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The 1968 Prague Spring: Separating Fact from Fiction

Much of the below is translated or adapted from an article written by the Russian historian and political scientist Nikolay Platoshkin. The article can be found here. You can find an identical blog post with hyperlinks to sources here.

Victors write history, and the historical narratives concerning the events of the Cold War are no different. The “Prague Spring” of 1968 is often shrouded in myths that serve the political interests of the hegemonic capitalist countries. The prevailing narrative typically presents the events as follows: economic and political reforms in Czechoslovakia, sparked by the election of the intrepid Alexander Dubček as First Secretary of the Communist Party in January 1968, were brutally suppressed by the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops on August 20-21. Naturally, the sympathies of the “free world,” particularly the United States, are portrayed as being aligned with the brave Czechoslovak reformers. However, the reality is more complex.

Genuine political and economic reforms in Czechoslovakia began long before the “Prague Spring,” influenced by developments in the Soviet Union during the early 1960s. As the Soviet Union under Khrushchev embarked on a period of de-Stalinization, it sparked a wave of reformist thinking across its satellite states. Under the leadership of Antonín Novotný, who had been President of Czechoslovakia and General Secretary of the Communist Party since 1953, the country initiated the rehabilitation of victims arrested during the Stalinist period. (The future leader of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, Gustáv Husák, was one of these, arrested in 1950 and released in 1963, a committed communist throughout.) Censorship was eased significantly, and Czechoslovak cinema, particularly the “New Wave” movement, gained recognition across Europe, with directors like Miloš Forman emerging internationally, as seen with his film Black Peter. A pivotal moment in this period was the adoption of a new economic policy in 1965, directly inspired by the Soviet Union’s Kosygin reforms. This policy aimed to decentralize economic planning, granting enterprises greater autonomy within a framework of business accounting.

The Soviet Union acted as the primary catalyst for reforms in Czechoslovakia, particularly after the new Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev came to power in October 1964, which further accelerated reforms in Moscow and Prague. However, by late 1967, internal conflict within the Czechoslovak Communist Party intensified. Students from the Strahov dormitories in Prague launched a sizable protest over power outages, prompting Novotný to cease reforms and ban liberal journals and films. The widespread unpopularity of these moves led members of the party’s Central Committee to oust Novotný. This coalition of strange bedfellows included noted liberal reformers like Husák, Čestmír Císař, and Jozef Lenárt joining forces with conservatives like Vasil Biľak, Drahomír Kolder, and Jiří Hendrych. When Novotný sought a lifeline from Brezhnev in December 1967, Brezhnev refused, partly because he viewed Novotný as an ally of his Soviet rival, Alexei Kosygin.

During heated debates within the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s Central Committee, which began in October 1967, Novotný suggested Alexander Dubček as a compromise candidate for First Secretary, a proposal that Brezhnev accepted. Dubček, who had lived in the USSR from 1925 to 1938 (where he was a classmate of Brezhnev) and was seen as a reliable ally, was considered a weak political figure, making him acceptable to both liberal and conservative factions within the party. He was also of Slovak descent, which would appease Slovak nationalists who opposed the unitary state. On January 5, 1968, Dubček was narrowly elected First Secretary by just one vote. Brezhnev’s unexpected visit to Prague in December 1967 was interpreted by the U.S. as a reluctant intervention in the party’s internal struggles, given the lack of a clear alternative to Novotný. Far from the enterprising reformer portrayed in Western media, Dubček was initially meant to hold the party line, something that he promised to do, part of a pattern of deception and careerism.

In February 1968, the U.S. State Department agreed with the U.S. Embassy in Prague’s recommendation to refrain from showing goodwill toward Dubček’s regime, viewing it as an unstable coalition of right and left forces. The U.S. chose not to act despite holding significant leverage at the time, stemming from the U.S. Army’s seizure of Czechoslovakia’s gold reserves during the liberation of western Czechoslovakia in 1945. The gold had been taken by the Germans after their 1939 occupation. Despite repeated requests from the Czechoslovak government, the U.S. avoided returning the gold, citing various pretexts. In 1961, the U.S. agreed to return the gold in exchange for settling claims of American citizens affected by post-1948 nationalization in Czechoslovakia. Both sides initially agreed on a sum of around $10 million, but the U.S. later quadrupled the demand due to Washington’s displeasure over Czechoslovakia’s arms supplies to Vietnam. Additionally, the U.S. delayed granting Czechoslovakia most-favored-nation trade status, linking it to the unresolved gold issue. At the onset of the “Prague Spring,” U.S. policy was frosty toward Dubček.

On March 22, 1968, Antonín Novotný resigned as President, and General Ludvík Svoboda, a former commander of Czechoslovak forces on the Soviet-German front, succeeded him. The day before, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Washington, Karel Duda, told U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Walter J. Stoessel, that the new leadership would likely seek better relations with the U.S. He dismissed the possibility of foreign interference in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs, which the Americans interpreted as a reference to Moscow, but warned that internal conflict could escalate if it led to violence. This affirmed the view that Dubček’s regime was meant to stabilize Czechoslovakia, at least for the time being, not usher in a wave of reforms that would destabilize the country.

On February 25, Major General Jan Šejna, a Novotný supporter who led the Defense Ministry’s party organization, defected to the U.S. with his young mistress. Czechoslovakia demanded his extradition, accusing him of corruption and plotting a military coup for Novotný, but the U.S. refused. Despite being deemed a criminal by the Dubček government and once considered a hardliner, Šejna became a key CIA informant on Czechoslovakia and received political asylum. Given the choice between sheltering an individual it once considered a “Stalinist” for a military advantage or diplomatic measures meant to thaw relations with a Cold War adversary, the U.S. government eagerly pursued the former option.

The U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Jacob Beam, held a low opinion of the new Dubček regime, viewing any push for liberalization as secondary to ousting Novotný, after which the government would likely seek stability. Nonetheless, Beam believed that the unfolding events in Czechoslovakia aligned with U.S. interests. On April 26, he recommended to Under Secretary of State for European Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, a more flexible stance on the issue of Czechoslovakia’s gold reserves as a diplomatic gesture toward the new Prague leadership. Beam suggested returning “Nazi gold” to Czechoslovakia in exchange for an initial payment to compensate individuals whose wealth was expropriated during communist nationalization, with additional payments to follow. He also proposed using most-favored-nation trade status as a potential incentive, which would mean low tariffs or high import quotas for Czechoslovakia. Beam believed these steps could enhance U.S. influence within the communist world. However, Beam’s modest proposal was not supported. The State Department agreed only to express approval of Czechoslovakia’s liberalization. Due to Czechoslovakia’s role as the third-largest arms supplier to North Vietnam, direct financial or economic aid from the U.S. was deemed impossible.

During this period, a significant debate unfolded in Washington between “hawks” and “doves” in the U.S. leadership. President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had decided not to seek re-election in October 1968, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk prioritized détente with the USSR. They believed this thaw in relations could help end the Vietnam War with Soviet assistance. Johnson even planned a potential visit to Moscow in October 1968, becoming the first U.S. President to do so. Johnson was concerned that excessive liberalization in Czechoslovakia might jeopardize the improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

In contrast, the “hawk” faction, led by Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Walt Rostow, saw an opportunity to weaken the USSR globally by attempting to pull Czechoslovakia out of the Warsaw Pact. Rostow believed this could distract the Soviets from Vietnam and possibly allow the U.S. to end the war on more favorable terms. Rostow is remembered as one of the biggest cheerleaders for the Vietnam War, claiming that strategic bombing of North Vietnam alone would be sufficient to win the war. This was based on Rostow’s belief that there was no genuine support for communism in South Vietnam and that ending the war was as simple as destroying North Vietnam’s infrastructure.

On May 10, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk a memorandum titled “Soviet Threats to Czechoslovakia,” interpreting Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Poland as a sign of Soviet hesitation and urging Johnson to summon the Soviet Ambassador to demand an explanation. Rostow also proposed creating a special high-level NATO group to monitor the situation in Czechoslovakia and prepare a response plan. However, both Rusk and Johnson rejected Rostow’s alarmist stance.

The U.S. Embassy in West Germany shared a cautious view for different reasons. Unlike the 1956 Hungarian crisis, the Embassy noted in a telegram on May 10 that moving American troops closer to or across the Czech border to counter a Soviet attack was conceivable due to the shared border between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. However, the West German government, including the Social Democrats, strongly opposed any U.S. military action from West German territory. The West German Deputy Foreign Minister even urged the U.S. Ambassador to moderate anti-Czechoslovak propaganda from Radio Free Europe in Munich and RIAS in West Berlin, leading the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, George McGhee, to consider joint actions with West Germany against Czechoslovakia unrealistic.

On May 11, Secretary of State Dean Rusk initiated a continuous exchange of opinions between NATO countries concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia. However, in a telegram to the U.S. mission to NATO, he recommended holding off on actions that might be perceived as NATO showing “unusual concern” about Czechoslovakia.

Despite this, the U.S. remained unwilling to address the pressing bilateral issues with Czechoslovakia. On May 28, Jiří Hájek, the new Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and a reformer, expressed frustration to the U.S. ambassador that bilateral relations had not improved since 1962 and had even regressed in some respects. Hájek reiterated demands for the return of Czechoslovakia’s gold reserves, pointing out that the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia had occurred with the West’s, including the U.S.’s, acquiescence. Ambassador Beam was unable to provide a concrete response but reported to the State Department that Prague was likely using the gold issue to bolster its authority within the communist bloc and to curb any growing pro-American sentiments within the country.

On June 13, the CIA provided a memorandum titled “Czechoslovakia: Dubcek’s Pause” to the top U.S. leadership. The memo assessed that the crisis in Czechoslovakia, both internal and external, had lost its immediacy, leading to a “pause.” The Soviet Union had been reassured by Dubček’s firm commitment to keeping the reform process under Communist Party control. In return, the Czechs were granted some autonomy in domestic matters by the USSR. The CIA noted that the Soviets were keen to avoid military intervention in Czechoslovakia, due to concerns that the country might leave the Warsaw Pact, given that Czechoslovakia had the largest army per capita within the Pact, totaling 230,000 soldiers.

Despite Moscow’s objections to the anti-Soviet rhetoric in the Czechoslovak media, the CIA reported that this rhetoric had “reached astonishing proportions” in recent weeks. The media blamed the USSR not only for the Stalinist repression of the early 1950s but also for the current economic difficulties in Czechoslovakia. However, it was precisely cheap raw materials from the USSR that were able to provide Czechoslovakia with high rates of economic growth and an improvement in the standard of living of the population. For all its embrace of market reforms, the Czechoslovak economy did not grow out of its moribund status, as goods produced in the country simply were not competitive enough. Inflation soon followed, leading to cuts to social services, which only led to greater public dissent.

The CIA concluded that due to the compromise between Prague and Moscow, “Moscow decided not to use force, at least for the time being.” Interestingly, the CIA noted that Dubček himself might benefit from this situation, as his perceived indecisiveness in implementing reforms could be attributed to Soviet pressure. U.S. intelligence, citing Czech sources, also reported growing disagreements within the Soviet leadership over Czechoslovakia. Leonid Brezhnev, who had placed Dubček in power, was under pressure as Dubček’s policies were increasingly seen as anti-Soviet. This situation could potentially be exploited by Brezhnev’s opponents within the Soviet leadership, including Kosygin.

U.S. intelligence, correctly assessing the situation, believed that Dubček was merely stalling by agreeing to Brezhnev’s terms and promising to maintain socialism in Czechoslovakia. They anticipated that at the upcoming Communist Party congress in September 1968, reformist views would be formally adopted as the party’s official program, revealing to the Soviets that they had been misled. The CIA also assessed that Dubček lacked firm convictions of his own and was influenced by the reformers Oldřich Černík and Zdeněk Mlynář, who were expected to play a crucial role after the congress. The CIA concluded that there was a significant likelihood of renewed tension between Prague and Moscow. Although Soviet leaders, or at least most of them, preferred to avoid sharp and costly military action, they might resort to threatening Czech borders if Dubček’s control appeared to be collapsing or if Czech policies became “counterrevolutionary” from Moscow’s perspective.

By this time, the CIA was heavily influenced by its primary “expert” on Czechoslovakia, General Šejna, who was pursuing his own agenda to discredit Dubček. On July 24, the CIA reported that the crisis in Czechoslovakia had subsided, according to Šejna, who believed that the Czechoslovaks would likely capitulate to Soviet demands and reverse the reforms. Šejna also suggested that such a rollback would not provoke significant public protests, as neither workers nor Slovaks were actively engaged in the liberalization process. The CIA noted that the “Prague Spring” was largely driven by intellectuals and parts of the party apparatus without improving the material conditions of the general population. Furthermore, anti-Soviet sentiment in the Czech press did not resonate with Slovakia. The CIA’s internal notes reflected concerns that Šejna might be underestimating the national factor, noting that military and police forces, being “conservative and pro-Soviet,” could quickly suppress any potential demonstrations against the rollback of reforms.

The CIA memo highlighted that the Soviets were facing substantial pressure from conservative forces within Czechoslovakia, as well as from the leaders of Poland and East Germany, who demanded more stringent control over the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Šejna believed that while the Soviets favored using political influence, they were prepared to use military force if necessary, which would likely involve a rapid advance of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. The CIA accurately assessed that Moscow was becoming aware that Dubček and the “liberals” were not fulfilling their promises to keep Czechoslovakia within the Soviet sphere of influence, specifically the Warsaw Pact.

By July 1968, the State Department was already considering raising the Czechoslovak issue at the United Nations, potentially as a protest against the slow withdrawal of Soviet troops following the end of the Warsaw Pact “Šumava” maneuvers on June 30. However, the U.S. was reluctant to take direct action at the U.N., preferring instead that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, or potentially Romania and Yugoslavia, initiate the discussion.

On July 14-15, the leaders of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria met in Warsaw to discuss the events taking place in Czechoslovakia. On the heels of the publication of liberal manifesto “The Two Thousand Words,” the Warsaw Pact leaders feared that anti-communist forces were exploiting the liberalization to promote disorder. Although they stated their common desire not to interfere in Czechoslovak affairs, they shared anxieties that reactionary forces were preparing for counterrevolution:

The reactionary forces were given the opportunity, in public, to publish their political platform under the title “Two Thousand Words,” which contains an open call for a struggle against the communist party and against the constitutional system, as well as a call for strikes and chaos. This appeal is a serious threat to the party, the National Front, and the socialist state. It is an attempt to foment anarchy. The declaration is, in its essence, the organizational-political platform of counterrevolution.

On July 20, 1968, Rostow issued another memorandum to the Secretary of State, pressing for active measures to deter the USSR from acting against Czechoslovakia. Rostow acknowledged that Czechoslovakia was within the Soviet sphere of influence and that its departure from Moscow’s control would severely undermine Soviet positions globally, including in Vietnam and the Middle East. The memorandum proposed establishing a special NATO group to develop a unified response plan for potential crises involving the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, suggesting that this move would reinvigorate the alliance itself. Rostow, also serving as special assistant to the president, requested from the US military leadership, via the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, information on NATO forces available for a possible intervention in Czechoslovakia. On July 23, the response indicated that a potential intervention could involve one US brigade, two French divisions, and two German divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff limited the U.S. contribution to one brigade due to the lengthy mobilization time required for a larger force.

Thus, the US was seriously contemplating a NATO intervention in Czechoslovakia a month before the Warsaw Pact troops entered the country. On July 22, the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, was summoned to the State Department, where Secretary of State Rusk lodged a de facto protest against Soviet media claims of NATO, Pentagon, and CIA subversive activities against Czechoslovakia. By July 24, President Johnson convened a meeting with the entire US political and military leadership, including the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the CIA. At this meeting, Rostow revised his earlier position, expressing doubts that the Soviets would take military action against Czechoslovakia. Rusk also declared that the “Czech crisis” had passed.

From July 25 to August 1, the top leadership of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic convened in Čierna nad Tisou in southeastern Slovakia—a historic meeting, as it marked the only occasion when the entire Soviet leadership traveled abroad simultaneously. During these discussions, a compromise appeared to be reached. Dubček, in the presence of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, agreed to halt anti-Soviet rhetoric in the Czechoslovak media, bolster the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ leadership, and remove several anti-Soviet figures from key government positions, including the head of Czechoslovak television, Jiří Pelikán. In return, Brezhnev promised to end the Soviet media’s critiques of Czechoslovak policies.

In the meantime, a group of conservative communist politicians, including Vasil Biľak and Drahomír Kolder who had supported Dubček’s rise to power, authored a “letter of invitation” to Brezhnev and the Soviet government to intervene in Czechoslovakia. They saw the writing on the wall: the Dubček government was neither trustworthy nor competent, and if the situation was allowed to continue, Czechoslovakia was likely to degenerate into chaos, with ordinary people suffering the most. The capitalist West would not help the people but only exploit the situation according to their political interests. The only viable choice was to ask the Soviet Union to restore order and remove the Dubček government. Brezhnev would later cite this letter as a major justification for the later Warsaw Pact invasion.

The US Embassy in Prague, in a dispatch dated August 4, reported that while the meeting in Čierna might have temporarily eased tensions, Dubček would likely struggle to honor his commitments without undermining his domestic support. The embassy suggested that the State Department publicly commend the Čierna meeting’s results for resolving the immediate political crisis in Czechoslovakia. However, despite the agreement, anti-Soviet articles continued to appear in Czechoslovak newspapers post-Čierna, and Dubček did not fully meet his promises. Instead of the bold reformist hero, Dubček should be seen as an opportunist who told others what they wanted to hear at the time so long as it helped him stay in power. Instead of confrontation, he nominally chose compromise at Čierna.

On August 10, during a meeting with President Johnson and Republican presidential candidate Nixon, CIA Director Helms remarked that while the immediate severity of the Czechoslovak crisis had diminished, it was not fully resolved. He noted that the Czechoslovaks were increasingly seeking to reduce their participation in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets wanted to avoid this at all costs, but had no honest leader to deal with.

On August 13, Brezhnev had an extensive telephone conversation with Dubček, which likely prompted the decision to introduce Warsaw Pact troops into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. During this call, Brezhnev implored Dubček to fulfill the commitments made at Čierna or at least specify when these would be met. In typical fashion, Dubček avoided providing a clear answer and revealed his intention to resign from his top party position at the upcoming Communist Party Congress in September. Moscow feared that the Czechoslovak party leadership might disintegrate imminently, prompting the decision to deploy troops to support Dubček and mitigate pressure from the liberals. Had Moscow simply wished to remove Dubček, it could have waited for the September Congress.

On August 19, Rostow conveyed to Dobrynin over dinner that the United States viewed the Soviet decisions at Čierna as “wise.” The Americans aimed to avoid exacerbating the situation in Czechoslovakia and were hopeful that the situation would stabilize following Čierna. On August 20, Dobrynin met with President Johnson. The President, in good spirits, discussed various topics, including Kosygin’s health and his own lack of a haircut, before addressing the main issue. Dobrynin informed Johnson of the Soviet leadership’s decision to deploy troops into Czechoslovakia, citing a threat to European peace and stating that the intervention was at the Czechoslovak government’s request. The message emphasized that the action was not intended to undermine American interests and assured the continuation of détente in Soviet-American relations. Johnson thanked Dobrynin and promised a response after consulting with Secretary of State Rusk. The conversation concluded amicably, with no condemnation of the Soviet action from the American side. Dobrynin was surprised by Johnson’s lack of immediate reaction, noting that the President seemed to underappreciate the gravity of the situation.

On August 20, Soviet forces were ordered to commence Operation Danube, marking the beginning of the troop deployment into Czechoslovakia. By approximately 11 p.m., Warsaw Pact troops from the USSR, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria began crossing the Czechoslovak border. Soviet airborne units landed at Prague’s Ruzyne Airport at 2:00 a.m. on August 21. The general directive for Soviet units in the event of encountering NATO forces was to halt and refrain from engaging.

Slovaks widely welcomed Soviet troops, joyfully hoping for a return of social guarantees and urban development, saying that “the Slovaks are not with Prague.” This sentiment reflected a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the central government’s policies, which many Slovaks saw as favoring Prague and the Czechs. The arrival of Soviet forces was seen by some as a chance to regain the social stability and economic progress that had been characteristic of earlier communist rule. Many Slovaks believed that aligning with the Soviet Union could secure better living standards, greater investment in infrastructure, and a reassertion of traditional socialist values that they felt were being eroded by the reformist agenda.

On August 20, President Johnson convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) in Washington. Both Secretary of State Rusk and Defense Secretary Clark Clifford expressed significant surprise at the Soviet decision to deploy troops. CIA Director Helms correctly identified the motivation behind the Soviet actions: Dubček’s failure to meet the commitments made in Čierna. Helms noted, “They (i.e., the USSR) wanted the Czechs to quiet the press. The Czechs did not do that.” Johnson labeled the troop deployment as aggression and inquired about possible responses from the United States. Rusk suggested that the U.S. could support Czechoslovakia at the United Nations if the Czechoslovaks raised the issue of the Soviet invasion there. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, stated that the United States lacked the strength for any forceful retaliation: “We do not have the forces to do it.” Vice President Hubert Humphrey concluded the discussion by emphasizing the need for restraint, noting, “All you can do is snort and talk.”

By August 26 most high-ranking Czechoslovak officials, including Dubček, signed the “Moscow Protocols” that required they pledge themselves to Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and renew the struggle against bourgeois ideology. Notably, the Soviets did not simply install pro-Moscow conservatives as their puppets, unlike the U.S. and CIA, who regularly overthrew governments around the world during the Cold War to install dictators loyal to Washington. Instead, the new government included reformers like Gustáv Husák and Jozef Lenárt who favored not suppression but “normalization,” the peaceful return to the pre-Dubček period. Although Czechoslovakia was not permitted to go down the road to chaos or counterrevolution, many of the same individuals who held power before the Soviet intervention remained in power afterwards, unlike in cases of U.S. military interventions.

It is also worth stressing the degree to which the Soviet leadership went to negotiate with Czechoslovak leaders, first with Brezhnev’s personal intervention in late 1967, the Čierna meetings in late July 1968, and the negotiations over the subsequent Moscow Protocols. Clearly, the Soviet Union was willing to go to great diplomatic lengths to keep the country inside the Warsaw Pact. Compare this to the 2000s, when Czech protests over U.S. missiles and radar stations due to NATO membership prompted only shrugs from Washington. Moreover, the U.S. used a large number of Czech troops to shore up its illegal war in Iraq, something the Soviet Union never did during its bloody occupation of Afghanistan.

As we have seen, the U.S. government viewed the Dubček regime with caution, not optimism, considering it a loose coalition of various political forces and a transitional phenomenon. The “Prague Spring” lacked support from both the working class and the Slovak region of Czechoslovakia. Instead of using diplomacy, the United States contemplated the possibility of military intervention in Czechoslovakia by several NATO divisions. The USSR’s approach to Czechoslovakia was deemed prudent by the United States, and the compromise reached in Čierna was regarded as a “wise decision.” The CIA (correctly) assessed the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops on August 20-21, 1968, as a response to Dubček’s failure to keep his word and implement the Čierna agreements.

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