#Hungarian Soviet Republic

[omfguslay]

Béla Kun circa 1903

[revolutionary-marxism]

The Counter-revolutionaries are running and propagandizing against us everywhere, beat them! Beat them to death where you find them! If the counter-revolution succeeds even for an hour, they won't spare a single proletarian. Before they can drown our revolution in blood, you must drown them in their own blood!

— Tibor Szamuely (People's Commissar), Vörös Újság (RED NEWS), 11 February 1919.

Tibor Szamuely, directly to Lenin's left, meeting with Vladimir Lenin in Moscow before being sent to Germany to participate in the Spartacist uprising and later the Hungarian Revolution of 1919 becoming the leader of the Lenin Boys, a paramilitary group that served as the armed wing of the Party of Communists in Hungary during their short lived rule as the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The emblem of the Party of Communists in Hungary

[workersolidarity]

Watch "History of the Hungarian People's Republic PLAYLIST" on YouTube

Fantastic work by our comrade The Finnish Bolshevik. It is a series on the History of Socialist Hungary.

If you'd prefer reading the series, you can find it here:

Western Historians would have you believe an "Imperialist" Soviet Russia just went around at the end of WWII invading Eastern and Central Europe and setting up Soviet "authoritarian dictatorships" under Russian control.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

I will try to put together each part into seperate posts throughout the day or over the next few days, but I can't be sure I'll find the time to do that with all 10 or 11 parts.

Each part is not that long, roughly 30-40 minutes, and makes for easy viewing in chunks.

In the videos, The Finnish Bolshevik deep dives into the history of the Hungarian State, how Western Imperialist Powers installed a Fascist Dictatorship, the impact of World Wars 1 and 2 and their aftermath, Hungary's Socialist Revolution, and Hungary's transformation into a Socialist State becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union and much more.

[mapsontheweb]

Hungary in 1867, 1941, and 2024.

From 1867 to today, Hungary's territory has undergone significant changes due to wars, treaties, and political shifts. In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, granting Hungary considerable autonomy within the empire. 

After World War I, the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 drastically reduced Hungary's territory by about 72% and its population by 64%, ceding regions to Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia), and Austria. In the interwar period, Hungary regained some territories through agreements with Nazi Germany: the First Vienna Award (1938) returned southern Slovakia and southern Carpathian Ruthenia, and the Second Vienna Award (1940) returned northern Transylvania from Romania. 

During World War II, Hungary occupied parts of Yugoslavia in 1941. However, post-war treaties, particularly the Treaty of Paris in 1947, reinstated the Trianon boundaries, nullifying the wartime gains. 

Throughout the Cold War era (1949-1989), Hungary was a socialist republic under Soviet influence, with its borders remaining consistent with those established in 1947. Following the fall of communism in 1989, Hungary transitioned to a democratic republic. Since 1991, Hungary has been a stable democratic state and a member of the European Union since 2004, with its current borders unchanged since 1947. Today, Hungary's borders are stable and internationally recognized.

by theflagmapguy_2.0

[scavengedluxury]

Posters of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Budapest, 1919, From the Budapest Municipal Photography Company archive.

[mariacallous]

Targeted outreach to ethnic groups—Latino voters, for example—has long been a staple of U.S. presidential campaigns. But it’s been decades since Americans of Central and Eastern European descent figured much in a candidate’s electoral calculus.

That has changed in this campaign, as became evident during the presidential debate in Philadelphia on Sept. 10, when Democratic candidate and Vice President Kamala Harris appealed directly to the “800,000 Polish Americans right here in Pennsylvania.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, she told her opponent, is “a dictator who would eat you for lunch.” Arguing that Poland would be the Kremlin’s next target if Russia wins in Ukraine, Harris said that if Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump were president, “Putin would be sitting in Kyiv right now.”

Key battleground states that will likely decide the outcome of the November election—including Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—have significant populations of Polish, Ukrainian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, and Baltic Americans. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, these groups were an important electoral factor, often backing Republican candidates who promised to be tough on Moscow, in whose empire their home countries lay. Politicians of either party ignored these voters at their peril, especially the millions of Polish Americans that made up the largest of the Eastern European voter blocs.

But since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet control over their homelands, these communities have been largely outside the radar of political strategists.

Today, the fate of Central and Eastern Europe is once again at issue amid Russia’s brutal all-out war against Ukraine. Leaders in Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states speak openly about the danger of Russian aggression against their own countries if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine. And so, Americans connected with these countries are suddenly being wooed again.

Take Pennsylvania, one of the most important swing states, with 19 electoral votes and a margin of victory of only 80,550 votes in the 2020 presidential election. Even a small shift among the state’s roughly 800,000 Polish Americans and more than 100,000 Ukrainian Americans could have a decisive effect.

And while few Americans are single-issue voters, among foreign-born and first-generation Eastern European voters, anxiety over the physical safety of their homelands may prove to be a decisive factor in their electoral choices. But even among voters with a less direct connection to the lands of their ancestors, distrust of Russia runs deep. Eastern European communities in the United States have also mobilized to raise millions of dollars to support Ukraine’s war effort and provide humanitarian assistance.

The Harris campaign began its outreach to Eastern European voters during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, when a range of national security speakers addressed the Russian threat in Ukraine and beyond. This confluence of circumstances has given Harris the opportunity to strike a tone reminiscent of former President Ronald Reagan and other Cold War-era leaders in her discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war: “As president, I will stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies,” she said during her convention speech.

During the September presidential debate, Trump twice refused to give a clear answer regarding whether he wants Ukraine to win its war with Russia. Harris, by contrast, made it clear that she sided with Ukraine and pushed back against Trump’s claim that he would end the war. “The reason that … Trump says that this war would be over within 24 hours is because he would just give [Ukraine] up, and that’s not who we are as Americans,” she asserted.

Ulana Mazurkevich, a Ukrainian American living in Pennsylvania and the co-chair of a group called United Ethnic Women for Harris-Walz, believes that Eastern European voters could be significant. “We are making the case to conservative ethnic voters that Trump’s unwillingness to firmly support Ukraine represents a grave threat to their countries of origin,” she told Foreign Policy. “We feel our message can move a few thousand Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian voters in Pennsylvania, and this can prove decisive.”

Such a focused stance on the security of Eastern Europe by a Democratic Party candidate has a precedent. In 1992, then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton and his campaign similarly understood the electoral significance of events in Eastern and Central Europe to voters from those regions. The Cold War had just ended, and these diaspora groups would soon turn to mainly domestic concerns. But Clinton also knew that these constituencies wanted their ancestral homelands to transform into prosperous, stable, and secure democracies. For his campaign, I co-authored—with the late Penn Kemble and the support of Richard Schifter—a background paper in which we looked at how Clinton might flip traditionally Republican-leaning Eastern European voters.

During that campaign, we successfully secured the inclusion of a democracy assistance program for East-Central Europe—as well as support for newly independent Ukraine and the Baltic states—in Clinton’s agenda. We also argued that these constituencies would welcome a discussion of early NATO membership for the Central European states, an idea that found sympathy among key Clinton advisors such as Sandy Berger, Anthony Lake, and Nancy Soderberg.

While still campaigning, Clinton soon made large-scale financial and technical aid to Poland, Hungary, and what was then still Czechoslovakia a key focus of his foreign policy message. And he criticized the Bush administration for being too slow in grasping the opportunity to stabilize democracy in Central Europe. In speeches at Georgetown University and in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Clinton addressed the concerns of Central European, Baltic, and Ukrainian Americans; he also dispatched his foreign policy advisors and surrogates from the U.S. Congress to meet with leaders and voters from these communities. Not surprisingly, Clinton carried Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—three of which Bush had won during the previous election..

Today, the Harris campaign’s focus on Ukraine and Eastern Europe has echoes of 1992. Two Democratic activists—former U.S. Rep. Tom Malinowski (who was born in Poland) and Maryland State Sen. James Rosapepe (with whom I worked during the 1992 Clinton presidential campaign)—have established a political action committee named America’s Future Majority Fund. The group runs ads focusing on Russia’s aggression, wrapping its pro-Harris message in Cold War-era realism and mentioning both Reagan and former President John F. Kennedy in an effort to reach centrist and conservative voters.

More recently, Harris campaign ads targeted at Pennsylvania have evoked Polish heroes and focused on the long history of Russian imperialism. The campaign is also supporting a bus tour scheduled for mid-October that will visit Polish and Eastern European communities in the Pennsylvanian towns of Doylestown and Wilkes-Barre. The latter is in Luzerne County, which is the only county in the United States with a plurality of Polish Americans.

Trump has tried to make his case to Eastern European voters as well, claiming that the war would “never have happened” under his watch. (Never mind that Russia and Ukraine were fighting each other in eastern Ukraine during the entire Trump presidency.) He also claims that he will quickly end the war if he wins in November. At the same time, Trump has spoken out strongly against further aid to Ukraine, scorned Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for allegedly making off with billions in U.S. taxpayer dollars, and accused him of refusing to negotiate peace with Putin.

This demagogy—coupled with his running mate J.D. Vance’s past remarks that “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine”—are giving some Eastern European voters pause. Whereas Harris and her running mate, Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, have embraced a strong pro-NATO posture, Trump has repeatedly argued against continued support for Ukraine and said he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to delinquent European allies.

Unlike other, riskier targeted strategies that could alienate swing voters in the political center—a hypothetical move to woo Arab Americans with a more anti-Israel stance, for example—Ukraine has created a clear opening for Harris. Trump’s attacks on Zelensky and calls to stop aiding Ukraine go against the grain of widespread support for Ukraine across both parties’ supporters.

And Trump advisors’ worries that his stance on Russia and Ukraine is unpopular may well have been the reason that Trump—who had initially refused to meet with Zelensky—relented just days after publicly mocking him. In a brief and awkward press conference, Trump refrained from criticizing Zelensky but emphasized his “good relationship” with Putin.

I was in Poland in late September and met with several Polish leaders, all of whom expressed worry about Trump’s position on Ukraine and relationship to Putin. Serious voices in Poland are discussing the high likelihood of having to fight a war against Russia. Without question, this sense of urgency is widely shared among recent Polish and Ukrainian immigrants. At a meeting of Eastern European community leaders in New York City on Sept. 21, the vice president of the Polish American Congress, Bozena Kaminska, reflected this worry. “For years, Poland was a secure democracy,” she said. “Since the war in Ukraine, our security is at risk.”

The votes of Polish, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovak, and Baltic Americans have returned to the forefront of electoral strategies in a handful of swing states. With the stakes so high and the races so close, small shifts among these culturally conservative constituencies could well provide the crucial margin of victory on Nov. 5. Given their track record on Russia and Ukraine, there is little that Trump and Vance can do to turn the tide in their favor; they will have to hope that Eastern Europeans’ voting decisions will be driven by other concerns.

Harris, in contrast, is betting on a combination of targeted outreach and continued missteps by her opponents on Russian aggression. Once again, a crucial immigrant community could help bring about a presidential victory.

[razistoricharka]

The Hungarian soviet republic was horrendously mismanaged but it did give us one of the hardest quotes and names for a paramilitary ever

Tibor Szamuely wrote in the pages of the Vörös Újság (Red News): "Everywhere counter-revolutionaries run about and swagger; beat them down! Beat their heads where you find them! If counter-revolutionaries were to gain the upper hand for even a single hour, there will be no mercy on any proletarian. Before they stifle the revolution, suffocate them in their own blood!" With their support, József Cserny organized a group of some 200 individuals known as "Lenin Boys" (Lenin-fiúk), whose intention was to uncover "counter-revolutionary" activities in the Hungarian countryside. Similar groups operated within Budapest.

[weirdestbooks]

Secrecy and Deception Chapter 22

Rebellions and Crises (Wattpad | Ao3)

Table of Contents | Prev | Next

Event: Arms Agreement Between the USSR and Afghanistan

Location: Kabul, Kingdom of Afghanistan

Date: September 1, 1956

Afghanistan was excited about the new arms agreement. He knew that it would be important, with the ongoing issue of Pashtunistan. The United States was allied with Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s army had not been upgraded since the Second World War.

Having this arms agreement and, in turn, good relations with the USSR was very important to him. Afghanistan did not want to be overrun by Pakistan and the United States, and these days, it felt as if the USSR was the only person who could stand up to the USSR and not face the risk of the United States messing with things.

This alliance would be important. 

Afghanistan wished he could thank USSR in person, but the larger country was busy, and his Russian wasn’t the best.

But now he had an ally against the United States and a chance to modernize his army.

Afghanistan felt as if a huge weight had been taken off his back. 

In a way, there was.

• ───────────────── •

Event: Hungarian Revolution 

Location: Tököl, near Budapest, Hungarian People's Republic 

Date: 10 pm, November 3, 1956

Hungary had never been more excited in his life. Things were finally turning around. He had declared himself neutral and withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact Organization that the USSR had forced him into. He had contacted the UN and asked for help in protecting his new neutrality, and now the Soviet troops would be leaving his country.

Even with the rumors of a Soviet invasion and the fears that he might not shake off the hand of the man whose thumb he had been under for years now, Hungary couldn’t help but be strangely giddy with excitement.

He was going to have his mind fully restored to him, no longer feeling the weight of the USSR press down on it, the exhaustion and fear that came from it. 

It was what he and his friends had fought for in the past week, what Hungary had yearned for so long.

He couldn’t believe it was so close. He had never felt more alive than he did now. When he heard about the Hungarian delegation that was invited to the Soviet Military Command in Tököl, he begged to be a part of the delegation, to be there and negotiate the removal of the Soviet parasite from his country.

His friends had been excited to hear the news, especially Attila, who was so passionate about fighting the USSR and making Hungary a better place for his people. Hungary knew he would never be able to thank them enough for what they had done for him.

So Hungary, for the first time in a long time, dressed himself as he wanted and slipped his knife into his sheath on his leg.

Paranoia had kept him alive, and he knew he couldn’t be too careful. He didn’t think he would need it, but Hungary had been betrayed too many times not to carry a weapon with him.

He could taste freedom on his tongue. He didn’t want to lose it, not when it was so close, not when it was just in his grasp.

Just in case. It was just in case.

When Hungary arrived at the Soviet Military Command, he was greeted by the site of the Russian SFSR.

“Russia,” Hungary said, surprised, “I didn’t know you were going to be here.”

“My son wanted someone here for this. Unfortunately, he decided that someone had to be me, and not any of the dozens of oblasts that could have easily been sent in my place,” Russian SFSR said, sounding very annoyed with the USSR. Hungary could relate to that feeling of annoyance.

“Well, it looks like an agreement will be reached soon, and then we can both go home and be done with this all,” Hungary said. Russian SFSR huffed out a small laugh.

“Very true. Now come. We have prepared a banquet in honor of you and your delegates as a way to show that no ill will shall be harbored between our countries and that we will respect your neutrality,” Russian SFSR said, turning into the room. Hungary blinked at first, surprised. 

A banquet? For him and his delegation? Something about it felt off because Hungary didn’t think that USSR or Russian SFSR would ever do anything like that for him. Both of them liked their power and clinging to it.

Then again, this was probably something that had been planned more by the Soviet officer and not Russian SFSR or USSR themselves.

Still, the nervousness didn’t leave until the first hour and a half had passed. As the night slowly crept to midnight and nothing happened, Hungary felt the tension leave him. This was just a banquet to celebrate that an agreement was near, that they were almost done.

It was fine.

Slowly, a small smile crept onto his face as everything suddenly felt more real.

It was so close.

So, with his anxiety gone, Hungary began to enjoy himself, taking great pleasure in how annoyed Russian SFSR looked, only confirming Hungary’s thoughts that the man was not involved in this.

Hungary was happy. It was a feeling that had been quite foreign to him, and it was something he had experienced little in his life. It was nice to relax and feel happy. The emotions were overwhelming, but they were good.

Then, at midnight, the party was interrupted when a man entered the room, flanked by men wearing a uniform Hungary recognized as belonging to the NKVD. Hungary’s blood ran cold, and a pit dropped in his stomach. 

The feeling and the anxiety that followed came on so quickly that Hungary felt as if he might be sick. His hand slid down to his side, where the knife was hidden. Hungary swallowed down his nerves and opened his mouth to speak but was cut off by the man who had entered the room.

“Arrest them,” he said. The NKVD officers went to do just that, and Hungary was quick to pull the knife from his sheath and lash out at Russian SFSR, who had approached him from the side.

The knife cut a gash across his nose, and as Russian SFSR raised a hand to the cut, Hungary lashed out again, hitting his hand and throwing his full weight behind the blow as the knife cut through flesh and bone, severing Russian SFSR’s first finger and nearly cutting through the second. 

Satisfaction welling up through him, Hungary began to yell.

“I AM HUNGARY! I AM HUNGARY, AND I AM MY OWN PERSON AND COUNTRY, AND YOU CAN’T TAKE THAT FROM ME!” 

Tears were welling up in his eyes, and he swung at Russian SFSR again before being restrained. Still, Hungary fought with everything he had.

This wasn’t fair! He was so close! He was neutral! He had left the Warsaw Pact! He was going to be free! He was going to be like Yugoslavia! Why couldn’t he have that?

It wasn’t fair!

Something heavy slammed into the back of Hungary’s head, and he groaned, slumping slightly but refusing to give up his fight. Then, another blow landed on the back of his head, and everyone went dark. 

• ───────────────── •

Event: Suez Crisis 

Location: Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt

Date: October 29, 1956

“We should have known that Israel would get involved in this. She’s too aggressive not to,” Palestine stated as she and Egypt heard the news of Israel’s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula earlier that day. Egypt sighed.

“I suppose she is hoping that this will force me to reopen the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba and allow her access to the canal,” Egypt commented, worry rolling in her stomach.

“And assumes that Britain, France, and the United States will help her,” Palestine said, “I don’t like how close she’s gotten to the canal.”

“You choose a perfect time to visit,” Egypt tried to joke. Palestine looked unamused, and the younger country smiled sheepishly. “Better to think positive than about how things can go wrong. If all three of them really do side with Israel, then I imagine that the USSR will side with us.”

“I hope so. After what happened to Iran when he tried to nationalize his oil fields…I hope that you don’t get put under their control. You and your president are my biggest hope to having control over my land and life again and putting an end to what Israel is doing to my people,” Palestine said, the ever-present worry in her eyes deepening. 

“I won’t let them put me back under my control. I am an independent country, and whether they like it or not, I will act like one. The Suez Canal is in my country, and therefore, it is my duty to control it, not two empires who have sworn that they don’t want to be empires anymore,” Egypt snapped, words flying out of her in a rush.

“I hope you’re right. It’s hard not to be worried when there is almost a guarantee that someone will try to hurt you for not behaving like they want you to,” Palestine said. Egypt frowned. She indeed was worried about this and the risk of war that it was creating, but at the same time…she didn’t want to think that a war would come. 

It wasn’t just that people were more dedicated to peace with the creation of the United Nations, but that it would be a war fought over the Suez Canal. A war could disrupt shipping or destroy the canal.

“At the end of the day, no one is going to risk being the one to destroy the Suez Canal,” Egypt said, her voice more confident than she felt. “There will be a diplomatic end to this.”

There had to be.

Are you interested in learning more about what happened to Hungary after being captured? Well on Sunday, two days from now, I will be posting a oneshot on exactly that. The chapter was going to run too long if I added it, and I really wanted to tell the story I had for Hungary.

[itsslowsonic]

Can Communism/Socialism Save America?

Everyone knows Fascism is bad, right? But most people don't know that Fascism and Communism are just two sides of the same coin. Fascism and Communism are all based on dictatorship. Did the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NAZI) allow other parties as their competitors? Did the Soviet Communist Party allow other parties to be their competitors? Does the Chinese Communist Party allow other parties to be their competitors? Do you want democracy or dictatorship? Do you want only one voice in your country? Do you want Collectivism that ignores or sacrifices any individual at any time as needed?

Can Communism/Socialism save Czechoslovakia? The Czechoslovakian Communist Party failed (1960 - 1990).

Can Communism/Socialism save East Germany? The Socialist Unity Party of Germany failed (1949 - 1990).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Hungarian People's Republic? The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party failed (1949 - 1989).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Socialist Republic of Romania? The Romanian Communist Party failed (1947 - 1989).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Polish People's Republic? The Polish United Workers' Party failed (1947 - 1989).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Armenia failed (1920 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic? The Azerbaijan Communist Party failed (1920 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Byelorussia failed (1920 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Estonia failed (1940 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Georgian Communist Party failed (1921 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Kazakhstan failed (1936 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Kirghizia failed (1936 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Latvia failed (1940 - 1990).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Lithuanian Communist Party failed (1940 - 1990).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Council of People's Commissars of the Moldavian SSR failed (1940 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Tajikistan failed (1929 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Turkmenistan failed (1925 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Uzbekistan failed (1924 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic? The Communist Party of Ukraine failed (1919 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic? The Soviet Communist Party failed (1917 - 1991).

Can Communism/Socialism save America?

Do you still need more proof to prove that Communism/Socialism did never and will never work?

Do you want to prove all animals can live without oxygen?

Do you really want to use your future and every American's future to experience the Communism/Socialism life to prove that Communism/Socialism cannot save America?

[omfguslay]

Savage Béla Kun to y'all 💅🏻

[berniesrevolution]

DISSENT MAGAZINE

At critical times, foreign wars have tested the moral convictions of American leftists and affected the fate of their movement for years to come. The Socialist Party’s opposition to entering the First World War provoked furious state repression but later gained a measure of redemption when Americans learned that U.S. troops had not made the world safe for democracy after all. Leftists proved prescient again in the late 1930s when they rallied to defend the Spanish Republic against a right-wing military and its fascist allies, Italy and Germany. The republic’s defeat emboldened Adolf Hitler to launch what quickly became the Second World War. When, twenty years later, American Communists backed the Soviet Union’s crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, they shoved their party firmly and irrevocably to the margins of political life, which opened up space for the emergence of a New Left that rejected imperial aggressors of all ideological persuasions.

The war in Ukraine has a good chance of turning into another such decisive event. Who to blame for the bloodshed in that country should be obvious: a massive nation led by an authoritarian ruler with one of the world’s largest militaries at his disposal is seeking to conquer and subjugate a smaller and weaker neighbor. In pursuit of that vicious purpose, Vladimir Putin’s soldiers have committed countless rapes and acts of torture. His air force is systematically trying to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy, hoping to undermine its citizens’ will to resist. Yet Ukrainians, with the aid of arms from the United States and other NATO countries, have so far managed to fight this superior force to a stalemate.

A sizeable number of American leftists have embraced an alternate reality. For them, the culprit is NATO’s post–Cold War expansion, fueled by the drive of the U.S. state and capital to bend the world to their desires. The popular author and journalist Chris Hedges cracks that the war in Ukraine “doesn’t make any geopolitical sense, but it’s good for business.” The Green Party condemns the “perpetual war mentality” of the “US foreign policy establishment” and concludes, “There are no good guys in this crisis.”

These critics ignore or dismiss the fact that every nation that joined NATO did so willingly, knowing that Russia was capable of launching the kind of attack now underway in Ukraine. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise, the expansion of NATO may well have been too hasty. But not one of its newer members has done anything to threaten Putin’s regime. And every country that joined the alliance enjoys a democratically elected government. They contrast sharply with the handful of nations, besides Putin’s, that voted against a UN resolution last month demanding the Russians withdraw from Ukraine: Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Nicaragua, Eritrea, and Mali. All but the last are one-party dictatorships, and Mali relies on Russian mercenaries to battle Islamist rebels.

It seems not to bother these leftists that they are making common cause with some of the most atrocious and prominent stalwarts of the Trumpian right. Tucker Carlson routinely bashes the U.S. commitment to Ukraine with lines like “Has Putin ever called me a racist?” while Marjorie Taylor Greene recently declared, “I’m completely against the war in Ukraine. . . . You know who’s driving it? It’s America. America needs to stop pushing the war in Ukraine.”

On February 19, some members of the alliance of right and left staged a demonstration at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington to vent its “Rage Against the War Machine.” Speakers included Ron Paul and Tulsi Gabbard as well as Jill Stein, the Green Party’s 2016 nominee for president, and Medea Benjamin, the founder of Code Pink. Carlson promoted the event on the highest rated “news” show in the history of cable TV. At the Memorial, several protesters flew Russian flags.

To paraphrase August Bebel’s famous line about anti-Semitism, the hostility of those leftists who oppose helping Ukraine is an anti-imperialism of fools—although, unlike past Jew haters, they are fools with good intentions. Wars are always horrible events, no matter who starts them or why. And we on the left should do whatever we can to stop them from starting and end them when they do.

But neither the United States nor its allies forced Putin to invade. In speech after speech, he has made clear his mourning for the loss of the Soviet empire and his firm belief that Ukraine should be part of a revived one, this time sanctified by an Orthodox cross instead of the hammer-and-sickle. As the historian (and my cousin) David A. Bell wrote recently, the United States is not “the only international actor that really matters in the current crisis.” It may have the mightiest war machine, but Biden is not shipping arms to Ukraine in an attempt to subjugate Russia to his will. We should, Bell writes, “judge every international situation on its own terms, considering the actions of all parties, and not just the most powerful one. . . . the horrors Putin has already inflicted on Ukraine, and his long-term goals, are strong reasons . . . for continuing current U.S. policy, despite the attendant costs and risks.”

(Continue Reading)

[mapsontheweb]

Hungary in 1918-1919

Nicolas de Lamberterie, 2020

"Történelmi atlasz - Középiskolásoknak", József Kaposi, 2016

by cartesdhistoire

Defeats on the front, rising prices, and the agitation of foreign peoples created a troubled situation in Hungary, and in January 1918, a general strike paralyzed activity in Budapest. At the instigation of certain former Hungarian prisoners freed from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and converted to Bolshevism, mutinies took place, and a new general strike of a political nature extended to the entire country on June 20.

On the night of October 29 to 30, Count Mihály Károlyi became the head of government of a de facto independent Hungary: it was the Aster Revolution which established the Hungarian Democratic Republic (November 16).

The head of the inter-allied military mission, the Frenchman Fernand Vix, demanded a retreat of the Hungarian armies by 100 km, an ultimatum which led to the fall of Károlyi and the formation of a government in the hands of the journalist Béla Kun, who had returned from Russia where he had been a companion of Lenin: the Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed on March 21. To face the armed offensives of its neighbors, the government formed a People's Army which, after some successes against the Czechs, was defeated by the Romanians who advanced on Budapest. Béla Kun left the capital on August 1, two days before the arrival of Romanian and Serbian troops supported by French forces (missions led by Berthelot and Franchet d'Espèrey, respectively).

The Bolsheviks' rise to power was poorly received in the provinces and among the Allies. In the southeast of the country occupied by French troops, a national government was formed in June in Szeged whose army was entrusted to Admiral Horthy who, at the time of Béla Kun's fall, already controlled the entire South and West of the country. After negotiating the departure of the Romanians with the Entente, Horthy entered Budapest at the head of his army on November 16. The assembly elected him regent of Hungary on March 1, 1920.

[brookstonalmanac]

Events 8.20 (1920-1990)

1920 – The first commercial radio station, 8MK (now WWJ), begins operations in Detroit 1920 – The National Football League is organized as the American Professional Football Conference in Canton, Ohio 1926 – Japan's public broadcasting company, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) is established. 1938 – Lou Gehrig hits his 23rd career grand slam, a record that stood for 75 years until it was broken by Alex Rodriguez. 1940 – In Mexico City, exiled Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky is fatally wounded with an ice axe by Ramón Mercader. He dies the next day. 1940 – World War II: British Prime Minister Winston Churchill makes the fourth of his famous wartime speeches, containing the line "Never was so much owed by so many to so few". 1940 – World War II: The Eighth Route Army launches the Hundred Regiments Offensive, a successful campaign to disrupt Japanese war infrastructure and logistics in occupied northern China. 1944 – World War II: One hundred sixty-eight captured allied airmen, including Phil Lamason, accused by the Gestapo of being "terror fliers", arrive at Buchenwald concentration camp. 1944 – World War II: The Battle of Romania begins with a major Soviet Union offensive. 1948 – Soviet Consul General in New York, Jacob M. Lomakin is expelled by the United States, due to the Kasenkina Case. 1949 – Hungary adopts the Hungarian Constitution of 1949 and becomes a People's Republic. 1955 – Battle of Philippeville: In Morocco, a force of Berbers from the Atlas Mountains region of Algeria raid two rural settlements and kill 77 French nationals. 1960 – Senegal breaks from the Mali Federation, declaring its independence. 1962 – The NS Savannah, the world's first nuclear-powered civilian ship, embarks on its maiden voyage. 1968 – Cold War: Warsaw Pact troops invade Czechoslovakia, crushing the Prague Spring. East German participation is limited to a few specialists due to memories of the recent war. Only Albania and Romania refuse to participate. 1975 – Viking program: NASA launches the Viking 1 planetary probe toward Mars. 1975 – ČSA Flight 540 crashes on approach to Damascus International Airport in Damascus, Syria, killing 126 people. 1977 – Voyager program: NASA launches the Voyager 2 spacecraft. 1986 – In Edmond, Oklahoma, U.S. Postal employee Patrick Sherrill guns down 14 of his co-workers and then commits suicide. 1988 – "Black Saturday" of the Yellowstone fire in Yellowstone National Park 1988 – Iran–Iraq War: A ceasefire is agreed after almost eight years of war. 1988 – The Troubles: Eight British soldiers are killed and 28 wounded when their bus is hit by an IRA roadside bomb in Ballygawley, County Tyrone. 1989 – The pleasure boat Marchioness sinks on the River Thames following a collision. Fifty-one people are killed.

[mariacallous]

Twenty-five years ago, as a State Department speechwriter, I worked with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to secure ratification by the U.S. Senate of NATO’s first enlargement since the 1950s. Like all of us who advised Albright, I felt passionately that bringing Central Europe’s new democracies into NATO was morally right and in America’s interest. But we also believed it was vital to set the highest possible bar for aspiring members. The United States insisted on admitting only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO during that round—rejecting calls by some European allies to add more countries.

“NATO is a military alliance, not a social club,” Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. New members had to be ready to contribute to its military missions and committed to its democratic values. They could not bring unresolved internal or border conflicts into NATO—the whole point of the process was to induce them to solve these problems before joining. Back in 1998, for example, we had to be confident that Hungary wouldn’t make territorial claims on neighboring countries with Hungarian minorities.

NATO kept its door open to more members after that first expansion. We expected the biggest test would be bringing in the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—because that would mean bringing states that had once been Soviet republics into the alliance. That Rubicon was crossed in 2004, without any serious harm to NATO-Russia relations. But I didn’t think Ukraine would ever join them. When NATO declared in 2008 that Ukraine “will become” a member, without offering a pathway for membership, I worried it was making a promise that might prove impossible to keep, even if Ukraine fixed its then-profound problems with corruption and democratic governance.

Russia’s full-scale invasion, and Ukraine’s heroic defense of NATO’s founding values, has changed all that.

At the coming NATO summit this July, NATO should offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan—the first formal step toward membership. It should make clear that Ukraine’s ultimate accession depends solely on actions within its control, not on what Russia does or on the ultimate resolution of the war.

One reason to be serious about Ukrainian membership is that experience has validated the original argument for bringing new members into NATO. In 1997, Albright predicted NATO enlargement would “expand the area of Europe where wars do not happen,” and that turned out to be true. Since then, Russia has only attacked countries not yet protected by the alliance—Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

Experience has also disproved the belief that nations could gain security from Russia by foregoing their aspirations for NATO membership in deference to its concerns. It’s often forgotten that Ukraine adopted a law prohibiting joining military alliances in 2010. Russia invaded anyway in 2014, stealing Ukrainian territory and giving Ukraine’s neighbors reason to fear that their borders were no longer secure, either.

So the old reasons for Ukrainian NATO membership have become stronger; the old fears of provoking Russia have become moot. But there is also a new argument for Ukrainian membership, one that stems naturally from a question that every American and European government is now asking: How do we define Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat?

If the current war were solely about sovereignty—about upholding the principle that borders can’t be erased by tanks—then there could be only one good answer to that question. Ukraine would have to regain all of its territory. And that should remain our common goal.

But Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal in Ukraine is clearly not just to grab land; nor is land the only thing Ukrainians are defending. U.S. President Joe Biden has said that Ukraine’s “brave resistance is part of a larger fight for democratic principles,” and if that is true—if this war is partly about preserving Ukraine’s freedom to build a democratic society and to align itself with countries that share its values—then Ukraine joining NATO as a strong, pluralistic democracy would also count as victory. It would arguably be as huge a blow to Putin as Ukraine regaining Crimea. It might thus relieve the political pressure Ukraine’s leaders feel to complete that military task more quickly than realities on the ground might allow, and focus them, constructively, on the work required to integrate seamlessly with the Western alliance.

The alternative some have proposed—offering Ukraine security “guarantees” that fall short of NATO membership, as the United States does for Israel, might help until full membership is achieved. But they are no substitute. The United States and Israel don’t have a mutual defense treaty because Israel doesn’t want one—in part because it fears a formal alliance would limit its freedom of action. Ukraine, in contrast, has been asking to assume the responsibilities of joining our alliance. It is a European country suffering exactly the kind of attack NATO was created to prevent, and it’s proving that it is ready and willing to interpose itself between the attacking nation and NATO’s other members—to defend their freedom as well as its own. How can NATO say no to such a country’s aspirations for membership without signaling hesitation to actually guarantee its security, and without validating Putin’s claim that Ukraine is part of a special Russian sphere of influence? There really is only one security guarantee that is taken seriously in Europe, and that is NATO.

That still leaves the question we posed 25 years ago: Can we bring into NATO a country with an unresolved conflict, without obligating the U.S. military to join that conflict? That is a serious and legitimate concern, especially since it is in the nature of an active conflict to expand unpredictably. But the answer cannot be to wait to admit Ukraine until the current war definitively ends. That would give Russia an incentive to never end the war—the very opposite of what NATO’s original enlargement conditions were designed to achieve.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty says that if a member is attacked, each ally must take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain” security. That is a serious legal obligation, even if it does not require going to war in response to every small provocation. But we would still get to define its contours in advance of Ukrainian accession.

If, for example, Russian troops were to still occupy some Ukrainian soil when Ukraine is ready for membership, allies could reach an understanding that Article 5 would not oblige them to take direct part in Ukraine’s operations to regain those remaining territories, but that they would take all feasible measures to stop a further Russian invasion. This would guarantee the security of that large part of Ukraine that its troops have protected and liberated, without committing American Marines to storm Crimea.

For those worried that Ukraine might take dangerous escalatory actions, NATO membership also would provide some insurance. Article 4 of the NATO treaty would require Ukraine and its new allies to “consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Ukraine would have more security; it would also be more embedded in NATO’s military and political institutions, with less freedom to act independently. It would be far better to bring Ukraine into such a structure than to let it remain an extremely well-armed free agent.

Of course, there is still fighting to be done before Ukraine can fully join the alliance. All of NATO’s members will have to be convinced. And Ukraine will have to ensure it is politically and militarily ready. But that is all the more reason to start the formal process now. A democratic Ukraine joining the West is a big part of how this war ends. And Ukrainians should know what they must do to make it happen.

[therearelightningonthetatra]

Children of Hungary. Sopron and Partium

The Sopron Frontier (Julia)

Having risen up against the Soviets and their cronies with the help of the Austro-Swiss Union, Sopron was effectively the sole-surviving part of western Hungary that still remained intact. Before long, however, it became (and remains to this day) a sanctuary for refugees fleeing what was described as “an endless orgy of destruction,” as well as a stronghold against the chaos beyond what was already being called the Frontier. Despite the difficulties, the region survived long enough to not only become an Austrian protectorate in 1987 but eventually be formally recognized by the Alpine Confederation in 2009.

Today the survivor-nation remains a young but determined bastion of order and civilization. Due to its history and culture, the region is also known for a peculiar union of Austro-Hungarian influences that is in a way an enduring legacy of the old Habsburg Empire. Although not internationally recognized as a successor state to Hungary it has claims through the Alpines, especially Austria, over Western Hungary (despite a lack of resources due to the Sicily incident) and remains a valued member of the Confederation.

The Republic of Partium (Janos)

Amidst the chaos and violence, Debrecen managed to survive, thanks in part to a military group fighting off the warlords until its future was secured by the arrival of the Transylvanians, themselves having survived the destruction of Romania. With the aid of their larger neighbors, the inhabitants once more felt safe enough to not only begin rebuilding their shattered corner of the country but also bring the surrounding region under control. Eventually, the city state became stable enough to proclaim itself the Republic of Partium in 2000.

Under the protection and guidance of Transylvania, Partium today is as stalwart and resilient as it had been in its founding all those years ago. Due to the influence of its more powerful neighbor, the survivor-nation has developed a culture that could be described as part-militant and part-Romanian. Though those same ties, it is also recognized internationally as an official successor to Hungary and with aid has laid claim to all of eastern half of the former country, although control beyond the immediate vicinity of Debrecen remains shaky at best.

Together, the two peoples had become known colloquially as “Hungary’s Children.” Despite all the changes brought about by circumstance and survival, both still remain in essence “Hungarian,” even if in increasingly different ways. With the Danube once more relatively safe for travel and trade (though the same cannot be said of the wasteland surrounding the old river), contact between the divided Magyars has become ever more commonplace. But time would tell whether the two halves would reunite. Then again, the future remains an open book.