#ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

[southeastasianarchaeology]

[Book] Maritime Southeast Asia: History, Culture and Religion; c. First Century CE–Fifteenth Century CE

ISEAS Publishing has just announced a new book edited by Birendra Nath Prasad on maritime trade and communication in Southeast Asia from the first to fifteenth centuries CE. You can order it through the ISEAS publishing link below.

ISEAS Publishing has just announced a new book edited by Birendra Nath Prasad on maritime trade and communication in Southeast Asia from the first to fifteenth centuries CE. You can order it through the ISEAS publishing link below. Often serving as an important node through which West Asian and South Asian maritime trade with China were maintained, maritime Southeast Asia remained exposed to…

[xtruss]

US Should Clear-up Bombs It Left in Laos 🇱🇦 Before Questioning China's Influence There

— Ding Gang | July 26, 2023

Illustration: Liu Rui/Global Times

During Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing last week, I was traveling in Laos. In conversations with Lao political and academic friends, I could always detect the presence of a shadow, that is, the influence of the US on Southeast Asia.

The US has a powerful presence in the region's economic, trade, political, and diplomacy spheres, even though the US and the region are separated by a vast ocean.

In Laos, looking around you feel like everything is from the past, like an old photo that has turned yellow but it's still clear. Older people will talk to you about the "secret wars" that the CIA orchestrated in Laos in the 1960s, and outside some houses, you will see American bomb casings erected. US warplanes dropped them on Laos decades ago, and sometimes they explode, injuring people nearby.

More than anything else, reality exists. When we talk about the Belt and Road Initiative, the cooperation in the Greater Mekong Region, there is always a mention of how the Americans see it, how the American media report it, and how they hype the so-called debt issue.

When a Hong Kong-funded company built a civilian airport in the Bokeo Province of Laos, US officials immediately came up to "visit" the region. It seems they were interested in more than just helping Laos remove the bombs.

A few days ago, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a Singaporean think tank, released a survey titled "Changing Perceptions in Laos Toward China," which said that more and more Laotian respondents are worried about China's economic influence. I wonder if the scholars who conducted the survey asked any Laotian farmers who benefited from eliminating bombs left by the US military by the Chinese companies or any Laotian employees who work for Chinese companies how much they earn per month.

In a recent report from the Chinese edition of the Voice of America, one scholar took the opportunity to call on Washington to commit to seizing the opportunity as a breaking point to check Beijing's expansion in Southeast Asia.

“US 🇺🇸 Dropped Bombs 💣 in Laos 🇱🇦, China 🇨🇳 Builds Railways 🚃”

"Check and balance" immediately makes me think of Henry Kissinger. It is the primary tool of the strategy of equilibrium that Kissinger "created" and utilized. The US has used such a tool to balance the challenges and maintain its hegemonic position.

Looking back over the past sixty years of China-US relations, it is easy to see that China is no longer a force that the US needs to utilize to counterbalance a main adversary.

Now, China is a friend of the US' enemy and even its foremost and long-term rival. That is why it is the first target of the US to check and balance.

This concept of checks and balances has profoundly affected the geopolitical understanding of China's neighboring countries, which have come to a juncture where they must draw a line in the sand.

When I took the high-speed train from Luang Prabang to Vientiane, I saw that all the compartments were almost full of passengers, most of them were Laotians. I observed them getting on and off the train with big bags, and I suddenly had a feeling that the US was tired. Suppose the China-Laos high-speed rail is seen as the rising China's economic energy spillover, reflecting the common pursuit of the development of China and Southeast Asian countries. In that case, who will the US checks and balances favor? And, can the US be checked and balanced?

China is not the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. China's rise is all-encompassing and multi-layered, a wide-ranging engagement and intermingling with its neighbors and the world, including the US, in almost all fields of industry, education, finance, culture, etc., and likewise a process in which 1.4 billion people are running towards affluence through peaceful development.

After I visit Bokeo Airport, I would like to say one thing: Americans are welcome to Southeast Asia to participate in the development. The infrastructure China is helping to build there will surely be a boon to American investment.

However, the best way for Americans to gain the trust of the Laotians is to first clean up the bombs they left behind.

It's time for the Americans and those who follow them to jump out of the loop of the equilibrium theory that has gone out of fashion.

— The Author is a Senior Editor with People's Daily, and currently a senior fellow with the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China.

[rhk111sblog]

Pro-US Vietnamese in Singapore accuses China of possibly sabotaging Philippine-Vietnam Relations

[southeastasianists]

2024/49 “Minorities in Brunei Darussalam: Intersecting Religion and Ethnicity” by Chang-Yau Hoon and Asiyah Kumpoh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Perspective offers a nuanced understanding of the interplay between religion and ethnicity among minority groups in Brunei Darussalam, a nation where Islam constitutes the majority religion and where religious proselytisation, except for Islam, is strictly forbidden.

The discussion focuses on two minority groups within the nation: the Christians and the ethnic Dusuns who uphold traditional faiths.

An examination of the two groups reveals that the Christian community maintains mutual respect and understanding, fostering peaceful coexistence with the dominant religion, while the Dusuns’ experience highlights the mutual tolerance between the community and the state. In effect, the Dusuns are given considerable autonomy to manage their religious matters and engage in ethnic rituals without apparent interference from the state.

This Perspective also delves into the interconnectedness of faith practices and ethnic culture, which often results in certain ethnic ceremonies, like Adau Gayoh, being publicly celebrated in communal spaces.

By examining how religion and ethnicity intersect and how religious minorities negotiate their space to practise their religions in Muslim-majority Brunei, this Perspective unveils the agency of religious minorities in navigating state-society relations.

*Chang-Yau Hoon is Professor of Anthropology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD), and Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was formerly Director of Centre for Advanced Research, UBD. Asiyah Kumpoh is Senior Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), Universiti Brunei Darussalam and Director of Institute for Leadership, Innovation and Advancement, UBD. She was formerly Dean of FASS at UBD.

ISEAS Perspective 2024/49, 5 July 2024

Download pdf

[beardedmrbean]

HANOI, Vietnam (AP) — Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party and the country’s most powerful politician, has died following months of ill health, official media said Friday. He was 80.

“General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party Nguyen Phu Trong passed away at 13:38 on July 19, 2024, at the 108 Central Military Hospital due to old age and serious illness,” the Nhan Dan newspaper said.

Official media said a state funeral would be held.

Trong had dominated Vietnamese politics since 2011, when he was elected party chief. During his tenure, he worked to consolidate the Communist Party’s power in Vietnam’s single-party political system. In the decade before he took the top role in Vietnamese politics, the balance of power had shifted more toward the governmental wing led by then-Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.

Born in 1944 in Hanoi, Trong was a Marxist-Leninist ideologue who earned a degree in philosophy before becoming a member of the Communist Party at the age of 22. He viewed corruption as the single gravest threat in maintaining the party’s legitimacy.

“A country without discipline would be chaotic and unstable,” Trong said in 2016 after being reelected to the party’s helm. Officially, Vietnam has no top leader, but the Communist Party chief is traditionally seen as the most powerful.

He launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign known as the “blazing furnace” that singed both business and political elites. Since 2016, thousands of party officials have been disciplined. They included former presidents Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo Van Thuong and the former head of parliament, Vuong Dinh Hue. In all, eight members of the powerful Politburo were ousted on corruption allegations, compared to none between 1986 and 2016.

Trong studied in the Soviet Union from 1981 to 1983, and there was speculation that under his leadership, Vietnam would move closer to Russia and China. However, the Southeast Asian nation followed a pragmatic policy of “bamboo diplomacy,” a phrase he coined that referred to the plant’s flexibility, bending but not breaking in the shifting headwinds of geopolitics.

Vietnam maintained its traditional ties with its much larger neighbor, China, dispute differences over sovereignty in the South China Sea. But it also drew closer to the United States, elevating its ties with its former Vietnam War foe to its highest diplomatic status, a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Trong’s legacy is mixed, with the unintended consequence of the anti-graft campaign being an erosion of institutions within the Communist Party, said Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow in the Vietnam Studies Program at Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. The party institutions were the bedrock ensuring that a balance of power remained among its different factions, he said.

“Vietnam has become more and more like China, where institutions and norms doesn’t really matter as much as personal power,” Giang said.

Vietanamese President To Lam was appointed the party caretaker on July 18 while Trong received treatment for his ill health. As Vietnam’s top security official, Lam had led the anti-graft campaign until becoming president in May, when his predecessor resigned after being caught up in it.

The party’s Politburo asked Lam to “preside over the work of the Party Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat,” according to a statement from its central office which was the first official confirmation of Trong’s poor health.

Rumors about his health have swirled in Vietnamese politics since he was first hospitalized in 2019, and more recently when he appeared extremely frail while meeting visiting Russian President Vladmir Putin.

Trong’ death leaves behind a yawning political vacuum in Vietnam. Although Lam is widely viewed as the likely next party chief, Giang predicted “a very uncertain time” in Vietnamese politics because the norms and institutions governing the country are “very shaky.”

“Now it isn’t only about the rules or norms, but it is also about who holds the most power,” Giang said.

The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent its condolences to its Vietnamese counterpart and “deeply mourned” Trong’s death, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported Friday.

[zvaigzdelasas]

TheStar.my - Vietnam’s ruling party makes leaders accountable for alleged corruption occurring under their watch - 15 Jan 23

The fallout from Vietnam’s Covid-19 pandemic-related graft scandals came to a head on Jan 5, when its National Assembly voted to dismiss two deputy prime ministers and approve two replacements.

One of the deputy prime ministers let go was veteran diplomat and former foreign minister Pham Binh Minh, who was also a member of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s politburo – a position he was also forced to vacate[...]

The difference this time is the way in which the two deputy premiers were ousted. Neither was disciplined by the party before resigning. They are also unlikely to face criminal prosecution, say analysts, given that there has been no evidence so far directly linking them to the scandals. Rather, they were made to take responsibility for wrongdoing that took place under their leadership.

This marks an inflection point in party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s “blazing furnace” of an anti-corruption campaign.

Dr Le Hong Hiep, a senior fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, told The Straits Times: “Now the party is trying to create a so-called ‘culture of resignation’, so that when you are found to have made a mistake or be responsible for a scandal that happened under your watch, you are expected to resign. You don’t wait for the party to take action against you.

“This would create a culture of accountability and more flexibility within the party’s personnel mechanism.”

WaPo - How Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption Fight Keeps Expanding - 11 Jan 23

Vietnam’s Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong has likened his anti-graft campaign to a “blazing furnace,” one that’s caught hundreds of senior officials, business executives and others in its blast over the years. While the country’s position has improved by more than 30 spots over the past decade on a global corruption perception index, it was still at 87th place out of 180 ranked in 2021. Now as Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing economy seeks to bolster its appeal as a destination for foreign investment in the midst of mounting trade tensions between the US and China, the fight seems to be flaring again.

Trong, who won a rare third term in 2021, said in a televised speech that “each party cadre and member needs to shoulder the responsibility of being a role model. The higher the position and rank, the more responsibility one must take.” [...]

People are sitting in jail, and some have been sentenced to death. In the first six months of 2022, at least 295 party members were disciplined due to corruption and deliberate wrongdoings, according to a statement of an August meeting of the central anti-corruption committee. Civil judgment enforcement agencies had recovered more than 9 trillion dong ($383 million) in major cases in same period. (In 2021 the committee reported prosecuting 390 graft cases and recovering at least $400 million in assets.) But in Vietnam’s closely controlled, one-party state, motivation is difficult to assess. Human rights groups repeatedly accuse the government of tamping down dissent. Freedom House, a US-based advocacy group, ranks Vietnam as “not free,” with a 2021 score of only 19 points out of 100. Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption group, gave it a score of 39 out of 100 in 2021, from 31 in 2012 — the year then-premier Nguyen Tan Dung’s government was tainted by a series of scandals. Arrests picked up again after a new administration took power in 2016

😁😁😁

[saotome-michi]

Just a few years ago, talking publicly about the status or role of Thailand’s monarchy was taboo. But on Sunday night, a political party that had campaigned for reform of strict laws that shield the royal family from criticism came out on top in a general election, winning the most votes and seats, according to an unofficial count.

Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, said it was an “extremely significant” moment. “They have the popular mandate – 14 million people voted for this party. And, of course, the party will proclaim this as a sign that Thailand has some readiness for more extensive structural reforms, no matter the institution.”

[aitoolswhitehattoolbox]

Librarian/Snr Librarian

What the role is: The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute is a leading research centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic developmen… Apply Now

[sa7abnews]

Why Thailand’s Political Crisis Feels Familiar—and What’s Needed to Break the Cycle

New Post has been published on https://sa7ab.info/2024/08/16/why-thailands-political-crisis-feels-familiar-and-whats-needed-to-break-the-cycle/

Why Thailand’s Political Crisis Feels Familiar—and What’s Needed to Break the Cycle

History has a habit of repeating itself—but rarely as frequently as it does in Thailand.

On Wednesday, Srettha Thavisin of the populist Pheu Thai party became the fifth Prime Minister in the last 20 years to be ousted by Thailand’s conservative elites. In a 5-4 vote, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered Srettha removed from office after a group of senators accused him of an ethical violation, citing his cabinet appointment of a lawmaker who had previously been jailed for bribery.

While his political fate hung in the balance on Wednesday, Srettha himself had appeared quite unbothered, touring a market in Bangkok and getting his secretary-general to attend court on his behalf. After the verdict, a somber Srettha told reporters at the Government House that he accepted the decision. “I reiterate that for the almost one year I have been in this role, I have tried with good intentions to lead the country with honesty,” he said.

“This is not the first time that the Pheu Thai Party has encountered obstacles,” the party said on social media. “Every time we fall, we fall forward. And rise up again with confidence.”

But rather than genuine ethical concerns, critics say, politics was behind the verdict: Like his predecessors who have been toppled by the army or judiciary, Srettha was widely seen as a proxy for Pheu Thai founder Thaksin Shinawatra, whose own premiership was cut short by a military coup in 2006.

Srettha’s dismissal also comes just days after the opposition Move Forward Party was dissolved in another Constitutional Court ruling over its supposedly seditious campaign to amend the country’s royal defamation law. It’s the latest setback to the popular progressive party that emerged as the biggest vote-getter in last year’s general election but was ultimately blocked from forming the government by a hastily-made coalition between Pheu Thai and the military- and monarchy-aligned conservative establishment.

The developments over the past week have only confirmed the cyclical nature of Thailand’s ongoing political crisis. But experts say that, though forces like the unelected and unchecked Constitutional Court and a conservative-dominated Thai Senate remain viewed as defenders of the old guard, the movement for democracy in the country, which is increasingly popular at home and abroad, will continue to gain momentum.

“Thailand’s younger population—and the younger population that will come after them—will support more progressive, more democratic ideals,” Mark S. Cogan, associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Japan’s Kansai Gaidai University, tells TIME. “Those ‘dinosaurs’ will die out eventually,” he says, referencing a pejorative nickname given to Thailand’s conservative elites. But until then, he adds, “like a wounded animal,” those whose power is under threat will “use every tool at their disposal in order to survive.”

Srettha’s dismissal and Move Forward’s dissolution are “even more extreme than what has happened over the last two decades,” Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, tells TIME. “I think it’s been made plain that [the Constitutional Court’s] legitimacy should be questioned.”

But while both moves follow a clear playbook—Move Forward’s predecessor party Future Forward was similarly dissolved by a unanimous verdict in 2020—Srettha’s unexpected removal by a split judicial vote has proved a head-scratcher for even the keenest observers of Thai politics.

Srettha was elevated to the premiership last August as part of a post-election devil’s bargain between Pheu Thai and their former conservative rivals, united in the goal to keep Move Forward from power. Some see Wednesday’s verdict as a sign that their alliance is crumbling; others suspect that Srettha was only intended as a placeholder to fend off Move Forward while Pheu Thai and the conservatives continued the politicking over their preferred leader.

Srettha quickly carved out a reputation as a “salesman” for Thailand, pitching economic projects abroad while touting populist policies at home. But while the business-oriented leader had “banked so hard on soft power,” says Cogan, his short-lived efforts have now been diluted by the recent political upheavals that have “damaged” Thailand’s international image. Last week, Move Forward’s dissolution was met with statements of concern from Amnesty International, the United Nations, the European Union and the U.S. Department of State.

As Thaksin’s camp and the conservatives negotiate over the imminent selection of a new Prime Minister, the progressive movement is intent on breaking Thailand’s cycle of political crisis.

While Move Forward’s former leader Pita Limjaroenrat is barred from politics, the dissolved party’s 143 lawmakers have regrouped under the new name the People’s Party. The reincarnation of Move Forward announced on Wednesday that it opposed the verdict to remove Srettha from office, decrying the powers of the Constitutional Court and saying that it “believes that today’s events will make all sectors of society more aware of the urgent need to draft a new constitution.”

And while the next government—whether led by Pheu Thai’s Chaikasem Nitisiri, Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra, conservative power broker Anutin Charnvirakul, or some other contender—is unlikely to help the People’s Party enact its liberal reform agenda, the progressive movement has its sights on a landslide general election victory in 2027, when it’s hoping to finally form a “government of change.”

“The establishment has been attempting to kill democracy, but that hasn��t been successful … because now you can see Move Forward is back in business,” Titipol Phakdeewanich, a political scientist at Ubon Ratchathani University, tells TIME. “It’s still possible for progressive parties to make a move, because they cannot entirely shut down progressive parties. At least they cannot stop elections anyway.”

But Cogan warns that the People’s Party cannot rest on its popularity alone. “There has to be some other development than just at the ballot box,” he says.

“So you can have all the success at the ballot box. But if you’re prevented from taking power, what does it matter? That’s not democracy,” says Cogan. “They must start cracking at the edges of the pillars that hold up those conservative elites.”

[warningsine]

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnam-president-lam-takes-top-job-communist-party-chief-2024-08-03/

HANOI, Aug 3 (Reuters) - Vietnamese President To Lam was named on Saturday to the nation's top position, general secretary of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam, replacing Nguyen Phu Trong, who died two weeks ago.

Lam, 67, had temporarily taken on the party chief's duties on July 18, a day before Trong's death, as his health deteriorated.

Party delegates unanimously supported Lam's nomination, officials told a press conference.

Addressing the delegates, he vowed to inherit and promote Trong's legacy, make no changes to the Southeast Asian nation's foreign policy, focus on achieving its socioeconomic development goals and continue a campaign against graft.

"In the coming time, the work on anti-corruption will be continued fiercely," Lam told the press conference. "Personally I feel fortunate that I have much experience in handling anti-graft campaign during the time I worked at the police ministry."

Vietnam, a major destination for manufacturing investment, has long been favoured by multinational corporations for its political stability, but experienced major turbulence in recent months that officials said was fuelled by the anti-graft effort.

The nation does not formally have a paramount leader, but the head of the party has a more prominent role than others, after Trong beefed up its power during his 13-year tenure.

Lam, a career security officer, had been seen as long aiming to become party chief, with experts calling the presidency a stepping stone for the top job.

"It is a sign of a temporary halt of internal fighting within the party," Nguyen Khac Giang, a Vietnam expert at Singapore think tank the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

"Although Lam vowed to push forward the anti-corruption campaign, the campaign may slow down a little as he may prioritize stabilising the party system before the party congress in 2026."

It was not immediately clear whether Lam would retain both top jobs until the legislative session ends in 2026, or whether a new president would be chosen.

Lam was elected president in May after leading the sweeping campaign of high-profile investigations against corruption as police minister. He replaced Vo Van Thuong, who had been in the job about a year when he quit amid accusations of unspecified wrongdoing.

Officials and diplomats said the party had discussed possibly naming a new president so that Lam could focus on the party chief job. Discussions may still be under way, one diplomat said on Saturday.

If Lam retains both jobs, he may boost his powers and possibly adopt a more autocratic leadership style, officials have said, similar to that of Xi Jinping, who is China's party chief and state president.

That would be a change for Vietnam, which, unlike its far larger neighbour, has engaged in more collective decision-making, with leaders subject to multiple checks.

It would not, however, be unprecedented. Trong held both top jobs for nearly three years until April 2021 after the death of a former president.

"In case the plenum ends without naming any new state president to replace Lam, it is a signal of a new chapter for Vietnam," Giang said. "This practice can then become a norm, not just until 2026, but even after that."

Xi congratulated Lam on his new role, the official Xinhua news agency said.

[aseaninstituteonline]

ASEAN’s Strategy for Enhancing Trade in Services: Opportunities and Challenges

by ASEAN Institute

ASEAN’s rapidly growing economy has positioned the region as a key player in global trade. This development is not only attributed to the robust growth in merchandise trade but also to the significant rise in trade in services. The importance of services trade has become increasingly evident, necessitating the development of a cohesive strategy for enhancing trade in services within the region. The present article discusses the opportunities and challenges faced by ASEAN in formulating and implementing a comprehensive strategy to bolster its trade in services.

The ASEAN region has made substantial progress in liberalizing its services sectors through the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 (Chanda, 2019). These agreements aim to facilitate the free flow of services and skilled labor, promote regional integration, and improve the competitiveness of the ASEAN services sector. However, despite these efforts, the level of services trade liberalization in the region remains uneven, and several challenges persist (Hoekman & Shepherd, 2017).

A crucial opportunity for ASEAN in enhancing trade in services lies in the potential of digital technologies. Digital services such as e-commerce, fintech, and telecommunication services are rapidly transforming the economic landscape in the region, opening new avenues for trade and investment (Urata & Narjoko, 2020). By embracing the digital revolution, ASEAN can effectively promote the development of cross-border digital services and facilitate the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the services sector.

However, to fully capitalize on these opportunities, ASEAN must overcome several challenges. One of the main challenges lies in the disparate levels of digital infrastructure and readiness among ASEAN member states (Mishra, 2020). Bridging this digital divide is essential to ensure that all countries can benefit from the growth of digital services trade. Additionally, regulatory barriers such as restrictions on data flows and foreign equity participation, and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights may hinder the growth of services trade in the region (Hufbauer & Lu, 2018).

Moreover, enhancing the quality of human capital is critical to the development of the services sector in ASEAN. Developing a skilled workforce that can meet the demands of an increasingly knowledge-intensive services sector is a significant challenge that needs to be addressed through regional collaboration in education and training (Sugiyarto & Agunias, 2014).

In conclusion, ASEAN has a unique opportunity to harness the potential of trade in services for its continued growth and development. By addressing the challenges in digital infrastructure, regulatory environment, and human capital development, ASEAN can successfully implement a comprehensive strategy to enhance its trade in services and ensure a prosperous future for the region.

References:

Chanda, R. (2019). Services Trade Liberalization in ASEAN. In S. Urata, M. Ando, & F. Kimura (Eds.), Integrating the ASEAN Economic Community: Progress and Challenges (pp. 131–158). Springer.

Hoekman, B., & Shepherd, B. (2017). Services Productivity, Trade Policy, and Manufacturing Exports. The World Economy, 40(3), 499–516.

Hufbauer, G. C., & Lu, Z. (2018). Digital Trade Restrictions in Asia. In P. Drysdale & S. Urata (Eds.), Plugging into Production Networks: Global Commerce, Regional Integration, and the Future of Asian Business (pp. 89–104). ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Mishra, N. (2020). Digital Divide and Economic Integration in ASEAN. In P. Athukorala (Ed.), The Asian Century: Economic Transformation, Integration, and Trade in Asia (pp. 327–348). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Sugiyarto, G., & Agunias, D. R. (2014). A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities, and Challenges in 2015 and Beyond. IOM Migration Research Series, (52), 1–46.

Read the entire article and more at the ASEAN Institute website.

Check out the ASEAN Institute on Youtube!

[southeastasianarchaeology]

Internship Career Opportunities - ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute has internship positions open, including one at the Archaeology Unit. Deadline for applications in 2 October 2023.

The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute has internship positions open, including one at the Archaeology Unit. Deadline for applications in 2 October 2023. The Archaeology Unit (AU) was formed in 2010 and inaugurated by H.E. President S R Nathan in August 2011. AU conducts excavations in Singapore, concentrating on the material culture of the period from 1300 to 1600, but also maintains an interest in…

[1apiwe]

Vietnam president resigns amid major anti-graft purge

At least 100 officials and businesspeople have been arrested in connection with a scandal involving the distribution of Covid-19 testing kits.

ietnam President Nguyen Xuan Phuc has resigned, state media said Tuesday, after days of rumours he was about to be sacked as part of a major anti-corruption drive that has seen several ministers fired.

Phuc has “submitted his resignation from his assigned positions, quit his job, and retired”, state news agency VNA said.

Phuc’s sudden departure is a highly unusual move in communist Vietnam, where political changes are normally carefully orchestrated, with an emphasis on cautious stability.

State media said the communist party had ruled he was responsible for wrongdoing by senior ministers under him during his 2016-2021 stint as prime minister, before he became president.

Vietnam cleans up

Two deputy prime ministers were sacked this month in an anti-corruption purge that has led to the arrest of dozens of officials, with many of the graft allegations relating to deals done as part of Vietnam’s Covid pandemic response.

Phuc “took political responsibility as leader when several officials, including two deputy prime ministers and three ministers committed violations and shortcomings, causing very serious consequences”, VNA said, quoting the party central committee’s official statement.

READ MORE 15 Thai officials charged after raid suspects walk free

ALSO READ: Slovakia may ‘freeze’ ties with Vietnam until kidnapping claims are confirmed

Earlier this month, the country’s rubber stamp National Assembly removed Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam from their positions as deputy prime ministers. 

Minh was a minister of foreign affairs while Dam was in charge of the country’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. 

At least 100 officials and businesspeople, including Dam’s assistant, have been arrested in connection with a scandal involving the distribution of Covid-19 testing kits.

Thirty-seven people — many of them senior diplomats and police — have also been arrested in an investigation over the repatriation of Vietnamese during the pandemic.

– Corruption, infighting –

After closing its borders to slow the spread of the coronavirus, Vietnam organised nearly 800 charter flights to bring citizens home from 60 countries and territories.

But travellers faced complicated procedures while paying exorbitant airfares and quarantine fees to get back to Vietnam.

Phuc, 68, was elevated to the largely ceremonial role of president in April 2021 after winning plaudits for the country’s broadly successful handling of the pandemic.

ALSO READ: Vietnam jails two activists for ‘spreading propaganda’ on Facebook

Authoritarian Vietnam is run by the Communist Party and officially led by the party general secretary, president, and prime minister, with key decisions made by the politburo, which now numbers 16.

Le Hong Hiep, a fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said Phuc’s resignation may also be linked to political infighting. 

“It’s mainly related to corruption investigations but we cannot rule out the possibility that his political rivals also wanted to remove him from his position for political reasons,” he told AFP.  

Communist Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong, the architect of what is Vietnam’s largest-ever anti-corruption drive, is due to step down in 2026. 

“Some politicians will try to get the (top) prize and because of the competition from their rivals — in this case Mr Phuc is one of them — they may want to remove him to clear the way for the other candidate to get the top job.”

[rhk111sblog]

Here is a nice, long Article on the “Foreign Affairs” Website talking about how the United States (US) is losing Ground to China in most Countries in South East Asia (SEA) in Terms of Influence. I suggest everybody read it, you can find the Link below. In the meantime, here are some selected Excerpts from the Article itself:

“In the Poll this Year, the Majority of Respondents picked China over the United States when asked whom ASEAN should align with if forced to choose between the two. This was the first time Respondents picked China since the Survey began posing this question in 2020.”

“In its 2020 Survey—the first Year that the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute asked Respondents “If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the Strategic Rivals, which should it choose?”—50.2 percent chose the United States, compared with 49.8 percent who chose China, when responses are adjusted (as they have been since the 2022 poll) to ensure that the responses of each Country are represented by equal proportion. In 2023, 61 percent of Respondents chose the United States compared with 39 percent who chose China, although the United States fared below the overall average in Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand. In the 2024 Survey, however, China edged past the United States as the Region’s choice of alignment Partner: 50.5 percent of Respondents chose China, and 49.5 percent chose the United States.”

“Breaking down this Year’s result by Country shows that since the 2023 poll, the United States has lost the most ground to China among Respondents in Laos (a 30 percentage point decline), Malaysia (a 20 percentage point decline), Indonesia (a 20 percentage point decline), Cambodia (an 18 percentage point decline), and Brunei (a 15 percentage point decline). The United States has also lost ground in Myanmar and Thailand (10 and 9 percentage point declines, respectively).”

“Western Media Outlets often carry Reports about the Debt Traps associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But BRI Projects are generally welcomed in Southeast Asia for the growth and development potential they offer the recipient Country. One high-ranking Diplomat from the Region pronounced it a Model for how to win “Hearts and Minds.” In January, I traveled to Laos, where the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat was taking place in Luang Prabang, the Country’s Cultural and Spiritual Center. There were no Signs of competition for Influence between China and the United States; Chinese Influence alone pervaded People’s daily Lives. Residents of Luang Prabang spoke positively of the boost to local Businesses since April 2023, when a BRI-affiliated Railway running through the City and connecting Laos to China opened fully.”

Here is the Link to the Article on the “Foreign Affairs” Website: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-losing-southeast-asia

SOURCE: America Is Losing Southeast Asia {Archived Link}

[southeastasianists]

Jo is the holder of a newly minted degree in English literature from one of the top universities in Laos. But the 22-year-old, who graduated only weeks ago, says he already feels "hopeless".

Confronted with a barren job market, the Vientiane resident holds no hope of finding work at home, and instead aims to become a cleaner or a fruit picker in Australia. His aspirations are low, but they reflect a hushed disenchantment spreading among his peers; the result of a severe and sustained economic downturn that has ravaged Laos for the past two years.

"Every person in this generation doesn't believe in the government. They want to leave Laos, they don't believe anything the government says," he tells the BBC. "Most of my friends have the same thoughts, but we only talk about it privately. If you say bad things about them in public, I don't know what will happen."

The economic crisis has been caused by a rash programme of government borrowing used to finance Chinese-backed infrastructure projects which has begun to unravel. The crisis shows little sign of easing, with public debt spiralling to unsustainable levels, resulting in government budget cuts, sky-high inflation and record-breaking currency depreciation, leaving many living on the brink in one of South East Asia's poorest countries.

Faced with a dire economic situation, and with the April shooting of activist Anousa "Jack" Luangsuphom underscoring the brutal lengths authorities in the one-party state will go to silence calls for reform, a generation of young Laotians increasingly see their future abroad.

"[Young people] aren't even thinking about change, it's a feeling of how am I going to get out of this country - I'm stuck here, there's no future for me," said Emilie Pradichit, a Lao-French international human rights lawyer and the founder of human rights group Manushya Foundation.

"If you see your country becoming a colony of China, you see a government that is totally corrupt, and you cannot speak up because if you do you might be killed - would you want to stay?"

The 'debt trap'

A sparsely populated, landlocked country of 7.5 million people, Laos is one of the region's poorest and least developed nations. In a bid to transform the largely agrarian society, the past decade has seen the government take on major infrastructure projects, mostly financed by historic ally and neighbour China - itself on a lending spree since 2013 as part of its global infrastructure investment programme, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI).

Laos has built dozens of foreign-financed dams to transform itself into the "battery of South East Asia" as a major exporter of electricity to the region. But oversupply has turned many dams unproductive, and the state electricity company sits in $5bn (£4.1bn) debt. Lacking funds, Laos handed a majority Chinese-owned company a 25-year concession to manage large parts of its power grid in 2021, including control over exports.

Also among the debt-laden megaprojects is the Lao-China railway, connecting Vientiane to southern China. It opened in December 2021 at a cost of $5.9bn (£4.85bn), but saddled the Lao government with $1.9bn in debt. Beijing says the railway has created an "economic corridor", but the numbers just don't add up for some economists, not least because Chinese state-owned companies hold a 70% stake.

"I'm sure people are happy to travel very quickly across Laos, but it's not justified at the cost that was agreed to," economist Jayant Menon, a senior fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, says of the railway.

All of this has added to Laos' ballooning debt, which is now ninth highest globally as a share of its GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund. Around half of that is owed to China, and Laos is now having to borrow more from lenders in the country just to stay afloat.

"Laos is so heavily indebted to China that their negotiating position is compromised," he said. "It's having to borrow just to service the debt. That's the definition of a debt trap."

The Lao government could not be reached for comment. But Mr Menon emphasised that Laos has repeatedly rejected other international lenders in favour of Beijing, perhaps because of a belief within the government that China "will not let another socialist country fail". He added that Beijing was also cautious about letting another BRI country default on its debt after Sri Lanka.

The only thing currently preventing that outcome are repeated Chinese debt deferment agreements - the conditions of which remain highly opaque. This has raised concerns over Beijing's growing sway over Laos. When asked if Laos is at risk of becoming a vassal state, Mr Menon said "that ship has sailed".

He said that the "macro-instability" caused by "massive debt accumulation" has also caused the decline of the Lao currency, the kip, which continues to depreciate to record lows against the US dollar. This has led to a decades-high rise in prices, and nowhere is this being felt more acutely than among ordinary Laotians.

'If I don't fight, I'll die'

"'I have never experienced anything like this year," says Phonxay, a frail looking woman in her 60s, selling household staples at a food market in Vientiane. She said her customers are buying less because "prices go up day to day", adding that August was the most expensive month yet. Her family has had to adapt to survive.

"My family needs to eat more cheaply than ever before. We eat half of what we used to eat," Phonxay says. "But I'll fight until the end. If I don't, I'll die."

But it's young Lao, their futures mortgaged off for the benefit of infrastructure projects offering them few tangible opportunities, that will bear the brunt of the economic crisis for years to come.

"Lao is very good to travel, but not good to live in," says Sen, a 19-year-old working as a receptionist in a hotel in Luang Prabang in northern Laos.

The city is bustling once again, with its Unesco World Heritage Old Quarter of pristine French colonial-era buildings filled with tourists. But Sen says times remain tough: "For normal people like me it's very hard. It's just better than living as a homeless person in India, and maybe just better than North Korea. I'm serious, we're just trying to survive."

He earns just $125 per month at his hotel job, but he doesn't see any point in going to university or applying for government jobs as he'd have to "pay lots of money" to corrupt officials to get anywhere as he has no family connections.

"At the moment, almost every Lao student like myself doesn't want to go to university," he says. "They study Japanese or Korean and then apply to work in factories or farming in those countries."

It's this "sense of discouragement among Lao youth… that needs urgent attention," says Catherine Phuong, the deputy resident representative at the UN Development Programme in Laos. She pointed to the "staggering" NEET (not in education, employment or training) rate of 38.7% among 18-to-24-year olds - by far the highest in South East Asia.

"We're especially concerned in Laos that with the debt situation we are seeing reduced investment in the social sector, including health and education," she told the BBC. "I'm sure you can imagine the impact that will have on this generation, not just in the coming years, but in the next 10 to 20 years."

But with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which has ruled the country since 1975, intolerant of dissenting voices, young people have had to turn to social media to air their grievances.

It was in March 2022, as inflation and the cost of living began rising, that Anousa "Jack" Luangsuphom created Kub Kluen Duay Keyboard or "The Power of the Keyboard", one of a growing number of social commentary Facebook pages critical of authorities.

The 25-year-old was drawing tens of thousands of followers when he was attacked at a cafe in Vientiane on April 29. CCTV footage shows a masked man firing a bullet into Jack's face and chest. A police statement days later blamed a business dispute or lover's quarrel. Jack survived the attack, but for his followers, the culprit was obvious.

"I feel really bad that the government would shoot him, that they would try to control us like that," says Jo, the university student in Vientiane, who follows Jack's Facebook page. "Jack is the voice of Lao people, he said things that normal people are afraid to say."

But these calls for reform will only be ignored or suppressed, and few know this better than Shui-Meng Ng - the wife of disappeared Lao civil society advocate Sombath Somphone.

Sombath has not been seen since being detained by police in Vientiane in December 2012, a time when his influence was growing and there was hope of reform.

Speaking to the BBC from her craft shop in downtown Vientiane, the last place she saw her husband the day he was abducted, Shui-Meng said voices like Jack's and Sombath's are squashed because they grow "too big a following" at times when the "Lao political elite are facing difficulties".

"Every time something like [Jack's shooting] happens, you see this," she said, zipping her lips. "People go silent."

[indizombie]

A study released last month by the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) found anti-vaccine messaging was often combined with anti-Indonesian government and anti-Chinese sentiments. The study, which focused on TikTok users in the country, found that these messages were "typically couched in religious discourse and spread by religious micro-influencers". Yatun Sastramidjaja, a visiting fellow at the institute and an author of study, said it was a "worrying trend". "First, because it indicates the government's chronic failure to gain the public's trust," she said. "There is [also] a long-established general distrust in the government's motives, which is seen to prioritise the interests of elites rather than those of the general population. "Second, in a climate of distrust, confusion and growing fears, religious micro-influencers can offer their followers a sense of refuge by nurturing faith in the protective power of religion and the bigger plan of the Almighty." Dr Sastramidjaja said some parts of the community were opposed to "mainstream reality". "The echo chamber effect of social media further strengthens the separation of this alternative religious reality," she said.

Hellena Souisa and Erwin Renaldi, ‘Indonesian epidemiologist says country has reached 'herd stupidity' in COVID second wave’, ABC