#India-China Border Clash | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

mariacallous · 8 months ago

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In the waters of the South China Sea, Chinese coast guard vessels have clashed with Philippine ships. In the air above the Taiwan Strait, Chinese warplanes have challenged Taiwanese jet fighters. And in the valleys of the Himalayas, Chinese troops have fought Indian soldiers.

Across several frontiers, China has been using its armed forces to dispute territory not internationally recognized as part of China but nevertheless claimed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In August 2023, Beijing laid out its current territorial claims for the world to see. The new edition of the standard map of China includes lands that are today a part of India and Russia, along with island territories such as Taiwan and comprehensive stretches of the East and South China Seas that are also claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

China often invokes historical narratives to justify these claims. Beijing, for example, has said that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which it claims under the name of the Diaoyu Islands, “have been an inherent territory of China since ancient times.” Chinese officials have used the same words to back China’s right to parts of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese government also claims that its sovereignty over the South China Sea is based on its own historic maritime maps.

However, in certain periods since ancient times China has also held sway over other states in the region—Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam. Yet Beijing is currently not laying claim to any of these.

Instead, Beijing has embraced a selective irredentism, wielding specific chapters of China’s historical record when they suit existing aims and leaving former Chinese territories be when they don’t. Over time, as Beijing’s interests and power relations have shifted, some of these claims have faded from importance, while new ones have taken their place. Yet for Taiwan, Chinese claims remain unchanged, as the fate of the island state is tied to the very legitimacy of the CCP as well as the vitality of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s political vision.

Many of the CCP’s territorial claims have roots in the 19th and 20th centuries during the late rule of the Qing Dynasty. Following diplomatic pressure and repeated military defeats, the Qing Dynasty was forced to cede territory to several Western colonial powers, as well as the Russian and Japanese empires. These concessions are part of what are known in China as the “unequal treaties,” while the 100 years in which the treaties were signed and enforced are known as the “century of humiliation.” These territorial losses eventually passed from the dynasty to the Republic of China and then, following the Chinese Civil War, to the CCP. As a result, upon the CCP’s establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new Chinese state inherited outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors.

But despite the humiliation the Qing Dynasty’s losses had caused, the CCP proved willing to compromise and reduce its territorial aims during times of high internal unrest. Following the Tibetan uprising in 1959, for instance, the CCP negotiated territorial settlements with countries bordering the Tibet region, including Myanmar, Nepal, and India. Similarly, when unrest rocked the Uyghur region in the 1960s and ‘90s, Beijing pursued territorial compromises with several bordering countries such as Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the CCP also pursued territorial settlements with Mongolia, Laos, and Vietnam in the hopes of securing China’s borders during times of domestic instability. Instead of pursuing diversionary wars, the CCP relied on diplomacy to settle border and territory disputes.

But China has changed quite a lot since then. In recent years, the CCP has avoided the inflammatory domestic political chaos of previous decades, and its once-tentative hold over border regions, such as Tibet and the Uyghur region, has been replaced by an iron grip. With this upper hand, the CCP has little incentive to pursue peaceful resolutions to remaining territorial disputes.

“China’s national power has increased significantly, reducing the benefits of compromise and enabling China to drive a much harder bargain,” said M. Taylor Fravel, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In this context, the CCP has expanded its irredentist ambitions. After the discovery of potential oil reserves around the Senkaku Islands, and the United States’ return of the islands to Japan in the 1970s, Beijing drew on its historical record to lay claim to the islands, even though it had previously referred to them as part of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands. Similarly, though Beijing and Moscow settled a dispute over Heixiazi Island, located along China’s northeastern border, in 2004, the 2023 map of China depicted the entire island (ceded, along with vast Pacific territories, by the Qing Dynasty to the Russian Empire in 1860) as part of its domain, much to the ire of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Collin Koh Swee Lean, a senior fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, argues that the Chinese mapping of Heixiazi Island shows that Beijing holds on to certain core interests and simply waits for the opportune time to assert them.

“Given the current context of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s increased dependence on China, it might have appeared to Beijing that it has the chips in its pockets because, after all, Moscow needs Beijing more than the other way around,” Koh said on the German Marshall Fund’s China Global podcast.

This raises the question of whether territorial disputes that were settled during times of CCP weakness can be revisited and become subject to irredentist ambitions should power balances shift in China’s favor.

According to Steve Tsang, the director of the China Institute at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, there is currently a limit to how far the CCP will push territorial claims against Russia, since President Xi will need Russian support to sustain his grand ambitions for Chinese leadership on the global stage.

Although it would be a long shot, even Russia may not be safe from these ambitions indefinitely. Given that large swaths of Russia’s Pacific territories were part of China until 1860, “China could claim back the Russian Far East when it deems the time is right,” Tsang said. Such control would grant Beijing unrestricted access to the region’s abundance of coal, timber, tin, and gold while moving it geographically closer to its ambition of becoming an Arctic power.

While there is plenty of historical evidence pointing to former Chinese control over the southeastern portion of the Russian Far East, the historical record is less unequivocal about Chinese control over Taiwan. Anything resembling mainland Chinese control over Taiwan was not established until after 1684 by the Qing Dynasty, and even then central authority remained weak. In 1895, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to the Empire of Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War, and by the time Chinese authority was restored in 1945, Taiwan had undergone several decades of Japanization.

These details have not prevented the CCP from claiming that Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. Yet more than any other irredentist claim, Xi has made unification with Taiwan a major component of his vision to rejuvenate the Chinese nation.

Unification, however, has little to do with ancient history and more to do with the challenge that Taiwan presently poses to Xi’s aims, according to Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor who teaches about Chinese foreign policy at the National University of Singapore.

“The CCP pursues a Chinese nationalism that emphasizes unity and homogeneity centered around the CCP leadership while they also often claim that their single-party rule is acceptable to Chinese people,” Chong said.

In contrast, Taiwan holds free elections in which multiple political parties compete for the favor of a people that have increasingly developed an identity distinct from mainland China.

“The Taiwanese experience is a clear affront to the CCP narrative,” Chong said.

Control over Taiwan is also attractive to Beijing because it is key to unlocking the Chinese leadership’s broader ambition of maritime hegemony in waters where almost half of the world’s container fleet passed through in 2022.

As with the case of Taiwan, the CCP’s historical arguments regarding its claims on island groups and islets in the East and South China Seas are likewise much weaker than many of its land-based claims.

Instead, Chinese territorial intransigence in the maritime arena is more about a strategic shift in the value of the seas around China, Fravel said.

Today, it has been estimated that more than 21 percent of global trade passes through the South China Sea. And beneath these waters are not only subsea cables that carry sensitive internet data but also vast estimated reserves of oil and natural gas.

Although it may say otherwise, Beijing’s unwillingness to let up on its tenuous territorial maritime claims suggests that China is pursuing long-held ambitions and global aspirations rather than attempting to reverse past losses. So long as the CCP wields its historical record selectively and changeably to serve its aims—and is willing to back its claims up with military action—China’s neighbors will remain at risk.

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nohkalikai · 8 months ago

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Activist calls for border march in Ladakh to mark land lost to China

The march would be taken out in the north and south banks of Pangong Tso lake, Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control with China; two dates are shortlisted — March 27 and April 7

Around 10,000 people from Ladakh will march to the border along China this month to showcase how much land has been lost to the neighbouring country, climate activist and education reformer Sonam Wangchuk said on Tuesday.

Mr. Wangchuk has been protesting in open in sub-zero temperature in Leh, surviving only on salt and water for the past 14 days, to demand constitutional safeguards for the Union Territory.

“We know from the shepherds that they are not allowed [anymore] to go to the places that they always used to go. In particular areas, they are stopped kilometres before where they used to go earlier. We will go and show whether land has been lost or not,” Mr. Wangchuk said.

The march would be taken out in Finger area (north and south bank of Pangong Tso), Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

He said two dates have been shortlisted for the march — March 27 and April 7.

“The march will also highlight the areas, prime pasture lands, that are being turned into solar parks. On one hand, nomads are losing their land to corporates who are coming to set up their plants, maybe mining in future. Nomads will lose 150,000 sq km of prime pasture land, on the other hand they are losing pasture land to China which is encroaching from the north, the Chinese have captured huge chunks of land in the last few years,” he said.

After the June 15, 2020 incident in Galwan where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, several rounds of talks between the two armies have taken place leading to disengagement and creation of buffer zones or no-go areas. These areas in eastern Ladakh were regularly patrolled before April 2020 when China started amassing troops close to the LAC. At least 26 patrolling points out of total 65 PPs in Eastern Ladakh are not being patrolled due to the border dispute.

At the centre of Mr. Wangchuk’s protest that has received huge support from the locals is the failure of talks between Ladakh civil society leaders and Union Home Minister Amit Shah on March 4.

The members of Leh Apex Body (LAB) and Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) representing the Buddhist majority and Shia Muslim dominated regions respectively in Ladakh, are jointly protesting for Statehood for Ladakh, inclusion of Ladakh in the sixth schedule of the constitution thus giving it a tribal status, job reservation for locals and a parliamentary seat each for Leh and Kargil.

Though ministry officials had in previous rounds of meetings agreed to examine how the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution can be implemented in Ladakh’s context, the meeting with Mr. Shah “did not result in any positive outcome”.

“Government has been declining to keep their promise on Sixth Schedule. The Home Minister said we cannot give this but we will give you some constitutional safeguard,” Mr. Wangchuk said adding that he wants to awaken the people of India to this “breach of trust”.

“People are disillusioned, disenchanted and angry. There is no chance BJP will win a seat here in the upcoming elections. But this is not only for Ladakh, am trying to awaken the nation, if this is how election promises are honoured, then elections are a joke. Why did we vote this party to power twice?” he said. Ladakh’s only parliamentary seat was won by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 and 2019.

After the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution was revoked by the Parliament on August 5, 2019, Ladakh was turned into a Union Territory without any legislative assembly.

#ladakh #climate #borderlands

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apas-95 · 2 years ago

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There's a post going around rn with a document from the communist party of India (Maoist) and the communist party of the Philippines condemning China for their supplying of arms to the Indian and Duterte govs, and how those arms have been used against those communist parties and innocents. It seems to me that to go against their trade agreements because of that would be in violation of China's non interventionist party, let alone if they supplied arms to the communist guerrillas for a Comintern 2 situation, but I'm unsure if that holds up on inspection

The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database shows zero arms trades between China and the Philippines, or India.

In the case of the Philippines, I'm aware of the specific thing being referenced whenever this point is brought up - a ceremonial gift of a few hundred rifles, given to the government of the Philippines during their campaign against local ISIS groups. This doesn't appear on any databases for the SIPRI peace institute because it's not an arms trade, it's an incredibly small token gift without any possible impact.

In the case of India, I've got no idea what's being referenced - especially since India is actively engaged in military competition against China, not only through posturing, but through active border clashes, and China is engaged fairly heavily in arming Pakistan against India.

I can understand why, on the level of national interest, these groups might oppose China - and, further, on the ideological level - but I think it's fairly clear that China isn't interested in suppressing these groups, its foreign policy towards a given nation is simply uninvolved with which group in a nation has power, and would just as happily work with these groups should they manage to rally their countrymen to their side.

If anything, given the clear ideological differences between themselves and the CPC, they should appreciate the fact that the CPC hasn't decided to impose its vision of socialism on other countries, and to let them undergo their own processes of national development.

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memecucker · 1 year ago

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I think its kinda interesting how border clashes between India and China had cooled down for decades but started up again in the 2010s only a few years after BRICS began to turn into an actual international bloc. Like that’s counter-intuitive but those are two really major things with Indo-Chinese relations there’s some connection going on there right? Like does the BRICS bloc act as insurance against clashes spiraling out of control into a hot war so commanders got more brazen or something idk much about the topic

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beardedmrbean · 1 year ago

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India says it has lodged a "strong protest" with China over a new map that lays claim to its territory.

Indian media have reported that the map shows the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as China's territory.

It was released by China's ministry of natural resources on Monday.

"We reject these claims as they have no basis," India's foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said.

He added that such steps by China "only complicate the resolution of the boundary question".

Beijing has not officially responded yet.

India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar also called China's claim "absurd".

"China has even in the past put out maps which claim the territories which are not China's, which belong to other countries. This is an old habit of theirs," he told TV channel NDTV on Tuesday.

India's protest comes days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the sidelines of the Brics summit in South Africa. An Indian official said afterwards that the two countries had agreed to "intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation" along the disputed border.

Shadow of 60-year-old war at India-China flashpoint

The Indian monastery town coveted by China

India has often reacted angrily to China's attempts to stake claim to its territory.

The source of the tension between the neighbours is a disputed 3,440km (2,100 mile)-long de facto border along the Himalayas - called the Line of Actual Control, or LAC - which is poorly demarcated. The presence of rivers, lakes and snowcaps means the line can shift in places.

Soldiers on either side come face to face at many points, which can spark tensions - the last time being in December when Indian and Chinese troops clashed along the border in the town of Tawang.

China says it considers the whole of Arunachal Pradesh its territory, calling it "South Tibet" - a claim India firmly rejects. India claims the Aksai Chin plateau in the Himalayas, which is controlled by China.

In April, Delhi reacted sharply to China's attempts to rename 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the state would always be "an "integral and inalienable part of India".

Relations between India and China have worsened since 2020, when their troops were involved in a deadly clash at the Galwan valley in Ladakh - it was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.

#nunyas news #give the terrirory to burma instead #everyone wins

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abhishekpandey123 · 7 months ago

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Elections in India

India’s national election will take place in phases over 44 days. Here’s why it takes so long

Nearly 970 million people or over 10% of the global population are eligible to vote in India’s general elections. The mammoth exercise is the biggest anywhere in the world and will take 44 days before results are announced on June 4.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is aiming for a third consecutive term in office. He is set to compete against a diverse yet faltering coalition of opposition parties who are finding it difficult to counter his popularity. The majority of polls forecast a comfortable victory for the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, solidifying his position as one of the most prominent and influential leaders in the country.

WHY DOES IT TAKE SO LONG?

Two primary factors contribute to this situation: the vast expanse of India, the most populous nation globally, and the intricate logistics required to enable each eligible voter to participate in the electoral process.

Over the years, the duration of voting has wavered. It took nearly four months to complete the vote in India’s first elections in 1951-1952, after it gained independence from British rule, and just four days in 1980. In 2019, voting took 39 days, and this year’s election is the second longest.

With 969 million registered voters, the size of India’s electorate is bigger than the combined population of the 27 European Union member states. This includes 18 million first-time voters, and around 197 million who are in their 20s.

The vote to choose 543 lawmakers for the lower house of Parliament takes place over seven phases. India’s 28 states and eight federal territories will vote at different times. Each phase is one day, with the first held on April 19 and the last on June 1.

Some states may complete their voting process within a day, while others might require more time. For instance, Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in India with a population of 200 million, equivalent to the size of Brazil, will conduct voting over seven days. This extended duration of the voting process in India's general elections has been criticized by Modi's opponents, who argue that it provides an advantage to the prime minister in terms of campaigning and travel, particularly in states where his party is not as strong.

EVERY VOTE COUNTS

The Election Commission of India is responsible for ensuring that a voting booth is accessible within a 2-kilometer radius of each voter. Chakshu Roy from PRS Legislative Research emphasized the extensive efforts election officials must undertake to enable every voter to cast their ballot. Around 15 million election officials and security personnel will travel across deserts and mountains, utilizing various modes of transportation such as boats, walking, and even horseback riding, to reach all voters.

It can be especially arduous. In 2019, when India last held elections, a team of polling officers trekked over 480 kilometers (300 miles) for four days just so a single voter in a hamlet in the remote state of Arunachal Pradesh, which borders China, could exercise their right.

Officials also traveled to a village tucked away high up in the Himalayas in 2019 to install a booth at 15,256 feet (4,650 meters), the highest polling station anywhere in the world.

This time too, polling stations will be installed in remote places, including one inside a wildlife sanctuary in southern Kerala state and another in a shipping container in western Gujarat state.

TIGHT SECURITY

Security is cited as a significant factor behind the multi-phase elections in India, according to experts. In order to ensure safety, a large number of federal security forces, who typically guard borders, are mobilized and work in conjunction with state police. Their primary responsibilities include preventing violence, escorting electoral officials, and transporting voting machines. Previous elections in India have been marred by deadly clashes between supporters of rival political parties, particularly in West Bengal. However, the presence of heavy security forces has contributed to a decrease in such incidents over the years, resulting in relatively peaceful voting. The geographical diversity of the country, with its rivers, mountains, snow, and jungles, poses challenges for the movements of security forces. Despite these obstacles, the chief election commissioner, Rajiv Kumar, has emphasized their commitment to ensuring a smooth voting process by going the extra mile for the convenience of voters.

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newslobster · 2 years ago

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Opposition Shows Rare Unity In Parliament, Yet Government Cagey On China Clashes

New Delhi: Opposition unity in Parliament was on display again as the Aam Aadmi Party and the Telangana Rashtra Samithi joined a strategy meet called by Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge, the Leader of Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, on how to compel the government to discuss the recent India-China border clashes, in Arunachal Pradesh, in Parliament. Bengal’s Trinamool Congress later…

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mariacallous · 2 years ago

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During the recent G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi got up from the banquet table to shake hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and have a brief conversation—their first in-person exchange in three years. Although both sides remain tight-lipped about the interaction, it nonetheless raised hopes among observers of a breakthrough in their 30-month border crisis, which began with a deadly clash in Ladakh in 2020. But any resolution that might emerge will not dispel the challenge posed by massive changes at the border undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This marks the third straight winter that around 50,000 Indian reinforcements will spend in Ladakh’s inhospitable terrain in the northern Himalayas, warding off an equal number of Chinese troops stationed a few miles away. Despite intermittent dialogue between the two militaries, Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Pande recently confirmed that China has not reduced its forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese infrastructure construction along the border is “going on unabated,” he said—confirmed by independent satellite imagery and echoed by the latest U.S. Defense Department report on China. Pande said the situation is “stable but unpredictable.” That unpredictability has become structural.

India and China have so far held 16 rounds of border talks between senior military commanders as well as numerous diplomatic and political engagements, but an agreement on actions to reduce the tensions in Ladakh has been slow to materialize. Of the seven areas in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese soldiers have faced one another since 2020, two have seen no change while the rest have seen each side take a limited step back. The challenge for India is becoming more concerning on the eastern part of the LAC—between the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet—where China has an infrastructure and military advantage, putting New Delhi on the defensive.

The widening power gap between India and China—military, technological, economic, and diplomatic—now constrains New Delhi’s options on the border. It also raises tough questions for India’s geopolitical partnerships, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), and its aggressive approach toward Pakistan. The border crisis will hang over India’s decision-making for the foreseeable future.

In October, the Chinese Communist Party held its 20th National Congress, and Xi assumed an unprecedented third term as leader. Among the images broadcasted at the Great Hall of the People minutes before Xi ascended the stage was a video from the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where at least 20 Indian soldiers and 4 PLA soldiers died in a clash in June 2020. The videos showed PLA regiment commander Qi Fabao standing with his arms outstretched to stop Indian soldiers from advancing. Qi was selected to be a delegate to the Party Congress, underlining the importance of the border crisis to the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative. Harnessing nationalism, the party wants to convey that it will protect what it considers Chinese territory at all costs.

India’s military and political leaders now confront a reality at the border that should have jolted them into serious action: China has a distinct advantage over India, which it has consolidated since 2020. By investing in a long-term military presence in one of the most remote places on Earth, the PLA has considerably reduced the time it would need to launch a military operation against India. New military garrisons, roads, and bridges would allow for rapid deployment and make clear that Beijing is not considering a broader retreat. The Indian military has responded by diverting certain forces intended for the border with Pakistan toward its disputed border with China. It has deployed additional ground forces to prevent further PLA ingress in Ladakh and constructed supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s political leadership is conspicuous in its silence, projecting a sense of normalcy.

Beijing refuses to discuss two of the areas in Ladakh, where its forces have blocked Indian patrols since 2020. In five other areas, Chinese troops have stepped back by a few miles but asked India to do the same and create a no-patrolling zone. This move denies India its right to patrol areas as planned before the border crisis began. The PLA has flatly refused to discuss de-escalation, in which both armies would pull back by a substantive distance. The question of each side withdrawing its additional troops from Ladakh is not even on the agenda. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson rejected any demand to restore the situation along the LAC as it existed before May 2020. The PLA continues to downplay the severity of the situation, instead emphasizing stability in its ties with India.

If the situation in Ladakh is “stable but unpredictable,” Indian military leaders have told Foreign Policy that major stretches of the LAC’s eastern sector—2,500 kilometers (or 1,553 miles) away—are an even bigger cause of concern. In 1962, this area was the site of a humiliating defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the PLA. Today, massive Chinese infrastructure development and troop buildup closer to the LAC has placed India at a military disadvantage. In September, Pande said when it comes to infrastructure in the area, “there is lots to be desired to be done.” Recent reports suggest at least three additional PLA brigades remain deployed in the area even after the Party Congress, further worrying Indian military planners.

China officially claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, which includes the Tawang Monastery where the sixth Dalai Lama was born in 1683. Tawang was historically a part of Tibet; Chinese officials, such as Dai Bingguo, who served as China’s boundary negotiator with India from 2003 to 2013, have publicly stated that it would be nonnegotiable in a permanent settlement of the disputed border. As questions arise over the succession of the current Dalai Lama, who is 87 years old, Chinese sensitivities about Tawang will intensify—even more so when linked to its internal security problems in Tibet. In the coming years, it is likely to become a higher priority for China.

Still, it is in Ladakh that the Chinese have built up infrastructure at a frenetic pace, with only military operations in mind: roads, bridges, airfields, heliports, accommodations for troops, and storage and communication infrastructure. Pande noted that one of the biggest developments is the G695 highway, which runs parallel to the LAC and gives the PLA the ability to quickly move from one valley to another. Flatter terrain on the Chinese side already gives Beijing an advantage, now further bolstered by infrastructure—an extensive network of new roads, bridges, and heliports.

In the 1960s, the PLA needed one full summer season to mobilize and launch military operations in Ladakh for the next summer. Now, it would need a couple of weeks to undertake the same operation. Indian military planners must live with this scenario, even if the current border crisis is resolved.

Modi approaching Xi in Bali recalled a short exchange between the two leaders on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, in 2017. Then, their conversation sparked diplomatic communications between New Delhi and Beijing that aimed to resolve a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at Doklam in Bhutan, which China claims as its territory. The talks led to disengagement, but the Chinese only stepped back a few hundred yards. They have since consolidated their military deployment and undertaken massive infrastructure development in Doklam, such as roads, helipads, and a military garrison. Even if an immediate crisis was averted, the status quo was permanently altered in China’s favor in Doklam.

A similar resolution of the Ladakh border crisis would carry bigger risks for India. Unlike in Doklam, China has entered areas in Ladakh that Indian troops regularly patrolled until 2020. Reinforcing the LAC over the vast span of Ladakh would require enhanced deployment of Indian ground forces. This permanent instability would put the Indian military under further pressure. With an already limited defense budget—China’s is more than four times as large—shifting more troops to the border would also divert resources from the Indian Navy, where multilateral cooperation with Quad partners to contest China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region is an absolute imperative.

Fearing escalation, India is forsaking even limited offensive options, such as launching a quid pro quo military operation to capture some territory in Tibet to arrive at the negotiating table with a strong hand. New Delhi’s defensive position instead seems to acknowledge its widening gap with Beijing; due to this power differential, it is unable to even use economic or diplomatic instruments to target China. After all, India’s bilateral trade with China—its biggest trading partner—reached record levels this year, with an all-time high trade deficit in Beijing’s favor. The U.S. Defense Department report on China reveals that Beijing has warned U.S. officials not to interfere with its relationship with New Delhi; Kenneth Juster, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said New Delhi doesn’t want Washington to mention Beijing’s border aggression.

India’s defensive posture plays out in its approach to diplomatic engagement and security cooperation. Unlike its Quad partners, India abstained from voting against China on the Xinjiang issue at the United Nations Human Rights Council meeting in October, and its comments on China’s crackdown in Hong Kong or aggression toward Taiwan have been guarded. Modi participated in both the BRICS summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit this year, along with Xi; Chinese delegations are still regularly invited to New Delhi for multilateral events. And an Indian military contingent participated with a PLA contingent in a military exercise in Russia this year.

The current situation along the LAC, both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, as well as China’s refusal to discuss issues on India’s agenda for resolving the crisis have added to the structural instability in their relationship. Chinese infrastructure development and the widening gap in power means that this instability will become permanent, even with a solution to the immediate crisis. India’s military will remain under pressure and on guard. Pande made this implicit when discussing future Indian plans on the border in November. “We need to very carefully calibrate our actions on the LAC [so as] to be able to safeguard both our interests and sensitivities … and be prepared to deal with all types of contingencies,” he said.

The risk of an accidental military escalation between Asia’s most populous countries—both nuclear powers—has increased significantly since 2020. This will continue unless Modi and Xi find a new modus vivendi. Establishing guardrails in the relationship will require political imagination and an honest appraisal of relative strengths; failing that, New Delhi faces tough geopolitical choices. It has so far eschewed any security-centric step with the Quad that could provoke Beijing, but murmurs from its partners about reticent Indian policy are bound to get louder. Meanwhile, India’s reliance on Russia for military equipment and ammunition now falls under a cloud of suspicion. And an unstable border with China prevents India from targeting Pakistan, a tactic that has proved politically rewarding for Modi.

The fundamentals of Indian foreign policy that have held steady since the years of former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—namely, strategic autonomy and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty—will come under greater stress as the border crisis looms over New Delhi. Modi boasts of great ambitions for India as a “Vishwa Guru,” or master to the world—a euphemism for a global superpower. But questions raised by the situation at the border with China continue to limit him.

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