#Tatiana Stanovaya

[cristianlisandru]

ANALIZĂ | Tatiana Stanovaya și ”GULAGUL DIGITAL” al lui Vladimir Putin: ”Nu exiști dacă nu ești în sistem, guvernul implementează moartea socială”

Noua legislație privind recrutarea cetățenilor ruși în serviciul militar, introdusă în mare viteză în Duma de Stat, schimbă dramatic relația dintre stat și popor, consideră Tatiana Stanovaya, fondatoarea proiectului de analiză politică R. Politik.  Organizația independentă R. Politik – fondată în 2018 – este un proiect independent de analiză a politicii ruse contemporane, iar Tatiana Stanovaya a…

[mariacallous]

Sergey Shoigu’s nearly 12-year tenure as Russia’s defense minister ended unexpectedly on Sunday when President Vladimir Putin removed him from his post and reassigned him to the country’s Security Council. Then, in a move that surprised even government insiders, Putin nominated Andrey Belousov, a longtime presidential economic advisor, as Shoigu’s successor. Belousov is a civilian with no direct military ties, raising questions about the rationale behind his appointment. Some observers have speculated that he may have been brought in to overhaul military spending and ensure the Russian army is adequately resourced for the ongoing war in Ukraine. The independent outlet Verstka spoke with government insiders and political scientists to get their take on what Belousov’s appointment could mean for the future of the Russian military. Meduza shares an English-language summary of Verstka’s findings.

On May 12, Vladimir Putin nominated Andrey Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister, replacing Sergey Shoigu who had held the job since 2012. The appointment came as a surprise to many government insiders since Belousov, often described as Putin’s protégé, has no direct ties to the security forces. Often referred to as an “economic ideologue,” he served as Russia’s economic development minister and later as a presidential aid; sources once described him to Verstka as Putin’s strategic counterweight to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. One member of Russia’s parliament characterized Belousov as “subtle, intelligent, and diplomatic” and expressed shock at his new post.

Only one source, a member of Russia’s Federal Assembly, didn’t seem surprised by the choice. “Well, what were you expecting?” he asked. “We have something akin to military Keynesianism in our economy, right? Here’s someone with a Doctor of Sciences who’ll be in charge of the economy of the ‘special military operation,’ not moving pins on a map. Let the General Staff handle the front. Besides, someone needs to watch the rear. [Rostec head Sergey] Chemezov and [Deputy Prime Minister Denis] Manturov were already wielding full control of the military-industrial complex, and now [the new head of Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry Anton] Alikhanov has been brought on board. A true Putin loyalist will keep an eye on them.”

“Belousov is a proponent of the mobilization model,” said political scientist Konstantin Kalachev. “He has [the president’s] trust. He knows how to manage money. He’s perfectly suited for that position.” According to Kalachev, the new defense minister’s priority will be “optimizing expenditures and aligning them with achievements,” as well as making sure that “for every ruble spent, another square meter of territory is added.”

At the same time, Kalachev continued, Belousov’s appointment is a “bombshell” and a “break from convention.” In his view, the reshuffle lends credence to the speculation that followed the arrest of Shoigu’s deputy Timur Ivanov on corruption charges in April and suggests that Shoigu “really was under suspicion.” One government insider commented that “Shoigu’s ambitions, not just his wastefulness, played a role against him.” Political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya said that with Shoigu’s move to the Security Council, it’s become something of “a reservoir for Putin’s ‘former’ key figures — people who can’t be let go but also can’t be placed anywhere else.”

Political scientist Ilya Grashchenkov also called Belousov’s appointment unexpected. “It was assumed that Belousov would move somewhere quieter, perhaps become the rector of Moscow State University or head some kind of development institute. As an ideologue of state economics, this would have aligned well with Belousov’s strategic interests, because Belousov is undoubtedly an economist,” he noted. He added that Belousov was greatly influenced by his father, Rem Belousov, who was a champion of Alexey Kosygin. “Belousov has incorporated these concepts of state and market symbiosis into the Russian economy,” explained Grashchenkov. “This has undoubtedly injected a distinct economic influence into what was once considered solely the domain of the [Defense Ministry].”

According to Grashchenkov, the Russian Defense Ministry is currently focused solely on military operations in Ukraine, rather than the financial aspect of war. “Belousov can now concentrate on fundamentally changing the methods used to manage all ministerial executive agencies, particularly everything related to front-line support, logistics, and so forth,” Grashchenkov added. However, it remains to be seen how much this unexpected appointment will alter the Defense Ministry’s structure or improve its functionality. Meanwhile, there’s still the question of whether or not Belousov will be liked in the army. “Mostly likely, he won’t be,” Grashchenkov surmised. “But Putin doesn’t need [him to be]. He needs an effective manager, which Belousov is.”

When Putin announced that Belousov would take over as head of Russia’s Defense Ministry, many Russian pro-war bloggers lauded the decision, saying that a military outsider and Putin loyalist might be just the person needed to reform the Defense Ministry. However, comments from readers left under these posts have been less optimistic. Many followers wrote that they were having “Serdyukovian flashbacks” — a reference to another civilian defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, whose tenure from 2007 to 2012 involved radical reforms and reductions in military numbers that led to widespread discontent within the Russian Armed Forces.

[ammg-old2]

The uprising was a mutiny, not a coup: Mr. Prigozhin’s stated goal was to oust the senior military leadership, not to take over the country himself, and on Monday he called it a “protest” over the order to make Wagner fighters sign contracts.

It also ended quickly. By late Saturday night, the Kremlin announced that Mr. Prigozhin would leave Russia for Belarus, and his troops would not face repercussions.

Now, the question is what the mutiny tells the elites who keep Mr. Putin in power, and whether it has changed their incentives.

“Mutinies can signal dissatisfaction within the ranks that future coup plotters can capitalize on,” Dr. de Bruin said. One large-scale study of military mutinies in Africa, for instance, found that they rarely escalate directly into coups, but they are associated with an increased likelihood of coups in the near future.

Sometimes the opposite is true: In the aftermath of a failed coup, leaders often take the opportunity to purge those whom they suspect of disloyalty, strengthening their hold on power. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, for instance, cracked down on tens of thousands after a failed coup attempt in 2016, purging the military as well as institutions like the police, schools and the courts.

But that may not be possible in this case, Dr. de Bruin said. Because Mr. Prigozhin withdrew, rather than being defeated by Russia’s army, “Putin doesn’t come out of this looking like he won the confrontation,” she said. The public saw that Wagner troops could race toward Moscow, and that they now seem to face little punishment.

Even if there was more going on behind the scenes, appearances matter. After making a brief statement on Saturday, Mr. Putin vanished from sight, making no further appearances during the dramatic uprising and its aftermath. Then his government announced a deal with Mr. Prigozhin, even though the president had publicly called Mr. Prigozhin’s actions “traitorous.”

Mr. Putin’s response, analysts said, may signal that disloyalty is not as costly as many might have imagined.

Mr. Prigozhin is an “exceptional phenomenon” and isolated among Russia’s elites, according to Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, but she wrote over the weekend that he still dealt Mr. Putin a blow. “I won’t discount the possibility of future imitators, but there will never be another one like him.”

None of that means that Mr. Putin’s days as president are numbered. But his hold on power looks less certain than ever before. Mr. Putin “is now marked as weak enough to challenge,” said Naunihal Singh, a professor at the Naval War College and the author of a book on the strategic logic of military coups. “I think there may be other challengers now.”

[blogynews]

Uncover the Jaw-Dropping New Developments in Russia's Tumultuous War With Ukraine

Russia’s position on the Israeli-Hamas conflict is becoming increasingly complicated, according to analysts. Moscow has traditionally maintained good relations with Israel while also having close ties with Iran, which provides financial and material support to Hamas. Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, explained that Russia is in a complex position. On one…

[blogynewz]

Uncover the Jaw-Dropping New Developments in Russia's Tumultuous War With Ukraine

Russia’s position on the Israeli-Hamas conflict is becoming increasingly complicated, according to analysts. Moscow has traditionally maintained good relations with Israel while also having close ties with Iran, which provides financial and material support to Hamas. Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, explained that Russia is in a complex position. On one…

[blogynewsz]

Uncover the Jaw-Dropping New Developments in Russia's Tumultuous War With Ukraine

Russia’s position on the Israeli-Hamas conflict is becoming increasingly complicated, according to analysts. Moscow has traditionally maintained good relations with Israel while also having close ties with Iran, which provides financial and material support to Hamas. Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, explained that Russia is in a complex position. On one…

[antonio-velardo]

Antonio Velardo shares: Putin Had Every Reason to Want Prigozhin Gone by Tatiana Stanovaya

By Tatiana Stanovaya Russia’s president had ample reason to wish for Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demise. Published: August 26, 2023 at 01:00AM from NYT Opinion https://ift.tt/W7TE8LP via IFTTT

[dailymailsky]

Plane crash which may have killed Wagner chief is seen as Russia's revenge for Prigozhin's mutiny

Numerous opponents and critics of Putin have been killed or gravely sickened in apparent assassination attempts.

MOSCOW: Russian mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and top officers of his private Wagner military company were presumed dead in a plane crash that was widely seen as an assassination, two months after they staged a mutiny that dented Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority.

Russia’s civil aviation agency said that Prigozhin and six top lieutenants were on a business jet that crashed Wednesday, soon after taking off from Moscow, with a crew of three. Rescuers quickly found all 10 bodies, and Russian media cited sources in Prigozhin’s Wagner company who confirmed his death.

US and other Western officials long expected Putin to go after Prigozhin, despite promising to drop charges in a deal that ended the June 23–24 mutiny. “I don’t know for a fact what happened but I’m not surprised,” US President Joe Biden said.

“There’s not much that happens in Russia that Putin’s not behind.”

Prigozhin supporters claimed on pro-Wagner messaging app channels that the plane was deliberately downed, including suggesting it could have been hit by an air defence missile or targeted by a bomb on board. These claims could not be independently verified. Numerous opponents and critics of Putin have been killed or gravely sickened in apparent assassination attempts.

Speaking to Lavian television, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Director Janis Sarts said that “the downing of the plane was certainly no mere coincidence.”

The crash came the same day that Russian media reported that Gen. Sergei Surovikin, a former top commander in Ukraine who was reportedly linked to Prigozhin, was dismissed from his post as commander of Russia’s air force. Surovikin hasn’t been seen in public since the mutiny, when he recorded a video address urging Prigozhin’s forces to pull back.

Police cordoned off the field where the plane crashed as investigators studied the site. Vehicles were seen driving in to take the bodies, reportedly badly charred, for a forensic exam.

At Wagner’s headquarters in St. Petersburg, lights were turned on in the shape of a large cross. Prigozhin’s supporters brought flowers to the building in an improvised memorial. While countless theories about the events swirled, most observers saw Prigozhin’s death as Putin’s punishment for the most serious challenge to the authority of his 23-year rule.

Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said on Telegram that “no matter what caused the plane crash, everyone will see it as an act of vengeance and retribution” by the Kremlin, and “the Kremlin wouldn’t really stand in the way of that.”

“From Putin’s point of view, as well as the security forces and the military — Prigozhin’s death must be a lesson to any potential followers,” Stanovaya said in a Telegram post.

In the revolt that started on June 23 and lasted less than 24 hours, Prigozhin’s mercenaries swept through the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and captured the military headquarters there without firing a shot, before driving to within about 200 kilometres (125 miles) of Moscow.

Prigozhin had called it a “march of justice” to oust the top military leaders who demanded that the mercenaries sign contracts with the Defense Ministry. They downed several military aircraft, killing more than a dozen Russian pilots.

Putin first denounced the rebellion as “treason” and a “stab in the back” and vowed to punish its perpetrators, but hours later made a deal that saw an end to the mutiny in exchange for an amnesty for Prigozhin and his mercenaries and permission for them to move to Belarus.

Details of the deal have remained murky, but Prigozhin has reportedly shuttled between Moscow, St. Petersburg, Belarus and Africa where his mercenaries have continued their activities despite the rebellion. He was quickly given back truckloads of cash, gold bars and other items that police seized on the day of the rebellion, feeding speculation that the Kremlin still needed Prigozhin despite the mutiny.

Earlier this week, the mercenary chief published his first video since the mutiny, declaring that he was speaking from an undisclosed location in Africa where Wagner is “making Russia even greater on all continents, and Africa even more free.”

Prigozhin’s overseas activities reportedly have irked Russia’s military leadership, who have sought to replace Wagner with Russian military personnel in Africa.

The Institute for the Study of War argued that Russian authorities likely moved to eliminate Prigozhin and his top associates as “the final step to eliminate Wagner as an independent organization.”

Flight tracking data reviewed by The Associated Press showed a private jet that Prigozhin had used previously took off from Moscow on Wednesday evening, and its transponder signal disappeared minutes later.

Videos shared by the pro-Wagner Telegram channel Grey Zone showed a plane dropping like a stone from a large cloud of smoke, twisting wildly as it fell, one of its wings missing. A freefall like that occurs when an aircraft sustains severe damage, and a frame-by-frame AP analysis of two videos was consistent with some sort of explosion mid-flight.

Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to have an effect on Russia’s war in Ukraine. His forces fought some of the fiercest battles over the last 18 months but pulled back from the frontline after capturing the eastern city of Bakhmut in late May.

As news of the crash was breaking, Putin projected calm, speaking at an event commemorating the WWII Battle of Kursk and hailing the heroes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. On Thursday, he addressed the BRICS summit in Johannesburg via videolink, talking about expanding cooperation between the group’s members. He didn’t mention the crash and the Kremlin made no comment about it.

[mauriciomeschoulam]

Insubordinación en el ejercito ruso

Artículo originalmente publicado en El Universal: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/opinion/mauricio-meschoulam/insubordinacion-en-el-ejercito-ruso/?outputType=amp

¿Estamos presenciando una insubordinación cada vez más intensa y sistemática en los mandos altos y medios en Rusia? ¿Putin está perdiendo o recuperando el control de los hilos en su país? ¿Qué rol jugó la rebelión de Prigozhin, el líder del grupo de contratistas militares privados Wagner, en detonar esa insubordinación? Las respuestas a preguntas como esas dependen enormemente de los textos leamos y de las interpretaciones que distintos centros de análisis están efectuando en estos momentos. Desde cierta óptica, muy repetida, estamos ante “el principio del fin” del presidente ruso; su poder se está erosionando casi de manera irremediable, se dice. En cambio, desde otras visiones, lo que sucede es que precisamente por los riesgos existentes, Putin está actuando con velocidad y fuerza para cubrir sus vulnerabilidades. La realidad es que se trata de eventos en pleno movimiento. Mi experiencia al analizar sucesos similares—que incluyen amenazas serias a dictadores como Assad, en Siria, o el intento de golpe de estado contra Erdogan en Turquía—es que, en este tipo de eventos, vale la pena observar con cautela y detenimiento los sucesos de manera diaria, y solo a partir del desarrollo de esos hechos, efectuar las evaluaciones correspondientes. En el texto de hoy recupero elementos de algunos de los análisis publicados recientemente para intentar una valoraciónactualizada del tema y sus implicaciones.    

1. El Instituto para el Estudio de la Guerra (ISW por sus siglas en inglés), un think tank de Washington, ha reportado que el Ministerio de Defensa ruso está destituyendo a comandantes de unidades y formaciones militares rusas altamente efectivas en combate, y parece estar acelerando este esfuerzo. Esta semana hubo informes de destituciones y arrestos de varios comandantes, incluyendo el comandante de la 58ª División de Armas Combinadas (el general Mayor Ivan Popov), el comandante de la 106ª División Aerotransportada y el comandante de la 7ª División de la Guardia de la Fuerza Aérea.

2. De acuerdo con el ISW, estas destituciones y arrestos se atribuyen a casos de insubordinación por parte de los comandantes, quienes han expresado críticas y demandas en nombre de sus soldados. De hecho, la insubordinación entre los comandantes parece estar extendiéndose a algunas de las tropas, y se han difundido amenazas de retirada en respuesta a las acciones del Ministerio de Defensa ruso.

3. El análisis de ese instituto indica que esta crisis en la cadena de mando rusa y la pérdida de confianza en el liderazgo militar pueden afectar la moral y la capacidadde las operaciones ofensivas tácticas rusas en Ucrania.Según el ISW, esta crisis también puede tener un impacto en el plano estratégico, es decir, en el esfuerzo de guerra en general y desmoralizar los planes militares rusos en Ucrania, comentarios que se reproducen en la comunidad de “blogueros militares”, una serie de personas que continuamente están reportando de manera crítica lo que pasa en Ucrania.

4. El Kremlin y la Duma se encuentran reaccionando ante estas situaciones. Además de las purgas, se está buscando emitir legislación para reprimir la disidencia interna a toda costa mediante la introducción del temor a la responsabilidad penal. El diputado de la Duma, VasilyPiskarev, declaró el 18 de julio que él y varios máspresentaron un proyecto de ley sobre "responsabilidad por propaganda y justificación de la ideología del extremismo".En una noticia de ayer, fue detenido “por extremismo” Igor Girkin, un ex oficial de inteligencia ruso que es uno de lospopulares blogueros nacionalistas que mencionábamos, muy crítico de la forma como la guerra está siendo conducida. “Esta es una de las consecuencias del motín de Prigozhin”, dijo Tatiana Stanovaya, una académica de Carnegie en suTelegram. Según su análisis, las fuerzas de seguridad rusas están siendo menos tímidas para efectuar este tipo de arrestos justo por las condiciones actuales. 

5. En otro análisis, The Economist señala que el motín liderado por Prigozhin revela la erosión del Estado y la fragilidad de la base de apoyo de Putin. Aunque por ley rusa, Prigozhin debería enfrentar graves cargos y según Lukashenko, hasta se llegó hablar de matarlo, Putin optó por reunirse con él y sus comandantes en el Kremlin para demostrar que aún tiene control sobre la situación. El jefe de la inteligencia británica lo puso en estas palabras esta semana: "Prigozhin comenzó ese día como un traidor en el desayuno, había sido perdonado para la cena, y luego, unos días después, fue invitado a tomar el té".

6. Aunque Prigozhin ha sido criticado en los medios estatales, muchas de sus plataformas de Telegram siguen operando y han erosionado el monopolio del Kremlin sobre la información.

7. The Economist explica que la división en el ejército ruso se hizo evidente con el motín, y la opinión pública, especialmente entre los jóvenes, siguió de cerca los acontecimientos en línea. Una encuestadora rusa continuamente citada, el Centro Levada, encontró que 92% de rusos siguieron las noticias sobre la insurrección de Wagner. Casi la mitad de encuestados simpatizaba con las críticas de Prigozhin sobre la corrupción existente, sobre la incompetencia militar y sobre las mentiras que se han dicho acerca de la guerra (aunque solo 22% expresó sentir confianza por Prigozhin mismo). 

8. The Economist indica que a pesar de que Putin intenta mostrar control y adoración en diversas regiones, el sistema sigue bajo tensión y no se han tomado represalias públicas contra los altos mandos militares que apoyaron a Prigozhin. Nuevas grietas han surgido en el ejército y, el progreso de Ucrania en el campo de batalla podría tener un impacto en el poder político del Kremlin.

Una valoración actualizada

1. Como se puede observar, estamos ante un evento en desarrollo. Por un lado, las fisuras en las fuerzas de seguridad son evidentes. De hecho, no se trata de algo particularmente nuevo. Ya desde hace meses, uno de los elementos resaltados por los documentos de inteligencia estadounidense que fueron filtrados, tenía que ver con las riñas al interior de las fuerzas de seguridad rusas. Tenemos también ya meses escuchando las críticas de Prigozhin y muchos otros actores rusos acerca de los malos manejos en la guerra. Esto sigue ocurriendo de manera cotidiana y refleja una serie de tensiones visibles y otras que no alcanzamos a dimensionar. No obstante, es claro que con la insurrección de Prigozhin, no solo las críticas se han intensificado, sino que se multiplican los eventos de insubordinación. 

2. Sin embargo, a la par de esas expresiones, estamos viendo también intensificarse los golpes y movimientospor parte del Kremlin, esencialmente contra mandos medios de las fuerzas de seguridad y contra la disidencia interna. Salvo en casos aislados como el de Surovikin (un alto comandante cercano a Prigozhin que se encuentra desaparecido desde junio, posiblemente arrestado), hay que decir que esta purga no está ocurriendo en los mandos más altos. Es decir, se trata de una purga por ahora limitada. El propio Prigozhin, como sabemos, sigue operando. 

3. Dicho eso, hay que considerar que Putin es un personaje enigmático, y que hasta donde se sabía (al menos hasta hace poco) tenía su poder altamente concentrado y bajo control. Sus decisiones respecto a Prigozhin o respecto al Ministerio de Defensa o bien, otros puestos altos, pueden ser el producto de varias posibilidades. Todo depende de cómo se interpreta esa serie de hechos que sí conocemos. Hay quienes piensan que Putin podría estar errando en sus estimaciones y que, por tanto, su colapso es cosa de tiempo. Desde otras interpretaciones, Putin podría estar actuando justamente a partir del temor de que las cosas se le salgan de las manos con mayor velocidad y prefiere mantener cerca a quienes percibe como enemigos o rivales. O bien, si estudiamos su conducta en estos 20 años, Putin podría estar actuando a partir de fríos cálculos y un amplio conocimiento de los círculos que le han rodeado durante décadas.

4. Pongamos un ejemplo concreto: Su decisión de pactar con Prigozhin, en lugar de aprehenderlo o mandarlo a asesinar, manteniendo vivas las operaciones de Wagner—que han servido a los intereses del Kremlin durante años (por ejemplo ahora mismo en la frontera entre Bielorrusia y Polonia)—al tiempo que respalda sostiene en su sitio a los rivales de Prigozhin como el ministro de defensa (pero también al mismo tiempo aprehendiendo a Surovikin, el general aliado de Prigozhin), son decisiones que pueden ser vistas como síntomas de debilidad, o decisiones erráticas, o bien, como movimientos calculados de fichas para asegurar que nadie concentre el suficiente poder para amenazarle. 

5. Hasta ahora, el presidente mantiene el respaldo de la gran mayoría de actores importantes en Rusia—por lo menos de manera pública—lo que incluye el Estado Mayor, la Guardia Nacional, el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional y el Ministerio de Defensa, por supuesto. No obstante, las preguntas que permanecen son muchas; coloco acá algunas:

a. La primera es si las purgas en mandos medios bastarán para que Putin mantenga el control de la situación, o si la insubordinación seguirá creciendo.

b. La segunda tiene que ver con la guerra en territorio ucraniano. Hasta el momento de este escrito, no es posible afirmar que las fisuras internas acá descritas hayan tenido consecuencias mayores para efectos de la contraofensiva ucraniana. Por lo que sabemos, dicha contraofensiva sigue caminando con la misma lentitud y dificultades que hasta hace pocas semanas. Tendremos que observar si esa inercia cambia. Por ahora no es el caso. Adicionalmente, Rusia está aprovechando su retiro del acuerdo de granos para bombardear la infraestructura portuaria y agrícola del sur de Ucrania, empleando misiles avanzados muy difíciles de detener, y reorientando el foco mediático y la conversación hacia esos temas, intentando paralelamente proyectar un mensaje de fuerza para negociar en medio del entorno acá explicado. 

c. La tercera tiene que ver con el tema de la escalada.Hay que entender que el sector que se está insubordinando de manera visible, o que efectúa constantes críticas contra las estrategias de la guerra e incluso contra Putin, es un sector que considera que Rusia debió haber escalado las hostilidades desde hace tiempo (usando armas nucleares, por ejemplo). Esta semana, Hanna Notte y en otro texto Andrey Baklitskly,relatan el debate que se ha estado suscitado entre la comunidad de expertos en Rusia acerca del uso de armas nucleares como instrumento no solo de guerra psicológica, sino de guerra material poniendo sobre la mesa la posibilidad de un primer ataque ruso. Si bien no son mayoritarias, crecen las posturas que indican que Moscú debería emplear ese tipo de armas ya no solo en territorio ucraniano, sino incluso contra países de la OTAN como los Bálticos, asegurando que es poco probable que EU respondería de manera proporcional (es decir, también usando armas nucleares). El hecho de que se hable de estos temas con mayor soltura refleja algo que hemos venido comentando desde hace meses: Hay muchas personas en Rusia que consideran que una superpotencia nuclear no tendría por qué estar siendo humillada y que ya va siendo hora de replantear toda la estrategia. Sin miedo. 

Así que, cuando hablamos de insubordinación, es importante considerar que ese es uno de los temas que se encuentran sobre la mesa. De ahí la relevancia de seguir estos hechos con todo detalle. Acá lo seguiremos comentando. 

Instagram: @mauriciomesch

TW: @maurimm

22 de julio 2023

[nbmsports]

Putin Says Wagner Can Keep Fighting for Russia, but Without Prigozhin

Three weeks after a brief mutiny in Russia by the Wagner mercenary group, President Vladimir V. Putin said its troops could keep fighting, but without their controversial leader, while the government of Belarus said some Wagner fighters were there, training its forces.The future of Wagner and its personnel, who have played an important role in Mr. Putin’s war against Ukraine, remains in doubt, part of the dissension and turmoil in the Russian military hierarchy that has spilled into public view since the rebellion. But the Russian leader made clear that he intends to sideline the Wagner boss Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, who directed the uprising.Mr. Putin, in an interview published late on Thursday, gave an account of a three-hour meeting in the Kremlin, just days after the uprising, with Mr. Prigozhin and his top commanders. Mr. Putin, who has tried hard since the mutiny to demonstrate his unassailable control over state affairs, presented himself in the interview as a coolheaded arbiter towering above the tumult, and portrayed the mutiny as a minor internal dispute that he had resolved.He said he had praised Wagner fighters for their military feats, and suggested that a different Wagner leader take over from Mr. Prigozhin, according to Kommersant, a Russian business daily that, along with a journalist from state television, conducted the interview. He said he told the Wagner troops that he “regretted that they had appeared dragged” into the mutiny, appearing to pin the blame on Mr. Prigozhin.“I outlined the possible paths for their future military service, including in combat,” Mr. Putin said. “Many nodded as I was speaking,” he added, but Mr. Prigozhin, who he said sat in the front and didn’t see the nodding, responded that the “guys do not agree with such a decision.”The government has ordered that Wagner troops who intend to keep fighting sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense, in effect becoming part of Russia’s regular military, which Mr. Prigozhin bitterly protested. But Mr. Putin’s latest comments appeared to leave open the possibility that there could continue to be Wagner units.Mr. Putin wants to draw a sharp distinction between Wagner fighters, whose experience and expertise he can exploit, and the mercenary leader he now sees as reckless and untrustworthy, according to Tatiana Stanovaya, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.“They want to preserve the core of Wagner but under different leadership, one that is clearly much more loyal, and even controllable,” Ms. Stanovaya said in a phone interview.“That meeting was a sign of reconciliation; not in the sense that the conflict is over, but in the sense that there are now rules of the game — you have to follow them,” she added.A Kremlin spokesman first disclosed the meeting early this week, saying that the Wagner commanders had aired their concerns — a striking admission considering that days earlier, Mr. Putin had denounced the uprising’s leaders as traitors.President Aleksandr G. Lukashenko of Belarus, who helped broker the end of Wagner’s uprising on June 24, said soon afterward that his country would welcome its fighters, and the Belarusian military quickly erected tent housing for thousands of troops at a disused base nine miles from the town of Asipovichy, about 50 miles southeast of the capital, Minsk. But last week, Mr. Lukashenko said there were no Wagner troops yet in Belarus, and the military invited foreign journalists to the camp to show that it was unoccupied.On Friday, though, the Belarusian defense ministry said in a statement that Wagner soldiers were instructing members of a Belarusian military force in defense and battlefield tactics. A state television channel broadcast video of what its correspondent said was training by Wagner fighters “at a training base near Asipovichy,” but the affiliations of the troops in the video could not be independently verified. A defense ministry spokeswoman confirmed that at least part of the video was taken at the same site as the new tent camp.Mr. Lukashenko, increasingly dependent on and subordinate to Mr. Putin, has made clear that he would like to have an experienced fighting force like Wagner at his disposal. In late June, in comments shown on state television, he urged his defense minister, Viktor Khrenin, to make the most of the opportunity.“They will tell you about weapons — which worked well, which did not,” Mr. Lukashenko said. “And tactics, and weapons, and how to attack, how to defend. It is priceless.”Mr. Prigozhin has said his rebellion was not aimed at toppling Mr. Putin, but at removing the military leaders in Moscow he had spent months denouncing as inept in foul-mouthed tirades that the president tolerated. After sending an armored column rolling toward the capital, he called off their advance after receiving assurances that he and the Wagner troops would not be punished.The Pentagon said on Thursday that Wagner troops are no longer believed to be fighting in a major capacity in Ukraine. And the Russian Defense Ministry said on Wednesday that Wagner fighters had given up a lot of their weapons and equipment.With the mercenaries apparently inactive and largely disarmed, the Kremlin has been making a clear attempt to diminish the role of their unruly leader. Mr. Prigozhin’s media empire, including several news websites, has been shut down, and his St. Petersburg mansion has been a regular feature of Russian state television, which portrayed its owner as a petty and immoral thug stockpiling cash, weapons, passports and possibly drugs.There have also been signs of a shake-up reinforcing the grip of the military establishment that Mr. Prigozhin deplored. Gen. Sergei V. Surovikin, chief of the Russian air forces and a former chief of forces in Ukraine, seen as a Prigozhin ally, reportedly knew in advance of the mutiny and has not been seen publicly since; a top lawmaker said this week that the general was “taking a rest.”On Wednesday night, a recording was made public of Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov accusing his superiors of undermining the war effort with dishonesty, and telling his troops that he had been removed from command of a Russian army in Ukraine for daring to speak truthfully about the flawed conduct of the war. Other commanders are said to have been questioned or detained, at least briefly.So far the turmoil does not appear to have helped Ukrainian forces as they fight to retake territory in a slow-moving counteroffensive that began in early June.Russia has launched several waves of attack drones at Ukrainian cities in recent days, including overnight into Friday morning, and it continues to bombard cities within artillery range. The Ukrainian authorities said on Friday that they had shot down 16 of 17 drones overnight.Mr. Putin has identified as possibly the new leader of Wagner a man known as “Sedoi,” or “Gray-haired,” who the president said had been the actual commander of Wagner troops since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. European Union sanctions documents, Wagner-linked bloggers, and Russian media outlets have identified Sedoi as Andrei N. Troshev, a veteran of wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The sanctions documents referred to Mr. Troshev as a “founding member” and “executive director” of Wagner.Mr. Putin has maintained an ambiguous stance on Wagner’s future, apparently leaving his options open. Days after the mutiny, he said that Russia had paid Wagner almost $1 billion in one year, but in the interview reported by Kommersant, he said that Wagner “does not exist,” at least legally.“We don’t have a law on private military organizations,” Mr. Putin said. “There isn’t such a legal entity.”Valerie Hopkins contributed reporting. Source link Read the full article

[zehub]

Guerre en #Ukraine : "Dans l’élite russe, beaucoup considèrent que Poutine a perdu la tête"

Entre Poutine et les élites russes, le fossé se creuse… Et les Occidentaux devraient en profiter, estime Tatiana Stanovaya, chercheuse au Carnegie Moscow Center.

[cristianlisandru]

ANALIZĂ | Tatiana Stanovaya: ”Evgheni Prigojin, fondatorul grupării de mercenari Wagner, un pericol pentru Vladimir Putin?”

Supranumit ”Bucătarul lui Putin”, Evgheni Prigojin – fondatorul grupării de mercenari Wagner – a intrat în centrul atenției după ce liderul de la Kremlin a declanșat așa-zisa ”operațiune specială” prin care a dorit să ”pedepsească” Ucraina pentru alegerea unui drum pro-european. Rezistența ucrainenilor a transformat mult doritul blitzkrieg al lui Putin într-un război de uzură, iar conflictul va…

[mariacallous]

Russia’s war in Ukraine took a dramatic turn on Friday when elements of its own forces began turning against each other, fueling fears of an attempted coup sparked by a powerful Russian mercenary tycoon and one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s erstwhile allies.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenary forces took control of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, as well as parts of Russia’s military command headquarters in southern Russia, after he accused the Russian military of shelling his own forces. In a brief public address on Saturday, Putin pledged to take “decisive actions” against Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, for what he characterized as a treasonous rebellion. Yet later that same day, Prigozhin announced he was turning his forces back from their march on Moscow after reaching a deal to end the crisis, reportedly brokered by Belarus. It’s unclear how Prigozhin could extricate himself from the crisis after Putin publicly accused him of treason, however.

To make sense of the crisis and what shock waves it might send through Russian elites, Foreign Policy spoke to Tatiana Stanovaya, an expert on Russian politics with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank and the founder of R.Politik, an independent political analysis firm. The interview was conducted before Prigozhin announced his forces were backing down.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

What’s your assessment of the mood among Russian elites and Putin’s inner circle in Moscow now?

So many people in state institutions, in the government security services, the presidential administration, talked about Prigozhin as a threat. Many were surprised and perplexed by the fact that Putin remained so tolerant of this. People theorized there were some hidden agendas. We tracked rumors that Prigozhin was carefully managed by the Kremlin, that he would never fall out of its control. And now we are seeing that yes, actually, he did.

We may now see a response of more repression on all of the Wagner [Group]’s network and infrastructure. People who were linked to Prigozhin will become vulnerable, and they will have to prove to Putin that they are on his side.

Does this constitute a direct threat to Putin’s hold on power?

I don’t really think that there is a significant threat immediately to Putin’s regime or to his power, but it’s certainly a blow to his reputation and image. The absence of any reactions from Putin to all of Prigozhin’s videos and statements attacking the Russian military, these very daring statements, actually opened the door for Prigozhin to go further and further.

That is why Putin bears responsibility in the eyes of the Russian elite. The feeling and sentiment of these people now is that they are feeling like the situation is falling apart: How did we get to this situation? Where is stability? Where is Putin? So this is a really very unusual place for Putin’s regime to be in. Elites before this used to always feel that there is vertical control and a strong state and stability with Putin.

What’s Prigozhin’s endgame here? 

In the beginning yesterday, when he released an interview and video where he said that the military attacked Wagner forces, I think that he aimed to attack only [Defense Minister Sergei] Shoigu and [Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery] Gerasimov.

Then it shifted very abruptly, and we came to this situation where he turned out to lack significant support from serious people in Moscow. I think that he had counted on at least some support. He likely believed that Putin would find himself confronted with a situation where he had to support Prigozhin and dismiss Shoigu. That was a massive miscalculation by Prigozhin.

When Putin gave his public address to Russians and talked about betrayal, for Prigozhin, it was a pivotal point where the conflict turned into a personal problem between Prigozhin and Putin. It was clear then that the situation was impossible to repair. And now Prigozhin has been completely abandoned. And I don’t see any real scenarios for him but to be completely destroyed.

What are the Wagner Group’s chances of success, or even Prigozhin coming out of this mutiny alive, for that matter?

Honestly, I think that the chances of Prigozhin staying alive are very slim. The Russian authorities made clear he must be destroyed. So it’s only a question of the price and the time. But they will try to find any possible way to end this.

Does Prigozhin have any support from other elites in Moscow or Putin’s inner circle?

I don’t believe so. Some other analysts have tried to convince me that Prigozhin has some people in Moscow supporting him. Who? I don’t see anyone. We know that Prigozhin had some contacts with the Federal Protective Service that are responsible for Putin’s personal security. But can I imagine that any of them will switch to support Prigozhin? For me that seems impossible.

Anton Vaino, Putin’s chief of staff, has often played the role of mediator between Putin and Prigozhin, especially during the Syria war. But he’s just an executor of Putin’s orders. He will do what Putin asks, and that’s it.

I can’t imagine now that someone powerful in Moscow, in a normal state of mind, would choose to back Prigozhin. It’s suicide. All these elites who have maintained ties to Prigozhin will likely try to prove that they have nothing to do with him, and they will condemn him to distance themselves from this.

The Wagner Group had operations beyond Ukraine, including in Syria, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. How could this affect the Wagner Group’s global footprint?

I have doubts that Wagner in Russia could avoid being dismantled and destroyed after this. Then what remains of it in different countries, that’s for Putin to decide. I think that they will try to preserve resources and people and infrastructure of what Wagner had abroad, assess what resources and [troops] to keep and control. The rest they will get rid of.

In an autocratic country where dissent is so stifled, why was Prigozhin allowed to be so critical of the military before this crisis blew up?

Prigozhin was considered in Putin’s eyes as a real patriot, a representative of Russia’s civil society, but a civil society that is worried about Russian strategy. That is why this situation has been so painful for Putin, and why he referred to it as “a stab in the back” from someone who Putin believed was a loyal, patriotic man.

The president’s administration and security elites had their hands tied because they did not have any sign from Putin that they had a right to move against Prigozhin, and they really wanted to. So they had to tolerate him. And even many of them convinced themselves that Prigozhin is someone who is useful for the regime.

Prigozhin felt that there was a space to maneuver, and he started to push the boundaries, and then he felt that he faced no response, no resistance. That started to change in recent weeks, when he was kicked out from Ukraine without a chance to return, and he was losing out on authorities to recruit people in other regions in Russia, and he was not allowed on TV, he felt like he was becoming too vulnerable politically just in face of a huge repressive machine regime that has rallied against him.

So he had to act, and I think in the beginning he thought when he acted that Putin would respond with moves in his favor.

What are you watching for next?

What I’m trying most to understand is how this crisis may deepen a split within Russian society. People are talking much, much more about a possible civil war because of this split, where on the one hand we have a part of society that supports Prigozhin, that is worried with the way the war is going, with an ineffective and corrupt army.

And on the other side there are people saying that in any situation we must stand by the state and support it, and whatever happens, we must consolidate it.

We are seeing hints already. You can see in some Russian Telegram channels, people questioning, “Why have the authorities refused a dialogue with Prigozhin? He deserves it.” And I’m afraid that if this crisis ends on a bitter note, it will fuel more resentment.

[ukrainenews]

Daily Wrap Up September 20, 2022

Under the cut:

Russia on Tuesday announced plans by separatists in Ukraine to hold referendums paving the way for the formal annexation of swathes of territory after nearly seven months of war with its neighbour, a former Soviet republic

Intense fighting continues around the city of Bakhmut in the Donetsk region, which Russian forces have been trying to capture for three months

The Ukrainian flag has been raised on the border between the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, according to a Telegram post from Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of the Donetsk region military administration on Tuesday

Putin postponed a planned address to the Russian nation today to tomorrow morning, reported Russian media. The planned speech was going to cover new annexations of Ukrainian territory.

“Russia on Tuesday announced plans by separatists in Ukraine to hold referendums paving the way for the formal annexation of swathes of territory after nearly seven months of war with its neighbour, a former Soviet republic. 

The self-styled Donetsk (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republics (LPR), which President Vladimir Putin recognised as independent states just before the invasion on Feb. 24, have said they want referendums on joining Russia on Sept. 23-27 - that is this Friday to Tuesday.

The Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, which have yet to be recognised as independent states by Russia, have also said they will hold votes of their own. Russia does not fully control any of the four regions, with only around 60% of Donetsk region in Russian hands.

The territory that Russia does control amounts to more than 90,000 square km, or about 15% of Ukraine's total area - equal to the size of Hungary or Portugal.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. With Crimea and the territory in the four other regions, Russia would gain an area about the same size as the U.S. state of Pennsylvania.

If Russia goes ahead with the referendums and joins all four regions to Russia then Ukraine - and potentially its Western backers too - would, from a Russian perspective, be fighting against Russia itself.

That would raise the risk of a direct military confrontation between Russia and the NATO military alliance, a scenario that President Joe Biden has said could lead to World War Three, because NATO-members are supplying arms and giving intelligence to Ukraine.

As such, a rushed Russian move to formally annex another big chunk of Ukrainian territory would be a major escalation just days after potentially the most significant Russian battlefield defeat of the war in northeastern Ukraine.

Russia's nuclear doctrine allows the use of such weapons if it is attacked with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons.

While escalating the stakes of the confrontation, Putin could also announce additional steps. Russian stocks plunged to their lowest in a month on Tuesday as Moscow reignited martial law fears with new legislation that tightened penalties for military personnel.

Unless Ukraine agreed to stop fighting for its lost territory, then Russia would have to commit significant military forces to defend the newly annexed regions - which are still not fully under Russian control.

"Putin has made a bet on escalation," said Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of the political analysis firm R.Politik.

"All this talk about immediate referendums is an absolutely unequivocal ultimatum from Russia to Ukraine and the West."

Ukraine said the threat of referendums was "naive blackmail" and a sign Russia was running scared.

"This is what the fear of defeat looks like. The enemy is afraid, and obfuscates primitively," said Andriy Yermak, chief of staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Ukraine says it will not rest until every Russian soldier is ejected from its territory. Kyiv says it will never accept Russian control over its territory and has called on the West to supply more and better arms to fight Russian forces.”-via Reuters

~

“Intense fighting continues around the city of Bakhmut in the Donetsk region, which Russian forces have been trying to capture for three months.

Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of Donetsk region military administration, said that Russian forces carried out an airstrike on Bakhmut overnight and hit a high-rise building.

"Three entrances of the building collapsed. Two people may be under the rubble," he said.

Despite the fighting, some civilians have remained in Bakhmut.

Kyrylenko said there had also been shelling in other parts of Donetsk in Siversk, Vuhledar and Avdiivka.

While Ukrainian forces are on the offensive in parts of Donetsk — especially to the east of Sloviansk —  Russian shelling and airstrikes continue in other areas in the region.”-via CNN

~

“The Ukrainian flag has been raised on the border between the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, according to a Telegram post from Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of the Donetsk region military administration on Tuesday.

“The Ukrainian flag was raised on the entrance sign installed on the border of Donetsk and Kharkiv regions!” he wrote, “Thanks to our Armed Forces, this section of the Kyiv-Kharkiv-Dovzhansky highway is free of occupiers, but extremely dangerous, as it is literally stuffed with deadly scrap metal.” Fierce battles were being fought in the area until recently, but now only abandoned equipment and minefields remain, Kyrylenko said.

“Together with the First Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yevhen Yenin and the Head of the State Emergency Service Serhiі Kruk, we went to the site to assess the scale of work to be done on demining,” Kyrylenko said.”-via CNN

~

“Putin postponed a planned address to the Russian nation today to tomorrow morning, reported Russian media. The planned speech was going to cover new annexations of Ukrainian territory.

The proxy Russian authorities in four occupied areas of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – have all announced on Tuesday their intentions to hold referendums between 23-27 September on joining the Russian Federation.

The White House rejected Russia’s plans to hold referenda in parts of Ukraine, adding that Moscow may be making the move to recruit troops in those areas after suffering extensive losses on the battlefield.

Several world leaders have said they will not recognize any referenda or new annexations of Ukrainian territory, with French president Emmanuel Macron calling the plan a “parody”.”-via The Guardian

[jrljohnsonsrussialist]

Russian Elite Increasing Divided on What to Do If Russia Faces Defeat in Ukraine, Stanovaya Says

Russian Elite Increasing Divided on What to Do If Russia Faces Defeat in Ukraine, Stanovaya Says

(Paul Goble – Window On Eurasia – Staunton, Dec. 18, 2022) Almost all the members of Putin’s entourage are coming to the conclusion that Russia will lose the war in Ukraine if the Kremlin doesn’t change course, Tatiana Stanovaya says; and consequently, “a divide is forming around one key question: what to do if Russia loses this war?” Until the retreat from Kherson, the Russian analyst says, most…

[kragnir]

Let the lunatic think what he wants, it’s the facts on the ground that count.