#GPS-Guided Artillery Shells

[xtruss]

Killer Drones Pioneered in Ukraine are the Weapons of the Future! They are Reshaping the Balance Between Humans and Technology in War

— February 8th 2024 | The Economist

Image: Getty Images

Precision-Guided Weapons first appeared in their modern form on the battlefield in Vietnam a little over 50 years ago. As armed forces have strived ever since for accuracy and destructiveness, the cost of such weapons has soared. America’s GPS-Guided artillery shells cost $100,000 a time. Because smart weapons are expensive, they are scarce. That is why European countries ran out of them in Libya in 2011. Illegal Regime of Isra-hell, more eager to conserve its stockpiles than avoid collateral damage, has rained dumb bombs on Gaza. What, though, if you could combine precision and abundance?

For the first time in the history of warfare that question is being answered on the battlefields of Ukraine. Our report this week shows how First-Person View (FPV) drones are mushrooming along the front lines. They are small, cheap, explosives-laden aircraft adapted from consumer models, and they are making a soldier’s life even more dangerous. These drones slip into tank turrets or dugouts. They loiter and pursue their quarry before going for the kill. They are inflicting a heavy toll on infantry and armour.

The war is also making FPV Drones and their maritime cousins ubiquitous. January saw 3,000 verified fpv drone strikes. This week Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s War Criminal and Thug President, created the Unmanned Systems Force, dedicated to drone warfare. In 2024 Ukraine is on track to build 1m-2m drones. Astonishingly, that will match Ukraine’s reduced consumption of shells (which is down because Republicans in Congress are shamefully denying Ukraine the supplies it needs).

The drone is not a wonder weapon—no such thing exists. It matters because it embodies big trends in war: a shift towards small, cheap and disposable weapons; the increasing use of consumer technology; and the drift towards autonomy in battle. Because of these trends, drone technology will spread rapidly from armies to militias, terrorists and criminals. And it will improve not at the budget-cycle pace of the military-industrial complex, but with the break-things urgency of consumer electronics.

Basic fpv drones are revolutionarily simple. The descendants of racing quadcopters, built from off-the-shelf components, they can cost as little as several hundred dollars. fpv drones tend to have short ranges, carry small payloads and struggle in bad weather. For those reasons they will not (yet) replace artillery. But they can still do a lot of damage. In one week last autumn Ukrainian drones helped destroy 75 Russian tanks and 101 big guns, among much else. Russia has its own fpv drones, though they tend to target dugouts, trenches and soldiers. Drones help explain why both sides find it so hard to mount offensives.

The exponential growth in the number of Russian and Ukrainian drones points to a second trend. They are inspired by and adapted from widely available consumer technology. Not only in Ukraine but also in Myanmar, where rebels have routed government forces in recent days, volunteers can use 3d printers to make key components and assemble airframes in small workshops. Unfortunately, criminal groups and terrorists are unlikely to be far behind the militias.

This reflects a broad democratisation of precision weapons. In Yemen the Houthi rebel group has used cheap Iranian guidance kits to build anti-ship missiles that are posing a deadly threat to commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Iran itself has shown how an assortment of long-range strike drones and ballistic missiles can have a geopolitical effect that far outweighs their cost. Even if the kit needed to overcome anti-drone jamming greatly raises the cost of the weapons, as some predict, they will still count as transformationally cheap.

The reason goes back to consumer electronics, which propel innovation at a blistering pace as capabilities accumulate in every product cycle. That poses problems of ethics as well as obsolescence. There will not always be time to subject novel weapons to the testing that Western countries aim for in peacetime and that is required by the Geneva Conventions.

Innovation also leads to the last trend, autonomy. Today, fpv drone use is limited by the supply of skilled pilots and by the effects of jamming, which can sever the connection between a drone and its operator. To overcome these problems, Russia and Ukraine are experimenting with autonomous navigation and target recognition. Artificial intelligence has been available in consumer drones for years and is improving rapidly.

A degree of autonomy has existed on high-end munitions for years and on cruise missiles for decades. The novelty is that cheap microchips and software will let intelligence sit inside millions of low-end munitions that are saturating the battlefield. The side that masters autonomy at scale in Ukraine first could enjoy a temporary but decisive advantage in firepower—a necessary condition for any breakthrough.

Western countries have been slow to absorb these lessons. Simple and cheap weapons will not replace big, high-end platforms, but they will complement them. The Pentagon is belatedly embarking on Replicator, an initiative to build thousands of low-cost drones and munitions able to take on China’s enormous forces. Europe is even further behind. Its ministers and generals increasingly believe that they could face another major European war by the end of the decade. If so, investment in low-end drones needs to grow urgently. Moreover, ubiquitous drones will require ubiquitous defences—not just on battlefields but also in cities at peace.

Kalashnikovs In The Skies

Intelligent drones will also raise questions about how armies wage war and whether humans can control the battlefield. As drones multiply, self-co-ordinating swarms will become possible. Humans will struggle to monitor and understand their engagements, let alone authorise them.

America and its allies must prepare for a world in which rapidly improving military capabilities spread more quickly and more widely. As the skies over Ukraine fill with expendable weapons that marry precision and firepower, they serve as a warning. Mass-produced hunter-killer aircraft are already reshaping the balance between humans and technology in war. ■

— This Article Appeared in the Leaders Section of the Print Edition Under the Headline "Killer Drones"

[mariacallous]

For Ukrainian soldiers facing the near-constant threat of Russian drones, a crude-looking, pocketable drone detector has become one of the most sought-after gadgets on the battlefield. Dubbed Tsukorok, or “sugar,” by its London-based creator, the grassroots device produced by a variety of manufacturers beeps loudly when a drone enters its detection range, allowing soldiers time to run to cover or turn on their jamming devices.

“It’s amazing because it is so cheap and simple,” a mortar crewman, currently positioned in the Donbas region, said of the Tsukorok. He, like all soldiers cited in this article, spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press.

More than two years into Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Russian military still enjoys the upper hand in electronic warfare. “The Russians have powerful electronic warfare equipment. … Unfortunately, Russia is significantly ahead of Ukraine,” Ukrainian activist Maria Berlinska told Ukrainska Pravda in April. Berlinska was instrumental in pushing the Ukrainian military to develop its own drone capabilities and has trained soldiers and civilians to fly reconnaissance and attack drones.

On Ukraine’s front line, electronic warfare has largely focused on the ability to use and defend from reconnaissance and strike drones as well as long-range missiles. Small, agile first-person-view (FPV) drones, which can carry between 2 and 11 pounds of explosives, are now used extensively by both sides. The ability to detect and jam the signals sent and received by those drones is a matter of life and death.

The Russian military has successfully used elaborate truck-mounted jamming systems to reduce the effectiveness of Western-made, GPS-guided artillery shells as well as HIMARS and JDAM guided bombs, the Washington Post reported in May. More recently, Moscow has used armored vehicles and tanks mounted with jamming devices to push across the front line.

Now, with the sky on the front line saturated with drones, Ukraine is attempting to catch up. That often means employing simpler, more inexpensive equipment with smaller ranges, such as the Tsukorok, to detect signals coming from Russian drones and other guided weapons. More than 50 Ukrainian companies are engaged in producing electronic warfare equipment, from the humble Tsukorok to expensive jamming devices. Tens of thousands of drones are also produced or assembled in the country every month.

But the detection gadgets are hard to obtain. “Right now, I think the demand [for jamming equipment] is at least 10 times higher than what we can provide,” said Bohdan Danyliv, the head of the military department at the Prytula Foundation, one of the biggest organizations supporting the Ukrainian military. “Honestly, it may be 50 times bigger.” The Prytula Foundation already delivers equipment including SUVs, strike drones, rifle optics, communication, and medical equipment to the armed forces. In recent months, the organization has looked to ramp up deliveries of electronic warfare devices.

“Yes, it’s difficult right now,” said Dmytro Selin, the London-based Ukrainian software engineer behind the first model of the Tsukorok. “Deliveries [of parts for manufacturing] aren’t reliable. Parcels can get stuck for weeks at a time. … Demand is a lot higher than our team can handle.”

Soldiers and the Ukrainian companies producing electronic warfare equipment must also deal with the ever-changing nature of electronic warfare. “Both the technologies and the tactics evolve very quickly,” said Anton Veklenko, the chief instructor and co-founder of Global Drone Academy, a Ukrainian company training Ukrainian civilians and soldiers in the use of military drones and electronic warfare.

Since 2022, electronic warfare has quickly made GPS guidance, which most off-the-shelf consumer drones use to navigate, obsolete. Both sides now deploy drones that act as relays to increase the flying range of their FPV drones to distances of up to 31 miles. Russia and Ukraine have also each experimented with autonomous guidance systems, allowing drones to strike their targets even when their signals jammed.

“We also train our pilots to detect which frequencies are being jammed in a specific area of the front line so that they can quickly change the frequencies used to fly their drones,” Veklenko said. “There’s no universal jammer that can block everything, so it’s a constant game of adaptation.”

The rise in popularity of the Tsukorok in late 2023, boosted by positive word of mouth from a Ukrainian military blogger, represents one of these adaptations. The constant threat of drones created the need for a small detector that could be used by any soldier without the training that more accurate and reliable—but also more complex—spectrum analyzers require. Selin, who moved to the United Kingdom in 2019, developed the first prototype in the summer of 2022, focusing at the time on detecting signals from the Russian Orlan reconnaissance drone.

Front-line troops use the Tsukorok to know when to turn on their energy-intensive jamming devices; artillery crewmen think of it as a last-resort warning, allowing them to run to prepared shelters as loitering munitions hurl toward them. A combat medic currently serving in the Kharkiv region explained that he always leaves a Tsukorok in his olive-colored ambulance: “I use it as a guide, to know when to use the jammer.”

The surge in demand put Selin and other groups building the device in a bind, as they went from producing a handful of detectors every month to hundreds, and then thousands, facing hurdles to scale up production. “I’m in talks with manufacturers and governments in Europe, but it is complicated, in good parts because of the bureaucracy,” Selin said. “But now we’re looking to diversify as much as possible,” with a goal of producing up to 10,000 detectors every month. Currently, half of the parts of the Tsukorok are produced in China and half in Ukraine; the final product is assembled in Ukraine.

“When it comes to the production of [electronic warfare] equipment, the situation right now is similar to what we had with FPV drones a year and a half ago,” said Danyliv of the Prytula Foundation. There is an “unstructured market, few established players, and a mix of bad devices that can cost a lot of money and high-quality devices that cannot be produced in enough quantities to meet the demand.”

The Tsukorok isn’t a miracle solution, Selin admitted: It can lose effectiveness in areas saturated with drones and is meant to complement, rather than replace, other detecting and jamming devices. “It is meant as a last warning device, but on the battlefield, soldiers will get information from lots of other sources,” Selin said.

“I call them personal protectors—it’s something that every soldier should have,” Danyliv said. “It won’t solve everything, but when you have one of those things in your pocket, you feel a lot calmer.”

[priteshwemarketresearch]

Ammunition Market Analysis, Key Players, Share Dynamic Demand and Consumption by  2023 to  2031

Ammunition Market: Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities

The ammunition market is an essential segment of the global defense and security industry, playing a pivotal role in both military and civilian sectors. From firearms enthusiasts to law enforcement agencies, the demand for ammunition continues to grow worldwide, driven by increasing security concerns, geopolitical tensions, and rising interest in recreational shooting. This blog explores the current trends, challenges, and future opportunities in the ammunition market.

Request Sample Copy: https://wemarketresearch.com/reports/request-free-sample-pdf/ammunition-market/410

What is the Ammunition Market?

The ammunition market encompasses the production, distribution, and sale of various types of ammunition used in firearms and other weapons systems. Ammunition can be categorized into small-caliber (used in handguns, rifles, and shotguns) and large-caliber (used in military artillery, tanks, and aircraft). The market includes bullets, shells, cartridges, and other types of projectiles that are used for defense, law enforcement, hunting, sport shooting, and other applications.

Growing Demand for Ammunition: Key Drivers

Several factors are driving the growth of the global ammunition market:

Rising Security Concerns: The increasing threat of terrorism, geopolitical instability, and military conflicts has prompted governments to invest more in defense and security. This, in turn, has increased the demand for ammunition for military and law enforcement agencies. Ammunition is critical in ensuring the readiness of armed forces and law enforcement personnel.

Civilian Gun Ownership: In many countries, the trend of civilian gun ownership has risen significantly, with firearms enthusiasts seeking ammunition for personal use, hunting, and sport shooting. The growth of recreational shooting sports like target shooting and skeet shooting is further contributing to the demand for small-caliber ammunition.

Advancements in Technology: Technological improvements in ammunition manufacturing have led to the development of more efficient, reliable, and cost-effective products. These innovations make ammunition more appealing to both professional and recreational shooters. For example, advanced projectiles and eco-friendly ammunition have gained popularity.

Hunting and Sporting Activities: Hunting continues to be a popular pastime in many parts of the world. The demand for ammunition used in hunting rifles, shotguns, and other firearms remains steady. As more people participate in recreational hunting and shooting sports, the need for various types of ammunition increases.

Key Trends in the Ammunition Market

The ammunition market is evolving, and several emerging trends are shaping its future:

Shift Toward Lead-Free Ammunition: Environmental concerns have led to a shift toward lead-free ammunition. Lead, a hazardous material, is being phased out of ammunition production due to its environmental and health risks. Many countries have already implemented regulations to ban lead-based bullets and shells in certain areas, especially in hunting.

Increasing Adoption of Smart Ammunition: Smart ammunition, which integrates advanced technologies like GPS, sensors, and guided systems, is gradually gaining traction. These types of ammunition are particularly useful in military applications, as they can increase accuracy, reduce collateral damage, and enhance overall operational efficiency.

Emerging Markets: Developing regions, particularly in Asia-Pacific and Latin America, are becoming key players in the ammunition market. As defense budgets in these regions rise and military modernization programs continue to expand, the demand for ammunition is set to increase. Additionally, the growing interest in shooting sports in emerging markets is contributing to market growth.

Consolidation of Manufacturers: The ammunition industry is witnessing consolidation, with major players acquiring smaller manufacturers to expand their product portfolios and increase production capacities. This trend is expected to continue as companies seek to strengthen their position in an increasingly competitive market.

Sustainability and Eco-Friendly Solutions: In response to consumer demand for greener products, ammunition manufacturers are exploring alternatives to traditional materials. Companies are focusing on producing ammunition that is both effective and environmentally responsible. This includes developing biodegradable components and using non-toxic materials for the manufacture of cartridges.

Challenges Facing the Ammunition Market

Despite its robust growth, the ammunition market faces several challenges:

Regulatory Constraints: The ammunition market is highly regulated, and manufacturers must comply with strict rules and guidelines regarding production, distribution, and sales. These regulations vary from one country to another and can impact market dynamics. For example, some regions have enacted laws that limit civilian access to certain types of ammunition or impose heavy taxes on sales.

Supply Chain Disruptions: Global supply chain disruptions, exacerbated by events like the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted the ammunition industry. Raw materials shortages, transportation delays, and labor shortages can all contribute to price fluctuations and supply shortages in the market.

Rising Raw Material Costs: The cost of raw materials, particularly metals like copper, lead, and brass, plays a significant role in the cost of manufacturing ammunition. Any increase in the price of these raw materials can drive up the cost of ammunition, affecting both consumers and manufacturers.

Increasing Competition: As demand for ammunition rises, so does competition in the market. Both established players and new entrants are vying for market share. While this creates opportunities for innovation, it also puts pressure on companies to maintain profitability while keeping costs low.

Future Outlook: Opportunities and Growth

The global ammunition market is expected to continue its upward trajectory over the next decade. The following opportunities may drive further growth:

Defense Budget Increases: With countries around the world investing more in their military capabilities, the demand for ammunition is expected to rise. The continued modernization of defense forces and the development of new weapon systems will create sustained demand for ammunition.

Technological Innovations: Advancements in ammunition technology, such as the development of high-performance and guided munitions, will enhance the effectiveness and utility of ammunition in both military and civilian applications.

Growth of Shooting Sports: As recreational shooting becomes more popular, particularly in regions like North America and Europe, the demand for ammunition will continue to expand. This trend, coupled with increasing participation in hunting activities, will support steady market growth.

Conclusion

The ammunition market is poised for significant growth driven by increasing demand from both defense and civilian sectors. While challenges such as regulatory restrictions and supply chain disruptions remain, the opportunities for innovation, technological advancements, and emerging markets present a bright future for the industry. Companies that can adapt to changing trends, meet regulatory requirements, and invest in sustainable practices will be well-positioned to thrive in this dynamic market.

[cantsayidont]

In just one year, the U.S. has spent at least $22.76 billion on military aid to Israel and related U.S. operations in the region (through September 30).[2] This was true, even before the U.S. expanded its presence in the region in late September/ early October 2024 in events too recent to be included in this report.

Figure 2, below, displays a list of U.S. arms deliveries to Israel, October 7, 2023 to September 2024. Note: This list is incomplete, drawn from news reports. Neither the Pentagon nor the State Department have provided comprehensive lists of items delivered, as they have done with respect to arms transfers to Ukraine.

Figure 2: U.S. Arms Deliveries to Israel, October 7, 2023 to September 2024[25] 4,127,000 kilograms JP-8 jet fuel 57,000 155mm artillery shells 36,000 rounds of 30mm cannon ammunition 20,000 M4A1 rifles 13,981 anti-tank missiles 8,700 (Mk82) 500-pound bombs 3,500 night vision devices 3,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions 14,100 (Mk84) 2,000 pound unguided bombs 3,000 laser-guided Hellfire missiles 1,800 (M141) bunker buster bombs 2,600 250-pound small diameter bombs 200 Switch Blade (Series 600) drones More than 100 Skydio X series drones 75 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV)

[The report's reference to Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) implies that these are separate weapons, which is probably wrong. JDAM is a GPS guidance kit that can be added to several types of free-fall bombs, like the Mk82 and Mk84, to turn them into guided weapons; the small diameter bomb already has such a guidance package. In any case, 14,100 is a terrifying number of Mk84 bombs, since each is capable of destroying much of a city block. Detonated all at once, they would be as powerful as one of the biggest nuclear bombs ever fielded by the United States during the Cold War.]

[aviationanddefence1]

The Germany precision guided munition market is large and includes rockets, artillery shells, guided bombs, and missiles. To accomplish precise target engagement, these bombs make use of a variety of guidance systems, including lasers, inertial navigation, radar homing, and the Global Positioning System (GPS). Precision-guided munition sales in Germany are primarily driven by the nation's dedication to preserving a defense force that is both technologically sophisticated and formidable. 

[sion5]

Ukraine hails GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells that can hit a target 25 miles away with pinpoint accuracy

[fapangel]

Artillery Usage Comparison (March 16th)

google docs

[Apologies for being late; I was rather ill yesterday and couldn’t keep working.

There is much to talk about. Maneuver/force positions will come later, I will cover more general background things here, and go into detail on a few matters which the preponderance of evidence now gives me more solid ground to speculate on.]

Field artillery has been present on the battlefield since Roman times, but when the corned gunpowder revolution arrived it quickly grew in stature to become the “king of the battlefield.” Infantry was still the queen, but as the saying goes, “everyone knows what the king does to the queen.” The lethality of artillery is hard to overemphasize. In modern combat between unsupported light infantry forces, by the time ammo is exhausted and one side has lost or won, 20% casualties are considered very high. This is the point of flanking; when you gain a positional advantage on your opponent that negates their cover and/or lets you apply your firepower to them more effectively than they can do to you, they either have to withdraw or accept destruction (and obviously, they usually withdraw.) This is how firefights are won and ground taken.

Artillery does not afford soldiers the luxury of a chance to withdraw – it arrives quickly, mows down those who are exposed without cover, and keeps the more fortunate pinned down in their foxholes as long as it’s falling. Artillery can kill more men in ten minutes than a raging close-quarters firefight will kill in a day. Thus it’s been a cornerstone of military affairs for a hundred and fifty years, and especially so for Soviet-legacy armies (e.g. Russia and Ukraine.) Western doctrine uses fire to enable maneuver; i.e. artillery pins down and constrains the enemy, allowing maneuver forces (viz. tanks) to close with them and apply their direct firepower to destroy them. (The point of maneuver is to apply firepower.) Russian doctrine always emphasized using maneuver to enable fire; with mobile units locating, engaging and stopping the enemy so heavy artillery can obliterate them. In practice these doctrines are flexible and any competent field commander can switch from one to the other as needed, but this does guide the general procurement strategy of these forces. The nature of the Russian “Battalion Tactical Group,” which adapts for Russia’s severe manpower shortage by pairing relatively scant mechanized infantry with the tank and artillery resources of an entire regiment, increases the artillery focus even more. Thus the performance of Russian artillery fires is a crucial factor in understanding their performance in the ongoing war.

Pre-war, the largest single materiel factor weighing in Russia’s favor was artillery. Significant superiority in tanks was a close second, but it was generally understood even by the layman years ago why the Javelin was such a significant boon to Ukraine; upgraded Soviet-era tanks wading into the face of the most modern anti-tank guided munitions was always going to be ugly. (Even the United States has only equipped a fraction of its tank force with active-protection systems for shooting down guided missiles; much like the small drone threat everyone understands this is the future, but adapting vast equipment stockpiles for it is a very costly and time-consuming task.) Artillery, however, worked as well as ever, and its one of the few weapons systems where “quantity has a quality all its own” still rings true. Even the USA, who has insane munitions like the “Excalibur” (basically a GPS-guided glide-bomb fired out of a howitzer) still relies on simple unguided HE shells as the mainstay, for they’re cheap, plentiful and effective. Reliable numbers of specific systems are hard to come by, but Russia started the war with at least seven thousand artillery units, compared to Ukraine’s total of three thousand.

Far worse, Ukraine’s artillery is biased more towards towed guns than self-propelled ones; a severe disadvantage in modern maneuver combat. Because of artillery’s power, the first target for any artillery battery is typically their enemy counterpart; “counter-battery fire.” Self-propelled gun systems mount the cannon on a tracked (or occasionally wheeled) chassis and protect the gun, its ammunition and its crew under armor that shrugs off shrapnel from hostile units. This lets them “shoot and scoot” to avoid retaliation, as well as keep up with tanks and mechanized infantry. Standard artillery cannons, that are towed behind vehicles, then unlimbered and set up in a stationary firing position, are still important for any military – much cheaper and easier to transport/deploy, and thus are essential for volume. But self-propelled guns are essential for the forces that make areas safe enough for such stationary firebases to get set up; the units that dodge hostile fire while firing back and eliminating the stationary guns of the enemy.

Then there’s the MLRS – Multiple Launch Rocket System – artillery. Based on the Katyusha of WWII fame, rocket artillery excels at shooting long-distance and achieving area coverage. Rockets are inaccurate and spread out a lot, but this is also a feature; it lets them plaster wide areas. Rockets also excel at salvo weight; they can put more steel into the air in one minute than an entire battery of self-propelled guns can deliver in thirty. This allows them to plaster entire wide-open fields with munitions; they can engage and destroy entire armored formations that are on the move. They’re awful at picking off single targets requiring precision (“point targets,”) and take forever to reload, but that’s what the Self-Propelled-Guns (SPGs) are for.

And then there’s the ammunition. First and foremost, the amount. Russia prepared for this war years ago; using small drones to drop thermite grenades on major Ukrainian ammunition dumps. These attacks destroyed many thousands of stockpiled Soviet-era ammunition, which Ukraine couldn’t replace. Incredibly, Russia even sent agents into NATO countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to destroy ammunition dumps there – literal acts of war on NATO soil – to eliminate stockpiles of Warsaw pact ammunition in Ukraine-friendly countries. That’s in addition to the shells expended during eight years of war in Donbas – they fired off more shells worth of old Soviet stocks than NATO has stockpiled total. They eventually started a new ammunition factory, but it can only produce 14,000 rounds a year. Even at triple capacity, it’d take years of production to build ammo stocks back up. That’s not unusual; that’s how every army on earth stockpiles ammo – not just artillery and missiles, but even rifle bullets. War consumes ammunition at a terrifying rate.

Then there’s the sophistication. Modern technology’s produced guided MLRS rockets, which turn the inaccurate area weapon into a very long-range precision weapon (the American G31 rocket is called “the 70km sniper rifle.”) In fact it turns them into a miniature SRBM launcher (see also the American ATACMS, an actual Short Range Ballistic Missile that can be fired out of an MLRS launcher.) Russia supposedly had plenty of these, while Ukraine had... about a hundred, at best.

But the most lethal artillery munition is much older and simpler – DPICM, “Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions.” When the fabled “VT” radio proximity fuze entered WWII, it didn’t just revolutionize anti-aircraft fire, but also ground artillery – it could reliably set artillery shells off in the air, spreading shrapnel much further and more uniformly and killing soldiers that should’ve been safe inside their foxholes. Patton called it the “funny fuze that won the Battle of the Bulge.” Improved Conventional Munitions further refined the concept; filling artillery shells with many small bomblets; raining a pattern of little grenades over a wide area. These reached their ultimate incarnation in the “Dual Purpose” kind: tiny shaped charges that could easily punch through the thin roof armor of tanks, and also had a fragmentation jacket and an incendiary ring around the explosive charge. In artillery shells these are devastating; they kill everything and set the remains on fire. In MLRS rockets, which are bigger and can carry more, they are known as “steel rain” and are responsible for the M270 MLRS’s reputation as the “grid square removal service” (as in the one square kilometer grid squares on standard military maps.) This is how MLRS can wipe out an entire company of spread-out tanks in wide-open fields without trouble.

These are one of the most powerful weapons ever fielded on Earth – and I’ve yet to see a single instance of Ukraine firing them, whilst Russia is raining them down every day.

By every single conceivable metric, the Russians should be dominating Ukrainian forces under a crushing hurricane of steel.

But instead, they seem to be getting their asses kicked square.

Curious Russian munition usage

As I noted on D+6, an awful lot of images of Russian MLRS “cargo” rocket containers have been seen throughout the war in bombarded cities; embedded in streets, buildings, and even embedded in unlucky civilian vehicles. These casings hold hundreds of small bomblets; usually DPICM, sometimes dedicated incendiaries, or even air-delivered anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Russian airdropped “butterfly mines” were quickly photographed a week ago, but I’ve seen nothing about mines in Kiev or Kharkiv. There’s the occasional sighting of incendiary weapons, but amid the many scenes of devastation from Kiev and Kharkiv as they suffer nonstop bombardment I haven’t seen the kind of widespread fires incendiaries would inflict (and those are most effective against residential suburbs filled with wooden houses, anyways; Eastern Bloc construction emphasizes massive concrete apartment blocks that aren’t very susceptible to incendiaries.)

Since MLRS cargo rockets leave evidence that HE frag artillery doesn’t, I’d put this down to a selection bias – but for the fact that at least 30% of the videos uploaded of this war are just shaky smartphone cam of artillery bombardments lighting up city skylines at night, and in the vast majority I’ve seen you can see the telltale “popcorn” rippling explosions of submunitions going off. That video is especially interesting as you can see the size of the buildings the munitions are landing around – they’re sizeable. Now sub-munitions can (and clearly have) level suburbs with small residential homes; the explosives punch holes in roofs and make the buildings uninhabitable and secondary incendiary effects then gut the structures. (The rubble still provides cover to infantry, just not as good as the building.) This video from today in Kharkiv is emblematic of the damage I’m seeing in most of these heavily bombarded cities; while the buildings have been rendered uninhabitable for civilians, they’re still substantially intact. There’s few if any shell craters to be seen; and almost never an actually leveled building. This is what you’d expect from heavy use of MLRS submunition warheads over unitary rockets or HE-frag shells.

Bluntly, this choice of munitions is stupid from every conceivable angle. Even if committing murder of civilians for the sake of murder (to hold the populace hostage as a bargaining chip in negotiations) submuntions only hit people walking around on the street; and most civilians in these bombarded cities will be in bomb shelters whenever possible (see the many taking refuge in the subway tunnels of Kiev as we speak.) This is also true for military troops; the first shells/rockets of artillery are the most effective as they catch men by surprise, standing up out in the open and thus most exposed to shrapnel.

There is one good use for sub-munitions in a city: “blocking fire.” By dropping steel rain on the streets you force enemy infantry to take cover, thus stopping them from moving through streets to react to your own movement. But I’m seeing MLRS cargo shells on social media still, and even accounting for reporting lag (Tiktok upload to OSINT twitter picking it up and circulating it) Kharkiv and Kiev proper haven’t been under direct ground assault for many days now. Kharkiv especially; the fighting is clearly moving away from the city and I’ve seen absolutely zero mention of Russian troops attempting advances into the city proper for many days. Thus there’s no maneuvering forces in the city to be blocked. As harassing fire it’s certainly lethal; preventing military defenders and civilians alike from conducting “business as usual” without being hampered by keeping close to shelter at all times, but single HE-frag shells are highly effective for that as well and much more efficient than MLRS rocket ammo, which is very bulky and harder to deliver to the front. Most importantly, MLRS sub-munition rockets are the best weapon for fighting maneuver combat; and their vast spread also makes them more effective when attacking targets who’s position isn’t precisely known (as we’ve seen, Russia is obviously struggling to conduct longer-range reconnaissance.) Blind-firing with artillery does work if done smartly. Japanese resistance forces during the Battle of Okinawa in WWII were producing an artillery gun from hidden caves to fire harassing rounds at American positions. The Americans performed a “map recon,” marked every place in the rough terrain that was flat and wide enough to house an artillery gun, handed out firing assignments and went about their day. The next time they took harassing fire, the gun crews started pounding their assigned targets, and sure enough, one of those flat spaces happened to have the Japanese gun and crew in it, fully exposed.

Cluster munitions aren’t even good for mass-murdering civilians in major cities. Russia’s continued use of them against those targets suggests to me that they might not have enough more suitable munitions to use. Soviet era stockpiles were build for actual maneuver war in open areas; just like America’s massive stockpiles, the bulk of them were DPICM. They may simply be using the most plentiful ammo available to them – which happens to be poorly suited to reducing the inner city strongholds they need to assault, especially Kiev.

The other possibility is that they can’t hit a flock of barns if they were standing inside the middle barn and are compensating with cluster warheads. Russian official propaganda has been bafflingly scarce. We know they’re inflicting casualties on the Ukrainians. They know that Ukraine is dominating the information war (and thus the perceptions war with NATO which is what’s greatly aiding the influx of volunteers, supplies, money and weapons from NATO) because Russian losses are posted to social media but not Ukrainian ones. And yet we’ve seen very little of their operations and strikes, and even then the footage is heavily cut. This drone video of Russian artillery strikes from yesterday is representative. Note the odd cut and how few artillery shells actually landing we’re allowed to see. Note how one shell has clearly landed on the railroad tracks of the rail yard, well short of the truck park that is clearly being targeted. An initial spotting round going wide isn’t unheard of, of course. And with a sample size of one we can’t conclude that the Russians are lousy shots. But it does invite the question of why the Russians are keen to deny us a wider sample size – if they had video of Russian artillery plastering Ukrainian forces, wouldn’t they put that out there?

Even odder, I’ve seen more drone videos of Russians employing their laser-guided 152mm shells than I’ve seen of normal quick-fuze engagements. (Note again how short and clipped this video is.) Ukrainians have multiple videos of their artillery achieving incredible precision, engaging point-targets like tanks, but Russia can only show similar results when artillery-fired PGMs are employed. And if their very infrequent use of other PGMs is any guide, they probably don’t have many of these, either.

Doctrinal Failures

This raises the question of how competent Russian artillery actually is. One thing you’d expect from any army, especially a Warsaw Pact army and explicitly from Russian BTGs is an obsessive focus on artillery fires – both in delivering and avoiding them. For a tank BTG, which nominally only has a single company of mechanized infantry, one good MLRS attack could erase the force’s entire infantry complement. A BTG can better withstand losses from counter-battery fire than unopposed attacks on their maneuver elements; dispersing the latter properly is just as important as aggressively accepting artillery duels with the former.

By that metric, the Russians don’t seem to know what the hell they’re doing. This video (again from the spotting drone) released today shows what appears to e a Russian command post being attacked by (characteristically accurate) Ukrainian artillery. Note how there’s no obvious attempt at camouflage, and the units aren’t dispersed (spread out so one artillery shell can’t damage or destroy multiple units.) Going back to this video of a Ukrainian counterbattery strike I noticed the foliage near the Russian positions is already on fire. Also, you can see Russian personnel ambling around in no great hurry. Either they had already taken fire, or their own artillery had set the foliage on fire by accident, giving away their position (MLRS backblast, perhaps.) In both cases it would be time to leave, in a goddamned hurry – again, shoot and scoot. Even towed guns can be limbered up and moved promptly if the enemy gives you a few minutes to do so. And yet the personnel present clearly show no such urgency.

Another odd thing – I’ve seen more examples of Russian towed artillery that have not dug into field positions than ones that have – in fact I’ve only seen the first example yesterday. Note the dirt berms and the ready ammo dump protected by earth-filled tires. Even rudimentary fortification such as this vastly increases the survivability of gun crews; especially in the wide-open flat terrain of southern Ukraine. The dirt berms that guarded the guns themselves were probably produced by a bulldozer; a single bulldozer can work up protection for an entire gun battery very quickly, depending on terrain. Gun batteries don’t always have time to dig in, if the need for artillery support is dire – and if they don’t have a bulldozer handy, they may never have time to dig in, as building berms high as the one you see there with just entrenching tools and your gun-crew manpower is very difficult. Again, we’re only getting the barest glimpse of Russian operations, but it’s becoming easier to see why Ukrainian commandos feel that dropping wee 60mm mortar shells on Russian gun batteries is effective – if they lack the training – or perhaps just the equipment – to dig into their firing positions, one little man-portable mortar can indeed put a whole gun battery – and it’s ammunition dump – out of action in a hurry.

Finally, there’s the impact of communications on artillery. Drones are so powerful in this conflict because the biggest challenge to artillery has always been information – finding the target, then communicating it back to your gun crews. This is why forward observation is an art form unto itself. Russian units are frequently operating the Orlan-10; a small man-portable fixed-wing drone. You can tell the Orlan is the main drone spotting for Russian artillery by how jerky the camera feed is; as a fixed-wing drone its a far less stable camera platform than small consumer quadcopter drones who’s primary use is as an airborne camera.

The other difference between these drones is, fixed-wing platforms have much longer range. The Orlan-10 is equivalent to a militarized hobbyist remote-control airplane; powered by a gasoline engine. And like the miniature airplane it is, it has great transit speed (90-150km/h) flight duration (16 hours) and range (it can be commanded up to 140km from its ground station.) Compare to consumer quadcopter drones powered by batteries. Since they’re meant for convenience and taking neat pictures from above, their range is pathetic and flight duration on batteries limited; fifteen minutes to an hour, typically.

The point I’m making is that most Russian drone-spotted artillery strikes we’ve seen are being controlled by the gun battery operating its own drone directly, whereas most Ukrainian ones are taken by small quad-copter “backpack” drones operated by a squad in proximity, who must them communicate their spotted information as a traditional fire mission to their artillery support. The recent Wall Street Journal article on the fighting in Vosnesenk (more on that later) included this very revealing detail of how Ukrainians are improvising field communications. Territorial Defense militiamen aren’t equipped with secure radios that regular forces have; but they were still able to use social media messaging apps to pass spotting data to a forward observer – observing fucking social media PM’s, before communicating the fire missions to Ukrainian artillery units with a fucking cell phone. It’s a given that a force (Russians) relying on unsecured civilan walkie talkies will also be utilizing cell phones when possible. They’re harder to intercept and can’t be jammed by any Ukrainian civilian playing loud music over their kid’s baby monitor, but using them requires leaving cell phone towers intact, and thus the same communication option open to their enemy.

In short, due to a failure of planning and procurement, the Russians are being matched in terms of communication integrity by militiamen texting each other on fucking Facebook. How do you think they’re stacking up against Ukrainian regulars with proper radios? How many Russian maneuver units can actually call for artillery support and promptly receive it? Or do they have to use “Mode B” through a Chechen fucking code talker and wait thirty minutes for the artillery unit to send its own drone?

Truly incredible.

Assembling a picture

All this evidence is circumstantial, of course, but it’s also spaced across enough time – two weeks now – that we can at least see some patterns. Additionally, we have a larger context to put it in as well. We’ve seen captured Russian guns that were in terribly maintained condition. We’ve seen evidence that some equipment stocks were recently re-activated from mothball status; and given lacking Russian maintenance of their forward-deployed vehicles (witness yet another sighting of a vehicle who’s wheel hub seals clearly dry rotted due to neglect) whether or not mothballed equipment was properly checked over and serviced before return to duty is doubtful. We’ve seen examples of flat-out ignoring sane doctrine; un-escorted supply convoys, poor spacing and movement discipline in hostile cities, poor use of combined arms, poor adherence to basic military principles such as use of camouflage, dispersion, and entrenching and if the continuing trend of entire mud-bogged tank companies is any indication, even a failure to conduct proper route recon. Even if these failures could be explained away as the myopia of the OSINT window the fact remains Russian forces are embarrassingly slow to adapt to the prevalent conditions. It took them far too long to start escorting convoys and using air patrol along the MSR and their failure to disperse, dig in and camouflage indicates a failure to adapt to the ubiquity of small squad-level recon drones on both sides – while the Russians have tactical EW the Ukrainians don’t in this regard it’s clearly not enough to establish spectrum dominance and certainly won’t help against strike UAVs like the TB-2, which their SHORAD has proven ineffective against as well. Nothing I see indicates they’re acting like people who understand that eyes are overhead at all times, and the people peering through them are not hajis with a handful of antiquated 81mm mortars to pop off with, but a modern military with heavy long-range artillery and the skill to use it well.

In sum, Russian artillery forces seem mis-provisioned for the siege warfare they’re now faced with, lacking in skill, and deficient in both basic military doctrine and their ability to adapt it to the situation. For two weeks the Learned Experts™ have insisted that this was just the OSINT window myopia at work; that the trickle of information was biased and that prudence dictated the assumption of competence. They were right – then. But now we’ve enough evidence in hand of systematic failures at every level of military organization that this assumption must be challenged. Perhaps the Ukrainians could slip into the woods and film a propaganda film by firing a 60mm mortar at nothing – but I do wonder where the devastating secondary explosions heard in that video came from. That their formations are very equipment heavy but infantry light is already well-known; but if they’re unable to perform foot patrols to keep squads of infantry from dunking on them with fucking 60mm mortars, why not with airpower? Or drones? Or mounted scouts; even unmanned ground vehicles?

In short, we’re seeing a failure not just to adhere to their known doctrine, but a failure of the doctrine itself – it doesn’t seem they ever bothered to answer these questions, to find solutions to the known problems, before starting a full-scale symmetric war with a near-peer adversary. I contend this extends to the artillery domain. The Russians are, most likely, not only incompetent and ill-prepared to use their most pivotal source of firepower, but facing a Warsaw-pact legacy military that is very, very skilled at employing their own.

They’re fucked.

Postscript

I Am Not An Artilleryman. If you are and I said something stupid, feel free to let me know. I’m no genius, just a – may Allah forgive me for uttering this word – journalist, and all I’m doing is using a broad familiarity with military matters to collate as much data as I can. Input from people who know what the fuck they’re talking about is a major source of data.

I’ve been writing all day since I woke up from my ick-haze. I’m going to try and crank out an update on the maneuver situation tonight, as well as another “general” update covering strategic matters. Stay tuned.

[scifigeneration]

Killer robots already exist, and they’ve been here a very long time

by Mike Ryder

Mykola Holyutyak/Shutterstock

Humans will always make the final decision on whether armed robots can shoot, according to a statement by the US Department of Defense. Their clarification comes amid fears about a new advanced targeting system, known as ATLAS, that will use artificial intelligence in combat vehicles to target and execute threats. While the public may feel uneasy about so-called “killer robots”, the concept is nothing new – machine-gun wielding “SWORDS” robots were deployed in Iraq as early as 2007.

Our relationship with military robots goes back even further than that. This is because when people say “robot”, they can mean any technology with some form of “autonomous” element that allows it to perform a task without the need for direct human intervention.

These technologies have existed for a very long time. During World War II, the proximity fuse was developed to explode artillery shells at a predetermined distance from their target. This made the shells far more effective than they would otherwise have been by augmenting human decision making and, in some cases, taking the human out of the loop completely.

So the question is not so much whether we should use autonomous weapon systems in battle – we already use them, and they take many forms. Rather, we should focus on how we use them, why we use them, and what form – if any – human intervention should take.

Autonomous targeting systems originated with innovations in anti-aircraft weaponry during World War II. Zef Art/Shutterstock

The birth of cybernetics

My research explores the philosophy of human-machine relations, with a particular focus on military ethics, and the way we distinguish between humans and machines. During World War II, mathematician Norbert Wiener laid the groundwork of cybernetics – the study of the interface between humans, animals and machines – in his work on the control of anti-aircraft fire. By studying the deviations between an aircraft’s predicted motion, and its actual motion, Wiener and his colleague Julian Bigelow came up with the concept of the “feedback loop”, where deviations could be fed back into the system in order to correct further predictions.

Wiener’s theory therefore went far beyond mere augmentation, for cybernetic technology could be used to pre-empt human decisions – removing the fallible human from the loop, in order to make better, quicker decisions and make weapons systems more effective.

In the years since World War II, the computer has emerged to sit alongside cybernetic theory to form a central pillar of military thinking, from the laser-guided “smart bombs” of the Vietnam era to cruise missiles and Reaper drones.

It’s no longer enough to merely augment the human warrior as it was in the early days. The next phase is to remove the human completely – “maximising” military outcomes while minimising the political cost associated with the loss of allied lives. This has led to the widespread use of military drones by the US and its allies. While these missions are highly controversial, in political terms they have proved to be preferable by far to the public outcry caused by military deaths.

A modern military drone. Alex LMX/Shutterstock

The human machine

One of the most contentious issues relating to drone warfare is the role of the drone pilot or “operator”. Like all personnel, these operators are bound by their employers to “do a good job”. However, the terms of success are far from clear. As philosopher and cultural critic Laurie Calhoun observes:

The business of UCAV [drone] operators is to kill.

In this way, their task is not so much to make a human decision, but rather to do the job that they are employed to do. If the computer tells them to kill, is there really any reason why they shouldn’t?

A similar argument can be made with respect to the modern soldier. From GPS navigation to video uplinks, soldiers carry numerous devices that tie them into a vast network that monitors and controls them at every turn.

This leads to an ethical conundrum. If the purpose of the soldier is to follow orders to the letter – with cameras used to ensure compliance – then why do we bother with human soldiers at all? After all, machines are far more efficient than human beings and don’t suffer from fatigue and stress in the same way as a human does. If soldiers are expected to behave in a programmatic, robotic fashion anyway, then what’s the point in shedding unnecessary allied blood?

The answer, here, is that the human serves as an alibi or form of “ethical cover” for what is in reality, an almost wholly mechanical, robotic act. Just as the drone operator’s job is to oversee the computer-controlled drone, so the human’s role in the Department of Defense’s new ATLAS system is merely to act as ethical cover in case things go wrong.

While Predator and Reaper drones may stand at the forefront of the public imagination about military autonomy and “killer robots”, these innovations are in themselves nothing new. They are merely the latest in a long line of developments that go back many decades.

While it may comfort some readers to imagine that machine autonomy will always be subordinate to human decision making, this really does miss the point. Autonomous systems have long been embedded in the military and we should prepare ourselves for the consequences.

About The Author:

Mike Ryder is an Associate Lecturer in Philosophy at Lancaster University

This article is republished from our content partners at The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

[xtruss]

Killer Drones Pioneered in Ukraine are the Weapons of the Future! They are R eshaping the Balance Between Humans and Technology in War

— February 8th 2024 | Leaders

Image: Getty Images

Precision-guided weapons first appeared in their modern form on the battlefield in Vietnam a little over 50 years ago. As armed forces have strived ever since for accuracy and destructiveness, the cost of such weapons has soared. America’s GPS-Guided Artillery Shells cost $100,000 a time. Because smart weapons are expensive, they are scarce. That is why European countries ran out of them in Libya in 2011. Israel, more eager to conserve its stockpiles than avoid collateral damage, has rained dumb bombs on Gaza. What, though, if you could combine precision and abundance?

For the first time in the history of warfare that question is being answered on the battlefields of Ukraine. Our report this week shows how First-Person-View (FPV) drones are mushrooming along the front lines. They are small, cheap, explosives-laden aircraft adapted from consumer models, and they are making a soldier’s life even more dangerous. These drones slip into tank turrets or dugouts. They loiter and pursue their quarry before going for the kill. They are inflicting a heavy toll on infantry and armour.

The war is also making fpv drones and their maritime cousins ubiquitous. January saw 3,000 verified fpv drone strikes. This week War Criminal, Thug, North Atlantic Terrorist Organization (NATO) and the West’s Scrotums Licker Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s President, created the Unmanned Systems Force, dedicated to drone warfare. In 2024 Ukraine is on track to build 1m-2m drones. Astonishingly, that will match Ukraine’s reduced consumption of shells (which is down because Republicans in Congress are shamefully denying Ukraine the supplies it needs).

The drone is not a wonder weapon—no such thing exists. It matters because it embodies big trends in war: a shift towards small, cheap and disposable weapons; the increasing use of consumer technology; and the drift towards autonomy in battle. Because of these trends, drone technology will spread rapidly from armies to militias, terrorists and criminals. And it will improve not at the budget-cycle pace of the military-industrial complex, but with the break-things urgency of consumer electronics.

Basic First-Person-View (FPV) Drones are revolutionarily simple. The descendants of racing quadcopters, built from off-the-shelf components, they can cost as little as several hundred dollars. fpv drones tend to have short ranges, carry small payloads and struggle in bad weather. For those reasons they will not (yet) replace artillery. But they can still do a lot of damage. In one week last autumn Ukrainian drones helped destroy 75 Russian tanks and 101 big guns, among much else. Russia has its own drones, though they tend to target dugouts, trenches and soldiers. Drones help explain why both sides find it so hard to mount offensives.

The exponential growth in the number of Russian and Ukrainian drones points to a second trend. They are inspired by and adapted from widely available consumer technology. Not only in Ukraine but also in Myanmar, where rebels have routed government forces in recent days, volunteers can use 3d printers to make key components and assemble airframes in small workshops. Unfortunately, criminal groups and terrorists are unlikely to be far behind the militias.

This reflects a broad democratisation of precision weapons. In Yemen the Houthi rebel group has used cheap Iranian guidance kits to build anti-ship missiles that are posing a deadly threat to commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Iran itself has shown how an assortment of long-range strike drones and ballistic missiles can have a geopolitical effect that far outweighs their cost. Even if the kit needed to overcome anti-drone jamming greatly raises the cost of the weapons, as some predict, they will still count as transformationally cheap.

The reason goes back to consumer electronics, which propel innovation at a blistering pace as capabilities accumulate in every product cycle. That poses problems of ethics as well as obsolescence. There will not always be time to subject novel weapons to the testing that Western countries aim for in peacetime and that is required by the Geneva Conventions.

Innovation also leads to the last trend, autonomy. Today, First-Person-View Drone use is limited by the supply of skilled pilots and by the effects of jamming, which can sever the connection between a drone and its operator. To overcome these problems, Russia and Ukraine are experimenting with autonomous navigation and target recognition. Artificial intelligence has been available in consumer drones for years and is improving rapidly.

A degree of autonomy has existed on high-end munitions for years and on cruise missiles for decades. The novelty is that cheap microchips and software will let intelligence sit inside millions of low-end munitions that are saturating the battlefield. The side that masters autonomy at scale in Ukraine first could enjoy a temporary but decisive advantage in firepower—a necessary condition for any breakthrough.

Western countries have been slow to absorb these lessons. Simple and cheap weapons will not replace big, high-end platforms, but they will complement them. The Pentagon is belatedly embarking on Replicator, an initiative to build thousands of low-cost drones and munitions able to take on China’s enormous forces. Europe is even further behind. Its ministers and generals increasingly believe that they could face another major European war by the end of the decade. If so, investment in low-end drones needs to grow urgently. Moreover, ubiquitous drones will require ubiquitous defences—not just on battlefields but also in cities at peace.

Kalashnikovs in the Skies

Intelligent drones will also raise questions about how armies wage war and whether humans can control the battlefield. As drones multiply, self-co-ordinating swarms will become possible. Humans will struggle to monitor and understand their engagements, let alone authorise them.

America and its allies must prepare for a world in which rapidly improving military capabilities spread more quickly and more widely. As the skies over Ukraine fill with expendable weapons that marry precision and firepower, they serve as a warning. Mass-produced hunter-killer aircraft are already reshaping the balance between humans and technology in war. ■

— This Article Appeared in the Leaders Section of the Print Edition Under the Headline "Killer Drones"

[i-hls]

New Precision Artillery Rounds Capable of Firing Without GPS

The United States Army is working on developing a precision guided 155 mm artillery round capable of firing and destroying targets in GPS denied environments. The shells are longer range than the currently used artillery shells. The Precision Guidance Kit Modernization (PGK-M) is intended to

https://i-hls.com/archives/96217

[benjaminzmillerinvestorquestions]

Most-Accurate US artillery shell is added to Ukraine’s arsenal.

Most-Accurate US artillery shell is added to Ukraine’s arsenal. The Pentagon has sent Ukraine its most accurate artillery shell, the GPS-guided Excalibur, according to budget documents that confirm the previously unannounced addition to the military armament assembled to combat the Russian invasion. A plan to replenish the US stock of Excaliburs acknowledges for the first time that the Pentagon has been supplying Ukrainian forces with the shell, reported Bloomberg. Officials have sidestepped questions about the Excalibur despite reports that planning was underway to provide it and that it was already in use in Ukraine. The Defense Department will spend $92M in congressionally approved supplemental funds for procurement of replacement M982 Excalibur munitions transferred to Ukraine.

The costs of rebuilding Ukraine are going to be significant and will require government and private funding of massive reconstruction projects.  If you would like to learn more about how you can help, and earn a significant passive income by purchasing a corporate income bond focused on the rebuilding of Ukraine offered by Andesite Blue, please email Benjamin Z Miller at  ben.miller@andesiteblue.co.uk   

Or contact any of our team at www.andesiteblue.co.uk/team

I hope that helps and good luck with your investing!

[ultrajaphunter]

(via Ukraine presented MLRS "VILKHA" on new chassis in Poland - Militarnyi)

Ukraine presented MLRS “VILKHA” on new chassis in Poland Artillery Defense industry of Ukraine Europe Luch Design Bureau MLRS Neighbors Poland Ukraine The Ukrainian defense industry has showcased in Poland a new version of the 300mm “VILKHA” (Ukrainian: «Вільха��, “Alder tree”) multiple rocket launcher.

The model of the MLRS is presented on the basis of a new chassis with a wheel arrangement 8×8 at the MSPO 2022 exhibition.

The first version of the 300mm MLRS “VILKHA” was based on the Soviet-era BM-30 Smerch missile launcher, using the same chassis and launcher.

The launcher also received protection in the form of armored plates.

РСЗВ «VILKHA» («ВІЛЬХА») від українського підприємства «КБ ЛУЧ». Вересень 2022. Польща. Фото: armyrecognition “VILKHA” MLRS by the Ukrainian enterprise SKDB “Luch”. September 2022. Poland. Photo credits: armyrecognition The ALDER MLRS is designed to defeat equipment, manpower, command posts, and other targets.

The Ukrainian rocket launcher is capable of launching new guided missiles at a range of up to 110 kilometers.

Український ракетний комплекс "Вільха", репетиція військового параду до Дня Незалежності у Києві, 2018 рік. Фото з відкритих джерел The Ukrainian Vilkha MLRS, rehearsal of the Independence Day military parade in Kyiv, 2018. Photo from open sources The main feature of the new guided missile is that the initial section of the trajectory provides correction of the jet projectile flight with the help of pulse engines, minimizing the deviation of the jet projectile flight from a given trajectory.

In the terminal part of flight, a missile is pointed at the target by an inertial-satellite navigation system.

Also, the Ukrainian rocket system provides for the formation of individual flight missions for each rocket, which allows you to hit several targets with a single salvo.

Ракета для РСЗВ «VILKHA» («ВІЛЬХА») від українського підприємства «КБ ЛУЧ». Вересень 2022. Польща. Фото: armyrecognition A missile for the VILKHA MLRS by the Ukrainian company SKDB “Luch”. September 2022. Poland. Photo credits: armyrecognition Specifications:

number of shells – 8-12 pcs.; maximum range – up to 110 km; projectile length – 7600 mm; caliber – 300 mm; weight of the projectile – 923 kg; guidance system – INS + GPS; number of launching channels – 12; full volley duration – not more than 40 s; projectile monitoring time – not more than 3 minutes; operational temperature – from -40 to + 50 °C.

About fifteen enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex worked on the creation of the system.

First of all, this is the “State Kyiv Design Bureau “LUCH”- the main executor of the project for the state defense contract.

“Мілітарний” працює завдяки постійній підтримці Спільноти

Ставай патроном на Patreon від $1 Будь спонсором на Youtube від 70 грн

[thunder-stuck]

UA will be the first army in the world to be equipped with Vulcano 155mm GPS guided ammunition, media reports `The longest ranging 155mm artillery shells available on the market`. Able to guarantee a one-meter point target engagement at distances of up to 70 km on moving targets || 9gagrss || https://ift.tt/unOeQmf https://ift.tt/Yy6wroh ||

[kragnir]

The cost for an Excalibur is high, but compare that with a tank, air defense system, ammo depot, or any other high-value target that it can destroy, especially seeing that a shell is the safest way to dispatch something, without endangering a plane or chopper, the cost is worth it.