#How Long Has Ali Khamenei Been | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

mariacallous · 1 year ago

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Villagers in southern Lebanon have been heading north, fearing all-out war. Most schools are closed. Israel has ordered its citizens to vacate 28 towns along the border with Lebanon. The Israeli army has exchanged fire with Hezbollah—Lebanon’s Shia political and paramilitary group—every day since October 7, resulting in casualties on both sides. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has said, “We must respond to what is happening in Gaza”; its foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, warned of a preemptive strike by Iran’s allies against Israel.

And yet, 12 days after the Hamas attack on Israel, the man who holds some of the cards and usually sets the tone, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, is still silent—no speeches, no interviews. For someone who loves to give fiery addresses to his followers and does so regularly, Nasrallah’s reticence is notable and can mean only one thing.

Hezbollah is keeping its powder (mostly) dry while Iran weighs its options and their possible outcomes. Israel has called up 300,000 reservists, the United States has sent two carrier strike groups to the Mediterranean, and President Joe Biden headed to the region with one word for Hezbollah: “Don’t.” For Tehran, regime survival trumps all considerations—and it requires the survival of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Republic’s most valuable asset and a key line of its defense. Every Israeli strike on Gaza, every mass-casualty event, will factor into the calculation as both Iran and Hezbollah assess their next moves.

Washington has said it has no evidence directly linking Tehran to the Hamas attack, but a long-standing, though not always easy, relationship binds the Palestinian group to the Iranian regime. Tehran supplies weapons and money to Hamas, and Hezbollah is reported to have provided training. Over the past year, the head of Iran’s paramilitary Quds Force, General Esmail Ghaani, worked to coordinate Iran’s proxies, and Nasrallah has spoken often this year of the unification of fronts. The order to initiate the attack may not have come from Tehran, but Hamas could have had a sort of blanket approval for efforts to launch such an operation. Tehran may have little understood what the attack would unleash. Despite Abdollahian’s bombast, the so-called axis of resistance appears somewhat stunned by its own horrifying success, which was in part made possible by Israel’s slow response on the day of the attacks.

“We were expecting to get a smaller number of hostages and return, but the army collapsed in front of us, what were we to do?” was how the Beirut-based Hamas leader Ali Barakeh put it to The Washington Post on Monday.

The unexpectedly high Israeli death toll may be one reason Nasrallah has kept silent—he is hedging, watching to see when and how far the Israeli army will go into Gaza, and whether Hamas will face an existential threat that requires Hezbollah’s response. Even then, Iran would likely prefer to sacrifice Hamas rather than waste Hezbollah, unless Iran itself comes under threat.

By keeping Israel on edge on its northern border, Hezbollah is in effect already helping Hamas, but doing so within the rules of engagement established after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Both sides understand that script, although the risk of a miscalculation is great. For now, Israeli officials are making clear that they don’t want a war with Lebanon—and simultaneously threatening to destroy the country if Hezbollah goes too far. Hezbollah has put out stern statements saying that it’s responding to enemy fire while, at the same time, having its spokesperson claim that the “skirmishes” are only a “warning.”

Hezbollah learned a hard lesson in 2006 about intervening in a war to back up Hamas. In early June of that year, Israel carried out the targeted killing of a Palestinian leader, and Hamas kidnapped an Israeli conscript, Gilad Shalit. By June 28, Hamas and Israel were at war, and the Israeli army had entered northern Gaza. The war would last for weeks. On July 12, as a show of support for the Palestinians, Hezbollah carried out a cross-border raid into northern Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. Three soldiers were killed during the ambush.

The Israeli response to the kidnappings was devastating for Lebanon, involving not only a ground invasion but massive air strikes, which killed an estimated 1,200 civilians; flattened large parts of the capital’s southern suburbs, where Hezbollah operates; and caused extensive damage to civilian infrastructure across the country. On August 27, shortly after a cease-fire was declared, Nasrallah made a startling admission in a television interview. “We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture [of two Israeli soldiers] would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”

Much has changed since the 2006 war, for all the parties involved. With Iran’s help, Hezbollah’s capabilities have increased considerably in the past 17 years. The group now has an estimated 60,000 fighters and a stockpile of missiles that went from 14,000 to 150,000 and includes precision guided missiles, according to experts. If Israel can level large parts of Beirut or other areas of Lebanon in the event of an escalation, Hezbollah is now also able to inflict devastating damage deep into Israel. This capability will be factored into Israel’s planning for a ground war in Gaza: How far can Israel go before Hezbollah unleashes a barrage of rockets? One possible scenario is that even an escalation would remain scripted, with both sides opting for precision strikes rather than a barrage of fire.

In parallel with Iran’s expansionist agenda, Hezbollah’s role in the region has grown since 2006. A local Lebanese Shia militia and a political party has now become a regional paramilitary group with a presence in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, much to the dismay of other Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. Since 2013, Hezbollah has been assisting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to brutally put down what had started as a peaceful uprising in 2011. Israel has conducted regular air strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian assets in Syria. Over the weekend, Israel struck the Damascus and Aleppo airports, raising the possibility of a Syrian front against Israel rather than one in Lebanon. Hezbollah would still be involved and play a key role, but Israeli retaliation would target Syria, a country that’s still at war and that has a president who owes his survival to Tehran and will have little say as to whether or how he will participate.

Most concerning for Hezbollah is its domestic and regional standing. In 2006, Nasrallah was seen as an icon who stood up to Israel for 34 days and emerged alive, denying the mighty Israeli army a victory—though at great cost to Lebanon. Israel had wrongly assumed that many Lebanese would blame Hezbollah for attracting Israel’s wrath. But after initial outrage that Hezbollah had dragged the country to war, the Lebanese directed their fury at Israel for destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure and for the high casualty toll. For a few years afterward, according to one poll, Nasrallah was the most popular leader in the Arab world (although he won only 26 percent of the vote).

Today is not 2006, however. Hezbollah has lost its shine in the eyes of much of the Arab world. Lebanon has been exhausted by a three-year economic crisis, and it is still recovering from the massive explosion at the Beirut port in 2020. Many Lebanese assign Hezbollah a portion of the blame for both of these calamities. Over the past two years, Lebanon’s Christian, Druze, and Sunni communities have each had an altercation or a violent clash with Hezbollah. On Friday, Hamas called for demonstrations across the region in support of its cause. Several thousand of Hezbollah’s core supporters answered that call across Lebanon, but the response was overall tepid and performative.

Still, the mood can easily turn, even if not in support of war, toward more vociferous expressions of support for the Palestinians or anger at the United States. In the hours after the al-Ahli hospital was hit in Gaza, several hundred protesters on mopeds drove from the southern suburbs to the U.S. embassy on the northern outskirts of Beirut, setting a nearby building on fire.

Tehran may well have been surprised by the extent of Hamas’s operation, but it is adept at recalibrating. It will capitalize on the global sympathy for Palestinians that the devastating pictures out of Gaza inspire, as well as on the fact that Israeli-Saudi normalization talks are on ice and the U.S. president is being shunned by Arab countries. But despite its bombast and rhetoric, the regime in Iran is not suicidal and will not seek to take a last stand and go down in flames. Whatever Tehran does now, together with Hezbollah, will be carefully calculated to ensure the survival of the regime and a smooth transition for the succession of the 84-year-old Khamenei.

Under pressure at home from an agitated, young population and economic sanctions, surrounded by countries cozying up to his archenemy, Israel, Khamenei has been working to improve Iran’s hand thanks to ties with China and Russia and the use of proxy militias. He also bought some breathing space and legitimacy with the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in March. He is now using the Palestinian cause to re-burnish his regional credentials.

Diplomacy is only now kicking in, with a sputter. Biden’s meetings with Arab leaders have been canceled in protest at the ongoing Israeli military campaign against Gaza and Washington’s refusal to call for a cease-fire. A political opening may be possible at a much later stage of the conflict, and at that time, Tehran may want a part in regional diplomacy.

In 1990, Iran was still exhausted by the Iran-Iraq war, and its pragmatic president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, wanted his country to be readmitted into the international community. He condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and reconciled with Saudi Arabia after a break of several years. In an effort to further garner the goodwill of the United States, Rafsanjani pushed Iran’s proxies in Lebanon to release the Western hostages that they had been holding since the mid-’80s. But when the 1991 Arab-Israeli peace conference was held in Madrid, Iran was excluded, in a slight it never forgot. Today’s Iran is much different; its president is no Rafsanjani, but the country again has domestic and economic problems that could drive it to seek inclusion or guarantees.

If the current outbreak of violence leads to an opening for a wider settlement, Iran seems unlikely to get a seat at the table. But stranger things have happened in the Middle East—and Iran’s proxies will have made sure that Tehran has been heard and its price has been set.

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biblenewsprophecy · 3 months ago

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Israel reports it killed Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah–Iran wants to take action!

COGwriter

Israel continues to eliminate leaders of groups that oppose it:

September 28, 2024

Israel’s military said Saturday that it killed Hassan Nasrallah, the overall leader of the Iran-backed group Hezbollah, in an airstrike the previous day on the group’s “central headquarters” in Beirut, Lebanon. The militant group confirmed Nasrallah’s death, saying its longtime leader “has joined his fellow martyrs.”

The Friday afternoon strike was the latest in a series of massive explosions targeting leaders of the militant group, which has been firing rockets and drones across Lebanon’s southern border into Israel for almost a year.

The Israel Defense Forces said in a Saturday statement that Nasrallah, who led Hezbollah for more than three decades, “was eliminated by the IDF, together with Ali Karki, the Commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, and additional Hezbollah commanders” in a strike by Israeli fighter jets on the group’s command facility “embedded under a residential building” in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which have long been a stronghold of the U.S.-designated terrorist group.

“The strike was conducted while Hezbollah’s senior chain of command were operating from the headquarters and advancing terrorist activities against the citizens of the State of Israel,” the IDF said.

Hezbollah said in its statement that it vows to “continue the holy war against the enemy and in support of Palestine.” …

Iran’s supreme leader urged all Muslims to stand by Hezbollah against Israel but did not indicate how Tehran would respond to Nasrallah’s killing.

In his first comments since Israel claimed to have killed Nasrallah, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said, “it is the duty of all Muslims to stand by the people of Lebanon and Hezbollah” against the “occupier, evil and suppressor” regime of Israel.

In a statement read on state TV, he said “all regional resistance forces” support and stand beside Hezbollah.

Iran’s influential parliamentary committee on national security met Saturday and demanded a “strong” response to Israel, state TV reported. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-hassan-nasrallah-killed-beirut-strike/

Israel has surprised many by its recent actions against Hezbollah.

Iran is concerned:

Iran’s Supreme Leader Transferred To Secure Location As Region Braces For What’s Next

September 28, 2024

Events are moving fast in the Middle East region following the massive Israeli airstrikes which killed Hezbollah’s longtime leader, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah belatedly confirmed his death on Saturday.

Overnight, Iran held an emergency meeting of its national security council, at the home of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But immediately after the meeting, which was likely disclosing to Iran’s leadership and miliary the death of Nasrallah, the Ayatollah was reportedly transferred to a secret and secure location. …

“The sources said Iran was in constant contact with Lebanon’s Hezbollah and other regional proxy groups to determine the next step after Israel announced that it had killed Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in a strike on south Beirut on Friday,” the report added.

Given Israel’s surprise and bold decapitation strike against Hezbollah, Iran likely fears that Israel could go after the Islamic Republic’s top leadership in Tehran next. Netanyahu had warned this week, “There is no place in Iran that the long arm of Israel cannot reach.”

There are unconfirmed reports that one or more Iranian IRGC offers were killed in the strike that took out Nasrallah.

So far Iran has been mute in terms of a military response. Will it launch ballistic missiles on Israel? Will it mount attacks on other Israeli assets in the region or across the globe?

Did Khamenei go to a secure location in order to oversee a new war? https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/irans-supreme-leader-transferred-secure-location-region-braces-whats-next

While many see Israel as winning, Israel will not be unscathed (cf. Isaiah 22:6-9).

What is next?

Let’s consider that, several weeks ago, Iran’s Supreme leader vowed revenge after a Hamas leader was killed in Tehran:

Ayatollah Says ‘Severe’ Revenge Coming For Israel Killing Hamas Leader On Iranian Soil

July 31, 2024

The world just woke up to a new Middle East on Wednesday which stands on the precipice of major war between Iran and its proxies and Israel, following the overnight Israeli assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the top political leader of Hamas, during an inauguration event for Iran’s new president. Haniyeh, who is based in Qatar, and an Iranian security guard were killed reportedly while in the Iranian capital. Hamas has since condemned the “treacherous Zionist raid on his residence in Tehran.”

Iran is vowing “severe” punishment, with the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, announcing in English and Farsi on X, “The criminal, terrorist Zionist regime martyred our dear guest in our territory and has caused our grief, but it has also prepared the ground for a severe punishment.”

And Iran’s newly sworn-in president Masoud Pezeshkian in a statement cited in state media said the country will “defend its territorial integrity, dignity, honor, and pride, and will make the terrorist occupiers regret their cowardly act.”

Taking out Haniyeh was the second high-profile assassination attributed by Israel in a matter of hours, following the Tuesday airstrike in Beirut that killed Hezbollah’s top military leader and right-hand man to Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Fuad Shukr.

That attack was massive and on a neighborhood and buildings in the south of the capital, with Lebanon’s Health Ministry saying three people, including two children, have been killed, with at least 74 wounded. https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/ayatollah-says-severe-revenge-coming-israel-killing-hamas-leader-iranian-soil

July 31, 2024

A former Israeli national security adviser tells VOA that Iranian proxy groups Hamas and Hezbollah face dilemmas in considering retaliations against Israel for the assassinations of two of their senior members in strikes on Beirut and Tehran over several hours beginning Tuesday.

Israeli reserves Brig. Gen. Jacob Nagel, a former national security adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, discussed those dilemmas in a Wednesday phone interview with VOA. Nagel is an Israel-based senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a U.S. foreign policy and security research group in Washington.

Israel asserted that it killed Fuad Shukr, the top military commander of Lebanon’s U.S.-designated terror group Hezbollah, in a Tuesday strike on a building in the group’s stronghold of southern Beirut. Hezbollah has not said whether Shukr was killed in the attack.

The Israeli government and military have not commented on the attack that Iran and the Hamas terror group said killed the group’s political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran hours later. Hamas and Iranian state media blamed Israel for Wednesday’s pre-drawn strike on a residence in the Iranian capital, without citing evidence. https://www.voanews.com/a/hamas-hezbollah-face-dilemmas-in-hitting-back-at-israel-after-assassinations-of-key-leaders/7723918.html

Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran want Israel gone.

Regarding Iran possibly attacking Israel, last March I posted the following:

The Bible shows that God will allow what looks to be a Iranian-Syrian confederation to strike the nation of Israel:

1 The burden against the Valley of Vision.

What ails you now, that you have all gone up to the housetops, 2 You who are full of noise, A tumultuous city, a joyous city? Your slain men are not slain with the sword, Nor dead in battle. 3 All your rulers have fled together; They are captured by the archers. All who are found in you are bound together; They have fled from afar. 4 Therefore I said, “Look away from me, I will weep bitterly; Do not labor to comfort me Because of the plundering of the daughter of my people.”

5 For it is a day of trouble and treading down and perplexity By the Lord God of hosts In the Valley of Vision — Breaking down the walls And of crying to the mountain. 6 Elam bore the quiver With chariots of men and horsemen, And Kir uncovered the shield. 7 It shall come to pass that your choicest valleys Shall be full of chariots, And the horsemen shall set themselves in array at the gate.

8 He removed the protection of Judah. You looked in that day to the armor of the House of the Forest; 9 You also saw the damage to the city of David, That it was great; And you gathered together the waters of the lower pool. 10 You numbered the houses of Jerusalem, And the houses you broke down To fortify the wall. 11 You also made a reservoir between the two walls For the water of the old pool. But you did not look to its Maker, Nor did you have respect for Him who fashioned it long ago.

12 And in that day the Lord God of hosts Called for weeping and for mourning, For baldness and for girding with sackcloth. 13 But instead, joy and gladness, Slaying oxen and killing sheep, Eating meat and drinking wine: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die!”

14 Then it was revealed in my hearing by the Lord of hosts,”Surely for this iniquity there will be no atonement for you, Even to your death,” says the Lord God of hosts. (Isaiah 22:1-14 NKJV)

Elam is a reference to at least some in Iran. The old Worldwide Church of God published the following:

Iranians comprise nearly 70 percent of the country. Iranians, though Islamic, are totally distinct from the neighboring Arab peoples of the Middle East. They are a mixed people of the remnants of Media and Elam and other ancestors of Semitic and Hamitic stock. (Stump K. South Asia in Prophecy. Plain Truth, July/August 1986, p. 5)

The Bible tells that after Tiglath-Pileser king of Assyria took over Damascus, he moved Syrians to Kir (2 Kings 16:9-10). God’s word has the expression “the Syrians from Kir” (Amos 9:7), which is basically confirmation that Kir of Isaiah 22 would include Syrians. The Bible also tells of a time when Kir will be destroyed (Isaiah 15:1b) and also says that Syria’s capital Damascus will be destroyed (Isaiah 17:1).While this does not mean that Kir must (or must only) be a reference to Syria, the fact that Syria is an ally of Iran is interesting.

In Isaiah 22: 8, “Judah” is a reference to those in the land commonly called Israel–God will allow Israel to be attacked! In Isaiah 22:9, consider that “the damage to the city of David” is a reference to at least part of Jerusalem–and notice that the damage will be great. This, in turn, would be expected to result in a massive Israeli, possibly with US involvement, attack against Iran and its allies, like Syria.the

The fulfillment of Isaiah 22:6-9 could lead to the prophesied peace deal of Daniel 9:26-27 and the countdown to the start of the Great Tribulation.

But notice verse 8: He removed the protection of Judah.

Part of the protection of Judah, aka the nation called Israel, comes from the USA.

While Syria (and others) may be involved in removing “the protection of Judah,” the more the USA distances itself from Israel, the more tempting an attack may seem for Iran.

Anyway, we may well see Iran attack Israel in 2024, and that could possibly lead to the confirmation of the deal of Daniel 9:27. (Thiel B. VOA: Hamas Leader Speaks in Iran of Israel’s ‘Political Isolation’. COGwriter, March 27, 2024)

Since that post, we have seen an attack by Iran in 2024. But as I emailed someone within a few hours after it began, I did not believe it was the attack of Isaiah 22:6-9. And it was not.

Related to some of Israeli actions against Hezbollah this month, the Continuing Church of God put together the following video on our Bible News Prophecy YouTube channel:

youtube

14:30

Israel Intensifies the War

European Union foreign policy chief, Josep Borrel, has been brokering the nuclear negotiations involving Iran and said that he thinks the deal is “in danger.” Iran blames the United States, whereas the USA says they are not delaying it. Israeli sources stated that Israel will stop Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. Joe Biden says the USA would use its own military power to prevent Iran from getting such a bomb if need be. In 2021, Iranian lawmakers submitted a bill seeking the government, by law, to commit to Israel’s destruction by the year 2040. Does the 22nd chapter of Isaiah point to damage coming to Israel from Iran and possibly Syria? Might Iran be concerned enough about limited progress with the USA to launch some type of attack? Is Iran the prophesied ‘King of the South’? Is it reasonable to think that the prophesied peace deal of Daniel 9:27 will not happen until after a military conflict. like a regional war? Should Christians watch the Middle East? Dr. Thiel and Steve Dupuie discuss these matters.

Here is a link to our video: Israel Intensifies the War.

We are in a time of wars and rumors of wars as Jesus foretold (Matthew 24:4-8).

As the Ayatollah continues to age, he may well decide that 2024 is the year for him to attempt to fulfill his desire to eliminate Israel.

This is something to watch for (cf. Mark 13:37).

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xtruss · 2 years ago

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Analysis: The Real Motivation Behind Iran’s Deal With Saudi Arabia

The agreement is about far more than just normalizing ties with Riyadh.

�� April 06, 2023 | Foreign Policy

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (left) and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud exchange documents after signing a memorandum of understanding in Beijing on April 6, 2023. Iranian Foreign Ministry/Anadolu Agency Via Getty Images

The China-brokered agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia announced last month generated huge buzz, with some observers going as far as proclaiming it a victory for international security.

But much of the analysis has missed a key point: For Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the deal is about far more than normalizing ties with the Saudi government in Riyadh. Instead, it is about further facilitating, along with China and Russia, the rise of a new anti-Western global order and excluding the United States from a new regional arrangement.

Indeed, from the view of Khamenei and the IRGC, restoring ties with Saudi Arabia is the least important aspect of the deal. What’s most important is that it’s one more milestone toward achieving the regime’s grand ambitions—this time with powerful friends. The 83-year-old supreme leader, like his predecessor, believes a clash of civilizations has long existed between the so-called Islamic world and the West. The long-term project of the Islamic Revolution has been to restore an Islamic civilization, with Iran’s Shiite Islamists at the helm.

In the modern era, the United States and the liberal international order it leads have always been seen as the ultimate obstacle—the Great Satan—standing in the way of achieving that goal. And for the Islamic Republic’s 44 years of existence, the regime has concentrated all its resources on shaking the very core of the West’s legitimacy. In recent years, this aim has come to bind Khamenei with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping—each unlikely bedfellows.

Whether or not China and Russia are fully invested in this ideological troika, it is clear Iran’s regime is all in. Khamenei sees an Islamic civilization led by Iran, a Russo-Slavic civilization led by Russia, and a Confucius-communist civilization led by China all at war with Western civilization—and he thinks now is the best chance they’ve had in decades to uproot the West.

Khamenei’s close circle and the IRGC genuinely believe the U.S.-led liberal world order is collapsing and a new anti-Western order led by China, Russia, and Iran is taking shape. As recent as November 2022, Khamenei outlined a vision of a new order based on “the isolation of the United States, the transfer of power to Asia, [and] the expansion of the [anti-West] resistance front” led by the Islamic Republic.

This is the lens through which Khamenei supports Putin’s war in Ukraine—and why he has gone all in on providing military support to Russia. It’s also how Tehran views the China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal. Hard-line regime officials in Iran have confirmed this. After the deal was signed, Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior IRGC commander and military advisor to Khamenei, asserted that the post-U.S. era in the region has begun and the deal was “China’s second biggest blow to the U.S.”

The deal’s lack of substance is not a concern to the Islamic Republic. Of course, regime propagandists are in selling mode, promoting the deal as a declaration of peace and an opportunity to apply pressure to remove sanctions on Khamenei’s regime.

In reality, however, the two states have simply agreed to restore diplomatic relations in the coming months, after Riyadh severed ties in January 2016 following the ransacking of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the IRGC’s paramilitary forces. From the view of Khamenei and the IRGC, the return to the pre-2016 status quo is another reason to proclaim victory as they believe it preserves their regional dominance with virtually no cost.

As far as the IRGC is concerned, there will be no practical change to its strategy, militancy, or support for its proxies and militia groups. Vehement hostility towards Saudi Arabia is ingrained in the IRGC’s ideology, with anti-Saudi doctrines that portray the Saudi royal family as “apostates” with “Jewish origins” incorporated into the IRGC’s formal program of indoctrination.

Riyadh is fully aware of this—it knows the true identity and motivations of the IRGC beyond the smiling face of Ali Shamkhani (Tehran’s lead negotiator). However, for the Saudis, the deal is very simply understood. It gives them the ability to pursue their primary goals, which are about building the economic strength of their country and carrying forward the social reforms sweeping the country under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, with what they will see as enhanced protection against Iranian direct or proxy attack. But they will likely have few illusions about the dependability of any Iran regime commitments or the durability of the agreement.

Against this backdrop, the excitement the China-brokered deal has generated about a lasting peace in Yemen is overstretched. At best, in the very short term, the IRGC will tactically delay its militancy against its lesser enemy, Saudi Arabia, to dedicate more attention to expelling its greater enemy, the United States, from the Middle East—and thus finalizing the collapse of the U.S.-led order, in its view.

If anything, in the long run, the IRGC likely hopes the China-brokered deal will actually advance its militia doctrine and reinforce its strategy of plausible deniability for attacks waged by the Houthis against Riyadh. In other words, the deal strengthens the IRGC’s ability to claim it has “no control” over Houthi operations, despite being their main backer.

In fact, at the regional level, Khamenei’s regime is focused on using the China-brokered agreement to disrupt rather than facilitate peace—namely, sabotaging the U.S.-negotiated Abraham Accords. The IRGC has spent the past two years working tirelessly to prevent more Arab states from normalizing ties with Israel, which it refers to as a “cancerous tumor” that must be eradicated.

The Iranian regime believes the China-brokered deal kills two birds with one stone in this regard, by delaying more Arab states joining the Abraham Accords and undermining the value of the United States in the Middle East.

But here’s why all of this presents a major security challenge to the West, its allies, and the international system more broadly: If Khamenei and the IRGC believe a new world order is emerging, they’ll be intent on speeding up the collapse of the U.S.-led one. This may increase anti-Western escalations, recklessness, and strategic errors on their part, including on the nuclear and terrorism files. Their military support for Putin suggests it already has—and more worrying developments are already in the making.

The most immediate and pressing concern should be the expansion of military cooperation among Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran—which is geared toward undercutting the U.S.-led world order. Less than a week after the China-brokered deal was announced, China, Iran, and Russia undertook joint naval drills across the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.

And although Xi will likely be reluctant to advance more provocative military ties with Khamenei, the same cannot be said of Putin. In the coming months and years, we will likely see closer on-the-ground cooperation between Tehran and Moscow beyond simply Ukraine. Given that both Khamenei and Putin have sought to use sub-Saharan Africa as a battleground to target Western interests, the possibility of IRGC Quds Force-Wagner Group coordination on the African continent is no longer far-fetched.

This would significantly alter the security dynamic in what is already regarded as the new hotbed of terrorism. A worst-case scenario could result in Moscow and Tehran coordinating non-state actor attacks against Western interests worldwide, with enough plausible deniability to avoid any consequences.

Beyond the military realm, the China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal has emboldened Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran’s shared ambitions to replace U.S.-oriented transnational entities and agreements with their own, such as by establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or replacing the U.S. dollar with the Chinese yuan and Russian ruble—a trend they will collectively push to expand.

Tehran itself has also been busy increasing its efforts to forge closer alliances with states it regards as part of this emerging anti-Western axis. Khamenei’s recent statements during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexandr Lukashenko revealed how the Islamic Republic wants to lead efforts to undermine U.S. sanctions globally, with the supreme leader calling for a “joint assembly” of countries sanctioned by the West.

The IRGC has already cultivated a network of illicit financing routes across the globe, not least in South America, with reports revealing how Tehran evades U.S. and European oil sanctions and smuggles gold to and from Venezuela. The recent resurgence of the anti-U.S. left in South America has once again provided Khamenei’s regime the scope to expand its network on the continent beyond simply Venezuela—an opportunity the aging ayatollah has not wasted

So although the China-brokered Iran-Saudi deal may at first glance seem like a positive step for regional stability and international security, a closer assessment of Khamenei and the IRGC’s motivations reveals a different reality. They are using it to inflict harm on the West, Arab-Israeli peace efforts, and the U.S.-led liberal international order. If there were any previous doubts, the deal confirms that a U.S. withdrawal from the region will create a vacuum that will be gradually filled by the anti-Western axis.

Contrary to what the isolationists say, the United States withdrawing from the Middle East won’t make problems disappear; it will in fact further undermine international security by empowering and enabling the very forces that are intent on challenging the liberal world order. The Biden administration has demonstrated with Ukraine how it can build and maintain coalitions of support with great skill. It now needs to do the same in the Middle East.

— Saeid Golkar is a Senior Fellow at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Service at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

— Kasra Aarabi is the Iran program lead at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. He is also a Nonresident Scholar at the Middle East Institute and is undertaking a Ph.D. at the University of St. Andrews, where his research focuses on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

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eretzyisrael · 2 years ago

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The link between the anti-Rushdie fatwa and Islamist Sayid Qutb

14 February 1989 was the fateful date when Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced a fatwa, or death sentence, on Salman Rushdie, author of the supposedly blasphemous work, The Satanic Verses. Rushdie lies critically injured in hospital following an attempt on his life 33 years later. ‘Blasphemy against Islam’ has long been a favourite pretext for persecuting Jews in the Arab world, dissident Muslims and western satirists. But with its doctrinaire adherence to, and aggressive advocacy for, sharia law, the forces of political Islam have declared lethal war on freedom of expression in the West. Sephardi Ideas Monthly points to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayid Qutb: From Egypt it is a little-known fact that Qutb’s ideology has travelled to Iran, where four of his books have been translated into Persian. (With thanks: Edna)

Salman Rushdie, sentenced to death by the Ayatollahs

Sephardi Ideas Monthly traces the little-known but very consequential line of influence that transcends the traditional Sunni-Shi’a divide and connects Sayyid Qutb to the Islamic Republic of Iran (IR). Qutb met with and encouraged Iranian revolutionaries and his writings played an important role in the Iranian Islamist revolution.

The current Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, translated four of Qutb’s books into Persian! One scholar summed up the issue concisely: “The influence of Sayyid Quṭb on the Islamist movement and the revolutionaries of Iran is still not acknowledged sufficiently and remains largely unknown in the West.” (See: “Sayyid Quṭb in Iran: Translating the Islamist Ideologue in the Islamic Republic.” Yusuf Ünal, Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (November 2016), pp. 35-50).

Qutb’s connection to Shi’ite activists dates back to the early 50s, when Iranian cleric Navvab Safavi, leader of the Iranian “Fedayeen of Islam,” visited him in Egypt. Safavi was impressed by Qutb, took his ideology back to Iran, and promoted the vision of an Islamic state among Iranian revolutionaries. Translations of Quṭb’s works soon followed. In many cases, the Persian-language translators were also activists who went on to play important roles in the Iranian revolution, the most prominent being Safavi’s student, Khamenei. Among the books that Khamenei translated was, The Future of This Religion, a work in which Quṭb:

…argues for the political supremacy of Islam, which will lead to the future submission of all humanity to Islamic ideology, and calls upon all Muslims to fight against the imperialist powers.

In order to honor Qutb’s thought and influence, in 1985 the Iranian regime’s postal service issued a stamp showing Qutb behind bars during his 1966 trial in Egypt. That trial ended in Qutb’s hanging.

It’s true that, in recent years, Qutb’s writings have inspired revolutionary Sunni jihadi groups that mercilessly target Shi’a. The difficulty in reconciling Qutb’s influence on both the Iranian revolution and anti-Shi’ite jihadis was examined at a February, 2015, conference held in Iran dedicated to “Re-reading and Re-viewing the Views of Sayyid Quṭb” (See Unal, p. 36). The willingness to re-engage with Qutb’s writings in such a charged geo-political context testifies to the depth of their impact in the IR. In addition, it’s important not to overstate the problem: other Sunni Islamist groups influenced by Qutb are more than happy to maintain positive relations with the Iranian regime, the most obvious example being Hamas.

Why isn’t the Qutb-Iran connection more well-known among Western observers of the MENA region? Perhaps the answer is connected to a related question: How is it that there isn’t a single English-language biography of Khamenei? Sometimes written off as “the chief apparatchik backed by the Iranian deep state” Khamenei has ruled Iran for thirty-three years. That’s a long time in a very unstable region. It’s reasonable to wonder if Khamenei is more competent than often perceived, and if his political acumen is connected to Qutb’s influence. Either way, if we wish to prepare for an extended conflict with the forces of Political Islam, it would be prudent to wonder how much of the revolutionary energy that animates portions of the Iranian regime is still being generated by its encounter with Qutb.

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#Islamism #Non-Arab/non-Muslim minorities

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gungieblog · 2 years ago

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Are the protests in Iran just doomed to flare and then be crushed?

Patrick WintourDiplomatic editor

Regime is again using violence in crackdown, but leaderless movement of young women has left it unsure about how to respond

“This is not a protest anymore. This is the start of a revolution,” chanted a group of students outside the science department of Mashhad University, as the unprecedented protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini continued into their 18th day on Monday.

That assessment, at least until recently, was not shared by Washington or European capitals. Expressions of support have been issued by the White House, some sanctions imposed and vague promises to loosen the Iranian regime’s blockade of the internet made. But overall the Biden administration has assessed this uprising as doomed to flare and then be crushed under the boots of the Revolutionary Guards. That after all is the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The baton, censorship and the police cell has a long and successful track record of violently quelling dissent.

Overseen by the 83-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Middle East’s longest serving ruler, it seems implausible that Iran’s deeply entrenched conservative leadership would abandon its normal instinct for a security response. It has worked in the past.

#iran

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jordanianroyals · 4 years ago

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The plot against Jordan's King Abdullah

By David Hearst. 14 April 2021 08:15 UTC

Abdullah fell foul of the axis of Mohammed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu after refusing to go along with the Trump plan to push West Bank Palestinians into Jordan

For once, just for once, US President Joe Biden got something right in the Middle East, and I say this conscious of his abysmal record in the region.

In accepting the intelligence he was passed by the Jordanians that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was up to his ears in a plot to destabilise the rule of King Abdullah, Biden brought the scheme to a premature halt. Biden did well to do so.

His statement that the US was behind Abdullah had immediate consequences for the other partner in this scheme, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel.

While bin Salman was starving Jordan of funds (according to former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher, the Saudis have not provided any direct bilateral assistance since 2014), Netanyahu was starving the kingdom of water.

This is water that Israel siphons off the River Jordan. Under past agreements, Israel has supplied Jordan with water, and when Jordan asks for an additional amount, Israel normally agrees without delay. Not this year: Netanyahu refused, allegedly in retaliation for an incident in which his helicopter was refused Jordanian airspace. He quickly changed his mind after a call from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to his counterpart, Gabi Ashkenazi.

Had former US President Donald Trump still been in power, it is doubtful whether any of this would have happened.

Without Washington’s overt support, King Abdullah would now be in serious trouble: the victim of a two-pronged offensive from Saudi Arabia and Israel, his population seething with discontent, and his younger half-brother counting the days until he could take over.

The problem with Abdullah

But why were bin Salman and Netanyahu keen to put the skids under an ally like Abdullah?

Abdullah, a career soldier, is not exactly an opposition figure in the region. He of all people is not a Bashar al-Assad, Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Abdullah was fully signed up to the counter-revolution against the Arab Spring. Jordan joined the Saudi-led anti-Islamic State coalition, deployed aircraft to target the Houthis in Yemen, and withdrew its ambassador from Iran after the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consul in Mashhad were sacked and Saudi Arabia consequently cut diplomatic relations.

He attended the informal summit on a yacht in the Red Sea, convened to organise the fight against the influence of Turkey and Iran in the Middle East. That was in late 2015.

In January 2016, Abdullah told US congressmen in a private briefing that Turkey was exporting terrorists to Syria, a statement he denied making afterwards. But the remarks were documented in a Jordanian foreign ministry readout passed to MEE.

Jordan’s special forces trained men that Libyan general Khalifa Haftar used in his failed attempt to take Tripoli. This was the pet project of the UAE.

Abdullah also agreed with the Saudis and Emiratis on a plan to replace Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with Mohammed Dahlan, the Emirati- and Israeli-preferred choice of successor.

Why then, should this stalwart of the cause now be considered by his Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, an inconvenience that needs to be dealt with?

Insufficiently loyal

The answer partly lies in the psychology of bin Salman. It is not good enough to be partially signed up to his agenda. As far as he is concerned, you are either in or out.

Under Abdullah, Jordan never quite managed to be fully in. As one former Jordanian government minister told me: “Politically, Mohammed bin Salman and his father were never very close to the Hashemites. King Salman does not have any affinity to the Hashemites that his other brothers might have had. So on the political front, there is no affinity, no empathy.

“But there is also a feeling [in Riyadh] that Jordan and others should be with us or against us. So we were not completely with them on Iran. We were not completely with them on Qatar. We were not completely with them on Syria. We did what we could and I don’t think we should have gone further, but to them, that was not enough.”

Abdullah’s equivocation certainly was not enough for the intended centrepiece of the new era, Saudi Arabia's normalisation of relations with Israel.

Here, Jordan would have been directly involved and King Abdullah was having none of it. Had he gone along with the Trump plan, his kingdom - a careful balance between Jordanians and Palestinians - would have been in a state of insurrection.

In addition, Abdullah could not escape the fact that he was a Hashemite, whose legitimacy stems in part from Jordan’s role as custodian of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy sites in Jerusalem. This, too, was being threatened by the Al Sauds.

The importance of Aqaba

But the plan itself was regarded by both bin Salman and Netanyahu as too big to stop. I personalise this, because in both Saudi Arabia and Israel, there are experienced foreign policy and intelligence hands who appreciate how quickly this plan would have destabilised Jordan and Israel’s vulnerable eastern border.

The plan has been years in the preparation and the subject of clandestine meetings between the Saudi prince and the Israeli leader. At the centre of it lies Jordan’s sole access to the Red Sea, the strategic port of Aqaba.

The two cities of Aqaba and Ma’an were part of the kingdom of Hejaz from 1916 to 1925. In May 1925, Ibn Saud surrendered Aqaba and Ma’an and they became part of the British Emirate of Transjordan.

It would be another 40 years before the two independent countries would agree on a Jordan-Saudi border. Jordan got 19 kilometres of coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba and 6,000 square kilometres inland, while Saudi Arabia got 7,000 square kilometres of land.

For the new kid on the block, bin Salman, a prince who was always sensitive about his legitimacy, reclaiming Saudi influence over Aqaba in a big trade deal with Israel would be a big part of his claim to restoring Saudi dominance over its hinterland.

And the trade with Israel would be big. Bin Salman is spending $500bn constructing the city of Neom, which is eventually supposed to straddle Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Sitting at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Jordanian port would be firmly in Saudi sights.

This is where Bassem Awadallah, the former chief of Jordan's royal court, comes in. Two years before he definitively broke with King Abdullah, and while he was still Jordan’s envoy to Riyadh, Awadallah negotiated the launch of something called the Saudi-Jordanian Coordination Council, a vehicle that Jordanian officials at the time said would “unblock billions of dollars” for the cash-starved Hashemite kingdom.

Awadallah promised that the council would invest billions of Saudi dollars in Jordan’s leading economic sectors, focusing on the Aqaba Special Economic Zone.

Awadallah was also close to the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, who had his own agenda in Jordan. He wanted to ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood and the forces of political Islam were permanently eradicated from the country, something Abdullah has refused to do, although he is no supporter.

The money, of course, never materialised. Saudi support for the kingdom diminished to a trickle, and according to an informed source, Muasher, Saudi funds stopped almost completely after 2014.

The price for turning on the tap of Saudi finance was too high for Abdullah to pay. It was total subservience to Riyadh. Under this plan, Jordan would have become a satellite of Riyadh, much as Bahrain has become.

Netanyahu had his own sub-agenda in the huge trade that would flow from Neom once Saudi Arabia had formally recognised Israel.

A confirmed enemy of the Oslo plan to set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, Netanyahu and the Israeli right have always eyed annexation of Area C and the Jordan Valley, which comprises 60 percent of the West Bank. Under this new Nakba, the Palestinians living there, denied Israeli citizenship, would be slowly forced to move to Jordan. This could only happen under a Saudi-oriented plan, in which Jordanian workers could travel freely and work in Saudi Arabia. As it is, remittances from the Jordanian workforce in Saudi Arabia are an economic lifeblood to the bankrupt kingdom.

The money pouring into Jordan, accompanied by an essentially stateless workforce of Jordanians and Palestinians, would finally put to bed grandiose visions of a Palestinian state, and with it the two-state solution. On this, Netanyahu and bin Salman are as one: treat them as a mobile workforce, not citizens of a future state.

Hussein's favoured son

That Prince Hamzah should be seen as the means by which Jordan is enlisted to this plan represents the final irony of this bizarre tale.

If the Hashemite blood runs deep in any veins, it is surely in his. He was King Hussein’s favoured son. In a letter sent to his brother Prince Hassan in 1999, King Hussein wrote: “Hamzeh, may God give him long life, has been envied since childhood because he was close to me, and because he wanted to know all matters large and small, and all details of the history of his family. He wanted to know about the struggle of his brothers and of his countrymen. I have been touched by his devotion to his country and by his integrity and magnanimity as he stayed beside me, not moving unless I forced him from time to time to carry out some duty on occasions that did not exceed the fingers on one hand.”

Abdullah broke the agreement he made with his father on his death bed when he replaced his half-brother with his son, Hussein, as crown prince in 2004.

But if Hashemite pride in and knowledge of Jordan’s history runs deep in Hamzah, he of all princes would have soon realised the cost to Jordan of accepting bin Salman’s billions and Netanyahu’s tacit encouragement, just as his father did.

Hamzah’s friends ardently dispute they are part of this plot and downplay connections with Awadallah. Hamzah only owns up to one thing: that he is immensely concerned at how low Jordan has fallen under years of misrule. In this, Hamzah is 100 percent right.

It is clear what has to happen now. King Abdullah should finally see that he must completely overhaul the Jordanian political system, by calling for free and fair elections and abiding by their result. Only that will unite the country around him.

This is what King Hussein did when he faced challenge and revolt by Jordanian tribes in the south of the kingdom; in 1989, Hussein overhauled the political system and held the freest elections in the history of the kingdom.

The government that emerged from this process led the country safely out of one of the most difficult moments for Jordan: Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War.

The real villains

Biden, meanwhile, should realise that letting bin Salman get away with the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi has a cost.

Bin Salman did not learn anything from the episode and carried on in exactly the same way, reckless and swift, against an Arab neighbour and ally, with potentially disastrous consequences.

The new foreign policy establishment in Washington should wean itself off the notion that US allies are its friends. It should learn once and for all that the active destabilisers of the Middle East are not the cartoon villains of Iran and Turkey.

Rather, they are the closest US allies, where US forces and military technology are either based, or as in the case of Israel, inextricably intertwined: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel.

Jordan, the classic buffer state, is a case in point.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

David Hearst is co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He is a commentator and speaker on the region and analyst on Saudi Arabia. He was The Guardian's foreign leader writer, and was correspondent in Russia, Europe, and Belfast. He joined the Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.

#King Abdullah II #prince hamzah #article

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newstfionline · 4 years ago

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Sunday, June 20, 2021

Businesses, U.S. legislators fume as Canada extends travel ban (Reuters) Canada is extending a ban on non-essential travel with the United States and the rest of the world until July 21, officials said on Friday, prompting frustration from businesses and U.S. legislators. Canada is under pressure from companies and the tourism industry to ease the ban, which was imposed in March 2020 to help contain spread of the coronavirus and has been renewed on a monthly basis ever since. But Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stood firm, saying the border would stay largely shut until 75% of Canadians had received the first of a two-dose coronavirus vaccine and 20% had been given both shots. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce—a national group that advocates for businesses—lamented what it said was Ottawa’s excessive caution.

Many Americans resuming pre-virus activities (AP) Many Americans are relaxing precautions taken during the COVID-19 pandemic and resuming everyday activities, even as some worry that coronavirus-related restrictions were hastily lifted, a new poll shows. The poll from The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research finds that majorities of Americans who were regularly doing so before the pandemic say they are returning to bars or restaurants, traveling and attending events such as movies or sports. Andrea Moran, a 36-year-old freelance writer and mother of two boys, said she feels both relief and joy at the chance to resume “doing the little things,” such as having drinks on a restaurant patio with her husband. “Honestly, I almost cried,” Moran said. “It’s such a feeling of having been through the wringer, and we’re finally starting to come out of it.” Still, 34% of Americans think restrictions in their area have been lifted too quickly, while somewhat fewer—27%—say they were not lifted quickly enough. About 4 in 10 rate the pace of reopening about right.

Voting debate roils Washington but leaves many voters cold (AP) Brenda Martinez, a 19-year-old community college student, thinks the government should help immigrant students more. Donald Huffman is worried about turning 50 next week with no work available because the federal government is delaying the pipelines he usually helps build. Binod Neupane, who just moved to Texas to research alternative fuels, wants action on climate change. The three Texas voters have little in common politically other than one thing—none considers voting and election reform, the issue that has dominated partisan debate this year, a top priority. As politicians from Austin to Washington battle over the practical aspects of how to run elections—clashing over details such as polling booth hours and the number of ballot drop boxes per county—many voters are disconnected from the fight. A passionate base of voters and activists on both sides may be intensely dialed in on the issue, but a disengaged middle is baffled at the attention.

Trust in government (The Spectator) Since 1958, the Gallup polling organization has periodically asked Americans how much they trust the federal government to do what is right. In 1958, 73 percent said ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’. Trust hit its high point in 1964, when that figure stood at 77 percent. Then it began to fall. By 1980, only 27 percent trusted the government to do what is right. That percentage rebounded to the low forties during the Reagan years, then fell to a new low, 19 percent, in 1994. It rebounded again, hitting a short-lived high of 54 percent just after 9/11. Then it plunged again, hitting another new low, 15 percent, in 2011. It has been in the 15- to 20 percent range ever since. A government that is distrusted by more than 80 percent of the citizens has a bipartisan legitimacy problem.

‘There’s no water,’ says California farm manager (Reuters) Salvador Parra, the manager of Burford Ranch in California’s Central Valley agricultural breadbasket, is worried about the lack of water. California’s worst drought since 1977 has forced Parra to leave fallow 2,000 of his 6,000 acres and dig deep for water to save the crops already planted. “There’s not very much being grown out there, just because there’s no water. There’s literally no water,” said Parra. In a good year, the ranch grows everything from garlic, onions, tomatoes and alfalfa to cotton. This year, Parra needs emergency water sources just to bring a reduced crop to harvest.

Mexico City shuts down classes again, enters higher COVID-19 risk tier (Reuters) Mexico City schools that had just gone back to in-person classes will be closed again starting Monday as the sprawling capital climbs into a higher tier of coronavirus risk, education authorities said on Saturday. Mexico City officials had loosened restrictions on gatherings in schools, hotels, stores and restaurants just two weeks ago as the dense urban zone moved into the lowest risk tier of the government's four-level "traffic light" model. But the federal Health Ministry on Friday evening put Mexico City, home to more than 9 million people, a step higher on the scale for June 21 to July 4.

Peru ex-military stir election tensions with appeal to Armed Forces to “remedy” poll (Reuters) A group of retired officers has suggested Peru’s military should refuse to recognize socialist candidate Pedro Castillo if he is declared winner of the country’s presidential election if fraud allegations are not investigated, according to a letter circulated widely on social media on Friday. Interim president Francisco Sagasti confirmed the letter, which was posted on Twitter and Facebook, arrived at the general headquarters of the armed forces, bearing the names of at least 80 retired military personnel. Friday’s letter appealed to military chiefs to “act rigorously” and “remedy” the “demonstrated irregularities” that took place during the vote or risk having an “illegal and illegitimate” commander in chief at the helm of the country. The tight election has deeply divided citizens of the world’s second-largest copper producer. Protest marches by supporters of both candidates take place almost daily in downtown Lima, calling for a swift resolution and respect for the popular will.

Drought in Brazil (Financial Times) The worst drought in almost a century has left millions of Brazilians facing water shortages and the risk of power blackouts, complicating the country’s efforts to recover from the devastating impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The agricultural centers in São Paulo state and Mato Grosso do Sul have been worse affected, after the November-March rainy season produced the lowest level of rainfall in 20 years. Water levels in the Cantareira system of reservoirs, which serves about 7.5m people in São Paulo city, dropped to below one-tenth of its capacity this year. Brazil’s mines and energy ministry has called it country’s worst drought in 91 years.

Paris’ tough suburbs (AP) Violent rivalries have long been part of the policing geography in the rotting high-rises of tough Paris-region neighborhoods where inequalities and hardship are often more common than good jobs and opportunities. But police say that fighting over turf or differences of race, religion and cultures wasn’t always as savage as it increasingly is now. “It’s more and more violent,” the police major said as he worked to reconstruct this week’s chain of events, from a clash in a pipe-smoking bar to a full-blown brawl between opposing groups from Pakistani and North African communities. “In a fight that perhaps 20 years ago would have been sorted out with fists or kicks, we now see people being run over with cars,” he said. “The population is increasingly violent. It’s no longer simply fighting. They absolutely have to win, even if that means leaving someone in agony on the floor.” Police are also increasingly the targets of violence. Most recently, the murders of two police officials in April and May—one in a stabbing, the other in a shooting during a drug bust—reinforced officers’ concerns that enforcing the law in France is an increasingly perilous profession.

Chips, Taiwan, and China (WSJ/The Wire China) Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. makes almost all of the world’s most sophisticated chips, and many of the simpler ones, too. They’re in billions of products with built-in electronics, including iPhones, personal computers and cars—all without any obvious sign they came from TSMC, which does the manufacturing for better-known companies that design them, like Apple and Qualcomm. TSMC has emerged over the past several years as the world’s most important semiconductor company, with enormous influence over the global economy. With a market cap of around $550 billion, it ranks as the world’s 11th most valuable company. Its dominance leaves the world in a vulnerable position, however. As more technologies require chips of mind-boggling complexity, more are coming from this one company, on an island that’s a focal point of tensions between the U.S. and China, which claims Taiwan as its own.

Hard-line judiciary head wins Iran presidency as turnout low (AP) Iran’s hard-line judiciary chief won the country’s presidential election in a landslide victory Saturday, propelling the supreme leader’s protégé into Tehran’s highest civilian position in a vote that appeared to see the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history. Initial results showed Ebrahim Raisi won 17.8 million votes in the contest, dwarfing those of the race’s sole moderate candidate. However, Raisi dominated the election only after a panel under the watch of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei disqualified his strongest competition. His candidacy, and the sense the election served more as a coronation for him, sparked widespread apathy among eligible voters in the Islamic Republic, which has held up turnout as a sign of support for the theocracy since its 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Uganda tightening measures due to virus surge (AP) Uganda is tightening its lockdown measures to try and stem a surge in coronavirus infections in the East African country that is seeing an array of variants. The measures announced late Friday by President Yoweri Museveni include a ban on private and public transportation within and across districts, including in the capital Kampala. Only vehicles carrying cargo and those transporting the sick or essential workers are permitted to operate on the roads. The normally crowded shops in downtown Kampala have also been ordered shut. An ongoing nighttime curfew will stay in place. The new measures will last 42 days.

#headlines #news

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phroyd · 5 years ago

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Iran is experiencing its deadliest political unrest since the Islamic Revolution 40 years ago, with at least 180 people killed — and possibly hundreds more — as angry protests have been smothered in a government crackdown of unbridled force.

It began two weeks ago with an abrupt increase of at least 50 percent in gasoline prices. Within 72 hours, outraged demonstrators in cities large and small were calling for an end to the Islamic Republic’s government and the downfall of its leaders.

In many places, security forces responded by opening fire on unarmed protesters, largely unemployed or low-income young men between the ages of 19 and 26, according to witness accounts and videos. In the southwest city of Mahshahr alone, witnesses and medical personnel said, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps members surrounded, shot and killed 40 to 100 demonstrators — mostly unarmed young men — in a marsh where they had sought refuge.

“The recent use of lethal force against people throughout the country is unprecedented, even for the Islamic Republic and its record of violence,” said Omid Memarian, the deputy director at the Center for Human Rights in Iran, a New York-based group.

Altogether, from 180 to 450 people, and possibly more, were killed in four days of intense violence after the gasoline price increase was announced on Nov. 15, with at least 2,000 wounded and 7,000 detained, according to international rights organizations, opposition groups and local journalists.

The last enormous wave of protests in Iran — in 2009 after a contested election, which was also met with a deadly crackdown — left 72 people dead over a much longer period of about 10 months.

Only now, nearly two weeks after the protests were crushed — and largely obscured by an internet blackout in the country that was lifted recently — have details corroborating the scope of killings and destruction started to dribble out.

The latest outbursts not only revealed staggering levels of frustration with Iran’s leaders, but also underscored the serious economic and political challenges facing them, from the Trump administration’s onerous sanctions on the country to the growing resentment toward Iran by neighbors in an increasingly unstable Middle East.

The gas price increase, which was announced as most Iranians had gone to bed, came as Iran is struggling to fill a yawning budget gap. The Trump administration sanctions, mostly notably their tight restrictions on exports of Iran’s oil, are a big reason for the shortfall. The sanctions are meant to pressure Iran into renegotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and major world powers, which President Trump abandoned, calling it too weak.

Most of the nationwide unrest seemed concentrated in neighborhoods and cities populated by low-income and working-class families, suggesting this was an uprising born in the historically loyal power base of Iran’s post-revolutionary hierarchy.

Many Iranians, stupefied and embittered, have directed their hostility directly at the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who called the crackdown a justified response to a plot by Iran’s enemies at home and abroad.

The killings prompted a provocative warning from Mir Hussein Moussavi, an opposition leader and former presidential candidate whose 2009 election loss set off peaceful demonstrations that Ayatollah Khamenei also suppressed by force.

In a statement posted Saturday on an opposition website, Mr. Moussavi, who has been under house arrest since 2011 and seldom speaks publicly, blamed the supreme leader for the killings. He compared them to an infamous 1978 massacre by government forces that led to the downfall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi a year later, at the hands of the Islamic revolutionaries who now rule the country.

“The killers of the year 1978 were the representatives of a nonreligious regime and the agents and shooters of November 2019 are the representatives of a religious government,” he said. “Then the commander in chief was the shah and today, here, the supreme leader with absolute authority.”

The authorities have declined to specify casualties and arrests and have denounced unofficial figures on the national death toll as speculative. But the nation’s interior minister, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, has cited widespread unrest around the country.

On state media, he said that protests had erupted in 29 out of 31 provinces and 50 military bases had been attacked, which if true suggested a level of coordination absent in the earlier protests. The property damage also included 731 banks, 140 public spaces, nine religious centers, 70 gasoline stations, 307 vehicles, 183 police cars, 1,076 motorcycles and 34 ambulances, the interior minister said.

The worst violence documented so far happened in the city of Mahshahr and its suburbs, with a population of 120,000 people in Iran’s southwest Khuzestan Province — a region with an ethnic Arab majority that has a long history of unrest and opposition to the central government. Mahshahr is adjacent to the nation’s largest industrial petrochemical complex and serves as a gateway to Bandar Imam, a major port.

The New York Times interviewed six residents of the city, including a protest leader who had witnessed the violence; a reporter based in the city who works for Iranian media, and had investigated the violence but was banned from reporting it; and a nurse at the hospital where casualties were treated.

They each provided similar accounts of how the Revolutionary Guards deployed a large force to Mahshahr on Monday, Nov. 18, to crush the protests. All spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution by the Guards.

For three days, according to these residents, protesters had successfully gained control of most of Mahshahr and its suburbs, blocking the main road to the city and the adjacent industrial petrochemical complex. Iran’s interior minister confirmed that the protesters had gotten control over Mahshahr and its roads in a televised interview last week, but the Iranian government did not respond to specific questions in recent days about the mass killings in the city.

Local security forces and riot police officers had attempted to disperse the crowd and open the roads, but failed, residents said. Several clashes between protesters and security forces erupted between Saturday evening and Monday morning before the Guards were dispatched there.

When the Guards arrived near the entrance to a suburb, Shahrak Chamran, populated by low-income members of Iran’s ethnic Arab minority, they immediately shot without warning at dozens of men blocking the intersection, killing several on the spot, according to the residents interviewed by phone.

The residents said the other protesters scrambled to a nearby marsh, and that one of them, apparently armed with an AK-47, fired back. The Guards immediately encircled the men and responded with machine gun fire, killing as many as 100 people, the residents said.

The Guards piled the dead onto the back of a truck and departed, the residents said, and relatives of the wounded then transported them to Memko Hospital.

One of the residents, a 24-year-old unemployed college graduate in chemistry who had helped organize the protests blocking the roads, said he had been less than a mile away from the mass shooting and that his best friend, also 24, and a 32-year-old cousin were among the dead.

He said they both had been shot in the chest and their bodies were returned to the families five days later, only after they had signed paperwork promising not to hold funerals or memorial services and not to give interviews to media.

The young protest organizer said he, too, was shot in the ribs on Nov. 19, the day after the mass shooting, when the Guards stormed with tanks into his neighborhood, Shahrak Taleghani, among the poorest suburbs of Mahshahr.

He said a gun battle erupted for hours between the Guards and ethnic Arab residents, who traditionally keep guns for hunting at home. Iranian state media and witnesses reported that a senior Guards commander had been killed in a Mahshahr clash. Video on Twitter suggests tanks had been deployed there.

A 32-year-old nurse in Mahshahr reached by the phone said she had tended to the wounded at the hospital and that most had sustained gunshot wounds to the head and chest.

She described chaotic scenes at the hospital, with families rushing to bring in the casualties, including a 21 year old who was to be married but could not be saved. “‘Give me back my son!,��” the nurse quoted his sobbing mother as saying. “‘It’s his wedding in two weeks!’”

The nurse said security forces stationed at the hospital arrested some of the wounded protesters after their conditions had stabilized. She said some relatives, fearing arrest themselves, dropped wounded love ones at the hospital and fled, covering their faces.

On Nov. 25, a week after it happened, the city’s representative in Parliament, Mohamad Golmordai, vented outrage in a blunt moment of searing antigovernment criticism that was broadcast on Iranian state television and captured in photos and videos uploaded to the internet.

“What have you done that the undignified Shah did not do?” Mr. Golmordai screamed from the Parliament floor, as a scuffle broke out between him and other lawmakers, including one who grabbed him by the throat.

The local reporter in Mahshahr said the total number of people killed in three days of unrest in the area had reached 130, including those killed in the marsh.

“This regime has pushed people toward violence,” said Yousef Alsarkhi, 29, a political activist from Khuzestan who migrated to the Netherlands four years ago. “The more they repress, the more aggressive and angry people get.”

Political analysts said the protests appeared to have delivered a severe blow to President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate in Iran’s political spectrum, all but guaranteeing that hard-liners would win upcoming parliamentary elections and the presidency in two years.

The tough response to the protests also appeared to signal a hardening rift between Iran’s leaders and sizable segments of the population of 83 million.

“The government’s response was uncompromising, brutal and rapid,” said Henry Rome, an Iran analyst at the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy in Washington. Still, he said, the protests also had “demonstrated that many Iranians are not afraid to take to the streets.”

Phroyd

#iran #violence #oppression #theocracy

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bountyofbeads · 5 years ago

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Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue, Built a Shiite Axis of Power in Mideast

https://nyti.ms/36l1n3r

Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue, Built a Shiite Axis of Power in Mideast

The commander helped direct wars in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and he became the face of Iran’s efforts to build a regional bloc of Shiite power.

By Tim Arango, Ronen Bergman and Ben Hubbard | Published Jan. 3, 2020 Updated 8:37 a.m. ET | New York Times | Posted January 3, 2020 |

He changed the shape of the Syrian civil war and tightened Iran’s grip on Iraq. He was behind hundreds of American deaths in Iraq and waves of militia attacks against Israel. And for two decades, his every move lit up the communications networks — and fed the obsessions — of intelligence operatives across the Middle East.

On Friday, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the powerful and shadowy 62-year-old spymaster at the head of Iran’s security machinery, was killed by an American drone strike near the Baghdad airport.

Just as his accomplishments shaped the creation of a Shiite axis of influence across the Middle East, with Iran at the center, his death is now likely to prove central to a new chapter of geopolitical tension across the region.

General Suleimani was at the vanguard of Iran’s revolutionary generation, joining the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in his early 20s after the 1979 uprising that enshrined the country’s Shiite theocracy.

He rose quickly during the brutal Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. And since 1998, he was the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ influential Quds Force, the foreign-facing arm of Iran’s security apparatus, melding intelligence work with a military strategy of nurturing proxy forces across the world.

In the West, he was seen as a clandestine force behind an Iranian campaign of international terrorism. He and other Iranian officials were designated as terrorists by the United States and Israel in 2011, accused of a plot to kill the ambassador of Saudi Arabia, one of Iran’s chief enemies in the region, in Washington. Last year, in April, the entire Quds Force was listed as a foreign terrorism group by the Trump administration.

But in Iran, many saw him as a larger-than-life hero, particularly within security circles. Anecdotes about his asceticism and quiet charisma joined to create an image of a warrior-philosopher who became the backbone of a nation’s defense against a host of enemies.

He was close to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who on Friday issued a statement calling for three days of public mourning and “forceful revenge,” in a declaration that amounted to a threat of retaliation against the United States.

“His departure to God does not end his path or his mission,” he said.

The first years of General Suleimani’s tenure in the late 1990s were devoted to directing the militant group Hezbollah’s effort against the Israeli military occupation of south Lebanon. General Suleimani, along with Hezbollah’s military commander, Imad Mugniyah, drove a sophisticated campaign of guerrilla warfare, combining ambushes, roadside bombs, suicide bombers, targeted killings of senior Israeli officers and attacks on Israeli defense posts.

At the end, the price for Israel was too high, and in May 2000 it withdrew from Lebanon, marking a major victory for General Suleimani, his Quds Force and Hezbollah.

The Arab Spring in the Middle East, and later the fight against the Islamic State, turned General Suleimani from a shadow figure into a major player in the geopolitics of the region, said Tamir Pardo, a former head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service.

“Suleimani’s professional life can be divided into two periods,” he said. “Until the Arab Spring, he is commander of a force that has branches in various parts of the world, active mainly in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, but at the end of the day is a secret operational organization whose main purpose is terrorism.”

“From the shock that befell the Middle East following the rise of ISIS, he is changing course,” Mr. Pardo continued. “He becomes a kingpin regional player, knowing with great talent how to exploit the secret infrastructure he has established for so many years, to achieve noncovert objectives — to fight, to win, to establish presence.”

In recent years, the man whose face had rarely been seen became the face of Iran’s foreign operations.

In Syria, he oversaw a massive operation to shore up the government of President Bashar al-Assad, whose own troops had been depleted by widespread defections and fierce fighting with rebels seeking to topple the government since 2011. His command of Arabic helped put local commanders at ease as he welded them into a support network for Mr. al-Assad.

Over a number of years, Iranian operatives guided by General Suleimani recruited militia fighters from countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, who were airlifted to Syria to back up Mr. Assad’s forces in key battles.

Many of these militia fighters received training at military bases in Iran or on the ground in Syria by operatives from Lebanon’s Hezbollah, an organization General Suleimani had helped develop over the years.

When Iranian and Iranian-backed forces became major combatants against ISIS after the group took over roughly a third of Iraq in 2014, pictures of General Suleimani, often photographed on the battlefield in fatigues, began being widely shared on social media. The publicity spawned rumors that General Suleimani was trying to widen his fame for a possible run for Iran’s presidency; he denied them, saying he always saw himself as just a soldier.

That conflict, from 2014 through 2017, was a rare instance of Iran and the United States nominally fighting on the same side. On a number of occasions, Americans were hitting Islamic State targets on the ground while General Suleimani was directing ground forces against the militants.

It was unclear what direct role General Suleimani played in Yemen. But Iran’s patronage of the country’s Houthi rebels, which intensified when Saudi Arabia intervened against them in Yemen’s war in 2015, had all the hallmarks of the Suleimani playbook: above all, to support local militants as a way of expanding Iranian influence and foil Saudi Arabia, the region’s Sunni power.

Iran had long offered similar support to the Palestinian militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, creating decades of new security headaches for Israel. And with the support of the Quds Force, Hamas was able to take over the Gaza Strip, capable of firing rockets that can reach into most of Israeli territory.

Previous American administrations had resisted striking General Suleimani directly, either because of operational concerns or out of fear that killing him could destabilize the region further and lead to all-out war between the United States and Iran.

At least once, though, Israeli officials ran the possibility of attacking him up their command structure. That was in February 2008, while Israeli and American intelligence operatives were tracking Mr. Mugniyah, the Hezbollah commander, in the hopes of killing him, according to senior American and Israeli intelligence officials. Operatives spotted the Hezbollah commander talking with another man, who they quickly determined was Mr. Suleimani.

Excited by the possibility of killing two archenemies at once, the Israelis phoned senior government officials. But Prime Minister Ehud Olmert denied the request, as he had promised the Americans that only Mr. Mugniyah would be targeted in the operation.

Perhaps more than any other individual, General Suleimani was the foil for American plans in Iraq, which like Iran is predominantly Shiite.

After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iranian militiamen and their Iraqi allies fought a clandestine war against American troops, launching rockets at bases and attacking convoys. The militias also played a large part in inflaming sectarian tensions that led to Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006 and 2007 between Shiites and Sunnis, leading President George W. Bush to order a troop surge there.

General Suleimani and other leaders of his generation were shaped by the brutal war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, a conflict so cruel, with trench warfare and chemical weapons, that some compared it to the devastation of World War I. Nearly a million people died on both sides, and General Suleimani spent much of that war on the front lines.

For him and his fellow soldiers, the war was a “never again” moment. Ensuring that Iraq was weak and unable to again pose a threat to Iran became the primary goal of Iran’s policy toward Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, whom the United States supported during its war with Iran in the 1980s.

“For Qassim Suleimani, the Iran-Iraq war never really ended,” Ryan C. Crocker, a former American ambassador to Iraq, once said in an interview. “No human being could have come through such a World War I-style conflict and not have been forever affected. His strategic goal was an outright victory over Iraq, and if that was not possible, to create and influence a weak Iraq.”

Sometimes, American officials secretly communicated with General Suleimani in an effort to ease tensions in Iraq. In 2008, the American general, David Petraeus, was trying to find a truce in a fight that American forces and the Iraqi Army were waging against Shiite militias loyal to Iran. In Mr. Petraeus’s telling of the story, he was shown a text message directed to him: “General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassim Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan.”

Years later, General Suleimani personally, and mockingly, addressed another American leader: President Trump, who in July 2018 warned Iran’s president not to threaten the United States.

“It is beneath the dignity of our president to respond to you,” General Suleimani declared in a speech in western Iran. “I, as a soldier, respond to you.”

“We are near you, where you can’t even imagine,” he added. “We are ready. We are the man of this arena.”

For years after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran railed against what it saw as American aggression in the region, worried that the United States would turn its attention to regime change in Iran after Mr. Hussein was gone.

American officials have blamed Iran for killing hundreds of American soldiers during the war, many with sophisticated, shaped-charge bombs that could slice through American armored vehicles.

As the United States sought to negotiate a deal with Iraq that would allow American forces to stay in the country past a 2011 deadline, it was General Suleimani who relentlessly pushed Iraqi officials to refuse to sign, using a mixture of threats and the promise of more financial and military aid, American and Iraqi officials say.

On his orders, Iraqi construction crews in 2014 began building a roadway for Iranian supplies and militiamen, a small piece of what was perhaps the general’s most important project: establishing a land route from Tehran to the Mediterranean, across Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, where Iran has long supported Hezbollah, a primary threat to Israel.

One telling episode that illustrated the depth of Iranian control came in 2014, when the Islamic State was rampaging across Iraq. General Suleimani paid a visit to Bayan Jabr, then the country’s transportation minister.

According to a collection of Iranian intelligence cables published recently by The Intercept and The New York Times, General Suleimani came to Mr. Jabr with a demand: He needed to use Iraqi airspace to fly planeloads of military supplies to support the Syrian government of Mr. Assad. Despite lobbying by the Obama administration to close Iraq’s airspace to the flights, Mr. Jabr quickly said yes.

“I put my hands on my eyes and said, ‘On my eyes! As you wish!’” Mr. Jabr told an Iranian Intelligence Ministry officer, according to one of the cables. “Then he got up and approached me and kissed my forehead.”

The same trove of documents contains evidence that General Suleimani is not universally admired within Iran.

A bitter rivalry between his Quds Force and the other main Iranian intelligence agency, the Ministry of Intelligence, played out over the course of the cables. Many criticized General Suleimani’s proxy campaign in Iraq, and the way his militia allies abused the Sunni population there, as weakening Iran’s long-term interests in the region.

“This policy of Iran in Iraq has allowed the Americans to return to Iraq with greater legitimacy,” one cable read.

In others, ministry case officers portrayed General Suleimani as a relentless self-promoter who used the battle against the Islamic State to bolster his potential political aspirations in the future.

Iran watchers sounded alarm that General Suleimani’s death would unleash unpredictable regional mayhem from Syria to Iraq that would be difficult for the United States to contain. Several Iranian diplomats said that the prospect of diplomacy with the United States, being quietly negotiated through Japan and France, was effectively dead. The talk was now of revenge, not negotiations, they said.

“This one life lost will likely cost many more Iranian, Iraqi, American and others,” said Ali Vaez, director of Iran program for International Crisis Group. “It is not just Suleimani’s death, but likely the death knell of the Iran nuclear deal and any prospect of diplomacy between Iran and the U.S.”

Qassim Suleimani was born in 1957 in Rabor, in eastern Iran, and later moved to the city of Kerman. He was the son of a farmer, and began laboring as a construction worker at age 12. His highest level of education was high school, and he later worked in the municipal water department in Kerman, according to a profile published by the Iranian state media.

According to a 2012 profile in The New Yorker, General Suleimani’s father became burdened with debt under the Shah. When the revolution came he was sympathetic to the cause, and joined the Revolutionary Guards soon after. He was married and had children, although there were conflicting stories in the Iranian news media about how many.

Within Iran, he was widely seen as exerting more influence over the country’s foreign policy than even the country’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif.

General Suleimani, in death if not in life, appeared to have united Iran’s rival political parties to rally behind the flag. Iran’s expansionist policies in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have been contentious at home among ordinary Iranians and some reformist politicians who saw money and resources diverted from Iran to fund General Suleimani’s missions.

But on Friday, there was only praise and grief. Iranian officials across the political spectrum issued statements of condolences and condemned the United States.

The powerful Revolutionary Guards, of which the Quds Force is a component, said plans were underway for a huge public funeral.

“He was so big that he achieved his dream of being martyred by America,” wrote a reformist politician and former vice president, Mohammad Ali Abtahi.

General Suleimani had received the country’s highest military honor, the Order of Zolfaghar, established in 1856 under the Qajar dynasty. He became the only military commander to receive the honor in the Islamic Republic.

Ayatollah Khamenei pinned the medal on General Suleimani’s chest last February, and in remarks that now seem prophetic, said: “The Islamic Republic needs him for many more years. But I hope that in the end, he dies as a martyr.”

______

Tim Arango reported from Los Angeles; Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv, Israel; and Ben Hubbard from Beirut. Nazila Fathi contributed reporting from Washington, and Farnaz Fassihi from New York.

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womenofcolor15 · 5 years ago

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Everyone Is Shook After U.S. Strike Kills Iranian Leader Qasem Soleimani, Trump Outed His Possible Reasons For It YEARS Ago

When you do clownery, it comes back to bite you. Folks fear a war may be on the horizon after President Trump ordered the U.S. to attack Iranian leader Qasem Soleimani. Meanwhile, Americans are slamming Trump for the disproportional strike and the prediction he made years ago while coming for Obama that makes him look even worse.

Folks are SHOOK after the Pentagon and the U.S. military issued an airstrike near Baghdad’s airport that killed Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force unit, last night. And rightfully so. The attack could cause major conflict across the Middle East. Not only that, killing Iran’s most notorious military commander and spy could possibly start a war with the U.S. & our allies (whom we've strained relations with ever since Trump took office).

After the strike, and without any Presidential address to the nation, Congress or our allies beforehand, President Trump took to Twitter. He posted the American flag, which was his way of letting the world know the U.S. was behind the drone attack.

pic.twitter.com/VXeKiVzpTf

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 3, 2020

After he sent his tweet, it was confirmed by news outlets that the strike had presidential authorization.

While almost no one here in America supports a man like Soleimani, who has been behind the death of American soldiers and US embassy attacks, there are reasons that Presidents like Obama and W. chose not to kill him but to make more strategic moves to tie Iran's hands. Retaliation from a country like Iran could be deadly on both sides, seeing that their affinity for nuclear war is known, and there are better ways to mitigate our issues with them. This is chess, not checkers. A leader like Trump, though, likely doesn't know how to play either. The air strike seemed to be more of a flex - not to be confused with BDE - than a strategic and necessary move. And we might pay dearly for it.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - the country’s most powerful leader – took to Twitter this morning to let the world know they WILL #SeekRevenge:

His efforts & path won’t be stopped by his martyrdom, by God’s Power, rather a #SevereRevenge awaits the criminals who have stained their hands with his & the other martyrs’ blood last night. Martyr Soleimani is an Intl figure of Resistance & all such people will seek revenge. /3

— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) January 3, 2020

“His efforts & path won’t be stopped by his martyrdom, by God’s Power, rather a #SevereRevenge awaits the criminals who have stained their hands with his & the other martyrs’ blood last night. Martyr Soleimani is an Intl figure of Resistance & all such people will seek revenge,” he tweeted.

According to multiple media reports, Iranian leaders are vowing “harsh retaliation.” Threats against the U.S. are being made on Twitter and folks are shook.

The American terrorists have dug their own graves with this heinous act of terror, and a #severerevenge awaits them.#Soleimani#TerroristTrump pic.twitter.com/QINPGVwVGb

— علیرضا یگانه(tariiiid) (@tariiiid) January 3, 2020

The drone attack comes after several attacks against the U.S. and its allies via proxies for months, according to CNN.

They are accused of hitting Saudi oilfields. A US drone before that. Oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. And this week they directed attacks at the US Embassy in Baghdad, the US says."

The Defense Department said Soleimani “was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region.”

Former Vice President/ Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden reacted to the U.S. airstrike, warning it could leave the U.S. “on the brink of a major conflict across the Middle East.”

My statement on the killing of Qassem Soleimani. pic.twitter.com/4Q9tlLAYFB

— Joe Biden (@JoeBiden) January 3, 2020

Presidential hopeful Bernie Sanders also reacted to Trump's "dangerous escalation" that will lead us to war:

Trump's dangerous escalation brings us closer to another disastrous war in the Middle East that could cost countless lives and trillions more dollars.

Trump promised to end endless wars, but this action puts us on the path to another one.

— Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders) January 3, 2020

Democratic presidential hopefuls Elizabeth Warren & Andrew Yang also responded via Twitter:

Soleimani was a murderer, responsible for the deaths of thousands, including hundreds of Americans. But this reckless move escalates the situation with Iran and increases the likelihood of more deaths and new Middle East conflict. Our priority must be to avoid another costly war.

— Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren) January 3, 2020

War with Iran is the last thing we need and is not the will of the American people. We should be acting to deescalate tensions and protect our people in the region.

— Andrew Yang (@AndrewYang) January 3, 2020

New York Mayor Bill de Blasio responded to the attack, saying he fears for the city of New York and our nation after the government “effectively declared war” without the people’s vote.

Worried for our city + our nation. Without the approval of Congress, the US Government effectively declared war on Iran tonight. The American people had no say in the matter, despite voting time + again to stop endless wars + bring our troops home. This one will not end soon.

— Mayor Bill de Blasio (@NYCMayor) January 3, 2020

NYC is a potential target, so Mayor de Blasio said the NYPD will take immediate steps to protect key locations across the city following the death of Iran’s top general.

Have spoken with Commissioner Shea + Dep Commissioner Miller about immediate steps NYPD will take to protect key NYC locations from any attempt by Iran or its terrorist allies to retaliate against America. We will have to be vigilant against this threat for a long time to come.

— Mayor Bill de Blasio (@NYCMayor) January 3, 2020

The NYPD continues to closely monitor the events in Iran & across the region for any further developments. While there are no specific / credible threats to #NYC, we’ve deployed additional resources to key locations.

As always, if you see something, say something. 1-888-NYC-SAFE pic.twitter.com/JwL0mojnsS

— Commissioner Shea (@NYPDShea) January 3, 2020

The news of Trump igniting a war against Iran isn't shocking to some. He seemingly told on himself nine years ago, while accusing President Barack Obama of possibly starting a war with Iran because he's too "weak and ineffective" to negotiate and also needs a boost before re-election. Sound familiar?

View this post on Instagram

9 years ago in 2011 he thought he was droppin science....turns out he was just telling on himself.

A post shared by Questlove Froman, (@questlove) on Jan 3, 2020 at 1:33am PST

Funny how the tables turn. He also tweeted the same thing:

Obama did not attack Iran, but instead negotiated and entered into a nuclear deal, one that Trump trashed ever since it was installed in 2015. Until, he did the same thing himself. Trump basically re-affirmed the same criteria in his "new nuclear deal" after withdrawing from the one Obama created. Spite makes us do weird things.

History always repeats itself, especially when people don't know and take heed to their history. It seems Trump is taking a page from former President Bill Clinton's impeachment blueprint. People are sharing a picture of this New York Times article accusing Trump - who's currently involved in an impeachment process - of doing the same thing Clinton did in the 90s:

In December 1998, the New York Times ran a cover story on the delay of the impeachment vote on Bill Clinton due to Clinton's launch of an "Iraq air strike."

Peep the comparisons below:

youtube

As of this afternoon, 3500 additional American troops have been deployed to Iraq for "protection" in dealing with their neighbor Iran.

Thoughts?

Photo: Evan El-Amin/Shuttershock.com

[Read More ...] source http://theybf.com/2020/01/03/trump-told-on-himself-years-ago-about-igniting-war-with-iran-now-everyone-is-shook-after-

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beardedmrbean · 13 days ago

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A furious blame game is unfolding among Iran’s armed forces over the fall of Bashar al-Assad, The Telegraph has learned.

Officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said commanders of the elite military force were blaming each other “in angry terms” for the collapse of Assad’s regime and the loss of Iranian influence in the region.

“The atmosphere is like something between almost punching each other, punching the walls, yelling at each other and kicking rubbish bins. They are blaming each other, and no one is taking responsibility,” one official from Tehran told The Telegraph.

“No one ever imagined seeing Assad fleeing, as the focus for 10 years had been only on keeping him in power. And it was not because we were in love with him, it was because we wanted to maintain proximity to Israel and Hezbollah.”

Iran spent billions of dollars propping up Assad’s regime after intervening in the Syrian civil war in the mid-2010s.

His government was also the lynchpin in a regional “axis of resistance” masterminded by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, and Qassim Soleimani, a former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force who was killed by a US air strike in 2020.

That network had already been badly mauled over the past 14 months by Israel’s wars against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and British and American airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen.

But the loss of Syria could be fatal because it was the main route for supplying Hezbollah, whose arsenal in southern Lebanon had projected Iranian military power directly to the border of Israel.

“You need someone there to send arms to [but] they are either getting killed or escaping. Now the focus is on how to move forward from this impasse,” a second IRGC official told The Telegraph.

“For now, there are no discussions about arms, as everyone is trying to understand what is really happening and how dangerous it is for Iran,” he said.

He added that some are blaming Brig Gen Esmail Qaani, the present commander of the Quds Force for allowing Assad’s army to disperse.

“No one dares to tell him to his face, but... he is the one to hold accountable and fire,” he said.

“He has done nothing to prevent Iran’s interests from crumbling. Allies fell one after another, and he was watching from Tehran. Even worse days might yet be coming.”

Iran’s supreme leader is due to address the nation on Wednesday about the “recent regional developments”.

In its official statement, the Islamic Republic expressed expectations of continued “friendly” relations with Syria.

Iran’s foreign ministry said the historical ties between Iran and Syria would persist.

“The relations between the two nations of Iran and Syria have a long history and have always been friendly, and it is expected that these relations will continue,” it said.

But behind the scenes, Tehran is in crisis.

The first IRGC official mentioned rumours suggesting that Maj Gen Qaani could be replaced by Khamenei because “many are now calling for it”.

He said Khamenei had summoned commanders several times in recent days as Syrian rebels were advancing towards Damascus.

“The situation is bizarre and heated and angry discussions are taking place – the other concern is what to tell supporters in Iran,” he added.

Asked about the military’s view of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader whose Oct 7 attack on Israel sparked the past 14 months of war, the official said: “I can just tell you that he is no longer a celebrity here.”

Soleimani, who was killed near Baghdad in January 2020, spent years in Syria and was credited in Iran with saving Damascus and reclaiming territory from the rebels.

Khamenei at the time had instructed the IRGC to “save Assad” and called the Quds Force “soldiers without borders”.

Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif praised Soleimani as a “commander in the fight against terrorism” and claimed the US and Europe owed him for helping defeat Isis in Iraq and Syria.

“But it’s a memory in black and white now and the resistance project almost no longer exists,” added the IRGC official who spoke to The Telegraph.

“You don’t need to be an expert to see that we are in our weakest and most vulnerable position in decades and many acknowledge that here,” he added.

Iran still has some options for supplying its proxies, including by sea, and is unlikely to simply abandon its network.

“Iran is anticipating the arrival of the Trump administration and maximum pressure of sanctions. It sees its partners across the region significantly weakened,” said Sanam Vakil, director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme.

“But, I do think, Iran will find new ways to provide that support.

“What has Iran done more successfully in the past is taking advantage of state weakness as well as opportunities in the region, and it will be looking for those moments of weakness and opportunities,” Mrs Vakil said.

“But they might not come now.”

Arash Azizi, an Iranian historian and author of a book about Soleimani, said others in the Iranian leadership may seize the opportunity for a fundamental reset of foreign policy.

“There is a big segment of the Iranian establishment which realises the gig is up: revolutionary Islamism devoted to confronting America is not going to get them anywhere,” he said.

“That doesn’t mean they want to be a liberal democracy, but they want to be more like Turkey or India, a big power in pursuit of their own interests.”

Some ordinary Iranian citizens, however, are celebrating the fall of Assad and told The Telegraph they hope the Ayatollah will go the same way.

“I celebrated with a bottle of aragh sagi [Iranian moonshine] and the hope for the fall of the mullahs,” one Tehran resident said. “The region deserves peace, and that won’t happen until they are gone.”

“More than 90 per cent of the people are happy and celebrating it, the mullahs should know that this is what will happen if they don’t have the people’s support,” he said.

“The repression of people leads to dictators’ downfall,” he added. “The mullahs will soon regret their actions in Moscow.”

#nunyas news #nearly every mena nations military #is a joke when it comes to actually fighting #instead of bullying locals

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diarrheaworldstarhiphop · 6 years ago

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Earlier this month, Syrian regime forces hoisted their flag above the southern town of Daraa and celebrated. Although there is more bloodletting to come, the symbolism was hard to miss. The uprising that began in that town on March 6, 2011, has finally been crushed, and the civil war that has engulfed the country and destabilized parts of the Middle East as well as Europe will be over sooner rather than later. Bashar al-Assad, the man who was supposed to fall in “a matter of time,” has prevailed with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah over his own people.

Washington is too busy over the furor of the day to reflect on the fact that there are approximately 500,000 fewer Syrians today than there were when a group of boys spray-painted “The people demand the fall of the regime” on buildings in Daraa more than seven years ago. But now that the Syria conflict has been decided, it’s worth thinking about the purpose and place of the United States in the new Middle East. The first order of business is to dispose of the shibboleths that have long been at the core of U.S. foreign policy in the region and have contributed to its confusion and paralysis in Syria and beyond.

There probably isn’t anyone inside the Beltway who hasn’t been told at some point in their career about the dangers of reasoning by analogy. But that doesn’t mean such lessons have been regularly heeded. The Syrian uprising came at a fantastical time in the Middle East when freedom, it seemed, was breaking out everywhere. The demonstration of people power that began in Daraa—coming so soon after the fall of longtime leaders in Tunisia and Egypt—was moving. It also clouded the judgment of diplomats, policymakers, analysts, and journalists, rendering them unable to discern the differences between the region’s Assads and Ben Alis or between the structure of the Syrian regime and that of the Egyptian one.

And because the policy community did not expect the Syrian leader to last very long, it was caught flat-footed when Assad pursued his most obvious and crudely effective strategy: a militarization of the uprising. In time, Syria’s competing militias, jihadis, and regional powers, compounded by Russia’s intervention, made it hard to identify U.S. interests in the conflict. So, Washington condemned the bloodshed, sent aid to refugees, halfheartedly trained “vetted” rebels, and bombed the Islamic State, but it otherwise stayed out of Syria’s civil conflict. Lest anyone believe that this was a policy particular to U.S. President Barack Obama and his aim to get out of, not into Middle Eastern conflicts, his successor’s policy is not substantially different, with the exception that President Donald Trump is explicit about leaving Syria to Moscow after destroying the Islamic State. While the bodies continued to pile up, all Washington could muster was expressions of concern over another problem from hell. Syria is, of course, different from Rwanda, Darfur, and Srebrenica—to suggest otherwise would be reasoning by analogy—but it is another case of killing on an industrial scale that paralyzed Washington. It seems that even those well versed in history cannot avoid repeating it.

Many of the analysts and policymakers who preferred that the United States stay out or minimize its role in Syria came to that position honestly. They looked at the 2003 invasion of Iraq and decried how it destabilized the region, empowered Iran, damaged relations with Washington’s allies, and fueled extremist violence, undermining the U.S. position in the region. It seems lost on the same group that U.S. inaction in Syria did the same: contributed to regional instability, empowered Iran, spoiled relations with regional friends, and boosted transnational terrorist groups. The decision to stay away may have nonetheless been good politics, but it came at a noticeable cost to Washington’s position in the Middle East.

(Prat note: lmao at FP thinking the US policy in syria was that of inaction)

The waning of U.S. power and influence that Syria has both laid bare and hastened is a development that the policy community has given little thought to, because it was not supposed to happen. By every traditional measure of power, the United States, after all, has no peer. But power is only useful in its application, and Washington has proved either unable or unwilling to shape events in the Middle East as it had in the past—which is to say, it has abdicated its own influence. That may be a positive development. No one wants a repeat of Iraq. In Washington’s place, Moscow has stepped in to offer itself as a better, more competent partner to Middle Eastern countries. There haven’t been many takers yet beyond the Syrians, but there nevertheless seems to be a lot of interest, and the conflict in Syria is the principal reason why.

Contrast the way in which Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the rescue of an ally in crisis—Assad—with the way U.S. allies in the region perceive Obama to have helped push Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from office after 30 years, much of it spent carrying Washington’s water around in the region. The Egyptians, Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis, and others may not like Assad very much, but Russia’s initial forceful response to prevent the Syrian dictator from falling and then Moscow’s efforts to will Assad to apparent victory have made an impression on them. Syria is now the centerpiece and pivot of Russia’s strategy to reassert itself as a global power, and its renewed influence in the Middle East stretches from Damascus eastward through the Kurdistan Regional Government to Iran and from the Syrian capital south to Egypt before arcing west to Libya.

Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf States still look to Washington for leadership but have also begun seeking help securing their interests at the Kremlin. The Israeli prime minister has become a fixture at Putin’s side; the Turkish president and his Russian counterpart are, along with Iran’s leaders, partners in Syria; King Salman made the first ever visit by a Saudi monarch to Moscow in October 2017; and the Emiratis believe the Russians should be “at the table” for discussions of regional importance. The era when the United States determined the rules of the game in the Middle East and maintained a regional order that made it relatively easier and less expensive to exercise U.S. power lasted 25 years. It is now over.

Finally, the situation in Syria reveals the profound ambivalence of Americans toward the Middle East and the declining importance of what U.S. officials have long considered Washington’s interests there: oil, Israel, and U.S. dominance of the area to ensure the other two. Americans wonder why U.S. military bases dot the Persian Gulf if the United States is poised to become the world’s largest producer of oil. After two inconclusive wars in 17 years, no one can offer Americans a compelling reason why the Assad regime is their problem. Israel remains popular, but over 70 years it has proved that it can handle itself. Obama and Trump ran on platforms of retrenchment, and they won. The immobility over Syria is a function of the policy community’s impulse to just do something and the politics that make that impossible.

Perhaps now that the Assad-Putin-Khamenei side of the Syrian conflict has won, there will be an opportunity for Americans to debate what is important in the Middle East and why. It will not be easy, however. Congress is polarized and paralyzed. The Trump administration approach to the region is determined by the president’s gut. He has continued Obama-era policies of fighting extremist groups, but then he broke with his predecessors and moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Trump breached the Iran nuclear deal, though he has done very little since about Iran other than talk tough. He wants to leave Syria “very soon,” even as his national security advisor vows to stay as long as Iran remains.

Despite and because of this incoherence, now is the time to have a debate about the Middle East. There is a compelling argument to be made that American interests demand an active U.S. role in the region; there is an equally compelling argument that U.S. goals can be secured without the wars, social engineering projects, peace processes, and sit-downs in Geneva. In between is what U.S. policy in the Middle East looks like now: ambivalence and inertia. Under these circumstances, Syria, Russia, and Iran will continue to win.

youtube

#syria #syrian civil war #Syrian arab army #daraa #USA #united states

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jetsway · 3 years ago

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Why Bill Gates Is Keen on Private Jets?

Makers of personal luxury planes like Bombardier Inc., General Elements Corp. what's more, Textron Inc. cut creation rates before in the pandemic yet recently have sounded idealistic about their capacity to win new clients.

"You have individuals that are coming in to business aeronautics that have not truly been doing business flight or claimed a value piece of an airplane," Textron CEO Scott Donnelly told financial backers as of late. "The decrease in the quantity of [commercial] flights is making it extremely challenging for individuals to get from direct A toward point B in the country without requiring an entire day doing it." North America represents almost 66% of the world's armada of personal luxury planes.

Environment concerns are genuine yet so are close term wellbeing stresses, and the comfort of flying private yields genuine usefulness benefits for top corporate chiefs, Carter Copeland of Melius Exploration said in a meeting. While personal luxury planes have a bigger carbon impression comparative with the quantity of seats, the outflows made by that side of the market fail to measure up to the more extensive business flying industry, so the last will probably draw in more consideration from environmental change activists, he said.

Honeywell Worldwide Inc., which makes motor innovation and cockpit controls for business jets, has said it anticipates that demand for private flights should get back to 2019 levels by the center of this current year. The development case from that point is murkier and is doubtlessly attached to personal luxury plane travel turning out to be more feasible for the general population, or maybe turning into a greener option in contrast to business flight if the area can lead the way on electric planes.

With arrangements stopped until another hardline organization gets to work in Tehran, the shots at resuscitating the 2015 Iran atomic arrangement at any point in the near future are not splendid. Besides, even effective discussions probably won't prevent Iran's chiefs from seeking after atomic weapons. The Biden organization needs to track down a superior method to hinder them.

It's as yet conceivable, maybe even possible, that the longing for sanctions alleviation will provoke the Iranians to rejoin the arrangement, officially known as the Joint Thorough Game plan, when they finish up the U.S. will make no further concessions. That would move back a portion of Iran's new advances, including its improvement of uranium to 60% immaculateness and its creation of uranium metal, utilized in atomic warheads.

Getting back to private jets the state of affairs bet, however, will likewise feature the first arrangement's major deficiencies — its quick moving toward dusk provisions, most remarkably. At the point when the JCPOA's key arrangements pass in 2030, there will be no restrictions on the size of Iran's atomic foundation, the number or sorts of axes it can run, or even the measure of weapons-grade fissile material it might have or deliver. By 2023, only a long time from now, there will be no restrictions on Iran's long range rockets, exceptionally viable conveyance vehicles for atomic weapons.

The way that the Biden organization desires to come to a "more extended and more grounded" follow-on arrangement mirrors its acknowledgment that the JCPOA isn't adequate. The difficulty is, approaching Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has clarified that Iran has no interest in such an arrangement. Affectations seldom, if at any time, adjust Iran's conduct and are probably not going to change the personalities of either Preeminent Pioneer Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the new president.

Nor is Iran's demand that it doesn't plan to foster atomic weapons solid. In case that were valid, the system might have sought after undeniably less exorbitant options in contrast to building its own broad advancement capacity. Setting up a common atomic industry to create power, utilizing fuel outfitted from outside the nation, was consistently an alternative — one that Iran reliably dismissed. Proof of its work on planning atomic warheads, uncovered in the atomic file Israel uncovered of Tehran, just affirms its advantage in a weapons program.

In the event that the U.S. can't convince Iran to temper such desires utilizing carrots, which appears to be improbable given Iran's resolved quest for an enormous atomic framework, it should discover more compelling sticks. To begin, the Biden organization ought to reexamine its expressed target and be clear the U.S. is resolved to prevent Iran from obtaining an atomic weapon, yet from having the option to deliver a bomb rapidly. It's possible Iran desires to turn into a limit atomic weapons state like Japan, which doesn't have an atomic weapon yet has every one of the way to create one rapidly. Not at all like Japan, Iran is a danger to its neighbors and should not be in a position where it could successfully give the world an atomic weapons done deal during a period based on its personal preference.

The Biden organization should in this way fix its definitive approach to say Iran won't be permitted to turn into an atomic weapons edge state. In principle, dealings could concede such a result. One approach to do as such is expand the JCPOA's nightfall statements for another 10 to 20 years. A superior option is force severe cutoff points on Iran's creation capacities and the numbers and kinds of rotators it can run, in ceaselessness.

In case Raisi's administration keeps on dismissing follow-on talks, in any case, the U.S. should make the expenses of seeking after a limit ability far more clear. To do as such, the Biden organization ought to consider giving Israel the GBU-57 Monstrous Arms Penetrator, a 30,000-pound mountain-buster, as some in Congress have supported. Such a weapon could be utilized to annihilate Fordow, the underground Iranian improvement office, just as other solidified atomic locales.

Obviously, the White House would have to arrive at a firm understanding with the Israelis about triggers for the bomb's utilization. In any case, being ready to give Israel a particularly fearsome weapon and renting the B-2 aircraft to convey it would send an incredible message. The Iranians may question whether the U.S. would finish its dangers; they will not experience any difficulty accepting the Israelis will.

Truth be told, giving the GBU-57 to Israel might be the best instigation for Iran to arrange a "more extended and more grounded" bargain. Really at that time may the system acknowledge that the U.S. is not kidding about keeping Iran from getting an edge status — and that Iran chances its whole atomic foundation without an arrangement restricting it. Under such conditions, Iran's chiefs will have an impetus to get something now for tolerating a result that the U.S. furthermore, Israel may somehow force.

Flying by personal luxury plane contract has numerous advantages, and in the event that you have the cash to do as such, you can decide to utilize this choice, which is the favored voyaging technique for some expert competitors, business leaders, diversion VIPs, guard authorities, government officials, and rich people. The facts confirm that utilizing an airplane sanction has reclassified how residents travel, in contrast with customary business flights. The advantages related with a private contract are more sumptuous, and you have greater accessibility as far as non-stop trips to distant areas all throughout the planet.

Booking your Sanction

despite the fact that it requires more opportunity to book a sanction flight, it tends to be finished easily on the web, or through phone with a record leader for the airplane contract organization you have picked. The area you pick will figure out which contract organization you can utilize; a few organizations are simply prepared to travel a particular distance because of the size of their airplanes. Your spending plan likewise assumes a significant part in this cycle. When booking your arrangement

#busniess #plane

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eretzyisrael · 3 years ago

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How the West was Lost

Today the world we live in is dominated by a Western alliance that includes the US and much of Europe, along with some smaller players. This alliance is threatened by two major forces: radical Islam, whose most dangerous expression is the revolutionary Iranian regime; and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), still smarting from its oppression by the West prior to its emergence as a great power. I’ll discuss Iran first.

Last week, Iranian drones attacked a ship near the coast of Oman, killing the captain and a crew member. Apparently the motivation was a tenuous Israeli connection. More recently, a ship in the same region was hijacked, and several others were disabled, apparently by a cyberattack. Although Iran denies being connected with any of these incidents, most observers believe that the Iranian regime was responsible for them.

The Iranian regime finances and arms terrorist groups throughout the region, including in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Lebanon, which survived a brutal civil war, an attempt by the PLO to set up a “Palestinian state” within her borders, an Israeli intervention to throw out the PLO, and the systematic murders of members of its government by Syrian agents, has finally been brought to her knees by her exploitation by the Iranian-controlled Hezbollah. The Covid epidemic, and a massive explosion of a cache of Hezbollah’s explosives at the port that leveled a third of her capital city didn’t help.

Israel, which fought a vicious little war with Hezbollah in 2006, now lives in the shadow of 130,000 rockets located in South Lebanon. These rockets, which include ones with precision guidance systems that can strike within a few meters of targets anywhere in Israel, are deeply embedded in the civilian population, including private homes. Israeli defense officials have said that if Hezbollah activates its rockets, the IDF will be forced to employ massive firepower that will essentially destroy the country. The possibility of war breaking out due to escalation between Hezbollah and Israel is a constant threat.

Westerners who visit relatives in Iran or go there for business, educational, or other reasons are often arrested on trumped-up charges and held hostage, either for ransom or political advantage. Sometimes they are tortured. Conditions in prisons for Iranian political dissidents are atrocious, with torture and rape common. Hundreds of Iranians are executed every year, some for serious crimes like murder or rape, but also for “being gay, committing adultery, sex outside marriage and drinking alcohol.” Political opponents of the regime are sometimes charged with spying and executed as well.

Iranian women protesting Islamic dress codes that are forced on them are beaten, arrested, jailed, and tortured. Masih Alinejad, an Iranian feminist now living in exile in the US, was the target of a plot to kidnap her and bring her back to Iran. The plan was foiled by the FBI. Kidnapping and murdering dissidents abroad has been standard procedure for the regime since it came to power in 1979.

The new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, has been nicknamed “the butcher of Tehran,” because of his responsibility for the execution of thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of people during a reign of terror in 1988. Raisi is considered one of the top candidates to succeed Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader.

Last, but not least, is the regime’s plan to develop nuclear weapons, which is advancing rapidly. Whether such weapons would be directly used – something which is difficult to judge, due to the religious aspects of Iranian ideology – or whether they would be employed as an “umbrella” to shield its more conventional military aggression, it’s likely that the imminent attainment of nuclear capability would greatly change the balance of power in our region, and make war likely. The regime has consistently and explicitly threatened to “wipe Israel off the map,” and Israel takes these threats seriously.

The Iranian regime, while it is economically and militarily weak, has developed means of leveraging asymmetric warfare, which along with its aggressive and even messianic ideology makes it a serious threat – not just to the region, but to the Western alliance and its leader, the US, which it calls “the great Satan.” The threat is immediate in the short term, due to its nuclear program. It is a highly repressive society, and although there is a strong domestic opposition, attempts to overthrow the regime will be (and have been) met with great brutality.

As an Israeli, naturally I am concerned about the local and immediate threat of Iran. But the PRC is a far greater threat to the Western alliance. China is already a nuclear power, and has recently been reported building up its stock of weapons. China’s military and economic power is thousands of times greater than that of Iran, and is every bit as brutal in its repression of internal dissent.

Although China does not publicly announce that the US is Satan, it is quietly moving its pieces – military and economic – on the world’s chessboard to increase its power and influence. It operates an unprecedented system of industrial espionage that has already neutralized the technological superiority of the US. It is building infrastructure throughout the world under its “Belt and Road Initiative” that will not only provide its industries access to markets, but the large debts incurred by the recipients will provide China political leverage over them.

Chinese technology that is used in the most critical communications infrastructure may contain “backdoors” that allow access to traffic on the networks. Everything from mobile phones to PCs to military communications systems have been suspected to be compromised.

The US and other developed countries are experiencing a long-term transition of their economies away from agriculture and manufacturing and toward service-based economies. Manufacturing has moved to China and to other countries, most of which are, or soon will be, in the Chinese sphere of influence. At the time of the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic, the US suffered a severe shortage of personal protective equipment and medical devices such as masks and so forth. It was simply not produced in the USA.

China does not (as far as I know) export violent terrorism as does Iran. But it has been engaging in territorial expansionism in all directions. Chinese pressure on Hong Kong and Taiwan make headlines, while China quietly “nibbles away” at Japanese islands, territories under Indian control, bits of Nepal and Bhutan, and so on. In the South China Sea, China has built artificial islands which have greatly extended its territorial waters and provided locations for military installations, including missile silos.

I have not discussed the possible exploitation of the Covid-19 epidemic. Certainly the misinformation and disinformation that was provided by China at the time of its outbreak exacerbated the harm to Western societies. There is even a credible argument that once the disease had become established in Wuhan, authorities there – under the direction of the national government – deliberately allowed the residents of the city to travel worldwide during the Chinese New Year period, knowing that this would spread the disease.

The Chinese strategy is safer and surer, if somewhat slower than the Iranian one. But the West has done little to protect itself, either against the immediate danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of a proven rogue aggressor state, or the long-term combined economic, military, and possibly biological domination of a rising totalitarian superstate. Western nations should be confiscating the Iranian regime’s nuclear toys, reestablishing self-sufficient economies, protecting their technological intellectual property, and strengthening their military forces. They are not doing any of these things.

Instead, the most advanced states of the West are self-destructing over issues of race and gender identity.

Abu Yehuda

#China #Iran #War

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