#Massachusetts Alimony Lawyer

[mwpetersonlaw]

Seeking a reliable alimony attorney in Massachusetts Visit mwpetersonlaw.com. Our compassionate team will advocate for your rights.

Massachusetts Alimony Lawyer

[eden-rafferty]

Exploring Legal Specializations: What Are The Types of Lawyers Working In MA?

Lawyers specialize in various areas of law to provide their clients with expert advice and representation in case they need legal help. Here are some examples of common types of lawyers that operate in Massachusetts.

i) Lawyer for Families

While many people associate Family Court Lawyers Worcester experts with divorce attorneys who handle the division of marital assets, child custody, and alimony, family law encompasses a much broader range of issues. A family lawyer handles any domestic relations or family-related issues, such as adoption and guardianship, paternity, juvenile delinquency, and child welfare. A family lawyer's typical responsibilities may include drafting contracts or negotiations, drafting prenuptial agreements, counseling clients on legal options, and resolving familial disputes. Family lawyers can work for small law firms that specialize in family law or for non-profit organizations.

ii) Criminal Defense Attorney

Criminal Defense Lawyer Worcester advocates on behalf of those accused of criminal activity, ensuring that their liberties and fundamental rights are upheld fairly within the justice system. A criminal defense attorney can work as both a public defender and a private attorney. In either position, their job is to use the law to the accused's advantage. Within the confines of the law, they must protect their client's best interests. Criminal defense lawyers may have to appear in court more frequently than other types of lawyers, particularly if the case goes to trial.

iii) Personal Injury Attorney

Personal injury lawyers primarily represent clients who have been injured in civil litigation. These injuries are frequently caused by car accidents, medical malpractice, product liability, or workplace accidents. The Best Personal Injury Lawyer In Massachusetts must establish that the responsible party - typically another person or a corporation is liable and owes their client damages. Many of these cases are resolved outside of the courtroom. 

iv) Medical Malpractice Attorney

People who hire medical malpractice lawyers have usually suffered personal injury as a result of a medical professional's error. These attorneys are responsible for any harm caused by inappropriate treatment, negligence, botched surgery, or misdiagnosis. Medical Malpractice Lawyers In Massachusetts can also represent health professionals when charges are leveled against them, and they are typically hired directly by the medical facility where the professional works.

v) Property Lawyer or Real Estate Attorney

Real Estate Attorney Worcester MA frequently represents agents, homeowners, and buyers as clients. Because of their expert knowledge, these lawyers can help you buy a home or advise construction companies on various zoning laws. They also handle evictions and foreclosures, representing both tenants and landlords. Real estate lawyers must be skilled negotiators because they frequently act as middlemen in real estate transactions and disputes.

Wrapping Up

These are just a few of the many specializations available in the field of law such as Corporate, Bankruptcy, Immigration, Labor and Employment, Environment, Healthcare, Taxation, Civil rights, and more. Lawyers In Worcester MA may choose to specialize in one area or work in multiple areas based on their expertise and interests.

If you are the one looking for any of the above-mentioned Worcester Lawyers in MA, then you can hire the same from Eden Rafferty. We are a law firm based in Worcester, Massachusetts, and are committed to providing exceptional legal results on behalf of our clients. 

Source URL - https://edenrafferty.blogspot.com/2023/08/exploring-legal-specializations-what.html

[westoverlaw22]

Divorce Mediation Training Certificates Northwestern Sps: School Of Professional Studies Northwestern University

Maybe you’re unsure in case your spouse is prepared for the accountability of caring for the youngsters alone. Whatever’s maintaining you up at evening, make a note of these points and be ready to discuss them in mediation. When you approach divorce mediation, you should be ready to return to a compromise so as to signal an agreement divorce mediation. You’re going to need to be prepared to give up some wishes that you simply would possibly feel you deserve, so as to receive the overwhelming majority of the gadgets which are most necessary to you. You can really feel comfy and free to discuss almost something throughout a divorce mediation session.

That’s exactly what might occur in traditional litigation if you don’t mediate. But just because you’ve made the decision to end your marriage doesn’t mean it has to turn into an all-out war. And the events would then transfer ahead peacefully, having come to a mutually agreeable resolution. No different divorce mediation divorce option comes near providing the benefits of mediation. Mediation can be cheap because the parties can collectively pay for the mediator instead of every of them paying for an legal professional.

Ratification and evaluate present safeguards for mediating events. They also present an opportunity for individuals not privy to the mediation to undermine the outcome. Some mediated agreements require ratification by an exterior body—such as a board, council or cabinet. In some conditions, the sanctions of a courtroom or different exterior authority should explicitly endorse a mediation agreement. In other situations, it may be agreed to have agreements reviewed by lawyers, accountants or different professional advisers. The time period mediation broadly refers to any occasion in which a third party helps others reach an settlement.

Parenting plans ought to be altered in accordance with children’s age peculiarities; one plan can't be appropriate for several years. Divorce Mediation is essentially the most respectful and constructive path via the divorce process. If you might be uncertain whether or not mediation is right for you, contact us as soon as attainable.

It’s a giant cause so many divorces turn into an economic and emotional catastrophe. The higher divorce settlement compliance price that mediation enjoys supports the frequent sense wisdom of this view. Adivorce mediator’s neutrality and skill at managing and diffusing battle is the cornerstone of the mediation course of. In our experience when folks really feel their concerns and feelings aren't only understood, however accepted and validated by the opposite aspect, they’re keen to compromise in a means that both really feel is fair.

At mediation, couples can explore their choices and hammer out their own mutually acceptable divorce phrases with the help of a neutral third celebration who is a professional mediator. If you are in a position to find middle ground on a number of pending divorce phrases at mediation – and you both log out on them – the terms turn out to be legally binding. Because the stakes involved are so high, you're well-advised to contemplate having a dedicated household regulation legal professional in your side throughout the divorce process, including mediation. While the care and custody of a kid are of utmost significance to most dad and mom, many recognize that the financial side of divorce is vitally important to their family’s monetary future. A decide will finally need to review and approve your separation settlement, however a talented mediator can work to ensure your agreement is honest and in accordance with Massachusetts household regulation statues. Your financials are a important part of a quantity of features of a divorce, including baby assist,alimony, and the equitable distribution of marital property and debts.

The common process of mediation is analogous across each settings. No making an attempt to coordinate schedules with household regulation divorce attorneys or a judge divorce mediation. Or waiting around for the court docket course of to dictate when you'll find a way to are obtainable in.

[tangent101]

Thoughts on writing

I was contemplating fanfics and yet another fanfic idea for the characters Chloe and Max from the game Life is Strange when it dawned on me that I actually had the makings of a good story here. And I don’t mean a LiS story, but something entirely my own. The basic premise was “what if Chloe was from a broken home because Joyce was caught in bed with David and then divorced William and got custody of her daughter?” (as to be honest, we never did see Joyce and William together outside of a couple of pictures where Joyce honestly looked... reserved at best and I had to wonder if she married William because she got pregnant).

The idea percolated for a tiny bit and soon migrated its way over to my own scifi world (a world that includes psychics and more subtle magics - less “superhero” and more akin to the old McCaffrey novel “To Ride Pegasus”), especially as a friend of mine pointed out there were enough depressing stories involving child abuse and broken homes out there, and not enough science fiction. 

It also helped some of the characters evolve a little - for instance, Kassi is an empath (but one whose abilities aren’t strong enough to warrant training - more sensing moods and being influenced by them and less projecting emotions), being raised in a broken household with her stepfather, Richard, hating “psykers” as job-stealing witches that are an abomination to God while working as a border guard “protecting America from those Canadian bastards”. Her real father, Brian, moved from their home in northern New Hampshire to Massachusetts to get a job engineering loaders (industrial power suits akin to the one from the movie Aliens) to try and pay child support and alimony (seeing Kassi’s mom got lawyered up and he didn’t have money for one).

Maya would appear a bit later into the story as a child with a minor precognitive talent who is hated by her father because her ability only manifested after the death of her mother in a car accident. Thus she’s shy and withdrawn and tends to be hyperaware of her surroundings. And naturally she is introduced to Kassi by “saving her life” and pushing her down just before Kassi would have been badly hurt by something. 

I even have a scene thought of where Kassi and Maya end up meeting one of my older characters, the Angel of Boston (a 30-something psychic vigilante who’s been stalking the slums of Boston and waging a war on drug dealers for over a decade while healing those in need), though whether or not I keep Angel in the story will depend on how the story grows.

So you never know. Sometimes the germ of an idea for a fanfic can blossom and become the germ of an idea for a non-fanfic with unique (or modified) characters. And let’s face it - some of the AUs out there bare little resemblance to the original characters and source, outside of names and some aspects of their personalities. So feel free to take that idea and let it grow into something new and entirely its own. You never know what it might lead to.

[nellieannmones]

The Operation Of Life Insurance During A Divorce

Divorce is a terrible thing. Even a pleasant divorce might result in financial hardship when considering the expense of establishing and maintaining two separate residences. Although there are many factors to consider before, during, and after a divorce, life insurance is frequently overlooked.

Life insurance can assist in preserving the things you’ve worked hard to accumulate if you’re going through a divorce. Life insurance can be a significant part of a divorce settlement, even though every divorce will have a unique set of financial difficulties.

How to Manage Life Insurance in an Existing Marriage

Married couples frequently obtain life insurance to cover current or future debts and other financial obligations. These duties could endure even after a couple decides to part ways. Because of this, existing life insurance issues may play a significant role in a divorce.

In the event of a divorce complaint, you can be required to present proof of all your existing assets, debts, and insurance policies to ensure that all life insurance has been taken into consideration. For instance, New Jersey mandates that each spouse submit an Affidavit of Insurance Coverage at the start of a disputed divorce case. This document contains a list of all the policies you and your spouse had when you filed for divorce and any procedures terminated in the last 90 days.

Making a list of all active insurance policies will benefit the divorce process.

Your current and future life insurance needs and the cost of maintaining the policies will affect how you address the obligations. Consider the scenario in which you and your spouse each hold a term life insurance policy and opt to keep them. You may each choose to be the policy’s owner and beneficiary for the other.

You and your spouse may opt to cancel your cash value life insurance policy and divide the remaining cash value equally.

Surrender fees, which lower a policy’s value upon surrender, could be another factor.

Ask Your Lawyer These Questions Before Handling Life Insurance

Remember the principles of why you initially bought life insurance when speaking with your lawyer. The goal of your new and existing insurance going forward in the context of the divorce should therefore be determined with the assistance of your lawyer. You might want to ask your lawyer the following questions:

How should my life insurance policies be handled following my divorce?

What duties will I have for insurance following my divorce?

How do I make sure my ex-spouse has insurance?

How do we determine how much life insurance we need?

How can we decide whether or not we are insurable?

It is advisable to speak with a financial planner who can advise you and help you determine the affordability of life insurance and the level of coverage you require because life insurance is typically a component of a larger financial or estate plan.

“Divorce gives people the option to decide how they want to live independently and how they want to support the children they had together,” says Chris Chen, CFP, of Insight Financial Strategists in Massachusetts. For instance, the supporting spouse might decide to foot the bill for the child’s college tuition. To pay for this potential cost if they pass away too soon, they would want to assess whether they need additional insurance coverage.

What Life Insurance Settlements Frequently Say

Even if the two parties combined assets are frequently divided evenly, a court could order one spouse to pay the other monthly alimony or child support. These payments guarantee that the dependant spouse will be compensated after the divorce and that the children will be taken care of.

In general, the court will order the spouse paying support to have life insurance in place if there is child support or alimony requirement. The opposing attorney may insist that the paying spouse keep their existing policies, like group life insurance policies.

If they don’t have a policy, they might need to buy life insurance to ensure they can still support themselves after they die.

To determine the value of the insurance, who owns the policy, who pays the premiums, who the beneficiaries are, and how much the procedure goes to each beneficiary, both ex-spouses will need to consult with their respective attorneys.

“Sometimes, a payor may not be eligible for or unable to buy a life insurance policy. A constructive trust, which sets aside a portion of the payor’s assets to ensure future support just in case the payor passes away, would be a choice in this situation.

Potential Issues With Life Insurance

The most frequent issues with life insurance that come up during and after a divorce are listed below.

A life insurance policy was altered.

The policy owner occasionally modifies the policy without notifying the recipient. For instance, if one ex-spouse is still paying support and has a life insurance policy, they are free to change the beneficiary without informing the other.

Or, a policyholder could stop making premium payments or let the insurance coverage expire. This can result in the policy being canceled, depriving the other ex-spouse of their financial security.

But there are ways to stay away from these issues. One possibility is for the spouse receiving support to be the policy’s owner. This provides you with complete control over the designation of recipients and the making of payments.

Another choice is to set up third-party authorizations on the account, which will enable you to receive notifications when a modification is made or information when the policy is due to expire.

The ex-spouse can receive information about changes to the life insurance, such as beneficiary changes, directly from the insurance company by having third-party authorizations. The ex-spouse receiving alimony or child support can ensure coverage and protect the support payments.

Adjustment of support

After a divorce, both parties may experience changes in their financial situation. If the support payor loses his job or the support receiver starts earning much more than the support payor, you could need to reallocate support.

“Life insurance liabilities must be redistributed when the amount of support is revised. After a divorce, circumstances frequently change, so the family may return to court to restructure the life insurance and child support responsibilities. However, it is more economical and advised to handle these cases out of court, according to Saadeh.

Insurance requirements

The necessity for life insurance may evolve. For instance, if a payor has a ten-year obligation to pay $100,000 in alimony, the payor may only require a $100,000 life insurance coverage. The payor no longer requires a $100,000 life insurance policy to cover the compensation if they have previously paid $50,000 in the first several years of assistance. A divorce settlement may allow the payor to reduce insurance as support is paid gradually.

To distribute half of the life insurance death benefit to a new beneficiary or to discontinue coverage, the payor may do either.

It’s vital to note that the policyholder must make these modifications; the insurance company won’t do it for them automatically.

After a Divorce, the Best Types of Life Insurance

The correct insurance will depend on what you already have. Term life insurance is often an excellent answer for many financial situations because cash is tight everywhere.

Divorces are emotionally and financially challenging. Your financial status and what you and your ex-spouse may reasonably afford will determine your life insurance needs. After parting ways, the best strategy to protect assets will be determined by carefully considering your options and your longer-term financial intention.

Credits: Paolo Moyet

Published: August 08, 2022

[joanslifeideasblog]

The Operation Of Life Insurance During A Divorce

Divorce is a terrible thing. Even a pleasant divorce might result in financial hardship when considering the expense of establishing and maintaining two separate residences. Although there are many factors to consider before, during, and after a divorce, life insurance is frequently overlooked.

Life insurance can assist in preserving the things you’ve worked hard to accumulate if you’re going through a divorce. Life insurance can be a significant part of a divorce settlement, even though every divorce will have a unique set of financial difficulties.

How to Manage Life Insurance in an Existing Marriage

Married couples frequently obtain life insurance to cover current or future debts and other financial obligations. These duties could endure even after a couple decides to part ways. Because of this, existing life insurance issues may play a significant role in a divorce.

In the event of a divorce complaint, you can be required to present proof of all your existing assets, debts, and insurance policies to ensure that all life insurance has been taken into consideration. For instance, New Jersey mandates that each spouse submit an Affidavit of Insurance Coverage at the start of a disputed divorce case. This document contains a list of all the policies you and your spouse had when you filed for divorce and any procedures terminated in the last 90 days.

Making a list of all active insurance policies will benefit the divorce process.

Your current and future life insurance needs and the cost of maintaining the policies will affect how you address the obligations. Consider the scenario in which you and your spouse each hold a term life insurance policy and opt to keep them. You may each choose to be the policy’s owner and beneficiary for the other.

You and your spouse may opt to cancel your cash value life insurance policy and divide the remaining cash value equally.

Surrender fees, which lower a policy’s value upon surrender, could be another factor.

Ask Your Lawyer These Questions Before Handling Life Insurance

Remember the principles of why you initially bought life insurance when speaking with your lawyer. The goal of your new and existing insurance going forward in the context of the divorce should therefore be determined with the assistance of your lawyer. You might want to ask your lawyer the following questions:

How should my life insurance policies be handled following my divorce?

What duties will I have for insurance following my divorce?

How do I make sure my ex-spouse has insurance?

How do we determine how much life insurance we need?

How can we decide whether or not we are insurable?

It is advisable to speak with a financial planner who can advise you and help you determine the affordability of life insurance and the level of coverage you require because life insurance is typically a component of a larger financial or estate plan.

“Divorce gives people the option to decide how they want to live independently and how they want to support the children they had together,” says Chris Chen, CFP, of Insight Financial Strategists in Massachusetts. For instance, the supporting spouse might decide to foot the bill for the child’s college tuition. To pay for this potential cost if they pass away too soon, they would want to assess whether they need additional insurance coverage.

What Life Insurance Settlements Frequently Say

Even if the two parties combined assets are frequently divided evenly, a court could order one spouse to pay the other monthly alimony or child support. These payments guarantee that the dependant spouse will be compensated after the divorce and that the children will be taken care of.

In general, the court will order the spouse paying support to have life insurance in place if there is child support or alimony requirement. The opposing attorney may insist that the paying spouse keep their existing policies, like group life insurance policies.

If they don’t have a policy, they might need to buy life insurance to ensure they can still support themselves after they die.

To determine the value of the insurance, who owns the policy, who pays the premiums, who the beneficiaries are, and how much the procedure goes to each beneficiary, both ex-spouses will need to consult with their respective attorneys.

“Sometimes, a payor may not be eligible for or unable to buy a life insurance policy. A constructive trust, which sets aside a portion of the payor’s assets to ensure future support just in case the payor passes away, would be a choice in this situation.

Potential Issues With Life Insurance

The most frequent issues with life insurance that come up during and after a divorce are listed below.

A life insurance policy was altered.

The policy owner occasionally modifies the policy without notifying the recipient. For instance, if one ex-spouse is still paying support and has a life insurance policy, they are free to change the beneficiary without informing the other.

Or, a policyholder could stop making premium payments or let the insurance coverage expire. This can result in the policy being canceled, depriving the other ex-spouse of their financial security.

But there are ways to stay away from these issues. One possibility is for the spouse receiving support to be the policy’s owner. This provides you with complete control over the designation of recipients and the making of payments.

Another choice is to set up third-party authorizations on the account, which will enable you to receive notifications when a modification is made or information when the policy is due to expire.

The ex-spouse can receive information about changes to the life insurance, such as beneficiary changes, directly from the insurance company by having third-party authorizations. The ex-spouse receiving alimony or child support can ensure coverage and protect the support payments.

Adjustment of support

After a divorce, both parties may experience changes in their financial situation. If the support payor loses his job or the support receiver starts earning much more than the support payor, you could need to reallocate support.

“Life insurance liabilities must be redistributed when the amount of support is revised. After a divorce, circumstances frequently change, so the family may return to court to restructure the life insurance and child support responsibilities. However, it is more economical and advised to handle these cases out of court, according to Saadeh.

Insurance requirements

The necessity for life insurance may evolve. For instance, if a payor has a ten-year obligation to pay $100,000 in alimony, the payor may only require a $100,000 life insurance coverage. The payor no longer requires a $100,000 life insurance policy to cover the compensation if they have previously paid $50,000 in the first several years of assistance. A divorce settlement may allow the payor to reduce insurance as support is paid gradually.

To distribute half of the life insurance death benefit to a new beneficiary or to discontinue coverage, the payor may do either.

It’s vital to note that the policyholder must make these modifications; the insurance company won’t do it for them automatically.

After a Divorce, the Best Types of Life Insurance

The correct insurance will depend on what you already have. Term life insurance is often an excellent answer for many financial situations because cash is tight everywhere.

Divorces are emotionally and financially challenging. Your financial status and what you and your ex-spouse may reasonably afford will determine your life insurance needs. After parting ways, the best strategy to protect assets will be determined by carefully considering your options and your longer-term financial intentions.

#areteautomation #lifehealthadvisors #learning #careergoals #decision

Credits by: Paolo Moyet

Date: August 8, 2022

Source:https://medium.com/@jrpmoyet/the-operation-of-life-insurance-during-a-divorce-cab79a4ad408

[paolos83blog]

The Operation Of Life Insurance During A Divorce

Divorce is a terrible thing. Even a pleasant divorce might result in financial hardship when considering the expense of establishing and maintaining two separate residences. Although there are many factors to consider before, during, and after a divorce, life insurance is frequently overlooked.

Life insurance can assist in preserving the things you’ve worked hard to accumulate if you’re going through a divorce. Life insurance can be a significant part of a divorce settlement, even though every divorce will have a unique set of financial difficulties.

How to Manage Life Insurance in an Existing Marriage

Married couples frequently obtain life insurance to cover current or future debts and other financial obligations. These duties could endure even after a couple decides to part ways. Because of this, existing life insurance issues may play a significant role in a divorce.

In the event of a divorce complaint, you can be required to present proof of all your existing assets, debts, and insurance policies to ensure that all life insurance has been taken into consideration. For instance, New Jersey mandates that each spouse submit an Affidavit of Insurance Coverage at the start of a disputed divorce case. This document contains a list of all the policies you and your spouse had when you filed for divorce and any procedures terminated in the last 90 days.

Making a list of all active insurance policies will benefit the divorce process.

Your current and future life insurance needs and the cost of maintaining the policies will affect how you address the obligations. Consider the scenario in which you and your spouse each hold a term life insurance policy and opt to keep them. You may each choose to be the policy’s owner and beneficiary for the other.

You and your spouse may opt to cancel your cash value life insurance policy and divide the remaining cash value equally.

Surrender fees, which lower a policy’s value upon surrender, could be another factor.

Ask Your Lawyer These Questions Before Handling Life Insurance

Remember the principles of why you initially bought life insurance when speaking with your lawyer. The goal of your new and existing insurance going forward in the context of the divorce should therefore be determined with the assistance of your lawyer. You might want to ask your lawyer the following questions:

How should my life insurance policies be handled following my divorce?

What duties will I have for insurance following my divorce?

How do I make sure my ex-spouse has insurance?

How do we determine how much life insurance we need?

How can we decide whether or not we are insurable?

It is advisable to speak with a financial planner who can advise you and help you determine the affordability of life insurance and the level of coverage you require because life insurance is typically a component of a larger financial or estate plan.

“Divorce gives people the option to decide how they want to live independently and how they want to support the children they had together,” says Chris Chen, CFP, of Insight Financial Strategists in Massachusetts. For instance, the supporting spouse might decide to foot the bill for the child’s college tuition. To pay for this potential cost if they pass away too soon, they would want to assess whether they need additional insurance coverage.

What Life Insurance Settlements Frequently Say

Even if the two parties combined assets are frequently divided evenly, a court could order one spouse to pay the other monthly alimony or child support. These payments guarantee that the dependant spouse will be compensated after the divorce and that the children will be taken care of.

In general, the court will order the spouse paying support to have life insurance in place if there is child support or alimony requirement. The opposing attorney may insist that the paying spouse keep their existing policies, like group life insurance policies.

If they don’t have a policy, they might need to buy life insurance to ensure they can still support themselves after they die.

To determine the value of the insurance, who owns the policy, who pays the premiums, who the beneficiaries are, and how much the procedure goes to each beneficiary, both ex-spouses will need to consult with their respective attorneys.

“Sometimes, a payor may not be eligible for or unable to buy a life insurance policy. A constructive trust, which sets aside a portion of the payor’s assets to ensure future support just in case the payor passes away, would be a choice in this situation.

Potential Issues With Life Insurance

The most frequent issues with life insurance that come up during and after a divorce are listed below.

A life insurance policy was altered.

The policy owner occasionally modifies the policy without notifying the recipient. For instance, if one ex-spouse is still paying support and has a life insurance policy, they are free to change the beneficiary without informing the other.

Or, a policyholder could stop making premium payments or let the insurance coverage expire. This can result in the policy being canceled, depriving the other ex-spouse of their financial security.

But there are ways to stay away from these issues. One possibility is for the spouse receiving support to be the policy’s owner. This provides you with complete control over the designation of recipients and the making of payments.

Another choice is to set up third-party authorizations on the account, which will enable you to receive notifications when a modification is made or information when the policy is due to expire.

The ex-spouse can receive information about changes to the life insurance, such as beneficiary changes, directly from the insurance company by having third-party authorizations. The ex-spouse receiving alimony or child support can ensure coverage and protect the support payments.

Adjustment of support

After a divorce, both parties may experience changes in their financial situation. If the support payor loses his job or the support receiver starts earning much more than the support payor, you could need to reallocate support.

“Life insurance liabilities must be redistributed when the amount of support is revised. After a divorce, circumstances frequently change, so the family may return to court to restructure the life insurance and child support responsibilities. However, it is more economical and advised to handle these cases out of court, according to Saadeh.

Insurance requirements

The necessity for life insurance may evolve. For instance, if a payor has a ten-year obligation to pay $100,000 in alimony, the payor may only require a $100,000 life insurance coverage. The payor no longer requires a $100,000 life insurance policy to cover the compensation if they have previously paid $50,000 in the first several years of assistance. A divorce settlement may allow the payor to reduce insurance as support is paid gradually.

To distribute half of the life insurance death benefit to a new beneficiary or to discontinue coverage, the payor may do either.

It’s vital to note that the policyholder must make these modifications; the insurance company won’t do it for them automatically.

After a Divorce, the Best Types of Life Insurance

The correct insurance will depend on what you already have. Term life insurance is often an excellent answer for many financial situations because cash is tight everywhere.

Divorces are emotionally and financially challenging. Your financial status and what you and your ex-spouse may reasonably afford will determine your life insurance needs. After parting ways, the best strategy to protect assets will be determined by carefully considering your options and your longer-term financial intentions.

Paolo Moyet

August 8, 2022

[rhodeislandcaraccidentatorney]

Rhode Island Attorneys in East Providence RI | Slepkow Law

Rhode Island Attorneys | Real Estate, Divorce, Custody, Family Law, Personal injury / Car accident, Business & Estate Planning, RI personal injury attorney

David Slepkow's insight:

WELCOME TO SLEPKOW, SLEPKOW & ASSOCIATES, INC.

Slepkow, Slepkow & Associates, Inc. is a law firm in Rhode Island with six experienced attorneys covering a full array of legal practice areas. These areas of law include: Real Estate Law and Real Estate Transactions, Child Custody, RI Divorce & Family Law, Personal Injury / RI Car Accident / Premises Liability, Estate Planning, Elder Law, Probate, Business and Criminal law. Please feel free to call a RI attorney at our law firm or use our convenient contact form if you have a legal question or issue. All of our Rhode Island lawyers personally return calls within 24 hours! Several of our attorneys are also licensed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MA) and regularly represent clients in Southeastern Mass.

We pride ourselves in the fact that we are the largest law firm in the East Bay of Rhode Island concentrating in Real Estate and Title Law.

SlepkowLaw has been a household name associated with quality, timely and effective legal work for over 80 years.

Frank Slepkow founded the law firm in 1932 when he opened his legal practice over King’s Drug Store in Riverside Square to serve the growing suburban area of East Providence. The firm began to grow as his two sons, Martin and Milton, joined the firm in 1967 and 1972, respectively. Now we have transitioned into the third generation with each of Martin and Milton’s sons joining the practice: David Slepkow in 1997; Matthew Slepkow in 1997; and Joshua Slepkow in 2006.

Along with Attorneys Bruce Cox and Anthony Marrocco, the third generation of Slepkow’s are poised and well equipped to continue the tradition of legal excellence into the 21st century.

We provide legal representation for clients in all areas of Rhode Island (RI) including: Barrington, Bristol, Burrillville, Charlestown,Central Falls, Coventry, Cranston, Cumberland, Central Falls, East Greenwich, East Providence (Riverside and Rumford), Exeter, Jamestown, Johnston, Lincoln, Narragansett, Middletown, North Providence, Newport, North Kingstown, North Providence RI, North Smithfield, Scituate, Smithfield, Pawtucket, Portsmouth, Providence, South Kingstown, Tiverton, Warren, Warwick, Westerly, West Warwick, Woonsocket, etc.

REQUEST A CONSULTATION

REAL ESTATE LAW

The firm’s real estate practice is not limited to residential and commercial closings and title searches, but includes zoning, land use planning, land ownership, title disputes, real estate litigation, landlord/tenant law and other RI and Massachusetts real estate legal issues

BUSINESS & CORPORATE LAW

Our attorneys and lawyers also have substantial experience in business and corporate law ranging from organizing an LLC, corporation or partnership to litigating a contract or commercial dispute.

PERSONAL INJURY & AUTO ACCIDENTS

Our personal injury and RI automobile accident practice goes well beyond the standard Rhode Island and Massachusetts auto accident. We help clients with slip and fall (premises liability), RI Car accident, Auto / Motor Vehicle Accidents, truck accidents (Semi and Tractor Trailer Trucking collisions & 18 wheelers), construction accident, hit and run, under insured or uninsured motorist claims, wrongful Death, hernia mesh injuries, dog bites, bicycle accidents, fatal crashes, insurance disputes, premises liability, motorcycle / Bike accidents and other negligence cases.

Rhode Island Personal Injury Lawyer and RI car accident attorney, David Slepkow has authored numerous RI Personal Injury Attorney written Articles which can be found at: Rhode Island Personal Injury and Car Accident Law Center and Providence Car Accident Blog. RI personal injury attorney, Slepkow will help you get the highest settlement possible. The East Providence personal injury lawyers at SS&A also help clients with pedestrian accidents in RI, drunk driving crashes (DUI / DWI and OUI), automobile collision, rear end car accidents, t-bone mishaps, fatal motorcycle accident and deadly bike collisions.

The attorneys at SS&A help clients with hundreds of different types of injuries including but not limited to back, neck, leg and arm injuries as well as traumatic head injuries ( tbi / head injury). A Rhode Island personal injury attorney will seek compensation for the following types of vehicular car and motorcycle accidents: rear-end, head on, wrong way accident, t-bone, speeding, illegal u turn, lane violation, running stop sign, failure to stop at red light, reckless driving, texting while driving, gps use and driving, distracted driving, drinking and driving, stoned or drugged driving, sleepy / tired / fatigued motorists or falling asleep at the wheel. Call a Rhode Island personal injury attorney or Rhode Island personal injury lawyer at our office for a free consult. A RI personal injury lawyer will help you get the compensation that you are entitled to and that you deserve. A RI personal injury attorney knows how battle with the insurance company to get a high value negligence motor vehicle crash settlement.

ELDER LAW, PROBATE, & ESTATE PLANNING

We maintain an active elder law practice which includes wills, trusts, Medicaid issues, nursing home payments, and probate court appearances.

DIVORCE & FAMILY LAW

Our Rhode Island divorce and family law practice helps clients with complex issues concerning RI Family Court matters such as child support, child custody, visitation, post divorce issues and uncontested divorce.

Rhode Island Divorce Lawyer David Slepkow also represents clients in the following types of RI Family Court Matters: motions to modify or terminate child support, contempt, family law, alimony, adoption, visitation,child custody, dcyf, relocation out of state, paternity, prenuptial agreements, out of state family law issues, criminal law matters as well as alimony and restraining orders. RI divorce attorney David Slepkow will represent you aggressively to protect your legal rights in Providence Family Court.

Rhode Island divorce attorney and Rhode Island child custody lawyer, David Slepkow will help you protect your rights in Providence Family Court every step of the way. David Slepkow is not only a Providence Family Court lawyer, he is also a Rhode Island personal injury attorney / RI personal injury lawyer.

CRIMINAL MISDEMEANORS & DUI

Rhode Island Criminal Defense Lawyer, David Slepkow, aggressively represents clients in Criminal Misdemeanors in Rhode Island (RI). David represents clients in the following types of Criminal Law Matters: domestic assault, domestic disorderly conduct, domestic vandalism, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, DUI / DWI, refusal to take breathalyzer tests, assault, shoplifting, writing bad checks, probation violations, Larceny, Vandalism, Obtaining money under False Pretenses, violation of no contact orders and restraining orders, expungements, etc.

[lastsonlost]

8 reasons straight men don’t want to get married.

By Helen Smith                                                                                                                                                                 

YOU LOSE RESPECT.                                                                                 A couple of generations ago, a man wasn’t considered fully adult until he was married with kids. But today, fathers are figures of fun more than figures of respect: The schlubby guy with the flowered diaper bag at the mall, or one of the endless array of buffoonish TV dads in sitcoms and commercials. In today’s culture, father never knows best. It’s no better in the news media. As communications professor James Macnamara reports, “by volume, 69 percent of mass media reporting and commentary on men was unfavorable, compared with just 12 percent favorable and 19 percent neutral or balanced.”                                                                                                                                                                       

 YOU’LL LOSE OUT ON SEX.                                                                      Married men have more sex than single men, on average - but much less than men who are cohabiting with their partners outside of marriage, especially as time goes on. Research even suggests that married women are more likely to gain weight than women who are cohabiting without marriage. A Men’s Healtharticle mentioned one study that followed 2,737 people for six years and found that cohabiters said they were happier and more confident than married couples and singles.                                                                                            

YOU LOSE FRIENDS.                                                                             “Those wedding bells are breaking up that old gang of mine.” That’s an old song, but it’s true. When married, men’s ties with friends from school and work tend to fade. Although both men and women lose friends after marriage, it tends to affect men’s self-esteem more, perhaps because men tend to be less social in general.                                                                                            

YOU’LL LOSE SPACE.                                                                               We hear a lot about men retreating to their “man caves,” but why do they retreat? Because they’ve lost the battle for the rest of the house. The Art of Manliness blog mourns “The Decline of Male Space,” and notes that the development of suburban lifestyles, intended to bring the family together, resulted in the elimination of male spaces in the main part of the house, and the exile of men to attics, garages, basements - the least desirable part of the home. As a commenter to the post observes: “There was no sadder scene to a movie than in ‘Juno’ when married guy Jason Bateman realized that in his entire huge, house, he had only a large closet to keep all the stuff he loved in. That hit me like a punch in the face.”                                                                                            

YOU COULD LOSE YOUR KIDS, AND YOUR MONEY.                           And they may not even be your kids. Lots of men I spoke with were keenly aware of the dangers of divorce, and worried that if they were married and it went sour, the woman might take everything, including the kids. Other men were concerned that they might wind up paying child support for kids who aren’t even theirs - a very real possibility in many states. On my blog, I polled over 3200 men to ask how they would react to finding out that a child wasn’t theirs after all. 32 percent said they would feel “anger and fury at the mother,” 6 percent said they would feel “depression,” 18 percent said “anger and depression,” 2 percent said “none of the above,” 32 percent said “angry at the system that forced them to pay,” and only 2 percent “didn’t care.” One man commented that his ex-wife had taunted him with the knowledge that his 11-year old son wasn’t actually his: “I was angry at the mother...I severed all ties to the boy. Some may see this as a failing. I see it as self-preservation, and to those that ask the question of whether or not the courts will make a non-biological parent pay child support, pay attention: YES THEY WILL! They see you as nothing more than a source of cash for the child. It seems that a person in these situations should be able to sue the real father for child support.”                                                                                                                                                                                          

YOU’LL LOSE IN COURT.                                                                           Men often complain that the family court legal system is stacked against them, and in fact it seems to be. Women gain custody and child support the majority of the time, as pointed out in this ABC News article: “Despite the increases in men seeking and receiving alimony, advocates warn against linking the trend to equality in the courtroom. Family court judges still tend to favor women, said Ned Holstein, the founder of Fathers & Families, a group advocating family court reform. “‘Family court still gives custody overwhelmingly to mothers, child support overwhelmingly to mothers, and courts still give almony overwhelmingly to mothers and women,’ he said. ‘The family courts came into existence years ago in order to give things to mothers that mothers needed,” he said. ‘The times have changed and the courts have not.’”                                                                                

YOU’LL LOSE YOUR FREEDOM!!                                                             At least, if you’re charged with child support that you can’t pay, you can be put in jail - and if you can’t afford a lawyer, you don’t have the right to have one appointed because, according to the Supreme Court, it’s technically a civil matter, never mind the jail time. Fathers and Families found that it’s the men who are jailed rather than women: “A new report concludes that between 95% and 98.5% of all incarcerations in Massachusetts sentenced from the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts from 2001 through 2011 have been men. Moreover, this percentage may be increasing, with an average of 94.5% from 2001 to 2008, and 96.2% from 2009 through 2011. It is likely that most of these incarcerations are for incomplete payment of child support. Further analysis suggests that women who fail to pay all of their child support are incarcerated only one-eighth as often as men with similar violations.”                                                                                                                                                                

SINGLE LIFE IS BETTER THAN EVER!! (AND SAFER)                          While the value of marriage to men has declined, the quality of single life has improved. Single men were once looked on with suspicion, passed over for promotion for important jobs, which usually valued “stable family men,” and often subjected to social opprobrium. It was hard to have a love life that wasn’t aimed at marriage, and premarital sex was risky and frowned upon. Now, no one looks askance at the single lifestyle, dating is easy, and employers probably prefer employees with no conflicting family responsibilities. Plus, video games, cable TV, and the Internet provide entertainment that didn’t used to be available. Is this good for society? Probably not, as falling birth rates and increasing single-motherhood demonstrate. But people respond to incentives. If you want more men to marry, it needs to be a more attractive proposition.                                                                                                                                                             

[brooksbbaw011-blog]

7 Myths About Lawyers

One extremely hot-button issue in American society and politics today and for any divorce lawyer is of same-sex marriage. Most of us who watch good news or look at newspaper regularly likely have encountered this issue at least. The divisiveness of same-sex marriage is really extreme that some politicians have called to get a federal amendment on the situation. Currently, however, the correct of your gay or same-sex couples being married isn't one which is handled about the federal level, but alternatively, the state of hawaii level.

As of 2012, there are simply a number of states which recognize same-sex marriage: Iowa, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Here in Louisiana, same-sex marriage just isn't recognized, and also this lack of recognition is specifically deliver to in the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil Code Article 89 states that "persons from the same sex might not exactly contract marriage with the other person." This means that there's no need for such couples to rent divorce attorney to finish their marriage formed in the state that recognizes them.

Whether you agree or otherwise with Louisiana's law, it really is interesting to notice that inability of gay or same-sex couples to marry prevents them from sharing inside rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage. For example, in Louisiana, we use a community property regime framework which the divorce attorney generally defines as what property is shared equally involving the spouses. Generally, if you happen to be married in Louisiana, items that you get over the course of your respective marriage by virtue of one's skill or industry are shared equally between you and your wife. Because gay people cannot marry, this idea goes out in the window.

For example, there could be a same-sex couple who has been together for thirty years. Let's say that one dies without leaving a will. Now, when they were legally married, then your surviving party towards the marriage would automatically be permitted half of the community property. In this example, however, despite the longevity with the relationship, the surviving party will be entitled to exactly zero. (From the perspective of the divorce lawyer, however, it can be likely that the rules of co-ownership would still apply.)

Another intriguing and arguably "legal" recognition of same-sex relationships can be found in the very different area of the Louisiana law: spousal support. Spousal support (which a divorce attorney in other jurisdictions may talk about as "alimony") is normally the cash what one spouse are usually necessary to spend for the other spouse. There are several different reasons or situations where the final spousal support award is going to be terminated. Some of these reasons are outlined mainly in Louisiana Code article 115. Article 115 says that spousal support is going to be terminated if 1) the spouse receiving the spousal support remarries, 2) either with the spouses dies or 3) a judicial determination that this spouse receiving the support has cohabitated with another man of either sex inside manner of married persons.

Cohabitated can be a funny word which basically means living together under the same roof. When we say "in the manner of married persons" we're probably discussing a relationship where the 2 different people share many in the same things which maried people do, including financial responsibility or intimacy.

In in this way, there could be some recognition by Louisiana to offer same-sex marriage some legal significance, albeit that's doubtful the kind of which some individuals wish it to.

Will Beaumont practices family law in New Orleans and Metairie, LA. This article is purely informational; it just isn't designed being taken as legal advice.

[brookszsqg444-blog]

7 Places To Get Deals On Lawyers

One extremely hot-button issue in American society and politics today and for the lawyer is that of same-sex marriage. Most of us who watch good news or see the newspaper regularly have probably encountered this problem at least one time. The divisiveness of same-sex marriage is indeed extreme that some politicians have called for the federal amendment on the matter. Currently, however, the proper of a gay or same-sex couples to become married is not one that's handled about the federal level, but rather, hawaii level.

As of 2012, you will find just a few states which recognize same-sex marriage: Iowa, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Here in Louisiana, same-sex marriage is not recognized, this also lack of recognition is specifically provided for inside the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil Code Article 89 states that "persons of the same sex may well not contract marriage with one another." This means that there is certainly no need for such couples to engage divorce attorney to get rid of their marriage formed inside a state that recognizes them.

Whether you agree or not with Louisiana's law, it can be interesting to remember that this inability of gay or same-sex couples to marry prevents them from sharing within the rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage. For example, in Louisiana, we possess a community property regime framework which divorce attorney generally defines as what property is shared equally between the spouses. Generally, if you might be married in Louisiana, issues that you get over the course of your marriage by virtue of your respective skill or industry are shared equally between you and your husband. Because gay people cannot marry, this idea is out in the window.

For example, there may be a same-sex couple who has been together for thirty years. Let's say that one of these dies without leaving a will. Now, should they were legally married, then this surviving party to the marriage would automatically be eligible to half in the community property. In this example, however, inspite of the longevity of the relationship, the surviving party can be eligible to exactly zero. (From the perspective of an divorce lawyer, however, it would be likely that this rules of co-ownership would still apply.)

Another intriguing and arguably "legal" recognition of same-sex relationships can be found in the very different area of the Louisiana law: spousal support. Spousal support (which divorce attorney in other jurisdictions may make reference to as "alimony") is generally the amount of money what type spouse are usually necessary to spend for the other spouse. There are several different reasons or situations in which the final spousal support award will likely be terminated. Some of these reasons are outlined mainly in Louisiana Code article 115. Article 115 says that spousal support will probably be terminated if 1) the spouse receiving the spousal support remarries, 2) either from the spouses dies or 3) a judicial determination the spouse receiving the support has cohabitated with another man of either sex inside the manner of married persons.

Cohabitated is often a funny word which simply means living together within the same roof. When we say "in the manner of married persons" were probably talking about a relationship where the two different people share many of the same things which married people do, for example financial responsibility or intimacy.

In in this way, there may be some recognition by Louisiana to provide same-sex marriage some legal significance, albeit most likely not the type which many people need it to.

Will Beaumont practices family law in New Orleans and Metairie, LA. This article is purely informational; it is just not designed to get taken as legal counsel.

[caidentqra802-blog]

How To Lose Lawyers In 7 Days

One extremely hot-button issue in American society and politics today and for the lawyer is that of same-sex marriage. Most of us who watch good news or read the newspaper regularly have likely encountered this challenge at least one time. The divisiveness of same-sex marriage can be so extreme that some politicians have called for a federal amendment on the issue. Currently, however, the right of a gay or same-sex couples to get married isn't one that is dealt with about the federal level, but alternatively, their state level.

As of 2012, there are simply a number of states which recognize same-sex marriage: Iowa, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Here in Louisiana, same-sex marriage isn't recognized, this also insufficient recognition is specifically provided for in the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil Code Article 89 states that "persons of the same sex may well not contract marriage with the other." This means that there is no need for such couples to engage divorce attorney to end their marriage formed inside a state that recognizes them.

Whether you agree you aren't with Louisiana's law, it's interesting to make note of this inability of gay or same-sex couples to marry prevents them from sharing in the rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage. For example, in Louisiana, we possess a community property regime framework which a divorce attorney generally defines as what property is shared equally involving the spouses. Generally, if you might be married in Louisiana, things that you cash in on over the course of your respective marriage by virtue of your respective skill or industry are shared equally between you and your partner. Because gay people cannot marry, this idea fades with the window.

For example, there might be a same-sex couple who has become together for three decades. Let's say that one too dies without leaving a will. Now, whenever they were legally married, then a surviving party to the marriage would automatically be permitted half with the community property. In this example, however, in spite of the longevity from the relationship, the surviving party would be entitled to exactly zero. (From the perspective of a lawyer, however, it would be likely that this rules of co-ownership would still apply.)

Another intriquing, notable and arguably "legal" recognition of same-sex relationships can be found in a very very different area in the Louisiana law: spousal support. Spousal support (which a divorce attorney in other jurisdictions may make reference to as "alimony") is normally the bucks what one spouse is usually necessary to spend towards the other spouse. There are several different reasons or situations where the final spousal support award will be terminated. Some of these reasons are outlined mainly in Louisiana Code article 115. Article 115 says that spousal support will probably be terminated if 1) the spouse receiving the spousal support remarries, 2) either of the spouses dies or 3) a judicial determination the spouse receiving the support has cohabitated with another man of either sex inside manner of married persons.

Cohabitated is a funny word which simply means living together underneath the same roof. When we say "within the manner of married persons" we're probably talking about a relationship the location where the two people share many in the same things which maried people do, for example financial responsibility or intimacy.

In in this way, there might be some recognition by Louisiana to offer same-sex marriage some legal significance, albeit probably not the type which many people need it to.

Will Beaumont practices family law in New Orleans and Metairie, LA. This article is purely informational; it just isn't designed to be taken as legal counsel.

[spencercwmj145-blog]

Why Most Lawyers Fail

One extremely hot-button issue in American society and politics today and to get a lawyer is that of same-sex marriage. Most of us who watch the news or browse the newspaper regularly likely have encountered this problem at least one time. The divisiveness of same-sex marriage is indeed extreme that some politicians have called to get a federal amendment on the problem. Currently, however, the proper of the gay or same-sex couples to get married is just not one that is addressed on the federal level, but instead, the state level.

As of 2012, you will find merely a few states which recognize same-sex marriage: Iowa, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Here in Louisiana, same-sex marriage is just not recognized, and also this not enough recognition is specifically provided for within the Louisiana Civil Code. Civil Code Article 89 states that "persons of the same sex might not contract marriage with the other person." This means that there is no need for such couples to hire divorce attorney to finish their marriage formed in a state that recognizes them.

Whether you agree or not with Louisiana's law, it is interesting to make note of this inability of gay or same-sex couples to marry prevents them from sharing inside the rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage. For example, in Louisiana, we have a very community property regime framework which divorce attorney generally defines as what property is shared equally involving the spouses. Generally, if you happen to be married in Louisiana, issues that you earn over the course of your marriage by virtue of your skill or industry are shared equally between you and your wife. Because gay people cannot marry, this idea goes out with the window.

For example, there can be a same-sex couple who has been together for thirty years. Let's say that one of them dies without leaving a will. Now, when they were legally married, then the surviving party towards the marriage would automatically be eligible to half from the community property. In this example, however, in spite of the longevity from the relationship, the surviving party could be entitled to exactly zero. (From the perspective of the lawyer, however, it will be likely the rules of co-ownership would still apply.)

Another intriquing, notable and arguably "legal" recognition of same-sex relationships can be found in the very different area of the Louisiana law: spousal support. Spousal support (which a divorce attorney in other jurisdictions may reference as "alimony") is usually the amount of money which one spouse is usually necessary to spend towards the other spouse. There are several different reasons or situations in which the final spousal support award is going to be terminated. Some of these reasons are outlined mainly in Louisiana Code article 115. Article 115 says that spousal support will be terminated if 1) the spouse receiving the spousal support remarries, 2) either of the spouses dies or 3) a judicial determination that this spouse receiving the support has cohabitated with another man of either sex in the manner of married persons.

Cohabitated is really a funny word which only denotes living together beneath the same roof. When we say "inside manner of married persons" we have been probably referring to a relationship the location where the two different people share many from the same things which couples do, for example financial responsibility or intimacy.

In in this way, there might be some recognition by Louisiana to provide same-sex marriage some legal significance, albeit not likely the kind which a lot of people wish it to.

Will Beaumont practices family law in New Orleans and Metairie, LA. This article is purely informational; it just isn't designed to be taken as legal counsel.

[attorneyawvm130-blog]

Little Known Facts About Divorce Lawyer Riverside Ca

Just lately, media interest has centered on The truth that significant modifications can http://jscottbennettattorney.com be over the horizon concerning alimony (or spousal guidance) within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We now have all listened to horror tales of individuals who are burdened with seemingly unfair and hardly ever ending alimony obligations ensuing from divorce. Whether you are a recipient of alimony or an obligor, there is not any concern that alimony laws are thanks for adjust. At present, in Massachusetts, alimony is actually established on the circumstance-by-circumstance foundation using the recipients will need as well as obligors income (or capacity to shell out). Whilst There are a selection of various formulation utilized by divorce legal professionals and judges as tips in deciding spousal aid quantities and durations, reform is essential to boost uniformity and structure in these regions. The existing alimony construction in Massachusetts was according to the traditional household construction of many years back exactly where just one partner was the primary wage earner. The other husband or wife was generally minimal in training and/or employability and stayed residence to be a homemaker with Major childrearing responsibilities. These days, a lot of Major homemakers and/or caretakers earn earnings and have obtained some amount of training which might render them employable. Whilst relatives dynamics have altered Using the times, alimony rules didn't hold pace and continue to be effectively unchanged. Nowadays, fairly often at the time of (or subsequent a divorce), obligors obtain them selves with alimony obligations which happen to be financially devastating and which may carry on over and above retirement age. Doable alterations to The present alimony legislation in Massachusetts may well consist of (but not be limited to) These associated with term limits, the exclusion of a 2nd wife or husband's revenue and property, limits based upon cohabitation or remarriage of the alimony receiver and http://edition.cnn.com/search/?text=divorce attorney limits relating to cash flow, time beyond regulation and well being insurance plan. Much more certain samples of phrase limits contain: - For prolonged-term marriages (people who lasted much more than 20 years), alimony would conclusion at retirement age. - The next optimum alimony conditions are proposed for marriages lasting below twenty years: - For marriages Long lasting five decades or less - 50% of the amount of months of marriage. - For marriages lasting 5 several years to a decade - 60% of the volume of months of marriage. - For marriages http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/?action=click&contentCollection&region=TopBar&WT.nav=searchWidget&module=SearchSubmit&pgtype=Homepage#/divorce attorney lasting ten years to 15 yrs - 70% of the number of months of marriage. - For marriages lasting fifteen decades to 20 years - 80% of the quantity of months of marriage. It's important to note that expression and amount of money boundaries can be deviated therefrom when vital. Considering the fact that virtually all alimony obligors are ex-husbands, it goes without the need of saying that a large number of divorced Adult men are powerful proponents of the new Alimony Reform Monthly bill, often called the Alimony Reform Act of 2011. Curiously, several Women of all ages can also be in help of your proposed reform. Offered the fact that divorced people today remarry, usually subsequent spouses experience the detrimental consequences of antiquated alimony rules when they sense that they're staying forced (coupled with their husbands) to guidance an ex-spouse. May well subsequent spouses think that This really is unfair and unreasonable, In particular provided the current deficiency of framework or limitation regarding alimony obligations as They can be presently awarded. While alimony is unquestionably warranted in several predicaments, alterations to the regulation are required and very expected by quite a few litigants and divorce/family members law Lawyers alike. I, for a person, look ahead to improve that will be sure that alimony awards are reasonable and sensible for both recipient and obligor.

[mayarosa47]

Divorce Lawyer Alpine Utah

American divorce laws have come a long way since the colonial times. Some couples in colonial and early national America executed contracts of a very private and special nature. They contracted to live apart and divide their assets so that each spouse could support a separate household. In instances of conflict, or when a mutual desire to live apart could not translate itself into action without court intervention, individuals requested divorces from judicial or legislative authorities. Such divorces necessitated a division of family property or a decree of alimony for support of an innocent wife. Thus the law of divorce and separation can reveal a great deal about attitudes toward women’s rights to family property.

In the colonial period, most divorce provisions mirrored those of English law. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii, or absolute divorces with the right to remarry, were rare. Divorces a mensa et thoro, or separations from bed and board, were more readily available but still uncommon. Some colonial assemblies refused to allow any divorces at all, although equity courts provided a remedy in cases of abuse and abandonment by ordering separate maintenances out of the husband’s property. Such separations were the equivalent in effect, if not in terminology, of divorces a mensa et thoro. Other colonies developed more liberal divorce policies than were known in the mother country. Even in these jurisdictions, however, divorces remained uncommon and were considered disgraceful.

In addition to divorces a vinculo matrimonii and a mensa et thoro, couples in many jurisdictions had a third option. Under the rules of contract law as enforced by courts of equity, husbands and wives could execute binding separation agreements between themselves. Couples generally made private contracts to live apart and divide property in the form of postnuptial trusts. Until late in the eighteenth century, most equity courts refused to enforce direct contracts between husbands and wives, but they would support agreements made through third parties. Hence the prevalence of postnuptial trusts as private separation agreements. Common law courts refused to recognize the validity of any contracts made between husbands and wives, whether directly or through third parties. The law of private separation agreements, therefore, was based exclusively on equitable principles and enforced only in jurisdictions that recognized them.

Outside the law, couples exercised yet other options. Although technically illegal and therefore unenforceable, agreements to separate made without formal contracts or the intervention of third parties must have occurred on a regular basis. In numerous instances men resorted to simple desertion, generally abandoning their property along with their families. Often no legal action was taken against them, and women lived out their lives in the awkward legal position of femes coverts without husbands. If men left without a trace and were unheard of for seven years, the law assumed death, giving their “widows” the freedom to remarry.

The most bizarre divorce option to modem ears was the wife sale, a folk custom of early modem England that made its way to the colonies. Wife sales occurred after couples had agreed between themselves to separate. Symbolic “sale” of the wife, usually to a prearranged buyer who might be the woman’s paramour or a relative, represented an acceptable form of divorce in some communities. Both church and court officials generally ignored the ritual and its effects, presumably in an effort to promote local harmony. The procedure followed in a wife sale demonstrates with graphic precision the inferior status of women in early modern Anglo-American society, for in the most primitive instances the woman was led to market in a halter and auctioned off to the highest bidder.

Other local customs surface in the record now and again, revealing popular dissatisfaction with the limited divorce options recognized by law. In Pennsylvania, for example, one community relied on arbitrators to settle accounts between a woman and man who wanted to live apart. After dividing their property, a permissible step in Pennsylvania, the arbitrators went beyond the law in ordering “that Fry and his wife should separate, and either should be at liberty to marry who they pleased.” Apparently the option of applying to the state Supreme Court for a formal divorce, a possibility by 1787 when the arbitration occurred, did not seem viable to the Frys and their neighbors. As such a case of community initiative demonstrates, popular attitudes favored easier divorce laws long before lawmakers acted to create them.

English Precedent and American Policy

In England, the ecclesiastical courts heard all cases of marital discord. They granted absolute divorces to couples whose marriages were adjudged void ab initio, for such reasons as bigamy, sexual incapacity, and consanguinity (blood relationship). All children of the unions became illegitimate. Ecclesiastical courts granted divorces from bed and board for adultery of either spouse, desertion, and cruelty. Innocent women received financial support in the form of alimony—usually biannual or annual payments in cash. Divorces from bed and board did not bestow the right to remarry, as did divorces a vinculo, and the children remained legitimate if conceived before the separation. The English courts of chancery heard all disputes arising from private separation agreements created by postnuptial trusts.

Late in the seventeenth century the House of Lords introduced a new kind of divorce, designed to benefit noblemen whose wives proved adulterous. If a man first obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro from the ecclesiastical courts, and successfully prosecuted a civil suit for damages against his wife’s paramour, he could obtain a private bill of divorce from Parliament giving him the right to remarry. His wife could also remarry, with one significant restriction. She could not marry the man who was her proved lover and the cause of the divorce. Ostensibly English lawmakers designed this form of divorce to protect the property of noble families. Adulterous wives were dangerous: they could deceive their husbands into making heirs of other men’s sons. To protect legitimate heirs, such women had to be put aside. Because adulterous husbands could not introduce spurious offspring as legitimate, there was no point in allowing women parliamentary divorces. No woman received one until 1801. The rules on remarriage indicate, however, that more was at stake than the protection of hereditary estates. Men also sought to punish and control unfaithful women.

The Puritans believed in the value of liberal divorce laws. Both Massachusetts and Connecticut granted divorces a vinculo matrimonii for causes unrecognized in the mother country. Although the Massachusetts General Court did not formalize grounds for divorce, decrees indicate that men received absolute divorces for their wives’ adultery and women received absolute divorces if their husbands neglected or abused them in addition to committing adultery. There is no evidence that separations from bed and board were granted in seventeenth‐ century Massachusetts, but in the eighteenth century women received them for cruelty and men and women for desertion. Two men won absolute divorces for desertion. Connecticut refused to grant separations from bed and board for any cause. All divorces in Connecticut were absolute and gave the right to remarry. They were available from both the courts and the legislature for adultery, desertion, fraudulent contract, and seven years’ absence without word. Legislative divorces also could be obtained for cruelty.

In the colonial period only Massachusetts and Connecticut enacted statutes providing for absolute divorce and enforced them on a regular basis. Historians believe that this radical departure from English law indicates the degree to which Puritan theories influenced Massachusetts and Connecticut lawmakers. As early as 1552 Puritan divines had advocated specific reforms in the ecclesiastical court rules on divorce. In a treatise authorized by Parliament, Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, reformers suggested allowing absolute divorces for adultery, desertion, continued absence without news, and cruelty or hatred. The Puritans did not view marriage as a sacrament, sacred in the eyes of God and the churches, but simply as a civil contract, and therefore dissolvable. Although such reforms never found support in early modem England, New England Puritans attempted to enforce them. Perhaps their belief in the family as an arm of government required policies designed to strengthen the family unit. In their eyes, absolute divorces benefited society by dissolving dysfunctional unions.

New England willingness to change English law has long been noted by historians. The Puritans felt no need to adjust their principles to the demands of a government and legal system they believed corrupt and long overdue for reform. But New England fervor did not extend elsewhere. The radical divorce tradition of Connecticut and Massachusetts lawmakers stands in marked contrast to the laws of the other colonies studied. Nowhere else did colonial lawmakers break with English tradition and change the rules for granting absolute divorces. In 1705 the colonial assembly of Pennsylvania authorized annulments for consanguinity and affinity and divorces a mensa et thoro in cases of adultery, bigamy, sodomy, and buggery, but the law contained no provision for divorces a vinculo matrimonii. Later in the colonial period, the Pennsylvania assembly attempted to imitate the English parliamentary practice of granting divorces a vinculo matrimonii by private bill. The Privy Council opposed such an intrusion on Parliament’s prerogatives, however, and in 1773 disallowed a divorce bill enacted in Pennsylvania. At that time the Crown issued instructions to all colonial governors demanding that they void any divorce bills enacted in the future.

Colonial New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina were even less innovative on the question of divorce than Pennsylvania. New York changed an early policy favoring absolute divorce, and refused to allow remarriage after 1675. There is no evidence that the southern colonies ever granted absolute divorces. Legal separations were another matter, however. All the southern colonies and New York administered them through their courts of chancery. Although no jurisdiction formalized the grounds by statute, separations generally could be obtained for desertion and cruelty, and occasionally for sexual offenses such as adultery, homosexuality, or bigamy. While their more radical northern neighbors were granting absolute divorces, then, the colonies with equity courts adopted a policy of support for separate residences and alimony in the tradition of English divorces a mensa et thoro.

Requests for separations usually came from abused or abandoned wives who sought both protection in living alone and alimony. Colonial policy on separations demonstrates a powerful tradition of paternalism. Jurists reasoned that because the law gave men so much power over women, it had an obligation to protect women when husbands abused that power. This sense of obligation, although present in many areas of the law, is particularly evident in the cases on separate maintenances, for here the courts came face to face with the most dangerous shortcomings of the laws on women’s property rights. Again and again chancellors noted the helpless condition of abused or deserted wives, their need for financial support, and the duty of the judicial system to provide assistance. Thus in Taveroon v. Taveroon, tried in South Carolina in 1726, the chancellors acted the role of intermediary between husband and wife. They ordered Stephen Taveroon to pay his wife forty shillings a week as a separate maintenance, because she could not live in their home in safety. Despite the straitened financial circumstances of the couple, which the court acknowledged, and the desire of Stephen to have his wife return home, the chancellors thought it “Equitable” for the woman to receive a separate maintenance. In 1736 the South Carolina Chancery acted similarly to protect Ruth Lowndes by requiring her husband Charles to “give Security for his good Behaviour towards her.” The court awarded Ruth a separate maintenance consisting of various household utensils and furnishings, a sidesaddle, a slave woman and two children, and fifty pounds in current money.

The history of divorce in colonial New York, Maryland, and Virginia imitates that of South Carolina. Chancellors ordered separations and payment of alimony in cases of abuse. In colonial Maryland, however, a challenge arose to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery early in the eighteenth century. To Thomas Macnamara, an abusive husband, it was not clear that the Chancery had a legal right to provide a remedy for his wife. When he was ordered to give her clothing and personal items and pay fifteen pounds a year for support, he claimed that under Anglo-American law only an ecclesiastical court could divorce a mensa et thoro. Chancellor Seymour dismissed his argument, however, answering that “the Infancy, Low Circumstances and present Constitution of this province prevent us from being Able to pursue [an ecclesiastical suit] here for want of the said Courts or Maintenance for the proper Oficers of them.” Seymour allowed Macnamara the right to appeal the decree to England, but ordered him to follow it in the meantime. After being imprisoned three separate times for failure to comply, Macnamara finally acknowledged his obligation to meet the court’s demand and began paying alimony. No record of an appeal to England has survived, if any was ever made.

Margaret Macnamara received her separation on the grounds of cruelty and sexual misconduct. It appears, however, that charges of cruelty and desertion or nonsupport, rather than sexual misconduct, most readily convinced judges to grant women support. In Maryland, no woman used a sexual offense alone as a reason for requesting the help of the court, although women expected the charge to bolster the legitimacy of their requests. The testimony of neighbors and relatives attests to the serious nature of sexual offenses, but although adultery or homosexuality were disturbing to the morals of most settlers, charges of nonsupport and abuse formed the basis of every complaint. The sexual double standard worked to deny women separations for the infidelity of their husbands. In a suit for alimony in Maryland, a woman’s main obligation was to prove her inability to provide for herself when living separately from a dangerous or negligent man.

After winning independence, many of the new states moved quickly to reform their laws on divorce. Pennsylvania imitated the New England model by providing for judicial divorces on several grounds. In 1785 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute granting jurisdiction over cases of divorce to the state Supreme Court. Appeals were allowed to the High Court of Errors and Appeals. Men and women subsequently obtained divorces a vinculo matrimonii for adultery, willful desertion of four years’ duration, bigamy, and knowledge of sexual incapacity before marriage. Divorces a mensa et thoro became available for the same causes and, in addition, for cruelty.

Massachusetts and New York followed suit in enacting post revolutionary divorce statutes. In 1786 Massachusetts lawmakers formalized grounds for the first time. Absolute divorces were obtainable for adultery, impotence, and criminal conviction carrying a prison sentence of seven years. Husbands and wives could obtain separations for desertion, and wives could obtain them for nonsupport. New York enacted its first divorce statute in 1787. Absolute divorces became available from the Court of Chancery for the single cause of adultery. Legal separations still were available for cruelty and desertion, as they had been in the colonial period. In 1813 the state assembly authorized the granting of divorces a mensa et thoro, thereby adding legitimacy to Chancery practices.

Connecticut maintained its liberal prerevolutionary statutes on divorce, although the appearance of a three-year residency requirement in 1796 indicated the state’s unwillingness to become the divorce capital of the new nation. Connecticut’s fears had validity, as demonstrated by the actions of one Pennsylvania woman, Beulah Torbert. According to Supreme Court Justice Jasper Yeates, “It appeared to us that Mrs. Torbert left her husband without cause, refused to return to him on overtures made her, and prosecuted him for adultery without cause, merely to found certain proceedings against him for a divorce, in the state of Connecticut.” Yeates made his remark in the case of Torbert v. Twining, tried in 1795. Virginia and Maryland did not enact statutes creating new divorce policies, but their assemblies did begin to enact private bills of absolute divorce. Petitioners applied directly to the legislatures for divorces, and the grounds were not formalized. In 1827 Virginia lawmakers changed their procedure somewhat, granting jurisdiction to circuit superior courts of chancery over annulments and separations from bed and board for adultery and cruelty. The legislature retained the sole authority to grant absolute divorces until 1848. Then that power also was delegated to the chancery courts, which granted them only on a charge of adultery, as in New York. In Maryland, divorces remained a sole legislative function even later than in Virginia. It was 1842 before the Maryland legislators relinquished jurisdiction to the courts. At that time, county courts of equity gained the power to decree divorces both a vinculo and a mensa et thoro. In the colonial period, South Carolina lawmakers had reasoned that only ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over divorces a vinculo. Because there were no ecclesiastical courts in South Carolina, there could be no absolute divorces. After the Revolution, the assembly continued its policy of opposition. Although South Carolina lawmakers now had the authority to legislate for divorce, they chose not to do so. Absolute divorces and annulments could not be obtained for any cause whatsoever. As Chancellor Desaussure explained in Vaigneur v. Kirk (1808), “The legislature has uniformly refused to grant divorces, on the ground that it was improper for the legislative body to exercise judicial powers. And it has as steadily refused to enact any law to authorize the courts of justice to grant divorces a vinculo matrimonii, on the broad principle that it was a wise policy to shut that door to domestic discord, and to gross immorality in the community.” Despite the continued absence of statutory rules to govern divorces, courts of chancery in South Carolina ordered separations from bed and board for cruelty and desertion, as they had in the colonial period. In most cases they did not use the term “divorce,” but their orders were identical to those creating divorces a mensa et thoro in other jurisdictions.

Given the unique characteristics of South Carolina as a slave society, it could not recognize the legitimacy of absolute divorce. Divorces most often were granted for adultery, but divorce for husbands’ extramarital affairs was impossible in a social climate condoning masters’ sexual exploitation of slaves. To allow white women the freedom to divorce for male adultery would have meant placing severe restrictions on men’s sexual behavior. That South Carolina more than Maryland or Virginia accepted the inevitability of male sexual license and refused to control it through the possibility of legislative (if not judicial) divorce is consistent with what historians know about the diverse cultures of southern slave societies. In White over Black, Winthrop D. Jordan pointed to the unusual prevalence of miscegenation in South Carolina during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

South Carolinians were less careful to conceal interracial liaisons than were other eighteenth-century slaveowners in the colonies. In this respect, they resembled the residents of the West Indies more than those of the mainland settlements. White women in South Carolina tolerated miscegenation by attempting to ignore it. Their own sexuality suffered as a result of the inevitable tensions in their marital lives. The plantation mistresses was “aloof from the world of lust and passion, a world which reeked of infidelity and Negro slaves”; in social situations they appeared formal and stiff. The difference between northern and southern attitudes toward male sexual continence in Southern Honor. Whereas middle-class northerners were beginning to extol the male virgin in terms similar to those traditionally reserved for females, southerners continued to approve of men’s sexual freedom. Young white men were expected to have intercourse with blacks in order to gain sexual experience. Married men who remained discreet and followed the rules in pursuing their sexual liaisons with slaves encountered no criticism. The problem was ignored in polite mixed society, and not perceived as a problem at all among men.

Divorce remained rare in the South as a whole and absent in South Carolina because it threatened male honor. Although men undoubtedly did seek to protect their honor by restricting access to divorce for themselves as well as their wives, they also were safeguarding their sexual privileges. Wives were forced to ignore their husbands’ illicit behavior because they possessed no legal power to prevent or control it. They could not divorce, or in most cases even obtain legal separations. It is unsurprising that the most successful complaint in southern divorce law was a wife’s adultery. In both Maryland and Virginia, the first private divorce acts (1790 and 1803, respectively) went to men whose wives gave birth to mulatto infants. Men’s honor, and their sexual rights, could not condone a woman’s unfaithfulness, particularly with a black man.

The Question Of Support: Separate Maintenances

Whether in North or South, when a marriage broke up, so did family property. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii often required a final disposition of all property owned by the husband and wife, although at times courts ordered awards of yearly alimony for women. When all the family property had to be divided by the courts, they proceeded according to the rules on inheritance. Women usually received one-third to one-half of the estate owned during the marriage. The award could consist of either real or personal property or both, depending on the circumstances of each case. Divorces a mensa et thoro generally included provisions for monetary payments to the wife, while the husband maintained his marital right to control family property. That variations on these patterns are common in the records, however, indicates legislative and judicial willingness to meet the needs of individuals. In determining alimony, moreover, chancellors could be affected by the behavior of the parties, granting more or less according to their impressions of the conduct involved. Women guilty of adultery received no alimony at all, and even the conduct of innocent women was subjected to close scrutiny. Thus in Peckford v. Peckford (1828), a suit for divorce on the basis of the husband’s adultery, the New York chancellor noted, “If the wife had been perfectly discreet, prudent, and submissive to her husband, I should have allowed her half of this property.” Because she had traveled to England against the wishes of her husband and “exposed him to temptation,” he awarded her only a life annuity equal to the value of one-third of their property.

In states with separate courts of equity, lawmakers gave jurisdiction over questions of property to the chancellors. The tradition grew out of chancery’s control of cases concerning women’s property rights, as well as the special ability of the masters in chancery to settle matters of account. Thus, even when legislative bodies enacted private bills of divorce, as in the Chesapeake states after the Revolution, chancery courts continued to exercise authority over separate maintenances.

Chancery courts in Maryland enforced both divorces a mensa et thoro and private agreements to live apart and divide property. The chancellors also heard all suits for alimony by women who received legislative divorces. In Maryland, then, all decisions concerning the division of property, even those arising from absolute divorces ordered by the assembly, came from the chancellors. This practice began early in the colonial period, with the case of Galwith v. Galwith (1689), and continued into the nineteenth century, despite an attempt by the legislature to assume jurisdiction in Crane v. Meginnis (1820). In this case the Court of Appeals overturned a legislative decree of alimony because it represented a usurpation of judicial powers. As Justice Earle observed, a suit for alimony was distinct from a suit for divorce in Maryland, and recoverable only from the Chancery Court or the Court of Appeals. Because suits for alimony had always been heard by chancellors, the legislature could not now take over jurisdiction. Before the Revolution, Pennsylvania rules on separate maintenances followed the usual guidelines, but with passage of the divorce statute of 1785, the law on alimony developed an unusual twist. Under the laws of the state, only divorces from bed and board gave a woman the right to alimony. Absolute divorces did not carry alimony, for they ended all marital obligations, including the wife’s right to financial support. Couples in Pennsylvania did divide family property at the time of divorce, but in poor or even middling families, the right to a share of collective assets meant less to women than the right to a portion of their husbands’ earnings. Significantly, the other jurisdictions studied did not adopt similar policies. They granted innocent women alimony, even in cases of absolute divorce. In Pennsylvania, men and women could choose which kind of divorce they wanted, whether absolute or from bed and board, for most grounds. Under the act of 1785, both kinds of divorce were available for adultery, bigamy, desertion of four years’ duration, and knowledge of sexual incapacity before marriage. But until 1815, divorces for cruelty, or forcing a woman to leave her home, brought only separations from bed and board. After 1815, a woman could make an election in a case of cruelty. It is interesting to note that when a choice was available, some women preferred separations with alimony to absolute divorces. Their decision may indicate that they preferred the financial security of a decree of alimony to the right to remarry. Given the poor preparation for earning their own livings that most women received in early America, their behavior is hardly surprising. Barbara Klingenberger was one Pennsylvania wife who preferred alimony to the right to remarry. In her original petition to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, she asked for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii with alimony. It was not possible to grant such a request under the laws of the state, and therefore the court decreed a divorce from bed and board with alimony. Barbara apparently was satisfied with the decree, but her husband appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that because Barbara had asked for an absolute divorce, she should have been granted one. In his opinion on the case, Chief Justice Tilghman noted the inconsistencies of Barbara’s petition, but decided that she wanted alimony. He wrote, “The petition was informal, and prayed for things which were inconsistent, viz.: a divorce from the bond of marriage and alimony; and perhaps, alimony was to the petitioner, the most important of the two.” He pointed out that Barbara had not appealed the decree or reapplied for a divorce a vinculo.

In Massachusetts, a provincial statute of 1695 had given the Superior Court of Judicature jurisdiction over alimony. In the colonial period the governor and council usually determined the kind and amount of support. Alimony usually consisted of cash payments to women, proportionate in amount to the family’s wealth and status in the community. Men frequently refused to pay alimony. Petitioners who won separate bed and board thus had an ambiguous success, not being allowed to remarry, nor released from the economic constraints of the marriage contract, nor guaranteed current support.

Under Massachusetts law women divorced a mensa et thoro did not enjoy the legal status of femes soles. In the eyes of the law they remained married, and therefore they could not contract, sue, or be sued in their own names. Women must have suffered considerable economic hardship under such divorce decrees. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii did not similarly handicap women. They became femes soles again, earning independence in the marketplace as well as in the household.

Given the lack of financial autonomy awarded to women divorced from bed and board, it is interesting to note that this was the only form of divorce granted to women in Massachusetts on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, although women who charged their husbands with adultery in addition to desertion or cruelty could receive absolute divorces. Obviously Massachusetts jurists believed sexual misconduct to be the worst offense against the sanctity of the family. Cases of nonsupport, desertion, or cruelty did not excite the full compassion of the courts. That these charges were also the ones made almost exclusively by women indicates a sexual bias in the handling of divorce decrees. Women in eighteenth-century Massachusetts noted the distinction and apparently took it into account in bringing suits for divorce and separation. Whereas men always sued for absolute divorces, women did not. “They requested divorce or, if that were not possible, whatever the governor and Council were willing to grant.” The Massachusetts policy on divorces a mensa et thoro was in agreement with the policy on feme sole traders generally. No colonial statute outlined a procedure for granting married women independence in commercial affairs. Such a statute did not appear until after the Revolution. The creation of a formal policy at that time probably also affected the granting of divorces. Separations from bed and board for the cause of desertion were no longer technically necessary after 1787. Women could apply for feme sole trader status instead. In fact, their rights under the statute were stronger than their rights under Massachusetts divorce law. Passage of the statute of 1787 may have served, then, as an alternative to divorce in Massachusetts. Connecticut policy on separate maintenances differed significantly from that of Massachusetts. No divorces a mensa et thoro were granted in the colony or state. Until 1811, the courts also refused to recognize or enforce private agreements between husbands and wives to separate and divide property. In Connecticut, couples either were married or were not. There was no in-between status by which some marital privileges were recognized, such as a wife’s right to support, and others were not. Connecticut law followed the suggestions outlined in the Puritan reform treatise of 1552. The reformers did not advocate divorce a mensa et thoro, and neither did Connecticut lawmakers. In this New England colony and state, therefore, couples received absolute divorces for desertion of three years’ duration, seven years’ willful absence without word, and cruelty, as well as for adultery.

Although Connecticut earned criticism from other jurisdictions for its liberal divorce policy, the policy was retained throughout the colonial and early national periods. Apparently the rules served the interests of residents well, perhaps in part because divorce substituted efficiently for rules allowing married women independent property rights. The General Assembly of Connecticut never enacted laws to govern the legal rights of independent businesswomen or women living separately from their husbands on an informal basis. Lawmakers believed that women already had a remedy in the rules on divorce, because each Connecticut divorce decree gave the husband and wife the legal status of unmarried persons. Equity Law And Private Separation Agreements The colonies and states with conservative policies on absolute divorce, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, lent particularly strong support to private separation agreements. Their policy grew partly out of a strong commitment to marriage settlements. Under equitable rules and principles, postnuptial settlements could be agreements to separate, and if they were made through trustees, courts of chancery felt the same obligation to enforce them as other marriage settlements. Despite their greater reluctance to grant absolute divorces, particularly in the colonial period, the jurisdictions with courts of chancery allowed the equivalent of divorce a mensa et thoro at the will of the parties. Such a policy denotes in some sense a liberal attitude toward divorce, for even in Connecticut a petitioner had to demonstrate cause to win a court-ordered separation. Although jurists supported postnuptial contracts to separate, conservative attitudes surfaced in postrevolutionary judicial decrees. For example, although equity courts increasingly supported direct contracts between husbands and wives, that is, contracts executed without trustees, they did not extend the new principle to separation agreements. Unless executed as trusts, private agreements to live apart and divide property were liable to be overthrown. A dislike of separations, which were increasing rapidly in number in the postrevolutionary era, prompted courts to enforce private separation agreements only when forced to do so by the weight of judicial precedent. If executed as postnuptial trusts designating a division of property between husband and wife, the courts had to enforce them, not because they were socially acceptable agreements to live apart but because they were legal agreements to divide property. Given a choice, some jurists would have preferred to stop the practice. Just like the other colonies and states with equity courts, New York supported private separation agreements made through the medium of trustees. New York imitated English practice in this area of the law beginning in the colonial period, and did not change its policy after the Revolution despite the growing opinion among jurists that separation agreements went against good public policy. New York chancellors refused, however, to support private separation agreements when the law behind them was not absolutely clear. In Carson v. Murray (1832), for example, the Chancery Court supported a separation agreement because it was made through trustees, whereas in Rogers v. Rogers (1834) it refused to validate an agreement made directly between a husband and wife, without the intervention of a third party. In Rogers v. Rogers, the chancellor expressed his disapproval of private agreements by men and women to live apart. He claimed to support them only as standard postnuptial trusts, and not as contracts beneficial in themselves to society. Like Swift, the New York chancellor opposed giving couples the right to separate at will. He wrote, “It is impossible for a feme covert to make any valid agreement with her husband to live separate from him, in violation of the marriage contract and of the duties which she owes to society, except under the sanction of the court; and in a case where the conduct of the husband has been such as to entitle her to a decree for a separation. The law of the land does not authorize or sanction a voluntary agreement between husband and wife. It merely tolerates such agreements when made in such a manner that they can be enforced by or against a third person acting in behalf of the wife.” Without that intervening third party, he felt no compunction about voiding the contract.

The chancellor from New York thus echoed sentiments expressed by southern jurists who opposed divorces but supported private agreements to separate. At times the contradiction in policy was acknowledged openly, both by attorneys and by judges. As one New York jurist observed, “However strange it may seem … that the agreement for a separate maintenance, which is merely auxiliary, should be enforced, whilst the principal agreement, viz. for a separation, is held to be contrary to the spirit and policy of the law, yet the decisions on the subject seem too numerous and uniform to be easily shaken.” Even though some early United States chancellors were unwilling to admit it, separation agreements served an important social function in a country that considered divorce a disgrace, and yet gave women few property rights unless they were separated legally from their husbands. Agreements to divide property also acted as a vital force behind the nineteenth-century movement to allow divorce at the will of the parties.

According to the rules of early American law, husbands had an obligation to support their wives. Under a legal system that gave male heads of household control over wives’ real property and ownership of their personal property, the guarantee of support served as compensation to women for their losses. The inability of married women to contract or to prosecute and defend suits at law further increased their need for financial support. Under standard common law rules, women did not possess the means to take care of themselves; men had to care for them. In a statement explicitly outlining the judicial reasoning behind women’s limited property rights, Justice Putnam of the Massachusetts Supreme Court first listed the ways in which married women found themselves restricted under the law, and then observed, “For these disabilities she is liberally recompensed by the obligations which the marriage imposes upon the husband to provide for her support during coverture, and by a claim for dower after its dissolution.” Inevitably, some men chose not to protect and provide for their wives, and the law developed rules for the exceptional cases. Divorce and legal separation served as a way of correcting and compensating for dysfunctional family relations. When abusive husbands forced wives out of their homes, courts moved aggressively to remind them of their obligations. If a man was not willing to treat his wife in a way that permitted her to remain at home in safety, then he became liable to support her in living elsewhere. This premise helps to explain the attitude of American jurists toward cruelty as a cause for legal separations. Under the laws of the colonies and states, cruelty had to be severe enough so that a woman feared bodily harm or death in order to win her a separate maintenance. Occasional, slight acts of physical violence were not enough to gain judicial support for a separation, nor was what today we would call incompatibility or mental anguish. Such things, although reprehensible, did not threaten life or limb. A woman could live with them. But when the degree of cruelty escalated to a level that required a wife to leave home, the courts acted uniformly in offering her help. Under American legal theory, women did not have to provide for themselves when they were forced to live separately from their husbands because of abuse or neglect.

When viewed from the perspective of divorce law, women’s property rights in the early decades of the nineteenth century truly represented an ideal rather than reality. In theory, a woman did not need to own property because her husband provided for her. But in order to justify giving husbands control over what women owned at marriage as well as the profits of their labor during marriage, the law had to ensure men’s financial support of their wives. During the early national period, courts and assemblies increasingly realized that their ability to guarantee women the ideal—support during marriage— was being undermined by practical considerations, including new attitudes toward marriage and divorce. In a society that was beginning to accept divorce as valid on many grounds, women living separately from their husbands became less exceptional. Society gradually realized that it could no longer deal with separated couples as deviant cases outside the ideal. They became a group representative of new views about marriage, including recognition of the individuality of husbands and wives and acceptance of conflicting interests. In response, lawmakers reluctantly adopted positions designed to reflect changing social attitudes toward marriage, separation, and property. They began to expand married women’s property rights. The spectrum of rules on divorce and alimony in the early states demonstrates that to lawmakers and jurists, there were no obvious solutions to the problem of how to define changing relationships between men and women. New York, Virginia, and Maryland, for example, did modify their strict colonial policies of opposition to absolute divorces, but their rules remained conservative in comparison to those of the New England states and Pennsylvania. All three conservative states, however, continued their pre-revolutionary policies concerning divorces a mensa et thoro and private separation agreements, an indication of their satisfaction with those rules and their desire to preserve them.

Despite the post revolutionary increase in divorce suits, all American jurists continued to express their belief in the necessity of strong family ties. Their perspectives on how best to promote family unity varied considerably, however, and their different responses reflected the various social, religious, economic, and legal circumstances that shaped their diverse cultures. Connecticut jurists believed that the best way to protect the family as they knew it was to deny women the ability to own separate property. Absolute divorce was far better for the morals of society than opposing interests within marriage. South Carolina was forced by peculiar circumstances to argue exactly the opposite point. Married women in the state were relatively free to own and control property if they chose to do so, and their rights to court-ordered separate maintenances were also guaranteed. But they could not, under any circumstances, remarry. That rule, South Carolina lawmakers maintained, was necessary to uphold the sanctity of the family.

The other jurisdictions fell between the extremes represented by Connecticut and South Carolina. They recognized several kinds of divorce and determined which was most suitable in particular situations. The common theme in all jurisdictions, however, was a reluctance to grant divorces at all. Divorce represented an ultimate breakdown, not only in family relations, but also in the delicate property arrangements of husbands and wives. Only death was similarly disruptive, demonstrated by the fact that jurists frequently ordered property settlements at divorce in the same way they did at death.

Even a cursory look at the divorce rate and trend in past decades shows the susceptibility of the divorce rate to short- and long-term fluctuations. For example, the rate of divorce dropped during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and quickly returned to its earlier level afterward. Then, toward the end of World War II and immediately after, it increased dramatically and reached a peak in 1946.

The United States has among the highest divorce rate among the industrialized countries, but it also has among the highest marriage and remarriage rates. Divorce was for decades perceived not only as an indication of pathology in divorcing individuals, but also as a social disease. The implicit and explicit prevailing belief was that divorce was harmful to the individuals involved and to society, and was an offense against God. Therefore, a remedy had to be found. The problem was at first believed to be the immorality of those involved; and the appropriate response was therefore censure and punishment. Later, as social scientists looked at the broader picture, they assumed that social ills were also to blame for the breakdown of families. They called on lawmakers to solve at least some of these social defects, and to protect the victims by raising high legal barriers against divorce. The psychological approach offered yet another view: Marital dissolution stems from the difficulties experienced by individuals. Therefore, divorce had to be eradicated by psychotherapeutic means and by providing support to families in crises. More recently, the U.S. ideology of the family has emphasized personal fulfillment as the main reason for maintaining family relationships, and love as the basis for marriage. Most people do marry, probably expecting that the promises of this ideology will be fulfilled. But they find themselves pressured into organizing their family life along other (less romantic but more dominant) dimensions. Internal family responsibilities, the demands of formal organizations, gender role stereotypes, social restrictions, and societal prescription regarding family life complicate, and may even preclude, finding personal satisfaction within the family setting. Divorce is often the consequence. But people rarely view their divorce in these terms. Social and structural factors are largely invisible to people who must cope with the personal consequences of these factors on a daily basis. So long as divorce remained a relatively rare phenomenon, affecting only a small proportion of the population, it was accounted for in highly individualistic terms. Having learned that marriage results from being in love with the right person, divorcing people consider themselves or their partners as responsible for marital breakdown. Divorce came to be viewed primarily as a matter of mistaken choice, as only a personal, not a social structural, failure. The language of guilt and innocence, blame and vindication has thus been used as an explanatory framework by the divorcing individuals. The community views divorce similarly, reinforcing the perception that both happy marriages and divorces are functions of mate selection.

Divorce and The Law

No area in which society touches family life has changed as rapidly and dramatically since the 1970s as the legal procedure for dissolving a marriage.

Until 1970, there were legal restrictions and specified grounds for divorce. The legally accepted reasons for breaking up a marriage were adultery, desertion, cruelty, and non-support.

Under the old legal system, the legal proceeding needed to be, and indeed was, adversarial. It required that one party should be found guilty of wrongdoing and responsible for the family breakdown. That person was to be punished by the court vis-à-vis the post divorce financial settlement. This traditional law reflected the social norms and accepted beliefs of the time: Marriage should be a lifelong commitment and that a man and a woman should devote themselves to each other, to their children, and to their home. In time, these assumptions about marriage, divorce, and gender-based division of roles and responsibilities came to be questioned. The public’s growing awareness of the gap between these assumptions and reality brought pressure to bear on lawmakers to reform the divorce laws.

The “divorce revolution” began in 1970 when California’s state legislature enacted the no-fault divorce law. The no-fault law conditioned divorce only upon one partner’s assertion that “irreconcilable differences have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage”. The underlying assumption reflected in this law was that bad marriages should be dissolved, that economic circumstances should determine alimony and the division of family assets, and that children, where possible, should maintain contact with both parents.

There is no uniform code of divorce law that is applied in all 50 states. However, most states adopted some variation of no-fault divorce laws. In some states, the divorcing couple must live apart for a certain period of time (from 6 months to 3 years) in order to obtain a legal divorce. In other less conservative states, “incompatibility” or “irreconcilable differences” must be shown by one partner if the other objects to the divorce. In most of these cases the fact that one partner chooses to leave the marriage is considered a sufficient proof of the need to divorce. Moreover, in some states, a divorce decree will be granted if one partner decides, for whatever reasons, that the marriage has reached a point of “irretrievable breakdown”. Under Utah law, to file for a divorce on no fault grounds you must meet certain requirements. You must meet the Utah residency requirements. To know if you can file for a divorce in Alpine on no fault grounds, speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. These reforms in family law appear to have emanated from changes in the larger fabric of society. Social trends and changes such as the women’s movement, women’s greater participation in the labor force, greater sexual freedom, the self-actualization theme of the 1960s and 1970s, and of course the increase in divorce rate, put the pressure on the lawmakers to change divorce statutes so that they might better reflect these social realities. A small part of these realities, which may nevertheless have been a strong motive for liberalizing the divorce law, was the fact that some lawmakers had themselves experienced painful divorces.

However, no-fault is not only a change in a legal code, it represents a cognitive scheme. Not only did it eliminate the need to prove a spouse’s misconduct, but “it eliminated the concept of fault itself”. The new law was connected with the trend that took moral issues out of the hands of social and governmental institutions, and promoted individual freedom and equality between men and women. It was also compatible with the rejection of the traditional patriarchal pattern of the family, and with the demand that adult men and women be treated as autonomous and equally responsible for breakdowns in their marriage and for their life after divorce. Several purposes were to be served by the reform of the divorce law: (a) the elimination of the need for hypocrisy, perjury, and collusion often required by the fault system, (b) the reduction of the levels of bitterness and suffering that are part of the divorce process, and (c) assistance given to reach a fairer and more rational financial settlement.

No longer does one partner need to file suit against the spouse on grounds such as adultery, mental cruelty, physical abuse, desertion, or other such marital misconduct. The basic premise for “fault” divorces was that there was one “right” and/or “innocent” party and one “wrong” and/or “guilty” party that needed to be punished. By replacing the old system with a single new standard of “irreconcilable differences” there is no longer a need to invent false reasons for divorce. More importantly, the new system recognizes that in marital breakdown, there is no guilty or innocent party. Now as far as the personal relationship between spouses is concerned, the legal process of divorce begins and ends with a “petition for dissolution,” where no justification need be given. The language that is used under the new system reflects this non-adversarial approach to the legal process. Although the rationale underlying the old divorce law was protection, that of the new law is equality. In the past, it was assumed and generally accepted that the state had a legitimate role in protecting the family and its members in the case of one partner’s gross misconduct. If that partner was physically abusing or committed adultery, he or she would be severely penalized by the court when financial arrangements were considered. The reformers sought to grant financial settlement based on the prevailing social norms; that is, personal freedom and the principle of equality between the genders. No more were property and alimony to be granted on the basis of either fault or gender-based role assignments. Each spouse has equal right to the accumulated wealth of the family. Under the new system, the husband is not solely responsible for financial support, nor is the wife solely responsible for caring for the children. The new standards for property division and alimony reflect the legislators’ belief in the responsibility and ability of each spouse to achieve self- supporting status. In addition, the “child’s best interest” guideline assumes no inherent advantage for mothers in custody hearings. Not only are fathers and mothers equally responsible for the financial welfare of their children, they are also equally responsible for their children’s overall well-being.

Adultery

Adultery is a ground for divorce in Utah. Consult with an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer if you want are seeking divorce on the grounds of adultery. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married man or woman with a person other than the offender’s spouse. Today Utah divorce laws make adultery a ground for divorce. An examination of the decisions will give some notion of what adultery is. A man may be guilty of adultery, even though the offense was committed with a woman who was stupefied with liquor at the time, or where the act was committed without the consent of the woman. It has been said that if a man chooses to marry an unchaste woman with full knowledge of her unchastity, he cannot obtain a divorce for her subsequent adultery, but this is not true. The true test is not knowledge of previous conduct but a violation of the conditions of the marriage after it has been entered into. Even though a man had illicit sexual relations with his wife before marriage and married her while she was an inmate of a house of prostitution, those facts do not vitiate his right to a divorce for her refusal to leave the house and to discontinue her adulterous acts. Voluntary separation does not grant a license to commit adultery, and it is generally held that under such circumstances the innocent party may have a remedy against the other by way of divorce. Adultery may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the courts often say that it must be of a “clear and positive” nature. The defendant is entitled to the same presumption of innocence as in criminal cases. It is not necessary to prove the defendant guilty of adultery “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but it is sufficient if he is found guilty by a “clear preponderance of the evidence.” In proving adultery where the parties are not caught, two elements are required: the opportunity to commit the act, and the inclination to commit it. For example, if a man takes a woman to a hotel and retires with her to a room for the night, that is sufficient to prove both the opportunity and inclination to commit adultery. Cruelty Cruelty is a cause for divorce in Utah. The courts generally content themselves with determining whether the facts in the particular case constitute cruelty. The early decisions required physical violence upon the person with danger to life or health. A single act of violence will not ordinarily serve as a ground for divorce if it is committed in a heat of passion and there is no likelihood that it will be repeated. However, if the single act was very severe and involved malice, it may be sufficient cause. Again, where one of the parties commits a series of less serious acts, and there is a likelihood that they will be continued, even though no one of the acts would be sufficient by itself, the cumulative effect of the acts is cruelty. When the mental injury is such that it preys upon the mind and undermines the health, though the suffering is caused by words or conduct unaccompanied by an act of physical violence, the result is bodily harm and therefore the conduct producing the mental suffering is legal cruelty. In other words, without repudiating the early theory that the injury must be physical, the courts admit that legal cruelty may come about from continuous nagging and abuse, humiliating insults, and other mean and annoying conduct which cause mental suffering and consequent ill-health. The chain of causation is indirect, but the ultimate result is an injury to health. Under the indirect injury to health doctrine, divorces have been granted on the ground of cruelty for harsh and humiliating language or demeanor, for the wife’s or husband’s constant nagging, for making false charges of infidelity, and for such things as the husband telling the wife of his love for someone else, for unfounded accusations of crime and misconduct, for studied vexations and deliberate insults, and for stopping payment on checks and destroying credit. Excessive sexual demands by the husband upon the wife is not an uncommon ground for divorce. If you are a victim of cruelty by your spouse, speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. The lawyer can help you get a divorce from your cruel spouse.

Desertion

Desertion is another ground for divorce in Utah. Before desertion becomes a legal ground for divorce, certain elements must be present: (1) a cessation of cohabitation, (2) desertion for the period prescribed by statute, (3) an intention to abandon, (4) want of consent on the part of the party abandoned, and (5) unjustifiable abandonment.

There is no simple or uniform statutory definition of desertion as a cause for divorce. Many courts hold that if the husband drives his wife away from him, his conduct will amount to desertion as clearly as if he had left her. When either spouse after having been gone for some time offers in good faith to return, but is rejected, unless such rejection is justified it will amount to desertion. There must be an intention to abandon. The intent to abandon need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances, as when there is long absence without justifiable cause. Desertion must be without the consent of the abandoned spouse. If there is a separation by consent, either expressed in the words of the parties or inferred from the acts of the parties, desertion cannot be relied upon as a cause for divorce. The abandonment must be unjustifiable. If either spouse is guilty of such misconduct as to create proper grounds for the other’s departure, the latter’s absence will not make out the necessary desertion. The question often arises as to what kind of conduct is sufficient justification for one spouse to leave the other. There is serious conflict on this question, and some courts stand strictly upon the principle that nothing but conduct which is a ground for divorce will justify one spouse in leaving the other. Never attempt to file a divorce petition in Utah on the grounds of desertion without the assistance of an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. Proving abandonment is complex and requires skill and expertise. This is best left to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer.

Impotence

Ordinarily, if impotence exists at the time of the marriage it is a ground for annulment. Annulment is different from divorce. Speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer to know the various grounds on which you can seek an annulment of your marriage.

Habitual Drunkenness

It is well recognized that excessive indulgence in intoxicating drinks as a fixed habit is habitual drunkenness, and this is true even though there may be intervals when the party refrains entirely from the use of intoxicating liquors. The courts have held that neither occasional drunkenness nor habitual but moderate use of liquor will constitute a ground for divorce. A wife cannot set up habitual drunkenness as a cause if at the time of the marriage she had full knowledge of the existence of the habit. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Divorce: Defenses

General and Special Defenses

The defenses to actions for divorce may be classified as general and special. The general defenses belong to the parties as litigants and are such as may arise in any law suit. The special defenses have been developed to protect all those likely to be affected by the dissolution of a marriage. It is the policy of the law to encourage the continuance of the marriage relation once it has been brought into existence. The law, therefore, encourages the defense of divorce actions. There are four generally accepted special defenses: collusion, connivance, condonation, and recrimination.

Collusion is any agreement between the parties by which they endeavor to obtain a divorce by an imposition on the court. Its essence is fraud upon the court. As demonstrated by cases, this fraud may appear in at least three forms: (1) by the commission of an offense for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, (2) by the introduction of false evidence of an offense not actually committed, and (3) by suppression of a valid defense. Connivance is the corrupt consenting by one married person to the marital offenses and acts of the other. The theory back of the connivance doctrine is that one who has consented to an act or wrong cannot be said to be injured by it and therefore should not be given the privilege of taking advantage of it as a ground for divorce. From the cases it seems that connivance appears most often in connection with adultery. A husband’s connivance at his wife’s adultery has often been held a bar to a divorce for the particular act connived at.

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce. It is necessary to look into the cases to see what offenses may be condoned, what is necessary to constitute condonation, and what are the effects of the condonation. That the doctrine applies to adultery is too well recognized to discuss. It applies to cruel and inhuman treatment, and perhaps to every other offense that constitutes a ground for divorce. An offer to forgive is not condonation unless it is accepted and acted upon by the other party, nor is the mere writing of letters in affectionate terms by the aggrieved spouse to the guilty one. Sexual intercourse with knowledge of a prior offense is the type of conduct which will make a case of condonation. Formal forgiveness is not essential to condonation, for the forgiveness may be implied from the conduct of the parties. There can be no condonation without knowledge of the offense committed, so that continued cohabitation cannot be construed as forgiveness if there is no realization that an offense has been committed.

Recrimination is a counter charge that the complaining party has also been guilty of an offense constituting a ground for divorce. The doctrine of recrimination is grounded on the old equity theory that one who asks relief must come into court with clean hands, and that divorce laws are made to give relief to the innocent and not to the guilty party.

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Divorce Lawyer Alpine Utah

American divorce laws have come a long way since the colonial times. Some couples in colonial and early national America executed contracts of a very private and special nature. They contracted to live apart and divide their assets so that each spouse could support a separate household. In instances of conflict, or when a mutual desire to live apart could not translate itself into action without court intervention, individuals requested divorces from judicial or legislative authorities. Such divorces necessitated a division of family property or a decree of alimony for support of an innocent wife. Thus the law of divorce and separation can reveal a great deal about attitudes toward women’s rights to family property.

In the colonial period, most divorce provisions mirrored those of English law. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii, or absolute divorces with the right to remarry, were rare. Divorces a mensa et thoro, or separations from bed and board, were more readily available but still uncommon. Some colonial assemblies refused to allow any divorces at all, although equity courts provided a remedy in cases of abuse and abandonment by ordering separate maintenances out of the husband’s property. Such separations were the equivalent in effect, if not in terminology, of divorces a mensa et thoro. Other colonies developed more liberal divorce policies than were known in the mother country. Even in these jurisdictions, however, divorces remained uncommon and were considered disgraceful.

In addition to divorces a vinculo matrimonii and a mensa et thoro, couples in many jurisdictions had a third option. Under the rules of contract law as enforced by courts of equity, husbands and wives could execute binding separation agreements between themselves. Couples generally made private contracts to live apart and divide property in the form of postnuptial trusts. Until late in the eighteenth century, most equity courts refused to enforce direct contracts between husbands and wives, but they would support agreements made through third parties. Hence the prevalence of postnuptial trusts as private separation agreements. Common law courts refused to recognize the validity of any contracts made between husbands and wives, whether directly or through third parties. The law of private separation agreements, therefore, was based exclusively on equitable principles and enforced only in jurisdictions that recognized them.

Outside the law, couples exercised yet other options. Although technically illegal and therefore unenforceable, agreements to separate made without formal contracts or the intervention of third parties must have occurred on a regular basis. In numerous instances men resorted to simple desertion, generally abandoning their property along with their families. Often no legal action was taken against them, and women lived out their lives in the awkward legal position of femes coverts without husbands. If men left without a trace and were unheard of for seven years, the law assumed death, giving their “widows” the freedom to remarry.

The most bizarre divorce option to modem ears was the wife sale, a folk custom of early modem England that made its way to the colonies. Wife sales occurred after couples had agreed between themselves to separate. Symbolic “sale” of the wife, usually to a prearranged buyer who might be the woman’s paramour or a relative, represented an acceptable form of divorce in some communities. Both church and court officials generally ignored the ritual and its effects, presumably in an effort to promote local harmony. The procedure followed in a wife sale demonstrates with graphic precision the inferior status of women in early modern Anglo-American society, for in the most primitive instances the woman was led to market in a halter and auctioned off to the highest bidder.

Other local customs surface in the record now and again, revealing popular dissatisfaction with the limited divorce options recognized by law. In Pennsylvania, for example, one community relied on arbitrators to settle accounts between a woman and man who wanted to live apart. After dividing their property, a permissible step in Pennsylvania, the arbitrators went beyond the law in ordering “that Fry and his wife should separate, and either should be at liberty to marry who they pleased.” Apparently the option of applying to the state Supreme Court for a formal divorce, a possibility by 1787 when the arbitration occurred, did not seem viable to the Frys and their neighbors. As such a case of community initiative demonstrates, popular attitudes favored easier divorce laws long before lawmakers acted to create them.

English Precedent and American Policy

In England, the ecclesiastical courts heard all cases of marital discord. They granted absolute divorces to couples whose marriages were adjudged void ab initio, for such reasons as bigamy, sexual incapacity, and consanguinity (blood relationship). All children of the unions became illegitimate. Ecclesiastical courts granted divorces from bed and board for adultery of either spouse, desertion, and cruelty. Innocent women received financial support in the form of alimony—usually biannual or annual payments in cash. Divorces from bed and board did not bestow the right to remarry, as did divorces a vinculo, and the children remained legitimate if conceived before the separation. The English courts of chancery heard all disputes arising from private separation agreements created by postnuptial trusts.

Late in the seventeenth century the House of Lords introduced a new kind of divorce, designed to benefit noblemen whose wives proved adulterous. If a man first obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro from the ecclesiastical courts, and successfully prosecuted a civil suit for damages against his wife’s paramour, he could obtain a private bill of divorce from Parliament giving him the right to remarry. His wife could also remarry, with one significant restriction. She could not marry the man who was her proved lover and the cause of the divorce. Ostensibly English lawmakers designed this form of divorce to protect the property of noble families. Adulterous wives were dangerous: they could deceive their husbands into making heirs of other men’s sons. To protect legitimate heirs, such women had to be put aside. Because adulterous husbands could not introduce spurious offspring as legitimate, there was no point in allowing women parliamentary divorces. No woman received one until 1801. The rules on remarriage indicate, however, that more was at stake than the protection of hereditary estates. Men also sought to punish and control unfaithful women.

The Puritans believed in the value of liberal divorce laws. Both Massachusetts and Connecticut granted divorces a vinculo matrimonii for causes unrecognized in the mother country. Although the Massachusetts General Court did not formalize grounds for divorce, decrees indicate that men received absolute divorces for their wives’ adultery and women received absolute divorces if their husbands neglected or abused them in addition to committing adultery. There is no evidence that separations from bed and board were granted in seventeenth‐ century Massachusetts, but in the eighteenth century women received them for cruelty and men and women for desertion. Two men won absolute divorces for desertion. Connecticut refused to grant separations from bed and board for any cause. All divorces in Connecticut were absolute and gave the right to remarry. They were available from both the courts and the legislature for adultery, desertion, fraudulent contract, and seven years’ absence without word. Legislative divorces also could be obtained for cruelty.

In the colonial period only Massachusetts and Connecticut enacted statutes providing for absolute divorce and enforced them on a regular basis. Historians believe that this radical departure from English law indicates the degree to which Puritan theories influenced Massachusetts and Connecticut lawmakers. As early as 1552 Puritan divines had advocated specific reforms in the ecclesiastical court rules on divorce. In a treatise authorized by Parliament, Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, reformers suggested allowing absolute divorces for adultery, desertion, continued absence without news, and cruelty or hatred. The Puritans did not view marriage as a sacrament, sacred in the eyes of God and the churches, but simply as a civil contract, and therefore dissolvable. Although such reforms never found support in early modem England, New England Puritans attempted to enforce them. Perhaps their belief in the family as an arm of government required policies designed to strengthen the family unit. In their eyes, absolute divorces benefited society by dissolving dysfunctional unions.

New England willingness to change English law has long been noted by historians. The Puritans felt no need to adjust their principles to the demands of a government and legal system they believed corrupt and long overdue for reform. But New England fervor did not extend elsewhere. The radical divorce tradition of Connecticut and Massachusetts lawmakers stands in marked contrast to the laws of the other colonies studied. Nowhere else did colonial lawmakers break with English tradition and change the rules for granting absolute divorces. In 1705 the colonial assembly of Pennsylvania authorized annulments for consanguinity and affinity and divorces a mensa et thoro in cases of adultery, bigamy, sodomy, and buggery, but the law contained no provision for divorces a vinculo matrimonii. Later in the colonial period, the Pennsylvania assembly attempted to imitate the English parliamentary practice of granting divorces a vinculo matrimonii by private bill. The Privy Council opposed such an intrusion on Parliament’s prerogatives, however, and in 1773 disallowed a divorce bill enacted in Pennsylvania. At that time the Crown issued instructions to all colonial governors demanding that they void any divorce bills enacted in the future.

Colonial New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina were even less innovative on the question of divorce than Pennsylvania. New York changed an early policy favoring absolute divorce, and refused to allow remarriage after 1675. There is no evidence that the southern colonies ever granted absolute divorces. Legal separations were another matter, however. All the southern colonies and New York administered them through their courts of chancery. Although no jurisdiction formalized the grounds by statute, separations generally could be obtained for desertion and cruelty, and occasionally for sexual offenses such as adultery, homosexuality, or bigamy. While their more radical northern neighbors were granting absolute divorces, then, the colonies with equity courts adopted a policy of support for separate residences and alimony in the tradition of English divorces a mensa et thoro.

Requests for separations usually came from abused or abandoned wives who sought both protection in living alone and alimony. Colonial policy on separations demonstrates a powerful tradition of paternalism. Jurists reasoned that because the law gave men so much power over women, it had an obligation to protect women when husbands abused that power. This sense of obligation, although present in many areas of the law, is particularly evident in the cases on separate maintenances, for here the courts came face to face with the most dangerous shortcomings of the laws on women’s property rights. Again and again chancellors noted the helpless condition of abused or deserted wives, their need for financial support, and the duty of the judicial system to provide assistance. Thus in Taveroon v. Taveroon, tried in South Carolina in 1726, the chancellors acted the role of intermediary between husband and wife. They ordered Stephen Taveroon to pay his wife forty shillings a week as a separate maintenance, because she could not live in their home in safety. Despite the straitened financial circumstances of the couple, which the court acknowledged, and the desire of Stephen to have his wife return home, the chancellors thought it “Equitable” for the woman to receive a separate maintenance. In 1736 the South Carolina Chancery acted similarly to protect Ruth Lowndes by requiring her husband Charles to “give Security for his good Behaviour towards her.” The court awarded Ruth a separate maintenance consisting of various household utensils and furnishings, a sidesaddle, a slave woman and two children, and fifty pounds in current money.

The history of divorce in colonial New York, Maryland, and Virginia imitates that of South Carolina. Chancellors ordered separations and payment of alimony in cases of abuse. In colonial Maryland, however, a challenge arose to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery early in the eighteenth century. To Thomas Macnamara, an abusive husband, it was not clear that the Chancery had a legal right to provide a remedy for his wife. When he was ordered to give her clothing and personal items and pay fifteen pounds a year for support, he claimed that under Anglo-American law only an ecclesiastical court could divorce a mensa et thoro. Chancellor Seymour dismissed his argument, however, answering that “the Infancy, Low Circumstances and present Constitution of this province prevent us from being Able to pursue [an ecclesiastical suit] here for want of the said Courts or Maintenance for the proper Oficers of them.” Seymour allowed Macnamara the right to appeal the decree to England, but ordered him to follow it in the meantime. After being imprisoned three separate times for failure to comply, Macnamara finally acknowledged his obligation to meet the court’s demand and began paying alimony. No record of an appeal to England has survived, if any was ever made.

Margaret Macnamara received her separation on the grounds of cruelty and sexual misconduct. It appears, however, that charges of cruelty and desertion or nonsupport, rather than sexual misconduct, most readily convinced judges to grant women support. In Maryland, no woman used a sexual offense alone as a reason for requesting the help of the court, although women expected the charge to bolster the legitimacy of their requests. The testimony of neighbors and relatives attests to the serious nature of sexual offenses, but although adultery or homosexuality were disturbing to the morals of most settlers, charges of nonsupport and abuse formed the basis of every complaint. The sexual double standard worked to deny women separations for the infidelity of their husbands. In a suit for alimony in Maryland, a woman’s main obligation was to prove her inability to provide for herself when living separately from a dangerous or negligent man.

After winning independence, many of the new states moved quickly to reform their laws on divorce. Pennsylvania imitated the New England model by providing for judicial divorces on several grounds. In 1785 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute granting jurisdiction over cases of divorce to the state Supreme Court. Appeals were allowed to the High Court of Errors and Appeals. Men and women subsequently obtained divorces a vinculo matrimonii for adultery, willful desertion of four years’ duration, bigamy, and knowledge of sexual incapacity before marriage. Divorces a mensa et thoro became available for the same causes and, in addition, for cruelty.

Massachusetts and New York followed suit in enacting post revolutionary divorce statutes. In 1786 Massachusetts lawmakers formalized grounds for the first time. Absolute divorces were obtainable for adultery, impotence, and criminal conviction carrying a prison sentence of seven years. Husbands and wives could obtain separations for desertion, and wives could obtain them for nonsupport. New York enacted its first divorce statute in 1787. Absolute divorces became available from the Court of Chancery for the single cause of adultery. Legal separations still were available for cruelty and desertion, as they had been in the colonial period. In 1813 the state assembly authorized the granting of divorces a mensa et thoro, thereby adding legitimacy to Chancery practices.

Connecticut maintained its liberal prerevolutionary statutes on divorce, although the appearance of a three-year residency requirement in 1796 indicated the state’s unwillingness to become the divorce capital of the new nation. Connecticut’s fears had validity, as demonstrated by the actions of one Pennsylvania woman, Beulah Torbert. According to Supreme Court Justice Jasper Yeates, “It appeared to us that Mrs. Torbert left her husband without cause, refused to return to him on overtures made her, and prosecuted him for adultery without cause, merely to found certain proceedings against him for a divorce, in the state of Connecticut.” Yeates made his remark in the case of Torbert v. Twining, tried in 1795. Virginia and Maryland did not enact statutes creating new divorce policies, but their assemblies did begin to enact private bills of absolute divorce. Petitioners applied directly to the legislatures for divorces, and the grounds were not formalized. In 1827 Virginia lawmakers changed their procedure somewhat, granting jurisdiction to circuit superior courts of chancery over annulments and separations from bed and board for adultery and cruelty. The legislature retained the sole authority to grant absolute divorces until 1848. Then that power also was delegated to the chancery courts, which granted them only on a charge of adultery, as in New York. In Maryland, divorces remained a sole legislative function even later than in Virginia. It was 1842 before the Maryland legislators relinquished jurisdiction to the courts. At that time, county courts of equity gained the power to decree divorces both a vinculo and a mensa et thoro. In the colonial period, South Carolina lawmakers had reasoned that only ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over divorces a vinculo. Because there were no ecclesiastical courts in South Carolina, there could be no absolute divorces. After the Revolution, the assembly continued its policy of opposition. Although South Carolina lawmakers now had the authority to legislate for divorce, they chose not to do so. Absolute divorces and annulments could not be obtained for any cause whatsoever. As Chancellor Desaussure explained in Vaigneur v. Kirk (1808), “The legislature has uniformly refused to grant divorces, on the ground that it was improper for the legislative body to exercise judicial powers. And it has as steadily refused to enact any law to authorize the courts of justice to grant divorces a vinculo matrimonii, on the broad principle that it was a wise policy to shut that door to domestic discord, and to gross immorality in the community.” Despite the continued absence of statutory rules to govern divorces, courts of chancery in South Carolina ordered separations from bed and board for cruelty and desertion, as they had in the colonial period. In most cases they did not use the term “divorce,” but their orders were identical to those creating divorces a mensa et thoro in other jurisdictions.

Given the unique characteristics of South Carolina as a slave society, it could not recognize the legitimacy of absolute divorce. Divorces most often were granted for adultery, but divorce for husbands’ extramarital affairs was impossible in a social climate condoning masters’ sexual exploitation of slaves. To allow white women the freedom to divorce for male adultery would have meant placing severe restrictions on men’s sexual behavior. That South Carolina more than Maryland or Virginia accepted the inevitability of male sexual license and refused to control it through the possibility of legislative (if not judicial) divorce is consistent with what historians know about the diverse cultures of southern slave societies. In White over Black, Winthrop D. Jordan pointed to the unusual prevalence of miscegenation in South Carolina during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

South Carolinians were less careful to conceal interracial liaisons than were other eighteenth-century slaveowners in the colonies. In this respect, they resembled the residents of the West Indies more than those of the mainland settlements. White women in South Carolina tolerated miscegenation by attempting to ignore it. Their own sexuality suffered as a result of the inevitable tensions in their marital lives. The plantation mistresses was “aloof from the world of lust and passion, a world which reeked of infidelity and Negro slaves”; in social situations they appeared formal and stiff. The difference between northern and southern attitudes toward male sexual continence in Southern Honor. Whereas middle-class northerners were beginning to extol the male virgin in terms similar to those traditionally reserved for females, southerners continued to approve of men’s sexual freedom. Young white men were expected to have intercourse with blacks in order to gain sexual experience. Married men who remained discreet and followed the rules in pursuing their sexual liaisons with slaves encountered no criticism. The problem was ignored in polite mixed society, and not perceived as a problem at all among men.

Divorce remained rare in the South as a whole and absent in South Carolina because it threatened male honor. Although men undoubtedly did seek to protect their honor by restricting access to divorce for themselves as well as their wives, they also were safeguarding their sexual privileges. Wives were forced to ignore their husbands’ illicit behavior because they possessed no legal power to prevent or control it. They could not divorce, or in most cases even obtain legal separations. It is unsurprising that the most successful complaint in southern divorce law was a wife’s adultery. In both Maryland and Virginia, the first private divorce acts (1790 and 1803, respectively) went to men whose wives gave birth to mulatto infants. Men’s honor, and their sexual rights, could not condone a woman’s unfaithfulness, particularly with a black man.

The Question Of Support: Separate Maintenances

Whether in North or South, when a marriage broke up, so did family property. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii often required a final disposition of all property owned by the husband and wife, although at times courts ordered awards of yearly alimony for women. When all the family property had to be divided by the courts, they proceeded according to the rules on inheritance. Women usually received one-third to one-half of the estate owned during the marriage. The award could consist of either real or personal property or both, depending on the circumstances of each case. Divorces a mensa et thoro generally included provisions for monetary payments to the wife, while the husband maintained his marital right to control family property. That variations on these patterns are common in the records, however, indicates legislative and judicial willingness to meet the needs of individuals. In determining alimony, moreover, chancellors could be affected by the behavior of the parties, granting more or less according to their impressions of the conduct involved. Women guilty of adultery received no alimony at all, and even the conduct of innocent women was subjected to close scrutiny. Thus in Peckford v. Peckford (1828), a suit for divorce on the basis of the husband’s adultery, the New York chancellor noted, “If the wife had been perfectly discreet, prudent, and submissive to her husband, I should have allowed her half of this property.” Because she had traveled to England against the wishes of her husband and “exposed him to temptation,” he awarded her only a life annuity equal to the value of one-third of their property.

In states with separate courts of equity, lawmakers gave jurisdiction over questions of property to the chancellors. The tradition grew out of chancery’s control of cases concerning women’s property rights, as well as the special ability of the masters in chancery to settle matters of account. Thus, even when legislative bodies enacted private bills of divorce, as in the Chesapeake states after the Revolution, chancery courts continued to exercise authority over separate maintenances.

Chancery courts in Maryland enforced both divorces a mensa et thoro and private agreements to live apart and divide property. The chancellors also heard all suits for alimony by women who received legislative divorces. In Maryland, then, all decisions concerning the division of property, even those arising from absolute divorces ordered by the assembly, came from the chancellors. This practice began early in the colonial period, with the case of Galwith v. Galwith (1689), and continued into the nineteenth century, despite an attempt by the legislature to assume jurisdiction in Crane v. Meginnis (1820). In this case the Court of Appeals overturned a legislative decree of alimony because it represented a usurpation of judicial powers. As Justice Earle observed, a suit for alimony was distinct from a suit for divorce in Maryland, and recoverable only from the Chancery Court or the Court of Appeals. Because suits for alimony had always been heard by chancellors, the legislature could not now take over jurisdiction. Before the Revolution, Pennsylvania rules on separate maintenances followed the usual guidelines, but with passage of the divorce statute of 1785, the law on alimony developed an unusual twist. Under the laws of the state, only divorces from bed and board gave a woman the right to alimony. Absolute divorces did not carry alimony, for they ended all marital obligations, including the wife’s right to financial support. Couples in Pennsylvania did divide family property at the time of divorce, but in poor or even middling families, the right to a share of collective assets meant less to women than the right to a portion of their husbands’ earnings. Significantly, the other jurisdictions studied did not adopt similar policies. They granted innocent women alimony, even in cases of absolute divorce. In Pennsylvania, men and women could choose which kind of divorce they wanted, whether absolute or from bed and board, for most grounds. Under the act of 1785, both kinds of divorce were available for adultery, bigamy, desertion of four years’ duration, and knowledge of sexual incapacity before marriage. But until 1815, divorces for cruelty, or forcing a woman to leave her home, brought only separations from bed and board. After 1815, a woman could make an election in a case of cruelty. It is interesting to note that when a choice was available, some women preferred separations with alimony to absolute divorces. Their decision may indicate that they preferred the financial security of a decree of alimony to the right to remarry. Given the poor preparation for earning their own livings that most women received in early America, their behavior is hardly surprising. Barbara Klingenberger was one Pennsylvania wife who preferred alimony to the right to remarry. In her original petition to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, she asked for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii with alimony. It was not possible to grant such a request under the laws of the state, and therefore the court decreed a divorce from bed and board with alimony. Barbara apparently was satisfied with the decree, but her husband appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that because Barbara had asked for an absolute divorce, she should have been granted one. In his opinion on the case, Chief Justice Tilghman noted the inconsistencies of Barbara’s petition, but decided that she wanted alimony. He wrote, “The petition was informal, and prayed for things which were inconsistent, viz.: a divorce from the bond of marriage and alimony; and perhaps, alimony was to the petitioner, the most important of the two.” He pointed out that Barbara had not appealed the decree or reapplied for a divorce a vinculo.

In Massachusetts, a provincial statute of 1695 had given the Superior Court of Judicature jurisdiction over alimony. In the colonial period the governor and council usually determined the kind and amount of support. Alimony usually consisted of cash payments to women, proportionate in amount to the family’s wealth and status in the community. Men frequently refused to pay alimony. Petitioners who won separate bed and board thus had an ambiguous success, not being allowed to remarry, nor released from the economic constraints of the marriage contract, nor guaranteed current support.

Under Massachusetts law women divorced a mensa et thoro did not enjoy the legal status of femes soles. In the eyes of the law they remained married, and therefore they could not contract, sue, or be sued in their own names. Women must have suffered considerable economic hardship under such divorce decrees. Divorces a vinculo matrimonii did not similarly handicap women. They became femes soles again, earning independence in the marketplace as well as in the household.

Given the lack of financial autonomy awarded to women divorced from bed and board, it is interesting to note that this was the only form of divorce granted to women in Massachusetts on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, although women who charged their husbands with adultery in addition to desertion or cruelty could receive absolute divorces. Obviously Massachusetts jurists believed sexual misconduct to be the worst offense against the sanctity of the family. Cases of nonsupport, desertion, or cruelty did not excite the full compassion of the courts. That these charges were also the ones made almost exclusively by women indicates a sexual bias in the handling of divorce decrees. Women in eighteenth-century Massachusetts noted the distinction and apparently took it into account in bringing suits for divorce and separation. Whereas men always sued for absolute divorces, women did not. “They requested divorce or, if that were not possible, whatever the governor and Council were willing to grant.” The Massachusetts policy on divorces a mensa et thoro was in agreement with the policy on feme sole traders generally. No colonial statute outlined a procedure for granting married women independence in commercial affairs. Such a statute did not appear until after the Revolution. The creation of a formal policy at that time probably also affected the granting of divorces. Separations from bed and board for the cause of desertion were no longer technically necessary after 1787. Women could apply for feme sole trader status instead. In fact, their rights under the statute were stronger than their rights under Massachusetts divorce law. Passage of the statute of 1787 may have served, then, as an alternative to divorce in Massachusetts. Connecticut policy on separate maintenances differed significantly from that of Massachusetts. No divorces a mensa et thoro were granted in the colony or state. Until 1811, the courts also refused to recognize or enforce private agreements between husbands and wives to separate and divide property. In Connecticut, couples either were married or were not. There was no in-between status by which some marital privileges were recognized, such as a wife’s right to support, and others were not. Connecticut law followed the suggestions outlined in the Puritan reform treatise of 1552. The reformers did not advocate divorce a mensa et thoro, and neither did Connecticut lawmakers. In this New England colony and state, therefore, couples received absolute divorces for desertion of three years’ duration, seven years’ willful absence without word, and cruelty, as well as for adultery.

Although Connecticut earned criticism from other jurisdictions for its liberal divorce policy, the policy was retained throughout the colonial and early national periods. Apparently the rules served the interests of residents well, perhaps in part because divorce substituted efficiently for rules allowing married women independent property rights. The General Assembly of Connecticut never enacted laws to govern the legal rights of independent businesswomen or women living separately from their husbands on an informal basis. Lawmakers believed that women already had a remedy in the rules on divorce, because each Connecticut divorce decree gave the husband and wife the legal status of unmarried persons. Equity Law And Private Separation Agreements The colonies and states with conservative policies on absolute divorce, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, lent particularly strong support to private separation agreements. Their policy grew partly out of a strong commitment to marriage settlements. Under equitable rules and principles, postnuptial settlements could be agreements to separate, and if they were made through trustees, courts of chancery felt the same obligation to enforce them as other marriage settlements. Despite their greater reluctance to grant absolute divorces, particularly in the colonial period, the jurisdictions with courts of chancery allowed the equivalent of divorce a mensa et thoro at the will of the parties. Such a policy denotes in some sense a liberal attitude toward divorce, for even in Connecticut a petitioner had to demonstrate cause to win a court-ordered separation. Although jurists supported postnuptial contracts to separate, conservative attitudes surfaced in postrevolutionary judicial decrees. For example, although equity courts increasingly supported direct contracts between husbands and wives, that is, contracts executed without trustees, they did not extend the new principle to separation agreements. Unless executed as trusts, private agreements to live apart and divide property were liable to be overthrown. A dislike of separations, which were increasing rapidly in number in the postrevolutionary era, prompted courts to enforce private separation agreements only when forced to do so by the weight of judicial precedent. If executed as postnuptial trusts designating a division of property between husband and wife, the courts had to enforce them, not because they were socially acceptable agreements to live apart but because they were legal agreements to divide property. Given a choice, some jurists would have preferred to stop the practice. Just like the other colonies and states with equity courts, New York supported private separation agreements made through the medium of trustees. New York imitated English practice in this area of the law beginning in the colonial period, and did not change its policy after the Revolution despite the growing opinion among jurists that separation agreements went against good public policy. New York chancellors refused, however, to support private separation agreements when the law behind them was not absolutely clear. In Carson v. Murray (1832), for example, the Chancery Court supported a separation agreement because it was made through trustees, whereas in Rogers v. Rogers (1834) it refused to validate an agreement made directly between a husband and wife, without the intervention of a third party. In Rogers v. Rogers, the chancellor expressed his disapproval of private agreements by men and women to live apart. He claimed to support them only as standard postnuptial trusts, and not as contracts beneficial in themselves to society. Like Swift, the New York chancellor opposed giving couples the right to separate at will. He wrote, “It is impossible for a feme covert to make any valid agreement with her husband to live separate from him, in violation of the marriage contract and of the duties which she owes to society, except under the sanction of the court; and in a case where the conduct of the husband has been such as to entitle her to a decree for a separation. The law of the land does not authorize or sanction a voluntary agreement between husband and wife. It merely tolerates such agreements when made in such a manner that they can be enforced by or against a third person acting in behalf of the wife.” Without that intervening third party, he felt no compunction about voiding the contract.

The chancellor from New York thus echoed sentiments expressed by southern jurists who opposed divorces but supported private agreements to separate. At times the contradiction in policy was acknowledged openly, both by attorneys and by judges. As one New York jurist observed, “However strange it may seem … that the agreement for a separate maintenance, which is merely auxiliary, should be enforced, whilst the principal agreement, viz. for a separation, is held to be contrary to the spirit and policy of the law, yet the decisions on the subject seem too numerous and uniform to be easily shaken.” Even though some early United States chancellors were unwilling to admit it, separation agreements served an important social function in a country that considered divorce a disgrace, and yet gave women few property rights unless they were separated legally from their husbands. Agreements to divide property also acted as a vital force behind the nineteenth-century movement to allow divorce at the will of the parties.

According to the rules of early American law, husbands had an obligation to support their wives. Under a legal system that gave male heads of household control over wives’ real property and ownership of their personal property, the guarantee of support served as compensation to women for their losses. The inability of married women to contract or to prosecute and defend suits at law further increased their need for financial support. Under standard common law rules, women did not possess the means to take care of themselves; men had to care for them. In a statement explicitly outlining the judicial reasoning behind women’s limited property rights, Justice Putnam of the Massachusetts Supreme Court first listed the ways in which married women found themselves restricted under the law, and then observed, “For these disabilities she is liberally recompensed by the obligations which the marriage imposes upon the husband to provide for her support during coverture, and by a claim for dower after its dissolution.” Inevitably, some men chose not to protect and provide for their wives, and the law developed rules for the exceptional cases. Divorce and legal separation served as a way of correcting and compensating for dysfunctional family relations. When abusive husbands forced wives out of their homes, courts moved aggressively to remind them of their obligations. If a man was not willing to treat his wife in a way that permitted her to remain at home in safety, then he became liable to support her in living elsewhere. This premise helps to explain the attitude of American jurists toward cruelty as a cause for legal separations. Under the laws of the colonies and states, cruelty had to be severe enough so that a woman feared bodily harm or death in order to win her a separate maintenance. Occasional, slight acts of physical violence were not enough to gain judicial support for a separation, nor was what today we would call incompatibility or mental anguish. Such things, although reprehensible, did not threaten life or limb. A woman could live with them. But when the degree of cruelty escalated to a level that required a wife to leave home, the courts acted uniformly in offering her help. Under American legal theory, women did not have to provide for themselves when they were forced to live separately from their husbands because of abuse or neglect.

When viewed from the perspective of divorce law, women’s property rights in the early decades of the nineteenth century truly represented an ideal rather than reality. In theory, a woman did not need to own property because her husband provided for her. But in order to justify giving husbands control over what women owned at marriage as well as the profits of their labor during marriage, the law had to ensure men’s financial support of their wives. During the early national period, courts and assemblies increasingly realized that their ability to guarantee women the ideal—support during marriage— was being undermined by practical considerations, including new attitudes toward marriage and divorce. In a society that was beginning to accept divorce as valid on many grounds, women living separately from their husbands became less exceptional. Society gradually realized that it could no longer deal with separated couples as deviant cases outside the ideal. They became a group representative of new views about marriage, including recognition of the individuality of husbands and wives and acceptance of conflicting interests. In response, lawmakers reluctantly adopted positions designed to reflect changing social attitudes toward marriage, separation, and property. They began to expand married women’s property rights. The spectrum of rules on divorce and alimony in the early states demonstrates that to lawmakers and jurists, there were no obvious solutions to the problem of how to define changing relationships between men and women. New York, Virginia, and Maryland, for example, did modify their strict colonial policies of opposition to absolute divorces, but their rules remained conservative in comparison to those of the New England states and Pennsylvania. All three conservative states, however, continued their pre-revolutionary policies concerning divorces a mensa et thoro and private separation agreements, an indication of their satisfaction with those rules and their desire to preserve them.

Despite the post revolutionary increase in divorce suits, all American jurists continued to express their belief in the necessity of strong family ties. Their perspectives on how best to promote family unity varied considerably, however, and their different responses reflected the various social, religious, economic, and legal circumstances that shaped their diverse cultures. Connecticut jurists believed that the best way to protect the family as they knew it was to deny women the ability to own separate property. Absolute divorce was far better for the morals of society than opposing interests within marriage. South Carolina was forced by peculiar circumstances to argue exactly the opposite point. Married women in the state were relatively free to own and control property if they chose to do so, and their rights to court-ordered separate maintenances were also guaranteed. But they could not, under any circumstances, remarry. That rule, South Carolina lawmakers maintained, was necessary to uphold the sanctity of the family.

The other jurisdictions fell between the extremes represented by Connecticut and South Carolina. They recognized several kinds of divorce and determined which was most suitable in particular situations. The common theme in all jurisdictions, however, was a reluctance to grant divorces at all. Divorce represented an ultimate breakdown, not only in family relations, but also in the delicate property arrangements of husbands and wives. Only death was similarly disruptive, demonstrated by the fact that jurists frequently ordered property settlements at divorce in the same way they did at death.

Even a cursory look at the divorce rate and trend in past decades shows the susceptibility of the divorce rate to short- and long-term fluctuations. For example, the rate of divorce dropped during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and quickly returned to its earlier level afterward. Then, toward the end of World War II and immediately after, it increased dramatically and reached a peak in 1946.

The United States has among the highest divorce rate among the industrialized countries, but it also has among the highest marriage and remarriage rates. Divorce was for decades perceived not only as an indication of pathology in divorcing individuals, but also as a social disease. The implicit and explicit prevailing belief was that divorce was harmful to the individuals involved and to society, and was an offense against God. Therefore, a remedy had to be found. The problem was at first believed to be the immorality of those involved; and the appropriate response was therefore censure and punishment. Later, as social scientists looked at the broader picture, they assumed that social ills were also to blame for the breakdown of families. They called on lawmakers to solve at least some of these social defects, and to protect the victims by raising high legal barriers against divorce. The psychological approach offered yet another view: Marital dissolution stems from the difficulties experienced by individuals. Therefore, divorce had to be eradicated by psychotherapeutic means and by providing support to families in crises. More recently, the U.S. ideology of the family has emphasized personal fulfillment as the main reason for maintaining family relationships, and love as the basis for marriage. Most people do marry, probably expecting that the promises of this ideology will be fulfilled. But they find themselves pressured into organizing their family life along other (less romantic but more dominant) dimensions. Internal family responsibilities, the demands of formal organizations, gender role stereotypes, social restrictions, and societal prescription regarding family life complicate, and may even preclude, finding personal satisfaction within the family setting. Divorce is often the consequence. But people rarely view their divorce in these terms. Social and structural factors are largely invisible to people who must cope with the personal consequences of these factors on a daily basis. So long as divorce remained a relatively rare phenomenon, affecting only a small proportion of the population, it was accounted for in highly individualistic terms. Having learned that marriage results from being in love with the right person, divorcing people consider themselves or their partners as responsible for marital breakdown. Divorce came to be viewed primarily as a matter of mistaken choice, as only a personal, not a social structural, failure. The language of guilt and innocence, blame and vindication has thus been used as an explanatory framework by the divorcing individuals. The community views divorce similarly, reinforcing the perception that both happy marriages and divorces are functions of mate selection.

Divorce and The Law

No area in which society touches family life has changed as rapidly and dramatically since the 1970s as the legal procedure for dissolving a marriage.

Until 1970, there were legal restrictions and specified grounds for divorce. The legally accepted reasons for breaking up a marriage were adultery, desertion, cruelty, and non-support.

Under the old legal system, the legal proceeding needed to be, and indeed was, adversarial. It required that one party should be found guilty of wrongdoing and responsible for the family breakdown. That person was to be punished by the court vis-à-vis the post divorce financial settlement. This traditional law reflected the social norms and accepted beliefs of the time: Marriage should be a lifelong commitment and that a man and a woman should devote themselves to each other, to their children, and to their home. In time, these assumptions about marriage, divorce, and gender-based division of roles and responsibilities came to be questioned. The public’s growing awareness of the gap between these assumptions and reality brought pressure to bear on lawmakers to reform the divorce laws.

The “divorce revolution” began in 1970 when California’s state legislature enacted the no-fault divorce law. The no-fault law conditioned divorce only upon one partner’s assertion that “irreconcilable differences have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage”. The underlying assumption reflected in this law was that bad marriages should be dissolved, that economic circumstances should determine alimony and the division of family assets, and that children, where possible, should maintain contact with both parents.

There is no uniform code of divorce law that is applied in all 50 states. However, most states adopted some variation of no-fault divorce laws. In some states, the divorcing couple must live apart for a certain period of time (from 6 months to 3 years) in order to obtain a legal divorce. In other less conservative states, “incompatibility” or “irreconcilable differences” must be shown by one partner if the other objects to the divorce. In most of these cases the fact that one partner chooses to leave the marriage is considered a sufficient proof of the need to divorce. Moreover, in some states, a divorce decree will be granted if one partner decides, for whatever reasons, that the marriage has reached a point of “irretrievable breakdown”. Under Utah law, to file for a divorce on no fault grounds you must meet certain requirements. You must meet the Utah residency requirements. To know if you can file for a divorce in Alpine on no fault grounds, speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. These reforms in family law appear to have emanated from changes in the larger fabric of society. Social trends and changes such as the women’s movement, women’s greater participation in the labor force, greater sexual freedom, the self-actualization theme of the 1960s and 1970s, and of course the increase in divorce rate, put the pressure on the lawmakers to change divorce statutes so that they might better reflect these social realities. A small part of these realities, which may nevertheless have been a strong motive for liberalizing the divorce law, was the fact that some lawmakers had themselves experienced painful divorces.

However, no-fault is not only a change in a legal code, it represents a cognitive scheme. Not only did it eliminate the need to prove a spouse’s misconduct, but “it eliminated the concept of fault itself”. The new law was connected with the trend that took moral issues out of the hands of social and governmental institutions, and promoted individual freedom and equality between men and women. It was also compatible with the rejection of the traditional patriarchal pattern of the family, and with the demand that adult men and women be treated as autonomous and equally responsible for breakdowns in their marriage and for their life after divorce. Several purposes were to be served by the reform of the divorce law: (a) the elimination of the need for hypocrisy, perjury, and collusion often required by the fault system, (b) the reduction of the levels of bitterness and suffering that are part of the divorce process, and © assistance given to reach a fairer and more rational financial settlement.

No longer does one partner need to file suit against the spouse on grounds such as adultery, mental cruelty, physical abuse, desertion, or other such marital misconduct. The basic premise for “fault” divorces was that there was one “right” and/or “innocent” party and one “wrong” and/or “guilty” party that needed to be punished. By replacing the old system with a single new standard of “irreconcilable differences” there is no longer a need to invent false reasons for divorce. More importantly, the new system recognizes that in marital breakdown, there is no guilty or innocent party. Now as far as the personal relationship between spouses is concerned, the legal process of divorce begins and ends with a “petition for dissolution,” where no justification need be given. The language that is used under the new system reflects this non-adversarial approach to the legal process. Although the rationale underlying the old divorce law was protection, that of the new law is equality. In the past, it was assumed and generally accepted that the state had a legitimate role in protecting the family and its members in the case of one partner’s gross misconduct. If that partner was physically abusing or committed adultery, he or she would be severely penalized by the court when financial arrangements were considered. The reformers sought to grant financial settlement based on the prevailing social norms; that is, personal freedom and the principle of equality between the genders. No more were property and alimony to be granted on the basis of either fault or gender-based role assignments. Each spouse has equal right to the accumulated wealth of the family. Under the new system, the husband is not solely responsible for financial support, nor is the wife solely responsible for caring for the children. The new standards for property division and alimony reflect the legislators’ belief in the responsibility and ability of each spouse to achieve self- supporting status. In addition, the “child’s best interest” guideline assumes no inherent advantage for mothers in custody hearings. Not only are fathers and mothers equally responsible for the financial welfare of their children, they are also equally responsible for their children’s overall well-being.

Adultery

Adultery is a ground for divorce in Utah. Consult with an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer if you want are seeking divorce on the grounds of adultery. Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married man or woman with a person other than the offender’s spouse. Today Utah divorce laws make adultery a ground for divorce. An examination of the decisions will give some notion of what adultery is. A man may be guilty of adultery, even though the offense was committed with a woman who was stupefied with liquor at the time, or where the act was committed without the consent of the woman. It has been said that if a man chooses to marry an unchaste woman with full knowledge of her unchastity, he cannot obtain a divorce for her subsequent adultery, but this is not true. The true test is not knowledge of previous conduct but a violation of the conditions of the marriage after it has been entered into. Even though a man had illicit sexual relations with his wife before marriage and married her while she was an inmate of a house of prostitution, those facts do not vitiate his right to a divorce for her refusal to leave the house and to discontinue her adulterous acts. Voluntary separation does not grant a license to commit adultery, and it is generally held that under such circumstances the innocent party may have a remedy against the other by way of divorce. Adultery may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the courts often say that it must be of a “clear and positive” nature. The defendant is entitled to the same presumption of innocence as in criminal cases. It is not necessary to prove the defendant guilty of adultery “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but it is sufficient if he is found guilty by a “clear preponderance of the evidence.” In proving adultery where the parties are not caught, two elements are required: the opportunity to commit the act, and the inclination to commit it. For example, if a man takes a woman to a hotel and retires with her to a room for the night, that is sufficient to prove both the opportunity and inclination to commit adultery. Cruelty Cruelty is a cause for divorce in Utah. The courts generally content themselves with determining whether the facts in the particular case constitute cruelty. The early decisions required physical violence upon the person with danger to life or health. A single act of violence will not ordinarily serve as a ground for divorce if it is committed in a heat of passion and there is no likelihood that it will be repeated. However, if the single act was very severe and involved malice, it may be sufficient cause. Again, where one of the parties commits a series of less serious acts, and there is a likelihood that they will be continued, even though no one of the acts would be sufficient by itself, the cumulative effect of the acts is cruelty. When the mental injury is such that it preys upon the mind and undermines the health, though the suffering is caused by words or conduct unaccompanied by an act of physical violence, the result is bodily harm and therefore the conduct producing the mental suffering is legal cruelty. In other words, without repudiating the early theory that the injury must be physical, the courts admit that legal cruelty may come about from continuous nagging and abuse, humiliating insults, and other mean and annoying conduct which cause mental suffering and consequent ill-health. The chain of causation is indirect, but the ultimate result is an injury to health. Under the indirect injury to health doctrine, divorces have been granted on the ground of cruelty for harsh and humiliating language or demeanor, for the wife’s or husband’s constant nagging, for making false charges of infidelity, and for such things as the husband telling the wife of his love for someone else, for unfounded accusations of crime and misconduct, for studied vexations and deliberate insults, and for stopping payment on checks and destroying credit. Excessive sexual demands by the husband upon the wife is not an uncommon ground for divorce. If you are a victim of cruelty by your spouse, speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. The lawyer can help you get a divorce from your cruel spouse.

Desertion

Desertion is another ground for divorce in Utah. Before desertion becomes a legal ground for divorce, certain elements must be present: (1) a cessation of cohabitation, (2) desertion for the period prescribed by statute, (3) an intention to abandon, (4) want of consent on the part of the party abandoned, and (5) unjustifiable abandonment.

There is no simple or uniform statutory definition of desertion as a cause for divorce. Many courts hold that if the husband drives his wife away from him, his conduct will amount to desertion as clearly as if he had left her. When either spouse after having been gone for some time offers in good faith to return, but is rejected, unless such rejection is justified it will amount to desertion. There must be an intention to abandon. The intent to abandon need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances, as when there is long absence without justifiable cause. Desertion must be without the consent of the abandoned spouse. If there is a separation by consent, either expressed in the words of the parties or inferred from the acts of the parties, desertion cannot be relied upon as a cause for divorce. The abandonment must be unjustifiable. If either spouse is guilty of such misconduct as to create proper grounds for the other’s departure, the latter’s absence will not make out the necessary desertion. The question often arises as to what kind of conduct is sufficient justification for one spouse to leave the other. There is serious conflict on this question, and some courts stand strictly upon the principle that nothing but conduct which is a ground for divorce will justify one spouse in leaving the other. Never attempt to file a divorce petition in Utah on the grounds of desertion without the assistance of an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer. Proving abandonment is complex and requires skill and expertise. This is best left to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer.

Impotence

Ordinarily, if impotence exists at the time of the marriage it is a ground for annulment. Annulment is different from divorce. Speak to an experienced Alpine Utah divorce lawyer to know the various grounds on which you can seek an annulment of your marriage.

Habitual Drunkenness

It is well recognized that excessive indulgence in intoxicating drinks as a fixed habit is habitual drunkenness, and this is true even though there may be intervals when the party refrains entirely from the use of intoxicating liquors. The courts have held that neither occasional drunkenness nor habitual but moderate use of liquor will constitute a ground for divorce. A wife cannot set up habitual drunkenness as a cause if at the time of the marriage she had full knowledge of the existence of the habit. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Divorce: Defenses

General and Special Defenses

The defenses to actions for divorce may be classified as general and special. The general defenses belong to the parties as litigants and are such as may arise in any law suit. The special defenses have been developed to protect all those likely to be affected by the dissolution of a marriage. It is the policy of the law to encourage the continuance of the marriage relation once it has been brought into existence. The law, therefore, encourages the defense of divorce actions. There are four generally accepted special defenses: collusion, connivance, condonation, and recrimination.

Collusion is any agreement between the parties by which they endeavor to obtain a divorce by an imposition on the court. Its essence is fraud upon the court. As demonstrated by cases, this fraud may appear in at least three forms: (1) by the commission of an offense for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, (2) by the introduction of false evidence of an offense not actually committed, and (3) by suppression of a valid defense. Connivance is the corrupt consenting by one married person to the marital offenses and acts of the other. The theory back of the connivance doctrine is that one who has consented to an act or wrong cannot be said to be injured by it and therefore should not be given the privilege of taking advantage of it as a ground for divorce. From the cases it seems that connivance appears most often in connection with adultery. A husband’s connivance at his wife’s adultery has often been held a bar to a divorce for the particular act connived at.

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce. It is necessary to look into the cases to see what offenses may be condoned, what is necessary to constitute condonation, and what are the effects of the condonation. That the doctrine applies to adultery is too well recognized to discuss. It applies to cruel and inhuman treatment, and perhaps to every other offense that constitutes a ground for divorce. An offer to forgive is not condonation unless it is accepted and acted upon by the other party, nor is the mere writing of letters in affectionate terms by the aggrieved spouse to the guilty one. Sexual intercourse with knowledge of a prior offense is the type of conduct which will make a case of condonation. Formal forgiveness is not essential to condonation, for the forgiveness may be implied from the conduct of the parties. There can be no condonation without knowledge of the offense committed, so that continued cohabitation cannot be construed as forgiveness if there is no realization that an offense has been committed.

Recrimination is a counter charge that the complaining party has also been guilty of an offense constituting a ground for divorce. The doctrine of recrimination is grounded on the old equity theory that one who asks relief must come into court with clean hands, and that divorce laws are made to give relief to the innocent and not to the guilty party.

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from Michael Anderson https://www.ascentlawfirm.com/divorce-lawyer-alpine-utah/ from Divorce Lawyer Nelson Farms Utah https://divorcelawyernelsonfarmsutah.tumblr.com/post/190909829920