#Willard Van Orman Quine

[bocadosdefilosofia]

«Tomemos, por ejemplo, el caso Pegaso. Si no hubiera tal Pegaso, arguye McX, no estaríamos hablando de nada cuando usamos la palabra; por tanto, sería un sinsentido incluso decir: 'Pegaso no es'. Y pensando que eso muestra que la negación de Pegaso no puede ser mantenida coherentemente, McX concluye que Pegaso es.

Pero McX no puede convencerse a sí mismo plenamente de que alguna región del espacio-tiempo, próxima o remota, contenga un caballo alado de carne y hueso. Si pues se le urgen ulteriores detalles sobre Pegaso, dice que Pegaso es una idea presente en la mente de los hombres. Aquí, empero, empieza a manifestarse una confusión. Por amor del argumento podemos conceder que hay una entidad, y hasta una entidad única (aunque esto ya resulta muy poco plausible), que es la mental idea-Pegaso; pero esta entidad mental no es precisamente aquello de lo que uno habla cuando niega a Pegaso.»

Willard Van Orman Quine: Desde un punto de vista lógico. Ediciones Paidós Ibérica, pág. 40. Barcelona, 2002.

TGO

@bocadosdefilosofia

@dias-de-la-ira-1

[tagitables]

Happy Birthday Quine ! 🎂

[postersbykeith]

[monstrousgourmandizingcats]

Van is so key to what makes Yellowjackets special that even though she's not a particular favorite character of mine I think about her constantly. Whenever I run across any other figure with Van featured prominently in their name--Van Jones, C. Vann Woodward, Stevie Vann, Robert Vann, Willard Van Orman Quine, Vannevar Bush, to name just a few--I think "oh, like the butch anprim who says stuff like 'I'm mixing up my pop culture references because I'm fucking upset' and may or may not be a werewolf!" Other Yellowjackets fans who don't have Van as a particular favorite character, take heed: we underestimate her at our peril.

[sororalice]

Towards a Philosophy of Magick, Pt: 9: Ontology

Where I introduce the ontological framework to be used in my work. Written 12-12-23

"Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics; we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged." -Willard Van Orman Quine, “On What There Is”, “Quintessence: Basic Readings From The Philosophy of Willard Van Orman Quine” (2004)

We have walked a long and winding road together, dear reader, through logic and epistemology, as we addressed the question “How shall we think?” and we have come out the other side of the abyss between thought and being, the ideal and the actual, to ask a new question: “What shall we think about?” This is the second stage of the alien’s quest to figure out what the hell is going on here and what to do about it.

Ontology is the philosophical study of being itself. It asks questions like “what exists?”, “of the things that exist, what are they like?”, and “what exactly does it mean to exist?” As such, it is the first step in the next stage of our project.

It is not our goal, however, to talk about what exists piecemeal. We don’t want a list of all the things which exist one by one (x amount of rocks, y amount of humans, z amount of whales, etc). Even if it were possible, such an accounting of reality would become tedious and unwieldy, and it wouldn’t get at the notions of being that we really wish to examine. Because of this, we will use the highest degree of abstraction possible that still gives us a usable taxonomy of what, in fact, exists. This level of abstraction gives us three primary entities: objects, properties, and relations, defined below.

1. Object - An object is a potential bearer of properties and potential member of relations. In linguistic terms, an object is what is picked out by nouns, i.e. “a person, place, or thing”. This definition includes concrete objects (what we usually mean when we say “physical objects”) and abstract objects (the objects of thought, such as numbers, abstractions, concepts, etc). Common objects include “a human”, “the number 9”, and “the musical note G”.

2. Property - A property is a feature of an object or relation, either concrete or abstract. Notably we cannot know about any objects which do not have properties (because “knowable” is a property) and properties are always associated with objects or relations (because what would the property be a property of, if not an object or a relation?). Linguistically, a property is what is picked out by adjectives. Common properties include “the color red”, “evenness” (in terms of numbers), and “loud”.

3. Relation - A relation is a way in which objects or properties interact. Notice also that we cannot know about any objects or properties that do not lay in any relations, because “is knowable by” is a relation. Unlike properties, relations are always “many placed”, meaning a relation is always between two or more objects or properties (even if both of those objects or properties are the same e.g when an object relates to itself). Common relations include “next to”, “greater than”, and “loves”.

These are our basic ontological notions, and for the purpose of this work they will be considered a set of “primitive” notions, by which I mean that they are basic and cannot be reduced to more basic concepts.

Now things get a bit more complicated.

1. Relational properties: Earlier I pointed out that we cannot know about any objects that have no properties because “knowable” is a property. But what sort of property is “knowable”? It is the property of possibly laying in the relation “is known by”. This is an example of a relational property, the property that a given object or property has of laying in a particular relation. For example, if A lays in the relation of being “next to” B, then A has the relational property of “being next to B”. “Next to” is the relation and “being next to” is the relational property.

2. Relations between properties: Sometimes we see two or more properties that lay in relation to each other. Common examples include “the loudness of the music is greater than the loudness of the dialogue”, “the redness of the ball is darker than the redness of the feather”, and “the fullness of the sack is greater than the fullness of the box”.

3. Degrees of Relations: The “degree” of a relation (also called its “adicity”) is the number of members of the relation. For example, the relation “parent of” is dyadic…while one can have more than one parent and a parent can have more than one child, the relation from parent to child always has two members: the parent and the child. A relation that an object or property has to itself, such as “loving oneself” is monadic; it has one member. And so on.

4. Grades of Relations: We say that a relation is “unigrade” if that relation only has a single set degree. To use the example again: the relation “parent of” is unigrade…this relation is always dyadic. However, the relation “cause of” is what we call “multigrade”…a single effect may have multiple causes, a single cause may have multiple effects, and so on, in any number of combinations, meaning that the degree of a particular “cause of” relation can be of any degree.

5. Symmetric, Asymmetric, and Non-Symmetric Relations: In some relations, such as “sibling of”, if A is in that relation to B then B is also necessarily in that relation to A. We call this sort of relation “symmetric”. Other sorts of relations, like “is looking at”, may or may not be symmetrical, and if they are not, we call this type “non-symmetric” (if they are symmetrical we still call them “symmetric”). But a third sort of relation, such as “to the left of”, are necessarily not symmetric, and we call this sort “asymmetric”. However, note that when relations are of a degree greater than dyadic we will have to qualify the notion of relational symmetry, because there are relations like “between” where a triadic relation between A, B, and C is symmetric in the sense that if B is between A and C, it is also between C and A, but it is asymmetric in the sense that if B is between A and C then it is not the case that A is between B and C. So we will always have to specify the symmetry relations of degrees greater than two to take this into account.

Having introduced these three primitive elements of our ontology, let me first say that there are controversies throughout the history of philosophy about every element of what I have said in this section and, indeed, throughout this entire work. A lot of philosophers out there would object to many of the moves I have made and to many of my positions. This is the nature of philosophy, and I neither begrudge them their disagreement nor intend to change my positions because of it. But I think that at this time it would pay to enunciate some of these positions and why I hold them.

1. I am a realist about properties, not a nominalist…I believe that objects and properties are both real and separate things because I observe the same object (let’s say one of those super-bouncy balls I used to get when I was a kid) have one set of properties at time t (let’s say the ball had the properties of “red”, “elastic”, and “spherical” when I bought it) and another different set of properties at time t+c (let’s say that, alas, a year later it had lost its former properties and gained the properties “pink”, “rigid”, and “cracked”). It seems to me clear that the ball is the same ball I bought from the little toy dispenser, not some different ball that has replaced the old one, and that its properties have changed. Both its history and its changes were continuous, I had it in my possession at all times, and everything I know about the laws of physics and chemistry lead me to expect that my poor bouncy ball would age in this fashion. Therefore I believe that I am justified in saying that I know that it was the same ball. In order for a change to occur in an object but for the identity of the object to remain the same, the change in the object must be explained by a change in properties, which presumes the existence of properties, and the ball itself must remain the same ball in which these different properties have manifested, which presumes the existence of objects. A nominalist with a scientific bent might object that what I observed as properties changing was actually innumerable tiny changes occurring in the molecular structure of the ball as it reacted to chemicals in the air and the substances within it went through various predictable chemical changes over time. I agree with this completely. But I will also point out that the reason the properties of the ball have changed are due to the interactions of the properties of the various subatomic objects that make up the ball and the air around it. In short, I believe in both objects and properties because as far down or up in reality we go, all the way down to individual quanta of energy, we keep finding objects that have properties.

2. I’m a realist about relations, in that I believe that relations are real things, distinct from objects and properties, not just potential features of objects or special kinds of properties that we just perceive as being related. The reason I believe this is that we see objects such as vortices, singularities, and even commonplace philosophical objects such as cats on mats and snow that is white, that all only exist as particular sets of relations between particular objects with particular properties. A vortex is a very particular set of relations of forces and matter…if the matter and forces fall out of that particular set of relations, the vortex ceases to be. The same is true about singularities, cats on mats, and snow that is white. All of the phenomena change as the relations that make them up change, and if the relations break down completely, the phenomena cease to exist. And this is generalizable throughout physical existence. All matter that we know of consists of subatomic objects arranged in very particular relations and if they lay in significantly different relations the matter changes in corresponding ways. In a similar way, abstract objects like functions, algorithms, and programs are made up of elementary abstract objects like numbers and logical operators in specific relations, and if those relations are significantly changed, those abstract objects change correspondingly. To me, this implies that relations bear metaphysical freight…they do part of the work of making reality what it is.

There are other controversies in ontology about all three of my primary elements. But as in the other parts of this work, this is not the place to go into these academic controversies, as staking a claim in academia is not the goal of this work. Instead, the goal of the present work is to create a foundation, a starting place for a later attempt at a systematic philosophy of magick that will build on the elements presented in this work. “Towards a Philosophy of Magick” is just the forerunner, just the voice in the wilderness, for this later work, and my audience is the mages and mystics who will hopefully benefit from it the most.

Now that we have established what exists (ontology), next we will talk about how what exists works together to do what it does (metaphysics).

[the-infinite-hotel]

Paradox's in a Nutshell

What do Back to the Future, Hotel California, math and the Umbrella Academy all have in common? They all belong to the confusingly straightforward world of paradoxes.You might be asking yourself as I have what is a paradox exactly, you’ve probably heard the word thrown around in regards to Sci-Fi novels or movies. Paradoxes exist everywhere you just don’t realize it yet. Webster defines a paradox as a statement that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true. If you have ever asked for advice for something but did not follow said advice? Have you given advice to someone but they just did not follow it? If you answered yes to any of these questions you are in a paradox, congrats!! The paradox that sums up this is people ask questions but they don’t want the answers. Now that is a paradox that people deal with on an everyday/semi daily basis, they are not all cut and dry. Now before we fully jump into this rabbit hole, we must recognize the rules of this adventure! Some guys categorized paradoxes and put them into different laws and classifications. The three laws that Patrick Hughes came up with were Self-reference, Contradiction, and Vicious circularity.

(source)

Willard Van Orman Quine came up with 2 classifications for paradoxes, one is the vertical paradox produces a result that appears absurd, but is demonstrated to be true nonetheless. The second one is a falsidical paradox that establishes a result that not only appears false but actually is false, due to a fallacy in the demonstration.

(source)

Throughout my blog I plan on putting different paradoxes I find into these laws and classifications and try to explain why they belong there. Now follow me as we dive into the confusingly straightforward world of paradoxes.

[philosophystudentorg]

Willard Quine's Legacy In 20th Century Thought | PhilosophyStudent.org

Meet Willard Van Orman Quine, a philosopher who changed our thoughts about knowledge and reality. Quine questioned old beliefs, suggesting that our understanding of the world is shaped by science. He introduced new ways to look at math and logic, and his ideas, like the “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” challenge us to think deeper about what is true. Please Visit our Website to get more information:…

[protestgradedunit]

paradox

a seemingly absurd or contradictory statement or proposition which when investigated may prove to be well-founded or true.

Willard Van Orman Quine’s classification of paradoxes

Veridical Paradox: establishes a result that appears to be absurd but is demonstrated to be true nonetheless

Falsidical paradox: establishes a result that not only appears false but is actually false as a result of a mistaken belief

[honeyleesblog]

June 25 ZODIAC

Close to home and strict: they are grouchy and variable simultaneously. They can undoubtedly squeeze into varying backgrounds and effectively switch companions. They are solid and extremely influential individuals. Their interests are areas of strength for extremely, their propensities frequently mislead them. They are drawn to the other gender. In the event that you are cautious you will come by a decent outcome. Barely any times in their lives will they fall affected by others. They have solid respect and a great deal of adoration for studies, which would ultimately raise them to a conspicuous scholastic position. They frequently carry on with a desolate existence, and for the most part concentrate abroad. A lady brought into the world on this day is very lovely, with a well disposed, dynamic, fairly hurried outside. In any case, she docilely quiets down. She will have youngsters and will be exceptionally joined to them. Somewhat modest and not fair 100% of the time. She tracks down joy in helping other people and really focusing on the feeble. Individuals conceived today are by and large miserable in their childhood. Nonetheless, everything improves as the years go by: their position settles, they become prosperous, and their state of mind improves decisively. [caption id="attachment_19280" align="aligncenter" June 25 ZODIAC

  Zodiac sign for those brought into the world on June 25 Assuming your birthday is June 25, your zodiac sign is Malignant growth June 25 - character and character character: levelheaded, clever, liberal, languid, weak, miserable calling: designer, anesthesiologist, financial analyst tones: dim, purple, child blue stone: sea blue creature: tiger plant: pampas grass fortunate numbers: 2,26,30,33,40,59 very fortunate number: 2 Occasions and observances - June 25 Sailors Day World Vitiligo Day (wikidata) Spain: Jacetania: patronal feast out of appreciation for St Nick Orosia. Ecuador: Machala: Cantonization celebrations. World Enemy of bullfighting Day. Mozambique: Freedom Day Spain: Alto Gდ¡llego: patronal feast to pay tribute to St Nick Orosia. June 25 Superstar birthday celebrations. Who was conceived that very day as you? 1900: Louis Mountbatten, English legislator (d. 1979). 1901: Giacomo Debenedetti, Italian essayist. 1903: George Orwell, English essayist and writer. 1903: Anne Respect, American entertainer. 1907: J. Hans D. Jensen, German physicist (d. 1973). 1908: Willard Van Orman Quine, American savant (d. 2000). 1911: William Howard Stein, American organic chemist. 1913: Cyril Fletcher, English humorist (d. 2005). 1917: Rafael Banquells, Mexican entertainer (d. 1990). 1922: Antonio Bienvenida, Spanish matador (d. 1975). 1923: Sam Francis, American painter 1924: Sidney Lumet, American movie producer (d. 2011). 1924: Luis Suდ¡rez Fernდ¡ndez, Spanish history specialist. 1924: Robert Venturi, American designer. 1925: Raდºl Rossi, Argentine entertainer (f. 1993). 1925: June Lockhart, American entertainer. 1926: Ingeborg Bachmann, Austrian author (d. 1973). 1928: Aleksდ©i Aleksდ©yevich Abrikosov, Russian physicist. 1928: Peyo, Belgian illustrator (d. 1992). 1928: Alex Toth, Spanish illustrator (f. 2006). 1928: Nito Veiga, Argentine soccer player and mentor (d. 2004). 1929: Eric Carle, American author. 1930: George Murdock, American entertainer (d. 2012). 1932: Peter Blake, English craftsman. 1933 - James Meredith, American common freedoms extremist. 1933: დ?lvaro Siza Vieira, Portuguese designer. 1933: Josდ© Marდ­a Aroca Ruiz-Funes, Spanish legislator (d. 2010). 1934: Beatriz Sheridan, Mexican entertainer and chief (d. 2006). 1936: Jusuf Habibie, Indonesian president. 1937: Obuchi Keizo, Japanese legislator, head of the state somewhere in the range of 1998 and 2000. 1940: Claudia Lapacდ³, Argentine entertainer. 1941: Denys Arcand, Canadian movie producer. 1942: Willis Reed, American b-ball player. 1942: Manolo Otero, Spanish entertainer and vocalist (d. 2011). 1945: Carly Simon, American vocalist. 1946: Romeo Dallaire, Canadian congressperson. 1946: Ian McDonald, English performer, of the band Lord Red. 1948: Manuel Bento, Portuguese footballer. 1948: Antonio Catalდ¡n, Spanish financial specialist. 1948: Manuel Guerrero, Chilean socialist pioneer, death of the "Degollados Case" (d. 1986). 1949: Patrick Tambay, French Recipe 1 driver. 1951: Eva Bayer-Fluckiger, Swiss mathematician. 1952: Al Parker, American pornography entertainer, chief and maker (d. 1992). 1954: David Paich, American performer, of the band Toto. 1954: Lina Romay, Spanish entertainer. 1956: Boris Trajkovski, Macedonian president (d. 2004). 1958: Noemდ­ Alan, entertainer and Argentine celebrity. 1958: Belდ©n Marrero, Venezuelan entertainer, performer and telecaster. 1959: Juan Francisco Munoz Melo, Spanish handball player. 1961: Ricky Gervais, English humorist. 1961: Carlos Alberto Telleldდ­n, Argentine attorney and criminal. 1962: Ricardo Iorio, Argentine bassist and vocalist. 1963: George Michael, English performer of Greek beginning. 1963: Yann Martel, Canadian author. 1964: Johnny Herbert, English dashing driver. 1964: Emma Suდ¡rez, Spanish entertainer. 1966: Dikembe Mutombo, Congolese b-ball player. 1968: Oleg Taktarov, Russian military craftsman. 1969: Zim Zum, American guitarist, of the band Marilyn Manson. 1969: Colin Greenwood, American bassist, of the band Radiohead. 1970: Paula Almerares, Argentine soprano. 1970: Erki Nool, Estonian competitor. 1971: Angela Kinsey, American entertainer. 1971: Neil Lennon, Northern Irish footballer. 1972: Carlos Delgado, Puerto Rican baseball player. 1972: Mike Kroeger, American performer, of the band Nickelback. 1972: Jon Maia, versolari, Basque vocalist, essayist and documentarian. 1973: Jamie Redknapp, English footballer. 1974: Jim LaMarca, American guitarist, of the band Chimaira. 1974: Paola Farდ­as, Ecuadorian model, entertainer and vocalist. 1974: Lauren Faust, American performer. 1975: Linda Cardellini, American entertainer. 1975: Chenoa, Spanish vocalist brought into the world in Argentina. 1975: Albert Costa, Spanish tennis player. 1975: Natasha Klauss, Colombian entertainer. 1975: Vladimir Krდ¡mnik, Soviet chess player. 1977: Lola Ponce, Argentine vocalist. 1978: Layla El, American expert grappler. 1978: Chuckie, Dutch DJ and maker of Surinamese drop. 1978: Aramis Ramდ­rez, Dominican baseball player. 1980: Inma Cuesta, Spanish entertainer. 1981: Simon Ammann, Swiss ski jumper. 1982: Sakai Hiroaki, Japanese guitarist, of the band 12012. 1982: Downpour, South Korean vocalist. 1982: Mikhail Yuzhny, Russian tennis player. 1983: Mabel Moreno, Colombian entertainer 1985: Scott Brown, Scottish footballer. 1986: Aya Matsuura, Japanese vocalist. 1987: Claudio Corti, Italian bike racer 1989: Carolina Miranda, Mexican entertainer, moderator and model. 1996: Lele Pons, Venezuelan web big name, artist and entertainer

[sabakos]

Oh hey it's online

The Times (London). Saturday, May 9, 1992 Sir, The University of Cambridge is to ballot on May 16 on whether M. Jacques Derrida should be allowed to go forward to receive an honorary degree. As philosophers and others who have taken a scholarly and professional interest in M. Derrida's remarkable career over the years, we believe the following might throw some needed light on the public debate that has arisen over this issue. Derrida describes himself as a philosopher, and his writings do indeed bear some of the marks of writings in that discipline. Their influence, however, has been to a striking degree almost entirely in fields outside philosophy – in departments of film studies, for example, or of French and English literature. In the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among those working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the world, M. Derrida's work does not meet accepted standards of clarity and rigour. We submit that, if the works of a physicist (say) were similarly taken to be of merit primarily by those working in other disciplines, this would in itself be sufficient grounds for casting doubt upon the idea that the physicist in question was a suitable candidate for an honorary degree. Derrida's career had its roots in the heady days of the 1960s and his writings continue to reveal their origins in that period. Many of them seem to consist in no small part of elaborate jokes and puns (‘logical phallusies’ and the like), and M. Derrida seems to us to have come close to making a career out of what we regard as translating into the academic sphere tricks and gimmicks similar to those of the Dadaists or of the concrete poets. Certainly he has shown considerable originality in this respect. But again, we submit, such originality does not lend credence to the idea that he is a suitable candidate for an honorary degree. Many French philosophers see in M. Derrida only cause for silent embarrassment, his antics having contributed significantly to the widespread impression that contemporary French philosophy is little more than an object of ridicule. Derrida's voluminous writings in our view stretch the normal forms of academic scholarship beyond recognition. Above all – as every reader can very easily establish for himself (and for this purpose any page will do) – his works employ a written style that defies comprehension. Many have been willing to give M. Derrida the benefit of the doubt, insisting that language of such depth and difficulty of interpretation must hide deep and subtle thoughts indeed. When the effort is made to penetrate it, however, it becomes clear, to us at least, that, where coherent assertions are being made at all, these are either false or trivial. Academic status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university. Yours sincerely, Barry Smith (Editor, The Monist) Hans Albert (University of Mannheim) David Armstrong (Sydney) Ruth Barcan Marcus (Yale) Keith Campbell (Sydney) Richard Glauser (Neuchâtel) Rudolf Haller (Graz) Massimo Mugnai (Florence) Kevin Mulligan (Geneva) Lorenzo Peña (Madrid) Willard van Orman Quine (Harvard) Wolfgang Röd (Innsbruck) Karl Schuhmann (Utrecht) Daniel Schulthess (Neuchâtel) Peter Simons (Salzburg) René Thom (Burs-sur-Yvette) Dallas Willard (Los Angeles) Jan Wolenski (Cracow)

Based.

[perkwunos]

Then take the materialist turn. We deny Cartesian dualism by denying one of its terms. There is no “mental substance,” everything is matter, and thinking itself arises out of matter. This is the kind of position which Quine espoused, for instance. And yet Quine re-created a similar structure in the new metaphysical context. Our knowledge comes to us through “surface irritations,” the points in our receptors where the various stimuli from the environment impinge. It is these which are the basis of our knowledge. Alternatively, he sometimes takes the immediate description of what is impinging, observation sentences, as basic, and he sees the edifice of science as built under the requirement that shows how (most of) these hold. In either variant, there is a mediational, or “only through,” structure here. The proof of the indeterminacy of translation, of the uncertainty of reference, of the plurality of scientific accounts comes from considerations that the choice between different ontological or scientific postulates will always remain not fully determined by these basic starting points.

“Inner” is being given a materialist sense here, in this “naturalized epistemology.” Our knowledge of the external world comes in “through” the receptors, and so they define the boundary, only in a “scientific,” and not a “metaphysical,” way. Similarly, we see the Cartesian structure repeated in various conjectures about a brain in a vat, which might be fooled into thinking that it was really in an embodied agent in a world, as long as a fiendish scientist was giving it the right input. Just as the old epistemology worried that as long as the contents of our minds remain the same, some evil demon might be controlling the input so that the world could change without our being any the wiser, so contemporaries re-edit a structurally similar nightmare concerning the brain. This has become the material replacement of the mind, supposedly because it is what causally underlies thinking. The mediational structure, and the mediating interface of inputs (now controlled by the fiendish scientist), and hence a parallel “only through” claim, all survive the “materialist” transposition.

If one asks the proponent of the brain-in-the-vat hypothesis why he focuses on the brain, he will reply something to the effect that thinking “supervenes on” the brain. But how does he know this? How do we know that you don’t need more than the brain, maybe the brain and nervous system, or maybe even the whole organism, or (more likely) the whole organism in its environment, in order to get what we understand as perception and thinking? The answer is that no one knows. The brain-in-the-vat hypothesis only looks plausible because of the force of the mediational structure, our captivity in the picture implicit in modern epistemology, which requires something to play the role of “inside.”

Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism

[tagitables]

Willard Van Orman Quine

[warningsine]

Hume's Fork, Logical Positivism, & Quine | THUNK

[phansterdam]

noam chomsky and willard van orman quine are the ultimate enemies-to-lovers pairing. no i will not be taking questions at this time

[katabasiss]

i cant believe willard van orman quine in his “quantifiers and propositional attitudes", from 1956 had the nerve to steal perry the platypus' arc smh like come on now willard be a little more subtle in ur plagiarism

[nyxxycat]

I see Willard Van Orman Quine, I run.