always in and out of time simultaneously, named literature, where this common dilemma figures itself with rhetorical self-consciousness. Literary history here, de Man contends, ‘could in fact be paradigmatic for history in general’; and what this means, translated from deManese, is that though we will never abandon our radical political illusions (the fond fantasy of emancipating ourselves from tradition and confronting the real eyeball-to-eyeball being, as it were, a permanent pathological state of human affairs), such actions will always prove self-defeating, will always be incorporated by a history which has foreseen them and seized upon them as ruses for its own self-perpetuation. The daringly ‘radical’ recourse to Nietzsche, that is to say, turns out to land one in a maturely liberal Democrat position, wryly sceptical but genially tolerant of the radical antics of the young.

What is at stake here, under the guise of a debate about history and modernity, is nothing less than the dialectical relation of theory and practice. For if practice is defined in neo-Nietzschean style as spontaneous error, productive blindness or historical amnesia, then theory can of course be no more than a jaded reflection upon its ultimate impossibility. Literature, that aporetic spot in which truth and error indissolubly entwine, is at once practice and the deconstruction of practice, spontaneous act and theoretical fact, a gesture which in pursuing an unmediated encounter with reality in the same instant interprets that very impulse as metaphysical fiction. Writing is both action and a reflection upon that action, but the two are ontologically disjunct; and literature is the privileged place where practice comes to know and name its eternal difference from theory. It is not surprising, then, that the last sentence of de Man’s essay makes a sudden swerve to the political: ‘If we extend this notion beyond literature, it merely confirms that the bases for historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars and revolutions.’ A text which starts out with a problem in literary history ends up as an assault on Marxism. For it is of course Marxism above all which has insisted that actions may be theoretically informed and histories emancipatory, notions capable of scuppering de Man’s entire case. It is only by virtue of an initial Nietzschean dogmatism—practice is necessarily self-blinded, tradition necessarily impeding—that de Man is able to arrive at his politically quietistic aporias. footnote4 Given these initial definitions, a certain judicious deconstruction of their binary opposition is politically essential, if the Nietzschean belief in affirmative action is not to license a radical politics; but such deconstruction is not permitted to transform the metaphysical trust that there is indeed a single dominant structure of action (blindness, error), and a single form of tradition (obfuscating rather than enabling an encounter with the ‘real’). The Marxism of Louis Althusser comes close to this Nietzscheanism: practice is an ‘imaginary’ affair which thrives upon the repression of truly theoretical understanding, theory a reflection upon the necessary fictionality of such action. The two, as with Nietzsche and de Man, are ontologically disjunct, necessarily non-synchronous.

[...]

‘Modernism’ as a term at once expresses and mystifies a sense of one’s particular historical conjucture as being somehow peculiarly pregnant with crisis and change. It signifies a portentous, confused yet curiously heightened self-consciousness of one’s own historical moment, at once self-doubting and self-congratulatory, anxious and triumphalistic together. It suggests at one and the same time an arresting and denial of history in the violent shock of the immediate present, from which vantage-point all previous developments may be complacently consigned to the ashcan of ‘tradition’, and a disorienting sense of history moving with peculiar force and urgency within one’s immediate experience, pressingly actual yet tantalizingly opaque. All historical epochs are modern to themselves, but not all live their experience in this ideological mode. If modernism lives its history as peculiarly, insistently present, it also experiences a sense that this present moment is somehow of the future, to which the present is nothing more than an orientation; so that the idea of the Now, of the present as full presence eclipsing the past, is itself intermittently eclipsed by an awareness of the present as deferment, as an empty excited openness to a future which is in one sense already here, in another sense yet to come. The ‘modern’, for most of us, is that which we have always to catch up with: the popular use of the term ‘futuristic’, to denote modernist experiment, is symptomatic of this fact. Modernism—and here Lyotard’s case may be given some qualified credence—is not so much a punctual moment in time as a revaluation of time itself, the sense of an epochal shift in the very meaning and modality of temporality, a qualitative break in our ideological styles of living history. What seems to be moving in such moments is less ‘history’ than that which is unleashed by its rupture and suspension; and the typically modernist images of the vortex and the abyss, ‘vertical’ inruptions into temporality within which forces swirl restlessly in an eclipse of linear time, represent this ambivalent consciousness. So, indeed, does the Benjaminesque spatializing or ‘constellating’ of history, which at once brings it to a shocking standstill and shimmers with all the unquietness of crisis or catastrophe.

High modernism, as Fredric Jameson has argued elsewhere, was born at a stroke with mass commodity culture. footnote5 This is a fact about its internal form, not simply about its external history. Modernism is among other things a strategy whereby the work of art resists commodification, holds out by the skin of its teeth against those social forces which would degrade it to an exchangeable object. To this extent, modernist works are in contradiction with their own material status, self-divided phenomena which deny in their discursive forms their own shabby economic reality. To fend off such reduction to commodity status, the modernist work brackets off the referent or real historical world, thickens its textures and deranges its forms to forestall instant consumability, and draws its own language protectively around it to become a mysteriously autotelic object, free of all contaminating truck with the real. Brooding self-reflexively on its own being, it distances itself through irony from the shame of being no more than a brute, self-identical thing. But the most devastating irony of all is that in doing this the modernist work escapes from one form of commodification only to fall prey to another. If it avoids the humiliation of becoming an abstract, serialized, instantly exchangeable thing, it does so only by virtue of reproducing that other side of the commodity which is its fetishism. The autonomous, self-regarding, impenetrable modernist artefact, in all its isolated splendour, is the commodity as fetish resisting the commodity as exchange, its solution to reification part of that very problem.

It is on the rock of such contradictions that the whole modernist project will finally founder. In bracketing off the real social world, establishing a critical, negating distance between itself and the ruling social order, modernism must simultaneously bracket off the political forces which seek to transform that order. There is indeed a political modernism—what else is Bertolt Brecht?—but it is hardly characteristic of the movement as a whole. Moreover, by removing itself from society into its own impermeable space, the modernist work paradoxically reproduces—indeed intensifies—the very illusion of aesthetic autonomy which marks the bourgeois humanist order it also protests against. Modernist works are after all ‘works’, discrete and bounded entities for all the free play within them, which is just what the bourgeois art institution understands. The revolutionary avant garde, alive to this dilemma, were defeated at the hands of political history. Postmodernism, confronted with this situation, will then take the other way out. If the work of art really is a commodity then it might as well admit it, with all the sang-froid it can muster. Rather than languish in some intolerable conflict between its material reality and its aesthetic structure, it can always collapse that conflict on one side, becoming aesthetically what it is economically. The modernist reification—the art work as isolated fetish—is therefore exchanged for the reification of everyday life in the capitalist marketplace. The commodity as mechanically reproducible exchange ousts the commodity as magical aura. In a sardonic commentary on the avant-garde work, postmodernist culture will dissolve its own boundaries and become coextensive with ordinary commodified life itself, whose ceaseless exchanges and mutations in any case recognize no formal frontiers which are not constantly transgressed. If all artefacts can be appropriated by the ruling order, then better impudently to preempt this fate than suffer it unwillingly; only that which is already a commodity can resist commodification. If the high modernist work has been institutionalized within the superstructure, postmodernist culture will react demotically to such elitism by installing itself within the base. Better, as Brecht remarked, to start from the ‘bad new things’, rather than from the ‘good old ones’.

That, however, is also where postmodernism stops. Brecht’s comment alludes to the Marxist habit of extracting the progressive moment from an otherwise unpalatable or ambivalent reality, a habit well exemplified by the early avant garde’s espousal of a technology able both to emancipate and to enslave. At a later, less euphoric stage of technological capitalism, the postmodernism which celebrates kitsch and camp caricatures the Brechtian slogan by proclaiming not that the bad contains the good, but that the bad is good—or rather that both of these ‘metaphysical’ terms have now been decisively outmoded by a social order which is to be neither affirmed nor denounced but simply accepted. From where, in a fully reified world, would we derive the criteria by which acts of affirmation or denunciation would be possible? Certainly not from history, which postmodernism must at all costs efface, or spatialize to a range of possible styles, if it is to persuade us to forget that we have ever known or could know any alternative to itself. Such forgetting, as with the healthy amnesiac animal of Nietzsche and his contemporary acolytes, is value: value lies not in this or that discrimination within contemporary experience but in the very capacity to stop our ears to the siren calls of history and confront the contemporary for what it is, in all its blank immediacy. Ethical or political discrimination would extinguish the contemporary simply by mediating it, sever its self-identity, put us prior or posterior to it; value is just that which is, the erasure and overcoming of history, and discourses of value, which cannot fail to be historical, are therefore by definition valueless.

[...]

The contradiction of modernism in this respect is that in order valuably to deconstruct the unified subject of bourgeois humanism, it draws upon key negative aspects of the actual experience of such subjects in late bourgeois society, which often enough does not at all correspond to the official ideological version. It thus pits what is increasingly felt to be the phenomenological reality of capitalism against its formal ideologies, and in doing so finds that it can fully embrace neither. The phenomenological reality of the subject throws formal humanist ideology into question, while the persistence of that ideology is precisely what enables the phenomenological reality to be characterized as negative. Modernism thus dramatizes in its very internal structures a crucial contradiction in the ideology of the subject, the force of which we can appreciate if we ask ourselves in what sense the bourgeois humanist conception of the subject as free, active, autonomous and self-identical is a workable or appropriate ideology for late capitalist society. The answer would seem to be that in one sense such an ideology is highly appropriate to such social conditions, and in another sense hardly at all. This ambiguity is overlooked by those post-structuralist theorists who appear to stake all on the assumption that the ‘unified subject’ is indeed an integral part of contemporary bourgeois ideology, and is thus ripe for urgent deconstruction. Against such a view, it is surely arguable that late capitalism has deconstructed such a subject much more efficiently than meditations on écriture. As postmodernist culture attests, the contemporary subject may be less the strenuous monadic agent of an earlier phase of capitalist ideology than a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments, emptied of ethical substance and psychical interiority, the ephemeral function of this or that act of consumption, media experience, sexual relationship, trend or fashion. The ‘unified subject’ looms up in this light as more and more of a shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capitalism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the winds as so many bits and pieces of reified technique, appetite, mechanical operation or reflex of desire.

If this were wholly true, of course, postmodernist culture would be triumphantly vindicated: the unthinkable or the utopian, depending upon one’s perspective, would already have happened. But the bourgeois humanist subject is not in fact simply part of a clapped-out history we can all agreeably or reluctantly leave behind: if it is an increasingly inappropriate model at certain levels of subjecthood, it remains a potently relevant one at others. Consider, for example, the condition of being a father and a consumer simultaneously. The former role is governed by ideological imperatives of agency, duty, autonomy, authority, responsibility: the latter, while not wholly free of such strictures, puts them into significant question. The two roles are not of course merely disjunct; but though relations between them are practically negotiable, capitalism’s current ideal consumer is strictly incompatible with its current ideal parent. The subject of late capitalism, in other words, is neither simply the self-regulating synthetic agent posited by classical humanist ideology, nor merely a decentred network of desire, but a contradictory amalgam of the two. The constitution of such a subject at the ethical, juridical and political levels is not wholly continuous with its constitution as a consuming or ‘mass cultural’ unit. ‘Eclecticism’, writes Lyotard, ‘is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and “retro” clothes in Hong Kong; knowledge is a matter of TV games.’ It is not just that there are millions of other human subjects, less exotic than Lyotard’s jet-setters, who educate their children, vote as responsible citizens, withdraw their labour and clock in for work; it is also that many subjects live more and more at the points of contradictory intersection between these two definitions.

Terry Eagleton, Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism

[kemetic-dreams]

Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa: A Philosophical Interpretation Crispinous Iteyo

 Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies Maseno University citeyo@yahoo.com Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya

(PAK) Premier Issue, New Series, Vol.1 No.1, June 2009, pp.147-159 thoughtandpractice@uonbi.ac.ke OR thoughtandpractice@gmail.com 

Abstract This paper offers a philosophical interpretation of belief in the spirits of the dead in Africa, with a view to identifying rational grounds for accepting or rejecting them. This endeavour is premised on the view that in this rapidly changing world, philosophy should inquire not only in to theoretical problems, but also into practical ones. Plato and Aristotle’s theories of the soul being some of the most carefully discussed philosophical theories on immortality or lack of it, will provide the background of deliberation in this paper. 

Introduction In the world today, science and technology seem to permeate every aspect of human life. In-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, genetic engineering, life support devices and genetically modified foods are among the myriad recent innovations. They attend to the material needs of human beings, thereby perhaps putting to doubt the value of generally theoretical disciplines such as philosophy. Nevertheless, the meeting of material needs does not necessarily satiate the range of human yearnings, because there are many issues of intense metaphysical and moral concern to humans that material things per se cannot address. Thus in spite of the scientific and technological advances, there is need to ask philosophical questions about challenges 152 Crispinous Iteyo such as fanaticism, discrimination, governance, the environment, cultural practices, and human destiny. In Africa, according to Mbiti (1969, 149), “there are many, and often complicated ceremonies connected with death, burials, funerals, inheritance, and the living dead, among others”, because belief in the spirits of the dead is common and widespread. This paper offers a philosophical interpretation of belief in the spirits of the dead in Africa, with a view to identifying rational grounds for accepting or rejecting them. This endeavour is premised on the view that in this rapidly changing world, philosophy should inquire not only in to theoretical problems, but also into practical ones. The paper is divided in to two sections. In the first, the term culture is explained and belief in the spirits of the dead among the Luba, Akan, Mende, Banyaranda and the Luo described, with special focus on Luo beliefs. The Luo are an ethnic group found around Lake Victoria in western Kenya, as well as in parts of Uganda and Tanzania. They belong to the larger linguistic stock called the Nilotes. In the second segment, philosophical interpretation and analysis of Luo beliefs about death is made. Plato and Aristotle’s theories of the soul, by far the most carefully worked out philosophical theories on immortality or lack of it, provide the background for the discussion. Conceptualising Culture Beliefs are key components of culture, largely influencing human behaviour. They are handed over from one generation to the other, sometimes with modifications. Culture influences people ostensibly because it provides them with an identity and a worldview through which they understand or interpret the cosmos. It is prudent therefore at this juncture to have a bird’s eye view of culture. Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 153 In the 1870’s according to A.T. Dalfovo in his article, “Culture: Meaning and Relation to Philosophy”, there was a shift in the understanding of culture from the personal to the social. For him, the new understanding emanated from Edward Taylor’s definition of culture in 1871 as the complex whole that includes among other things knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, and custom. This view gradually entrenched itself, so that it is now the prevailing understanding of culture. The social understanding of culture marked a shift from the theoretical to the empirical meaning, as a result of which humans were rescued from the notion of being cultured to the one of belonging to a culture. They were now seen as belonging to but not being, with the implication that no one would be without culture. This was in sharp contrast to the earlier theoretical interpretation, where some people would be cultured but others not. According to that earlier view, as something that could be possessed, culture meant the development, improvement and refinement of persons through education and training. This was in conformity with the meaning of the Latin word cultura (cultivation; attending to the land for the raising of crops). Applied to humans, the usage of culture tended to focus on the person, implying first of all an awareness of certain ideas, being conversant with certain mannerisms, possessing certain traits, and behaving accordingly. Thus according to the earlier theoretical perspective, culture was conceived normatively, stressing values rather than facts. 

Consequently, enculturation implied the cultivation of ideas, principles and traits that would have automatically resulted in “proper” behavior. A cultured person was hence a knowledgeable person, whose learning was followed by appropriate conduct. On the other hand, an uncultured person was not learned, and hence not refined in manners. The shift from the person to society and from the theoretical to the empirical, meant that the emphasis moved from knowledge to behavior, that is, from theory to practice. A synthesis of the components of culture as empirical is summarized in a simple phrase – “a way of life”. Hence to Oruka (Oruka& Masolo, 1983, p57), culture is a people’s body of knowledge, beliefs, behavior, goals, social institutions, together with tools, techniques and material constructions. It is in this light that one can talk of European culture, African culture, or Chinese culture. In this sense one can say it is one’s culture to do or not to do certain things, for example, initiating boys into 154 Crispinous Iteyo adulthood by circumcising them. It is in this sense that belief in the spirits of the dead is examined herein. The “way of life” is not static, but is rather susceptible to influences from other “ways of life”. Internal or external forces can bring gradual or massive change. On this note we can ask what exactly African culture is. This would be asking about the identity of the African way of life, whether it is traditional or modern. This is because there are elements of modernity and traditionalism in the contemporary African “way of life”. This phenomenon has a historical explanation in colonization. As Thairu (1975) laments, colonialists introduced their culture that included religion, language, clothing, food, music, health care and a set of beliefs that Africans were conditioned to adopt. Okot p’Bitek captures this vividly when he states: … contrary to the African idea that everybody must marry in the prime of their youth, have a family (and for a man, the more wives and children he has the better), young intelligent, beautiful and handsome Africans were lured to think that wifelessness, husbandlesness, childlessness, homelessness, were a virtue. (1986, p15). 

During the colonial era, terms such as “cultured” and “uncultured” - indicative of the theoretical and personal meaning of culture - were in vogue, perhaps as a technique of luring Africans to abandon their culture. A cultured African was that one who shed his traditional culture and embraced the Western one, while an uncultured African was that one who stuck to his/her traditional way of life. The ‘uncultured African’ was seen as “backward”. As much as colonialism disrupted African traditional culture and introduced what may be called modernity, the divide in terms of who or what is traditional and who or what is modern is not succinct, because ‘traditional culture’ was not obliterated. Some aspects of European culture have become part of culture in Africa, having been fully embraced. In other instances, both traditional and modern remedies may be sought to solve problems. Placide Tempels captured this fact thus: … among our Bantu we see the evolues , the ‘civilized’, even the Christians, return to their former ways of behavior whenever they are overtaken by moral lassitude, danger or suffering. They do so because their ancestors left them their practical solution of the great problem of humanity, the problem of life and death, of salvation or destruction (Tempels 1959, 18). Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 155 Spirits of the Dead in African Cultures Belief in the spirits of the dead in African cultures is widespread, as evidenced in the examples of the five African communities below. In the Luba thought as Tempels (1959) writes, there is belief that the dead fathers of the community still exist but in spirit form. After God in terms of force, he writes, come the first fathers, founders of the different clans. The ancestors constitute the most important chain, binding humans to God. They occupy an exalted rank, in that they are not regarded as the ordinary dead. They are, in Tempels’ view, spiritualized beings, being higher on the ontological hierarchy, participating to a certain degree in the divine force. After the first fathers were the dead of the tribe, following their order of primogeniture. They according to Tempels formed a chain through which the forces of the elders exercised their vitalizing influence on the living generations. The Akan people, according to Gyekye (1987) similarly have a conception of the spirits of the dead, manifested in their religious language, attitude, and practices.

 For example, the language of the religious rite of libation runs as follows: Supreme God, who is alone great, upon whom Men lean and do not fail, receive this wine and drink. Earth goddess, whose day of worship is Thursday, receive this wine and drink. Spirits of our ancestors receive this wine and drink (Gyekye, 1987, 85) Writing on the Mende, Little (1976) observes that the ontology is that of spirits. At the apex of the hierarchy there is Ngewo, the super spirit - Supreme Being. Below the Supreme Being are spiritual beings that fall broadly into two categories, ancestral, and non-ancestral spirits. The ancestral spirits are the spirits of former living members of the community - both former members of the various cults, as well as individual families. The non-ancestral spirits comprise certain widely known spirits or genii (Dyinyinga), associated quite often with natural phenomena such as rivers, forests and rocks, but not confined to any one locality. In presenting the cosmology of the Rwandese, Maquet (1976) says that the Banyarwanda view reality in two perspectives - from that of the material and that of the non-material world. The non-material world is composed of two categories, namely, that of God – Imana, and (2) the spirit of the dead Bazimu. The Bazimu 156 Crispinous Iteyo continue the individuality of living persons, and have the same names. Though nonmaterial, they are localized by their activity. They are viewed as not drinking, eating, or mating, but their existence in other respects is similar to that in the world of the living. The Bazimu sometimes come back to the world, returning to the places where they used to live. These spirits may stay permanently in the hut where their descendants live, or in the small huts made for them in the enclosure around the homes. Whatever their temperament was when they were in this world, it is believed, the Bazimu are bad. In order not to irritate them, various observances and interdictions must be complied with. Hence, there is the ‘cult’ of the Bazimu, which among other things, aims at appeasing the spirits. In Luo culture, belief in the spirits of the dead provides a basis for most of the practices that take place from the time one dies to the end of the mourning period. According to Oruka, spirits of the dead are to be feared since, if one does not comply with the customs, then he/she is haunted by them. Asked in a court proceeding why a burial ceremony has to be performed at even a drowned person’s home, he answered that if the ceremonies were not done, “the spirits of the dead would haunt the people, claiming they were ignored” (Oruka 1991, 71). The belief is that a human being is made up of visible (the body) and invisible parts (tipo). The union of the two parts forms human life. At death the body perishes, but tipo becomes the spirit. The spirit retains the individual identity, but becomes more intelligent and powerful than in the previous life. The spirit becomes jachien (demon) if and when the circumstances surrounding ones death were either not honorable or questionable (for example if it was through suicide). Spirits, in their spiritual form though, according to OchollaAyayo, (1989), are not separated from their clan. The above Luo beliefs lead to certain practices during and after the mourning period. For example, the dead have to be accorded due respect with the consequence that, among other things, dead bodies must be disposed of in a dignified and respectful manner, with all ceremonies that befit it; no farming and other economic activities are to take place in the vicinity of the bereaved home, because the dead is mourned by the community, and not simply by the family; funeral attendants must be fed; bodies must be buried in coffins and in their homes and if possible, graves should be plastered; funeral fire, magenga, must be lit and be on for seven days after the burial of a man, Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 157 and for three days for a woman; several ceremonies after burial, for example, nindo e liel, tero buru, and tero tipo take place in order to appease the spirits. Although the procedure observed and the amount of money spent in burials in the Luo culture may show variations according to sex, age and social status as well as certain peculiarities, Ayiemba (1986) observes that if the dead was not a celebrity, a certain minimum number of animals is required for slaughter. If the dead man was married and had grown up children, for example, there has to be a bull for the elders, a bull for sons-in-law, a bull or goat for wife or wives’ relatives, and a he-goat for maternal relatives. If his social, political or economic status was high, more animals would be needed. Interpretation and Analysis. 

In all the cultures mentioned above, there is the conception of the world of spirits. The categories of spiritual beings in this world differ from one thought system to the other. Nevertheless, it is apparent that there is the category of God or the Supreme Being, and then the category of “other spirits”, that is, ancestral spirits and/or “the spirits of the dead”. Spirits are believed to have more power than humans, but have less power than God. Some may be seen as having places of abode, while others seem to wander in the wilderness. Because they have more power than humans, they are capable of diminishing or increasing human power. To avoid the diminishing and to enhance the increment of power, humans placate them through prayer or other practices such as naming the newborn after departed relatives, or burying the dead with pomp and funfair. In short, spiritual entities are taken to be so real as not to be left out of a people’s ontological conception. This implies belief in life after death. When one dies, he or she becomes a spirit, and moves into the world of spirits where spiritual powers are acquired, and thereby able to positively or negatively affect the living. This is what calls for a philosophical analysis. Death and the common views and beliefs that surround it pose philosophical problems, for example, whether or not there is life after death and if so, what its nature is. These questions can best be discussed against the background of Plato and 158 Crispinous Iteyo Aristotle’s philosophical theories on the soul, not on the assumption that they are true, but as a framework for a systematic analysis of the phenomenon. Before Plato’s theory, Pythagoras, a mystical thinker, had taught that man, who was intermediate between God and the brutes, had a soul which after death migrated into other bodies. Compared with the gods, he held, man is very low and subject to error and death, but compared with the animals he is high up, capable of rising to greater heights. However, man could only rise to greater heights by purifying the soul. Pythagoras formed the orphic brotherhood to ‘save souls’ by teaching its membership steps to purify their souls. Plato’s theory of the soul is found in Phaedo, where he holds “that the soul is not only immortal, but also that it contemplates truths after its separation from the body at the time of death”. This assertion has two implications, namely, (1) that the soul does not perish at the time one dies, and (2) that the soul is characterized by cognitive features. This is explained by a number of reasons. First, the soul is immortal because it is exempted from dissolution and destruction, being among things that are not perceptible, but rather intelligible. Second, the soul is immortal because it is cyclical, in the sense that being alive is preceded by being dead, with the implication that ones ‘death involves the continued existence of the soul in question’, which goes on to animate another body. Third, ‘the soul is immortal because it has life essentially’, which implies that at no time can it cease to have life. In view of the foregoing, it can be inferred that for Plato, the human being is an amalgam of perishable body and immortal soul, meaning that there can be life after death. Death only separates the soul from the body. As the body perishes, the soul continues with life. Regarding the nature of the soul’s existence after ones death, Plato held that the soul of a person who was pure, one liberated from the things of the body, departs to the invisible world, to live in bliss in the company of the gods, but that of an impure man, the one who loved things of the body, becomes a ghost or enters into the body of an animal, for example a wolf or a hawk. Aristotle’s theory of the soul is embodied in his account of form and matter, which holds that every material being is composed of prime matter and substantial form as Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 159 its ultimate constituent principles. Substantial form is constant and unchanging, but prime matter comes and goes with every successive change to which the body is subjected. Matter is anything which has extension, that is, it occupies space. In living things, the substantial form is the soul, which is the source of the body’s functions and behavior. Plant soul he called “vegetative soul”, animal soul “sensitive soul”, and that of man he called “rational soul”. This is in a way equating life with soul, for to Aristotle, they both meant breath, which he saw as that which greatly differentiates living from non- living things. In summary, for Aristotle, ‘soul is a particular kind of nature, a principle that accounts for change and rest’ in living things. For Aristotle, living things function in their specific manner by virtue or potency of their souls. Thus Aristotle agree with Plato that the soul and not the body is the animating principle of a living thing. He however differed with Plato regarding the destiny of the soul. The implication of Aristotle’s theory is that a person’s soul has no life after his death. Death would ipso facto mean that the soul has ceased to be. These two theories have relevance to the belief in the spirits of the dead in a number of ways. 

First, there is the categorization of things in to form and matter. The categorization does not only provide for incorporeal substances such as the soul, but also opens up the possibility of an afterlife because if the soul is imperishable, then it outlives the body. But the provision and possibility is wrought with problems, for example the need for a justification of the belief that the soul is, and that it survives bodily death. Although Plato and Aristotle attempt to address these problems in their theories, the questions still remain. For example, to Plato the soul is a simple and immaterial entity containing no parts, and that which activates the body. It is the principle of motion as it is intrinsically active. Aristotle concurred with this by stating that it is the soul that differentiates living from non-living things - that the soul is the life of the body without which the body loses life and therefore activity because the soul is essentially life. However, these postulations do not prove that souls exist. The soul is only seen as the explanation of the activity in living things, and this is simply speculation. With the two conceptions above having failed to establish that souls exist, another approach is needed, perhaps the rationalistic one. From the rationalistic viewpoint one has to start like Plato and Aristotle with the premise that the soul is that which makes 160 Crispinous Iteyo a thing active, and that two kinds of things are observed in nature, namely, living and non-living ones. What living things have and non-living things lack is activity or life. When this activity or life vanishes, the body becomes a non-living thing. One then can move on to argue that if the thing that gives activity or life to the body is what is called the soul, then “soul” exists. This is simply arguing thus: living things are differentiated from non-living things because they contain activity; living things contain one thing that non-living things lack; if “the thing” in living things is what is called ‘soul’ then the soul exists; meaning that the soul must be the explanation of activity in living things. Nevertheless, the rationalistic approach assumes that things were created the way they are and hence living and non-living things will remain so. However, if taken in the context of evolution, one may argue that living things are not special, but are only a step ahead in this natural process, so that ‘non-living’ things today may be ‘living’ tomorrow. What this means is that “living” is simply a capacity rather than a substance (soul) that can depart from the body at death. Hence there is no entity called “soul”, but merely the capacity or activity associated with a living body - perhaps agreeing with Aristotle. If it is granted that there are souls, the question of their destiny arises. An answer to the question of what happens to the soul when one dies is derivable from the conceptions of the relationship between the body and the soul. There are notably two different conceptions regarding the relationship of these two. The first one is that which is advocated by Aristotle, that the soul as the form of the body is bound up with the body, its work being to move the body and perceive sensible objects. It makes the body an organic whole, having purpose as a unit. To this conception, it is not possible to separate the two, as they are related as matter and form. A view resulting from this is that the soul ceases to be at death, being incapable of having further existence beyond bodily death. The implication of this is that the soul is mortal. The second conception is that which supposes that the soul can depart from the body. This conception considers a living thing as composed of two primary principles - body and soul. 

The main proponents of this view as already observed were Pythagoras and Plato. Pythagoras and his orphic brotherhood taught the transmigration of the Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 161 soul. After a person’s death, they believed, the soul picked up another body, transforming into other kinds of living things. This means that whatever comes into existence is thereby born again in the cycles of life, nothing being absolutely new. Therefore just as a person casts off worn-off garments and puts on others that are new, the embodied soul casts off dying bodies and takes on others that are new. And to Plato’s theory, the soul is some kind of a “prisoner” trapped in a body, and that the purpose of philosophy is to free the soul from its entrapment in the body, that is, to enable it to attain its highest perfection (Lisska 1977, 102). This conception, therefore, leads to the view that the soul can be separated from the body. To George Galloway, some cultures highly subscribed to this view and even held that the soul “could detach itself from the body to roam at large in the world, and hence one would wake up where he lay down but in the interval his/her soul would have been abroad on strange adventures” (1960, p93). This conception lays ground for the separation of the soul from the body at death, and also the belief in the immortality of the soul, and the possibility of it existing as a spirit as its destiny would most probably be destined to the ontological mode of spirits. On the empirical front, there are reports that not only suggest that there are “souls”, but also that there is life after death. For example, people who had been declared dead but who had been resuscitated, have reported their experiences (Hick 1993, 129). The implication of this is that if there are souls, they are capable of independent existence from the body. Further, in Hindu and Buddhist cultures, it seems self-evident that people have lived many times before and must live many times again in this world (Hick 1993, 133). Evidence for this is that some people claim to have certain memories of people and events experienced in a previous life, and that some impartial investigators end up confirming such occurrences. Such claims may reinforce the view that indeed there are souls. However, one major weakness of the reports from those resuscitated and re-incarnated is that they present two different claims about the same thing. Is it not contradictory that the same thing (soul) should be re-incarnating in one culture and in the other moving straight to the “world of spirits”? Differently put, does one’s soul transmigrate because one is born in say Hindu culture, and that the other goes to heaven/hell because one is born say in a Christian culture? One may come to the 162 Crispinous Iteyo conclusion that either only one of these is true, or that both are false. The possibility of both of them being false would inevitably mean that there are no souls or that if they are there, they perish with the body, and this might imply that there are no spirits of the dead. 

Obviously, believers in the spirits of the dead would subscribe to the second conception of the destiny of the soul, which is that the soul is preordained to proceed to the ontological mode of spirits - that it disembarks from a dying body and moves on. However, it can be argued that even if the second conception is true, that there are souls that transmigrate or become spirits or go to heaven or hell at the death of a person, there would still be need for a strong argument in support of the view that the soul or the spirit still gets interested in the dead body to the extent that the manner in which the dead body is disposed, where it is disposed, how long it takes to be disposed, and how the mourners are treated, may irritate or please it. One may be perfectly correct to assert that if souls exist and become spirits at one’s death they may not be bothered with how the body is treated, because the relationship between soul and body will have come to an end. 

References Ayiemba, E.O. 1986. “Sagacity” in Were,G.S., B.E. Kipkorir, and E.O. Ayiemba Eds. South Nyanza District Socio-Cultural profile. Nairobi: Institute of African Studies, University of Nairobi, pp.17-27. Bostock, D. 1986. Plato's Phaedo. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Byrne, E.F. 1969. Human Beings and Being Human. New York: Meredith Corporation. Dalfovo, A.T. “Culture: Meaning and Relation to Philosophy”. Nyasani, J.M. ed. Philosophical focus on Culture and Traditional Thought Systems in Development. Nairobi: Evans Brothers (Kenya) Limited. Ferguson, J. 1970. Socrates: A Source Book. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. Galloway, G. 1960. The Philosophy of Religion. Edinburgh: T & T. Clark. Gyekye, K., 1987, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hick, J. 1993. Philosophy of Religion, 4th Ed. New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, Ltd. Jowett, Benjamin Trans. 1953. The Dialogues of Plato. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lisska, J.A. 1977. Philosophy Matters. Columbia: Charles E. Merril Publishing Company. Belief in the Spirits of the Dead in Africa 163 Little, K., 1976. “The Mende in Sierra Leone”. Forde, Daryll ed. African Worlds: Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Longman Concise English Dictionary, 1985, Longman Group U.K. Limited Burnt Mill, Harlow. Maquet, J.J., 1976. “The Kingdom of Rwanda”. in Forde, Daryll ed. 1976. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya Ltd. Mourelatos, A.P.D. ed. 1993. The Pre-Socratics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nussbaum, M.C. & A.O. Rorty eds. 1992. Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ocholla-ayayo, A.B.C. 1989. “Death and burial: An Anthropological Perspective”. Ojwang,J.B. and Mugambi, J.N.K. eds. The S.M. Otieno case: Death and Burial in Modern Kenya. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, pp.30-51. O’connor, D.J. ed. 1985. A Critical History of Western Philosophy. New York: The Free Press. p’Bitek, Okot. 1986. Artist the Ruler: Essays on Art, Culture and Values. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd. Oruka, H.O. ed. 1991. Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Nairobi: Acts Press. Oruka, H.O. & Masolo, D.A. eds. 1983. Philosophy and Cultures. Nairobi: Bookwise Ltd. Rheeders, K., 1998. Some Traditional African Beliefs: A Beginners Guide. Abington: Hodder & Stoghton. Russell, B., 1961. A History of Western Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.2009. “Ancient Theories of Soul”. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ Stumpf, E.S. 1993. Elements of Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Tempels, P. 1969. Bantu Philosophy. King, Colin Trans. Paris: Presence Africaine. Thairu, K., 1975. The African Civilization. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau.

[freudycat]

america is pretty fucking ~ wild-erson ~

Hi! Sorry for the late post. Last week, we found out that my grandpa was going to die really, really soon, and I honestly couldn’t bring myself to do anything. I’m sorry if I don’t sound as upbeat in this post -- I just really am not feeling it, but I need to force myself to do something so I can feel less guilty about doing absolutely nothing while I mope around. Also, just as a heads up, we might be flying over to my grandma’s home to give her some support, so I might not be able to update for a while.

Anyways, for today, I guess we can talk about Frank Wilderson. His writing is actually pretty interesting, and I really enjoyed reading his book Red, White, & Black. To be Frank (hehe), he does base a lot of his philosophy off of a few other authors, so I’ll explain their ideas as I explain Wilderson’s theories. Oof. Those teachers who say that you can’t plagiarize are really punching the air right now LOL.

Wilderson’s thesis level claim is that Blackness is ontological, in that it exists in a fixed state that can’t be changed. Basically, it is a permanent state of being that means that one is constantly subject to systems of violence and oppression. 

Then, he takes the concept of epidermalization from Frantz Fanon. Epidermalization describes the theory that there is a psychological response that is associated with a certain skin color. So, this falls within a symbolic order of a spectrum of what is “white” vs what is “Black”. A person would either react with extreme hatred or extreme attraction to Blackness. Wilderson uses this to justify how everybody is influenced by this system.

He also takes some ideas from Orlando Patterson. Patterson believed that there was an ontological conception of what is “white” (humanity, rationality) and what is “Black” (disrespectful, nonhuman). These conceptions led to social death, which Patterson says is the current state of Black people. 

There are three pillars of social death: natal alienation, which is how Black people were taken from African and were stripped of their culture; gratuitous violence, which is where the hatred of Blackness requires that there be more violence than necessary to satisfy the psychic desire to commit said violence; and general dishonor, which is where Black people are devalued by white people. 

I’m definitely not doing either of these scholars justice by just summarizing a tiny fraction of their work (but then again,, I’m doing that for every philosopher I’m talking about on this blog,, oof), and I hope to revisit them in the future!

Anyways, going back to Wilderson. He believes that there are two types of “death”, so to speak. One type is the social death as described by Patterson, where it is violence from individuals. The other type is political death. This is basically violence from the state itself.

He uses the phrase structural antagonism, which refers to the system and the general infrastructure of the state. It is antagonistic because it is the opposition of the slave to the master. He believes that the system of slavery has never really been abolished, but rather, has been reincarnated into different forms (ie, slavery => Jim Crow laws => prison industrial complex). 

This has a few impacts. First is “objective vertigo” -- it is the sense in which you never feel as if your identity is tied to a meaningful system. Because the state and the individuals all are against you, it is hard to think of yourself as human. Then, there is the material harm, which results from the fact that violence will be exerted against you. Because the entire system is built upon the social and political death of Black people, general reform would be impossible. 

Wilderson doesn’t really describe any implementable solutions to these problems. Oof. I don’t know how accurate his claims are, but even just by looking at what’s happening on the news, I can see why he might have made those claims. 

Anyways, I hope you at least learned something from this post! Thanks for reading :)

[meditationadvise]

7 Powerful Books That Will Unleash The Hidden Potential Of Your Mind

" A mind needs books as a sword needs a whetstone, if it is to maintain its side."

There it is: your mind -all leashed-up, bored, bookless and chasing its very own tail in the edge. It's time to unleash it. It's time to throw it back into the surprising waters of wonder and admiration. It's time to sidetrack it from the all as well familiar tail (or story, to wit), as well as give it a juicy carrot to chase around rather. Seven juicy carrots, to be exact.

So, shop that leash, open up your mind, snuggle with your ideal close friend, and dive precisely into the complying with mind-unleashing publications. However keep the light on. As Groucho Marx wittily believed, " Beyond a pet dog, a publication is guy's best buddy. Within a pet dog it's too dark to check out."

1.) "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsche

" We never ever recognize any type of information prior to translating it via concepts. All monitorings are, as Popper put it, theory-laden, and thus imperfect, as all our concepts are."

From epistemology and also quantum fungibility to ecological values and societal advancement, David Deutsche takes us on a provocative trip right into addressing a single inquiry: Is there a restriction to exactly what can be comprehended? He comes at a mind-expending solution of “no” by diving deep into the broadening waters of epistemology and also ontology. He profoundly claims that our understanding of anything is constantly at the “beginning of infinity” and also there will certainly constantly be a boundless amount a lot more left for us to recognize. Basically speculating that, with exact and versatile understanding, anything is feasible unless it is restricted by the laws of physics.

Highly sensible as well as integrating, The beginning of Infinity releases us into greater thinking on the path towards much better and also far better descriptions. He takes us from parochial, obsolete methods of believing to the idea of universality and upgraded ways of thinking of the cosmos as a thing to be gradually evolved right into making use of ever-expanding modern technologies. Therefore bridging the void from guy to overman. As he explained, "There is just one method of believing that is qualified of making progress, or of enduring over time, as well as that is the means of seeking great descriptions with creativity and also objection."

2.) ' Circulation: The Psychology of Optimal Experience' by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi

" The majority of satisfying activities are not all-natural, they demand an effort that initially one is unwilling to make. Once the communication begins to offer feedback to the person's abilities, it typically begins to be intrinsically rewarding."

Thanks to Csikszentmihalyi, the concept of the “flow state” has come to be an essential aspect of our social awakening. The optimum experience is gained through deep self-control in a particular field/art/sport that gives inherent reward, difficulty, and also comments, therefore integrating self-confidence, focus, control, flexibility, and also connectivity. Time stops or decreases. Instabilities go away. We quit respecting what others consider us. A creative unraveling of something bigger shows up. Every little thing flows easily in interconnected unison with us as its synergistic spearhead. In brief: we stop believing and also simply do.

By just asking the concern, " When are people most pleased?" Csikszentmihalyi, with time checked study, identifies flow states as the response. Professional athletes call it "remaining in the area," mystics have actually defined it as “ecstasy,” and artists term it “rapture.” Releasing ideal experience is concerning doing what we enjoy as a pathway toward better meaning, happiness, and also a self of higher intricacy. By doing just what we love in challenging ways, we take advantage of ideal experience right into our lives. This book powerfully discusses the psychology of this important process.

3.) "Phi: A Trip from the Mind to the Soul' by Giulio Tononi

" Dirty ideas, like dirty waters, can serve 2 objectives only: to hide what lies beneath, which is our ignorance, or to earn the shallow appear deep"

Phi takes the viewers on a mind-altering trip through the nature of consciousness. It interweaves scientific research, art, as well as the imagination with golden proportions, Fibonacci series, as well as fractal cosmology. The visitor has the happiness of viewing the world through such masters as Galileo, Alan Turing, Darwin and Francis Crick, amongst others. From neuroscience to pseudoscience, from deep introspection to mindful meditation, Tononi illuminates on exactly how awareness is a progressing, ever-deepening recognition of ourselves as finite, souls in a limitless universe.

We find out just how awareness is integrated information and just how the power of that combination requires miraculous duty and also credulity. It instructs exactly how the brain is the seat of our understandings, as well as is an innovative force par quality, as well as can also create brand-new forms and also brand-new qualia. It shows just how, by growing awareness, deep space comes increasingly more into being, and synthesizes the one and the many, the ego as well as the eco, the individual and the interdependence of all points into a linked force of Nature.

4.) "The Art of Fear" by Kristen Ulmer

"" Every little thing is great" is really a copout, a stuck area, an obstruction to the exploration of who and just what you are broadening right into higher and even more, as well as the advancement of humankind."

The Art of fear has to do with curiously accepting fear rather compared to conquering or repressing it. It has to do with restoring our understanding of fear from scratch. It has to do with realizing that Anxiety is just one of 10,000 employees at You Integrated, as well as how they all require a voice. Yet Fear many of all, lest all voices become quelched darkness. The key to fear, she discusses, is wondering regarding it, consequently utilizing its power rather compared to overcoming it. In between guts and curiosity is whatever we should be fearless.

Ulmer's individual trip with anxiety at some point led her to examine with Zen masters, where she discovered a mindfulness device called "Shift" which moves our perspective of worry from oblivious repression to aggressive curiosity, thus aligning it authentically with our real nature. The standard tenet being this: As opposed to quelching fear, equip it, by being curious as well as examining instead of judgmental and implicating. Honor it with deep respect so it does not operate secretly in twisted means below the surface.

5.) "Endgame: The Problem of Human being' by Derrick Jensen

" Property One: People is not and could never ever be sustainable. This is specifically real for commercial civilization."

Endgame will certainly take every little thing you think you understand about being a social remaining in an apparently useful society as well as turn it on its head. Absolutely except the regular statist, neither the faithful obedient resident. Endgame has to do with the vital demand to right away take apart the unhealthy human being that surrounds us. Endgame is a scathing, surging review against the harmful, unsustainable, and also ecologically unhealthy man-machine that is our contemporary culture.

Breaking guide down right into a series of easy yet increasingly intriguing facilities, Jensen takes us on a psychedelic as well as convincing flight into the undesirable stubborn belly of the fierce, ecocidal beast that is modern human being. His standard property is straightforward: Industrial people is unsustainable. It's not an inquiry of “if” but a question of “when” it's going to fail.

He suggests that the longer it takes people to fall, the worse the tragedy will be. In that light, there are 2 points we must be doing: Causing the autumn sooner rather than later, and preparing to endure it. His attitude is caustic as well as not so serious, however all the better for the shock worth it offers. This book actually squashes the box we're all so desperately attempting to assume beyond. A free (and maybe less hostile) read is Beyond Human being by Daniel Quinn.

6.) Trickster Makes this Globe: Mischief, Myth, and Art by Lewis Hyde

" Better to run with detachment, then, much better to have a method but instill it with a little humor, best, to have no way at all but to have rather the wit constantly making one's method anew from the materials at hand."

Trickster Makes This World is a mythological cornerstone for Spiritual Clowns and also practicing trickster-gods the world over, digging into the intestines of the prehistoric significance of sacred play and also brawler actions. Hyde checks out just how trickster numbers represent the “disruptive imagination” that inverts, reorganizes, and also overturns standard wisdom. From Raven to Coyote, Ape to Crow, Hermes to Loki, Eshu to Legba, Hyde reveals connections in between mythical tricksters that develop a concealed network that links social divides.

The ideal part regarding this publication is its capability to reveal just how mythology ends up being reality. “Trickster consciousness'” is a crucial component of human imagination. It reveals that we are the gods of renewal as well as rebirth, if we decide to be. We are the designers of mischief and also mayhem. We are the trickster gods in training. Charlatan is us, and also we are Charlatan. We are the supreme boundary-crossers. No manmade policies or legislations could have us, unless we let them. Also planetary regulations and also regulations can barely contain us. Charlatan makes this globe by tearing the old world down through high wit, ethical ambiguity, absurdity, and critical transgression and also then dancings in the ashes of its devastation. It is specifically from the dancing, the kicking up of dirt and also ash, where endure new globes emerge.

7.) 'Ethical Tribes: Feeling, Reason, and also the Void Between Us as well as Them' by Joshua Greene

" We need a kind of believing that allows teams with clashing principles to cohabit and flourish. To puts it simply, we require a metamorality. We need a moral system that settles disagreements amongst groups with different moral ideals, equally as common first-order morality solves differences among individuals with various egocentric rate of interests."

Moral Tribes is hands-on moral psychology and a revitalizing brand-new take on utilitarianism. Greene wraps video game theory, evolutionary biology, as well as neuroscience into a wonderful absorbable package to strengthen his concept of cognition, which builds elegantly into a theory of moral psychology. A sweeping synthesis of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy, Ethical People opens up a container of psychosocial worms that takes the principle of principles to the next level, exposing exactly how we are incredibly well-adept at fixing the problem in between “Me” and “Us,” through the concept of the “tribe,” yet how we are ridiculously less-adept at solving the meta-dilemma between “Us” and “Them.”

Greene's principle of metamorlity squares this psychosocial circle by counterintuitively applying utilitarianism to our base, pavlovian response to morality (advanced morality) by coming to be aware of our apathy in order to end up being a lot more understanding. By enhancing humankind as opposed to nationalism, and life patriotism rather of patriotic nationalism, we turn the tables on both prejudice as well as lethargy and we come to be a lot more caring as well as empathetic toward others. When we celebrate variety rather than trying to pack the square secure of manifest destiny right into the round hole of social association, we turn the tables on the monkey-mind's one-dimensional moral tribalism and we introduce Joshua Greene's multi-dimensional metamorality.

[sociologyboom]

Globalisation, Late Modernity or Post Modern society... Have a go at these Qs Yr13. (see info below the questions to help you respond)..

PRACTICE QUESTIONS:

ITEM A

Sociology has long debated the stage of current society, from viewing society as being in a late-modern phase to society entering postmodernity.  Postmodernists suggest that traditional theories of society are unable to promote positive change as they are simply meta-narratives that describe one person’s version of the truth.  They see society as too fragmented and diverse to adopt theories which change society for the better.

Others see traditional perspectives as still relevant to the study of society, noting that scientific rigour can identify cause and effect relationships that can be used to benefit society.

 Question 1: Applying material from Item A and your own knowledge, evaluate the view that society has entered a postmodern phase in which traditional sociological theories are no longer relevant. (20 marks) spend around 30 minutes on this response.

HINTS TO HELP YOU RESPOND:

Start by explaining the basics of the postmodern view.  Support this with facts about globalisation and the scale of change in society.  Evaluate postmodernity carefully using late-modernity and the views of Giddens and Beck, explain how these ensure that traditional sociology is still relevant.  Continue to note the postmodern views of diversity and fragmentation explaining hyper-reality and the confusion caused as a result making the enlightenment project void.  Evaluate this mentioning the naivety of postmodernists in suggesting that all individuals fail to see reality over media-created images. Use Marxist views of Jameson and Harvey to explain why the traditional view of Marxism is still relevant and evaluate this with the view that they reject the need for a proletariat revolution.

 Question 2: Outline and explain two characteristics of postmodern society.  (10 marks) spend around 15 minutes on this response.

HINTS TO HELP YOU RESPOND:

Select two notions of postmodernity, from hyper-reality to being defined by what we consume.  Note each in its own detailed PEEL paragraph. For example, ‘Postmodern society consists of many media-created images which cloud an individual’s judgement of reality in society.  Baudrillard describes this as a ‘hyper-reality’ where these signs mean more that traditional reality itself. The media places importance on these signs causing confusion in society.  This confusion over reality means that people lack the ability to change society for the better as they are unaware of a true reality.

    . Sociological Theory - Globalisation, late modern and postmodern society.

The sociology of the late 18th century was built up of mainly modernist theories, such as functionalism and Marxism.  These theories subscribed to the enlightenment project, viewing that through scientific reasoning sociology can find patterns and knowledge which can be used to benefit society.  This society consisted of ‘nation-states’, areas which had their own strict territorial boundaries and inhabitants who share a common language and culture.  Modern society tended to be ‘individualistic’ as people were able to develop their own identities.  It was a society built on capitalist values of competition.

Globalisation is the growing interconnectedness of people across the world, almost a shrinking of the world and a blurring of national boundaries which has occurred swiftly in society changing it dramatically.

EVALUATION POINT: Sociologists actively debate the effectiveness of traditional sociological theories to explain modern society and their relevance to a world that is experiencing globalisation.

Globalisation is the result of a number of factors.  Changes in the economy have occurred due to increased trading across national borders and the growth of transnational corporations (TNCs).  Technological advancements such as the introduction of the internet, international rail networks and increased number of flights have improved global links across countries. An ability to share culture across national boundaries with a new found ability to develop an identity through a mix of different cultures has increased the awareness of different cultural values across the globe.  The growth of political groups which work across many countries has also served to increase the spread of globalisation.

EVALUATION POINT: These changes in society cause debate amongst sociologists as to what type of society we are now in.  Late-modern society? Or postmodern society? Late-modern society sees society as simply having developed, still accepting the traditional sociological theories.  Postmodern society is too fragmented and diverse for any of the traditional sociological perspectives to hold value.

Late-modernity theories argue that society today is simply a more advanced continuation of modernity.  They still note that the enlightenment project, subscribed to by functionalism and Marxism, is relevant.  Giddens notes people search for ‘ontological security’. A need to feel secure in a stable life having knowledge of the world around them, however, a desire to bring about social change has impacted on this and caused globalisation.  By adopting ‘reflexivity’, seeing that tradition in society should no longer be a strict guide to behaviour, people have a ‘transformative capacity’ to make vast changes to society.  This causes an instability in society.

Ulrich Beck states that late-modernity brings with it increased ‘risks’, which he claims are ‘spiralling away from human control’. These are ‘manufactured risks’ which come about from technological advancements and include, nuclear disasters and global warming.  Despite this ‘global risk’ Beck and Giddens still believe that it is possible to achieve progress in society through the use of objective sociological reasoning, essentially subscribing still to the enlightenment project.

EVALUATION POINT:  It is naïve to suggest that individuals in society are able to respond to global risks effectively in order to change society for the better.  Groups in society will always find conflict around which shared solution is best.  For example, the political debate around the need for the replacement of the Trident nuclear submarine programme.

Postmodernism believes that a new era of postmodernity exists in society.  This is a dramatic shift from modern times, and as a result, sociology needs new theories to explain it.  Postmodernism developed in the 1970s, it sees individuals as defining themselves by what they consume, rather than their values.  Postmodernists see the traditional sociological perspectives that subscribe to the enlightenment project as ‘meta-narratives’, simply one person’s version of the ‘truth’. 

Postmodernity means that the enlightenment project is no longer achievable as there is no shared power which can improve society.  Society is unstable with a lack of grip on ‘reality’.  Baudrillard notes that signs created by the media have more meaning than reality itself, he describes this as ‘hyper-reality’.  This uncertainty makes it impossible to develop a shared power to change society for the better.

In postmodern society, identities change swiftly with people changing their consumption of goods and adopting a ‘pick and mix’ approach to their identity.  This negates the traditional view of an ascribed status in society.  This increases the lack of ability to see a shared truth and therefore a consensus over which theory or action is needed to benefit society.

ECVALUATION POINT: Postmodernists fail to acknowledge trends in society that support traditional sociology, such as the class divide which supports Marxist views.  Postmodernism is highly assumptive suggesting that all individuals are able to distinguish between true reality and the hyper-reality created by media images.  Many argue that humans can still use scientific knowledge to develop changes in society which solve problems, medical advancements support this view.

Jameson and Harvey, key Marxists, adopt some aspects of postmodernism in their approach.  They see the enlightenment project as still achievable. However, they do believe that society has entered a postmodern phase.  They see this as reflecting the society that Marxism predicts being a new stage of capitalism as society moves towards capitalism’s final epoch.  They argue that changes in the production of goods, insecurity in the jobs market and the growth of small, independent businesses has caused ‘flexible accumulation’, a new way of making profits.  This has caused political changes in society which provide a platform for oppositional movements such as feminism to take root.  Jameson and Harvey believe that these oppositional movements hold the power to change society for the better, holding faith in the enlightenment project.

EVALUATION POINT:  The acceptance of oppositional movements holding power of change in society does not reflect the traditional Marxist view that only a proletariat revolution will cause change in society.

    SUMMARY:

·         Sociologists debate as to whether or not society is in a late-modern or postmodern phase.

·         Globalisation has caused debate over which phase society is in.  It has come about by changes in the economy, technological advancements, ability to adopt parts of different cultures and growth of new political groups.

·         Late-modern theories still accept the enlightenment project.  They explain change in society as a result of ‘transformative capacity’.

·         As a result of technological advancements, late-modern society holds new manufactured risks, despite this the enlightenment project can reduce these risks.

·         Postmodernists believe that society is diverse and fragmented and that traditional sociological theories are meta-narratives.

·         Postmodernity sees hyper-reality as causing uncertainty in society impacting on the ability to change a diverse and fragmented society for better.

·         In postmodern society people define themselves by what they consume rather than values, making it difficult to promote positive change in society.

·         Marxists Harvey and Jameson see flexible accumulation as causing a growth in oppositional movements which aim to reduce inequality in society.

[the-mira-life-project-mtf]

The Art Of Trying To ‘Pass’ As Female (My MtF~HRT Research)

Just as Krista described her need to change her face in order ‘just to leave the house,’ most of the 28 patients with whom I conducted interviews and observations, and the many others with whom I shared casual conversations, explained their desire for facial transformation in order to carry out everyday activities. As much as patients might want to be beautiful women after surgery, their primary desire was to walk through the world being recognized as women—which, in a sense, meant not being recognized at all. But just as physician discourse often conflated or collapsed the biological category of the female with the aesthetic category of the beautiful when describing the aims of feminization, so too did patients draw on both of these notions when communicating what their goal of being a woman actually means.

Woman is difficult to define as a surgical category precisely because it is difficult to define as a social one. Not surprisingly, patients had different ideas (and ideals) in mind when they imagined the kinds of transformations that would allow them to be the kind of women they wanted to be. When I asked Rosa if she had a particular idea of what she hoped to look like after surgery, she immediately said, “Yes,” and reached into her bag. She pulled out a stack of papers wrapped in plastic sleeves and held together by a binder ring. She shuffled through the stack, unfastened the ring, and put a page on the desk in front of me. There were three photographs that had been clipped from magazines and pasted to a sheet of white paper. As she began to talk I was not sure which one I was supposed to be looking at. “I want to look like a woman,” she began. “I want a face that a man falls in love with. Like an angel. Innocent. You are a man. You understand. Look at her [pointing to an image on the page.] What do you feel? Body is nice, but look at her face. In that picture you can’t see her breasts, but you can see her face. She’s beautiful. You feel inside something like love. I want a face that a man sees and it makes him turn red.” Rosa was not sure what her particular features would be when all was said and done. She did not expect Howard to replicate the model’s face onto hers. She did, however, expect that her face would be one that would do something for others and, in turn, do something for her. Rosa described the changes she was after in terms of how particular aspects of her face evoked gendered attributes.

When our conversation turned from the effect she desired to the precise means of achieving that effect, she gave an inventory of her face and the multiple ways that it works against her. The bone above my eyes gives me an aggressive look. I have dark, shadowed eyes. If you see that actress Hillary Swank, she has this. Something doesn’t match on her face. Nose, obviously. My nose is male. Upper lip. I can’t wear red lipstick. If I wear read lipstick it makes me look like a man in a dress. When I watch videos of myself, my expressions never look happy. I look angry.

Rosa was confident that following surgery she would ‘feel more sure of [her]self.’ It was this confidence that made women beautiful. Just something about them that had such power and sex appeal. Women, in her telling, were not aggressive or angry; their faces are built to be adorned. Though she knew that Howard could not necessarily make her beautiful, she was confident that he could make her a woman. For her, that was enough.

Gretchen had much more modest desires. Her hopes for surgery were less about eliciting a particular response, than avoiding a reaction altogether. Just…I hope that I won’t have this kind of jerk that was sitting just to my left on the plane this morning who was seemingly horrified by seeing this (gestures to her face and body). He was probably having the idea that I was fantasizing about him or something. I just hope that next time, he won’t think about it twice. ‘Yes, I’m sitting beside a girl. So what and that’s all.’ End of story.

Pamela expressed her desires this way: I'm doing it (having FFS) so I will feel that I "pass" (making air quotes). Whatever that is. And of course the operative word there is ‘feel.’ I'm tired of thinking, is that person reading me? No? Well how 'bout that person? I want to think about something else as I walk down the sidewalk.... Like, say, what a nice dress in the window. Maybe that's it. Going unnoticed is a thing that most people take for granted.

Erving Goffman (1963) called those who do not draw unwelcome attention from their bodily appearance ‘normal’s.’ Normal’s, Goffman argues, simply cannot understand how it feels to be the object of derisive looks and hostile attention from complete strangers. To be a member of a stigmatized group is to be the object of distain. When some aspect of your physical body is the source of that stigma, there are, according to Goffman, two possible responses. You can come to terms with the fact of your stigma and attempt to ‘normificate’ it by acting normal, as though the stigma did not exist. Or, you can normalize it by making a conscious effort to correct it. Though ‘norming’ surgeries are sometimes the objects of ethical debate, the validity of the desired outcome is hard to dispute.

In an article entitled, ‘Self-Help for the Facially Disfigured,’ Elisabeth Bednar put the matter simply. Whether we are shopping, riding the subway, or eating in a restaurant, all of which are casual day-to-day social encounters, there is the initial stare, then the look away, before a second, furtive glance inevitably puts the beheld immediately in a separate class. For those who experience this discrimination, the question of the moral justification of surgery to increase societal acceptance...

She pointed out photographs in Howard’s book in which surgery did not necessarily improve a patient’s attractiveness, but it did change her sex. When referring to before and after photographs she said, “See this is an ugly boy and this is an ugly girl, but it is a girl. Other doctors can’t do this.” 

There can be no greater wish than to melt into the crowd or to walk into a room unnoticed (Bednar 1996:53). The patients and surgeons with whom I worked, referred to the fact (or fantasy) of going unnoticed as ‘passing.’ The language of passing is contentious for some transpeople because it can be read as implying a sort of deception; being taken as a member of a group to which one does not really (where really refers both to an ontological truth and to the rightful membership based on it) belong. This deception is also often marked by a supposed opportunism; passing is really only considered as such when a person passes from an undesirable group and into a desired one (Gilman 1999). It therefore frequently carries a connotation of a strategy to access particular forms of privilege. Many transpeople object to the language of ‘passing’ because, they argue, to say that one passes as a woman is to acknowledge that woman is not a category to which she rightfully belongs.

As Julia Serano insists, “I don’t pass as a woman. I am a woman. I pass as a cis-gendered woman” (by which she means a woman who has never changed her gender). These sorts of concerns about what it means both politically and ontologically to pass, were only voiced by two of the patients with whom I spoke. Despite their reservations, they, like all other patients I met, held the desire to pass as an incredibly important and explicitly stated aim. As historian of medicine Sander Gilman explains, ‘The happiness of the patient is the fantasy of a world and a life in the patient’s control rather than in the control of the observer on the street. And that is not wrong. This promise of autonomy, of being able to make choices and act upon them, does provide the ability to control the world. It can (and does) make people happy’ (1999:331-2).

Like language, social roles do not exist in isolation (Wittgenstein 1953:§243); they are by definition shared properties conveyed between people in given social group. A person’s individual conviction that she is a woman is not enough to maker her a woman in any social sense. To be a woman requires not simply the conviction that one is a woman, but the recognition of that status by others.

FFS is a surgical recognition that how one feels about and lives their sexed and gendered embodiment is not a private, psychic reality, but is the product of social life, of living with others. Passing is not a subjective act; it is a social one. Nearly all clinical literature as well as most popular literature on transsexualism suggests that transsexualism is a property (and problem) of an atomized and bounded individual. This focus on the individual and psychic nature of the bodily dissatisfaction that characterizes transsexualism is named explicitly as well as through the invocation of metaphors of isolation, internality and invisibility. While an individual body may be the site of the material intervention, the change enacted in FFS takes place irreducibly between persons. The efficacy of FFS is located not in the material result of surgery itself, but in the effect that the surgical result will produce in the perceptions of imagined.

Other writers argue that the goal of ‘passing’ not only obscures but effectively forecloses any possibility of a trans- specific radical political subjectivity (Bornstein 1994, Green 1999, Stone 1991). These writers insist that living as out trans-people is the only way to call attention to the oppressive gender system that devalues and delegitimizes trans-lives and bodies, among others. This kind of visibility can come at the great cost of personal and emotional safety, leading to a conflicting desire to be a part of the solution while maintaining ones safety and sanity (Green 1999). Perhaps nowhere is this made clearer than in the imaginary scene through which Howard explains the goal of his surgical work:

If, on a Saturday morning, someone knocks at the door and you wake up and get out of bed with messy hair, no makeup, no jewelry, and answer the door, the first words you’ll hear from the person standing there are, “Excuse me, ma’am….”

This incredibly powerful scene was a staple of Howard’s conference presentations, and was repeated in slightly altered and personalized forms by many of the patients who had selected Howard as their surgeon. Through this turning outward—and the making of femaleness at the site of the exchange with a stranger—FFS reconfigures the project of surgical sex reassignment from one rooted in the private subjectivity of the genitals, to one located in the public sociality of the face. Time after time, patients told me that their primary desire was to go through their daily lives and be left alone, without thinking about what others may see when they look at them.

Krista rode the city bus on the day before our interview. On that day, for the first time in recent memory, she did not prepare extensively before leaving the house. “I didn’t have to worry about having my bangs just right, or having just the right pair of glasses on. I just got on the bus and thought, ‘Wow, this is cool.’” Although her face was covered in bandages, sutures, and bruises, and people on that bus were undoubtedly looking at her, Krista found joy in the certainty that whatever they might have seen when they looked at her, the did not see a transwoman. The stuff of her maleness was gone. It was a novel—but so, so welcome—experience. It is important to remember that the stakes for passing are often quite high, often quite serious. The desire to pass does not only exist for the gratification of personal goals, but also achieves a mode of physical and emotional safety. It is crucial to remember that trans-people are disproportionately incarcerated, unemployed, and lost to suicide and other violence. I make this point not to hold counter discourses hostage to its message— as in an accusatory stance from which any divergence is a de facto support of transphobia or worse—but to tell the complete story of the context in which these procedures become objects of desire, and accomplish practical goals sometimes on the measure of life and death.

THE FULL FACE

Facial Feminization Surgery includes interventions in both the bone and soft tissues of the face. In general, the procedures involved in FFS are aimed at taking away or reducing particular features of the bones and soft tissue of the face. This focus on reduction and removal is based on a fundamental assertion that males are, on the whole, larger and more robust than females.

This assertion applies both to the bony skeleton and to soft tissues such as skin and cartilage. Whereas the modification of the facial bones are guided, at least in Howard’s case, by numerical norms, most soft tissue procedures are not. (The exceptions are the height of the upper lip and of the forehead; these assessments are guided by numbers and measurement). Instead, soft tissue procedures are often oriented toward and aesthetic ideal of feminine attractiveness.

Below are brief descriptions of the surgical procedures organized under the sign of Facial Feminization. Not every patient undergoes all of the procedures described here, though some certainly do. In Dr. Howard’s parlance, a patient whose surgery includes all of these procedures gets, ‘The Full Face.’

While one of the fundamental goals of this dissertation is to trouble the claims to absolute difference that often animate FFS, in the following descriptions I make use of the dichotomous distinctions that doctors use when characterizing the masculine features of patients’ skulls.

Bone Procedures

Brow Bossing and Frontal Sinus:

The prominence of the brow is one of the most distinctive and recognizable aspects of a masculine face. Some reduction of the brow can be accomplished through burring down the bossing (the thickness of the bones) just above the eyes. In other cases the anterior wall of the frontal sinus (the empty space just above and between the eyes) is removed (“unroofed”) and set back. The reduction of the frontal sinus is considered the most aggressive of all procedures involved in Facial Feminization Surgery (see Figure 1.7).

Rhinoplasty (internal reshaping of the nasal bones):

Rhinoplasty involves the fracturing of the nasal bones as well as the removal of cartilage. More radical bone fracturing and removal is required when frontal sinus reconstruction is performed. When the forehead is ‘set back’ through this procedure, the bones at the nasion (the depressed area between the eyes just superior to the bridge of the nose) must be reduced in order to create the desired relationship between forehead and nose.

Malar (cheek) Implants:

In order to produce the desirable oval shape of the female face, implants may be placed over the malar bones to enhance the fullness of the cheeks.

Genioplasty (chin shortening):

Based on the claim that female chins are shorter than male chins (as measured from the top of the bottom teeth to the most inferior point of the chin), a wedge of bone can be removed from the chin, and slid forward. Moving the bottom section forward also results in creating a more pointed chin.

Reshaping mental protuberance (chin):

A pointed chin is recognized as feminine, whereas a square chin is masculine. In combination with the advancement of the inferior portion of the chin, contouring is also done to enhance this characteristic.

Reduction Mandibuloplasty (jaw bone):

Alterations of the mandible focus on the undesirable squareness of the masculine jaw. This squareness is attributed to two aspects of the mandible: mandibular angle and mandibular flare. The mandibular angle describes the angular value of the posterior and inferior portion of the jaw. The more acute the angle, the more masculine the jaw. This is best seen from profile. Mandibular flare describes the extent to which the squareness of the jaw extends toward the lateral sides of the face. This squareness is best seen when looking at a person from the front. In both cases, bone can be removed in order to reduce the appearance of masculine squareness.

Soft Tissue Procedures

Scalp advancement:

By severing the tissue that connects the scalp to the scull, the scalp may be brought forward toward the face to help a patient compensate for a receding hairline. Excess tissue at the top of the forehead is excised. Scalp advancement as well as hairline reshaping and eyebrow raising all occur through the coronal incision (from ear to ear just behind the hairline) required to alter the bony contours of the forehead.

Hairline Reshaping:

In addition to bringing the hair-bearing scalp forward, the hairline itself can be reshaped. In this procedure, the M shaped male hairline is rounded out to reduce (if not eliminate) temporal baldness caused by a byproduct of testosterone.

Eyebrow Raising/Crow’s Feet Reduction/Forehead lift:

As noted above these procedures are performed at the site of the coronal incision after the bone work on the forehead has been completed. When tissue is excised during scalp advancement, the position of eyebrows is raised up higher on the forehead. This is described as a feminine characteristic. The appearance of the eyebrows is also changed as a result of the changes to the bones of the brow and forehead beneath them. The pulling of the skin of the forehead generally produces the addition (and typically considered beneficial) result of eliminating the wrinkles around the eyes often called crow’s feet. During this procedure, surgeons have access to the internal muscles of the forehead and may choose to perform a perforation of those muscles; this procedure is typically referred to as a forehead lift.

Rhinoplasty (reshaping of the cartilage and tip of the nose):

The tip of the nose is given its shape by internal cartilage. After the bone modifications have been made, the cartilage can be reshaped in order to achieve a ‘more feminine’ nose.

Upper lip shortening:

According to the surgeons with whom I worked, males have a longer upper lip (distance between the bottom of the nose and the vermillion part of the upper lip) than do females. This distinction can most easily be seen by observing how much of the upper teeth are visible when a person’s mouth is slightly open. This measurement is referred to as ‘tooth show.’ The length of the upper lip can be reduced by excising the desired amount of tissue just beneath the nose, raising the upper lip toward the nose, and applying sutures in the crease just at the base of the nose. This also results in increasing the amount of vermillion visible in the upper lip.

Lip Augmentation:

Lips can be augmented through a variety of procedures including the injection of pharmaceutical products (such as Botox and Restylane) or fat taken from other sites in the patient’s body. More permanent augmentation can be achieved by placing some of the tissue excised during the scalp advancement into the tissue on the underside of the upper lip.

Reduction of the thyroid cartilage (“Adam’s Apple”):

The Adam’s Apple—or more properly, the thyroid cartilage—is considered to be one of the clearest indicators of maleness. Thyroid cartilage removal is often referred to as a Tracheal Shave (or just trach shave) despite the fact that it is neither the trachea being altered, nor a shaving motion used to reduce it. While a relatively simple procedure, the thyroid cartilage reduction carries significant risks. An inexperienced surgeon may remove more tissue than necessary, and inadvertently alter the site where the vocal chords insert. This can result in a radical modification of vocal pitch.

CLINICAL EVAL

Clinic One -- Dr. Howard

Upon entering his office from the hospital corridor, one enters a warm but unremarkable waiting room: carpet and walls in shades of neutral brown, upholstered armchairs separated by low coffee tables offering a selection of news and fashion magazines.

In addition to personal and administrative offices, the practice has three small examination rooms, each equipped with a large examination chair (somewhat like a dentist’s chair, it defaults to an upright but gently reclining position), a rolling stool (on which Howard sits during most of the exam), a small side chair (where I sat while observing exams), and a counter at the back of the room that contains a hand-washing sink and a light box for illuminating x-rays.

There are few decorations in the exam room dedicated to initial consultations and pre-operative appointments. To the right of the patient seated in the exam chair, a silver and bronze toned image of a naked and reclining woman hangs on the wall. Her long hair flows down her back and shoulders but leaves the side of her breast exposed. On the wall facing the patient—and so behind Howard as he conducts the exam—is a magazine rack that holds several fashion magazines.

When I entered the room, Tracy was seated in the reclining exam chair, hands folded in her lap and looking nervous. Howard urged her to keep her seat as I introduced myself and shook her hand. With Tracy, as with all other patients whose consultations I observed, Howard began the appointment with a few minutes of friendly conversation. He inquired about the Canadian city in which she lives. As a person who has done a considerable amount of traveling throughout the world, Howard often has a personal story to tell about the patient’s hometown.

Though he tends to speak rapidly as a norm, these exchanges do not seem to me to be perfunctory or rushed; people’s stories sincerely fascinate him. After having seen this routine enacted a number of times, it is clear that Howard uses these first moments to establish a friendly rapport with new patients who are frequently very nervous—and in some cases could be best described as star struck. While this moment may be the culmination of many months or years of a patient’s personal and financial work, for Howard, this is another day in the office.

After the brief exchange of pleasantries, Howard moved into questions about Tracy’s medical history: height, weight, medications, prior surgeries, and so on.

When Tracy stated that she was actively losing weight and would like to get down to 180 pounds, Howard made his first recommendation of the appointment. “I’d like to see you down to 160,” he said. “The best results I see—not surgically but in terms of overall femininity—are in patients who get down to a female weight for their height. When you get down to 180, just keep on going.” While completely unrelated to the craniofacial surgical consultation underway, Howard’s recommendation on “overall femininity” signaled his understanding of FFS as both part of a larger goal of corporal feminization, but also as just one part of achieving that goal. In addition to signaling a holistic understanding of the project that brought Tracy to his office, this shift from conversation to recommendation marked the beginning of the exam; he is the expert with information to give.

Howard did not ask why Tracy was in the office to see him. He did not ask what her goal was for surgery. He assumed in Tracy’s case and in all other consultations I observed, that a person whose paperwork indicates that she has come to the office for an FFS consultation is doing so because she wants to have her face reconstructed to take on female proportions. I have not heard this assumption corrected. It is with this assumption that directly following the medical history, he began making measurements on Tracy’s face.

Clinic Two -- Dr. Page

Page’s office, located in an office park in an affluent suburb of a major West Coast city, shares a building with accountants, attorneys, and dental offices. The Ambulatory Surgical Clinic where he performs most of his operations is attached to his office, though it has a separate entrance at the back of the building. In the waiting room, leather armchairs and a long couch are arranged around a low coffee table covered in fashion magazines. The walls are covered in an ivory-toned wallpaper that in combination with the light coming in through a large window makes the space bright, though somewhat impersonal.

The dominant feature of Page’s waiting room is a mirrorbacked, top-lit curio cabinet featuring branded cosmetic products such as Juviderm and Botox, the presence of which makes it impossible to forget that this is not a neutral space; there is something for sale here. The reception desk is located in the front waiting room and is staffed by a few different young women.

On two occasions the stillness of their faces and the shape of their lips have made me quite aware that they have ‘had some work done.’

The two exam rooms in Page’s office are considerably larger and more brightly lit than those in Howard’s office. Here too, the reclining exam chair is the largest and most central object in the room. A small chair (where I sat during observations) is positioned just to the right of the exam chair, and a full-length mirror hangs on the wall next to it. A counter with a small sink occupied the left wall of the room. A model of a human skull sat on the counter, looking directly at the exam chair. When Page invited me in to observe the consultation, Leanne was seated in that chair.

Leanne was one of the few patients I encountered during my fieldwork who arrived for an FFS consult in what was referred to in both offices as ‘man mode’ or ‘male mode.’ She had taken the opportunity to visit Page’s office while traveling through town on business and looked every bit the businessman: short-cropped sandy blond hair graying at the temples, a crisply pressed pale blue shirt, navy blue necktie, grey trousers and black oxford shoes.

Page habitually opens the conversation by asking patients how they heard about him and his practice. This sets the tone that the patient is a consumer who has shopped around, and it helps to identify him as a businessman who is eager to grow his practice. After a bit of small talk about Leanne’s hometown and learning that this was her first visit to the region, Page began the exam not by taking a medical history, but by prompting a personal conversation.

“Tell me about yourself, about your transition.” An examination is frequently understood to consist of two parts: the history taking and the physical examination (Young 1997:23). It is immediately clear that though Howard and Page each ‘take a history’ from their patients before beginning the physical exam, what constitutes relevant history is different for each of them. Howard asks his patients about what are traditionally understood to be medical issues: their height, weight, current medications, previous surgeries, and overall physical health. This information helps him to assess whether the patient is physically well enough to be a candidate for surgery. It also signals that his primary interest is in the physical properties of the patient’s body, an interest that is born out in no uncertain terms in the examination that follows.

Page, on the other hand, does not ask such questions of his patients during their initial appointments. Instead, he elicits a ‘history’ of the patient’s feelings about herself and her transition, more generally. Because the appointment begins with the disclosure of personal—and often quite emotional—information, the examination that follows is framed as one directed toward the realization of personal and emotional goals more than physical ones. As the consultations progress, the distinctions between Howard and Page’s approaches become clear. Howard’s meeting with Tracy appears in the left-hand column below. Page’s meeting with Leanne appears on the right.

Clinic One -- Dr. Howard

Howard: “Now I’m going to take some measurements and we’ll look at your x-rays.” Howard washed his hands and came back to sit down in front of Tracy. She was sitting in the exam chair and he rolled up to her on a small, wheeled stool. He took a small white flexible plastic ruler from his coat pocket and measured the distance from the cornea of her eye to the most forward prominence of her forehead. “Your brows are down a little bit.” He felt the brows and temples on both sides of her face using both hands. He pressed the sides of his thumbs up under the bones at the top of her eye sockets in order to get a sense of the shape of the bone. “Look at the top of that light switch.” Howard directed Tracy’s attention to the switch on the wall directly in front of her. Looking at this object helped to make her head level. “Open your mouth just slightly.” Howard measured the distance from the bottom of Tracy’s nose to the inferior ends of her front teeth. “Bite down on your back teeth.” Howard bit exaggeratedly on his back teeth to show her what he meant. Looking away, he felt the muscles on either side of her jaw with his hands. He turned to me and explained to the patient that we had been talking earlier about how he decides whether or not to remove some masseter muscle when he does jaw tapering.

Talking to me: “She has a fairly prominent jaw, but the muscle is not that large. I won’t even consider removing any muscle on her.” Howard runs the pad of his thumb up and down the center of Tracy’s throat. “Have you got one of these things?” Settles on the patient’s Adam’s Apple.

Howard: “If you have this done by someone else don’t let them put a scar at the middle of your throat.” Tracy lives in a country that has a national health service and Howard makes explicit reference to this since he knows that by using that service Tracy could save a considerable amount of money on this procedure.

Howard: As he describes the potentially problematic placement of some other surgeon’s scar, he draws a line across her thyroid cartilage with his index finger to mark the cut. “If I do it I’ll put the scar up here…” He draws his index finger just under the point of her chin to indicate where he would place the scar. …so no one can see it. “Plus if you put the scar here [in the middle of the throat] it can stick to the cartilage and then it moves every time you swallow. It looks like the dickens. Let’s look at your x-rays.” Howard walks to the light box behind the exam chair and invites Tracy to join him. They stand shoulder to shoulder in front of the light box looking at the cephalograms that Tracy brought with her to the exam. “First I look to see that you’re brushing your teeth, and it looks like you are (laughs). When I was measuring here before…” Uses his finger to show the measurement he took from the forehead to the cornea. “…I was looking at the maximum prominence of your forehead to the cornea of your eye. In you it was 15mm, which is average for a male of your height. As far as I know, this measurement is not taken anywhere else in the world. It is not a standard measurement. Once I am in there and I begin to contour the forehead, I can’t tell where I am. This measurement helps me locate myself in space.” By this he means that because the cornea does not move as a result of any bone reconstruction in FFS, he can use it as a constant reference. He took a handheld mirror from a small drawer and handed it to her. She sat, holding the mirror, looking at her face as he spoke.

Tracy is being educated about what Howard will do and why it is the best approach.

Tracy: “How far can you go back?”

Howard: “The most I’ve gone back is 9mm.”

Tracy: “Let me rephrase. How far can you go back safely?”

Howard: “I could go all the way back here.” Pointing to the posterior wall of the frontal sinus on the cephalogram.

Tracy: “What happens to the sinuses?”

Howard: “They go away. As far as we know.” He indicates with his fingers where the sinuses are located on the cephalogram. “…is to reduce the weight of the skull. Now, the jaw.” Howard looks at Tracy’s jaw, and then down to the x-ray. “Do you grind your teeth?”

Tracy: “I know I used to.”

Howard: “You’ve got some wide angles here. Feel your jaw.” He places Tracy’s hand on her jaw. “Feel how it flares out? We can get rid of the bowing that males have in the mandible that females don’t have.”

Tracy: “How do you do that?”

Howard: “We use a bur instrument on the sides here…” Indicating anterior portion of the lateral mandible on his own face. “…and then we have an oscillating saw that we use to take out the larger parts of the bone here...” Indicating posterior section on his own face.

Tracy: “You actually take out parts of the bone?”

Howard: “Yeah.”

Tracy: “Okay.”

Howard: “Can I borrow a finger?” Howard reaches down and grabs the index finger of Tracy’s left hand. He places it on the side of his face in the medial section of his mandible. “Feel my teeth?” He presses her finger into his cheek and moves it back and forth so she can feel the texture of the bone below his bottom teeth. “Feel that ridge? That is what we take away. For some people, a thin layer of blood that forms on the bone becomes bone. I am one of those people. I was hit in the head with a golf ball when I was 13 and I got this big bump.” He feels the bump on the top of his head. “I’ve still got the bump because the blood that formed there turned into bone. If you look at an x-ray you can see it plain as day. If you are a person like that—and I don’t know how to know that in advance—it is possible that some of that ridge may come back. But it won’t all come back. The chin. I measured from the top of your bottom tooth to the end of the bone and that is 50mm. That is average for a male of your height. I want to take out 8 mm of chin height. I can’t do that by shaving it off the bottom, because then the muscles and tissues that attach to the bottom of your chin have nothing to attach to and they just sag down. Instead, I take out a wedge of bone that is 8mm thick, and stabilize the bone with titanium plates and screws.” Howard explains that medical grade titanium comes from recycled Russian atomic submarines. He makes a joke that the addition of this Russian material may make Tracy fond of vodka after surgery.

Tracy: “You cut a wedge out of the bone and then rotate it up?”

Howard: “Yeah. Have you seen my book? Maybe you want to buy one. There is a lot of information in there about all of this stuff. And some stuff that you don’t need. It can answer a lot of questions. We want to get ride of the sublabial sulcus at the base of your chin. I think of this as a very male feature. Now, what to do. The brow. Right now the distance from your brow to your hairline is 7cm. I want 5.5cm. The average male has a distance there of 5/8 of an inch longer than the average female. This is the case in 16-year-old males, even before they’ve experienced hair loss. You have a type III forehead. We talked about that. We’ll do your nose—if we do the forehead we have to do the nose. Do you remember Dick Tracy? His nose went straight out like a shelf? You probably won’t like that. Upper lip. Now your upper lip has a vertical height of 2.5mm and drops 2-3mm below your upper teeth. If you look at me when I talk, you don’t see my upper teeth unless I smile. He smiled to demonstrate. Women show their upper teeth when they talk. We’ll want to move you up to get some good tooth show. So. We’ll do your chin, your lower jaw, the thyroid cartilage. If I do all this at one time—and most patients choose to do that because it saves them a lot of time—I know this will take almost exactly 10 ½ hours.

Tracy: “Everything?”

Howard: “Yes”. Howard went on to describe the risks associated with these surgeries, the recovery process, and necessary preoperative preparation. When he’d answered Tracy’s questions, he led her down the hall to talk money with Sydney.   

Clinic Two -- Dr. Page

Leanne: “I began dealing with my gender issues at 50, when my wife and I became empty nesters. I have already been cleared for hormones but I am waiting to take them until after my daughter’s wedding in a few months. I am a manager—I mean, that is what I do for a living but that is also who I am. I like to have everything figured out before I start. That is why I am here. I don’t really know how hormones will affect me and what changes they might make to my face, but I do know that the face is the most important thing to me. I can do things with clothes, but I can’t hide my face.”

Page: “Making changes to your face can make you more feminine appearing.” As she spoke, he sat quietly, almost motionless. Like a practiced interviewer, he allowed her short silences to linger unfilled, and it turned out that she had a good deal to say.

Leanne: “I know that if I proceed with this my marriage will be over, and I understand that. My wife didn’t really sign up for all of this and I can’t force her to feel better about it. I am here because I want to manage my expectations; I need to know realistically where I might end up, instead of going forward with all of this and then finding out that you can’t do what I think you can do. I don’t want someone to give me all of the classic female things. This is a clear reference to Howard’s approach. I was interested in talking to you because you said that you work with features not totally remake them. It is not a clean slate. Given the face that I have, I want to know what to expect. Right now, I don’t look like a woman; I look like a man in a wig. I haven’t gone out much; I only wear women’s clothes when I go to counseling. But when I go out I worry about my face. I just don’t want to attract attention. I want to fit in.” Page did not verbally respond to any of Leanne’s personal and emotional disclosures; he simply began the physical assessment of her face. 

Page: “We’ll start at the top and work our way down. These are only suggestions, to let you know what is possible, and how I think of things. We think of the face in three sections: forehead, midface and lower face. One of the most feminizing effects happens in the forehead. We can move the hairline forward. Bone work is required to make a feminine skull.” Page rolled his stool backward to retrieve the model skull sitting on the counter behind him. He held the skull in his left hand and used the index finger on his right hand to show Leanne how the frontal bone could be reduced. “By burring down this area [above the eyes] instead of removing the bone, we can retain the angle from your forehead to your nose. Patients with ‘the works’ often look worked on. That is not what I want to give you. When you lose the natural transition from the forehead to the nose you don’t look good as a man or woman.”

This is a direct defense of his surgical approach against Howard’s more aggressive style. Page runs the pad of his thumb across the orbital ridge above Leanne’s left eye as she looks at her face in the mirror. “Reducing this will give you the feminine appearance. It gives you sex appeal. That’s the approach we’re going for. Passing as a woman takes more than what I do: it’s about hormones, behaviors, dress, makeup, voice. What I do is just one piece of the pie. Now, when I’m in doing the forehead contouring I can remove some frown muscle, which would be nice for you. At the same time I can take away the peaks at the hairline.” Page uses the wooden handle of a long cotton swab to trace along the temporal baldness of Leanne’s hairline.

Leanne: “I’ll need a wig anyway. I had hair transplants all through there but they failed.”

Page: “This dark space is the frontal sinus.” He points at the sinus on the x-ray using a yellow wooden pencil. “In my mind, the most desirable female forehead is convex horizontally and vertically; it is not vertical. I could take you back 8mm. The 15mm you currently are minus 8 equals 7mm. That is where I want you. If you had an x chromosome rather than the y you were born with, that is where you’d be. You got this…” indicating the brow prominence of the frontal sinus “…when you were 14, 15, 16 years old. You have what I call a type III forehead.” Explains how he’ll remove the frontal wall, and form patches to wire back into the exposed sinuses. “When taking out the frontal sinus you have two holes left: if you sneeze you make a bubble and if you sniff you make a dimple. That is good at the first cocktail party, but not the second. I take the bone I removed and make two small patches and wire them into place to close those sinuses. If someone just burred this down, they could only go about .5mm to 1mm.” This comment acknowledges the common approach by other surgeons to burr the bone rather than unroof it. It is both descriptive and defensive.

Page: “Okay. Your nose is really necessary to do. We can take the hump out of the dorsum and decrease the projection some. The upper lip could be shortened. That is really common in feminization surgery. It’ll be like when you were younger.” Page presses the wooden handle of the cotton swab just beneath Leanne’s nose, causing her upper lip to rise on the surface of her teeth and allowing more tooth to show. “In terms of the jaw, I would leave it alone.”

Leanna: “Really?”

Page: “Beautiful women have a strong jaw line. For you, brow lift, cheek implants possibly to give you some more fullness in the midface, and nose for sure. If you’d like to see what this would look like, we can image you and give you a better idea of what I am talking about.” Page led Leanne to a small, dimly-lit room attached to the exam room. There was space for only two distinct positions in this room, so I observed in the doorway, looking over Page’s shoulder as he worked. Page was seated at a laptop computer equipped with a special trackpad that allowed him to move a stylus along the pad controlling the computer display. His laptop was connected to a digital camera mounted on an adjustable stand. Leanne sat at the opposite end of the room in front of a grey backdrop. Page took six digital photos of Leanne’s (non-smiling) face: (1) looking straight ahead at the camera; (2) turning her whole body such that her face is in ¾ view; (3) profile; (4) ¾ view facing the other direction; (5) opposite profile; (6) facing forward but looking straight up, a ‘worm’s eye view’. Page invited Leanne to pull her stool up beside his so that she could watch as he altered the photos he just took.

Page: “I try to do things with imaging that I can do during surgery so that it’s not unrealistic. One thing would be to decrease projection. Come over here and I’ll show you what I mean.” Leanne got up from her seat in front of the drape and sat beside Page in front of the computer. Using the stylus on the trackpad, Page selected the areas that he could reduce: frontal bossing, orbital bossing, and nose projection. He circled each of these areas on the profile image because this image produces the most noticeable contrast. Once these areas were selected, Page drug the stylus back and forth across the trackpad. As he moved from left to right across the pad, the nose, forehead, and orbital bossing all reduced in unison. As he moved back to the left, they ‘grew’ back to their original (current) size. Leanne watched this in silence for a few seconds. It was clear that she was not seeing all that she hoped to see. Page was quick to step in. “I am kind of limited in what I can show here. I mean, you have to imagine what it would look like once your facial hair is gone [she had a day’s growth of beard]. You’ve also got some skin damage that you should really work on. I’d say the most important thing you can do for yourself between now and any surgery would be to start a skin-care regimen. Work on that sun damage and some of the brown areas, the wrinkles around the eyes.” Page indicated these problem areas on the computerized image of her face. “I work with an esthetician right upstairs. I can set an appointment for you if you want. I really do think that is really important. You know, beautiful women have beautiful skin.”

Leanna: “Yeah, I spent almost 20 years in Arizona. I have a lot of sun damage.”

Page: “Here are some other patients I have operated on. Maybe these will give you a better idea of the changes I am talking about.” Page opened a file on the laptop with several pre-op and post-op images of his patients. He flipped through the images, describing the procedures involved. “Here you can see I did the nose…Here you can see the reduced bossing; that really opens up the eyes… Here you can see the difference that a brow lift really makes. She looks great…” This didn’t seem to alleviate Leanne’s sense of disappointment with her own images.

Leanna: “These people look much more feminine than what I see when we look at me. I have my wig with me. Can I put it on and you can take the pictures again? That might give us a better idea of how this is going to look.” She crouches down and pulls her wig out of her briefcase. It is a bit disheveled and needs brushing. Leanne does her best to place the reddish-brown shag cut wig on her head, but there are no mirrors in this room. In addition to the contrast produced by her businessman’s attire, the wig is not quite on correctly. To my mind, this photo session has just changed quite radically. Page appeared somewhat reluctant, but he agreed to take a new profile photo on which to make the digital modifications. One of the qualities that made the wig desirable is particularly problematic during the photo shoot: it obscures her forehead and brow.

Page: “Could you pull your hair back so I can see your forehead?” Page took the photo. Leanne resumed her seat beside him at the computer and watched as he made the same alterations to the new photo as he had to the previous set. The addition of the wig did not produce the effect she’d hoped for. Page reiterated the importance of starting a skin-care regimen and beginning electrolysis on her face. “I think those changes could make a big difference for you. Let’s go talk to my office manager, Hannah. She can give you a better idea about prices and we can look at some more images.” The pair left the room and began flipping through a photo album in Hannah’s office.

Leanna: “Do you think I could ever look this good? I’m worried about going through all of this and looking as ridiculous as I do now.”

It is clear from these two representative appointments that though these doctors punitively share a common goal—the ‘feminization’ of their patients—what ‘feminine’ means to each of theme is quite distinct. Their approaches to the project of ‘feminization’ determine both what each doctor identifies as the problematically ‘masculine’ and the desirably ‘feminine’ and how they do so.

SURGERY DAY

For most patients I interviewed, the anticipation of and preparation for surgery had given significant shape to their personal, professional, financial and emotional lives for many months. For others, many (many) years. By the time they’d made the trip to the surgeon’s office, they had come to think of Facial Feminization Surgery as the event that would mark the difference between the life they had and the life they wanted.

It would, they hoped, be the end of a deep longing for transformation. Structured by the future goal of surgery, for these patients the present had collapsed into a seemingly interminable time before surgery. It was a continuation of the past experience of bodily dissatisfaction and disaffection into the almost, the can’t wait, the before to which every day following surgery would be the after. 

Dr. Howard pointed to a chair in the hallway outside his office. “I’ll walk by that spot at exactly 7:25am. If you’re there, you’re welcome to join me in the OR. If you’re not, you’re not.”

Patient: Rosalind

Rosalind, whose surgery is described in the interstices of this prose—had traveled from Wales to undergo surgery with Dr. Howard. When we met on the afternoon before her surgery, she was feeling very anxious. When I asked her about the source of her anxiety, she said that it was not the operation itself that worried her. Rather, she was nervous about the postoperative recovery period.

“I’m scared to death. A week before my plane ride I started praying for British Airways to go on strike. I saw a patient at the Cocoon House [Howard’s private recovery and convalescent facility, all gendered and natural metaphors intended] all bruised and bandaged and I’ve been walking around trying to think, ‘Why am I doing this?’”

 Rosalind had hoped to make this trip five years before, but financial issues had delayed her plans. For her, as for all patients who shared their stories with me, arriving in this office was the culmination of a long process of self-discovery.

“At 25 years old my hair started to fall out and I thought, ‘Oh no! I haven’t decided whether I want to transition!’ I tried topical creams and things to try to keep my hair and I became pretty obsessed with it. Then I started thinking, ‘Wait, is the problem that you’re going bald or that you’re transgendered?’”

She began feminizing hormones in 1999, and hoped that their effects would be enough to ease the anxieties she had about her appearance. She was not ready to commit to surgical alterations at that time because, she explained, she simply could not accept the idea that she was a transwoman.

“I still thought I could cure myself of being transgendered,”

In spite of this desire to be ‘cured,’ she began taking tentative steps toward ‘accentuating the feminine in [her] face.’ She underwent facial electrolysis that had produced permanent pockmarks on her cheeks and chin, only exacerbating her self-consciousness about her appearance. In 2002 she had surgery to remove her thyroid cartilage (Adam’s Apple) and, shortly thereafter, a surgery to reduce the size of her nose.

“That only made my brow look bigger,” she lamented. “My brow is my major concern. I need my nose to match my brow. I have a kind of Neanderthal brow. I want to do my jaw too, but I may have to skip that for now depending on whether I can get the money together. I was kind of hoping he wouldn’t say that I needed to do my jaw, but I know it needs to be done.”

Rosalind knew that her decision to have surgery would cause complications in her work and family life. She presented as male at work and at family events, and planned to continue doing so at least until her elderly father passed away. The thought of disappointing him with the fact of her female identity was unthinkable to her. She worked in the building and construction industry in a fairly small town and, for her, living full-time as a woman was simply not an option. Worries about work and personal consequences had kept her from making many changes both to her life and to her body, but she had finally decided that such concerns could no longer determine her choices.

“If I have to think too much about what others think, I’ll never do it. I have to do this for me. I’ve spent 25 years of my life thinking about not looking like I do now. I want that to go away. Constant thinking about that ruins the mind. After this I’ll be able to think of other things, everyday things.”

Rosalind told me, as did many patients, that it was during puberty that she began to hate her face. As she watched her ‘button nose’ give way to the oversized nose of a pubescent boy, she taught herself how to wash her face and brush her teeth in the dark.

“My mum would go into the bathroom after me and always wonder why the blinds were closed.”

It was easier for her to re-learn these daily habits than to deal with the look of her changing face in the mirror. This was the beginning of the long story that brought her all the way from Wales to have surgery with Dr. Howard some 25 years later.

I was tired and anxious when I joined Howard the next morning. We walked briskly down the hallway to the surgical wing, he in a shirt and tie covered by his long white coat, me in my canvas jacket and shoulder bag. I saw the loafers on his feet and felt like an idiot in my running shoes—I thought they’d be best for endurance.

After so much discussion of looks and numbers and desires and abilities, it is in the operating room that faces are reconstructed. It is here, as they say, that the rubber meets the road. While for surgeons the operation is an event that has been routinized and repeated hundreds or even thousands of times over, for the patient, the operation is something absolutely singular—assuming all goes well. Over the course of the surgery (up to nearly eleven hours in the case of a “full face” operation), the patient’s skin, bone and cartilage is pushed, pulled, burred, sawed, cut, cracked, tucked and sutured. In the end a strikingly new face may emerge; one whose production is guided by the hope that its new form will enable a coincidence of the patient’s self and body for perhaps the first time in a very, very long time.

Facial Feminization Surgery is guided by a hope for phenomenological integration—the creation of a body that (re)presents the self. Though the technical work of surgery is something that patients do not experience in real time, its effect animates their anticipation of a better life through the body as a better and truer thing.

He brought me to the charge nurse’s desk. I was to register my name in the vendor’s logbook. Dr. Howard offered me a pen. “You can keep it,” he said. “It’s got my name on it.” I signed in quickly and was given a sticky nametag. I followed Howard into the physicians’ locker room where I was shown for the first—and last— time where to find the supplies I would need to enter the OR. I slid my bag and jacket into an open locker.

For those who desire physical transformation, the operating room is place that symbolizes corporeal change and all the attendant hopes of what that change will bring. In addition to the physical transformations enacted here, the operating room is also the scene of an encounter between patients and surgeons that is structured by a common conception of the body or, more specifically here, the face. For these two people in this place, the patient’s face is a material thing. It is not the irreducible site of personhood, the distinct shape of which makes us individuals; it is a series of structures whose problematic characteristics can be rectified.

These structures do not necessarily map onto or even remotely relate to the social or personal identity that the face is typically taken to be. That is just the point: this face is not her face. Not yet at least. The preoperative face is simple, disinterested material for the surgeon who cuts into and reshapes its parts, and it also is this for the patient whose experience of her face as something disloyal—as non-coincident with her self—has motivated her arrival here.

This is a distinct vision of the body shared between the surgeon and the patient, two people who have arrived together in the operating room precisely in order to alter it. We grabbed blue paper caps from a shelf near the door to the hallway. He folded the bottom rim of his cap upward in order to pull it down snugly before tying the white paper straps behind his head. I did the same. We were ready. Howard swung open the door and we headed to OR 3, his regular room. He  handed me a surgical mask as we walked through the scrub room and into the OR where Rosalind was laying on the table being prepped by the Circulating Nurse (CN).

Dr. Howard went immediately to greet the patient. He caressed her forearm and assured her that everything would go well and that she would look beautiful. I! couldn’t stop staring at her fingernails: cotton candy pink against the blue and white striped blanked that covered her. Howard stayed by her head until she was under anesthesia. The moment the patient was unconscious, the feel of the operating room changed. With the presence of a guest no longer observed—I certainly did not count  as such—everyone in the OR began their tasks in haste.

“This is Rosalind Mitchell, 37 years old. We’re doing her forehead and nose today. She wanted to do the chin and jaw but her credit card didn’t come through. Says she’ll be back for those in the fall. This should take four and a half hours. She has no allergies and is on no medication.” Confirming! that all parties were in agreement, he began to prepare the first site: the forehead. Sitting on his stool at the end of the table, he began to comb and gather Rosalind’s long hair in rubber bands. Once the site was isolated, he shaved a one inch wide track through her hair, combed out the loose pieces and dropped them into a biohazard bucket. He injected the incision site with local anesthetic and then left the room to scrub in. While he was out, the CN sterilized the forehead site with soap and water and then with iodine that dripped in deep brown yellow drops through her hair and into towels on the floor. The doctor returned with his clean and dripping hands held at chest level. The CN helped him into his gown and gloves

The process of making a masculine face into a feminine one only rarely involves addition (of bone substance or implants). Instead, making feminine is almost always a process removing that which is masculine to reveal the feminine beneath. The masculine is a problem of excess: the jaw is too wide, the forehead too long and too prominent, the chin too square, the upper lip too long. Whereas genital sex reassignment involves rearranging and repurposing body parts in order to make new ones, like mastectomy for female-to-males, Facial Feminization Surgery is essentially about taking parts of the body away.

For this reason it can quite literally be read as carving away the outer unwanted body to reveal the self within. The metaphorical representation of “a woman trapped in a man’s body” is, in other words, rendered quite literally here. In this OR scene, the ontological and phenomenological statuses of the body and self are radically uncertain.

The surgeon further isolated the incision site by draping sterile blue towels over the patient’s hair and securing them in place with skin staples. Fully draped from head to toe, only the patient’s face was showing. One stitch was placed in each of her eyelids—sutures are necessary to keep her eyes closed (and thus moist) because her face will be tugged and moved quite a lot throughout the procedure. All was ready to proceed. Dr. Howard announced the time of the first incision; the CN recorded it on the whiteboard on the wall, and the operation began.

To reduce the frontal sinus that accounts for the ‘male brow,’ an incision is made beginning at each ear and meeting at the center of the head, just behind the  hairline. The skin of the forehead—from hairline to orbits (eye sockets)—is folded down over the eyes, revealing the smooth and very white frontal bone below.

The long, thin wooden handle of a cotton swab is broken in half, dipped in methylene blue and used to mark the frontal bone on either side. The periosteum (a membrane that lines the outer surface of bones) is cut at these lines and scraped forward into the orbits at the top of the nose bridge. Glancing at the cephalograms illuminated on the wall\mounted light board, the doctor marks the frontal bone with a yellow wooden pencil.

The burr tool whirs like a dental drill as it grinds off the undesirable bony prominence's above the orbits. Bone particles fly off the burr as it spins. They catch in the cloth and paper that covers the patient and in the folds of my scrubs as I lean in. By the end of the procedure they will become dry chalky dust. An oscillating saw blade replaces the burr tool and a cut is made along the pencil drawn lines. The cut bone is pried up out of its place, making a dull cracking sound as it is dislodged from the skull. The Surgical Tech (ST) collects this irregular oblong piece (about two inches across at its widest point) and sets it in the white plastic lid of a sample cup for safekeeping. The frontal sinus is revealed. Everyone’s frontal sinus (95% of us have one) is structured differently. Rosalind’s is internally asymmetrical, divided by thin walls of bone into three distinct cavities. Frontal sinuses are usually empty, but sometimes brain matter has protruded into them. “Is that brain or sinus? Not sure. Let’s go slow.”

A yellow pencil marks the location where corresponding holes will be drilled in the frontal bone and in the bone patch. Stainless steel non\magnetic wires are placed and spun down tight. The ends of the wires are trimmed and turned inward. The bone work on the forehead is done. Rosalind’s forehead has been set back 5 millimeters. 

The anesthesiologist leans over and speaks loudly in Rosalind’s ear: “You did a great job. Surgery is over. Just relax. Let us move you.”

RECOVERY

When a patient first encounters her new face after surgery, it is covered with bandages and dressings. Much of the skin that is visible is taut, swollen and discolored. Her nose may be packed and casted. There may be drains pulling blood from around her newly contoured jaw. She must suction saliva from her mouth because the throat pack placed during surgery will make it uncomfortable to swallow.

For the first several days following surgery she may need to manually stretch the muscles of her jaw to keep them from clamping tight in a gesture of defense. Even if the procedure is considered medically successful—in that the surgeon was able to meet the goals that he set for himself and there were no compromising complications—there is no way to know how well the surgery went, or whether the desired effect will actually be produced. That effect is, after all, not a property of the face itself. It is, rather, a response that the face will (hopefully) elicit.

Such a measure of success cannot be clinically assessed, nor can it be known right away. Depending upon the particular procedures performed, it may take up to a year for all of the swelling to subside and for the face to ‘settle down,’ as surgeons say. Though new structures of bone and soft tissue were created in the event of the operation, the face itself is never a fixed and stable thing; it is always a thing unfolding in time.

After all of the waiting she has already done—waiting for self-acceptance, for surgery savings funds to grow, waiting for consultations, for travel arrangements—now the patient must wait to heal and find out whether the face she wanted is the face she’s got. Surgery is the quintessential anticipatory regime (Adams, et. al., 2009). It is forward looking, oriented to a future post-surgical life that will be somehow better than the life that would have happened without it. Surgery is about intervention: the imagined and undesirable future can be changed through the event of the operation. Once that event has occurred, there is nothing to do but wait. And hope.

I first met Rachel five days after her surgery. She had her forehead, hairline, nose, thyroid cartilage, and jaw done. In addition, her upper lip had been shortened and enhanced. When I was introduced to her by Heleen, a Dutch attorney who was back in town to see Dr. Howard for some jaw revision work, I had to stifle a sympathetic wince.

Rachel’s eyes were ringed in deep browns and purples, and the sutures beneath her nose drew contrastive attention to the thin red incision line where the length of her upper lip had been reduced. Though the packing had been removed from her nostrils earlier that day, the cast on her nose remained and was held in place by a large X of tape rising up above her eyebrows and down across her cheeks. Her thinning hair and receding temporal baldness left sutures and staples visible across the crown of her head.

I felt sore for her, like neither of us should move too quickly. She, on the other hand, said she was feeling better than she had in days and was light on her feet as she led me to the back garden where we could talk. As Rachel spoke—with the marked accent and dry humor of a life-long New Yorker—she dabbed saliva from the corners of her swollen mouth with a white cotton handkerchief. We talked for more than two hours in the garden behind Howard’s private convalescent facility, with only one break: the unseasonably strong sun was heating the staples in her scalp and demanded that we move into the shade of a leafy tree.

Rachel, now in her mid-fifties, had first decided that she wanted FFS fifteen years earlier, as soon as she saw before and after photographs posted online.

“From the moment I knew it existed, I thought, ‘Wow.’ I knew that I didn’t have a pretty face. I’d get dressed up but I knew I didn’t look like a woman. I could put all the makeup in the world on and nobody was going to mistake me for a girl. Maybe when I was like 16. Essentially, I would say that from the moment I knew people were doing it, I immediately started thinking to myself, ‘Wow, I could do that, too.’”

When I asked her what it was about her face that she had wanted to change, she had trouble locating the problem that she hoped surgery could fix—though she could quickly recount the list of the procedures that had just been performed. “If I was sitting here with a friend and just talking,” she said, “I would say, ‘Beauty is like pornography, you know it when you see it.’ And it’s the same thing with a feminine face: you know it when you see it.” Though she noted that her, ‘rather large nose,’ was ‘a male trait in [her] family,’ the nose by itself was not the problem. Neither, necessarily, was it her ‘fairly prominent forehead.’ It was something greater than these, and something more diffuse.

“I was a handsome man, but I didn’t want to be handsome. I wanted to be pretty. I guess, in a certain sense, I wanted to have all the things that I enjoyed in women that I liked. The way they looked. The way their lips looked. What their hair looked like. How all the features went together. I think it’s kind of a simple answer: I wanted to be a pretty girl. One of the great things that Dr. Howard did was define this whole notion of feminizing in entirety, as opposed to just doing one thing. One thing in and of itself is not going to do it. It’s got to be a holistic approach.”

On account of this ‘holistic’ transformation, Rachel did not really have an idea of what she would look like once her face had finished healing. More than any particular ending point, what she most wanted her face to be was something other than what it had been for her entire adult life: masculine. The particular form that that femininity would take was not something that concerned her.

“[When considering having FFS] I would say to [my friend], ‘Do I really want to do this? Because what if I don’t really look good?’ She would say to me, ‘Well, you know what you look like now. Would you rather go through the rest of your life looking like you look now, or looking like somebody else? Maybe you’re not drop-dead beautiful or even pretty, but you’re not going to look like a man.’ And the answer to that is the latter. I knew how deeply dissatisfied I was. To the point of it being painful what I looked like, and having to look at myself in the mirror everyday. That got worse as I got further into my transition. That just got worse and worse. The disconnect between what I felt and how I looked just became more and more pronounced to the point where I just didn’t want to look in the mirror. I just hated it.… [Someone] asked me, ‘Are you going to look very different?’ And I said, ‘I sure hope so.’ That’s the whole point. It wouldn’t bother me if nobody recognized me. That wouldn’t bother me at all. If I look good. If somebody said, ‘You look fantastic, but I can’t quite place you,’ that would be wonderful.”

Her new face—still tender, bruised and cut—held, under its bandages, the possibility of a radically new identity in which she was not recognizable to anyone she knew. While to me such a prospect seemed as if it might be quite frightening, for Rachel, the potential of this total change was ‘wonderful.’

As Rachel sat healing, she recounted the promise that the facial change would be a total one through a personalized version of Howard’s early morning doorbell scene.

“My goal, my ideal is that I could go out on the street dressed like I’m dressed right now—just a pair of pants and a t-shirt and some sneakers—and no gender markings other than I’d be wearing earrings, which I always wear, and that when I went into a grocery store the person would say, ‘Can I help you miss?’ That’s really what I want. I want to read as, accepted as, and reacted to as a woman. So that is what I was hoping he would say he can do, and that’s what he does say he can do. That is what he promises.”

Becoming ‘accepted as and reacted to as a woman’ would be the actualization of a truth about herself that Rachel traced back to her earliest childhood memories of dressing in her mothers lingerie and heels. Her knowledge of her gender as being somehow ‘not right’ had persisted throughout her life. “I’ve essentially been feeling ashamed of myself probably since I was five years old—or probably more like four,” she said. “Living daily with a sense of shame about who I was. And not only living with it but hiding it, because I was also hiding the source of my shame.” Rachel had undergone years of therapy with various psychologists and psychiatrists.

“I had met someone very early on in the therapeutic process that I interviewed with and he said to me, ‘Look, this is the way you are. You’re not going to change. This isn’t going to go away.’ And I just refused to accept that. I was 20 years old. And out of everybody I saw in all the intervening years, what he said was the truth. It took me 30 more years to accept that.”

Rachel’s feelings about herself as a transwoman changed somewhat unexpectedly. Her mother had become ill with cancer and as the child who lived closest, Rachel undertook what became a very intimate caretaking role during her mother’s treatment. Despite longstanding conflicts in their relationship—many of which were rooted in Rachel’s gender issues—the two grew incredibly close through this ordeal.

“We were spending a lot of time just together by ourselves. And I just sort of let go of any resentment or anger I had towards her, and I really just wanted to make her get well. Having a positive influence on her life kind of opened something in me that I had closed off. When the whole thing was over, I thought to myself, if I can give her this [beginning to cry softly], then why can’t I give this to myself? So, I did.”

Tears welled up and streamed down her bruised cheeks as she recalled the epiphany that had not only enabled her to relate differently to herself as a transwoman but had also revived a loving relationship with her mother.

“What started to happen for the first time in my life, is that I started letting go of shame. I thought: I got my mother through this, how bad a person could I be? So I did start to just let go of feeling ashamed of myself, and feeling all this guilt. And that was a really new experience.”

Her mother’s cancer in remission and her divorce from her wife finalized, Rachel began hormone treatments, the beginning of her physical transition from male to female.

“I had my first shot and it felt fantastic. I felt like Marilyn Monroe. I remember getting on the train going back downtown and I had to remind myself, ‘You still look like a man to everybody.’ That’s how powerful it was. I recognize that it was psychological, but it was also physical, too.”

Though she felt it was likely that she would eventually undergo genital sex reassignment surgery, FFS was her first surgical priority. “The most important thing I could do was change my face,” she explained. It was a change that would free her in ways that, on that sunny afternoon, she could only imagine.

For many patients, a new face promised not only a new life but also a radically new—and uncertain—identity. So long as they would no longer be recognized as men, the particular form of their faces did not really matter to them. For example, Patricia looked forward to the feeling of her new face more than its look.

“I do think it is going to be profound to just get up every morning and look in the mirror and go, ‘Oh my god, here’s somebody who I’ve always known was there but I never saw.’ You know? Feeling is one thing, but seeing is another. That’s kind of the aspect I’m looking for, without any idea of what she’ll look like. Whatever, it’ll be an improvement.”

Some patients hoped that the effects of their surgery would be subtle, simply accentuating the features that they already liked about themselves, while others had a very particular idea of what they thought they would look like following surgery. This was informed by their understanding of what surgical modification could accomplish, as well as their own interpretation of how—and like whom—they looked prior to the operation.

Katherine both wanted and expected to retain her individuality. “I want to be a feminine version of myself,” she said. “Some people just aren’t realistic. If you’ve got a head like a medicine ball and you want to look like Angelina Jolie, you’re going to have a rough time of it. Rather than emulate someone else, I’d rather be an individual.”

Similarly, Brenda—who had consulted with both Howard and Page and ultimately decided to undergo surgery with Page—said, “I guess I want to look like me but more feminine.” Though word-of-mouth, personal experiences and plenty of online research, patients felt confident that their wildest dreams could come true. They had seen the photographs of scores of former FFS patients whose images and narratives of transformation attested to the possibility of total surgical transformation. It is the actualization of this idealized possibility that has earned Howard a sort of cult following, and a legion of fans and defenders.

Jill’s Story

Howard had performed Jill’s ‘full face’ FFS nearly ten years before, and she had been an outspoken admirer and supporter of his ever since.

“I’ve been a Jim girl for a long time,” she explained with a smile. When I first met Jill, she reached into her pocket and pulled out her cell phone to show me a picture of what she looked like before surgery. I admit that the difference between the photograph and the face before me was astounding. She clearly took great pride in this fact.

“I don’t reject what Joe was. I don’t apologize for what Joe was. I don’t apologize for what Jill has become. I am comfortable with the unique mutt that I am, which is a combination of what Joe was and what Jill is. I like to think it’s the best of both worlds as opposed to the forces of having to be one or the other.”

The photograph—and her narration of it—was not only an affirmation of her own reconciliation with her past, but a testament to what FFS could do. When Jill first learned about FFS in the late 1990’s, she had already come to peace with the idea that she would never transition.

She had a reasonably successful life as a husband and father, and felt completely isolated in her knowledge of herself as a woman. If she could not be recognized as a woman, then she would have to learn to accept her life as it was. At that time, before the expansion of the internet, she explained,

“There was no validation. There was no hope that we could blend into society and just live our lives. The choices were twofold. One, you accept the fact that you live in some margin—if that was okay. Or you accept the fact that you live something less than a fulfilling life. I was married. I had a son. I had a good career. I had money. I had all of the trappings that society told me that I was being successful, except that I had this secret.”

Jill described first learning that FFS was possible, as a moment that was “very empowering but it was also terrifying. When you become comfortable with the impossible, realizing that the impossible is possible gets scary.” Jill’s initial surgery lasted nearly 13 hours and the recovery, she said, ‘was hell.’ Much like the radical transformation that Rachel envisioned, Jill’s surgery had changed not only her face, but her most basic understandings of herself and her world. Though she had not been politically engaged in her life as a man, since her transition—which began with FFS—Jill found herself confronted with social inequalities that she had never been aware of before.

“As a man, I had never experienced discrimination. Really. Not that I knew of. You take it for granted: you’re white, you’re heterosexual—or perceived to be heterosexual—you’re granted a level of privilege that you don’t know that you have that just comes with your birthright. You’re living in a world that’s oblivious to many of the unfortunate realities that others have to face. To have that stripped from you and see that people can be fired over this, people can lose their housing, to see that people in your community are not welcome in women’s shelters but have too much self-respect to go to men’s shelters and so they freeze to death on a park bench because they can’t get a job and they’re homeless. To recognize that in school people get the crap beat out of them because they’re different. Those things are contrary to everything my parents raised me to believe. So I found that I was given opportunities of making choices.”

Newly empowered by her changing body and newly outraged by an understanding of life that she had not been aware of before, Jill became a prominent figure in transpolitical organizing circles, delivering keynote addresses at national conferences and writing a widely circulated book about her experience of coming to terms with her identity and going through the process of transitioning from male to female. She attributed this radical shift in her life to FFS. “My own involvement never meant to be as significant as it became,” she explained.

“Coming here and meeting Sydney and going through this process was the single most profound experience of my entire life. It remains so. And I’ll tell anybody who asks….

The fact of the matter is that coming here, finally looking in the mirror and seeing somebody who more closely reflected on the outside who I knew was on the inside and watching that person develop—because the person that I was six months after I left here was very different than the person who left here. I never would have transitioned without coming to see him. Coming here was day one. It was a physical change, it was a mental change, it was psychological change. It was the impossible becoming possible.”

Jill was, quite literally, the poster girl for FFS and for Dr. Howard. Her before-and-after photographs are featured in multiple places throughout Howard’s recently published book on FFS and are staples in his conference presentation slideshows.

Not only does Jill epitomize the feminine—both visibly female and normatively beautiful—she also exemplifies the total life changing potential of Facial Feminization Surgery. Hers is a narrative of redemption that emphasizes her own efforts for self-acceptance as materialized by Howard, the person with the unique skills and vision to see in her—and make her into—the woman she knew herself to be. Despite both her own and Howard’s characterization of her surgery as an unqualified success, Jill’s time on the operating table was not done. She was in for some revision surgery on her jaw.

In some patients, the blood that pools around the bone following jaw contouring surgery can later be reabsorbed and turn into bone. When this happens, patients often return for revision in order to recreate the narrowed jaw that the initial surgery produced. This increasingly square jaw is what brought Jill back to the office. No face—no matter how fantastic—lasts forever.

[meditativeyoga]

Spiritual Metaphysics

Spiritual Metaphysics

Spiritual Metaphysics represents the research of the spiritual or "non-physical" globe. The word "esoteric" indicates "over the physical". Every religious beliefs and also spiritual work is esoteric. Due to the fact that they accept idea and also belief rather than physical evidence. It is the scientific research of spirituality, approach and also faith. Based on the understanding that the human beings obtained from Master Teachers.

Spiritual Metaphysics

So, spiritual Metaphysics is the scientific research of seeking and also comprehending the spiritual world. This globe is an unnoticeable one. It goes beyond the physical or visible globe. The physical globe represents the material and noticeable world that we live in. Spiritual Metaphysics checks out the partnership in between our minds and also issue, kind and also significance, look and compound. To check out the real world that we stay in, we need to do it from a higher level, from above, though. It considers that every physical thing has its spiritual basis. It states that the truth that we see as well as really feel is the result of spiritual factors.

Spiritual Metaphysics consists of 3 essential sections. These areas are: ontology, theology and global scientific research. Ontology stands for the study of existence. Theology is the study of divine. It studies gods and solutions inquiries regarding divine creatures. Universal scientific research represents the study of the "first principles". These concepts are the primary legislations, such as the legislations of Aristotle.

Spiritual Metaphysics

It is an absolute science that exists for a very lengthy time. There are lots of people who have an interest in it. As well as they also utilize it to solve existential issues, looking for the truth and the spiritual globe. You could think that this scientific research is mystical, but it is strange just for those who never ever aimed to research it a lot more seriously. Everything that we see and also feel is regulated by global legislations. There is an order in every little thing. There is a design. Consequently, everything we understand was produced by a greater, infinite intelligence. This intelligence is called God, but it has several various other names.

In verdict, Spiritual Metaphysics attempts to find proof of the existence of that limitless intelligence. And the spiritual globe where every little thing begin.

[fellowshipoffoucault]

Reading III: On Materiality of Design

Introduction

Source papers:

Latour, Bruno (2008). ‘‘Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts’’ In Fiona Hackne, Jonathn Glynne and Viv Minto (editors) Proceedings of the 2008 Annual International Conference of the Design History Society – Falmouth, 3-6 September 2009. Universal Publishers. (30 pages)

Vossoughian,  Nader  (2017). Workers of the World, Conform!  (6 pages)

Bogost, Ian (2009). What is Object-Oriented Ontology? A definition for ordinary folk.

--

From my point of view, these texts posed a more unified whole than the other reading packages. I found that all of them where quite clearly focused on the materiality and the essence of being and societal aspects of the two. Materiality is easily relatable for us designers since design as a whole has, since it’s opening notes, been inherently tied into the physical world, if not directly then at least secondarily by processes and visibility.

 Non-human machinery and technological and material innovations (or artifacts, as Bruno Latour prefers to refer to them) are hugely influential to a human way of life. As Latour states, they replace, constrain and shape our actions; they affect actions and decision. Latour illustrates this to a great degree by describing the vast functioning of a door, but we might as well extent to any artifacts that we find relevant for our practise. How would our practise and design process be altered without the ever-present being of pens, surfaces, paper, laptops, keyboards or phones, among many other things? We can have authority in relation to some aspects of this material process, but we have to admit, that without them the process would be inevitably different, or as some might argue, non-existent. Materiality brings visibility. Artifacts, machines, shape the process and add to it; This is a peculiar realm between the triangle of material, intersomatic and extrasomatic. We might ease the talking about this realm by referring to it as “the mind of a machine”.

 Latour suggests that sociologists tend to assume realities in a similar way physicists are assuming dark matter in place of a missing mass that glues all the pieces of the known universe together. Latour is implying that non-humane mass of artifacts, the non-humane human-made materiality around us is this missing mass that tie us together into a supposed universal morality. I do agree that this constantly growing mass is vital for the society to exist as it does; whether I would grant it this much as authority, I am unsure of. Human and non-human operate in different realms that are connected by interfaces, some physical and some digital, but nevertheless the mere existence of interfaces tells me that we do not communicate well. What exactly is the common space of a human and an artifact, then? What is the communication, does the dialogue exist?

 We could say that artifacts and human-generated material around us is here to solve problems that humans are, in one way or another, unfit to fulfil. Therefor we might accept the idea that the essential purpose and / or functioning environment is the common devisor; that the questions of a machine and a human collide somewhere and produce a common motivation to solve the question in hand. Here we are making it even more clear that the functions and interfaces of artifacts are, as Latour describes it, prescribed in some ways; it is tempting to assume that technologies are created in some kind of bubble by some kind of neutral scientists, but this is never the case. It is an old joke about solutions only being applicable in highly controllable test circumstances, but not in a real, dirty, complex world. My point is that we have to take into consideration the ethical direction and assumptions under which these mechanisms are developed, and also attempt to define it by posing opposite questions; Where are they not operating? Who are they not designed for, who are not the assumed users of this?  Who has access to this? Talking about accessibility we might also pose questions about the development of the materiality and machinery around us; Who has access to these processes, and who keeps an eye on them? I feel like here designers could make good use of their interdisciplinary knowledge and language, to take an active role in examining and producing the technologies around us. Many already seem to do (take an example from one of our early inspirational lectures from Taeyoon Choi from School for Poetic Computation and the creation of machines and usage of alternate networks, https://sfpc.io/).

 Another question is, if we really have a dialogue with the physical world or are we just projecting and / or mirroring our own existence and way of perceiving the world? Here we are approaching the questions of object-based ontology explained in brief by Ian Bogost (What is Object-Oriented Ontology? A definition for ordinary folk, 2009.) This takes us far from the notions of human-centred design and the idea that we make things “from humans to humans”; object-oriented approach suggests that everything exists equally, and that we might consider a different approach into our being. There might already be discussions about it, but this poses an interesting dilemma for designers; does this allowance into existence also extend to non-physical things that mainly humans can read and have access to? Do they exist in this sense, or are they just an extension to our being? They have some proof of existence due to their influence on humans, but what would cats think of our layouts, posters or infographics? I am quite sure that their world would not be endangered if all of the design products vanished in a heartbeat. Maybe they would be left missing their waterbowls and cozy blankets, but this doesn’t really have anything to do with visual communications anyway.

 As a closing statement I am thinking that visual communication poses us a very peculiar question in relation to existence and materiality. Infrastructure of the information age provides us a solid ground where to grow and develop this network of communications, but at the same time it is restricting and shaping it in ways that are almost unimaginable. Could we actually work without these borders, do we exist without them? That is my final question on this matter, that surely has so many aspects to it and which I am very exited to hear about tomorrow. Thank you for making it to the end, and see you!

 -Stella

[a-ha-discourse]

Introduction Reading III: The New Materiality of Design Sabina Friman, October 6th, 2019

The material nature of design as a discipline is something we as design practitioners are well acquainted with. For us, it is the natural connection between our ideas and their execution, be it in the analogue or digital realm. Because the connection between us and the physical world around us is frankly indisputable, so is the designer’s role in shaping this material reality equally so. But this type of thinking goes both ways, for it is not only we who shape that around us, but that around us which in turn shapes us.

The three final texts of this course all grapple with the idea of materiality through different topics. In his blog post Ian Bogost – author and game designer – writes about object-oriented ontology as a way of studying, in short, the existence of things, while Nader Vossoughian – author, architectural historian and theorist – writes about how standardization has shaped the world we know today. Bruno Latour – philosopher, anthropologist and sociologist – discusses the way technologies, even those as simple and mundande as a door groom, have an effect on the way we are in the world.

In his text What is Object-Oriented Ontology? A definition for ordinary folk, Ian Bogost attempts to define the complex philosophical discipline of object-oriented ontology. His motivation for this particular task seems to have been inspired by a personal experience where he failed to adequately summarize and concretize the concept of OOO, something I can relate to in a way. Whenever someone asks me to crystallize what it is I do as a designer, expecting an elevator pitch perfectly adapted to their understanding of the field, I find it hard not to oversimplify and resort to desperate clichés to avoid glassy eyes.

Anyway, at first Bogost offers a broad definition of OOO as the ”philosophical study of existence”, a study that puts things at its center. He then offers concretizing examples and narrows the definition to the study of the nature of things, their relations with each other and that between them and us. He admits his attempt as a ”massive oversimplification” that ignores both the history and current trends of philosophy, but as a debatably necessary one to return ”the attention of philosophy to the real, everyday world”. Although I’m hesitant to the choice of words in the title (”ordinary folk” just seems a tad patronising), I agree with him on the importance of anchoring theory to physical reality as in the end, ”academia has a responsibility to the public interest”.

In Workers of the World, Conform!, Nader Vossoughian discusses the need that arose from industrialized society to restructure itself for the sake of maximizing efficiency. The ideal of such a liberated society meant for knowledge to be documented and circulated seamlessly through universal principles and organized systems. Different ideas on how to achieve this was presented, but in the end one solution prevailed; paper standards, or World Formats, or DIN 476. The fundamental link that Vossoughian explains was drawn between paper formatting and intellectual capital appeals to me. In a way, I see the standardization of paper as a standardization of our profession as well – maybe even the creation of it.

Of course, standardization does not always equal total universality, as proven by Vossoughians statement of the United States and Canada not having adopted the global paper standards even today. Even when converting, say, recipe measurements, one can get a sense of the limited universality of certain of concepts. No matter how annoying this can be in practice, the idea of it gives me a sense of comfort that there still are things that don’t fit the prescribed and made-up standards of the world, and that don’t need to be efficient in order to be valuable. Design can fulfil a purpose in many an unstandardized way.

Latour, in his peculiarly humorous tone of voice, tackles the topic of materiality through what resembles OOO to a large extent in Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts. He looks at how ”artifacts can be deliberately designed to both replace human action and constrain and shape the actions of other humans”, and delves into extensive analysis of everyday technologies such as door grooms or seat belts to prove how intertwined our societies are with these often unremarkable but necessary technologies. Although I found the text unneccessarily repetitive on the one hand, Latour managed to underline in many ways the more than hybrid nature of society; the collective and inseparable nature of us and the things we’ve built around us, the human and the non-human as equal actors that work together. For designers, I think the emphasis lies in the morality we transmit to the things we design, the values we instill in the things we shape, that in turn affect the people who end up interacting with these things. We truly are, or eventually become, what we create.

[queernuck]

Are We There Yet: Metapolitics, Metaphysics, & Revolution.

A joke common among UChicago students, found on t-shirts and other memorabilia, is “That’s all well and good in practice...but what about theory?” Largely derived from a sort of reversal on the relationship between engineering and physics students, as well as between physicists who see themselves as more “material” and thus “practical” in that they more directly inform the thinkability, the space of thought possible for engineers, it jokes about the way in which UChicago has very well-known programs in physics, in theoretical mathematics, in many disciplines of the refused-metaphysical that are better known that the departments one might associate with a school such as MIT. Of course, this also leads us to invoking the Chicago Boys, and the larger neoliberal bent of UChicago as a school: the school’s hospital was famously resistant to adding an Emergency Unit, the continued employment of Friedman was a major means of spreading neoliberal ideology throughout economics departments as a whole, creating the sort of rhizomal exchange of ideology that solidified neoliberal policy, and more than that how the Chicago Boys were part of an American neocolonial invasion, the preparation and enacting of what presents itself as a fascist, genocidal intervention in Chile through the installation and support of Pinochet, the likes of which is being mirrored through postmodern and neocolonial means of control in nations like Venezuela. We can see very easily the practice, but what of the theory?

To evoke Badiou’s discussion of Rancière, and the “thinkability” of politics, the way in which groups such as the Chicago Boys influence the political is not merely through their economics: if neoliberal policies are desired, they will be enacted. Politics that are neoliberal in character, in ideological maneuvering, predate the neoliberal realm of thought. However, what the creation of neoliberal ideology does is that it makes-thinkable the neoliberal, it makes it such that one can create a structure of justification, of realization whereby the neoliberal becomes not merely a program of rejection or austerity, but in fact is realized in a positive fashion. This is where Žižek might say the European Union failed in large part in Greece, even while succeeding: the structures of austerity imposed were known not as austerity, but as reforms in the name of neoliberal growth, a specific stoking that would bring Greece back to the threshold of proper European appearances. This very plainly did not work, and yet the debt continued to pile up. The austerity was to be solved only by more austerity, the creation of infinite cyclic debts, debts never meant to be paid, were part of a symbolic exchange through which the neoliberal creation of a simulacra of Greece could be realized and woven into the already-simulated Greek economy. While American parlance called certain economic actions “stimulus packages” it is perhaps more accurate to call them stimulated packages, in that the shifting of commodities at hand is one that stimulates certain flows of a natural, healthy economy with the hope that a sort of sympathetic magic will then develop the proper response from the market. Of course it is more complicated than that, but I wish to use that as an illustrative notion in order to critique the ideology of neoliberal structure, of neoliberal acts of ordination, such that we may do the same of our own politics, our own metapolitical holdings.

America adopts the democratic paradigm even in its war crimes: the joke about bombs representing democracy is often echoed among left-liberals, but is itself found among those on the right wishing to offer the same sentiment: that the acts of deterritorializing violence are colonial, are not representative of the democratic ideal the United States is founded on. In the case of reactionaries one finds a certain turn to this, one unsurprisingly often repeated by liberals, that this presents the necessary deterritorializing force through which democracy may be realized. Democracy is unthinkable so long as the city stands, so long as a city against the colonizer can present itself, even if it does so amidst structures of fascist resistance. This is how entire states are ordained as terrorist: the specific means by which legitimizations of violence against Hamas have been spread through a deterritorialization carried out from the seat of an F-15. It is not in attacking every village, every building that one creates assemblages of terror, but rather in creating a means by which any attack may be justified within the larger oppositions of terror, assemblages of terrorist bodies, that one finds the act of supposed-democracy carried out by the IDF’s Air Force. That the genealogy of these aircraft is directly descended from American stock is unsurprising, as America has been hegemonically the arbiter of democratic success for decades, especially following the fall of the Soviet Union: the vacuum left by the end of this conflict was quickly filled by the means in which American ideology realized that the spread of democracy could apply not only to the Soviet Other, but to any potential colonial subject deemed undemocratic. This forms the process by which one finds the American gaze fixated in Orientalist, Balkanized, neoliberal means: it is not in bringing democracy, but in bringing a connection to the democratic structure of American imperial control that one is able to reconcile the democracy of American colonialism and the ideology of the American state. 

When comparing action and ideology, the very means by which questions of success or failure are ordained is largely toward ends that specifically are contained within the vast and eternal scope of the capitalist act of coherence: a protest is only meaningful if it can realize itself within capitalism, even if it has anticapitalist ends. Occupy Wall Street was largely met with mild reforms and some symbolic gestures of acquiescence, far from the radical critiques many hoped to make within it. Demands to end the violence of policing are met with body cameras on gay cops. This is not to condemn these actions, nor to condemn the larger structure of advocacy. However, it is part of realizing that neoliberal inquiry, imposition, is part of advocacy and that there is only a specific break when the measure between ideal and action is outside the possibilities of liberal politics. One such movement is the movement towards the riot. 

When we riot, why are we rioting? The means by which the left have adopted various justifications for rioting as a sort of strategic rejoinder to reactionary critique is understandable, as the means by which these politics reckon actions has the benefit of hegemonic rearticulation, of capitalist reterritorialization, on its side. It can name marches, protests, strikes that are amenable to a postmodern gaze, it may even institute images of police brutality (always antiblack or antisemitic or homophobic or otherwise repeating violence) in order to critique itself retrospectively for harms it still commits. Conversely, the riot is now, is here, is going on and perhaps even of our own doing. The line between protest and riot can grow thin, and when hegemony favors fascism the confrontation is by nature uneven. It is through a creation of the democratic political ideal We have found ourselves asking this question without realization in many ways, and the common theme of organization, the notion that action will present itself as the best means of moving forward, has been a persistent but largely untenable one in the wake of Charlottesville. What is necessary for the theoretical, as well as for “theory” as a particular theoretical, is specifically contained within larger articulations of the relationship between the ideological and the concept of what constitutes action, measures of politics that effectively proscribe the means by which one moves forward.

Obviously, commonality of desire can be a strong point of organization, but this must be at once investigated specifically because of how flows of desire can so quickly be restructured, directed by machines of capital such that they are eventually contained within machines of the despotic, bureaucratic body, coopoted by parties of socialism through reformation, as if this goal were meaningfully possible while maintaining the structures of capital that make such politics possible. It is an ideological turn that makes these reformist solutions thinkable, and to accept them as anything other than attempts at creating conditions which will eventually be seized by proletarian revolution is to effectively capitulate to the neoliberal sphere of acceptability that many of these politics eventually rely upon. Recognizing that it is through a metapolitical arbitration, instead, that one must articulate a certain thought, that it is in making a politics first thinkable, and then articulating from that, that one is able to create the politics of revolutionary thought. However, that particular process is so often confused by questions of what is necessary versus what must be maintained as best. Some accept the notion of a Vanguard because they believe that it is not only the best means of realizing socialist change, but the only possible one, arguably entering into a sort of ontological acceptance of the Vanguard that can allow for a far too eager imposition of “Vanguard” as a label. Conversely, the commitment to the rejection of politics of a Vanguard as a means of articulating an anti-hierarchical commitment, even as part of organizing without hierarchical realization in one’s organization is criticized for not presenting a meaningful alternative, for not suggesting how the changes at hand are to be discussed, much less implemented. Change may be thinkable, but moreover in a revolutionary sense it must be matched with an understanding of material conditions that rejects bourgeoisie reckonings of the social and instead questions these structures at their most basic.

Deconstructive critique of neoliberal ideology, acting in a sort of reterritorializing fashion that follows behind neoliberalism, can be an incredibly effective means of discussing structural violence, of critiquing the neoliberal ideation as realized through the political, but that this process of measuring is so often reliant upon bourgeoisie structures of knowability, of articulation, of what constitutes meaningful experience cannot be ignored. Instead, it must be taken as part of the larger task of making revolutionary thought thinkable, the way in which consciousness can originate from the proletariat itself. That there are reactionary elements within the proletariat, the structural presence of the labor aristocracy, the aspirations to petit-bourgeoisie status, well-to-do peasants, is part of realizing that international resistance to colonial violence is just that: international, reliant upon the means by which colonial separation has created these delineations and reterritorialized topographies that often require negotiating, if not entirely rejecting, identities such as national character. The metaphysical of this, the metaphysics of metapolitics, comes to the fore at this point: the metapolitical can be an arbitration of what politics are best suited for a certain contingency, for discussing certain aims with certain supposed colonial subjects, but where must we draw these conclusions from? What then, constitutes knowing, constitutes the Other, constitutes meaningful encounter rather than simply passing political theatre? Perhaps there may even be a joy, a certain discordant tune to be heard in the theatre of politics, in the poetry of the philosophical communist, in the very sort of champagne socialism that has been forced upon us by reactionary flows of ideological renaming. The metaphysical duty lies in creating the thinkable, but moreover in where the thinkable becomes-thinkable, what it is that is thinkable as a result.

[blog1984705]

Lecture 4

As I stated in my last blog post I missed the fourth lecture of the course. I still wanted to make a blogpost about it, however I can only base it on the powerpoint of the lecture and the primary text I have read. I could not borrow notes from anyone, because I don’t know any of the peers from that course. This is an electoral course and I do not really spend time on other students during the lectures. Besides that the Coronavirus has impacted our daily life on a big scale it is hard to get into contact with these people. The fourth lecture is what I will be dedicating this blog to and I read a translation by Daniel C. Peterson based on Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd waʾl-ʿadl (Cairo, 1950), section 4, pp. 99–112 and 113–114. The name is translated to The Book that makes others superfluous. First I will write something about the writer, the text and the Mu’tazila, after that I will write something about Kalam.

The writer of the text is named Abu’l-Hasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār, but was better known as al-Qāḍī which means the Judge. He was was born and raised in Iran. During his studies he came under the influence of the Mu’tazilites. The Mu’tazila is a religious movement that has been founded in Basra, Iraq in the 700s AD by Wasil ‘Ata. The Mu’tazila means those who separate themselves. This name is derived from Wasil Ata’s withdrawal from the study circle of Hasan Al Basri over a theological disagreement. Others followed Wasil and together they formed a new circle. The Mu’tazila adapted Greek philosophy and attempted to understand them in Islamic context. What also differs them from for example the Sunnits is that they do not believe the Qur’an and Sunnah were the only sources of truth. They gave reason an elevated role in understanding both the spiritual and material world.

They formed a vivacious scholastic community reaching from Iraq to Syria and Iran. They had debates with jurists, philosophers, grammarians and heretics. An important thesis that the Mu’tazila followed was Al-Nazzam his infinite divisibility of bodies thesis. This had to do with juz’ or jawhar, which we could translate as atoms. He described them as the participles that cannot be subdivided. He claimed that beside God, atoms and accidents are exclusive constituents of the universe. So that the universe is made up of atoms that can be distinguished from each other, which he called discrete, and atoms that exist related to divine causality, which he called contingent. Hereby he admits that there would be two primary categories of beings, things are either atoms or they are accidents.

Accidents inhere in a body once it is constituted and change in the world is accounted by causality. According to Al-Nazzam there are three positions on causality of accidents. They are either caused by God, proceeded from their substrate or they are causal efficacy of human agents.

Besides that they were wondering how we could attribute things to God without knowing him. The Mu’tazilis were sustaining a strict avoidance of anthropomorphism. However the Qur’an states that God is one, and there is nothing like him. The Qur’an states that He is always knowing, powerful and living. Allah has ninety nine names which are all attributed to Him. The Mu’tazilis refused to admit attributes to distinct ontological entities, because they were wondering how it was possible to attribute or predicate things of God. 

Al-Qāḍī tried to answer these questions in the primary text. This was obviously difficult for him because God is a body, but not like any other bodies you can think of. Besides the attribution can’t be identical to the thing described, nor not so. In other words, God’s attributes, called sifat, belong to god, but without any inherence like accidents.

Al-Qāḍī explains in his text why we perceive all the perceptibles by the cause of life, just as we perceive it by the senses, even if we do not know it. If God were visible to us in any way, we would inevitably know him. Therefore, if that claim is invalid on account of what we find in ourselves, namely that we lack necessary knowledge of Him and in view of the fact that our deductive reasoning about Him is invalid, because He is neither knowable or unknowable. Besides that we can’t know what He would look like, what shape or colours he would have. Al-Qāḍī states that, for those who ask why he made it so that we are not able to see Him, if He created that in us, we would be free of the obligation that is not valid except with the acquisition of knowledge about us. Besides that he claims that we do not have a sixth sense by which we see God or other things that are impossible to see by the senses we have. Al-Qāḍī also refutes the claim that the reason we do not see God is the weakness of our vision.

An important term we spoke about in class was the term ‘Kalam.’ The Kalam was a rational tradition which, in opposition of the Mu’tazila, did not care for Greek Philosophy. Kalam is literally translated as “speech,” which refers to a rationalist form of Islamic theology. Kalam started as an intra-Muslim disputation and was autonomous of foreign influences. Kalam was all about theology, rational discourses and intelligent speech. Topics that were being addressed were the free will, the nature of Qur’an, the nature of God, divine attributes and the role of reason.

The Kalam had two functions, the first function was it being a defence system of the common orthodox creed, by refuting opposing opinions through the form of argument and to defeat the advocates of error through dialectic reasoning. Dialectic reasoning is the art of investigating or discussing the truth of opinions. It is the inquiry into metaphysical contradictions and their solutions.

The second function of Kalam was to dispel doubts and sophistries that cause confusion to the untrained minds of lay believers. This by bringing forth cogent proofs, expressed in clear language to remove that confusion and those doubts rationally.

The key doctrines of Kalam were that humans were responsible for their own actions. God does not predetermine all human choices and therefore humans have some form of free will. This causes human volition in sinful behavior. God gave us this free will to see if we are worthy of entering Jannah, which is the paradise. I think that our lives on this Earth would not matter without a free will, because this life is just a test for the life to come. If we can’t make our own decisions between good and bad things, there would be no test.

[drthomasmaples-blog]

Introduction

          Purpose. In this theoretical work, I explore whether a developmental sequence of archetypes occurs during the lifelong individuation process. Human development is a key concept for the theory underlying psychology and its practice; however, the lack of a developmental perspective based on the theoretical tenets of analytical psychology shows that need exists to elaborate upon this often-ignored subject matter.

Carl Jung wrote extensively about individuation. For Jung, individuation represented a goal that all human beings endeavor towards during their lifelong maturation process. While Jung wrote extensively on individuation and the archetypes that form the foundation of the collective unconscious, he did not create a theoretic perspective concerning how these pivotal psychological components drive human development towards an individuated state. The purpose of this theoretical work was to explore the lifelong developmental sequences that underlie the individuation process.

          Rationale. During his career, Carl Jung wrote extensively on individuation and self-realization as being synonymous representations of the psyche’s ability to transcend its own nature. Both individuation and self-realization involve an individual’s ability to understand the Self as a separate construct from the ego and other archetypes that lie within the collective unconscious of the individual psyche. Self-realized and individuated forms of consciousness are holistic (Jung, 1939/1969; 1950/1969; 1951/1969g) and drive the psyche to realize its inherent nature. For the purpose of this theoretical work, I utilized the term individuation as being inclusive of self-realization. A person that individuates realizes the true nature of the Self, as it exists separate from the split nature of a consciousness that develops evolving layers of complexity as an individual matures. Individuated consciousness allows a person to understand the minute interconnectedness that exists between the often-opposing themes common to the archetypes that form the foundation of the psyche. Concerning self-realization and the unification of consciously opposing themes, Jung (1951/1969f) stated:

In the psychology of the individual there is always, at such moments, an agonizing situation of conflict from which there seems to be no way out—at least for the conscious mind… But out of this collision of opposites the unconscious psyche always creates a third thing of an irrational nature, which the conscious mind neither expects nor understands… For the conscious mind knows nothing beyond the opposites and, as a result, has no knowledge of the thing that unites them. Since, however, the solution of the conflict through the union of opposites is of vital importance, and is moreover the very thing that the conscious mind is longing for, some inkling of the creative act, and of the significance of it, nevertheless gets through… The new configuration is a nascent whole; it is on the way to wholeness, at least in so far as it excels in “wholeness” the conscious mind when torn by opposites and surpasses it in completeness… Out of this situation the “child” emerges as a symbolic content… this new birth, although it is the most precious fruit of Mother Nature herself, the most pregnant with the future, [signifies] a higher stage of self-realization. (p. 168)

Inherent duality exists within consciousness from which an integrative third entity arises; this integrative entity mediates between the often-opposing themes apparent within the psyche; the process of mediating between the opposing themes of consciousness prompts individuation to occur. Therefore, an individuated state of being represents a psychologically holistic state that transcends the polarized nature of a consciousness divided by paradoxical awareness.

The idea of an individuated consciousness is a central theoretical component of many developmental theories of psychology. This is most evident in the use of the term self-actualization proposed by humanistic psychologists (Maslow, 1943; Rogers, 2008) and Erikson’s (1963) belief that the ego can reach a state of integrity during old age. Although Jung wrote extensively on how archetypes affect individuation, he and subsequent analytical psychologists have not developed a developmental theory (Withers, 2003).

The central focus of this theoretical work is to develop an understanding of the archetypal phenomena that occur while entering new phases of development during the individuation process. The results of research that underlies this theoretical work will show that an emergent model of archetypal development is discernible through the themes present in Hermann Hesse’s (2002) story, Siddhartha.

In Siddhartha, Hesse (2002) wrote about a young man’s journey to find his true nature. This research underlying this theoretical work utilized Hesse’s book as a case study from which to develop an archetypal theory of individuated development. I analyzed the protagonist, Siddhartha, as an exemplar case of Self-development. The hope was that by conducting this study, an understanding of the archetypes that drove Siddhartha to realize his Self image would emerge. My choice of the story, Siddhartha, over other novels that focus on developmental sequences, was due, in part to the influence Carl Jung had on the production of Hesse’s story, and the mastery of metaphorical language Hesse used to explain a process of soul work that encompassed the lifespan of the Buddha.

The Buddha was an extraordinary individual that achieved Nirvana. In part, he realized an apex form of consciousness that few will ever realize during their lifespan. Because of this, I read the story metaphorically rather than literally. I do not propose ultimate truths in this research; instead, I expand upon the two truths proposed by Buddhist doctrine: “Conventional worldly truths and truths that are ultimate” (Dalai Lama, 1975, p. 31). While most individuals will consciously adhere to “conventional worldly truths” (Dalai Lama, 1975, p. 31), by transcending the polarized nature of consciousness, an individuated being begins to understand ultimate truths as they occur within emptiness and existence (Dalai Lama, 1975). Even though this study examined the life sequence of an individual that attained the ultimate capacity psyche has to realize its nature, I did not seek to provide a doctrine of ultimate truth regarding the means by which an individual can achieve an individuated sense of consciousness. The Buddha achieved Nirvana: a state, which represents something greater than the ability the Self has to understand its inherent nature as an individuated construct reliant on the life of an individual.

Let us Help You Advance Confidently in the Direction of Your Dreams. (Dr. Thomas Maples)

Hesse was an ordinary individual that wrote extraordinary stories during his lifetime. Siddhartha was a story written about an extraordinary individual that found peace of mind by living in each moment, as it objectively occurred. In his quest to understand his emerging Self, Hesse explored the archetypal content of the psyche that prompts the search for an individual’s personal ontology. While biographical material is also rich in archetypal motifs, stories written in a manner similar to fairy-tales allow an individual to directly access the emotional polarities common to each archetype. Tales written in a metaphorical manner are an invaluable tool that prepares the psyche for the developmental tasks that lay ahead, and also form the foundation from which analytical psychology has sought to explain the means by which the unconscious manifests within the daily life of an individual.

Fairy tales are the purest and simplest expression of collective unconscious psychic processes. Therefore their value for the scientific investigation of the unconscious exceeds that of all other material. They represent the archetypes in their simplest, barest, and most concise form (von Franz, 1996, p. 1)

Hesse’s (2002) story is a historically fictionalized biography of the Buddha’s life. The literary prose that Hesse created presents a narrative account of the life of the Buddha. The Buddha was a person who provided a path toward an enlightened state of consciousness that exists outside the nature of suffering. His teachings continue to have a following some 2500 years after his death. This theoretical work illuminates the themes present in the story, Siddhartha, from an archetypal perspective, providing an outline of a Jungian theory of development.

References

Dalai Lama (1975). The Buddhism of Tibet: Translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins. Ithica, NY: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

Erikson, E. (1963). Childhood and society (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton.

Hesse, H. (2002). Siddhartha: A new translation with an introduction by Paul W. Morris. (C. S. Kohn, Trans.) Boston, MA: Shambhala. (Original work published 1922)

Jung, C. G. (1969). Conscious, unconscious, and individuation. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 275-289). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1939)

Jung, C. G. (1969). A study in the process of individuation. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 290-354). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1950)

Jung, C. G. (1969). The psychology of the child archetype. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 151-181). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951)

Jung, C. G. (1969). Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the self. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vol. 9-2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951)

Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review , 50, 370-396.

Rogers, C. (2008). The actualizing tendency in relation to ‘motives’ and to consciousness. In B. E. Levitt, B. E. Levitt (Eds.) , Reflections on human potential: Bridging the person-centered approach and positive psychology (pp. 17-32). Ross-on-Wye England: PCCS Books.

von Franz, M. L. (1996). The interpretation of fairy tales (Revised ed.). Boston, MA: Shambhala.

What does it means to Realize body, mind, and spiritual unity. There once was a person whom achieved it: Siddhartha Gautama. Explore more with Dr. Tom #drthomasmaples #buddha #buddhism #spiritual #zen #psychology #mindfulness

Introduction           Purpose. In this theoretical work, I explore whether a developmental sequence of archetypes occurs during the lifelong individuation process.

What does it means to Realize body, mind, and spiritual unity. There once was a person whom achieved it: Siddhartha Gautama. Explore more with Dr. Tom #drthomasmaples #buddha #buddhism #spiritual #zen #psychology #mindfulness Introduction           Purpose. In this theoretical work, I explore whether a developmental sequence of archetypes occurs during the lifelong individuation process.

[drthomasmaples]

Introduction

          Purpose. In this theoretical work, I explore whether a developmental sequence of archetypes occurs during the lifelong individuation process. Human development is a key concept for the theory underlying psychology and its practice; however, the lack of a developmental perspective based on the theoretical tenets of analytical psychology shows that need exists to elaborate upon this often-ignored subject matter.

Carl Jung wrote extensively about individuation. For Jung, individuation represented a goal that all human beings endeavor towards during their lifelong maturation process. While Jung wrote extensively on individuation and the archetypes that form the foundation of the collective unconscious, he did not create a theoretic perspective concerning how these pivotal psychological components drive human development towards an individuated state. The purpose of this theoretical work was to explore the lifelong developmental sequences that underlie the individuation process.

          Rationale. During his career, Carl Jung wrote extensively on individuation and self-realization as being synonymous representations of the psyche’s ability to transcend its own nature. Both individuation and self-realization involve an individual’s ability to understand the Self as a separate construct from the ego and other archetypes that lie within the collective unconscious of the individual psyche. Self-realized and individuated forms of consciousness are holistic (Jung, 1939/1969; 1950/1969; 1951/1969g) and drive the psyche to realize its inherent nature. For the purpose of this theoretical work, I utilized the term individuation as being inclusive of self-realization. A person that individuates realizes the true nature of the Self, as it exists separate from the split nature of a consciousness that develops evolving layers of complexity as an individual matures. Individuated consciousness allows a person to understand the minute interconnectedness that exists between the often-opposing themes common to the archetypes that form the foundation of the psyche. Concerning self-realization and the unification of consciously opposing themes, Jung (1951/1969f) stated:

In the psychology of the individual there is always, at such moments, an agonizing situation of conflict from which there seems to be no way out—at least for the conscious mind… But out of this collision of opposites the unconscious psyche always creates a third thing of an irrational nature, which the conscious mind neither expects nor understands… For the conscious mind knows nothing beyond the opposites and, as a result, has no knowledge of the thing that unites them. Since, however, the solution of the conflict through the union of opposites is of vital importance, and is moreover the very thing that the conscious mind is longing for, some inkling of the creative act, and of the significance of it, nevertheless gets through… The new configuration is a nascent whole; it is on the way to wholeness, at least in so far as it excels in “wholeness” the conscious mind when torn by opposites and surpasses it in completeness… Out of this situation the “child” emerges as a symbolic content… this new birth, although it is the most precious fruit of Mother Nature herself, the most pregnant with the future, [signifies] a higher stage of self-realization. (p. 168)

Inherent duality exists within consciousness from which an integrative third entity arises; this integrative entity mediates between the often-opposing themes apparent within the psyche; the process of mediating between the opposing themes of consciousness prompts individuation to occur. Therefore, an individuated state of being represents a psychologically holistic state that transcends the polarized nature of a consciousness divided by paradoxical awareness.

The idea of an individuated consciousness is a central theoretical component of many developmental theories of psychology. This is most evident in the use of the term self-actualization proposed by humanistic psychologists (Maslow, 1943; Rogers, 2008) and Erikson’s (1963) belief that the ego can reach a state of integrity during old age. Although Jung wrote extensively on how archetypes affect individuation, he and subsequent analytical psychologists have not developed a developmental theory (Withers, 2003).

The central focus of this theoretical work is to develop an understanding of the archetypal phenomena that occur while entering new phases of development during the individuation process. The results of research that underlies this theoretical work will show that an emergent model of archetypal development is discernible through the themes present in Hermann Hesse’s (2002) story, Siddhartha.

In Siddhartha, Hesse (2002) wrote about a young man’s journey to find his true nature. This research underlying this theoretical work utilized Hesse’s book as a case study from which to develop an archetypal theory of individuated development. I analyzed the protagonist, Siddhartha, as an exemplar case of Self-development. The hope was that by conducting this study, an understanding of the archetypes that drove Siddhartha to realize his Self image would emerge. My choice of the story, Siddhartha, over other novels that focus on developmental sequences, was due, in part to the influence Carl Jung had on the production of Hesse’s story, and the mastery of metaphorical language Hesse used to explain a process of soul work that encompassed the lifespan of the Buddha.

The Buddha was an extraordinary individual that achieved Nirvana. In part, he realized an apex form of consciousness that few will ever realize during their lifespan. Because of this, I read the story metaphorically rather than literally. I do not propose ultimate truths in this research; instead, I expand upon the two truths proposed by Buddhist doctrine: “Conventional worldly truths and truths that are ultimate” (Dalai Lama, 1975, p. 31). While most individuals will consciously adhere to “conventional worldly truths” (Dalai Lama, 1975, p. 31), by transcending the polarized nature of consciousness, an individuated being begins to understand ultimate truths as they occur within emptiness and existence (Dalai Lama, 1975). Even though this study examined the life sequence of an individual that attained the ultimate capacity psyche has to realize its nature, I did not seek to provide a doctrine of ultimate truth regarding the means by which an individual can achieve an individuated sense of consciousness. The Buddha achieved Nirvana: a state, which represents something greater than the ability the Self has to understand its inherent nature as an individuated construct reliant on the life of an individual.

Let us Help You Advance Confidently in the Direction of Your Dreams. (Dr. Thomas Maples)

Hesse was an ordinary individual that wrote extraordinary stories during his lifetime. Siddhartha was a story written about an extraordinary individual that found peace of mind by living in each moment, as it objectively occurred. In his quest to understand his emerging Self, Hesse explored the archetypal content of the psyche that prompts the search for an individual’s personal ontology. While biographical material is also rich in archetypal motifs, stories written in a manner similar to fairy-tales allow an individual to directly access the emotional polarities common to each archetype. Tales written in a metaphorical manner are an invaluable tool that prepares the psyche for the developmental tasks that lay ahead, and also form the foundation from which analytical psychology has sought to explain the means by which the unconscious manifests within the daily life of an individual.

Fairy tales are the purest and simplest expression of collective unconscious psychic processes. Therefore their value for the scientific investigation of the unconscious exceeds that of all other material. They represent the archetypes in their simplest, barest, and most concise form (von Franz, 1996, p. 1)

Hesse’s (2002) story is a historically fictionalized biography of the Buddha’s life. The literary prose that Hesse created presents a narrative account of the life of the Buddha. The Buddha was a person who provided a path toward an enlightened state of consciousness that exists outside the nature of suffering. His teachings continue to have a following some 2500 years after his death. This theoretical work illuminates the themes present in the story, Siddhartha, from an archetypal perspective, providing an outline of a Jungian theory of development.

References

Dalai Lama (1975). The Buddhism of Tibet: Translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins. Ithica, NY: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

Erikson, E. (1963). Childhood and society (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton.

Hesse, H. (2002). Siddhartha: A new translation with an introduction by Paul W. Morris. (C. S. Kohn, Trans.) Boston, MA: Shambhala. (Original work published 1922)

Jung, C. G. (1969). Conscious, unconscious, and individuation. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 275-289). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1939)

Jung, C. G. (1969). A study in the process of individuation. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 290-354). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1950)

Jung, C. G. (1969). The psychology of the child archetype. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vols. 9-1, pp. 151-181). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951)

Jung, C. G. (1969). Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the self. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. Hull, Trans., Vol. 9-2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951)

Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review , 50, 370-396.

Rogers, C. (2008). The actualizing tendency in relation to ‘motives’ and to consciousness. In B. E. Levitt, B. E. Levitt (Eds.) , Reflections on human potential: Bridging the person-centered approach and positive psychology (pp. 17-32). Ross-on-Wye England: PCCS Books.

von Franz, M. L. (1996). The interpretation of fairy tales (Revised ed.). Boston, MA: Shambhala.

What does it means to Realize body, mind, and spiritual unity. There once was a person whom achieved it: Siddhartha Gautama. Explore more with Dr. Tom #drthomasmaples #buddha #buddhism #spiritual #zen #psychology #mindfulness Introduction           Purpose. In this theoretical work, I explore whether a developmental sequence of archetypes occurs during the lifelong individuation process.