#after a german paratrooper bayoneted dielsi. dielsi still did not die

[pastlivesandpurplepuppets]

Five years later, while enrolled in an Advanced Infantry Officer’s Course at Fort Benning, Speirs reflected on his own shortcomings and successes in a revealing assessment of his platoon at Carentan. The thirty-two-page monograph concluded with these judgments:

LESSONS

The following lessons were brought out by the operation:

Strategic use of airborne is essential. The attrition of trained parachutists in extended ground combat operations as infantry is wasteful and should be avoided.

When assigning missions to lower units, the commander must consider the comparative strength of his units as reduced by previous casualties.

Bravery in combat must be recognized by decorations and awards. Morale is raised and incentive provided to perform well in future combat.

Tables of Organization and Equipment must be constantly revised to increase the fighting strength and capabilities of the unit.

Flank security during night movement is essential, regardless of the effect on speed and the physical condition of the men.

In night movement all men must be alert to keep contact both to the front and to the rear.

When in contact with the enemy at night, one-half of the unit must be alert and in position to repel attacks.

Intelligence agencies must keep commanders informed of the enemy indications. Commanders can then adjust their plans in accordance, avoiding the possibility of surprise by the enemy.

Wounded men must be carried along when a unit is forced to withdraw.

The hand grenade should be used to full advantage in close combat. The present hand grenade is too heavy for long throws, and, too, it cannot easily be carried in sufficient number for a sustained fight.

Soldiers must learn that an enemy assault is repelled by fire power alone. When individual targets cannot be located, continuous area fire must be used.

Units are forbidden to withdraw without orders however desperate the situation. Unit commanders must keep higher headquarters informed of the amount of enemy pressure, and request authority to withdraw prior to movement.

Most poignant of Speirs’s observations was his self-condemnation for disregarding Dielsi’s plight. “The platoon leader is to be severely criticized for failing to carry the wounded man back as the platoon withdrew from the house on the thirteenth,” Speirs wrote. “His assumption that the man was dead does not excuse him. His expectation of another enemy assault and his fear that this would find the platoon with no ammunition were the factors causing this grave mistake.

~ Jared Frederick & Erik Dorr