#2020 China–India skirmishes

[mariacallous]

Five years since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomous status, the central government’s iron-fisted approach to the region has left it more vulnerable to regional and geopolitical threats.

While Kashmir Valley, which has withstood the brunt of armed insurgency since 1989, continues to simmer with militancy-related violence, the theater of terrorism has now extended into the otherwise peaceful province of Jammu. Since 2019, at least 262 soldiers and 171 civilians have died in more than 690 incidents, including the February 2019 Pulwama terrorist attack. The unsustainable and disproportionate loss of lives underscores the risks to both regional stability and India’s national security.

In 2019, the Modi government revoked Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which granted the state of Jammu and Kashmir its special status, annihilating the contested region’s symbolic autonomy. Concurrently, the central government also imposed an indefinite curfew in the region and used internet shutdowns and arrests to control and suppress the local population. The result was a transformed landscape. Already scarred by militarization, Kashmir became enmeshed in barbed wire.

This undemocratic exercise, though later stamped and endorsed by India’s Supreme Court, has since spurred further legal changes. For example, the local population no longer has access to exclusive protections that previously allowed only permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir to apply for government jobs and buy property in the state.

In March 2020, the government repealed 12 and amended 14 land-related laws, introducing a clause that paved the way for a development authority to confiscate land and another that allowed high-ranking army officials to declare a local area as strategically important.

Local residents are appalled at the ease with which government agencies can now seize both residential and agricultural lands in the name of development and security—enabling mass evictions and the bulldozing of houses that are disproportionately affecting Muslim communities and small landowners.

Meanwhile, the ecological fallout from introducing massive road and railway networks, coupled with the addition of mega hydroelectricity projects, is polluting riverbeds and causing villages to sink. Since 2019, there has been a lack of local representation which could act as a buffer against massive development projects, most of which now fall under New Delhi’s governance. Meanwhile, the region’s unemployment rate, as of 2023, remains high at above 18 percent, as compared to the national average of 8 percent.

Over the last few years, the Modi government has also squashed dissent in the region by redirecting the military to maintain surveillance and control of the civilian population. According to the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir, over 2,700 people were arrested in the region between 2020 and 2023 under India’s contentious Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and the Public Safety Act. Those arrested include journalists like Fahad Shah and Sajad Gul, human rights defenders like Khurram Pervez, and prominent lawyers like Mian Qayoom and Nazir Ronga.

Modi’s repressive policies have deepened the trust deficit between Kashmiris and the Indian government. The top-down administration has further sidelined local bureaucrats and police officers, further widening the gap between the central government and local ground realities.

All of this has not only pushed the local population into distress, but also jeopardized India’s already fragile relations with its two nuclear neighbors, Pakistan and China.

The Kashmir conflict, rooted in the 1947 partition of India, has led to three major wars and several military skirmishes between India, Pakistan, and China. And though the region has always been contentious—India controls more than half of the total land, while Pakistan controls 30 percent, and China holds the remaining 15 percent in the northeast region near Ladakh—Modi’s aggressive handling has further provoked its neighbors.

Following the revocation of Article 370, the region was split into two separate union territories—Jammu and Kashmir forming one and Ladakh forming another, with both falling under the central government’s control.

This redrawing of the region’s internal borders, which signaled New Delhi’s assertions of reclaiming the Chinese-occupied territory near Ladakh—as well as India’s increasing tilt towards the United States—resulted in a deadly clash between India and China in 2020 and another one in 2022. Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions over the disputed Himalayan border, New Delhi has accused Beijing of carrying out “inch by inch” land grabs in Ladakh since 2020.

Meanwhile, Pakistan-administered Kashmir has been rocked by mass protests of its own this year, owing to the country’s political and economic crisis, exacerbated in part by the abrogation of Article 370. Those living in Pakistan-administered Kashmir fear that Pakistan may similarly try to dilute the autonomy of the region.

With refugees flooding in from Afghanistan on its west amidst Imran Khan’s standoff with the Pakistani Army, Islamabad has been on edge and looking for diversionary tactics. The deepening of Pakistani-Chinese relations, including military ties, has contributed to a volatile mix.

But Kashmir’s vulnerability has worsened partly because of India’s own tactical blunders, too. The last decade witnessed a spurt in home-grown militancy, but since 2019 the landscape has been dominated by well-trained militants from across the Pakistani border who have access to sophisticated weapons and technology.

Indian security forces, including paramilitaries and the local police, have turned a blind eye to these emerging threats, especially in the twin districts of Rajouri and Poonch along the border with Pakistan. It is in this area that the impact of terror attacks has been most felt.

The region is home to the nomadic Gujjar-Bakerwal communities and the ethnolinguistic Paharis. These groups are parts of divided families straddling the India-Pakistan border, and this shared cultural linkage between the Indian and Pakistani sides has been weaponized in the past by intelligence networks of both countries.

The Indian armed forces have historically relied on the Gujjar-Bakerwal communities for intelligence gathering in part because of their nomadic lives and deep knowledge of the region’s topography. However, since 2019, the evictions of nomads from forest lands, following the amendment of several land-related laws, as well as affirmative actions for Paharis, a rival ethnic group, have led to the disenchantment of the Gujjar-Bakerwals—and an eventual loss of traditional intelligence assets for India.

Another blunder has been the redeployment of troops from Jammu to the border with China in the northeast, following China’s incursions in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley in 2020. This has left Jammu dangerously exposed to militants who have been infiltrating the region from across the line of control on the western side and carrying out their operations with a fair degree of success.

In 2024 alone, Jammu has witnessed numerous attacks which have resulted in the deaths of 16 soldiers and 12 civilians. In June, for example, the region experienced one of its deadliest attacks when militants opened fire on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing nine and injuring over 30.

Kashmir’s internal politics has the potential to spill over and push the region into disaster. While India has made some significant strides in international diplomacy under Modi, it tends to neglect the neighborhood where the risks to India’s national security remain the highest. Its diplomatic engagement with China comes in fits and starts but diplomacy with Pakistan remains nonexistent, despite the resumption of a ceasefire in 2021. And while India considers the removal of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status an internal matter, Pakistan sees it as a provocation. All in all, there is a dangerous lack of engagement between the two nuclear rivals in South Asia.

In theory, the ongoing regional elections in Jammu and Kashmir provide a glimmer of opportunity for the people to choose their own local government for the first time in a decade. However, irrespective of who wins the elections, the local leaders will lack the power to enact meaningful change, given that the region remains under the control of New Delhi following its demotion from a state to two union territories.

For instance, Ladakh does not have a legislative assembly, and while Jammu and Kashmir have an elected assembly, the real powers are vested in the hands of a governor, who was appointed to lead the region by the Modi-led central government. As recently as July, the Indian government ruled to further expand the governor’s oversight powers, delivering a blow to local politicians and voters.

Much more needs to be done to change the status quo. Though it remains unlikely, New Delhi must consider meaningful solutions that could assuage some of the political wounds inflicted by the complete erosion of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy, including, for example, the restoration of statehood to the region. In order to win back the trust of Kashmiris, the Indian government must reinstate civil liberties and deliver on its promise to provide economic development and jobs.

To improve the region’s safety, Indian agencies must acknowledge their security lapses and repair their broken intelligence networks. And while the Indian security forces must not lower their guard against terrorist activities, terrorism should not be proffered as an excuse when it comes to the normalization of relations in the neighborhood.

Neither Pakistan, nor India can afford the war which is looming over their heads. Diplomatic negotiations, including over Kashmir, must begin with a sense of urgency.

[andronetalks]

China's Xi & India's Modi Cement Border Peace Deal After Years Of Friction

Zero Hedge BY TYLER DURDENWEDNESDAY, OCT 23, 2024 – 11:00 PM The India-China troop clash of 2020 along the largely unmarked frontier of Ladakh in a disputed border area in the Western Himalayas resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. It was the deadliest border incident between the two nuclear-armed nations in memory. Since then, other more minor skirmishes and tense…

[jobaaj]

🚨𝐁𝐢𝐠 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐚-𝐂𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐚 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬🚨 𝐋𝐀𝐂 𝐰𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐧𝐨𝐰 𝐛𝐞 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥??😮 🤔 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭'𝐬 𝐡𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐝?! ✨ There's been a 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 shift in Indo-Chinese relations! ✨ 📍 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐞𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥 (𝐋𝐀𝐂) 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐧𝐨𝐰 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐥𝐯𝐞𝐝, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐞! 🕊️ 💬 According to the latest statement from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 🇮🇳 & 🇨🇳 have 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐡𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 on new 𝐩𝐚𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 along the LAC after extensive negotiations! 🤝✨ 🧐𝐖𝐡𝐲? - To resolve a 4-year-long border dispute. - The standoff began in 2020 when skirmishes on Pangong Lake and Galwan Valley between troops resulted in casualties on both sides. - That spiked regional tensions and worsened ties between both countries for over 4 years! - According to EAM Jaishankar, India and China have completed the disengagement process and the situation has now returned to what it was before May 2020!! 😲𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐥𝐲: - Experts believe India should be careful. - China has yet to release its statement and considering its imperialistic and land-grabbing habits, India must stay vigilant. - While some progress has been made in Eastern Ladakh, the situation in Arunachal Pradesh remains dire. ❓𝑾𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕? Follow Jobaaj Stories (the media arm of Jobaaj.com Group for more)

For more updates and insightful stories like this one, follow Jobaaj Stories, the media arm of the Jobaaj Group. We’re dedicated to informing, educating, and inspiring young professionals and students with stories that truly matter. 🌟

[tfgadgets]

LAC Patrolling Pact Leading To Disengagement

The breakthrough came ahead of the BRICS meeting to be held in Russia New Delhi: India and China have arrived on a patrolling arrangement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas, and it can lead to disengagement and resolution of tension that began with skirmishes in May 2020, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said today. The breakthrough came ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s…

[code-of-conflict]

The Future of AI and Conflict: Scenarios for India-China Relations

Introduction: AI at the Center of India-China Dynamics

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to evolve, it is reshaping the geopolitical landscape, particularly in the context of India-China relations. AI offers both unprecedented opportunities for peace and collaboration, as well as heightened risks of conflict. The trajectory of the relationship between these two Asian powers—already marked by border tensions, economic competition, and geopolitical rivalry—could be significantly influenced by their respective advancements in AI. This post explores possible future scenarios where AI could either deepen hostilities or become a cornerstone of peacebuilding between India and China.

Scenario 1: AI as a Tool for Escalating Conflict

In one possible trajectory, AI advancements exacerbate existing tensions between India and China, leading to an arms race in AI-driven military technology. China’s rapid progress in developing AI-enhanced autonomous weaponry, surveillance systems, and cyber capabilities positions it as a formidable military power. If unchecked, this could lead to destabilization in the region, particularly along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). China’s integration of AI into military-civil fusion policies underscores its strategy to use AI across both civilian and military sectors, raising concerns in India and beyond​.

India, in response, may feel compelled to accelerate its own AI-driven defense strategies, potentially leading to an arms race. Although India has made strides in AI research and development, it lacks the scale and speed of China’s AI initiatives. An intensification of AI-related militarization could further deepen the divide between the two nations, reducing opportunities for diplomacy and increasing the risk of miscalculation. Autonomous weapons systems, in particular, could make conflicts more likely, as AI systems operate at speeds beyond human control, leading to unintended escalations.

Scenario 2: AI and Cybersecurity Tensions

Another potential area of conflict lies in the realm of AI-enhanced cyber warfare. China has already demonstrated its capabilities in offensive cyber operations, which have included espionage and cyberattacks on India’s critical infrastructure​. The most notable incidents include cyberattacks during the 2020 border standoff, which targeted Indian power grids and government systems. AI can significantly enhance the efficiency and scale of such attacks, making critical infrastructure more vulnerable to disruption.

In the absence of effective AI-based defenses, India’s cybersecurity could be a significant point of vulnerability, further fueling distrust between the two nations. AI could also be used for disinformation campaigns and psychological warfare, with the potential to manipulate public opinion and destabilize political systems in both countries. In this scenario, AI becomes a double-edged sword, increasing not only the technological capabilities of both nations but also the likelihood of conflict erupting in cyberspace​.

Scenario 3: AI as a Catalyst for Diplomatic Cooperation

However, AI also holds the potential to be a catalyst for peace if both India and China recognize the mutual benefits of collaboration. AI can be harnessed to improve conflict prevention through early warning systems that monitor border activities and detect escalations before they spiral out of control. By developing shared AI-driven monitoring platforms, both nations could enhance transparency along contested borders like the LAC, reducing the chances of accidental skirmishes​.

Moreover, AI can facilitate dialogue on broader issues like disaster management and environmental protection, areas where both India and China share common interests. Climate change, for instance, poses a significant threat to both countries, and AI-driven solutions can help manage water resources, predict natural disasters, and optimize agricultural productivity. A collaborative framework for AI in these non-military domains could serve as a confidence-building measure, paving the way for deeper cooperation on security issues​.

Scenario 4: AI Governance and the Path to Peace

A more optimistic scenario involves India and China working together to establish international norms and governance frameworks for the ethical use of AI. Both nations are increasingly involved in global AI governance discussions, though their approaches differ. China, while focusing on strategic dominance, is also participating in international forums like the ISO to shape AI standards. India, on the other hand, advocates for responsible and inclusive AI, emphasizing transparency and ethical considerations​.

A shared commitment to creating ethical AI frameworks, particularly in the military sphere, could prevent AI from becoming a destabilizing force. India and China could jointly advocate for global agreements on the regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and AI-enhanced cyber warfare, reducing the risk of unchecked AI proliferation. By working together on AI governance, both nations could shift the narrative from AI as a tool for conflict to AI as a force for global peace and stability.

Conclusion: The Crossroads of AI and India-China Relations

The future of India-China relations in the AI age is uncertain, with both risks and opportunities on the horizon. While AI could exacerbate existing tensions by fueling an arms race and increasing cyber vulnerabilities, it also offers unprecedented opportunities for conflict prevention and cooperation. The direction that India and China take will depend on their willingness to engage in dialogue, establish trust, and commit to ethical AI governance. As the world stands on the brink of a new era in AI-driven geopolitics, India and China must choose whether AI will divide them further or bring them closer together in pursuit of peace.

[secretstalks]

MGH Group CEO Anis Ahmed: Insufficient Air Freight Capacity Limits Chinese Goods Exports to India

Anis Ahmed, Founder and Group CEO of MGH Group, a prominent freight and logistics firm based in Singapore, has underscored the substantial air cargo potential between India and China. Despite a strong demand from Chinese exporters for the Indian market, the trade dynamics remain skewed. Indian airlines frequently find themselves returning to China with empty cargo holds, as Indian exports to China are minimal compared to Chinese exports to India.

“You can’t change much because Indian exporters aren’t selling to Chinese, but the Chinese love Indians—they sell everything to India,” Ahmed remarked in an interview. MGH Group, which acts as a general sales agent for ocean carriers and airlines and provides comprehensive logistics support, leverages its activities in China to manage air freight shipments into India. The company has formed a strategic alliance with IndiGo, India’s largest airline, to facilitate these shipments.

Ahmed explained that there is a lack of sufficient space for air freight to support online businesses due to the imbalanced trade flow. “India doesn’t send much to China, so when the aircraft return, they are empty,” he said.

Chinese freight carriers such as SF Express and YTO Cargo dominate the freight flight operations from China to India. IndiGo, India’s largest carrier, has recently initiated freighter services between Kolkata and Ezhou, Hubei Province, China. MGH Group utilizes both IndiGo and Chinese freighter companies for cargo transport from China to India.

“IndiGo is our gold standard. We aim to integrate with their network wherever possible. We are establishing service links for agriculture and industry that require faster transport,” Ahmed noted.

The bilateral relationship between India and China has been strained since the deadly skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control in May 2020. India’s Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has emphasized that normalization of relations with China is contingent upon peace and stability at the border.

Ahmed, who is based in Singapore but originally from Bangladesh, highlighted the need for significant players in the air freight industry to emerge in India to bolster its position in the global supply chain network. He stressed that protecting and developing the Indian supply chain is crucial for the success of the “Made in India” initiative. “I told the honorable secretary of aviation, ‘Sir, you have to protect the Indian supply chain.’ ‘Made in India’ can only be successful if its supply chain is also manufactured in India,” Ahmed said.

He advocated for a gestation period for Indian carriers to achieve profitability, invest in their fleets, and compete fairly with foreign carriers, which currently dominate the air cargo sector.

Ahmed is optimistic about the future of Indian airlines like Air India, Akasa Air, and SpiceJet. “Yes, we work with SpiceJet. We were among the first to take over and manage their cargo business since 2015. We cover all of India and are their global go-to market for all their destinations,” he said.

MGH Group aims to significantly expand its aviation segment, which currently represents 22% of its sales. “We want to double that. We’re just scratching the surface of this billion-dollar industry today. Over the next three to five years, we anticipate an eight- to nine-fold growth in this sector,” Ahmed projected.

The group is betting on India’s expanding airport infrastructure to enhance air freight operations. “We align our goals with the Indian government’s vision,” Ahmed concluded. “When the government announced the UDAN scheme for airport development, we adopted it as a blueprint for the future of Indian aviation, for both passenger and cargo transport.”

READ MORE

[ebelal56-blog]

Neighbor victimization: India's revealed secrets

Have you ever thought about how complex India’s relationships with its neighbors really are? It’s like a tangled web of history, politics, and strategy. Take the border disputes, for instance. With China, it’s been a long-standing issue, especially in the Himalayas. Remember the Galwan Valley clash in 2020? That really escalated things. And then there’s Pakistan and Kashmir—since 1947, it’s been a rollercoaster of wars and skirmishes. Now, let’s talk about India’s growing influence. While it’s great to see India taking the lead in South Asia, it can sometimes rub neighbors the wrong way. Countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka feel like they’re caught in the middle of a power play, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative competing for attention. Building dams over international rivers and not sharing with Bangladesh. And don’t get me started on the strategic alliances with Western powers. They can seem more like a containment strategy than a partnership. All of this creates a perception that India is making more enemies than friends. It’s a delicate balance, and one misstep could tip the scales

[arun-pratap-singh]

Explained | The escalation on the India-China border

Explained | The escalation on the India-China border

The story so far: On December 9, 2022, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Yangtse area in the Tawang region along the India-China border. The confrontation in Tawang was the most serious skirmish between the two sides since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has found that the skirmish that took place in December was aided by new road…

[wowhealthfitness20]

India and China agree to withdraw from Paigong Lake Area, troops will return to April position | भारत और चीन 3 दिन तक रोज 30% सैनिक वापस बुलाएंगे, पैंगॉन्ग से तीन फेज में होगी सेना की वापसी Hindi News National India And China Agree To Withdraw From Paigong Lake Area, Troops Will Return To April Position…

[indizombie]

Amazon is not only destroying extant jobs, but effectively diverting manufacture to China – a country that just last year killed 20 Indian soldiers. Conveniently, they have avoided disclosing country of origin to customers. They were fined a paltry Rs 75,000 and continue to not display the country of origin of their Amazon branded products on the website and app. Amazon has teamed up with arch rival Flipkart to oppose regulatory action while at the same time, undermining sovereignty by approaching Singapore for arbitration against a counter consolidation by Reliance acquiring Future Group’s retail arms like Big Bazaar and the like.

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, ‘As Amazon Hits India’s Job Market & Small Businesses, Need of the Hour is to Rein in the Corporate Giant’, CNN News18

[mariacallous]

In the early hours of Dec. 9, a few hundred Chinese soldiers armed with batons, spikes, and other primitive weapons tried to dislodge an Indian Army outpost on a ridge on the disputed border between India’s easternmost state, Arunachal Pradesh, and Tibet, which is governed by China. The Indian Army warded off the attackers, but the clash was fierce, injuring 34 Indian soldiers.

New Delhi blamed Beijing for trying to “unilaterally change the status quo,” while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said it was conducting a regular patrol when its troops were “blocked by the Indian Army illegally crossing” the border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Two days later, local military commanders from both sides agreed to a disengagement that prevents an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation at the ridge, near the edge of the Yangtse plateau. Still, Chinese and Indian soldiers remain separated by just 500 feet.

This month’s clash is not a one-off. Arunachal Pradesh has been the site of regular skirmishes in recent months, even as tensions remain high in the Ladakh region on the western section of the China-India border. Chinese provocations in the east reflect a breakdown of Indian deterrence. New Delhi’s trade with Beijing has increased, diplomatic ties have remained normal, and India has not undertaken local military operations. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reputation for toughness and resolve—essential for deterrence—has been tested and found wanting.

Modi is trapped by his own nationalist rhetoric: Since deadly border clashes in Ladakh in 2020, India’s government has downplayed the border crisis to shield the prime minister’s macho image. China has been quick to exploit this weakness, which has likely emboldened it to put even more pressure on India. This shift has far-reaching consequences for New Delhi’s foreign policy, chief among them how it approaches its partnership with Washington. India fears being boxed into an alliance, but it can no longer wish away the Chinese threat.

The Yangtse plateau lies in India’s Tawang district, which is claimed by China. The sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang in the 17th century, and the district is home to the second-largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery in the world. Dai Bingguo, a Chinese diplomat who led border negotiations with India for a decade, argued in a 2017 interview that the territory that includes Tawang is “inalienable from China’s Tibet.” “Even the British colonialists who drew the illegal ‘McMahon Line’ respected China’s jurisdiction over Tawang,” he said.

The McMahon Line, although not formally accepted by the Chinese, serves as the de facto border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. Henry McMahon, the British foreign secretary of colonial India, drew the line on a map with a thick red pen in 1914 during negotiations over the status of Tibet. In some places, the line violates its own principle of following the highest watershed, creating discrepancies on the ground. Yangtse is one such area of dispute, as established during border talks in the 1990s.

India first occupied the area in 1986, during the seven-year Sumdorung Chu crisis with China—a major standoff over the Yangtse plateau. It’s understandable why the PLA wants to control the 17,000-foot ridge, as military commanders agree on its tactical importance. It offers an unrestricted view of the entire Tawang Valley and Bum La pass, providing a tactical advantage. A Chinese military patrol was pushed back by India there as recently as October 2021; this year, the PLA sealed a road and constructed a camp around 500 feet short of the ridge.

Other reports suggest that clashes such as the one on Dec. 9 have taken place in Arunachal Pradesh two or three times a month on average recently, and that the Indian government has succeeded at keeping the incidents largely under wraps until now. Indian media reports that since the start of summer, the PLA has been “overtly aggressive” at the border with Arunachal Pradesh. Likewise, in the Doklam plateau in Bhutan, the site of a 73-day standoff over a Chinese construction project in 2017, the PLA has built a new bridge.

These Chinese grey zone operations—falling below the threshold of war—have gone on while tensions between the two armies in Ladakh remain high. There, each side still deploys more than 50,000 additional soldiers, Indian soldiers can’t access areas they patrolled in 2020, and border talks have failed to provide a breakthrough. If the PLA can try to dislodge India from a place like Yangtse, where New Delhi has deployed for decades, then it surely can target any place on the LAC at its will. Effective deterrence is a function of visible capacity to inflict unacceptable damage—whether military, economic, or diplomatic. The situation as it stands reflects India’s increasing inability to deter China on the disputed border.

Since the Ladakh crisis began, trade between India and China has reached record highs. India is the biggest recipient of grants from the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This economic entanglement has further diminished India’s deterrence. Meanwhile, New Delhi has taken few diplomatic steps to dissuade Beijing from incursions. In addition to attending multilateral summits hosted by China and inviting Chinese delegations to India, the Indian military has participated with the PLA in joint exercises. New Delhi has not undertaken any quid pro quo military operations to take control of Chinese territory on the border, which it could use as a bargaining chip to reverse Beijing’s ingresses in Ladakh.

Despite these realities, around 70 percent of Indians now believe the country could defeat China militarily. Modi has avoided any public conversation about China’s border threat. After the Galwan Valley clashes, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, the prime minister said on national television that “no one has intruded into our territory.” In Beijing’s view, New Delhi is reluctant to acknowledge any aggressive Chinese actions to prevent embarrassment to Modi, and hesitant to follow through threats out of fear of further escalation.

Modi’s brief exchange with Chinese President Xi Jinping at this year’s G-20 summit also failed to yield any result in the border dispute. Vijay Gokhale, who previously served as India’s foreign secretary and ambassador to Beijing, recently recommended that India should “convey signals more credibly and transparently.” In Gokhale’s words, the Modi government’s current actions corroborate Beijing’s long-held vision of New Delhi as “unequal as well as untrustworthy.”

The ongoing tensions at the India-China border inevitably shape Modi’s foreign policy. India has so far continued to pursue relationships with regimes shunned by the West, despite U.S. President Joe Biden calling ties with India the “the most important relationship for the United States, into the 21st century.” Before the war in Ukraine, India imported less than 1 percent of its crude oil from Russia; now more than 20 percent of its crude supplies come from Russia. India is collaborating with Iran on an infrastructure project to shorten the supply lines from Russia and engages with the military junta in Myanmar.

Aiming for a multipolar world, New Delhi has rarely backed the West at multilateral forums, but it hasn’t voted with Russia either. India simultaneously wants be part of the global south and have a seat at the global north’s table. But New Delhi can only pursue this independent course if it has the freedom to maneuver. Instead, its immediate and proximate challenge has become its biggest concern, forcing it to view all its foreign-policy choices through that prism. China has compelled India to reconsider choices that it has so far sidestepped, including a closer security and intelligence partnership with the United States and its allies.

The most important decision India currently faces is whether to officially join forces with the United States to counter China. Most observers see the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad (comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), as a potential showcase for that cooperation. Kurt Campbell, the White House Indo-Pacific czar, recently revealed that New Delhi was reluctant to have the Quad hold a leaders’ summit. When the United States explored whether the Quad could develop military teeth, the Indian side restated its discomfort.

More than three years after the United States agreed to have Indian liaison officers at the Indo-Pacific Command and Special Operations Command, the Indian government has not yet nominated one. New Delhi has not responded enthusiastically to the Australian Navy’s request to send an Indian submarine to dock in Perth, Australia; Japan also speaks in whispered tones about the depth or lack thereof of India’s commitment to regional security, including over Taiwan.

Ultimately, New Delhi’s reluctance to fully commit to an anti-China security partnership also reflects its apprehension about provoking Beijing. It is the only member of the Quad that shares a land border with China and recognizes that it must deal with a continental security challenge from China on its own; the United States would not take a risk over Tawang. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to view New Delhi through the prism of its ties with Washington. It does not wish to grant India the status of a regional power to be dealt on its own terms.

The Dec. 9 clash at Tawang underlines again that India cannot escape the Chinese threat on its border. The government’s tactic of staying silent until the crisis blows over has only made the Chinese more belligerent. Since the latest clash followed Modi’s personal overture to Xi, it should be evident that the prime minister’s personality-driven diplomacy has failed. Modi has turned national energy to focus on event management around India’s G-20 presidency next year, but that won’t diminish China’s intimidating stance either.

The status quo has changed, deterrence has broken down, and Beijing’s threat looms larger by the day. Sooner or later, India will have to take more decisive action.

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LAC पर डिसइंगेजमेंट प्लान: चीन और भारत की सेनाएं पूर्वी लद्दाख में बनाए गए स्ट्रक्चर तोड़ेगी, पेट्रोलिंग भी नहीं होगी Hindi News National The Forces Of India And China Will Break The New Construction Prepared In The Paigong Lake Area, The Patrol Will Also Stop…

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LAC पर डिसइंगेजमेंट प्लान: चीन और भारत की सेनाएं पूर्वी लद्दाख में बनाए गए स्ट्रक्चर तोड़ेगी, पेट्रोलिंग भी नहीं होगी Hindi News National The Forces Of India And China Will Break The New Construction Prepared In The Paigong Lake Area, The Patrol Will Also Stop…

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India China | India Befitting Reply To China; Ladakh, Jammu Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh an integral part of India | पाकिस्तान के दावे पर भारत ने कहा- हमने बातचीत का कोई मैसेज नहीं भेजा; लद्दाख पर चीन को बेतुकी बयानबाजी बंद करने की हिदायत Hindi News National India China | India Befitting Reply To China; Ladakh, Jammu Kashmir And Arunachal Pradesh An Integral Part Of India…

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India, China hold sixth Corps Commander-level talks in eastern Ladakh Image Source : PTI India, China hold sixth Corps Commander-level talks in eastern Ladakh  India and China on Monday held their sixth Corps Commander-level talks at the Chinese side of the Chushul/Moldo meeting point in the Eastern Ladakh sector, to address the ongoing military standoff there.

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India-China Military Disengagement

The term ‘Line of Actual Control’ or ‘LAC’ was first brought up by Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, in his two letters which were given to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1959. Earlier LAC was known as the McMahon line. China again mentioned the term ‘LAC’ in the Indo-China War of 1962. India has consistently shown its reluctance by not accepting the concept of line of actual control. However, finally, India excepted the concept of LAC in 1993 when Prime Minister of India PV Narsimha Rao visited China (Beijing) after Li Peng paid a visit to India in 1991. India accepted LAC to maintain peace and tranquility at the border. 

India-China Clash 

China has never been a pleasant neighbor to India. There are many instances where China has been proven troublesome for India, one such instance has occurred recently at Line of Actual Control (LAC). 

Tension grew between India and China in late April 2020 along with the disputed territory of LAC. The major concern from the Indian point of view was the intruding of China in Indian territory. Chinese troops came in 8 kilometers from Finger 8 to Finger 4 near Pangong Tso lake. Not only this they also made some permanent structures in that area which was a matter of concern for India. As a result of this trespass, there was a combat between the nations at Galwan Valley on May 5, 2020, which was held almost after 45 years. The standoff ended with many casualties suffered from both sides. However, 20 Indian troops were martyred and 4 Chinese soldiers were also killed in the skirmish (as revealed by China recently). 

Disengagement 

Recently in January 2021, a step was taken to ease or resolve the scuffle between India and China which continued for almost 9 months at LAC in Ladakh. Ninth Round of Military Level Talks was held on 24 January 2021 and it was settled down that armies of both the countries will disengage themselves from the border but in a synchronized and organized manner near Sothern and Northern shores of Pangong Tso lake. Both the countries agreed to pull off certain columns of tanks but for now, there is no pulling of frontline soldiers. 

China has to call off their soldiers and pull them back to Finger 8 while Indian soldiers have to take the position at their permanent base, Dhan Singh Thapa, near Finger 3. It has also been mutually agreed that neither Indian nor Chinese soldiers will do patrolling between Finger 3 and Finger 4 until any further formal agreement. To restore the situation, any permanent structures made by both of these countries have to be removed which were made after April 2020. 

However, this does not resolve the whole conflict between India and China but this is only a step towards the maintenance of peace and tranquility among these two nations.

Read about the History of India China relations here