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reasonsforhope · 5 months ago

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"It is 70 years since AT&T’s Bell Labs unveiled a new technology for turning sunlight into power. The phone company hoped it could replace the batteries that run equipment in out-of-the-way places. It also realised that powering devices with light alone showed how science could make the future seem wonderful; hence a press event at which sunshine kept a toy Ferris wheel spinning round and round.

Today solar power is long past the toy phase. Panels now occupy an area around half that of Wales, and this year they will provide the world with about 6% of its electricity—which is almost three times as much electrical energy as America consumed back in 1954. Yet this historic growth is only the second-most-remarkable thing about the rise of solar power. The most remarkable is that it is nowhere near over.

To call solar power’s rise exponential is not hyperbole, but a statement of fact. Installed solar capacity doubles roughly every three years, and so grows ten-fold each decade. Such sustained growth is seldom seen in anything that matters. That makes it hard for people to get their heads round what is going on. When it was a tenth of its current size ten years ago, solar power was still seen as marginal even by experts who knew how fast it had grown. The next ten-fold increase will be equivalent to multiplying the world’s entire fleet of nuclear reactors by eight in less than the time it typically takes to build just a single one of them.

Solar cells will in all likelihood be the single biggest source of electrical power on the planet by the mid 2030s. By the 2040s they may be the largest source not just of electricity but of all energy. On current trends, the all-in cost of the electricity they produce promises to be less than half as expensive as the cheapest available today. This will not stop climate change, but could slow it a lot faster. Much of the world—including Africa, where 600m people still cannot light their homes—will begin to feel energy-rich. That feeling will be a new and transformational one for humankind.

To grasp that this is not some environmentalist fever dream, consider solar economics. As the cumulative production of a manufactured good increases, costs go down. As costs go down, demand goes up. As demand goes up, production increases—and costs go down further. This cannot go on for ever; production, demand or both always become constrained. In earlier energy transitions—from wood to coal, coal to oil or oil to gas—the efficiency of extraction grew, but it was eventually offset by the cost of finding ever more fuel.

As our essay this week explains, solar power faces no such constraint. The resources needed to produce solar cells and plant them on solar farms are silicon-rich sand, sunny places and human ingenuity, all three of which are abundant. Making cells also takes energy, but solar power is fast making that abundant, too. As for demand, it is both huge and elastic—if you make electricity cheaper, people will find uses for it. The result is that, in contrast to earlier energy sources, solar power has routinely become cheaper and will continue to do so.

Other constraints do exist. Given people’s proclivity for living outside daylight hours, solar power needs to be complemented with storage and supplemented by other technologies. Heavy industry and aviation and freight have been hard to electrify. Fortunately, these problems may be solved as batteries and fuels created by electrolysis gradually become cheaper...

The aim should be for the virtuous circle of solar-power production to turn as fast as possible. That is because it offers the prize of cheaper energy. The benefits start with a boost to productivity. Anything that people use energy for today will cost less—and that includes pretty much everything. Then come the things cheap energy will make possible. People who could never afford to will start lighting their houses or driving a car. Cheap energy can purify water, and even desalinate it. It can drive the hungry machinery of artificial intelligence. It can make billions of homes and offices more bearable in summers that will, for decades to come, be getting hotter.

But it is the things that nobody has yet thought of that will be most consequential. In its radical abundance, cheaper energy will free the imagination, setting tiny Ferris wheels of the mind spinning with excitement and new possibilities.

This week marks the summer solstice in the northern hemisphere. The Sun rising to its highest point in the sky will in decades to come shine down on a world where nobody need go without the blessings of electricity and where the access to energy invigorates all those it touches."

-via The Economist, June 20, 2024

#solar #solar power #solarpunk #hopepunk #humanity #electricity #clean energy #solar age #renewables #green energy #solar energy #renewable energy #solar panels #fossil fuels #good news #hope #climate change #climate hope

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solarpunkbusiness · 6 months ago

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North Sweden’s green industry boom

Northern Sweden’s plentiful supply of cheap hydro and wind renewable electricity, coupled with a supply of raw materials and affordable land prices are prompting a ‘green’ industry boom in Sweden’s far north.

Long home to polluting industries, the Norbotten and Västerbotten regions are at the centre of an eco-boom attracting industries including battery manufacturing, data centres and low carbon steel which Sweden’s government estimates to be worth around US$120bn.

Last month, Swedish steel producer SSAB announced it would be building a 2.5 million tonne capacity fossil-free steel mill in the city, supplied with fossil free sponge iron from the Hybrit plant in nearby Gällivare. In January, steel company H2 Green Steel announced it had secured US$4.4bn in debt financing to build the world’s first large scale green steel plant in Boden, to the northwest of Luleå. And also in January Swedish battery producer Northvolt announced it had raised US$5bn in debt financing to help it expand its gigafactory in Skellefteå in Västerbotten.

And the creation of thousands of new jobs in the region is in turn prompting a need for new homes, shops and roads, which is again increasing demand for low carbon construction equipment.

“We have been following the development in the northern market for many years and see that there is room for a niche player like us,” Eriksson adds. “With the market’s focus on sustainable development, we are well-positioned for expansion northwards. Our focus will be on making electric and hybrid-powered units available from the fleet as needed.”

Source

#solarpunk #solarpunk business #solar punk #sweden #industrial transitions

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agbpaints · 2 months ago

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Name: Moth

Model: MTH-9L

Manufacturer: Ceres Metals Industries

Intro Year: 3145

Class: Light Battlemech

Cost: 4.677 mn c-bills

Weight: 30 T

Top Speed: 97.2 kph

Jump Capacity: 240 meters

Quirks: difficult to maintain, no/minimal arms, nimble jumper

In the wake of the 6th Andurian War, the Strategios of the Capellan Confederation Armed Forces determined that there was a need for a new, low cost light mech to serve as a forward observer and harassment unit in their augmented companies. While the venerable Raven remained in service, its relatively low speed and expensive suite of electronics lead to a number of costly losses during the conquest of Wallacia. To that end, specifications for a new scout were sent out for bids- the new mech had to be cheap, difficult for Free Worlds League precision energy weapons to engage with, and capable of engaging and providing support for indirect fire elements of the CCAF at a variety of ranges. Unusually, despite Hellespont Industrials, the Confederation's more seasoned light manufacturer, submitting a bid in the form of the Sunfire, Ceres Metals Industries won the contract. Their design, initially named Project GOSSAMER, was delayed several times due to production shortfalls and the discovery of a Federated Suns spy ring operating at Ceres' design bureau. Eventually the mech began full production in 3145 as the Moth.

An outwardly radical design, Ceres managed to reduce the cost of their bid significantly through the use of a number of off the shelf parts and existing research prototypes. The mech's engine was a GM 180 extralight fusion power plant, originally designed for a prototype Vindicator before the VND-4L project opted for a larger 225 power plant instead, allowing the 30 ton mech to achieve ground speeds of up to 97 kph. While this speed was deemed unacceptable for the task at hand, the mech's principle designer, Dr. Oxana Ufimtsev, opted to equip the mech with a battery of Anderson jump jets and used a novel delta design for the main hull of the mech, with very low profile arms and wide, integrated control surfaces to give the mech an unusually high glide coefficient. Together, these systems allow the Moth to leap distances similar to those achievable by the Spider, despite the mech's far less powerful engine. The cost of this innovative design is a frame with extremely cumbersome access points and systems not immediately intuitive to most mechtechs, leading to increased maintenance costs and repair times. When deployed in augmented formations alongside aerospace assets, technicians are commonly cross trained on both the unit's fighters and Moths, as the two repair schedules have been found to be similar.

The production model MTH-9L Moth uses a Moscovia light PPC as its main armament, supported by a pair of Ceres Arms model JX small pulse lasers mounted in the two weapons nacels that comprise the design's arms. Additionally, the mech carries a Diverse Optics ER small laser in the left arm and an Apple Churchill TAG system in the left, imported from Hellespont's Sian facility. Clad in 6 tons of Ceres mk III Stealth Armor, the Moth is easily capable of withstanding light fire from enemy mechs while confounding longer range sensor returns. Unfortunately, to make room for the light PPC, Ceres opted to reduce the size and ammenities of the mech's cockpit, resulting in complaints from pilots assigned to the machine for long scouting patrols.

In combat, Moths are most typically used as long range harassment units, using their stealth armor and long jump range to maintain evade enemy fire as they opportunistically engage with their TAG and light PPC. As the fight progresses, some pilots may choose to engage in more active combat, allowing the indirect elements they're supporting to remove the majority of a target'a armor before attempting to destroy vulnerable exposed components with their small lasers

The first recorded combat involving a Moth occurred on Brisbane between elements of the First Victoria Rangers and a raiding force of the Concordat Commandos. Captain Curtis Bao deployed a lance of Moths to waylay the advance of a Taurian armored colum and allow for his own heavy units and combat vehicles to position themselves in foothills east of the TDF landing site. The light mechs caught the tank company and their mech escorts by surprise, outflanking the vehicles and engaging into their weaker side armor at long range with their PPCs while painting targets for Bao's LRM carriers and Thunderbolts. Eventually, the Commandos' mechs rallied and began to engage the stealthy light lance, forcing them to withdraw, however the action blunted the Taurian advance and allowed time for the Victoria Rangers to mount a successful defense of Brisbane's capital, Badwater. The surviving Moths then saw use as city fighters, their jumping capabilities allowing them to manuever easily though the urban fabric of Badwater while their X-pulse lasers let them to brutally engage Taurian infantry.

As a new design, very few variants or operators outside the Confederation have yet to be spotted. Beyond the CCAF, a few Capellan aligned mercenary commands have been allowed to officially purchase small numbers of the design, while the allied Magistracy of Canopus has managed to acquire a number of lances of the mech through unknown sources.

While their infiltration was discovered and rooted out before the full design was finalized, MIIO operatives did manage to steal plans for the early prototypes of the Moth, which the New Avalon Institute of Science used as a test bed for re-engineered laser designs and new SRM munitions. A small production run of the design, similar but without the Capellan stealth armor, was produced by Corean Enterprises at their Augusta plant, but the AFFS appears to have abandoned adding the mech to its TO&E.

Finally, several examples of the Moth were captured by forces loyal to Alaric Ward's Star League during fighting on New Earth. The Jade Falcon remnant present immediately saw use in the design as a heavier alternative to their light Ion Sparrows. A Clantech refit of the mech has been spotted using an ER large laser in place of the PPC and a quartet of small pulse lasers in the weapons nacels.

#battletech #battlemech #custom mech #mech talk

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fatihulusoy · 5 months ago

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Greetings yet again folks! Before today's news i should ask this: what would you think when wearable tech is mentioned? AR/VR glasses? A smart watch? a pair of fancy glasses? nfc based products or was it something else for you?

what if i tell you there is a battery that is so stretchable and bendable that can be tailored between linings of your clothes now what would you think?

Meet the age of stretchable batteries people!

in that case i should mention when people of today was so busy with nonsense politics and rightist or leftist ideas there were quite a race between the biggest tech schools and companies for manufacturing this tech such as apple, samsung, stanford, Yokohama National University, zotach (japan based wearable tech company), sydney's UNCW, Australian research comity and more.. you get the idea..

so what is this tech in its core?

basically building more softer and more long term reliable materials to replace our common daily use batteries

in term of materials it nearly uses our common li-on batteries but these are mainly works like electrodes and often use polymers, hydrogels, and other flexible materials for electrodes and electrolytes. we can see in recent inovations include the use of stretchable conductors like gold nanowires or carbon nanotubes.

BUT what these mambo, jambo, wombo, combo means for public eye?

much longer active use time, higher adaptability, flexible form factor yet lower energy and power density.

for now this tech has been used in certain medical implant cases, wearable techs, tv's, and watches for now but there is some attempts to imply this in to textile industry recently..

and japan is seems like ahead of the race for now with Zotac’s VR GO 4.0 backpack

this is a backpack pc and its power source is tailored between in entire foam/ fiber pad. this "pc" is specifically made for VR/AR and streaming which includes

11th Gen Intel Core Mobile i7-11800H processor, an NVIDIA RTX A4500 graphics card with 20GB of GDDR6 memory and 7,168 CUDA cores, 16GB (32GB maximum) of DDR4 RAM, an M.2 slot for storage, a 2.5′ SATA 3 hard drive/SSD bay for storage, three USB 3.1 Type-A ports, a single USB 3.1 type-C port, DisplayPort, and a 12V DC outlet, all powered by dual 86.4 watt-hour hot-swappable batteries.

like i said this tech is still under developement stage and people still trying to make this tech better than other compettitives...

time will show us what will it gonna be turn out at the end..

lastly.. see you guys tomorrow...

sources:

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/adma.202204457

#tech #tech news #daily news #cyberpunk #future tech #scifi tech #research #rnd #r&d #battery #stretchable battery #apple #stanford #samsung #labs

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wolfliving · 7 days ago

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Strange Chinese trade-war recommendations at US Congress

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSION’S 2024 RECOMMENDATIONS Part II: Technology and Consumer Product Opportunities and Risks Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies The Commission recommends:

Congress establish and fund a Manhattan Project-like program dedicated to racing to and acquiring an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) capability. AGI is generally defined as systems that are as good as or better than human capabilities across all cognitive domains and would surpass the sharpest human minds at every task. Among the specific actions the Commission recommends for Congress:

Provide broad multiyear contracting authority to the executive branch and associated funding for leading artificial intelligence, cloud, and data center companies and others to advance the stated policy at a pace and scale consistent with the goal of U.S. AGI leadership; and

Direct the U.S. secretary of defense to provide a Defense Priorities and Allocations System “DX Rating” to items in the artificial intelligence ecosystem to ensure this project receives national priority.

Congress consider legislation to:

Require prior approval and ongoing oversight of Chinese involvement in biotechnology companies engaged in operations in the United States, including research or other related transactions. Such approval and oversight operations shall be conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in consultation with other appropriate governmental entities. In identifying the involvement of Chinese entities or interests in the U.S. biotechnology sector, Congress should include firms and persons: ○ Engaged in genomic research; ○ Evaluating and/or reporting on genetic data, including for medical or therapeutic purposes or ancestral documentation; ○ Participating in pharmaceutical development; ○ Involved with U.S. colleges and universities; and ○ Involved with federal, state, or local governments or agen cies and departments.

Support significant Federal Government investments in biotechnology in the United States and with U.S. entities at every level of the technology development cycle and supply chain, from basic research through product development and market deployment, including investments in intermediate services capacity and equipment manufacturing capacity.

To protect U.S. economic and national security interests, Congress consider legislation to restrict or ban the importation of certain technologies and services controlled by Chinese entities, including:

Autonomous humanoid robots with advanced capabilities of (i) dexterity, (ii) locomotion, and (iii) intelligence; and

Energy infrastructure products that involve remote servicing, maintenance, or monitoring capabilities, such as load balancing and other batteries supporting the electrical grid, batteries used as backup systems for industrial facilities and/ or critical infrastructure, and transformers and associated equipment.

Congress encourage the Administration’s ongoing rulemaking efforts regarding “connected vehicles” to cover industrial machinery, Internet of Things devices, appliances, and other connected devices produced by Chinese entities or including Chinese technologies that can be accessed, serviced, maintained, or updated remotely or through physical updates.

Congress enact legislation prohibiting granting seats on boards of directors and information rights to China-based investors in strategic technology sectors. Allowing foreign investors to hold seats and observer seats on the boards of U.S. technology start-ups provides them with sensitive strategic information, which could be leveraged to gain competitive advantages. Prohibiting this practice would protect intellectual property and ensure that U.S. technological advances are not compromised. It would also reduce the risk of corporate espionage, safeguarding America’s leadership in emerging technologies.

Congress establish that:

The U.S. government will unilaterally or with key interna- tional partners seek to vertically integrate in the develop- ment and commercialization of quantum technology.

Federal Government investments in quantum technology support every level of the technology development cycle and supply chain from basic research through product development and market deployment, including investments in intermediate services capacity.

The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with appropriate agencies and experts, develop a Quantum Technology Supply Chain Roadmap to ensure that the United States coordinates outbound investment, U.S. critical supply chain assessments, the activities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and federally supported research activities to ensure that the United States, along with key allies and partners, will lead in this critical technology and not advance Chinese capabilities and development....

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rjzimmerman · 6 months ago

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Excerpt from this New York Times story:

When President Biden signed the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, it was expected to set off a boom in renewable energy, with hefty tax breaks that would make solar and wind power cheaper than fossil fuels.

So far, however, that dream has only come partly true. Solar panel installations are indeed soaring to record highs in the United States, as are batteries that can store energy for later. But wind power has struggled, both on land and in the ocean.

The country is now adding less wind capacity each year than before the law was passed.

Some factors behind the wind industry’s recent slowdown may be temporary, such as snarled supply chains. But wind power is also more vulnerable than solar power to many of the biggest logistical hurdles that hinder energy projects today: a lack of transmission lines, a lengthy permitting process and a growing backlash against new projects in many communities.

If wind power continues to stagnate, that could make the fight against global warming much harder, experts say. Many plans for quickly shifting the country away from fossil fuels envision a large expansion of both solar and wind, because the two sources generate electricity at different hours and can complement each other. A boom in solar power alone, which runs only in daytime, isn’t enough.

Some of the early predictions that the Inflation Reduction Act would help slash U.S. greenhouse gas emissions roughly 40 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 depended on a rapid acceleration of both solar and wind power this decade.

Wind and solar power are often lumped together, but they have important differences that partly explain why one is slowing and the other is thriving right now.

For one, wind power is much more sensitive to location. Wind turbines in a gusty area can generate eight times as much electricity as turbines in an area with just half the breeze. For solar power, the difference between sunny spots and less sunny spots is considerably smaller. That means developers can’t just build wind farms anywhere.

In the United States, the best places for wind tend to be in the blustery Midwest and Great Plains. But many areas are now crowded with turbines and existing electric grids are clogged, making it difficult to add more projects. Energy companies want to expand the grid’s capacity to transport even more wind power to population centers, but getting permits for transmission lines and building them has become a brutal slog that can take more than a decade.

“Getting wind projects built is getting a lot harder,” said Sandhya Ganapathy, chief executive of EDP Renewables North America, a leading wind and solar developer. “The low-hanging fruit, the easier access places are gone.”

The wind industry has also been hampered by soaring equipment costs after the pandemic wrecked supply chains and inflation spiked. While those factors initially hurt solar, too, the solar industry has adjusted much faster, with China nearly doubling its manufacturing capacity for panels over the last two years. Wind supply chains, which are dominated by a few manufacturers in China, Europe and the United States, have yet to fully recover.

The cost increases have been devastating for offshore wind projects in the Northeast, where developers have canceled more than half the projects they planned to build this decade.

Wind isn’t languishing only in the United States. While a record 117 gigawatts of new wind capacity came online last year globally, virtually all of that growth was in China. In the rest of the world, developers weren’t installing wind turbines any faster than they were in 2020.

#wind power #solar power

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123567-9qaaq9 · 2 months ago

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Battery Manufacturing Equipment Market, Drivers, Future Outlook | BIS Research

Battery Manufacturing Equipment refers to the machinery, tools, and systems used in the production of batteries, typically for industrial, automotive, or consumer applications. This equipment encompasses the full range of processes involved in battery production, including material handling, electrode preparation, cell assembly, electrolyte filling, formation, aging, testing, and packaging.

According to BIS Research,the global battery manufacturing equipment market is projected to reach $88,093.50 million by 2031 from $9,439.22 million in 2021, growing at a CAGR of 27.12% during the forecast period 2022-2031.

Battery Manufacturing Equipment Overview

Battery manufacturing equipment plays a critical role in the production of various types of batteries, including lithium-ion, lead-acid, and solid-state batteries, among others. As demand for batteries rises due to the growth of electric vehicles (EVs), renewable energy storage, and portable electronics, the need for advanced, reliable, and efficient manufacturing equipment becomes increasingly important.

Key Stages of Battery Manufacturing

Material Handling and Preparation

Electrode Manufacturing

Cell Assembly

Electrolyte Filling and Sealing

Formation and Aging

Advancements in Battery Equipement

Automated Assembly Lines

AI and Machine Learning Integration

Environmentally Friendly Manufacturing

Download the Report Click Here !

Market Segmentation

1 By Application

2 Equipment By Process

3 By Battery Type

4 By Region

Demand – Drivers and Limitations

The following are the demand drivers for the global battery manufacturing equipment market:

• Rising Demand for Electric Vehicles (EVs) • Government Initiatives to Reduce Carbon Footprints and e-Waste

The market is expected to face some limitations too due to the following challenge:

• Rising Cost and Competitive Pressure for Battery Equipment Manufacturers • Logistics and Supply Chain Risks

Request a sample of this report on the Battery Manufacturing Equipment Market

Recent Developments in the Global Battery Manufacturing Equipment Market

• In May 2022, by aiding customers in the U.S. with battery manufacture, Xiamen Tmax Equipments maintained a favorable connection with them. It offered them the pouch cell pilot line, which comprises 52 machines ranging from mixing to testing. In accordance with the real requirements of the customer, Xiamen Tmax Equipments supplied complete solutions for the production of coin cells, cylinder cells, pouch cells, prismatic cells, and battery packs on a lab, pilot, and large-scale.

•In June 2022, Wuxi Lead Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. signed a contract with Volkswagen to deliver 20GWh lithium battery manufacturing equipment. The company would strengthen its presence in the European market and mark a new era of its global operation.

Battery Manufacturing Equipment Future Outlook

Several key trends and advancements are expected to shape the future of this industry

Increased Automation and Digitalization

Scalability and Flexibility

Sustainability and Energy Efficiency

Regionalization and Decentralization of Manufacturing

Access more detailed Insights on Advanced Materials,Chemicals and Fuels Research Reports

Conclusion

Battery manufacturing equipment is at the forefront of the global energy transformation, playing a crucial role in producing the batteries that power electric vehicles, renewable energy storage, and portable devices.

The evolution of battery technology, such as the shift towards solid-state batteries and the use of innovative materials, is reshaping the design and function of manufacturing equipment. Automation, digitalization, AI integration, and sustainable practices are expected to dominate the future of battery production, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and enhancing quality.

#Battery Manufacturing Equipment Market #Battery Manufacturing Equipment Report #Battery Manufacturing Equipment Industry

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allthebrazilianpolitics · 9 days ago

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Power outages in Brazil prompt surge in demand for generators, battery systems

Companies seek to anticipate potential outages, mitigate production losses, reduce dependency on grid and tariffs

A series of large-scale blackouts in Brazil is driving sales of generators and battery systems in 2024 to their highest levels since the 2021 water crisis. This rush by companies across multiple industries is an effort to prepare for potential outages, prevent production losses, and reduce dependence on the grid and variable tariff costs.

In this context, manufacturers, generator rental companies, and energy management firms are reporting record sales and inquiries. The clientele ranges from primary industry sectors, construction, agribusiness, and meat processing plants to hospitals. The city government of São Paulo, for instance, has become a major client following the 2023 and 2024 blackouts, when schools and public buildings operated using generators.

Micropower, a joint venture by Siemens, Comerc, and Equinor, has observed a rise in inquiries correlating with weather events impacting critical infrastructure. The company operates under a business model known as energy as a service, where clients pay for a service without investing in infrastructure or equipment such as generators and batteries.

CEO Sergio Jacobsen says demand for backup power systems in 2024 doubled compared to 2023. According to Mr. Jacobsen, the demand is particularly strong in the industrial sector due to concerns over production disruptions. “This demand is growing with the increase in extreme weather events. It’s a trend,” Mr. Jacobsen pointed out.

#brazil #brazilian politics #politics #economy #energy #image description in alt #mod nise da silveira

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mariacallous · 7 months ago

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On the top floor of a building somewhere in Ukraine is a drone workshop.

Inside is a chaotic workbench covered in logic boards, antennas, batteries, augmented reality headsets, and rotor blades. On one end of the room is a makeshift photo studio—a jet-black quadcopter drone sits on a long white sheet, waiting for its close-up.

This particular workshop’s Geppetto is Yvan. He grins as he shows off his creations, flittering around with a lit cigarette in his mouth, dangling ash, grabbing different models. (Yvan is a pseudonym; WIRED granted some of the people in this story anonymity due to the security risk.)

Yvan holds up a mid-size drone: This model successfully hit a target from 11 kilometers away, he says, but it should be capable of traveling at least 20. He’s trying different batteries and controllers to try to extend the range. He screws on a stabilizer tailpiece to a hard plastic shell—Yvan 3D-prints these himself—and holds up the assembled bomb. It’s capable of carrying a 3.5-kilogram explosive payload, enough to take out a Russian tank.

He uses his index finger and thumb to pick up a nondescript beige chip: This, he says, is what he’s really proud of.

One big problem with these drones—which are based on commercially available first-person-view (FPV) or photography drones—is that their explosive payload is jimmy-rigged on. It requires the drone to crash in order to close the circuit and trigger the explosion.

This chip, Yvan says, allows for remote detonation from a significant distance, meaning the operator can park their drone and lay in wait for hours, even days, before it goes off. He expects this technology could, eventually, be connected to AI—exploding only if it registers a nearby tank, for example. He has created a long-range smart land mine, I note. After the idea is passed through our translator, he nods enthusiastically.

There are many of these FPV drone workshops around Ukraine—Kyiv estimates there are about 200 Ukrainian companies producing aerial drones, with others producing land- and sea-based uncrewed vehicles. But Yvan, grinning proudly, insists that the manufacturer which he represents, VERBA, is the best.

Ukraine is facing increasingly tough odds in its defensive war against a better-resourced, better-equipped enemy. Thanks to delayed aid from Washington and shortages in other NATO warehouses, Ukraine has lacked artillery shells, long-range missiles, and even air defense munitions.

These drones, however, represent a bright spot for the Ukrainians. Entrepreneurship and innovation is scaling up a sizable drone industry in the country, and it’s making new technological leaps that would make the Pentagon envious.

The age of drone warfare is here, and Ukraine wants to be a superpower.

After Yvan showed off his workshop, we loaded into the car to visit one of his factories.

Behind a steel door is a room filled with racks, where 30 3D printers are working simultaneously, printing various drone components in unison. The twentysomething employees seem accustomed to the screeching alarm—some are soldering the drones together, others are tinkering with designs in AutoCAD, one is lounging on a sofa.

Strung across one shelf of 3D printers is a black flag, a take on Blackbeard’s (apocryphal) pirate flag. It shows a horned skeleton wearing an AR headset and holding a controller, thrusting his spear toward a bleeding heart as a quadcopter flies above.

In the first year of the war, when FPV drones were providing extraordinary footage of the front lines and viral video of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) dropping grenades on Russian tanks captivated the world, Ukraine was snatching up every consumer drone it could find. Chinese technology giant DJI became a household name in Ukraine, thanks to its drones’ ubiquity on the front lines. Ukraine’s early advantage was quickly lost, however, as Russia scrambled to snatch up these Chinese-made UAVs.

“When Russia sees, from Instagram, my product, Russia starts buying all these components in China,” a VERBA executive says. The new demand from Moscow can often cause either shortages or inflation, squeezing out the Ukrainian companies. So entrepreneurs like Yvan began building their own.

When Yvan began his operation in the early months of the war following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion, he was creating a handful of frankendrones to send to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Now, Yvan says, his operation is producing 5,000 FPV drones per month. He offers a range of systems, from a mammoth 12-inch model to a 4-inch prototype.

At first, these entrepreneurs were pursuing this project on their own—scrambling, like most of the country, to be useful in helping Ukraine defend itself. Kyiv was initially cool to the idea that a domestic drone industry was worth the money and attention, especially given the demand for more conventional arms. Some in the military, one executive says, dismissed the utility of these innovative weapons and surveillance platforms as merely “wedding photography drones.” (One executive said Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s new commander in chief, had been an early adopter inside the military, directly contracting 10 firms in early 2023 to begin assembling new technology for his forces.)

That attitude changed in 2023, when Ukraine set up Brave1, a government-run technology agency and incubator that helps connect private enterprise to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Since its creation, Brave1 has worked to streamline design, development, and procurement of new defense technology, while helping companies navigate government and military bureaucracy. Brave1 has already awarded more than $3 million in research and development grants and connected more than 750 companies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

When United24, the Ukrainian government’s in-house crowdfunding platform, first pitched an “army of drones” to its donors in 2022, it aimed to buy just 200 units. Today, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky projected late last year that his country would produce over 1 million drones in 2024.

“I would say that we can even double this number,” Natalia Kushnerska, head of Brave1’s defense technology cluster, tells WIRED.

“We have the responsibility and the motivation to do it today and to do it very fast,” she says. “Because we don't have any other choice.”

This is a war, one executive told me, “where the economy matters.”

Even hampered by sanctions, Russia has a $2 trillion economy—about 6 percent of that is geared toward its wartime production. Ukraine’s entire GDP, by contrast, is less than $200 billion.

While Kyiv has received substantial support from its NATO partners, it faces constant pressure to find efficiencies. The economics of these drones are looking better and better.

Yvan’s drones are, compared to conventional munitions, cheap. His most expensive unit runs about $2,500, but the cheapest is only $400.

Early in the war, the Ukrainians could reasonably expect—depending on weather, the mission, and Russian jamming efforts—that about 30 percent of their drones would connect with the target. Today, good Ukrainian-made systems are approaching a 70 percent success rate.

It can often take four or five artillery shells to successfully destroy a medium-range target, such as a tank. At $8,000 per shell—which are in short supply and high demand—that is an expensive proposition. Even if it takes two of Yvan’s most expensive drones to achieve the same objective, that’s thousands of dollars in savings. The proliferation of these drones reduces the “cost-per-kill,” as one executive phrased it, and reduces the strain on those dwindling ammunition stockpiles.

Even if Yvan and other producers are making more and more of their systems in Ukraine, they still rely on Chinese suppliers for critical onboard components. That comes with a trade-off—Chinese suppliers are cheaper, but they tend to be of lower quality and are happy to do business with Russia as well. Other options, such as companies in Taiwan, the United States, Canada, or Europe, are better quality but can be several times more expensive.

These supply chains, Yvan says, are “complicated.” Drone manufacturers who spoke to WIRED say anywhere between 40 percent and 80 percent of their drone components are made in Ukraine. Asked how long it would take before Ukraine manufactures nearly everything in these drones, from the rotor blades to the onboard components, Yvan provides a bullish estimate: “six months.”

It’s not an entirely unrealistic dream. Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and also minister responsible for digital transformation, said late last year that Kyiv hopes to break ground on a semiconductor factory, capable of producing 50,000 chips a year, by 2025. Ukraine produces about half the world’s supply of neon, necessary for the lasers used to make the chips.

There are already companies in Ukraine that have developed electronic design automation software—a necessary tool for producing chips—and that do electronic assembly inside the country itself. An industry source tells WIRED that a working group was formed in late 2023 to chart out how Ukraine could be a player in the semiconductor industry.

Another defense technology executive, Igor, manufactures considerably more-sensitive drones. “We definitely don’t buy anything from China,” he says. His products are more expensive, he says, “but we are looking for something that would differentiate us from the Russians.” At the moment, he says, “Russia is ahead.” He’s hoping to close that gap.

For any of this to work, however, there needs to be demand for these drones. The more they can sell, the more they can invest. “The things that they need,” Kushnerska says: “contracts and money.” Demand has certainly grown—fundraising platform United24 helped finance a fleet of naval drones and raised funds to purchase 5,000 surveillance UAVs. Other organizations have led similar purchases. The drone-makers, however, say it’s just not enough.

In early 2023, Ukraine’s parliament passed new laws to regulate how drone manufacturers can contract with the state; while profiteering is generally discouraged in the wartime economy, the law specifically allows the companies to charge up to 25 percent profit.

Yvan says he charges just a 10 percent premium for his drones and reinvests all that profit back into his operation. Representatives from other drone companies who spoke to WIRED say they operate on a similar basis.

More orders will mean more investment. Thus far, NATO countries have preferred to purchase locally-made equipment and ship it to Ukraine. That may be changing.

Bill Blair, Canada’s minister of defense, visited Kyiv shortly before I was there. While there, he announced that Ottawa would donate 800 Canadian-made drones to Ukraine. While the donation was lauded, a senior official asked the minister, “Why didn't you buy our drones?” After being briefed on the various innovations taking place in the Ukrainian drone industry, Blair was convinced. “We're also going to find ways to invest in Ukrainian industry,” he tells WIRED. “The point of the [Ukraine Defense Contact Group drone coalition] is to create capability, not only in the countries that are in the coalition but also capability in Ukraine.”

Even still, bureaucracy moves slowly. What’s more, startups—some of which are helmed by technologists or special effects gurus with no experience in procurement, let alone war—are often learning as they go. One executive, covering his eyes with his hand, says: “It’s like going completely blind.”

Not every company has been able to hack it. One executive says he’s aware of five defense technology startups that have shut down since the war began.

Much attention has been paid to FPV drones. They reinforce the idea that Ukraine’s defense is a scrappy, homespun effort. But even as the country has professionalized production of these light, agile drones, it has rapidly spun up production of other, more complicated systems.

One of Ukraine’s biggest disadvantages, from the start of the war, has been its difficulty in hitting targets inside Russia. Because Moscow has so effectively dominated the skies, Ukraine has been left playing defense.

That equation has changed substantially in recent weeks. Ukraine has had enormous success in attacking Russian oil refineries—knocking out as much as 15 percent of the country’s total refining capacity—and bombing Russian air bases. This has all been made possible by Ukrainian-made long-range attack drones.

Igor, who represents a company responsible for producing those long-range bombers, says they have developed a unit capable of flying 1,000 kilometers and carrying a 25-kilogram payload and has produced “several hundred” units for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And they are actively working on a new model, capable of flying up to 2,500 kilometers. (It will pack a smaller punch, he said: “The longer you go, the lighter the payload.”)

These systems are more expensive: from $35,000 to $100,000. But if they can destroy millions of dollars worth of Russian equipment, that’s a bargain.

“These are no simple drones,” Igor says. “We don’t have the luxury, like the Western guys, to spend years in development.”

They’re not stopping with drones, either. They’re using the same technology to develop Ukrainian-made missiles, capable of flying farther and doing more damage to Russian military infrastructure, tucked well behind the front lines, which is regularly used to attack Ukrainian cities.

Igor’s goal is to “bring the war to Russia.” FPV drones have broadcast the realities of the front lines in high definition—long-range bombers could successfully make it feel real, he says. “They don’t suffer like we suffer.”

The effort to bring the war to Russia is advancing on multiple fronts. One of the most famous uncrewed systems of the war has been Kyiv’s Sea Baby drones. Videos have gone viral of these sleek ships clipping along the waters of the Black Sea.

According to Kyiv, they can carry 850 kilograms of explosives, go 90 kilometers per hour, travel some 1,000 kilometers—and they are invisible to radar. This is the kind of capability that the Pentagon, and other defense departments, has spent years trying to develop. “We like to joke that everything we do now, in Ukraine, takes three days��globally, it takes three years,” Brave1’s Kushnerska says.

Ask around Kyiv about these drones, however, and everyone is mum. Even otherwise talkative defense sources go quiet when asked about the Sea Babys. Asked about the vehicles, one defense executive smiled and said simply, “That’s classified.”

Kushnerska is equally evasive: “We need to keep silent about new solutions and new surprises that we are preparing for the enemy.”

The skullduggery is understandable. These uncrewed vehicles have been responsible for doing massive damage to Russia’s prized Black Sea fleet and spearheading the first major attack on the Kerch Bridge, in Crimea, in 2022.

Developing naval drones, however, is relatively easy compared to uncrewed land systems.

Over tea with Stepan, another defense entrepreneur, he lists the litany of difficulties of trying to build uncrewed land systems: They don’t travel well over tough terrain, they don’t operate well in inclement weather, and they don’t tend to go very far.

And yet, Stepan says, his company has overcome all those obstacles—which the Pentagon is still wrestling with—and has put these land systems in the field. Plus, Stepan says he’s “pleasantly surprised by how they’re being used.” He says their smallest unit, which has generally been used to deliver food and equipment, recently rescued and evacuated a wounded soldier from the front line.

Ukraine is not the only side deploying these land systems, however. In late March, pro-Kremlin channels celebrated what they said was the successful deployment of Russian-made uncrewed land systems, outfitted with an AGS-17 grenade launcher.

Ukraine believes its advantage will come from how it dispatches these systems. “You need a mesh system,” Stepan says. And that’s one of the single hardest things to do. Ukraine has started dispatching repeater UAVs, which are used to extend the base station signal, allowing the drones to fly farther and defend better against Russian jamming.

One ground drone, basically a mobile machine-gun turret, boasts an 800-meter range. What’s more impressive, however, is what happens when the land system is paired with a surveillance drone. Rather than them firing directly ahead, Stepan’s team has been training Ukrainian soldiers how to raise the weapon's trajectory, firing in a parabolic pattern and using the drone’s camera to adjust its aim. This tactic, he says, extends the drone’s firing range to 2.4 kilometers.

Doing combined operations with a couple of drones is hard enough. If Ukraine wants to really take advantage of these autonomous systems, it will need to figure out how to command multiple systems across land and air—and that’s where artificial intelligence comes in.

Stepan walks through the four levels of how AI can augment warfare: One is reconnaissance, where machine learning can be used to collate large volumes of footage and satellite imagery. Two is “copiloting,” as he calls it, where AI can analyze that intelligence and help draw insights. Third is planning, where AI can help develop “interlinked, complex orders” for multiple systems across land and air; he likens that to having AI develop football plays. Finally, step four is full autonomy, where AI collects intelligence, analyzes it, develops orders based on the intelligence, and dispatches and commands autonomous units based on that information—although humans review and approve each step of the process.

There are steps beyond this, Stepan notes, that remove human involvement entirely, but he isn’t interested in going there. Another executive recounted a story of how one company designed an autonomous machine gun, capable of conducting object detection and opening fire on its own—that was a “big, big problem,” he says, after the weapon’s radio signals were jammed and it began firing wildly. “I think we can do this slowly,” he adds.

Stepan’s systems are capable of operating at step four, he says. It means his systems have the “ability to take in variables” in real time—it allows his drones to change tactics depending on the environment. He provides examples: “What if our team is close? What if there is [electronic warfare]? What if one system loses connection?”

Kushnerska says Ukraine, alive to the concerns about and risks of AI on the battlefield, is mostly interested in using artificial intelligence only in the “last mile.”

It’s not enough to build drones. Ukrainians also have to know how to pilot them.

The last stop on Yvan’s tour is at a strip mall some distance away. Outside, a group of fresh-faced young men smoke cigarettes and enthusiastically greet him as he walks past.

Inside is a sterile classroom, with a dozen desks laid out—each featuring a tablet, a workstation, and an array of tools. In the back corner are pallets of FPV drones waiting to be unloaded.

This is Yvan’s drone school. Here, students learn not just the ins and outs of piloting these quadcopters but also how the machines work and how to repair them. Down the hallway is a large conference room where the students first test their skills—flags and checkpoints are propped up on cardboard boxes taped together into platforms of different levels. Once students can successfully navigate this makeshift course, they graduate to piloting the drones outside.

Yvan’s drones are normally painted jet black, designed to look as nondescript as possible. One drone, sitting on a desk in the training school, is spray-painted a bright orange. Yvan grins: “We’re sick of losing them in the grass.”

As Kyiv mobilized tens of thousands of ordinary Ukrainian men to fight, training has been a critical necessity. Particularly as ammunition supplies have dwindled, virtual training has been especially attractive. High-tech combat simulators have allowed Ukrainian troops to simulate real combat scenarios with rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, even anti-tank missiles. Ukrainian entrepreneurs are hoping to have dozens of these simulators online in the near future, with the goal of training 100,000 troops.

An industry source tells WIRED that a drone combat simulator went online last month, allowing trainees to simulate the entire process of launching a long-range drone strike. Version 2.0 is being rolled out now, they say, adding that it is likely the first immersive offensive drone simulator in operation. The simulator is also intended to help Ukrainian pilots practice integrating their drones with land systems, which is notoriously difficult for even experienced soldiers.

While Yvan’s drone school offers hands-on experience for users of the FPV drones, this new drone simulator allows pilots to practice long-range targeting, flying in adverse weather conditions, and countering electronic warfare.

All of this—the FPV drones, the long-range bombers, the flight simulators—is Ukrainian innovation at work. And it is moving remarkably fast. Some day, after the war is over, Yvan may well be on the front lines of a Ukrainian technology renaissance, fulfilling orders for the Pentagon. First, both he—and Ukraine—need to survive.

In recent weeks, Russian forces have made modest but steady advances along the front lines. Defense executives, meanwhile, see sabotage and industrial espionage as constant problems. Even more acute is the threat of Russian air strikes. One executive recently recounted how one of his company’s main facilities was nearly hit by two Russian cruise missiles. The risk is very real.

Leaving the school, Yvan opens up the back of his car. He rummages around and hands me two patches: One features a cartoonish and scantily clad woman wearing an FPV headset with the Ukrainian flag on the side, piloting one of Yvan’s rotocopters. The other, an army-green Canadian flag, carries the words “ALWAYS BE READY.”

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