#Watergate Special Prosecutor

[deadpresidents]

Are there any studies on how this country might've changed if Ford had not pardoned Nixon? Is it likely that the DOJ would've indicated Nixon and is it likely that Nixon would've been impeached and convicted?

Nixon 100% would have been impeached and convicted and removed from office. The House Judiciary Committee had already voted to impeach Nixon about a week-and-a-half before he resigned, so the next step would have been impeachment by the full House of Representatives. That would have triggered the trial in the Senate.

The reason Nixon resigned was because Senate Republican leaders like Barry Goldwater and Hugh Scott went to the White House and told him that he was finished and that even they would be voting to convict him once he was impeached.

Whether or not Nixon would have been indicted if Ford had not pardoned him is hard to know, but at the end of the chapter about President Ford's pardon of Nixon in Richard Norton Smith's recent book, An Ordinary Man: The Surprising Life and Historic Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (BOOK | KINDLE | AUDIO), Smith reveals:

Among Ford's privately stated reasons for pardoning Nixon was his desire to relieve Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski of responsibility for deciding the former President's legal fate. The irony of this position was revealed only after he left office. In June 1982, ABC News marked ten years since the Watergate break-in by assembling seven of the twenty-three grand jurors originally summoned to investigate the Nixon White House. As they told it, prosecutors answering to Jaworski had drawn up a four-count indictment charging Nixon with "bribery, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and obstruction of a criminal investigation." All it required for implementation was a formal jury vote and two signatures -- those of the jury foreman and the special prosecutor. The grand jurors were unanimously prepared to endorse such a course. Jaworski was not. Arguing that no precedent existed for indicting a sitting President, he had persuaded the grand jury to instead forward its evidence to the House Judiciary Committee for possible impeachment proceedings. With Nixon's August 1974 resignation, the issue of Presidential guilt resurfaced. Jaworski's deputy Philip Lacovara argued for an indictment of the now-former President, a view widely held among the prosecutorial staff and seconded by members of the grand jury. Jaworski thought he had suffered enough. In reality, Jaworski had never intended to put Nixon on trial if he could possibly avoid it. Ford's pardon saved him from publicly disclosing this reluctance, something he confided before his death in October 1982 to [former Defense Secretary] Mel Laird and Houston Congressman William Archer, both instrumental in his original appointment.

[dreaminginthedeepsouth]

LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

August 8, 2024

Heather Cox Richardson

Aug 09, 2024

Fifty years ago, on August 9, 1974, Richard M. Nixon became the first president in U.S. history to resign.

The road to that resignation began in 1971, when Daniel Ellsberg, who was at the time an employee of the RAND Corporation and thus had access to a top-secret Pentagon study of the way U.S. leaders had made decisions about the Vietnam War, leaked that study to major U.S. newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post. 

The Pentagon Papers showed that every president from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon B. Johnson had lied to the public about events in Vietnam, and Nixon worried that “enemies” would follow the Pentagon Papers with a leak of information about his own decision-making to destroy his administration and hand the 1972 election to a Democrat. 

The FBI seemed to Nixon reluctant to believe he was being stalked by enemies. So the president organized his own Special Investigations Unit out of the White House to stop leaks. And who stops leaks? Plumbers. 

The plumbers burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist in California, hoping to find something to discredit him, then moved on to bigger targets. Together with the Committee to Re-elect the President (fittingly dubbed CREEP as its activities became known), they planted fake letters in newspapers declaring support for Nixon and hatred for his opponents, spied on Democrats, and hired vendors for Democratic rallies and then scarpered on the bills. Finally, they set out to wiretap the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, in the fashionable Watergate office complex.

Early in the morning of June 17, 1972, Watergate security guard Frank Wills noticed that a door lock had been taped open. He ripped off the tape and closed the door, but on his next round, he found the door taped open again. Wills called the police, who arrested five men ransacking the DNC’s files. 

The White House immediately denounced what it called a “third-rate burglary attempt,” and the Watergate break-in gained no traction before the 1972 election, which Nixon and Vice-President Spiro Agnew won with an astonishing 60.7% of the popular vote. 

But Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, two young Washington Post reporters, followed the sloppy money trail back to the White House, and by March 1973 the scheme was unraveling. One of the burglars, James W. McCord Jr., wrote a letter to Judge John Sirica before his sentencing claiming he had lied at his trial to protect government officials. Sirica made the letter public, and White House counsel John Dean immediately began cooperating with prosecutors.

In April, three of Nixon’s top advisors resigned, and in May the president was forced to appoint former solicitor general of the United States Archibald Cox as a special prosecutor to investigate the affair. That same month, the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, informally known as the Senate Watergate Committee, began nationally televised hearings. The committee’s chair was Sam Ervin (D-NC), a conservative Democrat who would not run for reelection in 1974 and thus was expected to be able to do the job without political grandstanding.

The hearings turned up the explosive testimony of John Dean, who said he had talked to Nixon about covering up the burglary more than 30 times, but there the investigation sat during the hot summer of 1973 as the committee churned through witnesses. And then, on July 13, 1973, deputy assistant to the president Alexander Butterfield revealed the bombshell news that conversations and phone calls in the Oval Office had been taped since 1971.

Nixon refused to provide copies of the tapes either to Cox or to the Senate committee. When Cox subpoenaed a number of the tapes, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire him. In the October 20, 1973, “Saturday Night Massacre,” Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, refused to execute Nixon’s order and resigned in protest; it was only the third man at the Justice Department—Solicitor General Robert Bork—who was willing to carry out the order firing Cox.

Popular outrage at the resignations and firing forced Nixon to ask Bork—now acting attorney general—to appoint a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, a Democrat who had voted for Nixon, on November 1. On November 17, Nixon assured the American people that “I am not a crook.”

Like Cox before him, Jaworski was determined to hear the Oval Office tapes. He subpoenaed a number of them. Nixon fought the subpoenas on the grounds of executive privilege. On July 24, 1974, in U.S. v. Nixon, the Supreme Court sided unanimously with the prosecutor, saying that executive privilege “must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.'... The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts….”

Their hand forced, Nixon’s people released transcripts of the tapes. They were damning, not just in content but also in style. Nixon had cultivated an image of himself as a clean family man, but the tapes revealed a mean-spirited, foul-mouthed bully. Aware that the tapes would damage his image, Nixon had his swearing redacted. “[Expletive deleted]” trended.

In late July 1974, the House Committee on the Judiciary passed articles of impeachment, charging the president with obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress. Each article ended with the same statement: “In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.”

And then, on August 5, in response to a subpoena, the White House released a tape recorded on June 23, 1972, just six days after the Watergate break-in, that showed Nixon and his aide H.R. Haldeman plotting to invoke national security to protect the president. Even Republican senators, who had not wanted to convict their president, knew the game was over. A delegation went to the White House to deliver the news to the president that he must resign or be impeached by the full House and convicted by the Senate.

In his resignation speech, Nixon refused to acknowledge that he had done anything wrong. Instead, he told the American people he had to step down because he no longer had the support he needed in Congress to advance the national interest. He blamed the press, whose “leaks and accusations and innuendo” had been designed to destroy him. His disappointed supporters embraced the idea that there was a “liberal” conspiracy, spearheaded by the press, to bring down any Republican president.

LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

HEATHER COX RICHARDSON

[mariacallous]

On Aug. 8, 1974, Republican U.S. President Richard Nixon shocked the nation. Following more than a year of multiple investigations into his administration over the Watergate scandal, Nixon went on television and announced that he would be resigning from office the following day.

“To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the president and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home,” Nixon said as the nation watched. “Therefore, I shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow.”

Less than two years earlier, Nixon had defeated South Dakota Sen. George McGovern, the Democratic Party’s candidate, in a landslide victory that pundits had compared to former President Franklin Roosevelt’s historic reelection in 1936. But now, Nixon became the first president in the nation’s history to step down before finishing his term. Americans were stunned and relieved. But even as Nixon’s administration has come to represent the ultimate rupture of a presidency, his was in fact the third consecutive administration to end in disruption in the mid-20th century. John F. Kennedy had been assassinated in November 1963. Lyndon Johnson had unexpectedly withdrawn from his reelection campaign in 1968. And then, six years later, Nixon would resign.

Nor was the outcome inevitable, as it may seem today. Nixon had fought when Congress, a grand jury, special prosecutors, judges, and reporters tried to find out what his role had been in the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in June 1972, and whether he had obstructed subsequent investigations. Just a few days before Nixon’s announcement, a mere 31 percent of Republicans polled by Gallup felt that he should no longer hold the office.

The pressure had mounted. On July 24, in United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court ruled that the president must turn over secret White House tape recordings—one of which contained a “smoking gun” in which legislators could hear him in a conversation with advisor H.R. Haldeman, agreeing that they should persuade the CIA to stop the FBI from looking into the matter. On Aug. 7, Sen. Barry Goldwater, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, and House Minority Leader John Rhodes—all Republicans—met with Nixon and said that if the House voted to send them articles of impeachment, which seemed likely, many in the GOP would join the Democrats in voting to remove him from office. Nixon’s job approval, according to Gallup, fell to 24 percent, with more than a majority of the country thinking he should leave. That’s what he did.

On Aug. 9, at 9:31 a.m., the president entered into the East Room with the first lady, Pat Nixon, and addressed a small group of cabinet officials, friends, and supporters. As he held back tears during different moments of his talk, Nixon advised everyone who was surrounding him: “Aways give your best. Never get discouraged, never be petty. Always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don’t win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself.”

He then went down to the Diplomatic Reception Room, where he wished the new president, Gerald Ford, good luck. Nixon walked up the staircase to the helicopter that was waiting for him outside, turned to look at the White House one last time as president, waved with his fingers shaped as a “V” for victory, and then flew off to Andrews Air Force Base, where Air Force One brought him back to California.

“With his departure,” wrote Jules Witcover in the Washington Post on Aug. 9, “he leaves behind a political legacy of negativism that far transcends the damage to his own party.”

Nixon’s presidency came to an abrupt end, but the resignation was just the final stage of a tumultuous era. The nation had been embroiled in fierce internal battles over issues such civil rights and the war in Vietnam. College campuses had been rocked by ongoing protest. Even the clothing that a person chose to wear sent strong signals about what they stood for. The Democratic Convention in August 1968 in Chicago had been a fiasco. The whole world watched as anti-war activists clashed with Mayor Richard Daley’s police force; inside the convention, anti-war delegates fought with supporters of then-Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who had become the nominee when Johnson withdrew from the race

And all of this took place after there had been a series of assassinations that started with Kennedy. When Martin Luther King Jr. was killed in Memphis, Tennessee, in April 1968, unrest swept through major cities. When an assassin killed one of the late president’s brothers, Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, in June, many young people lost all hope.

It is not a surprise that in 1974, Knopf published Robert Caro’s The Power Broker, a masterful work that would come to be considered one of the greatest nonfiction books of the century. Caro traced the career of the legendary unelected civil servant Robert Moses, who started his career as an idealistic reformer but ended as someone who did whatever was necessary, and to whomever, in his quest for total power. “The real lesson of Moses’ career,” wrote a reviewer in the Los Angeles Times, “and it is not nearly so difficult to understand in light of recent events such as Watergate—is the way the techniques of opinion manipulation and power use can operate within democracy.”

But another perspective suggested that perhaps Nixon’s resignation demonstrated that “the system worked,” with the optimists wanting to believe that a scandalous president being forced to give up power would restore the trust in government and elected officials that Vietnam and Watergate had stolen from them.

“No one can rejoice in the events which culminated in the resignation of the President,” noted American Bar Association President Chesterfield Smith in a newspaper interview. “We can, however, find comfort in the fact that … when our system for the administration of justice was tested—by perhaps its greatest challenge of all time—that system proved equal to the task.”

Such feelings did not last long. History took a different turn, and public distrust of government worsened. In 2024, Americans have trouble believing that their leaders will serve the public interest. According to Pew, a mere 22 percent trust the federal government to do what is right “just about always.” Though there have been some moments of improvement, such as at times during Ronald Reagan’s presidency and in the years immediately after 9/11, the public trust percentages upward of 70 percent that were normative in the early 1960s currently feel impossible to recreate. Even in recent years, when trust has grown slightly higher, positive numbers remain far lower than before.

So why didn’t Nixon’s resignation make things better? How did an act of such massive historical weight fail to cure the ills that were afflicting the body politic?

To begin with, Richard Nixon was never held accountable. Just one month after he told Americans that he was stepping down, his successor, Ford—who Nixon had appointed to be his vice president in 1973, when Spiro Agnew resigned in scandal—pardoned Nixon for any crimes that he might have committed. Seeking to heal the nation, Ford did the opposite. Nixon, who in 1977 told television interviewer David Frost that if a president did something, then it was legal, went on to have a career writing books and giving advice to future leaders. Rather than a criminal, he was treated as a statesman.

Public distrust also never went away because Vietnam and Watergate created a more vigilant outlook, with institutional support, as more people on both the left and right were constantly on the lookout for wrongdoing. Investigative journalists, nonprofit organizations, and good government groups such as a Common Cause were determined to keep holding elected officials accountable. So Americans naturally learned more about the bad things that politicians could do, such as when Sen. Frank Church’s committee revealed the illicit activities of the CIA during the Cold War, as the forces of reform struggled to clean the government so that it work be better. The quest for improvement tapped into a distrust of government that had always been part of the United States since its founding, when the country was created in a rebellion against a corrupt and oppressive British government.

Had this healthy skepticism been balanced with messages about the virtues of what Washington could do, such as when elderly Americans received health care through Medicare or poor young kids received nutrition through school lunch programs, public opinion might have improved. But instead, a conservative movement swept through the nation. Conservatism targeted the ills of government. As Reagan declared in his inaugural address, “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”

These feelings only intensified as more conservatism became more entrenched in politics and as the United States moved further away from Roosevelt’s New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society. Even some Democratic leaders such as President Bill Clinton, though still liberal, embraced Reagan’s logic as well. During his State of the Union address in 1996, Clinton proclaimed that “the era of big government” was “over.”

As if all of this was not enough, the intensification of hyperpolarization over the past two decades has caused red and blue Americans to distrust officials from the other side. To be sure, strong partisanship is a good thing. Robust parties offer Americans real mechanisms within the mainstream political system to express differences and to struggle over policy. Parties have helped to provide coherence to the country’s incredibly fragmented government.

But when “affective polarization” became normative, as political scientist such as Liliana Mason have argued, intense emotionalism left members of each party disliking the other and disgusted by their opponents to the point that there could be no reconciliation. Fundamental differences have been supplanted by fundamental distrust. And social media has created multiple opportunities to spread all kind of information regardless of its veracity, which further fuels these feelings.

Besides the sorts of tensions that this culture of distrust has created, the sentiment also makes it more difficult for the government that we all need to survive, thrive, and do good work.

Rather than hoping that somehow conditions will miraculously change, the time has come for a new reform agenda, where the country’s elected officials take the concerns that were at the root of the good-faith skepticism that took hold when Nixon stepped down. Instead of just railing against those in charge, Americans need more dialogue about improving processes, procedures, and rules—while demanding better leadership—in order to produce a government that is always looking out for the national interest.

[grits-galraisedinthesouth]

Judge Cannon Dismisses Classified Documents Case Against Trump - The New York Times

Deep State Panic Button:

(Now Arrest Merrick Garland & Jack Smith!)

"Judge Dismisses Classified Documents Case Against Trump

Judge Aileen Cannon ruled that the entire case should be thrown out because the appointment of the special counsel who brought the case, Jack Smith, had violated the Constitution. Her decision is sure to be appealed.

The Alto Lee Adams Sr. U.S. Courthouse in Fort Pierce, Fla., where Judge Aileen Cannon is hearing the classified documents case.Credit...Saul Martinez for The New York Times

By Alan Feuer July 15, 2024, 10:05 a.m.

A federal judge dismissed in its entirety the classified documents case against former President Donald J. Trump on Monday, ruling that the appointment of the special counsel, Jack Smith, had violated the Constitution.

In a stunning ruling, the judge, Aileen M. Cannon, found that because Mr. Smith had not been named to the post of special counsel by the president or confirmed by the Senate, his appointment was in violation of the appointments clause of the Constitution.

The ruling by Judge Cannon, who was put on the bench by Mr. Trump, flew in the face of previous court decisions reaching back to the Watergate era that upheld the legality of the ways in which independent prosecutors have been named. And in a single swoop, it removed a major legal threat against Mr. Trump on the first day of the Republican National Convention, where he is set to formally become the party’s nominee for president.

Mr. Smith’s team will almost certainly appeal the ruling by Judge Cannon throwing out the classified documents indictment, which charges Mr. Trump with illegally holding onto a trove of highly sensitive state secrets after he left office and then obstructing the government’s repeated efforts to retrieve them."

[robin-the-blind-sniper-rifle]

I definitely would like to say, now that everything is over, it is not the time to stop fighting. The Biden Administration needs to spend its last two months in office preparing to stop the orange from pardoning himself. The first thing to be done is to do everything they possibly can to protect the Department of Justice from being abolished. Here’s why.

In 1974, two years after the first revelation of Watergate and Nixon’s treason, the US Department of Justice implemented an addition to the constitution stating that the president is not allowed to pardon himself under the fundamental rule that no one can be a judge in his own case. Unfortunately, this addendum is quite vague, but it still exists as long as the Department of Justice exists. Henceforth why we should protect it.

I’m sure the question is “why does the addendum matter if it’s broad and based on a fundamental principle that not everyone shares?” Here’s why.

The idea of a presidential pardon originated from the royal pardon the king of Britain had. While it was on paper, the royal pardon of the king meant nothing. He was the king, and the king could do no wrong under the monarchical system, therefore making himself invulnerable to any offenses unless he were deposed or executed. Why does this matter? We’re not a monarchy, that’s not how this country operates (ideally).

Exactly.

The president is not the king. The president is the president until he isn’t for one reason or another. The president is meant to be bound by the limits of the Constitution and a self pardon would mean an imposition of said Constitution. Allowing a president to pardon himself would mean allowing him to project his power past his term, past his authority, in a way that doesn’t sit well with the system or the people.

The concerns with the way such a broken system (the one we have now) would operate under this framework are very valid. He wants to stack the Senate with yes men who will make flimsy legal arguments for his case; he wants to stack the courts with judges who support him; he wants to wipe his prosecutors from existence. But here’s what he doesn’t think about, something we need to hold onto.

In a world where he does pardon or attempt to pardon himself, it is easily grounds for impeachment, simple as that. He can try to do it and then it’s up to the courts to decide which way they want to go with it in terms of allowance. I won’t pretend to know or even guess the outcome of such a debate because there is no precedent and it could go either way.

But.

People like us, like Jack Smith (the special counsel of the Department of Justice still prosecuting the orange) still exist. So sign petitions, whatever you can find. Don’t embroil yourself in doomsday media. Most importantly, hold onto the hope that justice will be done.

We didn’t get a blue president, but we can still put the orange one behind bars the way he deserves

[foreverlogical]

It long had seemed that the “stall” would be the worst thing the Supreme Court could do when it came to Donald Trump’s claim of immunity from prosecution. How naive.

Delay there will be. The six justices in the Republican-appointed supermajority held, “A former president is entitled to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his ‘conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority.’” They added, “There is no immunity for unofficial acts.” Rather than make clear that trying to overthrow the Constitution’s peaceful transfer of power is not an official act, the justices send the whole matter back to trial judge Tanya Chutkan. Expect more consideration, more parsing, more rulings, more appeals. It will all likely end up at the Supreme Court again in a year, if the whole prosecution isn’t shut down entirely.

But damage to our system goes well beyond delay. Trump v. U.S. astounds in its implications. It grants the president the power of a monarch. Richard Nixon defended his conduct in Watergate, telling interviewer David Frost, “When the president does it, that means it’s not illegal.” Effectively, the Supreme Court’s supermajority has now enshrined that brazen claim.

To be clear, there are reasons to be nervous about prosecuting former chief executives, so some standards make sense. In this case, though, the Court has issued an instruction manual for future lawbreaking presidents: Make sure you conspire only with other government employees. You’ll never be held to account. 

What makes something an official act? “In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives,” the justices ruled. And a jury cannot learn about the other parts of a criminal conspiracy that may involve official acts.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett did not agree with this last critical point. She said that of course juries can consider the context of a criminal act. Neither Justice Samuel Alito (who flew insurrectionist flags outside his two homes) nor Justice Clarence Thomas (whose wife was on the Ellipse on January 6) recused themselves. They cast the deciding votes to keep from jurors the full story of the attempted overthrow of the Constitution. 

The founders said repeatedly that presidents have no special immunity, as a brief filed by the Brennan Center on behalf of top historians made plain. After all, that was one of the very things about the British monarchy that they hated and against which they rebelled.

Even more directly, this ruling undoes the restrictions on presidential abuse of power put in place by officials and jurists of both parties since the 1970s.

The imperial presidency described an age of growing executive authority and abuse of power. It came crashing to an end during Watergate and after revelations about the misuse of intelligence and law enforcement by Nixon’s predecessors.

The presidential immunity concocted today would have blessed most of Nixon’s crimes. Nixon ordered his White House counsel to pay hush money to burglars in an Oval Office meeting on March 21, 1973. Presumptively an official act? He dangled clemency before E. Howard Hunt, one of the conspirators. Use of the pardon power — entirely immune? He resigned when a tape revealed he had ordered the CIA to go to the FBI to end the investigation of the burglars sent by his campaign committee. “Play it tough,” he told his White House chief of staff. On its face, official.

What about other criminal cases involving high officials? In the Iran-Contra scandal of the late 1980s, numerous officials were charged (including the national security advisor and the defense secretary). Ronald Reagan faced no charges, but not because he was presumed immune. What if he did break the law — would he have escaped accountability? In 2001, federal prosecutors probed whether Bill Clinton sold pardons. They cleared him — but issuing a pardon is surely an official act.

In her dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor said it plainly: “Under [the majority’s] rule, any use of official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt purpose indicated by objective evidence of the most corrupt motives and intent, remains official and immune. Under the majority’s test, if it can be called a test, the category of Presidential action that can be deemed ‘unofficial’ is destined to be vanishingly small.” 

So, yes, all this will delay Trump’s trial. In that sense, he gets what he craved. But the implications are far worse for the structure of American self-government.

It is a massive failure for Chief Justice John Roberts. The other major rulings on presidential accountability for legal wrongdoing have been unanimous. U.S. v. Nixon (limiting executive privilege) was written by the Republican chief justice Nixon appointed, and it was unanimous. Clinton v. Jones (opening the president to civil suit even while in office) was unanimous. Let’s grant that Roberts is an institutionalist. He is presiding over the collapse of public trust in the very institution he purports to revere.

And Trump v. U.S. has enormous implications for the future of the presidency. Remember that utterly bonkers hypothetical from the appeals court argument — that a president could order SEAL Team Six to assassinate an opponent? Sotomayor again: “A hypothetical President who admits to having ordered the assassinations of his political rivals or critics . . . has a fair shot at getting immunity under the majority’s new Presidential accountability model.” 

We read sonorous language in the majority opinion that “the president is not above the law.” But just in time for Independence Day, the Supreme Court brings us closer to having a king again.

[vote-democrat-president-congress]

Trump secretly sent covid tests to Putin during 2020 shortage, new book says

“War,” by Bob Woodward, traces how Trump and Biden responded to international crisis and concludes that Trump is worse than Nixon, the president exiled by the Watergate scandal.

By Isaac Stanley-Becker October 8, 2024 at 8:56 a.m. EDT As the coronavirus tore through the world in 2020, and the United States and other countries confronted a shortage of tests designed to detect the illness, then-President Donald Trump secretly sent coveted tests to Russian President Vladimir Putin for his personal use.

Cut through the 2024 election noise. Get The Campaign Moment newsletter. Putin, petrified of the virus, accepted the supplies but took pains to prevent political fallout — not for him, but for his American counterpart. He cautioned Trump not to reveal that he had dispatched the scarce medical equipment to Moscow, according to a new book by Washington Post associate editor Bob Woodward.

Putin, according to the book, told Trump, “I don’t want you to tell anybody because people will get mad at you, not me.”

Four years later, the personal relationship between the two men appears to have persisted, Woodward reports, as Trump campaigns to return to the White House and Putin orchestrates his bloody assault on Ukraine. In early 2024, the former president ordered an aide away from his office at Mar-a-Lago, his private club and residence in Florida, so he could conduct a private phone call with the Russian leader, according to Woodward’s account.

The book does not describe what the two men purportedly discussed, and it quotes a Trump campaign official casting doubt on the supposed contact. But the unnamed Trump aide cited in the book indicated that the GOP standard-bearer may have spoken to Putin as many as seven times since Trump left the White House in 2021.

These interactions between Trump and the authoritarian leader of a country at war with an American ally form the basis of Woodward’s conclusion that Trump is worse than Richard M. Nixon, whose presidency was undone by the Watergate scandal exposed a half-century ago by Woodward and his Washington Post colleague Carl Bernstein.

“Trump was the most reckless and impulsive president in American history and is demonstrating the very same character as a presidential candidate in 2024,” Woodward writes in the book, “War,” which is set to be released Oct. 15.

The Trump campaign did not respond to a request for comment.

With publication on the eve of the presidential election, Woodward, who has chronicled the successes and failures of U.S. presidents for 50 years, concludes that Trump is unfit for office while President Joe Biden and his team, mistakes notwithstanding, exhibited “steady and purposeful leadership.” Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential nominee, makes several appearances in the narrative, with Woodward presenting her as a shrewd and loyal No. 2 to Biden but not an influential voice in his administration’s foreign policy.

The book is Woodward’s fourth since Trump’s upset victory in 2016. It focuses principally on the twin wars consuming Biden’s national security team — Russia’s all-out war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, and Israel’s campaign against Hamas and other Iranian-backed proxies since the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023.

The book also examines the long shadow cast by Trump over the foreign conflicts of the past four years, and over the bitter U.S. political environment in which they have unfolded. And it includes candid assessments by Biden of his own missteps, including his decision to make Merrick Garland attorney general. Reacting to the prosecution of his son Hunter — by a special prosecutor named by Garland amid partisan recriminations over the Justice Department’s prosecution of Trump — the president told an associate, “Should never have picked Garland.”

Woodward reveals how Biden weighed his fate before exiting the presidential race in July, including over lunch earlier that month with Antony Blinken, his secretary of state. Blinken, reports Woodward, warned Biden in the private dining room off the Oval Office that everyone’s legacy is reduced to a single sentence — and that, if he continued to campaign and lost to Trump, that would be his legacy.

Still, Blinken believed at the end of the meal that the president was leaning toward staying in the race, underscoring how unpredictable Biden’s decision-making remained until the final moment.

“War” illuminates the frantic, and often failed, effort by Biden’s team to prevent escalation of fighting in the Middle East — fighting that the president came to see as inseparable from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political fortunes, and from political dynamics in the United States, too.

According to Woodward, one of Trump’s national security advisers, Keith Kellogg, secretly met with Netanyahu during a trip to Israel earlier this year. Upon his return, Kellogg publicly circulated a memo effectively blaming Biden for the Hamas-led attack on Israel, writing, “This visit reinforced that the Biden Administration’s erosion of U.S. deterrence globally and its failed policies vis-à-vis Iran have opened America up to a regional war in the Middle East with devastating consequences for our ally Israel.”

At the time, Biden advisers were pushing Israel’s leaders to agree to a cease-fire deal as part of an effort to head off an invasion of Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip. Their entreaties were futile; the Rafah offensive began in May. No one felt the limits of the administration’s ability to restrain Israel more acutely than Blinken. “It was obvious Blinken had no influence,” Woodward writes.

On Ukraine, too, Trump’s influence was pronounced, even from his home at Mar-a-Lago. The former president’s resistance to funding Kyiv’s war effort created a blockade on GOP support in the House. This past spring, House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) was able to persuade Trump to soften his stance, according to Woodward, not by showing him that Ukraine’s cause was just, but by convincing him that the aid package would help the Republican conference’s electoral chances and thus benefit him personally in the run-up to the November election.

“War” offers several snapshots of Harris, always in a supporting role to Biden and hardly determining foreign policy herself.

The book recounts how Harris sought to spur French President Emmanuel Macron into action in the fall of 2021, in preparation for what the U.S. intelligence community indicated would be a significant Russian military action against Ukraine. So, too, the vice president made her case to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022, going so far as to press him to develop a succession plan ensuring stability “if you’re captured or killed,” as she put it. And the book reveals how her forceful public tone following a meeting in July with Netanyahu — pledging that she would “not be silent” about Palestinian suffering — contrasted with her more amicable approach in private. The difference, according to Woodward, infuriated Netanyahu, who was taken aback by her public remarks.

From the Israeli viewpoint, however, Harris had little responsibility for the administration’s approach to the conflict.

“Until now, I didn’t feel that Vice President Harris had any impact on our issues,” Michael Herzog, the Israeli ambassador in Washington, is quoted as saying about the period before Harris replaced Biden on the ticket. “She was in the room, but she never had an impact.”

As for Trump’s own decision-making process on foreign affairs when he was commander in chief, the book shows how he took in a wide range of viewpoints, including from people without relevant expertise. During a high-level meeting about Afghanistan held at one point in the Situation Room, Trump went around the table to ask everyone’s opinion.

“Mr. President, I’m the notetaker,” one person deflected.

“Oh, no,” Trump replied, “if you’re in this room, you’re talking.” The notetaker briefly shared her views.

“War” presents the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in the summer of 2021, as a wound for the Biden administration that would shape its response to other international flash points. The debacle, in which U.S. intelligence failed to foresee how quickly the Taliban would seize power, elicited sympathy from the architect of the initial 2001 invasion, George W. Bush, who told Biden, according to the book: “Oh boy, I can understand what you’re going through. I got [expletive] by my intel people, too.”

Woodward contrasts the intelligence failure in Afghanistan to the remarkable insight gained by American spies into Russian plans ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. U.S. capabilities, Woodward reports, included a human source inside the Kremlin.

The book shows how Biden’s early decisions, which were sometimes in conflict with the judgments of his closest advisers, shaped the course of the war. Foremost was his public vow that Washington would not commit troops to the conflict, which took a key bargaining chip off the table but laid down a marker for the American public wary of new foreign entanglements. Biden, according to Woodward, felt past Russian aggression had been badly mismanaged by his predecessors, including the one he had served, Barack Obama.

“Barack never took Putin seriously,” Biden told a close friend.

Biden’s own blunders were costly, the book reveals. In January 2022, he seemed to undercut American resolve by raising the possibility that Russia might seek only a “minor incursion.” His national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had to do damage control with counterparts in nine NATO countries, in addition to Japan, Woodward reveals.

Woodward writes that Biden’s most delicate diplomacy, however, involved seeking to foreclose Russia’s nuclear option. In the fall of 2022, that option seemed like a live one, as U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Putin was seriously weighing use of a tactical nuclear weapon — at one point assessing the likelihood at 50 percent. An especially frantic quest to bring Moscow back from the brink came in October of that year, when Russia appeared to be laying the groundwork for escalation by accusing Ukraine of preparing to detonate a dirty bomb.

Biden’s team confronted similar hair-raising moments with the Israelis, Woodward reports, foreshadowing Netanyahu’s recent campaign against Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based militant group and Iranian proxy, in an explicit rejection of U.S. calls for a cease-fire. In a parallel of unsubstantiated Russian claims of Ukraine’s intention to use a dirty bomb, the Israelis seemed poised, in the days after Oct. 7, 2023, to launch a preemptive strike against Hezbollah based on what American experts deemed “phantom” warnings of Hezbollah mobilization along Israel’s northern border.

“The Israelis always do this,” was the reaction of Brett McGurk, Biden’s Middle East coordinator, according to the book. “They claim ‘We got the intel! You’ll see it. You’ll see it.’ But like 50 percent of the time the so-called intel doesn’t actually show up.” Apparent drones reported by the Israelis turned out to be birds.

Yet the book also shows how the Biden administration did little to alter its policy toward Israel even as senior U.S. officials abandoned their belief that the government in Jerusalem was operating in good faith. Already in the days after Oct. 7, Blinken’s impression of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s approach was: “It doesn’t matter how many people die. I have a mission to eradicate Hamas and it doesn’t matter how many Palestinians die. It doesn’t matter how many Israelis die.”

Biden, according to Woodward, was cautious about setting limits on Israel’s conduct lest Netanyahu blow past them. In a one-on-one call in April, Netanyahu promised Biden that the Rafah offensive would take only three weeks, a vow the American president never took seriously. “It’ll take months,” Biden replied.

To associates, Biden complained that Netanyahu was a liar only interested in his political survival. And he concluded the same of the prime minister’s associates, saying that 18 out of 19 people who work for Netanyahu are “liars.”

At the same time, support for the Biden administration’s Middle East policy came from unexpected places, the book reveals. Before the Oct. 7 attacks, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a loyal Trump lieutenant and shape-shifter who went from an outspoken critic of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to a trusted interlocutor, had relayed information to Biden about prospects for the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Graham believed normalization was best completed under Biden, arguing that congressional Democrats would be reluctant to lend support to a Trump-sponsored initiative. Graham promised he could deliver the Republican votes.

After Oct. 7, Graham continued to engage with the crown prince. During a March visit by the senator to Riyadh, which is recounted by Woodward, Graham proposed a phone call with Trump, so the crown prince pulled out a burner phone labeled “TRUMP 45.” In earlier meetings, the crown prince had brandished other such devices, including one labeled “JAKE SULLIVAN” for Biden’s national security adviser.

During the March call with Trump, conducted by the crown prince over speakerphone while Graham was present, the former president teased the senator for once calling for the Saudi royal’s ouster over the assassination of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, which the CIA concluded Mohammed had ordered. Graham brushed it off, professing to have been wrong about the autocrat.

The royal court in Riyadh, however, is not the comparison Graham uses when describing visits to Trump’s residence at Mar-a-Lago. According to Woodward, the senator invokes an even more brutal form of authoritarianism.

“Going to Mar-a-Lago is a little bit like going to North Korea,” the book quotes Graham as saying. “Everybody stands up and claps every time Trump comes in.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/10/08/bob-woodward-new-book-war-trump-putin-biden/

[raindogs2]

Here is a letter ex-Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox sent to high school seniors in 1994 after they asked him “What should Americans learn from Watergate?” 20 years later in ‘94.

His answer is remarkable—unfortunately things didn’t work out so well in 2024.

[todaysdocument]

Analysis, Index and Particularized Claims of Executive Privilege for Subpoenaed Materials

Record Group 460: Records of the Watergate Special Prosecution ForceSeries: Transcripts of In Re Grand Jury Proceedings

[hand stamp in upper right corner of the document] FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NOV 26 1973 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAMES E. DAVEY, Clerk [hand written check mark covers the hand stamp] IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ) ISSUED TO RICHARD M. NIXON, OR ANY ) SUBORDINATE OFFICER, OFFICIAL OR ) Misc. No. 47-73 EMPLOYEE WITH CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF ) CERTAIN DOCUMENTS OR OBJECTS ) ANALYSIS, INDEX AND PARTICULARIZED CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE FOR SUBPOENAED MATERIALS Pursuant to the special court procedures issued on October 30, 1973, the President of the United States through his counsel submits herewith an analysis and an index of the subpoenaed materials and particularized claims of executive privilege where applicable. All materials subpoenaed are primarily identified in the subpoena as related to one of a series of specified conversations, one of which was a telephone conversation and the remainder of which was conducted in personal meetings. For each conversation, the subpoena demands production of "1. All tapes and other electronic and/or mechanical recordings or reproductions, and any memoranda, papers, transcripts or other writings, relating to" the specified conversations. This submission treats each conversation covered by the subpoena separately, in the order of the subparagraphs of Paragraph 1 of the subpoena. (The materials covered by Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the subpoena were voluntarily provided by the President to the Special Prosecutor for the Grand Jury's use when the subpoena was issued.) PART I Item 1(a) of the subpoena relates to "Meeting of June 20, 1972, in the President's Executive Office Building ("EOB") office involving Richard Nixon, John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman from 10:30 a.m to noon (time approximate.)" [full transcript at link]

[richardnixonlibrary]

#Nixon50 #OTD 7/24/1974 At the Sea and Sand Hotel in Laguna Beach, near the Western White House, President Nixon's chief defense attorney, James D. St. Clair, read the President’s statement announcing his intention to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683) requiring production of the presidential tape recordings, pursuant to the subpoena issued by the Watergate Special Prosecutor. Chief Justice Warren Burger announced the Court’s ruling upheld the district court decision that President Nixon's "generalized interest in confidentiality" was not grounds for refusal to comply with a subpoena for tapes of his recorded conversations relating to the Watergate affair, thereby rejecting Nixon's claim of executive privilege. The vote was 8-0. Justice William Rehnquist, a former Nixon administration official, recused himself. (Image: WHPO-E3323-18)

[hellwurld]

special prosecutor cocks? deep throat? watergate gay as fuck 🤣🤣🤣

[dreaminginthedeepsouth]

de Adder

* * * *

LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

June 16, 2024

HEATHER COX RICHARDSON

JUN 17, 2024

Early in the morning on June 17, 1972, Frank Wills, a 24-year-old security guard at the Watergate Office Building in Washington, D.C., noticed that a door lock had been taped open. He ripped off the tape and closed the door, but when he went on the next round, he found the door taped open again. He called the police, who found five burglars in the Democratic National Committee headquarters located in the building.

And so it began.

The U.S. president, Richard M. Nixon, was obsessed with the idea that opponents were trying to sink his campaign for reelection. The previous year, in June 1971, the New York Times had begun to publish what became known as the Pentagon Papers, a secret government study that detailed U.S. involvement in Vietnam from presidents Harry Truman to Lyndon Johnson. While the study ended before the Nixon administration, it showed that presidents had lied to the American people, and Nixon worried that the story would hurt his administration by souring the public on his approach to the Vietnam War. Worse, if anyone leaked similar information about his own administration—and there was plenty to leak—it would destroy his reelection campaign.  

To stop his enemies, Nixon put together in the White House a special investigations unit to stop leaks. And who stops leaks? Plumbers. 

These operatives burglarized the office of the psychiatrist who worked with the man who had leaked the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg, to find damaging information about him. They sabotaged opponents by “ratf*cking” them, as they called it, planting fake letters in newspapers, hiring vendors for Democratic rallies and then running out on the unpaid bills, planting spies in Democrats’ campaigns and, finally, wiretapping. 

On June 17, 1972, they tried to tap the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in Washington’s fashionable Watergate complex.

The White House denied all knowledge of what it called a “third-rate burglary attempt,” and most of the press took the denial at face value. But two young reporters for the Washington Post, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, followed the sloppy money trail behind the burglars directly to the White House.

The fallout from the burglary gained no traction before the election, which Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew won with an astonishing 60.7 percent of the vote. They took 520 electoral votes—49 states—while the Democratic nominees, South Dakota senator George McGovern and former Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver, won only 37.5% of the popular vote and the electoral votes of only Massachusetts and Washington, D.C. 

But in March 1973, one of the burglars, James W. McCord Jr., wrote a letter to Judge John Sirica before his sentencing, saying that he had lied at his trial, under pressure to protect government officials. McCord had been the head of security for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, known as CREEP. Sirica was known for his stiff sentences—reporters called him “Maximum John”—and later said, “I had no intention of sitting on the bench like a nincompoop and watching the parade go by.” Sirica made the letter public, and White House counsel John Dean promptly began cooperating with prosecutors. In April, three of Nixon’s top advisors resigned, and in May the president was forced to appoint Archibald Cox as a special prosecutor to investigate the affair.

In May the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, informally known as the Senate Watergate Committee, began nationally televised hearings. The committee’s chair was Sam Ervin (D-NC), a conservative Democrat who would not run for reelection in 1974 and thus was expected to be able to do the job without political grandstanding.

The hearings turned up the explosive testimony of John Dean, who said he had talked to Nixon about covering up the burglary more than 30 times, but there the investigation sat during the hot summer of 1973 as the committee churned through witnesses. And then, on July 13, 1973, deputy assistant to the president Alexander Butterfield revealed that conversations and phone calls in the Oval Office had been taped since 1971.

Nixon refused to provide copies of the tapes either to Cox or to the Senate committee. When Cox subpoenaed a number of the tapes, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire him. In the October 20, 1973, “Saturday Night Massacre,” Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckleshaus, refused to execute Nixon’s order and resigned in protest; it was only the third man at the Justice Department—Solicitor General Robert Bork—who was willing to carry out the order firing Cox. 

Popular outrage at the resignations and firing forced Nixon to ask Bork—now acting attorney general—to appoint a new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, a Democrat who had voted for Nixon, on November 1. On November 17, Nixon assured the American people that “I am not a crook.” 

Like Cox before him, Jaworski was determined to hear the Oval Office tapes. He subpoenaed a number of them, and Nixon fought the subpoenas on the grounds of executive privilege. On July 24, 1974, in U.S. v. Nixon, the Supreme Court sided unanimously with the prosecutor, saying that executive privilege “must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.'... The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts….” 

Their hand forced, Nixon’s people released transcripts of the tapes. They were damning, not just in content but also in style. Nixon had cultivated an image of himself as a clean family man, and the tapes revealed a mean-spirited, foul-mouthed bully. Aware that the tapes would damage his image, Nixon had his swearing redacted. “[Expletive deleted]” trended.

In late July 1974 the House Committee on the Judiciary passed articles of impeachment, charging the president with obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress. Each article ended with the same statement: “In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.”

Still, Nixon insisted he was not guilty, saying he did not know his people were committing crimes on his watch. Then in early August a new tape, recorded days after the Watergate break-in, revealed Nixon and an aide plotting to invoke national security to protect the president. Even Republican senators, who had not wanted to convict their president, knew the game was over. A delegation went to the White House to deliver the news.

On August 9, 1974, Nixon became the first president in American history to resign.

Rather than admit guilt, though, he told the American people he had to step down because he no longer had the support he needed in Congress to advance the national interest. He blamed the press, whose “leaks and accusations and innuendo” had been designed to destroy him. His disappointed supporters embraced the idea that there was a “liberal” conspiracy, spearheaded by the press, to bring down any Republican president. 

When his replacement, Gerald Ford, issued a preemptive blanket pardon for any crimes the former president might have committed against the United States, he guaranteed that Nixon would never have to account for his illegal attempt to undermine his Democratic opponent, and that those who thought like Nixon could come to think they were above the law. 

On May 30, 2024, when a jury of twelve ordinary Americans found a former president guilty on 34 criminal counts, it reasserted the principle that no one is above the law. 

—

LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN

HEATHER COX RICHARDSON

[ravenkings]

While 60 percent of all adults surveyed by CNN afterward approved of the [Manhattan DA’s] charges, 76 percent agreed that politics played a role in the prosecution. As for the effect on America’s system, 31 percent said the indictment strengthened democracy, while 31 percent said it weakened it.

All of which indicates that the system’s credibility is on the line in a way it has not been before. Many have criticized American justice over the years for systemic racism, excessive punishment, mistreatment of women subjected to assault or other issues, but they did not command the bullhorn of the presidency. When past presidents like Richard M. Nixon or Bill Clinton got in trouble, they defended themselves aggressively, but did not call the whole system into question.

“In 1972 to 1974, the Republicans participated as good-faith members of the process,” said Garrett Graff, the author of “Watergate: A New History,” published last year. “They saw their roles as legislators first and Republicans second. They definitely were skeptical” initially of the allegations against Nixon, “but they followed the facts where they led.”

Even Nixon’s sharp-tongued vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, was careful about disparaging the justice system broadly. “Agnew, of course, was Nixon’s attack dog, but mainly against the press, not the F.B.I. or the special prosecutor,” Mr. Graff said.

Mr. Trump, on the other hand, is holding nothing back as he assails “the ‘Thugs’ from the Department of Injustice” and calls Mr. [Jack] Smith a “deranged lunatic.” Republicans like Representative Andy Biggs of Arizona have called for dismantling the F.B.I. “We have now reached a war phase,” he wrote on Twitter on Friday. “Eye for an eye.” Elon Musk said the authorities were showing “far higher interest in pursuing Trump compared to other people in politics.”

Several of Mr. Trump’s competitors for the Republican presidential nomination joined in. Former Vice President Mike Pence compared the indictment to leaders of “third-world nations” who “use a criminal justice system in their country against their predecessors.” Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida said “the weaponization of federal law enforcement represents a mortal threat to a free society.”

The former president’s defenders generally do not address the substance of the 37 counts against him, but instead make a case of selective prosecution that resonates powerfully among many Republicans: What about Mr. Biden? What about Hunter Biden? What about Hillary Clinton?

–Peter Baker, “Trump’s Case Puts the Justice System on Trial, in a Test of Public Credibility,” The New York Times, June 10, 2023

[bobmccullochny]

History

October 20, 1818 - The U.S. and Britain agreed to set the U.S.- Canadian border at the 49th parallel.

October 20, 1935 - Mao Zedong's 6,000 mile "Long March" ended as his Communist forces arrived at Yanan, in northwest China, almost a year after fleeing Chiang Kai-shek's armies in the south.

October 20, 1944 - During World War II in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur set foot on Philippine soil for the first time since his escape in 1942, fulfilling his promise, "I shall return."

October 20, 1968 - Jacqueline Kennedy married multi-millionaire Greek businessman Aristotle Onassis, ending nearly five years of widowhood following the assassination of her first husband, President John F. Kennedy.

October 20, 1973 - The 'Saturday Night Massacre' occurred during the Watergate scandal as President Richard M. Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus. Attorney General Elliot Richardson resigned. A firestorm of political protest erupted over the firings leading to widespread demands for Nixon's impeachment.

Birthday - British architect Christopher Wren (1632-1723) was born in Wiltshire, in southwestern England. Considered one of the greatest minds of his time, he designed St. Paul's Cathedral and 52 churches for the City of London. His secular buildings included the "new" wing of Hampton Court near London and Greenwich Hospital, now the Royal Naval College.

[sixstringphonic]

Prosecutors Appeal Dismissal of Trump Documents Case

The special counsel, Jack Smith, argued that Judge Aileen Cannon had erred in throwing out charges against Donald Trump of improperly holding national security secrets after leaving office. (Alan Feuer, NYT, 8/26/24)

Federal prosecutors began their bid to resurrect the moribund classified documents case against former President Donald J. Trump on Monday, telling an appeals court in Atlanta that the trial judge had improperly thrown out the charges.

In a filing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, the prosecutors argued that the judge, Aileen M. Cannon, erred last month when she handed down a bombshell ruling that dismissed the case on the grounds that Jack Smith, the special counsel who brought it, had been appointed to his job illegally.

The ruling by Judge Cannon, who was placed on the bench by Mr. Trump, stunned many legal experts for the way that it upended 25 years of Justice Department practice and flew in the face of previous court decisions about the appointments of special prosecutors reaching back to the Watergate era.

Issued on the first day of the Republican National Convention, where Mr. Trump formally accepted his party’s presidential nomination, Judge Cannon’s ruling also gave him a major legal victory at an auspicious political moment.

Mr. Smith’s appellate brief on Monday was merely the start of a legal battle that may end up at the Supreme Court and is likely to drag on until well after the election in November.

Should Mr. Trump win the election, he would have the power to fire Mr. Smith and could order the Justice Department to drop the appeal. Should he lose, the appeals process will determine whether he can still go to trial on the charges.

In their filing, Mr. Smith’s deputies told a three-judge panel of the appeals court that Judge Cannon had committed an error when she ruled that no specific federal statute authorized the appointment of special counsels like Mr. Smith or gave them the “prosecutorial power” that they have wielded for 25 years. The prosecutors pointed to four current statutes that they believe give the attorney general the authority to name special counsels.

“The district court’s contrary view conflicts with an otherwise unbroken course of decisions, including by the Supreme Court, that the attorney general has such authority,” the prosecutors wrote, “and it is at odds with widespread and longstanding appointment practices in the Department of Justice and across the government.”

The classified documents case, which was being heard in Federal District Court in Fort Pierce, Fla., before Judge Cannon threw it out, had once seemed to be the most straightforward of the four criminal prosecutions Mr. Trump has faced in the past two years.

He was charged in June of last year with illegally holding on to a trove of classified national security materials after leaving office and then obstructing government efforts to retrieve them along with two co-defendants, Walt Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira, who worked for him at Mar-a-Lago, his private club and residence in Florida.

Since 1999, the appointment of special counsels has been governed by internal Justice Department regulations traditionally believed to have been based on at least four federal laws laying out the structure of the department and the powers of the attorney general.

That practice was adopted after Congress permitted the Independent Counsel Act, a law that specifically authorized and governed a different type of independent prosecutor, to lapse after the Whitewater investigation into President Bill Clinton.

But Judge Cannon rejected that tradition, ruling that none of the statutes governing the conduct of attorneys general actually gave them the authority to appoint special prosecutors like Mr. Smith. She also found that Mr. Smith’s appointment was illegal because he had not been named by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

Prosecutors with some measure of independence from the federal officials who appoint them have long been used to conduct sensitive political investigations. The practice reaches back to the days when the Confederate leader, Jefferson Davis, was charged with seditious conspiracy after the Civil War, Mr. Smith’s deputies reminded the appeals court.

The prosecutors claimed that Judge Cannon had “erroneously disregarded this history as ‘spotty’ or ‘ad hoc’” and paid too much attention to the minor iterations in the rules that have governed independent prosecutors over the decades.

Mr. Smith’s team also expressed concern that Judge Cannon’s refusal to recognize the validity of the way in which he got his job could “call into question hundreds of appointments throughout the executive branch.” And that, they wrote, “could jeopardize the longstanding operation of the Justice Department.”

Judge Cannon based her decision to toss out the documents case on the appointments clause of the Constitution. The clause requires presidential nomination and Senate confirmation for all principal officers of the government, but allows so-called ���inferior officers” to be put in place by leaders of federal departments, including the attorney general, under the guidance of specific laws.

Mr. Smith’s deputies told the appeals court that Judge Cannon had made a mistake when she found that there were no laws that specifically authorized Attorney General Merrick B. Garland to name Mr. Smith to the post of special counsel in November 2022. Mr. Smith was given the job of investigating allegations that Mr. Trump had illegally held on to classified documents after leaving office and separate accusations that he had plotted to overturn the 2020 election.

In seeking to persuade the appeals court, Mr. Smith’s team pointed primarily to a Supreme Court case, United States v. Nixon, which found that the attorney general had the statutory power to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s.

In her dismissal order, Judge Cannon took the position that the Supreme Court’s finding about the Watergate special counsel was a “nonbinding” aspect of the ruling, which largely focused on the separate issue of whether President Richard M. Nixon had to comply with a subpoena in the broader inquiry.

While the appellate brief by Mr. Smith’s team was chiefly designed to bring back the criminal charges against Mr. Trump, it also looked beyond the classified documents case to the long-term health of the Justice Department. Prosecutors worried that there could be devastating consequences to the department if Judge Cannon’s findings were left unchallenged.

“If the attorney general lacks the power to appoint inferior officers,” they wrote, “that conclusion would invalidate the appointment of every member of the department who exercises significant authority and occupies a continuing office, other than the few that are specifically identified in statute.”