beautywithinfootball

[beautywithinfootball]

Site Moved

Hi all,

I have recently moved the contents of Beauty Within Football to a new site: http://motz.football/analysis

All of the future analyses will be posted there.

Thanks to everyone for reading throughout the years. 

[beautywithinfootball]

Manchester United v Manchester City (1-2)

Match date: 10 September 2016

Plenty of storylines coming into this match: obviously the Manchester derby, Mourinho and Guardiola’s friendship-turn-rivalry, the respective managers’ style of play, and the amount of money spent to put together teams of such quality.

Mourinho set his side out in a 4-2-3-1 with Mkhitaryan and Lingard both given their first Premier League starts of the season. Pogba and Fellaini continued in a double pivot with Rooney in front of them supporting Ibrahimovic.

Guardiola gave Claudio Bravo his debut after moving from Barcelona, while Iheanacho started at centre forward with the absence of Sergio Agüero. Guardiola’s side looked like a 4-3-3, with De Bruyne given a lot of freedom.

De Bruyne’s Significant Influence

A game against different ideas where one team likes to control the ball and the other likes to control the space, it was in midfield where this ‘battle’ became very evident, particularly in the first half, and the victor was Manchester City. As mentioned above, Manchester United continued in a 4-2-3-1 with Pogba and Fellaini the two midfielders, with Rooney in front of them providing support to Ibrahimovic. Manchester City were in a 4-3-3 with Silva and De Bruyne in front of Fernandinho. Both Silva and De Bruyne have not really played as central midfielders in a 4-3-3 previously. Under Pellegrini, they were both used either out wide in Pellegrini’s 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 variation or as something of a number 10 in a 4-2-3-1. Thus far, however, the two have looked good in central midfield roles under Guardiola and De Bruyne, in particular, looked very good against Manchester United.

Prior to the match, Jose Mourinho said that Manchester United were going to find it harder without Agüero being available for Manchester City and it appears that Mourinho was right as he miscalculated how big of an influence De Bruyne would have in the absence of Agüero. Where the central triangles of the Manchester sides matched up on paper, it seemed that Mourinho had no plan to really adapt to De Bruyne and Silva’s movement around Pogba and Fellaini. Countless times, De Bruyne drifted to the left side of Manchester City’s attack. One of the first good chances for either team came after De Bruyne peeled away from Fellaini, in between Valencia and Bailly, and the Belgian’s consistent movement, without a consistent mark, allowed him to control the game for Manchester City in the opening half.

Despite the directness of Manchester City’s opening goal, scored by De Bruyne, it highlighted again that neither Pogba or Fellaini took responsibility or had the tactical discipline to consistent mark De Bruyne. However, there were more issues for Manchester United than the failings of Pogba and Fellaini; Pep had Nolito and Sterling stretch the game as wide as they could, meaning that both Shaw and Valencia were forced to take up wider positions which left the Manchester United back four incredibly stretched. De Bruyne’s runs into the left half space were the result of Nolito dragging Valencia out wide and the game created between the United right back and Bailly. It was a move calculated by Guardiola and it certainly got the better of Mourinho and his side.

Not only did De Bruyne score the opening goal and tear Pogba and Fellaini apart with his movement in the first half, not to mention nearly scoring a second in the opening 45 minutes that Iheanacho tapped in, but in the second half, as a false nine, he nearly had again after good movement into the penalty area. 

Differences in Pressing

Going into the match, there were a few questions to address: is Mourinho going to have his side try to press high when City try to build out of the back? What are Manchester City’s fullbacks going to do? The answer to these questions are that Manchester United did try to press and that the Manchester City full backs mostly stayed in more conventional wide positions.

The issue with Manchester United’s pressing was fairly simple in that they did not commit enough numbers to press. When Bravo had the ball had his feet, he always had an option, even he had to delay his pass, he knew the movement of his teammates would open create an easy option.

Below is a good example of City’s ability to quickly play out. Stones plays the ball back to Bravo, Bravo plays it over to Otamendi, De Bruyne shows for the ball and then plays a quick pass out to Kolarov. This situation was in a theoretically advantageous situation for Manchester United as Sagna played a sloppy back pass to Stones, leading the centre back just about to the end line before he could play to Bravo. This should have allowed for Manchester United to commit numbers forward, but as you can see below, there was a huge gap between the lines for Manchester United. The initial press is fine, but once the first line of pressure was beaten, Manchester City were easily able to get forward with their attacks.

There was times when Stones moved into a central midfield area when the ball was out wide, seeing Fernandinho drop deeper to get away from Rooney during build up. A lot of the time in the first half, Stones and Otamendi were able to carry the ball forward in their half space without pressure from Manchester United. Mkhitaryan and Lingard were dragged away from the centre of the pitch by Kolarov and Sagna, Rooney followed Fernandinho, and Fellaini and Pogba were trying to deal with Silva and De Bruyne. That first good chance that came from De Bruyne’s movement behind Fellaini and between Valencia and Bailly came after Otamendi was allowed to travel with the ball and then play an excellent through ball for De Bruyne.

Whereas Manchester United’s pressing was disorganised, Manchester City’s was energetic, which does not necessarily mean it was well organised (although it was relatively), but it was effective. The midfield battle of Pogba and Fellaini against Fernandinho, De Bruyne, and Silva allowed Manchester City to win the ball back quickly and high up the pitch through numbers and intensity around the ball. Silva, in particular, darted around the middle third of the field to win the ball back for his side, something that he would not have done under Pellegrini in the last few years.

Structurally, Manchester City did not look as prepared for Manchester United’s counter attacks and United did look dangerous a few times when Pogba was able to strove forward with the ball. Once someone like Pogba was able to resist the initial City press, they were able to get numbers forward. Though it is hard to remember an instance when Manchester United were able to get a quality shot on target from one of their counter attacks in the first half. There were a handful of United counter attacks, which Guardiola knows, but City’s initial press through Silva, De Bruyne, and Fernandinho was typically very good.

Mourinho’s Changes, Pep Responds 

The Manchester United boss had to make changes at half time and he could have done so for a number of players, but chose Lingard (who had a placard behind him at times saying ‘Boy to FA Cup Hero’) and Mkhitaryan to take off for Herrera and Rashford. This changed Manchester United from a 4-2-3-1 to a 4-3-3 with Rashford on the left and Rooney on the right, while Herrera played in a holding midfield role behind a now more advanced Pogba and Fellaini.

The impact of the changes was immediate as now United had pace on the left through Rashford, had more stability in the middle of the pitch with Herrera doing a very good job, and the ability to play more direct with Pogba and Fellaini more advanced positions. Manchester United were now able to get the ball forward much quicker and assert more pressure on Manchester City and more control on the game The passing diagram below really shows the difference in play.

It also allowed for their pressing to be much more effective as Bravo now had to go long much more often and was really put under pressure with the ball at his feet (think just before his incident with Rooney in the penalty area).

With Mourinho’s changes, Guardiola reacted quickly. After just eight minutes into the second half, he took off Iheanacho, who had done relatively well, for Fernando. This move meant that De Bruyne moved forward into a ‘false nine’ position, while Fernandinho moved forward in middle next to Silva, maintaining City’s 4-3-3, but giving them another ball winner in midfield. At this point, United were getting numbers forward, but were incredibly vulnerable to City’s counter attacks and the visitors should have done better with their chances in the second half. De Bruyne was incredibly unlucky not to have another goal after a City counter attack, with his shot going off the inside of the near post and moving across the line before going out for a goal kick near the far post.

With his side down 2-1, Mourinho made his last change, bringing on Martial for Shaw, essentially giving Manchester United a front four of Martial, Rashford, Ibrahimovic, and Rooney. Pep adjusted his side to a 5-4-1 with Fernando dropping between Stones and Otamendi to maintain City’s numerical advantage at the back.

Conclusion

Guardiola wins another contest between Mourinho, giving him a significant advantage between the two. With arguably the best managers in the world on show in the Premier League this season, we were given a really good look at what that means: a high energy league, with tactical greatness. Guardiola’s plan bettered Mourinho’s in the first half and it was the best showings of football in the Premier League so far this season.

After the match, Mourinho bemoaned the decision not to award a penalty on Bravo’s challenge on Rooney and wanted a handball against Otamendi, while Guardiola said that his side need to improve significantly if they want to win the league, let alone, the Champions League.

[beautywithinfootball]

Arsenal v Liverpool (3-4)

Match date: 14 August 2016

A tough match for both sides to start the new season, but certainly more so for Arsenal who entered the match without either Mertesacker or Koscielny at centre back, leaving Calum Chambers and Rob Holding to fill in. Along with that, Wenger opted to leave Granit Xhaka on the bench with a midfield three of Coquelin and Eleney behind Ramsey in Arsenal’s 4-2-3-1.

For Liverpool, who had a first and relatively ‘successful’ preseason under Klopp, came into the game with a few question marks in the starting XI, but were certainly in much better shape than the Gunners and got off to a flying start as Klopp wanted and is necessary for Liverpool if they want to push for a top four finish.

Arsenal Attack Out Wide, Press Well

Despite having around five players that will not consistently get into their starting XI throughout the season, Arsenal started the game fairly well as they put Liverpool’s midfield and back four under a good amount of pressure early on. There were a few different things to look at, with the first being Aaron Ramsey’s runs. The Welsh international was playing just behind Alexis and was consistently making runs into the channels, but also beyond the Liverpool back four. He had a good chance with less than ten minutes played after making a run into the penalty area and another after Alberto Moreno headed the ball into his path. This was a big part of Arsenal’s first half dominance, but a lot of Ramsey’s freedom came from Jordan Henderson’s indiscipline in the holding role that he was deployed, presumably only because Can was on the bench. Henderson was overall okay in his role, but at times pressed too high and allowed Ramsey to run off of him out wide. Below is a good example when Ramsey peeled off Henderson.

A lot of Arsenal’s attacks came in the wide areas which was because of Liverpool’s narrow 4-3-3 mid-block. There were few times when Chambers or Holding were on the ball that Arsenal were able to get by Liverpool’s compact front three and midfield and get the ball directly into Coquelin, Elneny, or Ramsey. As Liverpool screened the central passing lanes, however, it allowed Arsenal to attack in the wide areas through Monreal, Bellerin, Walcott, and Iwobi.

Liverpool were vulnerable in these areas, especially with Walcott isolated against Moreno. The Liverpool left back has caught a lot of criticism with his rash decision making and positioning and this game would not do him any favours with Liverpool supporters as he gave away a penalty and was caught too high on a few occasions, only to be exploited once by Walcott.

Generally, Arsenal’s best attacking play in the first half was due to Liverpool’s sloppy passing and Arsenal’s very good pressing in the middle of the field. While Arsenal struggled at times to build from the back and bypass Liverpool’s midfield to launch attacks, they were consistently able to win the ball back from Liverpool.

This came down to a few different things; Liverpool simply looked sluggish and their attacking players’ communication and movement seemed a half second off, but because Arsenal were overloading the wide areas, in particular, when they lost the ball, they were quickly able to win the ball back and launch quick attacks as Liverpool were caught transitioning from defense to attack and causing destabilisation in their defensive structure. An obvious example of this is the game’s opening goal, when Liverpool won the ball back at the edge of their area. At this point, Moreno already began to move forward, while Liverpool’s out ball was to Adam Lallana who was just inside the middle third of the field, but isolated against Coquelin, with no passing option. Once Arsenal won the ball back, Moreno was caught too high and Arsenal took advantage.

This is not to say that Liverpool were particularly good defending on the right either. A perfect example was Oxlade-Chamberlain’s goal when he got past two Liverpool players, but the issues were similar to those mentioned above; Liverpool’s front three and midfield allowed for the ball to be moved out wide and the runs of Ramsey were generally to the left side of Arsenal’s attack (he came from the side on both of his chances). Arsenal’s attacks in the wide areas were different. On the left, they looked to overload that area with Ramsey, Alexis, Iwobi, and Monreal working together in a right space to try to unlock Liverpool, while on the left side the plan seemed to be to isolate Walcott against Moreno, as mentioned above. Below is Arsenal’s passing down each side.

Liverpool Respond

The second half was a much different match overall. The first notable change was Liverpool’s willingness to press higher up the pitch and really put Chambers and Holding under pressure when they had the ball, while forcing them into deeper positions to receive from Cech and act as depth for their midfielders, rather than simply limiting the two Arsenal centre backs’ passing options into midfield. This meant that Arsenal were forced to go long and, without Giroud, Liverpool’s centre backs and midfield were comfortable in winning the ball back. Below is a good example from very early on in the second half with Chambers on the ball having received a pass from Monreal, who was pressed by Mane.

Once Liverpool got on the ball, they were much more patient and Arsenal were already deeper based on Liverpool’s pressing, which allowed Liverpool players more time on the ball without Arsenal’s ability to press as quickly. This allowed Liverpool to build up their attacks with much more structure in their build up play, getting the ball in Arsenal’s final third, and allowing freedom to Coutinho, Firmino, Mane, Wijnaldum, and Lallana. From this we saw Arsenal continually look unbalanced as those five Liverpool players began to overload the middle of the field. Liverpool’s second and third goals both involved good build up play, but also a player showing into the space between the Arsenal back four and midfield (Coutinho in the second goal, Wijnaldum in the third), and a runner beyond the ball in the final third (Wijnaldum in the second, less so Clyne in the third).

Liverpool’s fourth goal was almost entirely down to Mane’s individual ability, but it started with Liverpool’s high positioning on Cech’s goal kick, forcing him long. Lovren won the header, Wijnaldum won the second ball, and Lallana played a ball down the line to Mane. 

Substitutions

Arsene Wenger made all three substitutions in eight minutes with Oxlade-Chamberlain, Cazorla, and new signing Xhaka coming on. In that time, Mane and Oxlade-Chamberlain scored making the score 4-2, and with that scoreline, it forced Arsenal to get forward and pinned Liverpool back a bit, but the away side maintained decent shape with their 4-3-3 collapsing into a 4-1-4-1 and forced Arsenal into wide areas. Emre Can was brought on soon after Arsenal’s second goal, which pushed Henderson further forward and gave Liverpool a bit more balance as they dropped deeper.

It can mostly be put down to a coincidence that Arsenal showed better after the substitutions; again with Liverpool up 4-1, Arsenal were always going to push to get more goals and try to get something out of the game. Obviously, Xhaka and Cazorla are overall more quality players to have on the field, but their introductions were not direct causation for Arsenal’s final push.

Liverpool were able to kill the game off in some respects.Origi was brought on and offered Liverpool both a strong player that was able to hold the ball up and someone to get in behind the Arsenal back four. With that, Liverpool were able to keep the ball well, assisted by Arsenal’s seemingly unwillingness to really press the ball.

Conclusion

After the match, Lallana revealed that Klopp instructed his team to get on the ball more, which can account for their patience in the second half, and to show more energy in their pressing, which was shown when they pressed Arsenal higher up the pitch. 

Wenger’s side were passive in the second half; they struggled when Liverpool had the ball in their own half, whereas in Liverpool’s half, they looked more willing to take chances to press the ball. When Arsenal pressed high, they got chances and rewards from it.

An interesting note: five of the seven goals were scored by former Southampton players in Walcott, Lallana, Mane, Oxlade-Chamberlain, and Chambers. 

[beautywithinfootball]

Juventus v Bayern Munich (2-2)

Match date: 23 February 2016

The last time these two sides met in the Champions League, Bayern Munich won 2-0 in both legs and went on to win the competition. Three years on, the two sides meet again with Juventus at the top of Serie A and a year on from their finals appearance, while Bayern Munich have dominated Bundesliga under Guardiola, but have failed to reach the heights of three years ago in the Champions League.

Allegri decided to set his side out in a 4-4-2, with a similar line up to their last big match against Napoli in Serie A, except that Mario Mandzukic returned to the starting XI with Morata dropping to the bench.

Guardiola, with a number of centre backs out injured, opted for David Alaba and Joshua Kimmich at the back in what was very much a 3-3-4 for large periods of the match.

Bayern’s Positioning

A very interesting match from Guardiola’s Bayern Munich and one that saw them dominate the match for the opening hour. As mentioned above, Bayern Munich looked like a 3-3-4 for much of that sixty minutes, which came about through the movements of Vidal, Lahm, and Bernat. 

Vidal’s performance on the night was very good and he played in a Busquets-like role, as he dictated the tempo for Bayern Munich and dropped in between Kimmich and Alaba both in and out of possession. His defensive reading of the game was not as superb as Busquets was, but his work rate and mobility allowed him to cover Alaba and Kimmich well, while stepping to midfield to win balls as well. For much of the game, against Juventus’ 4-4-2, he gave Bayern an extra man at the back. On the ball, he kept it moving and was less pensive that Xabi Alonso would have been in that deep-lying role, which allowed for Bayern’s ball circulation to be that little bit quicker.

Perhaps more interesting that Vidal’s positioning, however, was that of Philipp Lahm’s and Juan Bernat’s. When the team sheets were announced, one would generally expect that these two would have played as more traditional full backs. However, this was not the case and throughout the match, Lahm and Bernat would position themselves in the half space of their respective side rather than provide width in each phase of possession. This allowed for many things to happen around them, including Bayern maintaining a central overload, 1v1s in the wide areas for wide players, and with certain movements, overloads in the wide areas. 

With Lahm positioned centrally, it forced Paul Pogba to come inside as well, which allowed Robben to get into 1v1s against Patrice Evra throughout the match. This happened on the left as well, with Costa isolated against Lichtsteiner. While Robben did score a goal and looked good at times, it could be argued that neither Costa or Robben had a huge influence on the match despite Guardiola making efforts to allow them to find isolated moments. Lahm’s positioning also allowed Vidal to play a bit deeper, to help Alaba and Kimmich in case of Juventus’ counter attacks, as the Bayern captain acted as a holding midfielder, but also made a few good runs through the half space, including one which led to a chance that should have seen Müller score. Notice Lahm’s positioning below.

On the other side, however, Bernat played much higher up the field, while still in the half space, and allowed Thiago to find space and help Vidal keep the ball moving quickly. This also kept Cuadrado much deeper, which nullified his pace on Juventus’ counter attacks. You can in fact see Bernat in a slightly higher position than Thiago in the screen capture above. Costa’s starting position was always a bit higher than Robben’s as well, which meant that Bernat had to be closer to allow him more support and form a triangle with Lewandowski. Lahm could play deeper in the right half space because Robben started deeper, which also allowed Müller to drift out wide throughout the match. Notice the triangle formed by Müller, Lahm, and Robben below and Müller’s movement into a wide position.

Juventus’s Low Block

Allegri set his side out with the intention of not conceding at home, and thus defended in a low block for much of the match. In their 4-4-2, Mandzukic and Dybala always had Kimmich, Vidal, Alaba, and sometimes Lahm in front of them and allowed those players to keep the ball rather than looking to press to high. Marchisio and Khedira stayed centrally in midfield, rarely moving out of their shape, while Pogba and Cuadrado were a bit more susceptible to the movements of Bernat and Lahm from out wide to central areas. Below you can see an example of Juventus in their low block, 4-4-2. Also notice the Bayern player’s positions based on what was mentioned in the section before. 

The midfield kept stayed compact horizontally to one another and vertically to the Juventus back four. Marchisio was usually a bit deeper than Khedira, who is arguably a bit better at pressing a ball carrier, and took away space for Müller and Lewandowski to check into the get the ball into feet from Thiago, Lahm, and Vidal. Instead Juventus forced the ball to move out wide before it was to get to the Bayern Munich central pairing and Juventus were able to deal with most of the crosses put into the area.

At times Juventus did try to press, but it was only when they had either lost the ball high up the pitch and Bayern played the ball back to Neuer. This allowed Juventus to press with the knowledge that even if they forced a long ball, it was mostly going to be won by one of their teammates. The issue here for Juventus was that, while they did force Neuer to play long at times, it was often far too easy for Bayern to play past the press of Dybala and Mandzukic, meaning one of the midfielders was then forced to engage the ball carrier and was thus pulled out of shape.

Allegri’s Changes

Allegri was forced to bring on Hernandes for Marchisio at half time due to an injury to the Italian. This added a bit more creativity to the Juventus midfield, while maintaining discipline. The Brazilian midfielder was certainly tidy in possession despite Juventus not seeing much of the ball.

Allegri’s tactical changes came after Robben scored Bayern’s second goal, giving them a 2-0 aggregate score and two away goals. Each line of the 4-4-2 played higher up the pitch, allowed Juventus to put more pressure on Bayern and make it harder for the away side to build out of the back and control the game as they had been doing for roughly the first hour. Allegri brought on Sturaro for Khedira and he played a bit closer to Hernandes than Khedira had been, allowing the duo to move the ball quicker and sustain possession for Juventus a bit longer which allowed Cuadrado and Pogba to move higher and a bit narrower in attack.

Allegri’s last change was to bring on Morata for Dybala which meant that Juventus had a strike partnership of Mandzukic and Morata, both of whom are over six feet, a bit taller than both Alaba and Vidal and significantly taller than Kimmich. This allowed Juventus a more physical and aerial approach, which is ultimately how they scored the equaliser as Morata won a defender over Lahm, directing it into the path of Sturaro in the Bayern Munich penalty area.

Conclusion

Guardiola and Bayern Munich put on a fantastic display of football in the opening hour of the match and it resulted in two goals and could/should have been at least one more. However, after the second goal, it seemed that Allegri and the Juventus thought to themselves that the result could not get much worse and so they engaged Bayern Munich much higher up the field, forced errors for the first goal, and made adjustments to help get a second goal.

Despite coming back and drawing the match, Juventus still have a huge amount of work to do if they are to qualify. Guardiola has a less-than-usually-invincible record in the away legs of Champions League matches, in both the group stages and knockout stages, but it usually very good in home matches and will undoubtedly have his team prepared. It will be interesting to see how Allegri sets his team out. Does he look to try to win 1-0 by sitting in a low block again and get a goal on a counter attack? Or does he try to engage Bayern Munich, with or without the ball, higher up the pitch?

[beautywithinfootball]

Juventus v Napoli (1-0)

Match date: 13 February 2016

A tight clash between the two top sides in Serie A. A win for Napoli would have seen them secure a five point advantage over Juventus, while a win for the home side would give them a one point advantage over Napoli.

Allegri opted to set his side out in a 4-4-2 with Dybala and Morata as the front two and the midfield four flat. Pogba was on the left, with Khedira and Marchisio through the middle, and Cuadrado on the right.

Sarri fielded a 4-3-3 with his strongest XI with Higuain in search of his 25th goal in 25 Serie A appearances.

Juventus Control Space, Slow Napoli’s Play

Allegri’s side, in most Serie A games, are comfortable controlling the ball and through their use of the ball, dominating games. This game was different, however, as Juventus allowed Napoli to have the majority of the ball while they controlled the space in which the away side was allowed to play. Napoli are arguably at their best when they are able to counter attack through Insigne, Callejon, and Higuain and by limiting the space in behind, Juventus were able to nullify Napoli’s counter attacking threat. Juventus defended in a low-block 4-4-2 and remained centrally compact throughout the match. This is not to say that Juventus did not have good spells of possession, they certainly did, but they were setup to deny Napoli from playing quick passes in the final third, while looking to play through Morata, Pogba, Dybala, and Cuadrado going forward. Below is a good example of Juventus’ shape throughout the match.

You’ll notice above that there are few options for Koulibaly (on the ball). Hamsik, Jorginho, and Allan would all be forced back to the same line as the Napoli centre backs rather getting the ball further up the field. In the above picture, you can see that there is limited space behind Dybala and Morata and in front of Marchisio and Khedira and because of this the Napoli centre midfielders rarely tried to pick up the ball in that area. When they moved deep to get the ball, however, it slowed down Napoli’s ball circulation significantly and made it even more comfortable for Juventus to defend as there was no central threat for Napoli and the passes between the centre midfielders and the centrebacks were short and slow. The most played pass for Napoli was from Raul Albiol to Hamsik in the left half space, but still in front of the Juventus midfield.

The times that Napoli were able to put together attacking movements were when one of the full backs, Hysaj or Ghoulam, got wide and high while the Juventus midfield was caught slowly shifting. On the left, when Ghoulam got forward and Hamsik picked up the ball as explained above, it allowed Insigne to find space a bit more and get on the ball. Once Napoli got behind the Juventus midfield around the outside, they were too slow to exploit the unbalanced Juventus lines and most of the time Callejon, Insigne, Hysaj, and Ghoulam would try to swing a cross in for Higuain. Most of the crosses were poor and the best chance was cut out by Bonucci.  

Notice above the passes from Hamsik to Insigne; Insigne was arguably the biggest threat for Napoli in the final third. Allegri made an adjustment in the second half to have the midfield shift more to that side of the pitch to nullify Hamsik and Insigne’s influence on the match. Pogba’s positioning was noticeably narrower as Marchisio and Khedira were positioned more to the right. Below you can see that slightly unbalanced midfield line of Juventus. Marchisio and Khedira are cutting off passing lanes forward in that half space, also notice Insigne’s position.

 In the second half, Hamsik and Insigne’s influence dropped off significantly. Insigne was forced to drop deeper to get on the ball compared to the first half and the space around him was crowded by Lichtsteiner, Cuadrado, and Marchisio.

Juventus’ Front Three and Napoli’s High Line

Napoli played a very high line for much of the match, with the back four staying very compact with the midfield. When they were defending, Napoli were very much a 4-5-1 and limited the space between the lines, but it also isolated Higuain significantly. This allowed Napoli to squeeze the pitch, press Marchisio and Khedira well, and try to limit Juventus’ playing out of the back. Marchisio and Khedira both had good games from a defensive standpoint, but Napoli’s midfielders were able to put good pressure on them and limit their influence going forward. Below you can see the Napoli back line very high, with Cuadrado and Morata both recovering from an offside position. You can slo see the crowded midfield area.

With Marchisio and Khedira struggling to have a positive influence of Juventus’ attack, and because they were outnumbered 2 v 3 in midfield, Dybala consistently dropped into the midfield. The young Argentine was given a relatively free role and he tried throughout his time on the pitch to connect play going forward. He found his space relatively limited because of Napoli’s high line and their squeezing of the midfield, but he was able to pick up the ball and keep it moving. He missed Juventus’ best chance of the match after a late run into the box saw him get on the end of a pass from Pogba that he hit over the bar. He played very much like a number 10, like Tevez did last year, and with his movement, along with Morata’s, it often left the Napoli centrebacks without a man to mark. 

Morata often found himself drifting into a wide left area, and while he got on the ball at times, there was little offered to him. Often times Dybala would find himself deep and Morata would drift out wide, leaving Juventus without a central target. Much of the time, Juventus’ outlet was the pace of Cuadrado. The Colombian had a relatively good game in this respect and showed some good moments on the ball, but often he lacked a final ball or decision and looked better when Juventus were quick to counter and he came inside with the ball.

Pogba’s Second Half, Evra, Zaza

Juventus’ number 10 had a relatively quiet first half, largely in part due to Napoli having a bit more of the ball and Pogba playing in a wide left role in Juventus’ 4-4-2. However, in the second half, Pogba certainly grew into the game, in part due to Allegri’s midfield change. As previously mentioned, the Italian manager made changes to Juventus’ midfield structure, shifting it to the right to nullify the influence of Hamsik and Insigne. This meant that Pogba was positioned more centrally and allowed him to get on the ball and have a greater influence on Juventus going forward. Much of the time, he was in the left half space, which made it hard for Napoli to deal with his movement from central to wide areas. Dybala had arguably the best chance of the game when Pogba drifted from a central area into the half space and was found with a quick diagonal from Marchisio. Below you can see Pogba in that half space area of the pitch.

Allegri’s positional change for Pogba allowed Evra to get further forward and involved in the attacking play of Juventus. It helped push Callejon back, but also allowed Juventus to have that extra body in midfield and still have width when attacking. The other difference in the second half was that Zaza played both more central than Morata and higher than Dybala, giving Juventus a good outlet. Regardless of how wondrous Zaza’s strike was it is important to note that he was in a position that Juventus probably would not have had a player earlier in the match and the ball into him came from Evra.

Conclusion

An excellent display of football and of Allegri’s growth. He nullified Napoli’s biggest threats and allowed those changes to become attacking positives for Juventus. With their win, Juventus go a point above Napoli and continue their excellent run of form.

Sarri looked out of ideas from the start of the match because of Juventus’ setup. Without service, Higuain was limited in his contribution, while Insigne and Hamsik were forced to get on the ball deeper than they would have liked.

Overall, Juventus had a better plan to win the game and Zaza’s goal allowed them to get the three points they deserved.

[beautywithinfootball]

Everton v Tottenham (1-1)

Match date: 3 January 2016

Everton started this season very well, losing just one game (against Manchester City) in their opening eight games, including a 3-1 win against Chelsea. Since then, they have hit inconsistent form as they are one of the top scoring sides in the league, but have also conceded some of the most goals. Tottenham, however, have been consistent throughout the year and Pochettino’s youthful side see themselves close to a Champions League spot.

Roberto Martinez set his side out in a 4-2-3-1 with Leighton Baines back in the side and Aaron Lennon also included in the starting XI.

Pochettino had Tottenham in a 4-2-3-1 as well with Tom Carroll partnering Eric Dier as the double pivot. Dele Alli was moved further up the pitch behind Harry Kane. Ben Davies played at left back over Danny Rose.

Tottenham’s Build Up in Attack

Tottenham dominated much of the match, especially the first half; their ball movement was good, they created space well with one another, and caught Everton’s shape off balance. There were a few aspects of their play that allowed them this dominance. The first important thing to note was Eric Dier’s positioning when Tottenham had the ball. The young Englishman would drop to the right of Toby Alderweireld. This allowed for a number of different movements for Tottenham. 

First, it allowed Kyle Walker to move very high up the pitch, acting as a right winger and not having to worry about Everton exploiting space in behind him once he moved up the field. Walker was a consistent outlet in Tottenham’s attacks and Spurs were unlucky not to score just a few minutes into the match when Walker sent a ball across the six yard box toward Dele Alli, only for Seamus Coleman to intervene. Walker’s forward presence also pushed back Leighton Baines. The second movement that Dier’s position allowed was for Christian Eriksen to move infield. With Walker providing width on the right, Eriksen was then allowed to drift inside and become more involved in the play. This allowed Tottenham to overload the central areas, with Erik Lamela also drifting inside on occasion. The midfield rotation of Carroll, Dele Alli, and Eriksen was important to Tottenham’s success early on. Carroll was typically the deepest midfielder when Dier dropped alongside Alderweireld, but when Carroll was marked, he would move out of that space and allow Alli or Eriksen to drop into the space, making it harder for Everton to track their movements. 

Tottenham’s midfield combinations and Harry Kane dropping into that area, not only allowed them to control the game, but forced Everton to become very compact. As Tottenham built play up, overloading Tottenham in the central areas with the rotations of Alli, Eriksen, Carroll, Kane, and Lamela, they would play out to Walker, who’s starting position was high up the pitch, and try to overload that side of the pitch. Then, if nothing was working on the right, they were able to switch the ball quickly into the centre and then Ben Davies consistently made late runs into the space down the left flank, catching the likes of Lennon and Coleman off balance.

Tottenham looked good in possession throughout the match, although they sometimes failed to create any clear cut chances; of their four shots on target, three were from outside the area and the two shots that hit the frame of the goal were also from outside the area. Dele Alli’s goal, which was very good and exemplifies Tottenham’s midfield movement, was his side’s only shot on target from inside the area.

Everton’s Struggles, Tottenham’s Pressing and Shape

Along with the struggles above, Everton also struggled going forward. They got the opening goal after a good ball from Cleverley into Lukaku, who then nodded it back to Lennon, with the former Spurs man finishing it very well. However, it was a rare chance for Everton. Throughout the first half, in particular, when Tottenham dominated the game, Lukaku was isolated and he always had either Alderweireld or Vertonghen right on his back when Everton played a ball into him. This forced a lot of his play to go backward, but so many times it took far too long for the Belgian to get support from his teammates that he was eventually crowded off the ball.

A lot of credit has to be given to Tottenham for Everton’s poor performance in the first half. Spurs pressing was very good, forcing Everton to play long balls, which in theory works with a striker like Lukaku, but as just mentioned, he was often too isolated. When Everton were able to get support round Lukaku or the Belgian was able to turn with the ball, Tottenham’s defensive transitions were quick and precise much of the time. With Eric Dier dropping in to the right of Alderweireld, Tottenham were never going to be too exposed at the back even if both Walker and Davies had gone into advanced positions. Dier, Alderweireld, and Vertonghen stayed connected and, generally, Carroll sat in front, though Eriksen and Alli also rotated through that space.

When Everton were able to get numbers forward, they struggled to break down Tottenham’s midblock and two banks of four. There were few passing lanes for the likes of Barry and Cleverley to pick out Barkley and Lukaku in advanced positions and the space between the lines, where Barkley excels when he picks up the ball in those positions, was limited. Below is an early example of Spurs defending in their midblock, which changed from their attacking 4-2-3-1 (although with Dier’s positioning it was more of lopsided 3-3-3-1ish or 4-1-4-1ish) to a 4-4-1-1.

Everton and Martinez’s Reaction

The title here might seem a bit odd considering Everton scored first and the game ended in a draw, however, as it often does, the scoreline does not tell the full story. Everton were very much outdone in the first half by Tottenham and likewise, Martinez was outdone by Pochettino. The Argentine’s fluid midfield space and overloading one side to isolate and open up the other side were incredibly effective, as was Tottenham’s pressing, especially on Funes Mori, who looked like the antithesis of his composed partnered, John Stones. Everton needed to make significant changes, but they only really came in the second half.

At the start of the second half, two things were noticeable about Everton; they defended in a midblock, slightly higher than they had in the first half, and there was more of an effort to press higher up the field. It was immediately more effective as it forced Tottenham to play long when Kane was dropped into midfield or turn the ball over like Funes Mori had done for Everton in the first half too many times. Below you can see a good example of Everton’s higher pressing; Lukaku is cutting off the passing lane from Vertonghen to Alderweireld, Lennon is tight to Davies, Barkley is tight to Carroll, but is also conscious of the space between Lennon and himself.

With this, Everton certainly started the second half much better and looked to assert themselves on both sides of the ball. In the 60th minute, Martinez made a double change, bringing on Besic for Kone and Deulofeu for Lennon. Up until this point, Tottenham were sometimes still able to outnumber Everton in central midfield and the rotations of the Spurs’ midfielders were too much for the three man Everton midfield, especially with Barkley recovering from pressing high on occasion. With Martinez’s changes, Everton were now able to match up with Tottenham’s narrow midfield. Cleverly, although no more on the left in place of Kone drifted inside to make Everton very compact and with Besic on, it gave Everton a player with high work rate, as well as technical qualities, through the middle of the pitch. Below you’ll see a screen capture of Besic tracking a run of Lamela. Lamela started his run from the centre of the pitch and Besic stuck with him, something that Barkley, Barry, and Cleverly rarely did in the first half. As mentioned, Everton were now better suited to deal with the fluidity of Tottenham’s midfield players.

Conclusion

An interesting tactical battle between two very good managers. Pochettino certainly got the better of Martinez in the opening half, but the response from Martinez was, while necessary if Everton were going to get anything from the game, a good one. Tottenham’s midfield fluidity and width from Walker and Davies allowed them to dictate play while Everton’s defensive structure struggled to cope. Perhaps Tottenham were unlucky not to score more in the first half, they did hit the frame of the goal twice, but they also produced few opportunities inside the Everton penalty area.

Martinez’s changes at half time and in the 60th minute allowed Everton to get more of a hold on the match and made the second half far more even than the first. Everton need more consistency in their performances if they are going to have any success this year.

Tottenham are looking for a Champions League spot and if they can continue to build on performances like today and offer more midfield runners beyond Kane (like Son has done in the past), they were be able to create more meaningful chances.

[beautywithinfootball]

Manchester City v Liverpool (1-4)

Match date: 21 November 2015

Manuel Pellegrini’s had two early losses to West Ham United and Tottenham early on in the season, but have since had a good run of form despite consistent injuries to the likes of Vincent Kompany and Sergio Agüero.

For Liverpool, Jürgen Klopp’s appointment has been very positive, despite a loss to Crystal Palace in their last league match. Klopp’s style of play has been a welcome change change for Liverpool and helped the Merseyside club to a 3-1 win over Chelsea at Stamford Bridge a little less than a month ago.

For this game, Pellegrini set his side out in a 4-2-3-1 with Demichelis and Mangala at the back, with Kompany still out and Otamendi on the bench. Yaya Toure and Fernando anchored midfield, with Fernandinho also on the bench. Sterling, Navas, De Bruyne, and Agüero started in the front four.

Klopp made just one change to the side that beat Chelsea 3-1, with Dejan Lovren coming into the side in place of the injured Mamadou Sakho. Daniel Sturridge was fit enough for the bench and Christian Benteke also found himself on the bench.

Liverpool’s Pressing and Transitions

The most talked about part of Klopp’s style of play is the pressing. You have certainly seen the quotes about how Klopp believes that the act of pressing is the best playmaker in the world and against Manchester City you could see why Klopp holds this belief. Liverpool dominated the game because of their intensity, because they controlled the space, and because they pressed Manchester City well. In Liverpool’s 4-2-3-1, Roberto Firmino was supported by Coutinho, Lallana, and Milner and the quartet were energetic throughout the game in terms of their pressure on the Manchester City back line. The first and second goal are excellent examples of the workrate and pressing of Liverpool. On the first goal, Coutinho chases down at a pass from Joe Hart to Sagna, wins the ball from the French fullback, and dribbles at Demichelis before playing Firmino in behind, who tries to play the ball back to Coutinho, but Mangala puts it into his own net. Just before this, Lallana’s pressing forced Mangala to play the ball back to Hart. The second goal was similar as Firmino took advantage of mistakes by Demichelis and Mangala as they had to deal with a bouncing ball, only for the Brazilian to get on the ball and find Coutinho, who finished past Hart.

The pressing was good and for the most part and Liverpool had their most successful pressing on the right side of Manchester City’s back four. A lot of this could have been down to Milner playing narrow when Manchester City had the ball in their defensive third, making Liverpool look more like a 4-3-2-1/4-3-3. Liverpool looked to maintain a narrowness in midfield to outnumber Yaya Toure and Fernando, but also eliminate passes into the feet of De Bruyne and Agüero in central areas. When Manchester City did try to play out of the back and into the centre of midfield, it was a trigger for Liverpool players to press. With that said, Milner was excellent in sliding out to close down Kolarov when the ball was worked out to the Manchester City left back, but it was rare that the home side looked dangerous down the left side of their attack through Kolarov and Sterling. Below is an example of Milner tucked in alongside Lucas and the front three of Coutinho, Firmino, and Lallana. Also notice that the central passing lanes for Manchester City are crowded out and that Agüero and De Bruyne are forced into wider positions, but are not wide enough to really be considering a safe passing option.

As good as Liverpool’s pressing was, their transitions were excellent. When Liverpool lost the ball, they were quickly surrounding the Manchester City ball carrier to win it back and when they did, Liverpool players quickly broke forward and it was this latter transition that caught Manchester City out. The third goal was an excellent example of this as Miner wins the ball back for Liverpool at the edge of their own penalty area, combines with Firmino, and then is pushing forward with the support of Coutinho, Can, and Moreno and then score within about 15 seconds of winning the ball back. Liverpool were direct and incredibly quick to support their attacks. Firmino was given a very free role, playing as a false nine, and was usually the furthest forward, darting in and out of spaces. The pace at which Liverpool attacked Manchester City was too much for the home side.

Manchester City’s Midfield and Defense

The success of Liverpool was due in large part to the failures of Manuel Pellegrini’s team selection and Manchester City’s shape. The likes of Otamendi and Fernandinho were not selected in the starting XI due to their involvement and travel to games in South America over the international break, however, it left Pellegrini with a starting midfield pairing of Yaya Toure and Fernando. Up against Can, Milner, Firmino, Lallana, and Coutinho, the Manchester City duo were always going to struggle to keep up with the Liverpool midfielders. Combine this with the high and wide positioning of Navas and Sterling and the free movement of De Bruyne and it is clear that Liverpool were able to overrun Fernando and Toure easily before creating havoc for Demichelis and Mangala with their forward movement. Below is a screen capture from just before Liverpool’s second goal. Liverpool are in transition, but Yaya Toure and Fernando are high up the pitch.

Fernandinho would have been a player that would have been able to keep pace with Liverpool’s transitions and not allowed such a huge gap to open up between the midfield and the back four. This gap became increasingly easier for Liverpool to exploit as the game went on, not only during these quick transitions, but in fairly paced build-up play. With Firmino dropping off into the space between the lines and Coutinho finding space here as well, there was no Manchester City player really willing to close them down. Below is a screen capture of Coutinho finding the ball in these pockets of space between the Manchester City midfield and back four.

It is in these spaces that Fernando or Yaya Toure should have been, but is also an area of the pitch that Otamendi would have been willing to step into to mark Coutinho or Firmino. Demichelis and Mangala were unwilling to do so and this is what has allowed the false 9 system to work; centre backs don’t have a player to pick up, but are too slow to react to the movement of players from the halfspaces or wide areas into the middle of the pitch. Without a player to consistently mark and a player that would have stayed mostly central, as they would have had against Benteke, Demichelis and Mangala were dragged out of position by the interchange of Coutinho, Lallana, and Firmino.

While Liverpool had an excellent team performance, Coutinho, Lallana, and Firmino really stuck out in terms of Liverpool’s attacking threats. Coutinho and Firmino both scored a goal and assisted one another as their link up play was excellent, particularly in the space between the lies. The narrowness of the front three allowed Liverpool to have numbers up against the Manchester City centre backs. When Liverpool had the ball and were going forward, the front three of Liverpool, already narrow, made runs directly at the Manchester City centre backs and, as mentioned before, Demichelis and Mangala were not supported well by Fernando or Toure.

Liverpool also found these overloads in the wide areas of the pitch. They had excellent, intricate passing in those areas of the pitch as the full backs, front three, and then Milner or Can would come over as well. It was another aspect of play that was similar to Klopp’s Dortmund at their peak; when they overload the wide areas and played quickly through the defenders as they worked centrally.

Manchester City Fail to Adjust

There are a few points to be made about Pellegrini’s tactics, the first being the personnel on the pitch. Toure and Fernando were not the best centre midfield pairing considering the energy and dynamism of Liverpool’s midfield and forward lines and as mentioned, they were often overrun by Liverpool’s midfield. However, there were adjustments that could have been made that would have allowed Manchester City to get back into the game. With Liverpool’s midfield so narrow, City should have been trying to play into the wide areas much quicker. The ball movement, however, was incredibly slow and this allowed Liverpool to easily shift from side to side as Manchester City moved the ball. Had the ball movement been quicker and Liverpool been caught out, generally, Manchester City could have been in 2v1 situations in the wide areas against Moreno and Clyne for much of the night. There were some signs of City attacking the wide areas early on, particularly when De Bruyne drifted into the right channel and found himself isolated against Lovren on two or three occasions, but City failed to capitalise on these instances.

There were also times when the Manchester City ball movement could have been quicker and exploited the spaces opened up by Liverpool’s press. The space between the lines was certainly a factor for Liverpool’s dominance, but De Bruyne found himself in similar positions for Manchester City, but they were unable to get him the ball quick enough for those positions to be dangerous.

Conclusion

Liverpool were the better team and Pellegrini’s changes came too late to have any real impact on the game. Jurgen Klopp had an excellent plan going into the game and it was executed almost to perfection (he said it was a very good performance, but not perfect). If Liverpool and Klopp are able to continue with these sort of performances, and do so consistently, they could be well within the top four by the end of the season.

While this performance was very poor for Manchester City, and a lot of the blame can be put on Pellegrini for his selections, he was also without his two first choice centre backs (Kompany injured and Otamendi on the bench due to travel), without Fernandinho (on the bench due to travel), without David Silva, and without a fully fit Agüero. This was very poor for Manchester City, but there were no real alarmingly aspects to the performance that will carry on to others.

[beautywithinfootball]

Bayern Munich v Arsenal (5-1)

Match date: 4 November 2015

In the last match day, Arsenal won 2-0, scoring the decisive goal on a set piece through Olivier Giroud. Bayern Munich controlled the ball in that game, but lacked the cutting edge, while Arsenal’s defense, while effective in the end, certainly had weaknesses.

Guardiola made two changes in his 4-2-3-1 from that last match against Arsenal with Javi Martinez coming in to partner Boateng at centre back. Alaba, who started at centre back in the last Champions League match, started at left back. Further forward, Kingsley Coman was given the start with Vidal dropping to the bench.

Wenger was forced to make a number of changes with Gabriel and Debuchy coming in at centre back and right back, respectively. Ramsey was replaced by Joel Campbell on the right side on the midfield and Giroud started up top with Walcott out in Arsenal’s 4-2-3-1.

Thiago

‘Thiago or no one’ was what Guardiola said in regards to the transfers he was seeking when he first came to Bayern Munich. The former Barcelona midfielder had shown signs of being an excellent talent in his appearances at the Catalan club, but he has turn into a world class footballer under Guardiola (when healthy). This match showed not only this world class quality that Thiago has, but just how important he was to Bayern Munich. The Spaniard created chances, did excellent defensively, and, most importantly, dictated the tempo of the game for Bayern Munich.

Playing in a 4-2-3-1, a slightly different shape compared to the 4-1-4-1 that Bayern Munich played the last time against Arsenal, Thiago played on the left side on the two holding midfielders alongside Xabi Alonso. This became extremely important to allowing Thiago to get on the ball as much as he did. The Spaniard was allowed to dictate the game and create chances, such as the ball that Lewandowski headed past Cech for the opener, because of what Kingsley Coman and David Alaba did around him. Coman had a good match; he took on Debuchy a few times and put some good balls across the box, but the most important part of his performance was that he was always willing to stretch the pitch on the left side of Bayern Munich’s attack. This, of course, stretched Arsenal’s back four and because of his willingness to take on Debuchy and his pace, it pushed Arsenal back on that side. This gave Thiago more space and he would drift into a wide left position at times, but mostly only in the middle third. As Bayern Munich moved into the final third, the movement of Alaba and Coman allowed Thiago relative freedom in the central areas as the two former players would drag Debuchy, Cazorla, and Mertesacker out of position.

More important to Thiago’s play than Coman, however, was the positions taken up by Alaba throughout the match. Despite playing at left back on the official line up sheet, Alaba’s position was much more advanced and central. There were some phases of Bayern Munich’s build up play when the Austrian would position himself at left back and defensively he would certainly come back to a left back role, but much of the time, when Bayern Munich had the ball, Alaba would get very high and central beyond Thiago. Alaba would occupy the likes of Cazorla which meant that Thiago now the freedom to his left because Coman stretched the play for him laterally and had space vertically with Alaba pushing Cazorla back. Alaba’s movement would happen almost right away when Bayern Munich won the ball and, at times, Thiago would drop to the left of Javi Martinez into the space where a traditional left back would position himself during the build up phase of a team like Bayern Munich. Below you can see him in a more central role during Bayern’s build up play, but notice Coman stretching the field wide and Alaba making his central, forward run.

Differences From Arsenal’s 2-0 Win

Bayern Munich’s movement of the ball was much quicker in this match compared to the last match day, however, a lot of this had to do with Arsenal’s defensive work. As noted in the analysis of that last match, Santi Cazorla is not in the Arsenal side because of his defensive abilities, but rather to dictate Arsenal’s play. Yes, he can win tackles and make interceptions, but when Arsenal defend deep, he loses players or, in this case, does not maintain enough pressure on the ball. This was a big difference for Arsenal compared to their win; they defended in a low block as they did in the other match, but there was significantly less pressure on the ball when Bayern moved the ball just around the edge of the penalty area. The perfect example is the first goal a Thiago cross to Lewandowski at the back post. 

This lack of pressure on the ball not only allowed passes like this, but allowed Bayern Munich to play quick combinations around the box and open Arsenal up. It is one thing not to concede space, as Arsenal tried to do by defending deep, but to do so effectively, there must be pressure on the ball.

Another big difference from the first match was that Lewandowski was no longer as isolated. At the beginning of the match, Douglas Costa was playing centrally just behind Lewandowski, while Thomas Müller was playing on the right, stretching the width of the pitch as he did in the first match. However, from about 10 minutes in, Costa switched out to the right and Müller came inside and played just off of Lewandowski. This was a big difference from the first match as Müller enjoys playing in the penalty area and was able to create space for Lewandowski and the midfield runners that wanted to get onto the second balls from crosses. Müller’s lack of presence in the central areas during the first match was very noticeable and it made a huge impact for Bayern when he played centrally.

For Arsenal, there were a few significant differences from their home win. The first was the personnel. Rather than Walcott up top, Olivier Giroud started which meant that Arsenal lacked a threat in behind the Bayern Munich back line that they had in the first match. Sanchez was in the side on the left and his pace and directness was influential at times, but he was also pegged back because of Lahm’s advanced positioning. Giroud was an isolated figure when Arsenal were defending deep, but he remained an outlet for Arsenal to play long to, but rather than having the pace of Walcott to create chances, Giroud had to hold the ball up and wait for Arsenal players to support him and they struggled at times to get out of their defensive shape.

In the opening stages, Alexis Sanchez and Mesut Özil looked good going forward for Arsenal. As mentioned, Sanchez was direct with his dribbling, while Özil overloaded the left side of the pitch, which made sense both in that he could support Sanchez and his movement was not as easily tracked by Alonso as it would have been by Thiago. Aside from a few glimpses and Özil’s disallowed goal, the duo had little impact on the match.

Pressing

A big part of the match was the pressing of each side. Arsenal, at times, tried to press Bayern Munich, although it is hard to say if this was really in the initial plans of Arsene Wenger or a reaction to going 1-0 down very early on in the match. Either way, Arsenal’s pressing was not very useful, but instead left the English side a bit open at the back and Bayern Munich used these opportunities to play quick, direct passes through the middle of the pitch, but they also looked to play big diagonal balls to Douglas Costa and Kingsley Coman in the wide areas where they were isolated in 1v1s against their respective full backs. Below is an example of this; Thiago gets on the ball and plays wide to Costa on the far side. In this instance, Alexis Sanchez recovers quickly enough and Monreal forces Costa back toward the halfway line, but this allowed Bayern to get the ball forward quickly and behind Arsenal’s midfield for a brief period of transition.

Another good example was just prior to Bayern Munich’s second goal. Arsenal had five players around the ball, but there was a disconnect not only between the lines, with the back four too deep compared to the holding midfielders, but a disconnect between the five players around the ball. Below you can see Giroud and Campbell moving away from the ball while Sanchez is pressing. This phase of play led to an Alonso pass to an isolated Lahm at the halfway line with the five Arsenal players below working back to recover. Lahm played the ball to Costa, who engaged Monreal and played back to Lahm, who then crossed into the box and Müller was able to get on the end of it and score.

Bayern’s pressing allowed them to keep control of the ball and snuff out Arsenal’s counter attacks on a number of occasions. The pressing from Bayern Munich in the last match was good, but there was notably more intensity about it in this match. Bayern would swarm the ball quickly and rather than win the ball and try to keep it, they would instead look to play into the spaces that the Arsenal ball carrier would have been in defensively. It is easy to point out that Alaba’s goal came from good pressing as he won it back and beat Cech from distance (it is also worth noting his central position in this instance).

Conclusion

An excellent performance by Bayern Munich and Thiago, in particular. The German side’s ball movement was much improved compared to two weeks ago and they were able to translate their possession into goals. Thiago’s influence on the game, being the one to dictate the tempo of Bayern rather than Alonso, was a huge reason for Bayern’s more effective possession. The Spaniard was quick and decisive with his passing and looked to break the lines.

Arsenal find themselves in a difficult position in the Champions League now. They must win both of their remaining matches and hope that Olympiakos do not win a match.

[beautywithinfootball]

Chelsea v Liverpool (1-3)

Match date: 31 October 2015

Chelsea and Jose Mourinho were knocked out of the League Cup in their last match, losing to Stoke City on penalty kicks, but their performance was a slight improvement upon their other recent matches.

Liverpool won their League Cup match thanks to a goal by Nathaniel Clyne and Jurgen Klopp’s tactics are beginning to take hold at the Merseyside club.

Mourinho set his side out in his typical 4-2-3-1, but regulars in Fabregas, Matic, and Ivanovic were on the bench in favour of Mikel, Ramires, and Zouma. Eden Hazard played just behind Diego Costa while Oscar played from the left. 

Under Klopp, Liverpool have looked very much like a 4-3-2-1 with Milner, Lucas, and Can anchoring the midfield and allowing Coutinho and Lallana to support the striker. However, against Chelsea, Liverpool looked much more like a 4-2-3-1 with Milner in a more advanced position. Lallana played centrally behind Firmino and Coutinho started on the left.

Liverpool’s Shape and Press

Liverpool’s pressing has improved significantly under Klopp since the German took over just a few weeks ago. As mentioned above, the shape was slightly altered with Liverpool looking more like a 4-2-3-1 than a 4-3-2-1 with Milner (who was very poor on the day) playing on the right of the attacking three. Although Milner’s side seemed to be where Liverpool forced Chelsea to play when the home side were building out of the back. This could be for a number of reasons, the first being that Milner’s defensive qualities are better than Coutinho’s and second being that Azpilicueta is naturally right footed, but plays as a left back. Another reason was Oscar’s habit to come inside when Chelsea had the ball, meaning when Azpilicueta did get on the ball, he was unable to find a player without significant pressure on them.

With that said, Liverpool pressed well across the middle third of the pitch. If they weren’t able to win the first the ball in the first phase of their press, they certainly won the second ball and were able to get right back at Chelsea. Mikel and Ramires lacked the ability on the ball to get out of situations when they were being pressed by Coutinho, Lallana, Firmino, Can, or Lucas so Liverpool were able to win the ball back numerous times when Chelsea’s defensive midfielders got on the ball.

As mentioned before, Oscar was narrow at times (in the second half he and Hazard switched) and this hurt Chelsea going forward. Hazard and Costa showed some lateral movement, but Chelsea struggled to play into those forward two because Liverpool were able to maintain a compact shape and as seen above, Liverpool were able to win the ball back in the middle third majority of the time. The bright spot for Chelsea was Willian. The Brazilian was a constant outlet for Chelsea and he was able to get by Liverpool’s pressing with his pace and directness, but rarely was he offered support by his teammates and often found himself isolated with Liverpool players around him.

Space Between the Lines

In the opening minutes of the match, Chelsea were all over Liverpool and got a goal because of it. For the few minutes after that goal, Lucas, in particular, was caught out in the space between the lines for Liverpool. Costa, Hazard, Willian, and Oscar all seemed to be finding space around the defensive midfielder and he struggled to cope with the direct runs from the likes of Willian. However, Liverpool’s pressing began to dictate the match and the Merseyside club were able to maintain possession, with both of these aspects taking the pressure off of Lucas. The Brazilian went from having a very poor game to having a good one. He made a number of forward runs both with and without the ball (a memorable one being when he won a header over Kurt Zouma). Following that early period where Chelsea were able to give Lucas trouble, they were really unable to worry Liverpool in those spaces.

Liverpool, however, took full advantage of the gaps between Chelsea’s midfield and back four. The movement of Coutinho, Lallana, and Firmino made it difficult for Chelsea to track the runs and thus the space between the lines began to open up for the away side. At times the trio would all occupy that space, making it difficult for Mikel and Ramires and leaving Terry and Cahill without a man to mark. Other times the fluidity between Firmino and Lallana (the former would drop off and the latter would make forward runs) made it difficult for the Chelsea players to pick up the Liverpool players moving between the lines. Below is a good example of the the space between Chelsea’s back four and midfield. At this point, with Benteke on, it was even more noticeable as the Belgian centre forward was ever present in pushing back Cahill and Terry.

Coutinho played a lot in the left half space and Firmino and Coutinho would overload the left channel area, while Lallana would drift around centrally and to the left as well. Overall, the movement of the trio was excellent and it was supported by the passing of Mamadou Sakho from the back. The French centre back broke the midfield lines numerous times with his passing, finding Coutinho, Lallana, and Firmino in that pocket of space, typically with time to turn. You can see below that Coutinho and Firmino worked around that similar area of the pitch and Sakho was able to find them ten times throughout the match, while he found Lallana four times with similar passes. 

A lot of this space was initially created by the width that Moreno and Clyne offered on either side. Much of Liverpool’s play, particularly in the first half was out wide. In the first half, it seemed like everytime Liverpool got the ball, they looked to Moreno on the left or Clyne and Milner on the right and then looked to play a cross into the box. Interestingly, majority of the crosses that Liverpool played were before Benteke came on the pitch. With that, Chelsea’s midfield was stretched. Willian had to cover the forward runs of Moreno and Oscar had to do the same with Clyne so that meant when Chelsea were defending, and their shape looked like a 4-4-1-1 with Hazard just behind Costa, that their midfield was stretched, which allowed the passing lanes from the likes of Sakho to Coutinho and Firmino to open up.

Below you can see the build up to Coutinho’s second goal. Sakho has played a big diagonal out to Benteke, but the interesting bit here is that, again, Coutinho is between the lines and unmarked which allowed him to get on the end of Benteke’s knock down easily.

Chelsea also had huge gaps between Ramires and Mikel and the front four when Liverpool had the ball deep within their own half. The front four would press, but Liverpool were able to play out of that pressure so easily because there was about 30-40 yards between the first line of pressure and the second line. Lucas and Can would go into that space and Mignolet, Clyne, Skrtel, Sakho, and Moreno were able to easily find a their feet and then they would have time to turn. This made it extremely hard for Chelsea to cope with Liverpool’s possession. They conceded too much space between their forward and midfield lines and too space between their midfield and back lines. Interestingly enough, Mourinho has been quoted as saying that he believes the space between the lines is the most important space on the field, so that there was so much space for Liverpool to exploit in this match, it did not bode well for Chelsea and Mourinho. Below you can see a good example of this with Ramires and Mikel highlighted.

Changes

The first significant change of the match was Mourinho’s reaction to scoring in the opening minutes of the match. Chelsea were all over Liverpool prior to the goal, both defensive and going forward, but once they scored, Chelsea sat deep, allowed Liverpool to have the ball and were unable to get out of their low block with any consistency. Overall, Chelsea had two shots on goal; the Ramires goal and Oscar’s strike from the halfway line. With their defensive record as is, it was a bit of surprise that Mourinho had his side defend so deep. Chelsea have just two clean sheets this season and are tied for the fourth highest amount of conceded goals.

For Liverpool, Benteke’s introduction was significant for a number of reasons. Obviously, he was gave Liverpool an aerial option up top and this was important in the build up to Coutinho’s second goal and his own goal, but interesting enough Liverpool attempted less crosses following Benteke’s substitution on. As mentioned above, however, he was a constant up top in that he pushed back Cahill and Terry and allowed the space between the lines to became even more gapping for Liverpool’s playmakers to operate in and dictate the game.

Mourinho tried to get an attacking influence on the match, replacing Mikel with Fabregas and Azpilicueta with Falcao, but at that point, momentum had shifted significantly.

Conclusion

Chelsea could have gone on to win this match. They got an early goal and could have continued bringing the game to Liverpool, but instead, they sat back and allowed Liverpool to control the game.

Liverpool were bright both with and without the ball and Klopp’s influence is starting to be seen. It was certainly the best game for Klopp so far, based on the result and performance, but the German will have pointed out a number of areas that still need improvement.

Where does Mourinho go from here?

[beautywithinfootball]

Arsenal v Bayern Munich (2-0)

Match date: 20 October 2015

Arsenal have started their Champions League in poor form, losing to both Dinamo Zagreb and Olympiakos, leaving them with zero points from two games coming into this match. Bayern Munich have started in just the opposite fashion, beating both Dinamo Zagreb and Olympiakos in easy fashion.

As he looked to get Arsenal their first points of the campaign, Arsene Wenger set his side out in a 4-2-3-1 with Theo Walcott up top. The pacey Englishman’s inclusion as the lone frontman was a tell of how Arsenal were going to play on the night. Petr Cech started in goal for Arsenal, marking his first Champions League match for his new club.

As mentioned, Bayern Munich and Pep Guardiola came into the game in a good position at the top of their group. The Spaniard set his German side out in a 4-1-4-1 with Xabi Alonso as the holding midfielder. David Alaba started at centre back alongside Jerome Boateng. Despite fielding a strong starting XI, Bayern Munich’s bench was made up of mostly youngsters and inexperienced players.

Bayern Munich’s Midfield

For most of the match, the ball was in Arsenal’s half as Bayern Munich were in almost complete control. Arsenal had two good chances in the first half through Walcott and Özil, both efforts which were saved by Neuer. Other than those chances, Arsenal’s attacks were limited as Bayern Munich kept the ball moving and won it back quickly. In a 4-1-4-1, there were a few different parts that allowed Bayern to be so dominant with the first being Arsenal’s approach to the match that allowed Xabi Alonso time on the ball. The Spaniard was rarely closed down which gave him the time to not only pick out passes to Douglas Costa and Thomas Müller, both of whom found themselves in 1v1 situations against their respective full backs for much of the night, but Alonso was also able to pick out forward passes to Thiago and Vidal despite Arsenal’s compact shape.

This became problematic for Arsenal when Xabi Alonso was able to pick out forward passes to Thiago and Vidal in the space between the lines, as in the screen capture above. Cazorla is an excellent deep-lying playmaker, often starting Arsenal’s forward movements and he can make tackles, but he is not suited for the defensive responsibilities of playing as a holding midfielder when Arsenal are defending deep. The above screen capture is an excellent example of this. Cazorla should be goal side of Vidal, but instead Vidal finds space and gets on the ball. It was these little movements of Vidal and Thiago, evading Cazorla and Coquelin, that allowed them to get on the ball between the lines and disrupt Arsenal’s defensive shape. Below is an excellent example of Thiago getting free in a large space between the Arsenal midfield and back four after Bayern build up on the left and pivot the ball to an unmarked Alonso. This particular pass led to Thiago and Müller combining for an excellent chance for Thiago that Cech saved well.

Thiago, in particular, was outstanding on the night. He was creative and kept the ball moving and certainly would have been the man of the match for Bayern Munich had they gotten a goal, despite missing a good chance. At the beginning of the second half, Bayern Munich’s shape was a bit altered. Thiago, who was playing on the right in front of Alonso during the first half, shifted to the left and played alongside Alonso rather than in front of him. Vidal switched over to the right, but was higher up the pitch (more on this later). At this point, Thiago became the controller of the game, rather than Alonso, and came to pick the ball up deeper. This made sense as it gave Bayern Munich more central cover to break up Arsenal’s counter attacks with Alonso not being mobile enough, but Arsenal also played a little higher up the pitch so Thiago was able to break the first line of pressure on the dribble before finding a forward pass.

There was, perhaps, too much of a controlling aspect from the Bayern Munich midfield. At times, their ball movement was far too slow, which allowed Arsenal’s defensive shape to react quickly enough to cut off forward passing lanes.

Bayern Munich Look Wide

Bayern Munich have excellent attacking options all over the pitch, but this season Douglas Costa has stuck out the most. The Brazilian was bought in the summer and helped Bayern Munich to nine straight wins to start of their Bundesliga campaign. Costa is outstanding in 1v1 situations, which Bayern Munich looked to find him in throughout the match. With Arsenal’s midfield narrow, with Ramsey tucked in, Xabi Alonso and Boateng were able to find Douglas Costa on diagonal balls that found him isolated against Bellerin. The Brazilian was the constant target for Bayern Munich’s attacks as the German side looked to move Arsenal away from the left and then play a quick ball out to Costa. At times, however, Costa’s final ball across the box was lacking, but perhaps that is Guardiola not worrying about the ball in, but rather the second ball.

On the other side, Thomas Müller kept his width throughout the first half, while Lahm occupied the half space. Müller’s width allowed Thiago to find that space between the lines, knowing that Monreal would not be able to move forward to press him, but it also stretched the Arsenal back line, which allowed more isolation for Costa on the other side of the pitch. Müller’s impact on the game was minimal. He seemed constraint to the touchline by Guardiola in the first half, which took away his ‘raumdeuter’ quality as well as his ability to get on the end of balls into the box. The second half saw him freed up a bit, with Lahm playing wider and Vidal, now playing on the right, a bit higher up the field than Thiago had in the first half in what was now more like an asymmetrical 4-2-3-1, as plotted below. 

Bayern Munich looked for Müller’s inside runs a few times in the first half, but he mostly kept his width and worked with Lahm to drag the Arsenal defense over to the right before the German side would look to switch the ball quickly to Costa on the left. In the second half, with the slight change in space mentioned above, Bayern Munich looked to Müller more often. With Vidal and Müller now able to occupy Monreal, Bayern Munich looked to play diagonal balls to the back post for Vidal and Müller to get a head on. Unfortunately for Bayern Munich, the balls were never really testing enough and Monreal did well to defend them.

Arsenal’s Setup

Knowing that Bayern Munich keep the ball, Arsene Wenger came out with the plan to sit deep, absorb the visitor’s pressure, and play on the counter. This, of course, is something that Wenger started to do with Arsenal last year after poor results over the years against the big teams in the Premier League as well as failings against the likes of Barcelona in the Champions League. With that approach to the match, Wenger opted to start the match with Theo Walcott up top rather than Olivier Giroud as Walcott offers more pace up top. In the first half, Arsenal were able to use Walcott’s pace to create opportunities and overall the Englishman did very well as a lone striker up against Alaba and Boateng.

At times, however, Arsenal were so deep that it made it impossible for them to get out. Once they won the ball back, Bayern Munich were able to swarm the ball carrier and win the ball back quickly and Walcott, despite being an outlet, was unable to get the ball because the Arsenal players had no time to get their heads up and the covering Bayern Munich players were able to cut off the passing lanes into Walcott. Below is a good example of how deep Arsenal were, but also the positioning of the Bayern Munich players in case of a counter attack.

When Arsenal were able to get out of their deep positions and counter, which happened much more often in the first half than it did in the second half, Walcott did extremely well. He not only offered the pace in behind for Arsenal to hit long balls into, but he held the ball up relatively well, allowing Arsenal to get numbers forward. He also had an excellent chance that Neuer saved well. For Arsenal, it was all about the pace they had up top. Along with Walcott running in behind, Alexis Sanchez’s ability on the ball created chances for Arsenal as well. It was his run in the first half that allowed Özil to test Neuer early on.

Changes

Arsene Wenger was forced into the game’s first change, with Aaron Ramsey going off with a pulled hamstring. He was replaced by Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, but despite suiting Arsenal’s counter attacking mentality, the Oxlade-Chamberlain had little influence on the match.

Guardiola made the first tactical changes of the match, bringing on Joshua Kimmich for Xabi Alonso and Rafinha for Vidal. This moved Lahm into a central midfield role that now consisted of Kimmich, Lahm, and Thiago. it was an interesting change, but one that should have allowed for Bayern Munich to have further control of the midfield based on the personnel.

In Olivier Giroud, Arsene Wenger made the most telling change of the match. Walcott had done well so it was interesting that he was the one replaced by Giroud as Walcott could have moved into another attacking position, but Giroud’s height came into play on the set piece that won Arsenal the game. Neuer should not have come out for the ball, but he did and it allowed Giroud an open net to guide the ball into.

Conclusion

Overall, Bayern Munich were slightly the better side. It is difficult to say that Arsenal’s approach to the match worked enough to get them a win. They kept Bayern from scoring, so essentially their low block defending was effective, but the telling goal of the match came from a set piece rather than a counter attack. Following that goal, th German side pushing so many players up the field in search of an equaliser, Arsenal countered well and scored a second. This win leaves Arsenal in a much better position than they had been; they now have three points in the group from three games. Wenger will be pleased with how his side played. They were caught out at times defensively, but the game plan went as expected.

Guardiola will be displeased with how Bayern Munich conceded, especially as it was because of a mistake by Neuer. However, in the view of winning the group, Bayern Munich are still very much favoured to do so.

[beautywithinfootball]

Tottenham v Liverpool (0-0)

Match date: 17 October 2015

A busy international break for Liverpool saw the sacking of Brendan Rodgers following a string of disappointing performances and results leading back to last year. The Northern Irishman was replaced by Jurgen Klopp, who made his name, particularly, at Dortmund by winning two Bundesliga titles as well as taking the German side to a Champions League final, losing against Bayern Munich.

Mauricio Pochettino was without Eric Dier, who has excelled as a holding midfielder for Spurs, due to suspension. The Argentine continued with a 4-2-3-1 with Dembele and Dele Alli playing as the two holding midfielders with Christian Eriksen playing behind Harry Kane.

Klopp went with a 4-2-3-1/4-3-2-1 that saw Adam Lallana return to the team and Divock Origi start up top for Liverpool with Daniel Sturridge, Danny Ings, and Christian Benteke all out injured. The midfield three of Milner, Lucas, and Can moved from a 2-1 to a 1-2 throughout the match with Lallana and Coutinho playing wide and in behind Origi at different stages of the match.

Liverpool’s Shape and Pressing

It was expected: Liverpool’s pressing. When the rumours of Klopp’s appointment came about, supporters and analysts started to look at Klopp’s defining gegenpressing that made him and Dortmund so successful in Germany and in Europe. The media, supporters, and analysts asked, ‘Could Klopp bring it to Liverpool?’ He will, and despite so few sessions with a full squad, Liverpool showed good signs of Klopp’s gegenpressing against Tottenham. 

In the opening stages of the match, Liverpool showed their newfound, ‘high-octane’ approach to pressing and play. Almost immediately, Liverpool were moving the ball up the field, trying to find Origi as quickly as possible and the Belgian did fairly well throughout the match acting as a target for Liverpool’s quick, vertical passes that Klopp will want. More importantly, in the early stages, was Liverpool’s pressing. Early on, Liverpool had a lot of numbers forward with Origi, Coutinho, Lallana, Milner, Can, and Lucas all getting forward, allowing the early pressing to be a bit more frantic and incessant, forcing Tottenham into a number of turnovers. Below is a good example of Liverpool having numbers forward and swarming Tottenham as soon as the home side got on the ball.

This early pressure saw Liverpool win the ball high up the pitch and attempt to play balls into Tottenham’s penalty area, but there was typically not a target. Rather the support was late, but Liverpool won two corners early on, one which saw Origi hit the crossbar from a header after a flick-on from Emre Can.

As the match went on, Liverpool’s shape really took form and it looked very much like a 4-3-2-1, rather than the 4-2-3-1 that had helped bring success to Klopp while he was at Dortmund. Coutinho and Lallana were given free roles behind Origi, but were also responsible for closing the passing lanes into midfield from the Tottenham centre backs as well as closing down the full backs when Spurs played the ball wide. Milner and Can were played on either side of Lucas, who was a bit deeper. The 3 in the midfield were situated in a 1-2, with Can and Milner acting as shuttlers. The 4-3-2-1 asked a lot out of Coutinho, Lallana, Milner and Can regardless of whether Liverpool were pressing high up the pitch or defending in a mid-block, which they did for a good portion of the match. When defending in the mid-block, Liverpool’s pressing and shape started from the top. Origi would close down the centre backs quickly and would approach them by cutting off the passing lane to the other centre back. If Vertonghen was on the ball, it was a trigger for the entire Liverpool team. Origi would close down Vertonghen, taking away the pass to Alderweireld, and forcing the play into Rose, with Liverpool shifting quickly to close down that area of the pitch. Below is an example.

The narrow shape of Liverpool meant that Milner and Can, in particular, were forced to do a huge amount of work. As Tottenham moved up the pitch and played out to the full backs, Milner and Can had to slide over to put pressure on. AS mentioned, this was a bigger ask for Can as Kyle Walker got much involved in Tottenham’s forward play than Danny Rose did so Can was forced to cover Coutinho numerous times when Kyle Walker found himself free down the right side of Tottenham’s attack. Because of the  initial narrow shape though, the movement of Can and Milner allowed passing lanes to open up from the likes of Lucas, Sakho, and Skrtel into Coutinho, Lallana, and Origi. This was particularly evident on the left side from Sakho to Coutinho, although the Brazilian struggled to really pick out Origi, whose movement was not great when Lallana or Coutinho were able to find space and dribble at the Tottenham back line.

Dembele and Eriksen

During the opening 25 minutes or so, when Liverpool were putting Tottenham under intense pressure, Mousa Dembele, who was more than likely only brought into the side because of the suspension of Eric Dier, was Spurs best player. The Belgian was able to use his strength and slaloming touch to get by and through the Liverpool pressure before finding a teammate. At times, he attracted two or three Liverpool players which allowed his teammates to find more space. In this respect, he was excellent, as was his defensive contribution. When Liverpool looked to break through Lallana or Coutinho, it was often Dembele who put in a tackle that won Tottenham the ball back. There were questions about whether Dembele and Alli would be able to cope with free moving players like Coutinho and Lallana, given that both Spurs players would certainly benefit from a true defensive midfielder alongside them in a 4-2-3-1, but Dembele’s defensive work was outstanding.

While Dembele was good going forward, Eriksen was the focal point of Tottenham’s best attacks, starting late on in the first half and carrying on into the second half. As Liverpool began to defend in a mid block, the spaces for Eriksen on either side of Lucas began to open up. Lucas is not a particularly mobile defensive midfielder and is often clumsy in his challenges in his defensive third. Up against a playmaker that is capable of finding space, Lucas struggles with excellent examples coming against Manchester United with Herrera, Arsenal with Özil, and Everton with Barkley. Like Coutinho and Lallana, Eriksen was able to get on the ball in the half-spaces and when got behind Lucas.

No Goal Scorers, Changes

The match end 0-0 and there were few good chances for either side. Mignolet was forced into a few good saves, but Lloris was rarely tested by Liverpool. Both sides lacked a goal scorer, or at least one on form. With Benteke, Ings, and Sturridge all out, Klopp was forced to play Origi as Liverpool’s front man and the Belgian did okay in terms of holding the ball up (although this was inconsistent) and supporting Liverpool’s build up, but overall he never looked like scoring a goal. The same can be said about Kane. The English striker has struggled a bit this year, but got away from Martin Skrtel a few times when he peeled off into the left channel. He shot his best chance at Mignolet and without Son or another player that would run beyond Kane as against Manchester City, the Englishman struggled.

Neither manager had a bench with players that could really change the game. Klopp brought on Joe Allen late on in the match and Jordon Ibe even later. Ibe, it can be argued, could have been a player that a significant impact on the match had he been brought on earlier. Liverpool were very narrow going forward for the majority of the match and Ibe could have given them a wide outlet and his movement and pace could have been useful to Coutinho and Lallana.

Pochettino was forced into a change early on replacing the injured Chadli with N’Jie, but the Argentine’s next change did not come until the 87th minute when Andros Townsend was brought on for Erik Lamela.

Conclusion

Liverpool supporters and Klopp will be encouraged by the opening 20-25 minutes of the match when Liverpool pressed Spurs incredibly well and were energetic going forward. Having only trained with the squad for a few days, it was a glimpse of things to come for Liverpool under Klopp. It will be interesting to see what the German does once the likes of Benteke, Sturridge, Firmino, and Henderson are fit again.

Pochettino will be pleased with the performance of Dembele, Eriksen, and Alli, in particular. The midfield three did their parts defensively and going forward. Pochettino will have to get the best out of Kane even when there aren’t players that can run off of him should the Spurs boss continue to use him.

[beautywithinfootball]

Bayern Munich v Borussia Dortmund (5-1)

Match date: 4 October 2015

A highly anticipated match between what have been competitive rivals over the last half decade or so as well as a show down between two of the best tacticians in Pep Guardiola and Thomas Tuchel. With that, both managers named somewhat surprising starting XIs.

Guardiola named Lahm, Boateng, Martinez, and Alaba in his starting XI, which came across as the Bayern Munich playing four at the back in a 4-1-4-1/4-3-3, but as it turned out, Bayern Munich looked much more like a 3-1-4-2ish with Boateng, Martinez, and Alaba at the back. Alonso, Thiago, and Lahm played in a midfield three, while Costa, Götze, and Müller supported Lewandowski.

Thomas Tuchel had some surprises of this own as he named Sven Bender at centre back alongside Mats Hummels, with Sokratis at right back and Piszczek at left back. Further forward, the midfield looked very much like a diamond at times with Weigl at the base, Gündoğan and Castro, a rather surprisingly selection, on either side, and Kagawa in support of Aubameyang and Mkhitaryan, who played from the left, but high up the pitch.

Dortmund’s Pressing

Under Tuchel, Dortmund’s pressing has been much more calculated than it had been under Klopp. The former Dortmund manager had his side press with tenacity, while Tuchel’s pressing has seen a more structured approach to this side of Dortmund’s game. When out of possession, Dortmund looked very much like a 4-3-3 with Mkhitaryan, Kagawa, and Aubameyang leading the press and early on it looked like Kagawa’s main responsibility was to ensure that the Bayern Munich centre backs were unable to get the ball into Alonso. Below is an excellent example of this. You can see Kagawa, who was on Alonso, moving toward Martinez (who was playing centrally at this point) while also taking away the pass lane to Alonso. Dortmund’s pressing here takes away the forward options for Martinez, forcing him to play a square ball out to Boateng.

For the opening stages of the match, Dortmund did well to disrupt Bayern Munich’s passing. The Bavarian side had some possession, particularly on the right side of their shape through Götze and Lahm, who positioned himself in the half space which allowed for an overload on that side of the pitch, but at this stage Lewandowski and Müller struggled to really get involved as Bayern were forced into the wide areas in order to avoid Dortmund’s central-heavy shape. As mentioned, much of Bayern Munich’s possession came on the right, which somewhat played into the hands of Dormtund as Mkhitaryan’s positioning saw him drop off a lot. The Armenian has typically been playing as the left sided attacking midfielder in Tuchel’s 4-2-3-1 this season with his runs both with and without the ball moving ahead of Aubameyang so he was in some ways, playing very similar to how he would usually, but had a bit more responsibility in his support of Aubameyang. Either way, with Mkhitaryan dropping, it allowed him and Dortmund to match Bayern Munich’s numbers on the right, but also allowed Aubameyang to find himself in a 1v1 with Alaba.

About 12 minutes into the match, Pep made an interesting change after a rather innocuous Dortmund attack; there was a long ball aimed at Mkhitaryan’s run between Boateng and Martinez that the Spaniard headed into touch at which point Guardiola directed the two to switch. With Boateng through the middle, Bayern Munich had more pace in through the middle to deal with Aubameyang and Mkhitaryan’s central runs, but it also allowed the German centre back to get on the ball, which became very important.

Bayern’s Defensive Shape

Guardiola has said before that he likes to play three at the back to force the opposition to play with two strikers if they are going to try to press, meaning that the midfield areas will open up. Perhaps thinking that Tuchel would go with a 4-2-3-1, Pep could have been thinking that Kagawa would support Aubameyang’s pressing, allowing Xabi Alonso to get on the ball to play balls into Douglas Costa and Götze. Tuchel went with a 4-4-2ish shape, however, so the midfield was overloaded, but the wide areas were relatively open. This also meant, however, that Bayern Munich were able to control the forward passing of Gündoğan and Weigl as they were able to get five men into a central area to close the passing lanes. Bayern forced Dortmund out wide where they really only had width from the full backs, but neither got up the field. Below is a good example from early on in the match where Gündoğan has the ball and Bayern Munich flood the midfield area with six players. Notice they still have a numerical advantage at the back.

Further up the field, Bayern Munich were equally effective in their pressing. There were a number of times when Dortmund would win the ball back and Bayern would already have numbers up, particularly on the right side of the pitch with Lahm, Götze, and Müller in that area of pitch.

Bayern Munich Overload, Switch

In Marti Perarnau’s excellent Pep Confidential, Guardiola says, 

“In all team sports, the secret is to overload one side of the pitch so that the opponent must tilt its own defence to cope. You overload on one side and draw them in so that they leave the other side weak."And when we've done all that, we attack and score from the other side. That's why you have to pass the ball, but only if you're doing it with a clear intention. It's only to overload the opponent, to draw them in and then to hit them with the sucker punch. That's what our game needs to be.”

This is exactly what Bayern Munich did against Dortmund, that an exploit Dortmund’s high line with an inexperienced centre back. Integral to Bayern’s success here was Jerome Boateng. After moving into the centre of the back three rather than the right, he saw the ball much more often and had more time to pick his head up and see the field. 

The first Bayern Munich goal is an excellent example of overloading the play, highlighting Bayern’s overloading of the right side of the pitch from the start of the match. The ball is not  Just before Boateng players the ball over the top, Bayern Munich have a 4v2 against Piszczek and Hummels with Müller making a run straight through the two. You’ll notice the screen capture below, as well, that Dortmund are playing a high line, but do not really have pressure on the ball.

Bayern Munich’s third goal was very similar in that it came from a long ball by Boateng, this time into Lewandowski’s path. Again there was no real pressure on Boateng despite a high line from Dortmund, so he had time to pick out his pass and the weight of it was rather perfect. When Boateng moved into the centre of the back three, there seemed to be more of an emphasis on getting him on the ball than there was with Martinez, which is a bit odd considering Martinez has played as a centre midfielder for the majority of his career, typically meaning his passing range would be better than a centre back’s. However, Boateng’s diagonal balls were excellent. As mentioned, Bayern would overload one side of the pitch, usually the right side through Lahm, Götze, and Müller and then Boateng would be the one to play a big diagonal out to Douglas Costa, who was then in a 1v1 with Sokratis. Though the Brazilian did not have the most influential of matches (compared to his form this season), he was a constant outlet and was reliable in stretching the pitch regardless on the side of the field he was on.

The patterns repeated for the fourth and fifth goals as well. Bayern played through Dortmund’s press with a few quick vertical passes. These passes were the result of Bayern Munich stretching the field as much as possible. Regardless of the side they were on, Douglas Costa and Götze were almost always on the touchline. If Götze did drift inside, Lahm would shuffle through the half space into the wide areas, again giving Bayern their width and this is why Boateng’s diagonals were so important. Dortmund were caught out because of their high line, yes, but their defensive compactness was undone by how big Bayern Munich made the field.

Guardiola’s 2-1 Changes, Tuchel’s Changes

At half time, Guardiola switched from the three at the back to a back four with Lahm at right back, Martinez and Boateng at centre back, and Alaba at left back. This gave Bayern Munich more defensive cover in the wide areas, which was where Dortmund wanted to get the ball in order to pick out Aubameyang’s central runs. However, it was hard to say how this would have worked at 2-1 because Bayern Munich scored on their first possession off of the kick off in the second half. At 3-1, Guardiola’s 4-1-4-1 made even more sense in terms of ‘protecting’ their two goal advantage. Götze and Müller rotated between the central and wide right positions in the midfield four and both were quick to support Lewandowski, but one still maintained width.

Tuchel also made changes at half time, switching from a roughly 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield to a 4-2-3-1, which is how Dortmund have typically lined up under their new boss this season. This saw Castro move to the right of three behind Aubameyang and Mkhitaryan was now deeper. Tuchel made changes in the 53rd minute which better suited the system with Reus coming in for Kagawa and playing on the left with Mkhitaryan moving into a central role while Januzaj replaced Castro on the right. Again, viewers were not really able to get a sense of how the match would have gone with the tactical changes because of Bayern’s early third goal. Dortmund created a few good chances, but their faults came at the back.

Conclusion

A hugely anticipated match sees Guardiola beat Tuchel rather convincingly and much of it was because of Tuchel’s tactical approach. Dortmund’s high line was exploited easily by Bayern Munich, but credit should not be taken away from the positional play of Bayern Munich. They were constantly overloading Dortmund, particularly high and wide on the right, opening up space for runners as well as space on the opposite side for Douglas Costa (and Götze on the fifth goal) to exploit.

Guardiola and Bayern Munich will now feel much more comfortable having beaten their closest rival to the league title convincingly, while Dortmund’s good start to the season comes to a halt. With an international break, Tuchel will have time to regroup and make sure that his side come out strong against his old team, Mainz.

[beautywithinfootball]

Barcelona v Bayer Leverkusen (2-1)

Match date: 29 September 2015

Barcelona come into the match having lost Messi to a knee injury in their last Liga match against Las Palmas. With the Argentine out for two months, regardless of the other talent in the side, there were questions raised about how Barcelona would cope.

In Messi’s place, Luis Enrique started Sandro on the right side of Barcelona’s 4-3-3. Interestingly, Jeremy Mathieu started at left back over Jordi Alba, with the rest of the starting XI lining up as expected.

Roger Schmidt set his side out in their usual 4-4-2 / 4-2-2-2 with Bender and Kramer in centre midfield and Calhanoglu and Kampl on either side. Bellarabi and Javier Hernandez were partnered up front.

Bayer Leverkusen Press, Get Their Chances

Roger Schmidt faced Barcelona with the same plan as he does every other match; press the opposition high up the pitch with persistent intensity. Some might question this tactic against Barcelona, but under Luis Enrique the Catalan side have never looked as comfortable or disciplined coming out of the back as they did under Pep Guardiola and Tito Vilanova. Regardless, Barcelona still have quality and teams rarely look to press them, especially at home, but that’s just what Schmidt had Bayer Leverkusen do.

In their 4-4-2 / 4-2-2-2, Leverkusen typically allowed Pique and Mascherano to have time on the ball, only pressing the two Barcelona centre backs when Leverkusen had significant numbers forward from an attack and had just lost possession or the centre backs were receiving without immediate options, when they were facing their own goal, or very deep in their own half. The focus, instead, was to play with a high block, but to cut off the passing lanes from Pique and Mascherano into Iniesta and Rakitic, while also blocking the passing lanes into Suarez, Neymar, and Sandro. Below is an example of Leverkusen’s pressing when Barcelona had the ball deep in their own half. Whereas Leverkusen’s pressing excels when they are able to press as a compact unit, here Barcelona have made the space huge with Alves and Mathieu on the touchlines and the midfield three of Busquets, Iniesta, and Rakitic spread. With that said, Ter Stegen also has no comfortable pass available to him. Alves is an option on the right, but not with the position of the ball and Ter Stegen’s body.

As Barcelona moved the ball up the field, the same problems continued as Leverkusen ensured there was never a particularly ‘easy’ pass for Barcelona to play. Much of Barcelona’s play in the opening 45 minutes came in their defensive third and the middle third and with Leverkusen playing a relatively (relative to what one would typically see against Barcelona) high line, the German side were able to keep Barcelona at bay. That is not to say that Barcelona did not have their chances, Sandro had two good opportunities, but the chances were to be expected for the amount of possession Barcelona had. However, Leverkusen, because of their pressing and direct, high tempo attack, were able to create two excellent chances from open play in the first half. On Leverkusen’s first ball into the box, Hernandez forced Ter Stegen into a save. After already being 1-0 up through Papadopoulos’ goal, Bellarabi easily beat Pique and maybe should have scored, but Ter Stegen saved what was right at him. So not only did Leverkusen, in particular Hernandez and Bellarabi, put Barcelona under constant pressure through their pressing, but their attacks were incredibly quick and Barcelona struggled to keep up, especially when either Pique, Mascherano, or Mathieu were isolated in a 1v1 situation.

Barcelona’s Struggles

As mentioned above, Bayer Leverkusen’s pressing was fantastic for much of the match and the German side persisted for the entire 90 minutes. Barcelona struggled to bypass Leverkusen’s pressing. The passing lanes, especially in the first half, were closed out well by the Leverkusen forward and midfield lines. Coupled with this was what seemed like little movement or fluidity amongst the front three of the Spanish side. Neymar was pinned to the left, Suarez did his best to stretch the field, and Sandro stayed on the right. In theory, against Bayer Leverkusen (and all teams really), the opposition wants to make the field as big as possible as Leverkusen want to press in compact groupings. There was little room for the Barcelona front three to move in fairness, as Leverkusen did their best to keep the field compact. Below you can see Leverkusen’s compactness, but also notice that Barcelona don’t have clear wide options at this point in the match. 

Perhaps the biggest issue for Barcelona was the ability for a player to break the lines or evade defenders on the dribble. When no forward passing lanes are available, the best way to take away a line of pressure is to bypass it on the dribble and Barcelona have one of the best players in the world capable of just that, however, he is out injured. With Messi, the match would have been very different. The Argentine’s movement into deep, central areas would have allowed him to get on the ball, at least as often as Iniesta and Rakitic and this would have then allowed him to break the lines with his dribbling. There were times when Neymar and Iniesta did this very well; both would typically make diagonal runs with the ball angled from the left half space to the right corner at the top of the penalty area.

Above you can see that both Neymar and Iniesta did well to take on players, but there was still an inability in their dribbles to really break a line of pressure and free up Barcelona’s attack. It did happen occasionally, but was mostly muted. Again, credit to Leverkusen’s disciplined and compact defensive shape, whether they were defending high up the pitch or in a mid to low block, the German side looked very much in control of the match for the first 70 or so minutes.

Roger Schmidt Takes Away His Outlets

Ten minutes into the second half, Schmidt opted to replace Javier Hernandez with Stefan Kiessling. It was a surprising move as Hernandez’s movement in and around the Barcelona penalty area had been excellent and the Mexican should have extended Leverkusen’s lead just before he was replaced. Taking off Hernandez also partially took away Leverkusen’s ability to play behind Barcelona’s high line. Kiessling can hold the ball up well and bring others into play, but he was not an option for Leverkusen in behind and his pressing wasn’t as intense as Hernandez’s had been. Interestingly enough, Schmidt’s next substitution was to take off Bellarabi and replace him with Julian Brandt. Bellarabi had been Leverkusen’s brightest player during his time on the pitch, so in that sense it was interesting that he was taken off, but it was also odd because of how much success Bellarabi and Hernandez had found in opening up Barcelona’s back four. Whereas in the first half, Barcelona had to be wary of Leverkusen’s quick attacks, it is of little coincidence that after Hernandez and Bellarabi were taken off, Barcelona rarely had to defend.

Luis Enrique’s Changes

There were two rather significant changes that Luis Enrique made at half time that helped Barcelona change the complexion of the match and were then aided by the Spaniard’s substitutions. The first change was the positioning of the holding midfielder. At the start of the half, Barcelona looked very much like a 3-4-3 rather than a 4-3-3. Busquets and later Mascherano were very deep and sat in between the centre backs. This did two things: it allowed Mathieu and Alves to move further up the pitch and provide a wide outlet for Barcelona and it also allowed Barcelona to be in a 3v2 in the middle of the pitch at the back rather than a 2v2 against Bayer Leverkusen’s forwards.

The Spaniard’s first and second substitutions came quickly. The first was Jordi Alba for Iniesta, though it would have been interesting to see who Alba would have been taking off had Iniesta had injured himself. The second change was Munir on for Sandro. The first was more significant. With Iniesta off, Busquets moved up to fill his spot in midfield, Mascherano slide over into the middle centre back position, Mathieu dropped to left centre back, and Alba played high up the pitch on left. The new left back did very well acting as an outlet and created a decent chance.

The second change that Enrique made was the position of Neymar. The Brazilian was not getting on the ball too much in a wide position in the first half. He was high up the pitch and Barcelona struggled to work the ball his way. So at half time, Enrique instructed Neymar to come inside and play just off of Luis Suarez. This allowed the two to combine easier and for Suarez to move into that left channel when he wanted to, but it also allowed Neymar to find the passing lanes that Leverkusen were not as careful closing, typically in the half spaces. He still drifted back out into a wide left area, especially before Alba came on, but he now had freedom to move around the pitch and it allowed Barcelona to outnumber Leverkusen (remember Busquets/Mascherano were acting as centre backs, though Mascherano moved back into a holding midfield role around the time Sergi Roberto came on) in the middle of the pitch.

Sergi Roberto’s introduction was important as well. He added forward runs both with and without the ball, but it occupied the Leverkusen centre backs. Without Neymar and Sergi Roberto’s central presence, Suarez certainly would not have gotten the space he did to score the winner.

Conclusion

An excellent tactical match. Bayer Leverkusen and Roger Schmidt came out and pressed Barcelona, allowing the German side to have complete control of the opening 45 minutes and they certainly should have been ahead by more than one goal going into the half. However, Luis Enrique’s subtle changes at half time allowed Barcelona to get a better grip on the match and their task was significantly aided by Schmidt’s decisions to take off both Javier Hernandez and Karim Bellarabi. Without those outlets, Leverkusen rarely put pressure on Barcelona, allowing the Spanish side to play at will.

While Barcelona won the match, and Enrique’s changes were subtle yet effective, there are still questions on how Barcelona will cope without Messi for two months.

[beautywithinfootball]

Tottenham v Manchester City (4-1)

Match date: 26 September 2015

Tottenham have had some good performances so far this season despite their points tally while Manchester City had started the season with five wins in five games, but lost against West Ham United last time out. 

Mauricio Pochettino named a young starting XI with just four players over the age of 24. Dele Alli started as one of the two holding midfielders with Eric Dier beside him in a 4-2-3-1, though their shape changed to a 4-1-4-1 situationally. 

Manuel Pellegrini stayed with a 4-2-3-1, but was unable to start Joe Hart or Vincent Kompany. Fernando got a start in midfield next to Fernandinho, with Yaya Toure in front of them and Kevin De Bruyne on the right.

Manchester City Start Well, Tottenham Press

Manchester City were the better team in the opening 30 minutes of the match and were right to be ahead through Kevin De Bruyne’s goal. Interestingly enough, that goal came from a quick counter attack by the away side. They moved the ball well in what was a fairly open match and for all the openness that was in the match, Fernandinho was able to help dictate the game for the City. A lot of their best play came down the right side of the pitch through Sagna and De Bruyne as Ben Davies was left in 2v1 situations a few times due to Christian Eriksen keeping a high position. 

Obviously Fernandinho’s passing statistic is not one you would expect to see with a team that is controlling a match, but that is a testament to just how open the match had been. The holding midfielder was able to fine a good amount of space when he got on the ball as Tottenham’s attacking quartet was pressing high, but with Spurs back four and holding midfielders a bit too deep, there was too much space behind the initial press that allowed Manchester City to play out of the back rather easily. The image below shows the good and the bad of Tottenham’s press. Ultimately, Manchester City are forced back to Caballero who plays the ball long, which is what Tottenham wanted as Sterling, De Bruyne, and Agüero were unable to win aerial battles against Tottenham’s back four. The bad part of this press, however, is how disjointed it is. Kane does a good job cutting the field in half, but had Fernandinho or Yaya Toure been quicker to fill the space noted, then Manchester City would have been able to play pass Tottenham’s first line of pressure rather easily.

Tottenham’s press got better and they began to force Manchester City into those long balls more and more, allowing Spurs to win the ball back most of the time. So while the pressing of Eriksen, Son, Lamela, and Kane wasn’t winning the ball high up the pitch, they disrupted Manchester City’s play, forced them to play long, and got the ball back in deeper positions, which allowed Spurs to build. 

Tottenham’s Shape

Pochettino’s teams typically play in a 4-2-3-1, with two holding midfielders that are fairly disciplined. At Southampton, the Argentine had Wanyama and Schneiderlin, both of whom were key to how Southampton played. At Tottenham, with the starting XI against Manchester City, Pochettino had much more fluidity in those two holding positions. Eric Dier has said in the past that he sees his future as a centre back, but has done very well in a holding role so far this season. Alongside Dier was Dele Alli, who’s flexibility helped Tottenham when they were in possession.

Both did well defensively; Alli attempted and won seven tackles in the match, while Dier did well covering and in that 4-2-3-1 shape, they did as expected. However, when Tottenham had the ball, they looked more like a 4-1-4-1 at times because of Alli’s flexibility. It was situational, typically when Tottenham had possession at the back and were looking to build. Alli looked to move out of that deep, central space to give Dier the ability to get on the ball while there was no real worry to overload that area of the pitch as Yaya Toure’s defensive work rate was lacking. With Dier free to get on the ball, it allowed Alli to push on and get on the ball in higher areas of the pitch, while also allowing the fluidity of Eriksen, Lamela, and Son to flow, with the knowledge that the central areas would be covered in any transitions.

Again, this was situational and there were times when Dier and Alli were both deep when Spurs had possession, but when Alli did push forward, Tottenham looked at their best. By occupying one of Fernandinho and Fernando, it allowed the likes of Kane and Son to move into that area of the pitch without a marker and that allowed Tottenham to play some good looking football in Manchester City’s half, although none of their goals were the result of their sometimes excellent possession.

Tottenham’s Attacking Quartet

Tottenham’s overall team performance was excellent and it is hard to choose one player that stood out above the rest, but the collective performance of the front four should be one that gives Spurs supporters a positive view going forward. There are different combinations that work incredibly well and supplement one another fantastically.

Harry Kane consistently dropped into midfield when Tottenham had the ball and was typically followed by Otamendi or Demichelis, both of whom wanted to be touch tight to the forward all night, into that area of the pitch. Kane also moved out wide, again dragging the Manchester City centre backs with him into those areas of the pitch, which again opened up space in the central areas of the pitch. Last year, however, Tottenham lacked a player that would run into that space, but with Son, they now have a player who makes those direct runs without the ball at his feet. Son started the match in the hole behind Kane for this reason, but was moved to the left in the second half as his work rate was needed to help keep Sagna from getting forward. There were a number of times when Son looked to run in behind Kane, but he was rarely picked out. Nonetheless, the two compliment one another very well; Kane likes to drop into midfield to get involved in build up play and Son wants to run behind into space.

Eriksen and Lamela offer different qualities as well. Eriksen was welcomed back into the side after his injury and with his inclusion in the side, there was guile and creativity in the Spurs side that they were otherwise lacking. The intricate play of the Dane was the catalyst for some excellent one touch play by Spurs around the Manchester City penalty area, while Lamela’s directness with the ball, especially against Kolarov, helped open up the Manchester City back line.

Changes

It was odd to see Pellegrini start the match with Yaya Toure behind Agüero, forcing De Bruyne out wide, considering that Manchester City’s best performances this season have been when David Silva was played behind Agüero with Sterling and Navas in the wide areas. With pace and real width out wide, space opens up for Silva to operate and drift around in, which could have meant the same for De Bruyne had Pellegrini lined up differently. Instead, Yaya Toure was played through the middle and that allowed Alli to get forward, which opened up space for Tottenham. Unsurprisingly, Yaya Toure was taken off for Navas with Pellegrini’s first change. The Spaniard gave Manchester City that directness on the right that had been taking and, though his decision making it woeful at times, Navas put in a few dangerous balls and forced Lloris into a save.

After that change, Spurs scored to make it 3-1, which meant Pellegrini and Manchester City really had to chase the game. With that in mind, Pochettino knew space was going to open up and so he brought on Clinton N’Jie, who was able to exploit the space left by Manchester City as they pushed numbers forward and eventually setup Lamela for Tottenham’s fourth goal.

Conclusion

One could blame the assistant referees for some poor decisions that lead to goals and there was nothing truly tactically spectacular about the match, but it was certainly a positive result for Tottenham and should the supporters a sense of what Pochettino’s side can become if they continue to develop.

Manchester City looked fine for much of the match, although they were a bit naive and slow as the match went on. Pellegrini will be hoping for a much better performance in the midweek Champions League match against Borussia Monchengladbacj.

[beautywithinfootball]

Borussia Dortmund v Bayer Leverkusen (3-0)

Match date: 20 September 2015

Borussia Dortmund have had an excellent start under Thomas Tuchel, coming into the match having played ten matches and winning all ten. The Dortmund players have spoken about how refreshing Tuchel is and how attentive to detail he is, as well as how tactically sound the German coach is. While Dortmund have started brilliantly, Leverkusen have struggled a bit to recapture their good form of last season.

This is Borussia Dortmund’s first ‘big’ test under Tuchel. Bayer Leverkusen have been excellent under Roger Schmidt, so it was always going to be a good match. Tuchel continued with a 4-2-3-1 / 4-1-4-1 and had his strongest XI on the field, excluding Marco Reus who was only fit enough for the bench with a toe injury.

Bayer Leverkusen and Roger Schmidt started in a 4-4-2 with the newest signing, Javier Hernandez, up top with Stefan Kiessling.

Leverkusen’s Press, Hummels

So far under Thomas Tuchel, Gündoğan and Weigl have been incredibly important to Dortmund’s play. When Borussia Dortmund played Monchengladbach, Gündoğan’s display seemed to capture a lot of what Tuchel wanted his side to look like. Since that 4-0 win, Dortmund have continued in good form and continue to impress with the performances behind the good results. Up against Leverkusen, however, they had their biggest test. This is not really because Leverkusen are a ‘big club’ in Germany or because they did well last year compared to Dortmund, but rather because of Roger Schmidt’s tactics. He enjoys a high-tempo match with his sides continuously pressing high up the pitch while Dortmund like to control the ball (as good Bayern Munich though and Leverkusen lost that match 3-0) and will look to play out of the back through Leverkusen’s pressing.

The opening minutes of the match saw Hummels and Sokratis exchanging passes. Leverkusen were high up the pitch in a 4-4-2, but neither striker was putting pressure on the Dortmund centre backs, instead, they were cutting off the passing lanes into Gündoğan and Weigl. Calhanoglu and Bellarabi were both narrow as well, again, hoping to cut off the forward passing lanes from Sokratis and Hummels, in particular. The German centre back is one of the best ball-playing centre backs in the game, so if Leverkusen and Schmidt were going to cut off the passes to Gündoğan and Weigl, they had to ensure that Hummels did not have any forward options. Below you can see a screen capture from early in the match with Sokratis on the ball. Notice the positioning of the Leverkusen strikers and wide players as they cut off those passes in the Dortmund centre midfielders.

This approach from Leverkusen worked to an extent as Gündoğan and Weigl and struggled to get on the ball less than they typically would, although because of the high percentage of Dortmund’s possession in the match, they still saw plenty of the ball. In the above screen capture, you can see where Weigl wants to be receiving the ball; between the first and second lines of Leverkusen’s pressing. Early on, however, Leverkusen’s positioning forced Hummels and Sokratis to play the ball into their respective full backs; a forward pass, but not really breaking Leverkusen’s pressing lines and because of that were not that threatening, rather than getting the ball into Weigl.

Even when Dortmund’s midfielders were getting on the ball, a Leverkusen player was usually touch tight to them, forcing the ball back to Hummels and Sokratis. With Leverkusen suffocating passes into Gündoğan and Weigl, Dortmund had to work the ball to Kagawa and Aubameyang another way and so Hummels became the deep-lying playmaker of sorts that Gündoğan was in that 4-0 win over Borussia Monchengladbach. However, for Hummels to get the ball through the Leverkusen midfield, it meant that Gündoğan and Weigl had to be clever in their movement. The Dortmund duo had to drift apart to drag the Leverkusen players with them and create a passing lane for Hummels to play forward. The outward movement of Gündoğan and Weigl was a trigger for Aubameyang to come checking in for a pass from Hummels, likewise with Hummels to Kagawa. The first good Dortmund attack came from this scenario. Bellarabi left his position to press Hummels, Weigl began moving into the half space with Javier Hernandez following him, and Aubameyang checked into the centre passing lane that was created. A few passes later, Jonas Hofmann had a good chance. Below is a screen capture of Hummels’ ball bypassing the Dortmund midfield as well as Leverkusen’s first two lines of pressure.

For the first half, Kagawa and Aubameyang were the target players for Dortmund. Gündoğan and Weigl were responsible for creating the passing lanes into the more advanced two and Hummels had to play the pass. There were times when Kagawa would move into the wide areas, again, triggered by the movement of Gündoğan and Weigl in the midfield. In the match, Hummels made ten passes to Kagawa and Aubameyang, nine of which came in the first half as Dortmund bypassed the midfield and Leverkusen’s press.

Dortmund Going Forward

During Dortmund’s build up play, Gündoğan and Weigl were usually on the same receiving line, but when the home side were able to break Leverkusen’s press, Dortmund’s shape was more of a 4-1-4-1 than a 4-2-3-1 with Gündoğan moving forward to be in line with Kagawa. Mkhitaryan and Hofmann would typically drift in and out of the half spaces laterally, opening up space either centrally for Kagawa and Gündoğan to operate or in the wide areas for Ginter and Schmelzer to get forward, or they would push further forward in line with Aubameyang. Weigl was almost always available when Dortmund were in Leverkusen’s half as the home side had a man advantage in the centre of the pitch. Weigl’s positioning allowed the home side to move the ball more freely as Leverkusen defended in a 4-4-2 for most of the match, although looked like a 4-2-3-1 at times in the second half. Below is an example of Dortmund’s shape when in possession in Leverkusen’s half, in particular focusing on the midfield triangle’s shape.

The particular phase above came after Dortmund had overloaded the left side of the pitch, which they look to do often under Tuchel. Aubameyang, Kagawa, and Mkhitaryan had all drifted over while Hofmann took up a central striker role. Dortmund overloaded the left constantly throughout the match, opening up the right side for a quick switch, but the combination play on the left, through the half space and centrally, particularly between Kagawa and Mkhitaryan, was excellent and dragged the Leverkusen back line out of their shape consistently. 

A year ago, Mkhitaryan was looking down and out at Dortmund. He struggled to find the form that earned him a move from Shakhtar Donetsk, but under Tuchel, he has looked fantastic. As mentioned above, Mkhitaryan’s movement through the half space on the left was fantastic. He would drift inside and his combination play with Kagawa, Aubameyang, and Schmelzer was excellent. The Armenian international was excellent with the ball at his feet as well. He would pick up the ball in the left half space and go on diagonal runs with the ball, evading defenders, while creating space for his teammates. It was not as explosive as Messi’s runs, but against Leverkusen, it was just as effective in getting away from defenders and creating space.

Schmidt’s Changes

At halftime, Schmidt took off Kiessling and Kramer. Neither performed particularly well. Kiessling was unable to really help Javier Hernandez press either Hummels or Sokratis and the German striker was unable to keep up with the movement of the ball to take away the central passing lanes. He was also meant to be an aerial outlet for Leverkusen when Dortmund pressed, but he struggled to win his duals against Sokratis and Hummels. With that, it made sense for Schmidt to replace him with a more energetic forward option in Julian Brandt. The thought behind the youngster’s introduction was to allow more pressing, but also an another counter attacking option. With Brandt, Bellarabi partnered Hernandez up top. 

Schmidt also brought Mehmedi on at halftime for Kramer. This moved Calhanoglu into the middle with Kampl, which gave Leverkusen an energetic midfield duo, but meant they lacked some a real ball winner in the centre of the pitch. 

Conclusion

Tuchel’s side got the best of Leverkusen in every part of the match. While Leverkusen’s pressing seemed difficult to break down at times, Dortmund were able to adjust in order to break the lines. With this win, it gives Dortmund 11 wins in 11 matches under Tuchel. The movement of the midfield was key to opening up Leverkusen and going forward, Dortmund’s combination play was too much for Leverkusen.

Schmidt has struggled to find the form of last year and now has just six points from their opening five matches. Tuchel tactically got much the better of Schmidt with the latter never really adjusting his side once Dortmund were able to pass through the midfield.

[beautywithinfootball]

Chelsea v Arsenal (2-0)

Match date: 19 September 2015

The London sides met in the Community Shield before the first weekend of the Premier League with Arsenal winning and Wenger getting his first win over Mourinho. The league, however, is far different and Mourinho doesn’t lose at Stamford Bridge.

Chelsea were back to their winning ways in the Champions League midweek after a poor run of form in the league. Mourinho would certainly be hoping that their Champions League win helps steady the confidence of his players. The Chelsea boss set his side out in a 4-2-3-1 with Matic and Fabregas as the holding midfielders while Oscar was back in the side behind Diego Costa. Kurt Zouma partnered Gary Cahill at the back with John Terry on the bench.

Arsenal struggled in the Champions League, losing to Dinamo Zagreb while being reduced to 10 men. Wenger had rested a number of players in that match, but was back to full strength against Chelsea in a 4-2-3-1. Walcott started as the lone striker while Gabriel started at the back with Koscielny.

Walcott Up Top, Kurt Zouma in - Reflection of The Managers’ Plans

Starting Theo Walcott up top was the most interesting decision on Wenger’s part for a number of reasons. The first being that it gave a hint as to the mindset of Wenger’s approach to the match which was to allow Chelsea to have the ball, for the most part, and look to exploit them on counter attacks. Defending in a low block like this is something that Arsenal did in ‘big games’ a lot last year for the first time. The Frenchman talked about how his side needed to be less open so as to avoid big defeats like those suffered to Manchester City, Liverpool, and Chelsea over the last few seasons. So being away from home against Chelsea, Wenger instructed his side to sit deep, but needed an outlet that could test Chelsea and so Walcott was named as the lone striker, supported by Sanchez and Ramsey, two players that make vertical runs very well. Overall, while Walcott was always a willing runner, he rarely got his chances when Arsenal were defending deep. Walcott and Arsenal had two very good opportunities to counter, but with Kurt Zouma on the pitch, Chelsea had a centre back that was willing to match Walcott’s pace making Arsenal’s counter attacks less effective.

Walcott’s best moments of the match came in the first half, before Chelsea settled into dictating the rhythm of the match and before Gabriel was sent off. Arsenal were able to get some good possession in Chelsea’s half and Walcott was a good option for the Gunners in behind the Chelsea back line, something that Giroud doesn’t offer. Walcott was called offside a few times, but he was making runs off of the Chelsea back line which the likes of Sanchez, Cazorla, and Özil were looking for. Below are good examples of such runs.

As mentioned above, however, Kurt Zouma was able to contain the runs of Walcott well throughout the match and the young Frenchman’s inclusion was at the expense of John Terry. It is difficult to think that Mourinho would have been able to predict the inclusion of Walcott in the Arsenal side. Walcott did score against Dinamo Zagreb, while Giroud struggled to have any real influence on the match, but Wenger seemed to already have the plan to start Walcott against Chelsea for the reasons stated above in regards to how Arsenal would look to play. So Zouma’s start was a reflection of Mourinho’s approach to the match. At home and needing to win, he needed his side to be in complete control of the match, taking the game to Arsenal rather than the other way around. With that idea in mind, Zouma has the pace that allows Chelsea to play higher up the field and squeeze the space without the worry of a pacey player getting in behind as Mourinho would have to worry about with John Terry at the back with Cahill. We saw this earlier in the season when Chelsea played Manchester City. Chelsea were in need of getting back into the match and controlling the game with the ball, but could not allow counter attacks and so at half time, Mourinho replaced Terry with Zouma, which led to a slightly better performance from Chelsea in the second half.

Above you can see Chelsea’s centre back pairing playing a higher line against Walcott than the would have been able to had John Terry been in the side. It allowed Chelsea’s midfield to play higher up as well and put Arsenal under pressure once they won the ball. 

Chelsea’s Midfield

There has been a lot made of Chelsea’s midfield over the course of this season. They struggled against Manchester City in the 3-0 and they struggled against Everton in the 3-1 loss. The troubles have been the balance of Matic and his holding midfield partner and the player at the top of the 2-1 triangle. In those previously mentioned matches, Fabregas and Mikel partnered Matic. Against Manchester City, Fabregas pushed too high from his position, leaving holes behind him for David Silva to exploit. Against Everton, with Matic and Mikel partnered, the two were consistently dragged out of the middle, leaving space for the likes of Ross Barkley and Steven Naismith.

In this match, however, one of the key parts to a better midfield display was the return of Oscar. With the Brazilian in front of them, Matic and Fabregas were able to sit a bit deeper, knowing that Oscar was doing to close down the central passing lanes. With Matic and Fabregas deeper, the likes of Sanchez, Ramsey, and Özil struggled to find space between the lines, with all three Arsenal attackers looking to come inside. The narrowness of Arsenal’s trio could have caused problems, but Oscar disrupted passes into the midfield which forced the Arsenal players back out wide where they were less than effective. Below you can see where Cazorla was able to link up with Özil and Ramsey. Notice that the passes are largely in unthreatening areas of the pitch.

As you can see in the screen capture below, the midfield kept it’s shape fairly well and were able to close down Arsenal’s midfielders quickly. 

Arsenal could have caused Chelsea more problems than they did. Had Alexis Sanchez stayed out wide and been able to run at Ivanovic, it would have required Chelsea’s midfield to shift over and help their right back, but Sanchez played through the middle. Other times, Chelsea caused their own problems as there were a few times when Hazard and Oscar switched positions during a Chelsea attack. When Arsenal won the ball back, there was not enough time to transition back to Oscar through the middle, which allowed Cazorla a bit more time on the ball. Overall, however, it was a much improved performance from Chelsea’s midfield and Mourinho will be happy to have Oscar back in the side.

Chelsea Attack the Left, Red Cards

Chelsea overloaded the left side of their attack throughout the match. Diego Costa would drift into the wide spaces on the left to offer a target for when Chelsea needed to play a direct ball and from there attacks would continue to develop. When Chelsea built their play up a bit slower, the focus of the ball would still be down the left as Hazard, Costa, Oscar, and even Azpilicueta made some runs forward in an attempt from to open up the Arsenal right side of defense. 

Arsenal did well to defend Chelsea’s attacks on the left and neither goal was conceded from that side, but the persistent play put Bellerin, Gabriel, and later Chambers, under a huge amount of pressure and it would have been interesting to see whether Chelsea would have eventually broken down that side had Arsenal stayed at full strength.

The red cards lost the game for Arsenal. While Chelsea were probably the better side in the opening 45 minutes, they were certainly going to be on top of Arsenal with a man advantage. Arsenal switched to a 4-4-1 which allowed Chelsea’s midfield to have more time on the ball. Arsenal still managed some opportunities to get forward and possess the ball, but they were ultimately undone by a set piece early on in the second half that saw the Gunners have to look for a goal, leaving them a bit more open.

Conclusion

A lot can be discussed about the red cards, but the fact of the matter is that both players were sent off and the game changed because of it. Mourinho again got the better of Arsene Wenger and the Chelsea boss will be happy with the overall performance. They were not too smooth going forward, but defensively they looked strong through the middle as the midfield three was arguably made up of Mourinho’s first choice combination.

Wenger was disappointed with Mike Dean at the end of the match and while he does have reason to be as Costa’s off the ball flailing on Koscielny was worthy of something. Perhaps the best part of Arsenal’s match was that early on, Walcott looked very bright and sharp at centre forward and Wenger should be looking to use him more often.

[beautywithinfootball]

Manchester City v Juventus (1-2)

Match date: 15 September 2015

Two sides with distinct starts to their respective domestic leads with Manchester City coming into the match having secured the maximum number points and not conceding a goal while Juventus have already lost twice which is just one less loss than all of last year.

The hope for Manuel Pellegrini was to carry on his side’s league form, but he was forced to do so without Sergio Agüero, who was only fit enough for the bench. Wilfred Bony started up top while Samir Nasri started as well in Pellegrini’s 4-2-3-1.

As mentioned, Juventus have so far struggled in Serie A, but Massimiliano Allegri would have been hoping that his players could draw on their appearance in the Champions League final last season despite losing a number of key players. Juventus started in the match in a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield, but it became very much a 4-5-1 / 4-3-3.

Allegri’s Midfield

Juventus started the match in a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield consisting of Pogba, Hernanes, Cuadrado, and Sturaro behind Morata and Mandzukic. While Pogba clearly played on the left side of the diamond and Cuadrado played somewhat on the right, there was a rotation between Hernanes and Sturaro between the bottom and top of the diamond. The idea here seemed to be that Pogba and Cuadrado would be able to occupy Yaya Toure and Fernandinho when Juventus were in possession and that this would allow one of Hernanes or Sturaro to be able to get on the ball by outnumbering David Silva in that area of the pitch. However, this became an issue. With Cuadrado playing centrally, given that he has never really played in a central role before, his natural instinct was to drift out wide, which helped keep Kolarov pinned back, but also meant Fernandinho was free to pressure the free midfielder for Juventus. The most notable example was when the Brazilian won the ball from Sturaro very early in the match and played in Sterling who had his shot saved by Buffon. Below is that example.

The idea was tactically interesting and perhaps would have worked better with the likes of Khedira or Marchisio, but Cuadrado’s natural play took him wide. This was not the only time that Sturaro looked uncomfortable picking up the ball in a deeper position, so as the match went on the positions of the diamond became much more permanent with Hernanes acting as the deep lying midfielder. However, as the match went on, the diamond became less and less effective. Despite outnumbering Manchester City in the middle of the pitch, Juventus struggled for possession of the ball and were continually left exposed in the wide areas, so just about 15 minutes or so into the match, Juventus looked very much like a 4-3-3. Allegri seemed to have this plan going into the match though as there were times in the opening quarter hour where signs of a 4-3-3 appeared, but it became Juventus’ true shape a bit into the match. Morata played from the left, Mandzukic was through the middle, and Cuadrado was on the right. Morata and Cuadrado had the task of keeping Sagna and Kolarov pinned back as much as possible. Below you can see Juventus in their diamond shape early on and the switch to a 4-3-3, which was much more of a 4-5-1 when defending.

Defensively, it was an excellent move by Allegri to move to a 4-5-1. As mentioned, Cuadrado was able to keep Kolarov from having too much of an attacking threat down the Manchester City left, while Morata was able to keep Evra from having to deal with a 2v1 situation all night. More importantly, however, was how Juventus’ shape slowed Manchester City’s attacks. Yes, there was space in the wide areas and Manchester City used it, but the English side would certainly prefer to get the ball into the likes of Silva and Yaya Toure in central areas between the lines. Silva, in particular, thrives in this area of the pitch and Manchester City typically combine very well around the opposition’s penalty area. However, Manchester City looked slow in possession as Yaya Toure was forced to drop deep to get on the ball while the passing lanes to David Silva were closed out due to the narrowness of Sturaro, Hernanes, and Pogba in the centre of Juventus’ five man midfield. Toure was rarely able to get on the ball behind the Juventus midfield and David Silva was only really able to get on the ball in the half-spaces, but even when he received the ball there, he was never really able to turn inside with it, but was instead forced wide.

Going forward, Juventus looked good when they did one of two things; either play direct balls into Morata or Mandzukic, or look for Lichtsteiner and Cuadrado to combine down the right side of the pitch. In fact, Pogba’s goal that was ruled off because of Morata’s offside position started with a direct ball up to Mandzukic and then a ball out wide to Cuadrado and the Colombian put in an excellent cross, as he did a few times on the night. Pogba was lively throughout the match and gave Juventus width on the left when Morata came inside, but the Frenchman was mostly left isolated in that area and Juventus rarely played on that side of the pitch.

Manchester City Lack Penetration

Perhaps an unfair heading considering the chances that Raheem Sterling had, but overall, much of Manchester City’s play was in front of Juventus’ defensive and midfield lines. As mentioned above, David Silva was unable to really find space between the lines, the area he wants to get on the ball, and so his influence on the match was hardly influential. Yaya Toure had to drop deep to get the ball and was unable to break the lines on the dribble with one of his excellent forward runs. What Manchester City were missing was Agüero. He was only fit enough for the bench and without him, Bony was selected. The Ivorian striker is good in his own respect, but compared to Agüero and against a team that was willing to sit back and allow Manchester City to have the ball, Bony’s skill set was less suited than Agüero’s would have been. Manchester CIty needed a player that could either find the passing lanes to get into or drag defenders out of position to allow the passing lanes to open for a teammate. They also needed a player that could get in behind the Juventus back for with a quick turn or combination, something that Agüero would have been able to do.

Without that player and without David Silva getting on the ball in dangerous positions, Manchester City looked slow in possession and less than purposeful with the ball. They moved it out wide, trying to create space in the middle, but the play was slow and the home side struggled to up the tempo when needed. Sterling had his chances when Manchester City broke forward, and a huge credit to Gigi Buffon for his brilliant saves on the Englishman, but Sterling had a clear chance in each half, with the second half effort one being that could have demoralised Juventus.

Changes

Pellegrini made the first change, bringing on Kevin De Bruyne for Sterling, both of whom signed in the summer for a total of over £100m. It was somewhat odd considering how the match was going. Not only had Nasri not contributed much, but there was a need for pace and purpose in Manchester City’s play and as good as De Bruyne is, he is a similar playmaker to what Manchester City had on the pitch already. Pellegrini was forced into his second change with Otamendi coming on for the injured Vincent Kompany. Just before Morata scored, Navas was warming up, but after Juventus went up 2-1, Pellegrini opted to bring on Agüero. Despite the personnel changes, there was no real change of approach from Manchester City. Pellegrini must have had the belief that they were going to get a go ahead goal, despite failing to create persistent chances.

Allegri’s first change was forced as Dybala came on for the injured Mandzukic while Barzagli was brought on to help keep Juventus’ lead.

Conclusion

Allegri was well prepared for the match. He certainly had a concrete idea about how he was going to play Manchester City; do not allow them dominance in the middle of the pitch. With that he started with a diamond, but it was brief and gave way to a 4-5-1 that allowed Juventus to continue limiting balls into Silva between the lines, but also gave support to the Juventus full backs. Overall, despite their troubles in Serie A so far, Juventus looked good and tactically astute.

Manchester City lacked finishing, but also lacked any consistent penetration and any penetration from their typical style of football. Everything was slow and it allowed Juventus to have everything played in front of them.