#yet I’m supposed to respect and quote value this idea of family and support
Explore tagged Tumblr posts
Text
Sometimes I’m like, yes the lowest level of the hierarchy pyramid is fulfilled which is great you know to have shelter and stuff. But then I’m like you know … I could achieve so much more without like idk having to live with a cunt of a cat who not only terrorizes my own little cat but gives me anxiety attacks and idk some sense of personal boundaries or maybe less guilt or passive aggression who knows .
#but hey. at least I have a place to sleep which isn’t nothing.#but it’s like no wonder I have the mental issues I fucking have! I’m proud of myself for not being worse honestly.#the way everything is sooooooo unbelievably backhanded and insincere and completely inauthentic.#yet I’m supposed to respect and quote value this idea of family and support#idk it’s better than nothing for sure. and i am grateful despite how it may sound#but it isn’t 100% and it doesn’t feel true or real sometimes. not unless you fit the mold not unless you present well.#and what makes that any different than the rest of the world and people that family is supposed to be a refuge from.. idk maybe I am just#an alienated pos.
0 notes
Link
New fic!! The original idea was for a steamy one-shot gift fic for the wonderful @krisrix but the plot ran away with me and it’s now a full-blown multi-chapter fic. Updates will hopefully be on a regular basis.
Hope you like it @krisrix! I”ve been meaning to write you something ever since you created that amazing art for Can’t Find My Way Home!
Behind Closed Doors
Baz
I can’t get out of David Mage’s office fast enough. I thought weekly one-on-one meetings with him were torture but now he’s moved them up to twice a week, as we reach the end of year, and it’s simply excruciating.
I hate him. I hate this job. I’ve come to despise working at Watford, which breaks my heart. But I won’t leave. I’m going to stay the course and I’ll be damned if I don’t outlast Mage here.
My mother started this company. This is her legacy and I won’t let that pompous bastard ruin it.
He’s doing his best to do just that. The numbers bear that out. Month after month I’ve been trying to communicate to him what a disaster his policies are. How they’re actually weakening the company. He just spouts some drivel about “fresh starts ”and “thinking outside the box” and then the phrase I absolutely abhor: “take it to the next level.”
I damn near leveled him when he said that today.
Father still sits on the Board of Directors but it hasn’t been much help. Somehow the rest of the Board has morphed into collection of lackeys for Mage; sycophants, supporters, cronies. It’s sickening. I think the only reason Father still has a seat is because he started Watford with Mother. They can’t vote him out.
At least I don’t think they can.
I’m storming down the corridor to get to the blessed isolation of my office when a voice calls out behind me.
“Baz!”
I can’t deal with Snow right now. I really can’t. I quicken my pace but the wanker just speeds up to catch me. Literally. He actually tugs at my sleeve.
I stop and level a glare at him. “What do you want, Snow? Some of us have work to do to keep this company afloat.”
Simon Snow is Mage’s personal assistant. His right hand man. His closest confidant and staunchest supporter. His jack of all trades.
I wish I could hate him as much as I hate Mage. I’ve tried.
I’m stupid enough to have fallen in love with him instead. It’s a cross I have to bear, but at this moment being in his presence after that disastrous meeting is almost more than I can handle.
“You haven’t sent in an RSVP for the Christmas party yet. I need to send the final number to the caterer today. I’ve sent you three emails about it, Baz.”
I arch my brow and give Snow my iciest sneer. “As if I have time to read frivolous emails about social gatherings. It’s end of year, Snow. The busiest time for the financial department, which you should know. Happens this time every year.”
“Christmas comes this time each year,” Snow mumbles.
Did he really just quote the Beach Boys most idiotic lyric at me? It shouldn’t surprise me that Snow likes that utterly insipid Christmas song. It’s absolutely endearing that he does.
I harden my heart against his charm.
“Yes, Snow. I’m quite aware. End of year financial accounting also comes this time each year and that’s rightfully occupying far more of my attention than the utterly useless Christmas party you’re harping about.”
He looks hurt. I internally curse myself. It’s not Snow’s fault I’m in this mood. It’s not Snow’s fault that he’s in charge of the dreaded Watford annual Christmas party. It’s not Snow’s fault I’m in love with him.
Actually, that last one is entirely Snow’s fault. He can’t walk around this place with that riot of disheveled bronze curls, the constellations of moles and freckles on his tawny skin, that bloody dimple on his left cheek when he smiles, his distressingly charming personality, completely unwarranted kindness, and expect me not to fall recklessly, hopelessly in love with him.
I’m so weak for this boy.
I soften my voice. “Listen, Snow. I know you’re putting all your energy into the party right now. I’m putting all mine to the financials.” I take a breath. I can do this. “I’m sorry I haven’t responded to your emails.”
Simon perks right back up at my apology. “That’s alright, Baz. I know how stressful end of year is for you. That’s why I emailed, so you could get back to me when you had a free moment.” He glances back towards Mage’s office. “I should have known better than to run you down after a meeting with Mr. Mage.”
Two years working here and he still calls him Mr. Mage. It’s ludicrous. And that bastard never corrects him. It’s some hierarchy, respect bullshit. It’s not like Snow doesn’t know Mage well enough to call him David.
He’s Mage’s pet project. Scholarship student out of the care home system and under Mage’s tutelage for years at that small university Mage worked at before he inflicted himself upon us here at Watford.
Corporations don’t function like universities though and Mage’s management here is a testament to that. If I didn’t know better, I’d think he’d come to Watford to purposely run us into the ground.
Perhaps he has. I wouldn’t put it past him.
Snow is still looking at me, likely waiting for a response. Instead I let my mind wander, like I usually do when I am confronted with him.
I have to, for self-preservation. Being near Snow is like being caught in a tractor beam, like he’s the sun and I’m crashing into him. It’s why I try to avoid him at all costs. He’s too distracting.
I’m doing it again.
“So, shall I put you down as a yes, then, Baz?”
“Yes, fine, whatever.” I’m pathetic. I hate the party. I only go because I know how much work Snow puts into it and because he looks so damn good in a suit.
“And shall I put a plus-one?”
“What?”
“Are you bringing a date?”
Bollocks. This is why I should have answered his email. To avoid awkward questions like this. To avoid inadvertently saying something monumentally stupid like “you can be my plus-one, Simon.”
“Ah, no, no, just me.”
“Right, then.” Snow beams at me. “I’ll mark you down for one. We’ve still got a spot open at our table. I’ll put you with us.” His smile grows even wider. “Saturday at seven. At the Club. I’ll see you there, Baz.”
He nods and then scurries back down the hallway towards Mage’s office.
Fuck. How am I going to get through an entire evening at the same table as Snow?
Simon
I really should know better than to interrupt Baz when he’s in a snit and storming down the hallway from Mage’s office.
If it weren’t for the fact that he’s always in a snit after a meeting with Mage.
I know they don’t get on. It’s too bad really. Watford’s a family thing for Baz. But it still must be hard to see someone else in his mother’s place. In her office. Running her company.
I’m not sure I agree with all of Mage’s policies either. I know he was the dean at the school but I uni isn't like the corporate world.
Sometimes I wish I didn’t work here, with him. I mean, I know it’s a good job, with solid prospects, a good salary, stable environment. But I’m not using my degree here, am I?
I double majored in Sociology and Human Resources. I’m actually overqualified to be a personal assistant, but here I am planning Christmas parties and managing Mage’s schedule.
I owe him. For a lot of things. Getting me out of the care home system. Supporting me for that scholarship to the private secondary school that paved my way to getting into uni. Being my mentor at uni. Hiring me when he got this job.
It’s quite a lot. I can’t just walk away from this. I like Watford. I like what they do here. I like the values this company has. Or had, I suppose. Things are changing quite a bit under Mage.
He’s the one who would write a reference for me, if I left. Which is why I don’t dare leave. I’m not sure he wouldn’t consider it a betrayal. He’s funny that way. Very focused on loyalty and allegiance. Everything seems to boil down to “us and them” with him. He and I are the “us” and it seems everyone else is the “them.”
Particularly Baz and his father. The other long-term Watford employees. Half the Board.
Well, less than half now. A fair number have ‘retired’ and been replaced with people who are friends with Mage.
I didn’t think that’s how Boards worked. Maybe I’m just naïve.
I can’t let myself think about all that. I just have to concentrate on doing my job and doing it well.
I’m glad I caught Baz, even if he was in a mood.
I think he’s always in a mood. Two years I’ve been here and Baz is still an enigma to me. I’ve asked Penny about him. She’s been here longer than I have. She just says he’s brilliant and a tosser and that I should let him be.
Easier said than done.
There’s something fascinating about Baz. It’s not just that he’s fit either.
He’s quite fit.
But he’s intriguing as a person, not just because of how he looks. He’s young to be the CFO of a corporation the size of Watford. I know he was top of his class at LSE. Brilliant financial mind, could have had any job he wanted but he wanted to work here. With his mother. So, he started in the financial department and worked his way up.
Penny told me he’d just been promoted to CFO when the accident happened. It was a bad multiple car pileup on the M5. Baz actually passed by it on his way home that night. I can’t imagine how that must have felt. Seeing that car, knowing it was his mother’s.
I don’t know how he came back to work here, after that.
But he did. Agatha says he’s much more withdrawn since then. He used to be a bit more social, would occasionally go out to lunch with people, sometimes even to the pub for drinks after work.
Not now.
Baz comes in early, goes home late. He’s rarely out of his office unless it’s to lead a department meeting or meet with Mage. I think he even eats in there.
I’ve tried to get to know him. Hasn’t gone too well. I mean we’ve talked, of course, but not much more than that. Not for lack of trying on my part though.
I plan the corporate activities—the Christmas party, the summer soiree at the Club, periodic department morale boosters and whatnot. Retirement parties, new employee meet and greets. All sorts of events.
Baz rarely goes to any of them. I mean, he comes to the Christmas party every year and the summer event, but it’s more like he makes an appearance. Shows up, has a drink, shakes some hands with Board members and then buggers off.
I don’t know why I’m so determined to be friends with him. Penny says I’m obsessed. I disagree.
I think it’s just that he seems lonely and that bothers me.
I know how that feels.
Baz
The only diversion at the Christmas party this year has been Snow. He spent the first hour rushing around, talking to the caterer, having a word with the DJ, sorting some table seating mishap. We were well into the dessert course before he finally sat down.
In the open seat next to me.
I’d planned to leave after dessert, make my cursory rounds with the Board members and then scuttle out of here before anyone noticed. It’s still my plan, but having Snow seated next to me is definitely putting a wrench in the works.
I go to such lengths to avoid proximity to him. But having him so near, being able to look at him up close—it’s mesmerizing.
I practically swoon when his knee inadvertently bumps mine under the table. He’s left-handed so we end up knocking our hands together as he eats his food. I don’t think I’ve ever seen Snow eat before. He does it with a gusto, determination and rapidity that’s breath-taking. I think he ate every remaining roll in the bread basket. And he took my butter. Not that I was planning on eating it but still. I don’t think he’s quite aware of plate assignments at formal table settings.
Or he just loves butter.
From the way he slathered it on his roll I’m going to assume it’s the latter.
He’s also hitting the wine fairly hard. We have a few bottles at our table but Bunce and Wellbelove have only had a glass each. I’ve sipped at mine. I don’t think Rhys drinks and Gareth has a whiskey by him.
Snow’s on his third glass by the time the DJ starts playing and the dance floor begins to fill.
I think he’s well on the way to being pissed. He hurried off to hand over a check to the caterer but it appears he took a detour to the bar. Snow’s back and he’s got a drink in each hand.
“Here.” He hands me one.
I shake my head. “Sorry, Snow. One glass limit for me tonight. I’m driving.”
His face falls for a moment but then he shakes his head and beams at me. “More for me then, I suppose.”
“Simon.” Bunce is seated on his other side. “I don’t think you need two Mojitos.” She commandeers the one intended for me and passes it off to Wellbelove.
Wellbelove just shrugs and takes it.
“I think I’m entitled to as many Mojitos as I please.” Snow leans back in his chair and proceeds to down his entire drink.
“What’s brought this on?” Bunce asks, placing a hand on his shoulder. She darts a concerned look in my direction.
As if I would have any idea why Snow has decided to drown his sorrows in rum. It’s a tempting idea to follow suit except for the fact that I despise rum.
And I hate being drunk. Hate the loss of control, the giddiness, the way I find myself saying things that absolutely should not be said. That would be a disaster here, with Snow at my side.
Who knows what nonsense I would start spouting about the blue of his eyes or the light glinting in his bronze curls. I’d never live it down. I’d die of mortification on the spot.
I’ll stick to one glass of wine and then a lonely drive home to end my night curled up with a good book.
Of course, that’s not what happens.
What happens is that Snow continues to drink. Profusely.
Wellbelove offers to take him home when she leaves but he waves her away. Bunce tries to be more forceful with him but he’s having none of her bossiness tonight (Bunce is a force of nature) (I’m secretly relieved I don’t have to interact with her department often).
“I can’t leave, Penny. Not until everyone else packs it up. I’ve got to pay the DJ and make sure everyone’s got a ride home. It’s my job.” Snow’s explaining this to her, with his hands on her shoulders and an adorably earnest expression on his face.
“Yes, I know that, Simon. Perhaps that would have been a good reason not to make so many trips to the bar, now wouldn’t it?”
He laughs. It comes out as a bark, nothing like Snow’s usual laugh. I take a closer look at him. There’s a hint of desperation behind the forced cheerfulness. I hadn’t noticed it before. Something’s bothering Snow, enough to make him behave this way, so out of character for him.
“It’s alright, Penny. I’ll be fine. It’s not like I don’t know how to handle my liquor. Better than most.”
“That’s not the point, Simon.” Bunce groans. She looks at her watch again. “I need to go. I’ve got to get to the airport early tomorrow morning.” She tugs at his sleeve.
Bunce’s boyfriend lives in America. I don’t know how they manage this long-distance relationship of theirs but I do know there’s a lot of flying back and forth for holidays.
I step closer to them and then, even though I’ve just had the one drink, I find myself saying something absolutely rash. “I’ll drive him home, Bunce. You go on.”
They both turn to look at me, Bunce incredulous and Snow inordinately pleased. “There you go, Penny. Baz’ll get me home. You can count on Baz. That’s what he does all day, he counts things. Count on Baz. Baz’ll take care of me, Pen.”
Bunce rolls her eyes and then fixes me with a stern look. “Baz, so help me, you better get him home in one piece.”
I give her a bored look, hopefully masking the ridiculous way my heart is pounding at the thought that I’ll be watching over Snow and at the way he’s gazing at me right now.
Because he is. Gazing at me, I mean. Raptly, intently, fondly. I can’t quite wrap my head around his expression. I want him to look at me like that all the time.
“Relax, Bunce. I’m quite sure I can handle getting one pleasantly drunk employee home.” I focus on Snow, who is literally beaming at me now. “As long as you remember where you live, Snow, we should be fine.”
“I’m pleasant now, am I?” Snow’s latched onto that unfortunate word choice of mine. I’m not even soused and I’ve already said too much. I am utterly pathetic.
Bunce shakes her head but leaves Snow in my tender care. She writes his address on a paper napkin and shoves it in my pocket before she goes, to his disapproval. “I know where I live, Pen. I’m not a complete idiot.”
She gives him an odd look, her gaze going back and forth between us thoughtfully. “I’m not so sure, Simon. I’m not so sure.” And then she leaves.
It takes a while to sort everything out. Snow has a check in his pocket for the DJ. He has a conversation with the Club manager about sending the bar bill to the office. He wanders around making sure there aren’t any purses or coats or belongings left behind, and then we finally make our departure.
He’s tipsy, that’s for certain, but I think Bunce was mistaken as to how drunk he is. Granted, he’s taken in a prodigious amount of liquor, but I think he’s got the right of it—he can handle the alcohol, better than I had assumed. He’s uninhibited, that’s for certain, but he’s definitely not incoherent.
I input the address Bunce scribbled onto the napkin in my SatNav as Snow leans back in the passenger seat of my car, a sigh escaping him as he does.
“You alright, Snow?”
“Yeah.”
His eyes are closed. He looks tired. I haven’t put much thought into all he does, to make these parties go off without a hitch. He’s the one doing all the work, behind the scenes, but he certainly doesn’t get any credit for it.
I feel bad for snarling at him as much as I do.
“Are you sure?” Why am I still talking?
“Yeah, it’s just been a bit of rough night.”
“Why’s that? You pulled it off again. Lovely evening for all.”
He turns his head to the side and opens his eyes. “You really thought it was lovely?”
I don’t know what’s gotten into me tonight. My voice softens as I answer. “I do. You always do a wonderful job with these events, Snow. It’s a thankless job, I’m sure, but thank you for doing it.”
Snow’s smile is brilliant. I reluctantly turn my eyes back to the road. “Thanks, Baz. I wish everyone agreed with you.”
I frown. “I can’t think anyone would find much to criticize.” I give him a wry look. “Other than the DJ insisting on playing The Electric Slide.” I dare another sidelong glance at him. His grin is even wider now. “That needs to be on the no-play list.”
“Ah, come on, Baz. It got a lot of people on the dance floor.”
“Not me.”
“And what would get you on the dance floor? I didn’t see you out there at all tonight.”
My mouth is dry. I’m not prepared to have this type of conversation with Snow. It’s not intimate but it’s somehow far more personal than any we’ve had previously.
“I don’t dance.”
Snow snorts. Literally. “I don’t believe that for a minute.”
“And why not?”
I can’t help glancing at him again. He’s laser-focused on me as he answers, an intensity in his gaze that makes my skin tingle. “You don’t move like someone who can’t dance.”
I swallow. This is definitely veering into intimate territory. I take a breath and answer him. “I didn’t say I couldn’t. I said I don’t. There’s a difference.”
“Ah. So what would it take for you to dance?”
“Nothing that comes to mind.”
“Hmm.”
We lapse into silence. We’re almost at Snow’s flat. I’m utterly failing at the witty banter. I’ve got Snow’s undivided attention and I can’t for the life of me come up with anything to say. It’s tragic, really.
I pull up in front of his building. There’s a spot conveniently open. I manoeuvre the car into the tight space and park. “Alright then, Snow?”
This smile of his is soft, not the heart-stopping brilliance of before. I think I love this one even more. It’s private, personal, like he’s saved it just for me. That’s a load of rubbish, I know, but I let myself believe it for a moment.
“Yes, thank you, Baz. Thanks for driving me home.” Snow’s made no move to unbuckle his seatbelt or get out of the car. He’s just contemplating me. Raptly.
It’s like staring into the sun. I can’t hold his gaze. I tap my fingers on the steering wheel, clear my throat and force my eyes away from him. “Alright, then.” Christ, now I’m repeating myself. Will the embarrassments of tonight never end?
He reaches out a hand and gently touches my forearm. It’s electric. I can feel the heat of it through the fabric of my suit. Then it’s gone and Snow is swiftly unbuckling his belt and making his way out of the car. He leans into the open door. “See you Monday, Baz.” And then he’s gone, the door thudding closed behind him. He’s not the steadiest on his feet but he’ll do. He just needs to get in the building and up to his flat.
I stay parked anyway, to be certain he makes it in safely. It’s a good thing I do, because I can see the distress on his face a moment later. He’s patting down his pockets, face rapidly growing more alarmed as his search continues. He stares at the car, expression frantic now. I roll down the window. “What’s the problem?”
Simon rushes back, stumbling a bit as he does. “Baz. I can’t find my keys. I can’t find them anywhere.” He’s scrabbling in his pockets again—trousers, suit jacket, overcoat. His eyes meet mine. “Fuck. I must have dropped them at the Club.”
“Is there a spare set anywhere?”
He shakes his head. “I’ve been meaning to leave a set with Penny but I keep forgetting.”
Blast it. “Get in. We’ll head back to the Club. The cleaning crew should be there.”
The cleaning crew is not there. No one is. The Club is locked, dark and deserted. I’m a bit taken aback. You’d think they’d want the place cleaned up before the Sunday brunch crowd. I’m rethinking my whole attitude towards the place.
But that’s not helping with the Snow situation. “What am I going to do?” He’s got his hands in his hair, furiously pulling at his curls. “I can’t get into my building. I can’t call Penny—she’s got an early flight, I don’t dare wake her up.”
I make my decision. It’s a stupid, moronic, risky decision, but I’m tired and I’m besotted with this blasted boy and I can’t just leave him to his own devices, now can I? I told Bunce I’d take care of him and I damn well keep my promises. I can’t help the small sigh that escapes me. “You can come home with me, Snow. I’ve got a sofa you can use for the night. I’ll bring you round here in the morning so you can track down your keys.”
His hands drop to his sides and his red-rimmed eyes meet mine. “I’m sorry to be such a pain in the arse, Baz, really I am.” His brow furrows. “You can drop me off at a hotel or something. I’d hate to inconvenience you.”
I can’t help but frown back. “I am not having you spend the night in a hotel. I’ve got a perfectly serviceable sofa at my place. It’s not an inconvenience. It’s easier this way, truly. I can help you search for your keys tomorrow.”
His face softens to that fond look again and I’m wrecked. I can’t think when Snow looks at me like that. “Thanks, Baz. You’ve no idea how much I appreciate this. I feel like such a knobhead.”
I just nod at him. I don’t quite trust my voice at the moment. My heart is beating so rapidly that I swear he can hear it when he gets in the car.
It’s fine. Everything is fine. I’m fine. Snow’s fine.
Fuck. I most certainly am not fine. I’m going to have Simon Snow sleeping at my flat. It’s a fucking dream come true but not in the way I’d fantasized.
I’m simply helping him out. It’s just for one night. This means nothing.
It means everything.
Christ, what am I even thinking? It can’t mean anything. Honestly, even if Snow were interested, which he’s certainly not, it’s against company policy. No fraternizing. No inter-office romances. Strictly off-limits, especially for one of the chief officers to potentially be involved with a subordinate.
It’s theoretically both an HR and Compliance violation, even if it’s not spelled out explicitly in the handbook.
It’s one of the reasons I’ve kept my distance from him. Not given in to the temptation to test the waters, see if he’s even remotely interested. Because it’s doomed from the start. I can’t date Snow. Not as long as he’s employed at Watford.
Snow’s still babbling rambling apologies to me. I let him. I’m too tired to argue and too overwhelmed to speak at the moment.
He falls silent by the time we pull into the parking garage at my building. He’s still a bit wobbly but not enough that I have to steady him, thank God. I don’t know what I’d do if I had him leaning into me right now.
I find out the answer to that question moments later as I fumble with my keys. My hands are shaking and it takes me a few tries to fit the key in the lock. Just enough time for Snow to slump against the wall and slide down to a seated position.
“No, Snow, what? Not here. We’re almost inside. Come on, now, get up.” He’s got his eyes closed.
“It’s spinning a bit, Baz.” The words are just a whisper.
“Bloody hell. You were fine just a minute ago. How much did you have to drink?”
He shakes his head and then stops with a moan, both hands going up to grip his temples. My eyes dart around the landing. I need to get this idiot inside.
“I had a shot of whiskey when I went to get my coat, just before we left.”
“Snow, you are an absolute moron. What the hell has gotten into you tonight?”
“Mage.” It’s even quieter than before but I hear it. It sears my heart. What did Mage do, to have Simon behave so out of character tonight?
It’s not something I’m going to delve into out here. Somehow, I’ve got to get him into my flat. I should be able to pry it out of him while I fetch him some water and paracetamol. He’ll definitely need both.
And pyjamas.
Blast it. I do not need the mental image of Snow wearing my pyjamas at this particular moment.
I shove the door open, drop my keys in my pocket and reach out a hand towards him. “Up, Snow.” He opens his eyes and stares at my hand. “Come on. Let’s get you inside. We can talk about whatever’s bothering you then, alright?” I’m using my gentlest voice, the coaxing one I used to use on my siblings when I’d try to get them to go to bed.
Snow reaches up and grips my hand and I haul him to his feet. He stumbles a bit and leans into me hard. I’m not expecting it and my arm involuntarily slides around his waist to steady him. We stagger into my flat, Snow a near dead weight in my arms. I manoeuvre him to the sofa where he’ll spend the night and he drops down heavily onto the cushions. The momentum drags me down as well.
Snow slumps against the back of the sofa and I leap to my feet. “I’ll just be a moment.” I take my overcoat off and toss it on a chair before hurrying to the kitchen to fetch Snow some water. It takes me a few moments to hunt down the paracetamol. I rarely use it so I check the bottle to make sure it’s not expired. Thankfully, it’s not. I tuck the bottle in my pocket and head to my room for a pair of pyjamas.
I return to find Snow, head lolling back on the sofa, snoring gently. He’s ridiculous and entrancing and the line of his neck is utterly enthralling. I can’t take my eyes off him. I shake my head in irritation and raise my voice. “Snow. Wake up. You can’t sleep in your suit.”
His head bobs up and his eyes widen. It takes a moment for him to focus on me but when he does a smile lights up his face. “Baz.”
“Present and accounted, Snow. Now, sit up, that’s right. Time for some water or you’ll feel like absolute shite in the morning.” “Think I’m going to feel like that no matter what.”
“You’ll feel worse if you don’t do as I say. Now, come on, drink the water and then I need you to take some paracetamol for your head. It’s going to be pounding soon enough, I’m sure.”
Snow obediently takes the paracetamol and drinks most of the water. I scamper off to the kitchen to bring him another glass. He’s managed to stay awake this time. He blinks up at me. “Thanks, Bazy.”
That’s not going to do at all. I’m absolutely not going to tolerate nicknames from this intoxicated wanker.
“You do not get to call me that, Snow. Under no circumstances do I answer to nicknames.”
“Baz’s a nickname.” It comes out as a mumble.
I roll my eyes. “That’s my name, Snow. It’s not a nickname. It’s what everyone calls me.”
“Not your father. Not Mage. Call you Basilton, they do.”
“I am not going to engage in a debate about my name while you are inebriated. It’s one o’clock in the morning. Give it a rest.”
“Alright, Bazy.”
“Snow.” My voice has an edge to it. I don’t care how adorable he’s being at the moment. I simply cannot allow this.
“Hmm. How’s this then. I’ll stop the Bazy bit if you stop calling me Snow. M’ok?”
“What?”
“M’name’s Simon.”
“I’m aware.”
“Rather you call me that, than Snow.”
I sigh. “Fine, then. Simon. Are you happy now?”
He grins in response and then proceeds to slump further down. This won’t do at all. He’s still in his suit.
“Might need the loo.”
Of course, he needs to use the loo. I position myself in front of him and hoist him up. We lurch our way to the bathroom down the hall. I go in search of a spare pillow and blanket while Snow—er, Simon—uses the facilities. There’s some thumping and bumping, which is likely his attempt at getting out of his clothes and into the pyjamas I left with him. I can feel my face heat up. I’m going to leave him in his suit if he hasn’t managed to change out of it himself. There are some lines that simply can’t be crossed.
Simon’s somehow managed to get out of his suit and into my pyjamas and I can’t say that the sight of him in them doesn’t make my head spin. His clothing is scattered on the floor and over the side of the bathtub. I tut at him and gather it all up, hanging it in the hall closet once I get him situated on the sofa again.
“You need to drink more water, Simon.”
“I will if you sit with me a bit.”
I sit at the far end of the sofa, perched on the edge. Simon tilts his head in my direction, eyes heavy-lidded. “Thanks, Baz.”
“Drink your water.” He takes a few sips and then closes his eyes again. “What’s going on tonight, Simon? I’ve never seen you like this.”
He opens his eyes and regards me thoughtfully. “How would you know? You don’t really spend much time in my company do you, Baz?”
He’s right. I don’t. I observe him from a distance, taking note of every nuance of him, every facial expression, every burst of laughter. I’ve collected scraps of information about him from office gossip and the interactions we’ve had. I know him better than he thinks.
I’ve been to most of the corporate events since he started working here and I’ve never seen him behave in an inappropriate fashion. It’s not that he’s been behaving poorly tonight. It’s just so unlike him. “I know you take pride in what you do and you are usually impeccable in your behaviour. Tonight’s a bit of a departure from that, wouldn’t you say?”
He sighs.
“Simon. What’s going on?”
“I got into a bit of a scrap with Mage.”
“When?”
“At the party.”
I think back on the night. I don’t recall seeing Simon with Mage but I didn’t have eyes on him the whole time. He was running around quite a bit all evening.
“What about?”
“Quite a few things. The party mostly.” Simon exhales again and his expression becomes grave. “No one gave me any new parameters for the cost. I followed last year’s budget. Mage had approved it a few months ago.”
A chill goes through me. I’d just gone over the projected year-end numbers with Mage Friday. They weren’t good. He’s been vastly overspending with marketing and Board-focused events. Retreats. Strategic planning sessions. Consultants. Corporate mumbo-jumbo as far as I’m concerned. Colossally wasteful. It’s done nothing for our bottom line. Made it worse, if anything.
Our customers rely on our thoroughness and reliability. Mage has cut a swathe through the staff in the last two years, alienating long-term employees and hiring toadies who curry his favor. The loss of Possibelf six months ago and Minos a few weeks after decimated those departments. Mage hired Bunce’s brother, but Premal is new to the business and far too arrogant to ask for help. The managers under him have been floundering for months, despite my clandestine assistance.
Assistance Mage has sharply reprimanded me for more than once.
He was incensed on Friday, with the numbers I had shown him. Accurate, up to date, precise numbers. He’d threatened another round of layoffs, which will only weaken us further. That’s why I was in such a foul mood when Simon caught me.
It seems Simon’s borne the brunt of Mage’s rage as well. “What did he say?” My tone is far gentler than it typically is with him.
“He was furious about the menu. The open bar. The holiday prizes we give out every year.”
That was my mother’s tradition. A series of gifts for random employees. She’d draw the names out of a top hat and the winners would march off with an iPad or a new watch. A television or a swanky SatNav. There were always one or two splashy items while the rest were more moderate. It was a unique way to boost employee morale and add a tinge of excitement to the party. Something a bit more personal than the yearly holiday bonus check.
Simon was still speaking. “Said we couldn’t afford it. Said I’d overstepped my bounds by not clearing it with him.” His face clouds over. “But I did clear it with him, Baz. I cleared it with him months ago, when I booked the Club. When I purchased the items. How was I to know the funds were more precarious now?”
There was no way for Simon to know. Not if Mage hadn’t told him. He is a direct report to Mage, no one else. It isn’t my place to peruse the budgets with the CEO’s assistant. Another example of how unfit this man is to run the company.
Simon leans forward, his head buried in his hands. “Christ, I feel like such a fucking idiot. I never intended to make things worse.”
I’m not sure how I end up with my hand on his shoulder. “It’s not your fault. You did what you’re supposed to do. It’s his job to keep up with the finances. It’s his job to communicate if he needs plans to change.” My hand makes its way across his back and then he’s leaning against me, his head on my shoulder.
I can smell the clean, fresh scent of his hair. His curls are tickling my neck. He’s pressed up against me and I can’t pull away. I’m riveted to the spot.
I find myself crooning soothing phrases into his hair. It isn’t Simon’s fault and it’s complete bollocks that Mage has made him feel responsible and guilty. No wonder he was hitting the drinks hard tonight.
If I know anything about Snow it’s that he’s frugal to a fault. He grew up in the care system, had nothing of his own. The scholarship may have rescued him from that environment but he’s never lost his sense of caution about expenses. It’s a well-known office fact. I don’t need to know him well to know this about him.
It’s obvious from where he lives. How he eats. I think he’s the only other employee who brings food from home almost exclusively. I do it because I’m anti-social and I don’t really like eating in front of others much. He does it to conserve his finances.
I keep murmuring comforting words to him. It’s basically a litany of “it’s alright, you did nothing wrong” repeated over and over at this point. I’m not quite sure what else to do. I really should get up and get him settled for the night.
But I don’t want to. I know it’s wrong to relish the sensation of him near me but it’s been far too long since I’ve had human contact like this. I know I’m supposed to be comforting him but this is consoling me as well.
I may never have another chance to hold him in my arms like this.
I don’t know how much time passes. I’ve stopped speaking now, I’m just holding him. He stirs and lifts his head. He’s so close. Our eyes lock and I’m lost in the blue of his gaze.
“Thank you, Baz.” It’s a whisper but the feel of his breath ghosting against my lips makes me shiver. His hand comes up to cup my face and his head tilts up.
And then he kisses me. Simon Snow is kissing me and it’s simultaneously the best thing and the worst thing in the world.
The best because it’s Simon Snow kissing me and I’ve desperately wanted this for so long. I’ve never been kissed quite like this. He’s doing this thing with his jaw and it’s overwhelming me. It’s soft, passionate, so devastatingly sensual that my lips part of their own volition and I lose myself in the taste of him.
It’s the worst because I can’t let him keep doing it. He’s not himself. He’s had too much to drink. He doesn’t mean this. He’s not thinking clearly. I pull away, every nerve in my body alight with the sense of him. I’m literally dragging my lips from his as the regret pools in my stomach, weighing me down.
“I’m sorry, Simon. That was uncalled for. I apologize.”
He blinks at me, face flushed. “What’re you apologizing for? I kissed you.”
“I know that. But you’re not yourself. I shouldn’t have let you do that.”
Simon frowns at me. “But I wanted to.”
I’m not prepared for this. I feel exposed, raw, vulnerable. It’s all I’ve wanted and the reality that I can’t let myself have this is devastating.
“You may think that now, Simon, but you likely won’t feel the same way tomorrow.” I shift away slightly and then stand up. I can’t help but reach out one more time, to rest my hand on his shoulder. I can feel the heat of his skin through the fabric. It’s an effort to step back but I have to do it.
I yank the pillow and blanket from the armchair nearby and make a show of fluffing the pillow and settling it in place for him. I give him a gentle push and he slides down until he’s curled up on his side. He looks so young, so trusting. My hand creeps forward of its own volition to sweep the curls off his forehead, my fingers lingering in his hair for a moment. I settle the blanket over him and decisively step away.
Simon’s eyes follow me as I move towards the hallway leading to my room. “Good night, Simon.”
I close my eyes for a brief second and then switch the light off. I see him shift a bit in the dimness,hear his whispered “goodnight, Baz”and then I turn away to find the lonely comfort of my room.
It takes me a long time to fall asleep.
Simon
Baz may think I’m going to forget this or regret it in the morning. He couldn’t be more wrong. The only thing I might regret is the hangover I’m sure to have tomorrow, but I don’t expect I’m going to feel much remorse about that.
I doubt I’d have had the courage to kiss Baz just now, if I hadn’t had a few drinks in me.
I probably wouldn’t have had the nerve at all, if Mage hadn’t aggravated me to the point of throwing all caution to the wind and indulging in more liquor than I’ve had since uni. Can’t be helped.
It did serve to clarify things for me.
I like Baz. More than like him.
I can’t delude myself that the feelings I have for him are just casual interest or fascination. The truth is I’ve had a crush on Baz for quite some time now.
I’d resigned myself to it being a one-sided attraction but I’m not sure that’s true, if the way he responded to my kissing him is any indication.
I liked that too.
I pull the blanket up to my chin. It smells like Baz; cedar and bergamot.
I breathe the scent in and let my eyes drift closed.
#carry on#simon snow#baz pitch#work au#my writing#my fic#non magical au#mutual pining#misunderstandings#not a slow burn!
68 notes
·
View notes
Text
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
"Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
BEST ANSWER: Try this site where you can compare quotes: : http://financeandcreditsolution.xyz/index.html?src=tumblr
RELATED QUESTIONS:
What car insurance would be cheaper on which car?
I'm in the state of Alabama with ALFA and I'm looking at either an Infiniti G35 coupe or a Toyota 4Runner....both between the years 2000-now. I'm thinking the 4Runner would be cheaper. What are some other opinions?
Would I lose my auto insurance?
Hey there, I have been in 2ed car accident, and its my 2ed one in the past two years. I was wondering If my insurance would drop me, or cancel my renewal or just raise my rates? If it helps they where both rear ends, and no damages to my car, and just scratch to the other car.""
Where can i get cheap car insurance?
im driving a six years old Saab aero convertible.and on red 'p' and im 26yrs old.i was told i have to pay near $5000 a year .is there any other way to get around it?
How would McCain guarantee affordable healthcare for all?
Healthcare costs are hurting the budgets of working families, businesses, states and the federal government. Don't tell me someone is looking for a handout when it comes to something as basic as healthcare. A simple accident can wipe out hard-won savings in any family. Now how's McCain gonna do it? Please?""
Why can you 16 years old own cars in America?
Hello, So when I'm watching MTV or whatever television program here in the Netherlands I'm noticing that so many 16 year old drive a car. But where do you guys get the money from? Because a really crappy cheap car cost about 1000 euro's and than you need to pay a 390 euro (507 dollars) a month. I'm 16 too and with my 40 hours of work in a month I make 200 euro (260 dollars), so I can't afford a car now. (at least not paying every single month 390 euros) Nevertheless in the Netherlands you must be 18 years old to drive a car, but even when I'm 18 I think I won't make a 390 euro a month (only for my car). So do your parents pay? Don't you have to pay taxes or whatever? Thanks. David Calculation: Cheap car = 1000 euro Good cheap car = 3000 euro Average insurance 18 year old = 100 euro a month Can't find translation but road taxes = 80 euro a month cost of maintance = 80 euro a month Average driving 1000km a month with 7/100L = 70 * 1,80= 126 euro We pay 1.80 euro a liter (benzine) = 1 gallon = 3,8L = 6,84 euro's = 8,9 dollar per gallon so: 390 euro = 507 dollars a month""
How to convince parents to let me have auto insurance?
I've had my license for a little over three months now. However, I have no insurance, and therefore cannot drive (in California). Their reasoning is that I am an unsafe driver which I disagree with because I quite easily passed my driving test at the DMV and always think before I do anything when I drive. However, they seem firm on their decision... It's a bit frustrating having my license for so long but still being unable to drive. I'm tired of having to always ask friends for a ride or my parents; I just want a taste of independence. Of course, I'm not trying to be too arrogant or stubborn, I've respected my parent's decision, it's just bugging me a bit now haha. I offered to do a six-month plan instead of a year plan since I'm heading off to college in Septemberish. I'm about to turn 18 in a couple weeks also. Does anyone have any advice?""
Car insurance for young drivers?
I've just passed my test. How do I set up young driver's car insurance?
Can i get my own car insurance ?
i am 18 and my mom cant afford to have me on her car insurance can i get my own???
What's the average state-farm-auto-insurance quote?
For a young woman getting her first car under her name with good grades (good student discount)? I'm trying to find out for a friend getting her first car
How much on average would insurance be on a Grand Prix? (For a 17-year old)?
Are they considered sedans or sports cars? I think I would go through State Farm, with the good grade/safe driver book. Does anyone have experience insuring one? It would be anywhere from 1997-2003 model with about 100,000 miles on it. Thank you!""
Does anyone know of affordable health insurance for college students?
Does anyone know of affordable health insurance for college students?
What company provides a good low cost life insurance policy for older people?
My father just retired, but he is stubborn and against getting a life insurance policy. I would like one to cover expenses he may leave behind and to take care of his wife, but he just doesn't see the need for some reason. His wife (my mother) is also the same way and they are too old fashioned and set in their ways to change their way of thinking. My parents are not rich and does not have a lot of money saved up. As a result, I may have to pay it myself even though I am supporting my own family on a single income. Obviously, the older one gets, the more expensive a life insurance policy becomes. Does anyone know of any good, reliable low cost life insurance companies out there? He doesn't have any major problems, but it would be best if there are some that doesn't require any health checks.""
Teen Car Insurance + Accidents Clarification?
I'm a 16 year old girl who just got her license in March. A week after I got my license, I rear ended another car while driving my mom's new car that is insured. We got it fixed and only had to pay the 500 dollar deductible. I do not have my own car. My sister, who is 19, has her own car that is not covered for collision. My dad's car is not covered for collision either. My sister just got into an accident, rear ending someone as well. I really need to get a car next year for work and such but my parents said my insurance would be high enough already with both of me and my sister's accidents. Couldn't I just buy a car on my own and not get collision coverage on it like my dad and sister's cars? Would that be cheaper? I really don't know how car insurance works at all, i only know what my parents tell me, so any help would be appreciated :) Oh, and if it matters, I went to traffic school after my accident to remove the points against my driving record (I think that's what it did) My sister had already gone to traffic school recently for a speeding ticket so she can't go again for her accident.""
Driving Someone Else's Car...Do I need Insurance?
Okay lets say that I have my license but I don't have car. If I have a friend or a family that lets me drive their car and I get into accident...who's fault would it be? Mines or the owner's? And If I do drive someone else's car..do I need insurance to pay for the owner's car if I accidentally damage their car? Or no?
How much is car insurance for a 17 year old girl?
I'm trying to find out how much insurance will be when I buy my car, but websites like go compare wont let you check until your 17 :) No idea what you need to find out so heres some details :) Vauxhall Corsa Specification 1.0 12V GLS Transmission Manual Engine Size: 973 cc Fuel Type: Petrol Thank you :) x""
Where are gender therapist in Michigan that's affordable or that take medicaid?
trying to seek help but my funds are kind of low and I have medicaid insurance and I live in Clinton, Michigan can anyone help I really need help please""
""What is the most popular/best dental insurance PPO in south florida, St lucie county to be exact?
I'm looking for a good dental insurance plan. One that is not so expensive and preferably with no or <6m waiting period for basic dental such as fillings
Can please someone suggest the cheapest and yet good car insurance company?
thanks
Car Insurance Rates By City?
Where can I find statistics that show the average car insurance rates for that city or town. I am looking to invest in some property, not far from Metropolitan New York, and became interested in knowing. Currently where I live and at my age, 20, insurance for me is in the proximity of $5,000. Which I do not intend on paying. Thanks, and information or suggestions are welcome""
Where can I find a good car insurance?
I leave in Los Angeles. at the present time I have insurance with Farmers but I want to change it because it is expensive. I'm thinking about Progressive Insurance, What do you think and what else do you suggest? Thanks""
K what insurance is the best?
car insurance. ?
Insurance for a 2013 Kia Optima?
I'm 17 years old girl, and live in Washington state. I'll be getting a 2011 - 2013 Kia Optima, and I wonder what my insurance will be. What would be the cheapest, if you know?""
What companies are still insuring unoccupied and or second homes?
This seems to be a new trend. It seems that insurance companies are canceling Homeowner's policies of their customers who are selling their homes! Once the client has to move out to their new home the insurance company cancels the policy on the home that's still for sale. This is being done even if the customer has been a client for over 30 years and is using that company for the new home! Sellers are having a rough enough time with the real estate market these days! What can be done about this? Also suppose the seller decides not to sell but keep the home as a vacation spot? Are second homes being uninsured also?
How much roughly would car insurance be for a new male driver aged 25?
My husband is going to take his driving test soon so we can buy a car but i dont know how much to budget in for car insurance as neither of us has driven before and haven't dealt with car insurance before. We would probably just buy a cheap runaround like a ford fiesta 1.4 engine or a car like this (roughly 500 in value) and wondered hw much we should expect to pay for a years insurance on this. i know it will be more expensive than other drivers as its for a new driver and a male but I would really appreciate it if someone could give me a rough figure. thanks :D ps. i dont need links to any comparison sites as they only work if you have a car already and all the details! thankyou! :)
I want to finance a car. Can the registration and insurance be under my brothers' name?
Will a car dealership allow me to register the car under my brother? I want to put the car in my brothers name because the insurance will be cheaper. His credit is in better than mine.
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Rough estimate of my car insurance cost?
Hello, I'm 17 years old, male, never been in an accident or anything, and I am currently insured by my parents. If I wanted to get my own car insurance, roughly how much would this cost me? Thanks.""
What is the average insurance of a 16 year old driving a chevorelt camero sorry for the spelling?
What is the average insurance of a 16 year old driving a chevorelt camero sorry for the spelling?
Can i go on someones insurance but drive a different car to them?
well i know i can be put on some kind of car insurance with someone like a family member but i herd that's only if i just drive there car. is there a way i can be put onto there insurance but Drive my own car. Or does anyone know a cheap car insurance company for young new drivers??? I've tried hundreds and there all saying around 2,500ish!!! which is ridiculous i might be young but i have a one year old and a new born child it is highly unlikely that i will be racing with friends, and putting myself in unsafe situations!!! my cars only Worth like 1000 so i refuse to pay for insurance that's costs more than my car!!!! Any kind of help would be nice!! Thank you :)""
How can i get car insurance restore?
This what happen i went away from vac and i left my family member money to pay for my car insurance and they didnt do that. Is there a way for me to get my car insurance restore back on. Dont care if i have play plenty or anything but just want back on.
How do i find affordable insurance?
I lost my job last year and had to get medicaid for health insurance because I am a single mother of one. I have since gotten my license in the beauty industry and have just started a new job. The problem is that they do not offer health benefits (I think it has something to do with them being a franchise). And I know that I will have to go through re-determination in November for the medicaid and because I am employed will be denied. So, what exactly are my options, especially now that things are going to change. Any help would be appreciated.""
Advice onCar insurance?
which cart insurance is best for two 19 year Olds? I have never had insurance of my own and I have never gotten a ticket or been in an accident. My boyfriend will be 20 next month and he has had insurance but not recently. We are on a fixed income and would prefer to only spend around 150 per month. Any advice on insurance for a 2000 4x4 2 door Ford explorer? It's a 6 cylinder engine..automatic transmission.
Drivers test question - Getting insurance before taking the drivers test is required. where is the cheapest?
Hello, I am 18 years old (turning 19 next week) and I am ready to take my drivers license. But before taking my driving test, It is required that I have insurance for my car (my dads car). So, I was wondering - where can I get the cheapest car insurance in California? I did check on Geico, but their alittle too expensive. PS: my permit expired by July 19th, so I have to hurry. So please, help me out! even the slightest information can be very helpful! Thanks""
Car insurance claim?
Around a month ago already my passenger side car window got shattered. It's still intact, just completely spidered out. I had been on my thirty minute break from work and parked near the grass side of my apartments. My window was actually rolled down half way too. While inside my apartments ( we live on the first floor very near to where my car was parked) I remember a guy mowing the lawn around the apartments. When I went back outside to go back to work I had saw my window. We know for a fact that the lawn mowing guy ran over a rock and it had hit my window, but we didn't actually see it. Again, my window was rolled down a bit so if someone wanted to break in they could have. I have called the apartments on several occasions and they said they would get back to me on the lawn mowing company so I can make a claim. Still never have. This was almost a month ago. What can I do? If anything since I didn't physically see it? I also only have liability coverage on that car.""
""Found a Cheaper Car Insurance, What to do?""
Dear Mates, My car insurance is just started 5 days ago. I have paid them around 300 as deposit. I have found somewhere more cheaper then recent one. If I want to finish my policy with them, How much do they Refund me. Please help me if you knows. Thanks""
""What does Flood Insurance cost in Houston, Texas? We are moving there in a few months. Thx!?
Friend of ours told us it can be expensive in Houston. Is that true?
How much car insurance coverage do i need for my car?
I totaly own my 04 toyota corolla What do you guys think the coverage should be...
Can i claim insurance if i'm driving amother car?
if i was driving my friend's car and we got into an accident, can i claim insurance on her car under MY NAME/POLICY, since i have my own insurance with my own car?""
How much is a fine for driving someone else's car with no insurance?
i have insurance on my car but the car i was driving didnt have insurance.
How much is the average price for full cover motorcycle insurance ?
Im going to buy a 2013 Honda 600RR , how much would insurance cost ?""
What would the insurance price be for me?
I'm an 18 year old male, and am thinking about getting an 2006 Pontiac Grand Prix with 115000 miles on it, what do you think would be the cost of insurance for me if you could guess/estimate?""
High Risk Auto Insurance - Where can I find the lowest quote online?
Is there any online auto insurance website that specializes in getting the lowest rates on car insurance for high risk drivers? If so can anyone guide me to one? thanks
Car Insurance?
Ok, first does anyone know which states do not require car insurance? Second question is do you have to have full coverage on a financed car? No silliness here real answers.""
I hit someones car (My first accident)?
I was pulling out and hit another car I was going under 5km/h backing up and I cut the wheel to much and hit a parked car How much is that gonna cost me We are not going through insurance How much would it cost to paint it
Does anyone know of any good and affordable marriage counslers in york pa?
My husband and I desperately need marriage counseling before it is too late. We are very poor and can't afford much. Does anybody know of someone good and affordable? My health ...show more
Why are the big insurance companies so much cheaper?
I am getting off my parents auto insurance and getting my own. The Quote from the agent my parents use who is local to the area was nearly two hundred dollars more per year than the quote i got from progressive. Is there a reason to use a local company? he tried to sell me on customer service but i only deal with my insurance company maybe once or twice a year so i'm not sure that its worth $200 to me. Is there a reason to use a local company?
I got a no insurance ticket in alabama went to court but never paid fine what will happen if i get caught back?
there
Health Insurance and Hospital?
I'm not quite sure how to say this w/o getting too deep into it,but there seems to be a Communication problem between Mount Sinai Hospital in Miami Beach and my Insurance company united american. They(the hospital) tell me they never get paid by my insurance Company and i have been back and forth between the two of them. Once Mount Sinai's business office sent me a correspondence saying my insurance company told them that i should pay the bill. I think the hospital is lying...anyone have any problems with this hospital when it comes to business etiquette and what came of it..what did you do about it. They don't have their heads screwed on right""
I'm looking for the lowest car insurance I can find?
nationwide offered me 200/monthly liability allstate 123.00/month esurance 89/month Any idea if I can find the next lower one?
Looking for a online site to get cheap car insurance quote from all carriers at once?
Looking for a online site to get cheap car insurance quote from all carriers at once?
Whats the cheapest car insurance for teen?
Hi I'm getting my drivers license in two weeks I don't have a car still trying to find one. I'm 17 I live in Hollywood,fl and I'm just trying to find out the cheapest insurance for me. So if you can help me and tell me who has the best policy for teens full coverage and or liability for the cheapest price. Also I didn't Go to driving school""
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
How much monthly would it cost for me to get an apartment in the US?
I would like to know the total living costs... Plus food, gas, insurance, electricity, everything... Like the average cost... I know the apartment would be $460, I already found one, but I don't know how much it would be for everything else included.""
Car Insurance Calculator?
Im looking for a car insurance calculator so i can see how much this car would cost to insure should i end up getting it. Im only 17 so calling a car insurance company i would rather stay away from and idk what company my parents are even with But is there a calculator that doesnt require a ton of steps and just lets me put in what car i have and some basic questions about stuff that affects a 17 year old. Calculators i have been looking at ask for like house payments and monthly income ect and im 17. I dont have any of that. So any good and easy calculators to see if this car is too expensive to buy?
What is the most economic way to insure a second car?
I already have fully comprehensive insurance for both myself and my spouse on our first car but now are looking to buy a second car. I also have 9 years no claims bonus.
From Whom can I purchase health ins over 65 years & not eligible for Medicare?
My spouse is over 65 and will be getting residency USA and is not eligible for Medicare nor am I. From whom can we purchase health insurance?
Name some good life insurance companies?
Burial insurance I need for future.
Driving without insurance can I go to jail?
I was caught driving without insurance and expired plates last month. I went to court and I was fined $250. I have not been able to earn that much money and I was wondering if I could be thrown in prison for this. I have court in a week.
Do you think car insurance should be mandatory in all of the United States?
I live in Wisconsin. Car insurance is not required for cars trucks and anything else on the road. I think this is wrong with medical and car repair bills being so expensive these days. Worst part about it is some of these non insured people drive like lunatics and if they do hit you they have nothing to even sue them for. I think it's disgusting.
I want a good car like a 1992 - 1997 supra for my first car. How much will the extras cost?
If I do well in my senior year of school, my parents will by me a car! I have done a bit of research, and concluded that i would like something along the lines of a Toyota Supra. I am not too interested in power and racing qualities e.c.t but i love the way it looks. A Toyota Celica also looks looks on the cards. As im on a budget of around $15 000Au (Around $20 000 American) i am looking at one of the 1992-1997 models. I am concerened that this seems too good to be true, and I am going to have to pay for repairs, insurance, fuel (Gas) and rego. I have heard that these cars are reliable but I REALLY don't want to have to pay for large amounts of these extras. So basiclly how much will i probs have to pay for these? If its alot, what other similar cars are there?""
I'm looking for free car insurance quotes?
As I'm a new driver, my parents told me to seek on the internet for insurances quotes, to help me handle my own things. So yeah i'm looking for websites that offer free car insurances quotes.""
Do you think which is better for a 1984 corvette classic car insurance or regular car insurance?
I am planning on getting a 1984 corvette but the insurance for it is a little too high.i just found out about classic car insurance but i really don't know much about it.but for classic car insurance,am i limited to a certain number of things like how far i can drive my car,when i can drive,etc?will the insurance actually be less or more for classic car insurance?and what is the best classic car insurance company i should go with?""
Cancelling M&S Car Insurance?
Basically I took at a M&S car insurance plan for my car. A guy crashed into me whilst on a roundabout (my right of way) and his insurance have since accepted responsibility for the accident.I am now wanting to cancel the insurance as they have been very unhelpful throughout the whole process. I am just wondering how much I am going to have to pay to cancel the policy- As I was spreading the cost with agreed monthly payments the total cost including interest was 738. I did a one off payment of 101.87 and then so far have paid 4 installments of 57.89. As I have had the policy for 4 months. In the t's & c's on the website it says this: If you cancel your policy within 12 months of the Policy Start Date, we will calculate the cost for the period of cover based on our short period rates in force when we receive the Certificate of Motor Insurance and refund any excess premium you have paid. If we cancel, the premium will be calculated in proportion to the period of cover provided and we will refund any excess premium which you have paid when the Certificate of Motor Insurance has been returned to us As I have had the policy for 4 months how much will I have to pay to cancel (even the the whole process was not my fault!).just want to buy a new car and insure with somebody else! (recommendations very welcome!) Thank you in advance for your help people!""
Should I be adding my 19yr old daughter to my auto insurance?
Our 19 yr old daughter let he car insurance laps. My insurance company found out and added her to my policy this will cost an extra $700.00 + for six months. She also kept say all along that she was paying her own auto insurance for the last 6 months. I`v found out this was not true she stopped paying about 4 months ago. So she has been driving with out insurance for at least 4 months now. Her car is also in her name so I really can`t take it from her. I`m very upset at her for lien I just found all this out the other day.
When I turn 25 does my car insurance automatically go down or do I have to notify them? (AAA car insurance)?
I heard when you turn 25 the car insurance rates go down a lot, but is it automatic or do I have to tell them?""
Classic car insurance for a 19 year old?
I'm 19 and have saved up enough to purchase a classic muscle car. Are there any classic car insurance companies that will insure me? I will only be driving the car about 200-300 miles a month so it will be well below 5000 miles a year. Also, I have only one accident on my record and that was when someone backed into my car in a parking lot. What rates could I expect from these companies?""
Selling my car an confused about insurance?
I have a car from a dealership. It has to have full coverage etc. If I sell this car I got from the dealership & I don't pay off the loan an buy a car off craigslist. What will happen insurance wise when I take the car from the dealership of my insurance? Will there be a hassle? Should I call my dealership? Please help me
HOW does indemnity insurance affect Home insurance?
How does having indemnity insurance on a home for buiding work carried out with out building regs affect the cost of Home building insurance?
Why is my car insurance so much cheaper than other companies?
i was looking around for auto insurance to see if there was anything cheaper than what im paying now. im a 20 year old male with a 2005 scion tc. i have been driving for about 2 years and currently use state farm. when i first insured my car 2 years ago, i was paying $148/mo. due to a speeding ticket, it has risen to $194/mo. i also have comprehensive and collision with a $500 deductible. $100,000/$300,000 coverage with full glass also. not complaining, i think this is great i looked at nationwide, allstate, geico, and progressive. these companies are supposed to be so great, but progressive quoted me at $485/mo for the same coverage! the other companies where all in that general area. progressives state minimum coverage plan for me was almost $300/mo. why do these other companies cost so much more? im not complaining about mine, obviously im not gonna switch, but i am curious as to the difference in price.""
Will i get any payouts on my car insurance?
hi there i had an accident back in december 2012 that was NOT my fault but did not declare any points om my licence when i took my insurance policy out, becaus this was not my fault will i still get payed out for my car or any compensation claims elsewhere to thatr accident""
Car Insurance?
I am moving to the US (I am a Canadian Citizen), how much should I look to pay for car insurance in Miami?""
What is the average cost of hormone replacement therapy with and without insurance?
I've fianally decided to begin my transition (male-to-female) and i wanted to know what it would cost to begin HRT. I ask for both with and without insurance because i have a college based insurance plan (SHIP) and i am not sure if it will cover HRT (it covers gender identity counseling so IDK) Thank you all in advance ~<3 P.S. i live in Moscow, Idaho.""
Renault Clio insurance 17 year old male?
I am 17 Years old and wanting to insure a renault clio expression (2001) have you got one? where can i find the cheapest quote? which companies?
Does car insurance go up if you get your drivers permit?
will my parents car insurance go up if i only get my permit?
""What's the average cost of motorcycle insurance say, if you are 20 years old and live in Los Angeles?""
What's the average cost of motorcycle insurance say, if you are 20 years old and live in Los Angeles?""
How much does insurance on a 2012 corvette for a 16 year old cost?
i know what you're probably thinking. who would buy a 16 year old a brand new corvette? but i have enough to buy one for myself, i am 16 at the moment, so can you tell me how much insurance would cost? please no comments about there being no way i could get one.""
Should I wait until I am 25 or 26 to start driving a car again? Is it true about Insurance costs? Please read?
Hello, I am 21 and in college. I am in Northeast Illinois. I have not driven a car since I was 17. This is because I did miserably in driver education. I passed the classroom, so technically I passed driver ed, but the driving I failed miserably. My parents won't let me be behind the wheel of their cars again. I talked with a friend of mine recently and she said that the cost of driving insurance in Illinois is dramatically less when a driver turns 25 or 26. I am thinking that maybe I should start driving again at age 25 or 26 so I can keep costs down (especially in a nasty economy like this country has right now). Now, here's the other thing, my dad has cancer (leukemia), he's the one who gives me rides to places, my mom doesn't want to give me rides because she is still angry at me for what I did when I was 17. She said to me You're not driving again, ever. You lied to me. You disobeyed our orders and was arrogant. You're done. I don't care about your behaviors anymore Yeah, she hasn't changed since what I did at age 17. My dad has a had time walking, sitting, standing, etc. He has mentioned a couple of times Its not a bad idea that maybe you should think about driving again, you will have to drive some time, son Then I think about the insurance cost and how much of a hassel it would be. So, should I do it? Should I wait until I am 25 or 26 to start driving again? Should I wait longer? It seems like my mom won't forgive me and my dad has this cancer making it hard on him. I don't know what to do. Thanks""
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
What will the average insurance payment be for my BMW?
Ever since I was little I've always wanted a BMW. Well now since I'm turning 16 in the fall I have the option of getting a 2004 BMW 5 Series 545i for $9,000. It's in extremely good condition and I just love it. I will be making around $200-250 a month and my monthly payment will be about $106 to the bank till my senior year in college ( yes that's 84 months but it's in good condition so it's worth it) and I was just wondering if any one had a idea how much insurance would cost? I really want to get this car but I won't if I'm not able to pay a payment and insurance at the same time due to other small bills i have. Thanks""
How long will it take to get a auto insurance check?
I was in a car accident june 3rd, I filed the claim the same day.. talked to the guy doing my claim the next day he said state farm would accept 100% fault so I had to send state farm the police report and some other things they needed and they are suppose to send me check. I faxed all the paper work last Tuesday so how long do you think it will take for them to send me a check? I'm just impatient because I have had no car and had to take all this time off work since I can not get a ride to work and a ride to take my childern to daycare and now my work says if I'm not back by next weekend they will fire me. I called the guy doing my claim just to see how long it normally takes but he never called me back. Any ideas? Thanks!""
What car can i get that will be the cheapest insurance a month?
Hello I'm 18 I'm a male and I live in Cleveland Ohio I was wondering what is the best car I can get with the lowest insurance a month? And what is the best car insurance for first time drivers?
How much will my insurance go up?
I backed out of my driveway and hit my grandmas car leaving a basketball-sized dent. my dad says I have a $500 deductible but what exactly does that mean? should I pay without using my insurance, and approximately how much would my insurance go up if I did decided to inform them? The vehicle was parked.""
Insurance question?
When you move in with your boyfriend could you be put on his insurance, or would that only work if you are married?""
Do you need motorcycle insurance or a motorcycle license to purchase a sports bike ?
Do you need either of these things to buy a sports motorcycle ? I'm 19 and live in Florida. Any idea ?
Insurance question?
i'm from texas and had an accident. i crash and my name does not appear in the insurance policy as an insured driver. but the car is insured with liability. will the insurance still pay for the damages of the other car. i am 17 and have a driver license. or wat can i say? should i say something like i got the car without permission or something like that
HElp With A PROJECT on CAR INSURANCE!?
ok so i have a project and all the car insurance places are closed and i can't finish it! so umm can anyone help?? this is all the information i have, i just need an estimate for a monthly payment 1996 eagle talon married couple 25 years old driver low milage on car car is paid for, goood driving history car is used for job too for dilivering pizza live in florida umm if you need any more information let me kno please helpp worth 20% of final grade in class!!!!""
""Young drivers (in your early 20), how much are you paying for car insurance?""
Young drivers (in your early 20), how much are you paying for car insurance?""
If a company is self insured (medical) that doesn't mean the company owns the ins. co. does it?
If a company is self insured (medical) that doesn't mean the company owns the ins. co. does it?
Which company offers good whole life insurance?
I am sick of term life insurance and the company I am with now is abysmal. I would appreciate any help. I have a wife and two daughters, it's about them, not me....""
My car was considered a loss. how do insurance co. determine how much to pay for the car? 2001 toyota carolla
A four door CE model. No major problems some small scratches and dents.
How Much do you pay for your insurance or how much is it for new cars and teens?
How Much do you pay for your insurance or how much is it for new cars and teens?
Does insurance cover braces if you have a crossbite?
About 3 weeks ago I went to the orthodontic and he said I have a crossbite plus this tooth that looks like it's pushed back into my mouth.. Anyways he said maybe in 1-2 months I would get a letter saying if my insurance accepted. My questio nis, does insurance cover and accepts if you have a crossbite and that tooth ?""
Cheaper car Insurance for 18 year old?
I'm an 18 year old male and live in Florida. I have state farm insurance and I was paying 167 a month for minimum car insurance, I have a clean record and I drive a 97 Honda civic. I had a mechanical failure in my car that caused my wheel to fly off while I was driving, I filed a claim and all of a sudden they want 365 a month for minimum coverage, why am I paying so much, 167 already seemed steep to me, I work part time and that basically a week of pay for me. Where can I find insurance that doesnt cost so much? The insurance cost more than my damn car payments did.""
Where can I find out about my health insurance?
My school said that if I drop courses making me a part time student, it could affect my health insurance. How do I find out about my health insurance?""
Will obstruction of plate show up on car insurance?
I got a ticket for obstruction of plate this morning and I was wondering whether this will show up as a record on the insurance. I would rather pay it off myself because I don't want my parents to find out. Also, will it increase the rates? I read somewhere that no proof of insurance can increase rates, but I got a ticket for that awhile ago, it didn't affect anything.""
What type of car insurance is the best for first time drivers?
About to buy a car for the first time just wanna kno wat car insurance would be the best for a 16 year old
Can auto insurance company refuse to cancel my policy?
I have gotten another auto insurance company due to the rudeness and refusal to switch my monthly draft to another bank. I had one bank and to close due to some suspicious activity that indicated signs of fraud. When I called to tell my insurance company about this the lady was very rude to me and made remarks about not wanting to my payments, I have been on time with every payment. She didn't believe me and told me she would wipe all other accounts that I had with that bank. I truly honestly had to close my account and she won't take the new account. I have already got my new insurance ready to go just need cancel my old insurance. Would I be mean if said I am canceling because someone was rude to me and made my ordeal a joke?""
How long does it take to get your auto insurance back after policy been cancled?
How long does it take to get your auto insurance back after policy been cancled?
Cheapest Bike insurance in ontario for sport bike?
I'm looking into selling my cr250 for a street bike something along the lines of a 1998-2001 cbr/gsxr 600. My only problem as I'm sure you can all relate is insurance. I simply cannot afford to be paying 3-4000 dollars upfront. So does anyone know of a insurance company that will do business on a month to month bases insted of anually.
Is it cheaper to add a car to my insurance or get a new incurance for the 2nd car?
I have a 1989 trans-am it is modified and i was wondering if it would be cheaper to add it to my insurance company or get a second insurance company just for that car. Andy help???
""Geico Car Insurance, help? what do i do?""
Hey guys, my parents have three cars and all have geico insurance, but we're about to be out of country for a month or two and not even going to be using the cars for one or two months.. Is there a way that we can cancel/pause the insurance, so we won't have to pay insurance for a month. I mean we're not even gonna be using the cars, so were losing 1,200 dollars for absolutely nothing.. And if you can, can you explain it or just give me a link? thanks""
Average family health insurance cost?
for a school project i need to calculate how much my healthcare insurance costs per month. i am about to be a college student and do not understand how the entire insurance process works. i come from a family of 5, and apparently i have blue cross health insurance. was wondering roughly how much it costs monthly for my insurance, or what is an average monthly rate for health insurance for a person who is under a family health insurance committment? any sort of clarification helps thanks. c:""
What is the cheapest insurance for an 18 yo first time car?
i asked my uncle, he said it could be around $300 for 6 months, idk if it is true or not. but are there any cheap insurance? idk, please help. if i want to buy a new tundra, how much it does it cost?. i work full time. $3k/month.""
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
Lookeba Oklahoma Cheap car insurance quotes zip 73053
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/finding-good-auto-insurance-denver-alexander-arnold/"
0 notes
Text
“Is this what I get from treating you this well?!”
As I watch my dear cousin practice everyday, putting her all into the pieces she plays, I can’t help but feel the overwhelming yet mysterious sorrow yet tinged with a hopeful outlook seep from the music of Tchaikovsky’s June: Barcarolle. I remain entranced as I listen to her weave the disjointed notes of the piano into an enchanting piece of music. The beauty of the song, the relentless effort of the pianist and the purity of the piano cannot be truly appreciated through a simple studio recording; it simply does not do the music nor the pianist not the piano justice.
However, in my deep ruminations, I find myself wondering whether or not the captivating melancholy of the piece was what brought me out of my world of words, or was it this certain human nature that coloured the notes with the heartbreaking tears of a Chinese child. The sadness of a child who balances being just a child with the stresses of being the perfect puppet for her painfully stereotypical Asian parents, be it my imagination or my innate nature to embellish things, I couldn’t help speculate that beyond the sickening overdose of pink, frills, and overwhelming materialism, a world of emotional and mental agony lay hidden from me, that what I see is simply a façade of a perfect little Chinese that has been painstakingly built and maintained by my aunt.
Memories and stories plague my mind and I find myself wanting to not believe the stereotype of Asian children that I’ve read and that my once fellow classmates and I once mockingly perpetuated, however, when I see my dear cousin, my heart breaks. I remember the several hours of shouting, the lecturing and the tearing down of her spirit by her mother, my aunt, since I arrived in China, a nation that values an excellent and impressive reputation more than anything and I find myself forced to face the harsh reality of what having true Asian parents entailed.
Unlike my cousin, I never found myself enduring any of the same treatment from my own mother or father, despite themselves being Asians. Though, during my preschooling years, my mother did have me write out the English alphabet as beautifully as my five-year-old self could muster until my hands were sore and my eyes were dry of tears, however, soon after that, there wasn’t any hint of stereotypical Asian parenting from her or my father. Yet, I am my parents’ most studious child, achieving rather high results and who loves to learn. I suppose it was because by the time I was in grade one, I discovered I couldn’t rely on my parents to help me with homework. After all, my father’s education was cut short due to the Vietnam War and my mother never finished high school, and to top it off, neither enjoyed school nor studying anyways. Perhaps it was my fear of failure that prompted me to be the best I could be and coincidentally, nurture my love for learning…at least, when it came to certain subjects. However, sometimes I would resent my parents’ inability to further nurture my learning.
During my schooling years, I watched on as fellow classmates would express irritation and exhaustion from going to and from extracurricular and tutorials, from competitions to recitals, from annexes to stages. I often felt relieved that my parents more or less were completely hands off when it came to my education, especially when I saw the detrimental impacts of their minds slowly becoming warped with the motto, “Practice makes perfect,” “I must be perfect,” “I need to get an A,” and all the other terrifyingly similar phrases brainwash them into failure-fearing students. Nonetheless, I would simultaneously feel envious and ashamed when I see fellow classmates advance in life, earning awards, experience and recognition in and outside of school because of how strict and demanding their parents were while I did nothing worthwhile in my spare time other than contemplate and daydream.
Therefore, I find myself in a position where I both worry for my young cousin’s mental and emotional health from being regularly torn down by her mother whenever she gets a mark below of an A or 85% and somewhat agreeing with my aunt on the matter of an environment that enriches a child’s learning. I don’t, however, support her method of executing it - the forceful nature, the threatening of abandonment, the unnecessary fearmongering, the emotional manipulation. The tiresome and expensive hours of tutoring after a long day at school (mind you, that the standard school day in China is relatively longer than that in the West), the extracurricular such as hours of music lessons and dance classes, on top of English classes that, from my experience, don’t quite teach students how to use English effectively - and all this is relatively normal within the lands of China, however, in the case of my dear cousin, more is expected of her as she is one of a considerable amount of young Chinese being shipped off overseas to study by their parents.
If my young cousin was a university student, I suppose she wouldn’t find it too hard, well, that if she wasn’t too concerned of her own integrity. At least then, the option of hiring someone to do the course for her would be there. Though, personally, I would find it appalling if she were to choose that route when she is in university, but for now, she isn’t. Instead, next year, if all goes according to my aunt’s plans, my cousin will be attending the either the best or second-best high school in the state I live in, in Australia.
When I asked my aunt as to why she would go to such lengths for my cousin, she simply said that it was cheaper to send her to study in Australia because it’ll help my cousin live a better life in China when she grows up. I’m sure many will understand the linear thought pattern of my aunt; better school, better university, better job, better life. However, at what cost? I’m not talking about the financial cost here, but more so the invisible cost.
Call me an overly-sensitive leftist or whatever degrading term there is for people like me, but how would this impact a child mentally? How about emotionally? And even socially?
Now, to be clear, I’m not simply picking out on the idea of suddenly sending children off to another country to finish their high schooling years; I’m referring to the Chinese, if not, Asian method of raising children. (Though, I should point out this doesn’t mean there aren’t non-Asian parents who also practice this method of parenting - it’s just that, from my observations, majority of parents who do use this method are Asians, a fact most of the world acknowledges.)
Emotionally, children are raised to think that if they aren’t great, they are worthless and/or hopeless. Mentally, children have huge expectations weighing down on them at very young ages which they are to fulfil, most of which don’t line up with their own dreams and ambitions, that is if they even have their own dreams and ambitions. Socially, well, where is the time to socialise if your life revolves around getting good grades? Now, add that to the financial costs of schooling, tutoring and extracurricular. The cost is quite staggering, I find and I haven’t even begun to count the lack of life skills these children possess who are subjected to this sort of parenting. Also, as some may add, the children of such strict and demanding parents lose out on a childhood.
Bear with me, but such things as a childhood is a relatively recent invention. Prior to the Victorian Era, the idea of a childhood didn’t exist as we know today and by the time it did, it was a concept only among the rich and wealthy, and don’t quote me on this, living in the West. However, in East Asia (maybe even the whole of Asia), I speculate, this sort of thinking never quite flourished as much or took that much of a hold until the late 20th century, be it because of the World Wars that occurred earlier in the century or the difference of cultural values.
In my humble opinion, I theorise it’s more so the difference in cultural values. In the West, individualism is upheld and everyone is accountable for themselves whereas in the East, collectivism is the core of cultural values, where the actions of one person affects the many, for example, the generational imprisonment in North Korea should one member of the family executes a treasonous action. In the West, doting on the young/new generation and then not expecting anything in return as they age is the norm due to the culture that each is responsible for their own life - this in itself, is both good and bad. However, in the East, the young/new generation is doted on beyond comprehension and is expected to somehow pay back all the kindness they were shown as children, often in the means of a financial & emotional fashion. Why this is, is because of a concept of ‘filial piety’, a concept that most who grew up without an Asian background have never heard of. Essentially, 'filial piety’ is the younger generation respecting, perhaps even to the point of serving, the older generation. It’s an idea that the older generation is responsible of the younger generation until they can no longer, in which then the roles are swapped. However, do not quote me on that. This, I think, then drills an idea into the head of the parents that they can say to their children that because they’re treating them incredibly well, they can demand the equivalent back in the form of grand grades. Consequently, if their demands aren’t met, they feel as if their threats of abandonment and/or their greatly exaggerated predictions of a terrifying and catastrophic future is justified. So, I surmise that Asian parents see their children as an investment and therefore, they reason the more they put into the children, specifically their education, the more they’ll get in return later in life, such as better life.
Personally, as much as I find the method of Asian parenting both disturbing yet beneficial, I am intrigued by it. From a sociological and psychological perspective, it’s an example of human diversity expressed through culture that I find fascinating to explore and understand. Then, as the eldest daughter of two Vietnamese-born Chinese parents, I find it to be a personal matter worth looking into, as I never had to experience it. I have a hunch it may have partly been because of my parents adoption of a strict form of Christianity prior to me starting primary school, my own studious initiative and the fact I was born in and grew up in Australia, where he academic environment isn’t as competitive as it is in Asia.
Now, I admit I am over generalising all this, perhaps even exaggerating it, but in essence, I ask myself and the world this; just how much are we willing to pay, maybe even sacrifice, to allow our children a better future? And are we willing to deconstruct the social construct we call a 'childhood’? Or will we be the generation that will reconstruct what a 'childhood’ means, as the culture of the 21st century is rapidly changing and adapting?
My conjecture is that, with changing values of modern life, society’s approach towards raising children will change dramatically in order to accommodate higher educational demands and to tackle the challenges of raising children with ever advancing technology at their fingertips. In consequence to all of the aforementioned, the traditional idea of a 'childhood’ will radically evolve and I surmise that the possibility of a new parenting style where a hybrid of the Asian method and Western values will become the new norm. And that, I find, is an intriguing notion.
So, as my cousin plays Tchaikovsky’s June: Barcarolle, I stand back and marvel at her mastery of the piano; her hands gliding across the black and white keys, playing a magnificent melody of moving melancholy and hopeful happiness. I let my thoughts mellow as I let the notes paint a beach before me, the waves gently caressing my feet as I watch the setting sun make way for an array of brilliant stars, illuminating the vast darkness that is the night sky, hoping that when the sun rises once again, my dear cousin does indeed have a bright tomorrow.
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only ���true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/21/can-accusation-of-lynching-be-ordered-taken-down-as-a-supposed-threat-of-lynching/
0 notes
Text
Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in (c) imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/21/can-accusation-of-lynching-be-ordered-taken-down-as-a-supposed-threat-of-lynching/
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes
Text
[Eugene Volokh] Can accusation of lynching be ordered taken down as a supposed threat of lynching?
Duke University professor Jeff Powell sent me the following response to my post on Brummer v. Wey, the “stop speaking about plaintiff” New York injunction case. I’m of course delighted to publish it and to offer some reactions:
Professor Eugene Volokh is an expert on First Amendment law, and one disagrees with him at one’s peril. Still, if even Homer sometimes nodded, then Professor Volokh too may occasionally make a mistake. I think he has done so in his recent comment on an ongoing defamation case in New York, Brummer v. Wey. The plaintiff in that action, Christopher Brummer (a professor at Georgetown Law School) is suing a wealthy entrepreneur, Benjamin Wey, and his businesses for attacks on Brummer posted on Wey’s “online tabloid” TheBlot. The case’s origins go back to late 2014, when Brummer served on an adjudicatory body of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) that barred two stockbrokers from future involvement in the industry; Wey apparently has had dealings with them. In response to the FINRA action, TheBlot began what Brummer believes is a concerted attempt to destroy his reputation as a scholar and his standing as a decent person. The New York trial court has denied Wey’s motion to dismiss but the case has not yet gone to trial.
Professor Volokh is concerned about an unusual development in Brummer v. Wey, the trial court’s decision on June 6th to enjoin Wey and his corporate co-defendants from posting articles about Brummer to TheBlot while the suit is ongoing and requiring them to remove all existing posts. Brummer, who is African American, moved for a preliminary injunction in response to TheBlot’s publication of a series of articles and comments employing violent images and language in a racialized context. In one instance, an article about the FINRA action was prefaced by what appears to be an actual photograph of an early 20th century lynching, with photos of Brummer and others associated with FINRA superimposed and labeled “FINRA racists;” the text purports to quote one of the ousted stockbrokers (both of whom are African American) as saying that “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer, unqualified moron to lynch us by the tree.” Another example is a comment attributed to an otherwise unknown “Bill:” “These FINRA motherf–––––s ruin lives! F––– them or shoot them? Both perhaps.” Brummer filed an affidavit accompanying his motion for an injunction describing his great fear about “harm to me and my family from Mr. Wey or generated by his grotesque calls to others to do harm.”
It’s obvious why Brummer, and the trial court judge for that matter, find TheBlot’s grotesque attacks deeply offensive, but the court’s decision to issue the injunction was surprising as a legal matter. The usual rule is that preliminary injunctive relief is not available in defamation actions, although many American courts will now enjoin the continued or repeated publication of statements after they have been held defamatory. The New York court’s decision appears out of step with this general practice and is in obvious tension with the bedrock First Amendment principle that only the most pressing governmental interest can justify a prior restraint on protected speech. Professor Volokh, an admirable defender of First Amendment freedoms, is alarmed about the implications of what he believes is the Brummer court’s failure adequately to respect those freedoms.
I agree with much of what Professor Volokh has written. But Professor Volokh also dismissed as constitutionally unacceptable the argument, advanced by the plaintiff’s lawyers but essentially ignored by the court, that it was appropriate and consistent with the First Amendment for the court to enjoin the specific speech in question because it presents a constitutionally-unprotected “true threat” to Brummer personally.
True threats, as the United States Supreme Court defines them, are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” It isn’t necessary that the speaker “actually intend to carry out the threat;” the idea is that the law ought to be able to protect people “from the fear of violence” as well as “from the possibility” that the threatening speech will lead to someone (not necessarily the speaker) carrying out “the threatened violence.” As Justice Samuel Alito explained a couple of years ago, the First Amendment “does not protect true threats” because they “inflict great harm and have little if any social value.” There is, in other words, no reason to conclude that the Constitution forbids an injunction limited to speech that falls within the unprotected category of true threats.
In his comment, Professor Volokh does not directly disagree with this conclusion, but he doesn’t believe that TheBlot’s lynching photo-and-broadside is a true threat in the constitutional sense. He makes two points: first, in the article it is Brummer who is the racist and perpetrator of the (metaphorical) lynching of the two stockbrokers; and, second, “an accusation, however hyperbolic, that someone is guilty of lynching isn’t itself tantamount to a threat to lynch” that person. He goes on to give what he thinks is an analogous case, calling someone a Nazi “for being complicit as an Israel-supporting Jew in supposed crimes against Palestinians.”
At first glance, Professor Volokh’s argument seems logical, but its logic is abstract: A::B as C::D. Abstraction here is, however, a constitutional error. As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote less than a year ago: “Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. The context here bespeaks danger.” In the context of the tragic history and present-day reality of racism in this country, a speaker who employs the imagery and language of lynching in a virulent attack on an African American — and who juxtaposes his victim’s picture to the ghastly image of a lynching — has gone far beyond the hyperbole and caustic language protected by the First Amendment.
Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African Americans. TheBlot’s article was expression coolly calculated both to frighten its victim and to rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer. The fact that the article’s “argument” was that Brummer is the racist and lyncher is beside the point: racism is not logical, and in any event the accusation that the victims or racism are guilty of race hatred is a long-standing feature of American racist rhetoric. Professor Volokh’s hypothetical ignores the crucial importance of context: his imagined slur would not draw on the history of American racist violence that gives the image of lynching its frightening power.
Taking into account the contexts of American history and society, and of TheBlot’s hosting of attacks on Brummer laced with racial and violent imagery, I think the trial court in Brummer v. Wey can properly conclude that the lynching photo/article was a true threat, whatever Wey’s personal intentions about carrying through on the threatening message. The First Amendment allows government, and specifically the courts, to protect the victim of such a threat from the fear and the possibility of violence to himself or his family while the victim is pursuing a legal action against the person issuing — or insinuating — the threat.
The American legal system affords freedom of expression extremely broad latitude, and rightly so. Determining whether the First Amendment permits a court to issue any injunction restricting the Brummer defendants’ choices about what to say, at least in advance of trial, requires consideration of what Justice Harry Blackmun once termed “the broad right of the press to print” and “the very narrow right of the Government to prevent” expression for any reason. Blackmun wrote those words in an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s refusal to permit an injunction against speech in the great Pentagon Papers Case, which is a reminder (if you agree, as I do, with the Court’s decision) how important it is to err on the side of speech. But true threats are not protected speech, and the First Amendment gives them no shelter.
For the moment, the defendants have obtained a stay of the trial court’s order, and Professor Volokh has expressed the hope that ultimately the appellate court will vacate the injunction “preferably by making clear that such an injunction violates the First Amendment.” I disagree: I think that the right outcome, in terms of fidelity to the First Amendment, is for the appellate court to modify the injunction so that it is a ban on those postings that, viewed realistically and in context, are true racist threats. The Constitution is not offended by relieving Brummer of the alarm he understandably feels at TheBlot’s intimations of violence while he pursues his case against Wey, and the legal processes of trial and appellate review should ensure that Wey’s right to engage in constitutionally protected speech is safeguarded.
Here are my thoughts in response (in addition to a thank you for the kind words and for the willingness to debate):
1. It seems to me that Powell’s response mixes together two First Amendment exceptions — the exception for threats and the exception for incitement.
If the concern is that the articles that accuse Brummer of “lynching” the two black stockbrokers will “rouse in susceptible readers racist and potentially violent sentiments about Brummer,” that’s a concern about incitement: This speech should be punished, the argument is saying, because it may persuade readers to do bad things. But incitement of violence is punishable only if it is (a) intended to and (b) likely to lead listeners to engage in © imminent illegal conduct (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)). A mere “bad tendency,” or a danger of misconduct, is not enough. (This is why, for instance, harsh criticism of many people — police officers, politicians, businesspeople and others — is protected even if it’s possible that some listeners who hear the criticism will decide to attack the targets as a result.)
Here, there is no evidence that Wey specifically intended to get people to violently attack Brummer. There’s no evidence that such an attack is likely. And in any event, it is clear that this did not contemplate an imminent attack (the classic example of that is the speech in front of the grain dealer’s house, aimed at riling a mob that is present there and then). See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana (1973) (noting that “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is not punishable incitement).
Nor can this fit within the narrow exception of solicitation of crime (U.S. v. Williams (2008)). Even if that exception applies to solicitation of specific crimes against specific targets at some unspecified future time, criminal solicitation has historically still required a purpose to cause the crime — no evidence of such a purpose on Wey’s part was introduced. And in any event, if the imminence requirement is relaxed for solicitation of a specific crime against a specific target, such a relaxation would have to be matched by at least some requirement of a concrete call for action (or else the solicitation exception would swallow the limitations on the incitement exception). Setting aside the anonymous (and likely hyperbolic) comment, there is no such call in the Brummer-lynched-Harris-and-Scholander accusation.
2. So I think the merging of the threats argument with the incitement argument is unsound here. But what about the threats argument on its own?
The problem is that, regardless of “context,” the post accusing Brummer of lynching Harris and Scholander just can’t be seen as “the speaker mean[ing] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to Brummer. Again, the post depicts the image of a lynched black man, but the text makes clear that the image refers to Harris and Scholander, Brummer’s alleged victims. “FINRA deliberately picked Chris Brummer … to lynch us by the tree.”
Brummer isn’t shown with a noose around his neck; indeed, he is shown alongside two white men, all three in standard business photographs, with the captions “Sicko!” and “FINRA Racists” (and, as to Brummer alone, “Dr. Bratwurst”).
I agree that “Lynching is our paradigmatic image of private racist violence against African American,” but here it is being used to accuse Brummer of figurative racist violence — and of literal racist adjudication — not to threaten Brummer. The “tragic history and present-day reality of racism” can’t justify, I think, categorically labeling images of lynching associated with a person as threats, when the person is accused of being the perpetrator of lynching (not urged as a target for lynching).
In this respect, Watts v. United States (1969) is instructive. There, Watts, at a public rally during the Vietnam War, said “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
There, too, was a tragic history and present-day reality of political assassination: John F. Kennedy had been assassinated a few years before; by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. had been killed, too; in 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists tried to kill Harry S. Truman and in 1954 wounded several congressmen on the House floor.
But the court concluded that only “true ‘threat[s]’” can be punished, and they must be distinguished from “political hyperbole,” even “very crude offensive” hyperbole. Even when the statement expressly (though conditionally) stated a literal desire to kill the president, it still wasn’t a true threat. And I think this is even clearer as to the accusation of lynching by Brummer, which doesn’t expressly refer to lynching of Brummer.
Likewise, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). The NAACP had organized a black boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Miss. To enforce the boycott, the organizers stationed “store watchers” who would write down the names of black customers who weren’t going along with the boycott and the names would then be published in a local black newspaper and read aloud in church. Unsurprisingly, there were some incidents of violent retaliation against blacks who didn’t comply with the boycott.
Yet the court refused to conclude that statements that “if we catch you going in any of them racists white stores, we’re gonna break your … neck” and “You can go in [to the white-owned store], but the sheriff here isn’t going to sleep with you at night” were constitutionally unprotected. The court did note that this was “extemporaneous rhetoric” and perhaps less latitude would be given to prepared written material. Still, the fact that even such statements, which seem pretty threatening on their face, could be seen as protected shows that speech that lacks such explicit threats shouldn’t be lightly interpreted as implicitly containing the threats.
Lynching is a horrible crime. But accusations of horrible crime — lynching or otherwise — aren’t the same as threats of horrible crimes, even when they involve “racial and violent imagery.”
0 notes