#UWSA

[jjcocker]

IS ALICE'S NEW SONG PREDICTING SKMETHIGN SOFNFNSKdnakdjaoai

[captain-price-unofficially]

Soldiers of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a Chinese-backed ethnic militia in Myanmar/Burma, during a parade, 17 April 2019.

Calling this group a militia is honestly one of the hugest understatements of the decade. They have numerous Chinese MANPADs, APCs, and even a helicopter. They also control a significant portion of the world tin market.

They are not actively fighting the Burmese military junta, but are supplying weapons to other Chinese-backed ethnic militias such as the MNDAA and Arakha/Arakan Army.

[adshofar]

미얀마 최대 소수민족무장단체, 중국과 함께 경제 및 정치 개혁 방안을 채택

[애드쇼파르] 미얀마 최대 소수민족무장단체 United Wa State Army(UWSA)가 2025년 2월, 6일간 열린 연례 총회에서 미얀마-중국 경제 회랑을 통한 경제 성장 촉진을 포함한 9대 계획을 채택했다고 전했다. Wa State TV 보도에 따르면, 이번 총회는 Wa 자치구 수도 Panghsang(Pangkham)에서 진행되었으며, 정치 개혁, Mansai 주석 광산 재개, 불법 활동 근절, 전력 생산 증가 등을 주요 의제가 논의 되었다고 전했다.  또한, 농업, 교육 및 의료 서비스 개선 방안도 논의되었다고 밝혔다. 소수민족 정치평론가는 이번 총회에서 채택된 계획들이 Wa 경제와 밀접히 연관되어 있다고 평가하였다.  베이징이 제안한 경제 회랑은 미얀마-중국 연결성을 강화하기 위한 여러…

[chrysocomae]

Wa Army Shows How to Succeed in Fight Against Myanmar Junta

[sdyc2023-crisis]

China is Not Interested

18 December 2021

After news reached Beijing that 10,000 Wa soldiers, commanded by Defence Minister Yee Mon as part of the Combined Military Army, were ordered to face-off against the Tatmadaw in Kayah State, AND that drug abuse has become rampant among the UWSA, Yunnan has sent representatives to Wa State. 

The UWSA has been instructed to back out of the unified federal army, and that it cannot take commands from the rebel government.

[digitalcreationsllc]

Powerful Ethnic Militia in Myanmar Repatriates 1,200 Chinese Suspected of Involvement in Cybercrime

One of Myanmar’s biggest and most powerful ethnic minority militias has arrested and repatriated more than 1,200 Chinese nationals allegedly involved in criminal online scam operations, an official of the group said Saturday. The arrests were carried out in territory controlled by the United Wa State Army, or UWSA, in eastern Shan state in raids on Tuesday and Wednesday, Nyi Rang, a liaison…

[usmlematerialsnet]

IMG USMLE Step 1 Experience 2022 Score 254

https://medbooksvn.org/img-usmle-step-1-experience-2022-score-254/

[superpuppyone]

Hey, ubba-bubba! I took my USMLE Step 1 last September—and I passed!!! That being said, I did not do everything exactly the way that people say you should...

Premieres on November 5!

[keygateiron]

how i feel starting a new block

[adshofar]

2025년 1월 29일 미얀마 현지신문 헤드라인

Myawady Daily (국방일보) – 1월 28일 네피도, 정부-민간 무역진흥 위원회 회의에 참석한 위원장 겸 교통통신부 장관 Mya Tun Oo 장군 – 1월 28일 네피도, 미얀마 징병 중앙위원회 회의에 참석한 위원장 겸 국방부 장관 Maung Maung Aye 장군 – 1월 24일 만달레이 지역 Thazi 타운십, 샨주북부에서 양곤으로 이동 중이던 차량 검문검색중 20억 짯 상당의 각성제 138만 정 적발, 남성 1명 체포 Daily Eleven (민영일간지) – 1월 28일 IQ Air 글로벌 환경 오염 도시 순위, 양곤 39위, 1월 26일 8위 – 1월 23일 UWSA 관할 구역 Mongmao 타운십 부친을 살해한 30세 마약 중독자 공개 재판, 사형 선고 – 양곤 장터 화장…

[ursa-ironii]

Me, EVERY single time one of my friends uses their nickname for me

[antoine-roquentin]

A boycott by bureaucrats is undermining the coup in Myanmar 

For almost two weeks, tens of thousands of Burmese, and sometimes hundreds of thousands, have taken to the streets to protest against the coup. But it is a subtler form of protest that is causing the generals the most grief. Thousands of public-sector workers, from at least 245 districts and 21 ministries, are on strike, according to Kim Jolliffe, an analyst. Government offices are deserted. So too are classrooms. Many public hospitals have in effect shut. Those that have not are so understaffed they are turning new patients away. “Operations at many government departments all but halted this week,” reported the Irrawaddy, a news website, on February 16th.

The banking system is also seizing up. Online banking remains possible, at least when the army allows the internet to operate, but most branches are closed. Reports suggest lending has dried up and most administrative work has stopped. “A dysfunctional financial sector would definitely hurt the regime,” says Ko Ko (not his real name), a manager at a branch of AYA bank in Yangon. He and almost all his colleagues have been on strike since last week.

The government pays bills and salaries and disburses pensions via Myanma Economic Bank (MEB). But so many of its employees are on strike that it is at a “near standstill”, says Mr Jolliffe, who is studying the civil-disobedience movement. With many tax collectors on strike, too, the coup leaders may end up with neither the infrastructure nor the money to pay staff. “This is a real pressure point and is something the military probably did not include in their game plan,” says Mr Jolliffe.

Why Myanmar’s military will win in the end 

“This is no bunch of knuckle-dragging old men,” notes the Yangon lawyer. “They may be ruthless, but they are smart and have built a loyal corps of officers whose wellbeing is tied to their ascent in the army.”

That much has been apparent in its campaigns against ethnic pocket armies around the nation’s remote borderlands. In bitter wars with ethnic rebels in northeastern Shan and western Rakhine states, the Tatmadaw has turned to increasingly well-integrated combined-arms campaigns integrating operations between infantry, artillery and air power underpinned by information technology and supported by drones.

Even if still rudimentary by the standards of advanced militaries, these evolving tactics have marked a significant advance for an army traditionally centered on infantrymen supported, if lucky, by some artillery and logistically reliant on human porters.

A similar capacity for innovation, coordination and willingness to learn on the job is being displayed on today’s battlefields in downtown Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyidaw and a score of other urban centers.

Tatmadaw leadership has almost certainly been blindsided by the sheer scale and scope of popular protest which has brought scores of thousands of people from all walks of life onto the streets in a massive campaign of protest and civil disobedience reinforced by an international outcry.

Strikingly, though, the military’s nerve, discipline and cohesion have all so far held, and in a sharp break from the reflex violence of 1988 and 2007 top command has opted for a strategy of slow attrition aimed at waiting out the storm and restoring a degree of normality and economic stability as soon as possible.

At the most basic level, one statistic illustrates the strategy and arguably highlights its prospects for success: over two weeks of tumultuous confrontation at a watershed juncture in the nation’s political trajectory there have been only two critical casualties – a young woman shot in the head in Mandalay last week and a policeman the junta has reported was killed.

Three key factors have underpinned the war of attrition. At street level, the protest movement’s insistence on non-violence has been central. Articulated by National League for Democracy (NLD) party leaders and observed by demonstrators with remarkable discipline, non-violence has secured the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) the moral high ground.

Equally, however, it has played to the military’s objective of waiting out the crowds without spilling blood, setting up a contest that turns on time and resolve to decide which side can outlast the other.

Military restraint has also turned on a second factor, the absence of which would almost certainly already have demanded swift and brutal crowd dispersal: peace in the borderlands.

The critical importance of avoiding war on two fronts and balancing conflict with the array of ethnic armies ranged around Myanmar’s frontiers has been an enduring element of Tatmadaw strategic thinking for decades.

It was most famously demonstrated in the series of ceasefire pacts thrown together between 1989 and 1991 as the military struggled to deal with the fallout from its crushing of the 1988 uprising in central Myanmar.

The same mindset was on display in the run-up to the military’s latest power-grab.

In retrospect, there can be little doubt the Tatmadaw’s surprise decision last November to agree to an ad hoc ceasefire with the Arakan Army (AA) in western Rakhine state pointed to contingency planning for a possible coup to remove the NLD government after the crushing electoral defeat inflicted on the military’s interests and long-term agenda.

Setting aside already well-advanced preparations for a dry season offensive that would normally open in December, the post-election ceasefire secured peace in a theater of operations that since 2019 has tied down nearly half of the army’s mobile reserves, allowing thousands of troops to be redeployed between January and early February to the country’s heartland.

The importance of peace in the borderlands was further underscored in one of the coup regime’s opening statements that pointedly stressed its interest in pursuing the stumbling peace process within the context of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

And, to date at least, neither the bloc of NCA-signatories nor, far more importantly, the powerful alliance in northern Myanmar led by the Chinese-leaning United Wa State Army (UWSA), has shown any inclination to distract the military from its focus on containing the challenge of democratic forces in the ethnic Bamar heartland.

Finally, beyond the borders of Myanmar, even the Tatmadaw — renowned for deep (and invariably misguided) paranoia over external threats – can have been broadly confident of a permissive international stage on which to launch a coup.

Boilerplate support at the United Nations from Russia and China, a characteristically flaccid reaction from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Western agonizing over a response that balances moral outrage with apprehensions over pushing Myanmar into the arms of China have all combined to shape a favorable international environment for a blatant seizure of power.

Against this strategic backdrop, the Tatmadaw’s tactical response at street level has centered on rules of engagement (ROEs) mandating minimum use of force. Even in the case of often inadequately trained and overstretched police, manning the frontlines for the first two weeks of the crisis, these ROEs have been observed for the most part with striking discipline.

Minimum force has translated into a range of less than lethal measures and systems used only sparingly. These have included water cannons, tear gas and non-lethal baton rounds typically fired from shotguns.

On the streets of Mandalay, troops have also been spotted armed with air guns with telescopic sights, apparently intended to target – if necessary – protest leaders. As one military expert explained: “These are not enough to punch a hole in someone but certainly enough to make them stop whatever they are doing.”

Beginning overnight on February 14 and 15, the deployment of military units in key cities reinforced but did not significantly change the dynamic established by the police. A new and important tactic though was introduced with night-time internet shutdowns between 1 a.m. and 9 a.m.

Without unduly inconveniencing daytime commercial activity, the shutdowns have permitted army troops – mostly mechanized infantry units from the Tatmadaw reserve of Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) — to deploy under cover of an information blackout and, in coordination with police, to step up arrests of protest leaders with over 500 now detained according to UN sources.  

The military has also turned to drones, already used extensively in rural counterinsurgency campaigns for surveillance of the urban battlespace and movement of large crowds. Likely to follow in the coming days will be the invisible imposition of a security grid and a tightening squeeze on areas of population density.

“What you’ll probably see is a division of urban areas into sectors and districts with operational responsibility assigned to different battalions, companies and platoons,” noted the Western military analyst who was briefed on similar operations by the Thai military in Bangkok in 2010.

“Over 10 or 15 days they’re going to be identifying protest organizations, groups and leaders. Then at night-time they’ll clean it up, making arrests, intimidating, beating people up,” he said.

“So, first the Civil Disobedience Movement faces a loss of leaders at the mass level. Then it’ll come down to the tactical street level. And once leaders have disappeared, either detained or gone into hiding, there’ll be a real personal impact on individuals in different organizations.”

[klugpuuo]

hatred and malice. i can perfectly replicate character-me's uwu voice but not my normal voice. i just wish for my voice back but now i am forever cursed to be the guy who says 'UWSA MAJOW!'

[moonlightedva]

uwsa majow

[sdyc2023-crisis]

A Successful Coalition

23 November 2021

The Kachin Independence Organisation and Palaung National Liberation Front have officially joined the NUCC. With the authorisation of a massive protection fund, the NUG has devoted 5 billion kyat for the installation of air raid sirens and anti-aircraft guns. Members have also come to a consensus on not engaging in hostile military action against each other. 

Most importantly, perhaps, is the formation of the unified army consisting of the militaries of the KNU, KNDF, UWSA – surprisingly, 2000 members of the Arakan Army based in Shan State, and 10,000 members of the Kachin Independence Organisation. These troops are to be led by Yee Mon, Minister of Defense. With a renewed strength, citizens have hope in the combined military forces.