#would have weakened the latin continuity theory

[sisididis]

I’m currently reading about the proposals that circulated during the late 19th and early 20th century to unify Romania and Bulgaria under a single federation, and the main source for these that I found is Bulgarian. 

[impatient14]

Anthony J. Crowley as Lucifer: A Meta of Facts, Fiction, and Everything in Between

The theory that Crowley is Lucifer is hotly defended and contested, with naysayers typically casting the archangel Raphael as Crowley's identity in heaven (@vroomvroomwee's Crowley is Lucifer is particularly good-read the replies and reblogs too!) However, despite Raphael's notably absence in Heaven and the matchmaking plot of S2 (Raphael is traditionally associated with love and marriage), I think there is far more evidence that suggests he was Lucifer, instead. Yes, I know Crowley refers to Lucifer as someone other than himself in S1, but I'll get to that and everything else below the cut.

Full disclosure, I stumbled into this analysis from a different angle. Originally, I was just posting a quick little thought I had about Crowley's role on Earth. TLDR version, Crowley could have been acting not only as an agent of Hell on Earth to tempt humans but specifically ordered to tempt Aziraphale to Fall, an order he almost immediately succeeds in doing but chooses not to report. Since S2 made it clear that Crowley did not reserve his mercy for Aziraphale alone (i.e., his sense of fairness is intrinsic and not a characteristic obtained through his love for Aziraphale), it would be reasonable to think Crowley maneuvered himself into being assigned Hell's agent on Earth specifically to protect Aziraphale from Hell. This would not only mean Crowley remembered him from the beginning, it would mean he had the kind of power to assign himself that role. (It would also mean Crowley has been lying to both Hell and Aziraphale this whole time- a detail that would support Agnes Nutter's prophecy that "He is not who he says he is.")

This idea, that Crowley not only refused to send Aziraphale to Hell but actively protected him from it, screams rebellion--a characteristic Lucifer is most known for. Sure, you could argue all the angels who fell were rebellious (note here that Raphael never fell), but Crowley is the only demon in Hell who continued to rebel after he fell, making his association with the characteristic as notable as Lucifer's. This will be important in a moment.

Let's start with some history/translation issues.

The difference between Lucifer, Satan, and the Devil.

The conflation of these three names is a Christian phenomenon thought to have occurred in the process of organizing a conglomeration of "lost gospels" from numerous Christian sects, each one with their own translations and traditions. In the original Hebrew, "Satan" is actually ha-satan ("the satan"), defined as a role rather than a name (specifically the role of testing one's faith). At some point in the translation process, "the" is dropped and the tempter is simply, "Satan." Satan, before being completely subsumed by Lucifer, was considered Lucifer's vessel on earth-a separate entity.

Now, "Lucifer" is Latin for Venus' morning appearance. The word was taken from the Greek words Φωσφόρος (Phosphorus), "light-bringer", and Ἑωσφόρος (Eosphorus ), "dawn-bringer." So how did Lucifer become synonymous with a fallen angel? Folklore and metaphor. I could go really deep here, but instead I'll just say the Sumerian myth about the goddess Inanna's ability to descend into other realms including the underworld and then rise again to heaven. This myth is based in the synodic cycle of the planet--you guessed it--Venus (more specifically Venus in retrograde). Jump to the Book of Isaiah when the king of Babylon is condemned, Isaiah refers to the king as "Lucifer:"

How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! [how] art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! {14:13} For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in the sides of the north: {14:14} I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the most High. {14:15} Yet thou shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit. {14:16}

Thus, the "morning star" falling from heaven is a motif born out of a long list of myths and translations that get thrown in a pot together, stirred up, and then served according to disparate cultures and traditions. Some of those traditions combined "the satan" and "Lucifer" into Satan/Lucifer, some others kept "Satan" and "Lucifer" as two separate beings, with Lucifer ruling over Satan who acts as an agent of temptation on earth. (Sound familiar? Hold that thought!)

In contrast to "Satan" and "Lucifer," "The Devil" can be deterritorialized more simply. The title comes from a series of translations of Greek's  διάβολος (diábolos), or "slanderer." Thus, how the Devil became synonymous with all things Satan, Lucifer, and Hell can be inferred via its etymology.

So, if in some traditions Satan's role is to tempt people's faith, that would mean Crowley is Satan, right? Under my thinking, yes and no.

In the Bible, "tempting" Eve simply meant asking why she hadn't eaten from the Tree of Knowledge and then telling her the truth about what would happen if did (i.e., she would not die as God claimed but would instead be granted the wisdom to know the difference between good and evil). This is important if you recall that "the satan" may act as an agent of hell, but it isn't inherently good or evil, it's there by God's design to test people. So in this way, sure. Crowley plays the role of "the satan." But in the Good Omen's universe, Satan is given definition as the King of Hell (aka Benedict Cumberbatch and a team of CGI wizards), while Lucifer is only mentioned once (I'm getting there, promise!). Given all the amalgamations we've just gone over, it isn't outside the realm of possibility that Gaimon and Pratchett switched their roles. If anything, it makes far more sense that "Lucifer" would become "Crowley" over "Satan." Lucifer was an angel not a deity, so he would become a demon, while the Satan of Good Omens is set up as a direct opponent to God.

But why does Crowley have to have been Lucifer? Couldn't he have been another fallen angel?

Sure. But it isn't a coincidence that Lucifer and Raphael aren't mentioned by name (except once, I know!). Crowley's physical characteristics are more inline with Lucifer's than Raphael's (according to literary tradition, i.e., Paradise Lost and Dante's Inferno); he was the first one to say "let there be light;" rebellion is intrinsic to him (continuously rebelling against hell); he's androgynous (Lucifer as the masculine fallen angel and the feminine Venus); and he has many faces (which he shows off more in S1). Plus, Lucifer is said to have committed the sin of Pride, something Crowley demonstrated a lot of after he cranked the cosmos.

Also, S2 has made perfectly clear that Crowley is insanely powerful for a demon. (I'm convinced the huge power surge they investigate is not the miracle that hides Gabriel but is in fact the burst of energy Crowley produces when he's angry. It occurs at roughly the same time and in the same place. Narratively, it'd be just as easy to have the blackout occur another way, so Crowley's power surge must have another purpose.) In the book, the Narrator of Good Omens (God) says, "Crowley has something no other demons have, especially not Hastur--an imagination." Crowley is repeatedly singled out as being different than the other demons. He is able to read the report that is locked to everyone but the highest of authorities in Heaven.

So, now let's talk about that quote from S1: "I never asked to be a demon. I was just minding my own business one day and then... oh, lookie here, it's Lucifer and the guys!"

It's reasonable to assume Crowley is referring to himself saying "lookie here" after he was the subject of the first part of that sentence. But in actuality, the suggestion that Crowley was "minding his own business" would contradict him then going up to a group of people and initiating a conversation. Therefore, the ellipses (as they are designed to do) represent an absent thought. In this situation, the transition of the subject. In this moment, Crowley is recalling the moments before he fell, when he was minding his own business (while in the company of others) when someone singled out him the other rebels/questioners.

Taken another way, it's also entirely possible that Crowley is referring to himself in the third person as an outside viewer of the situation because, in point of fact, even if Crowley was Lucifer, Lucifer no longer exists according to Neil:

What does all this mean?

It means that even if Crowley was Lucifer, Lucifer doesn't exist because Good Omens takes place after the Fall. Now, this may put a little hiccup in the idea that Crowley can read the top secret files because he was an archangel, but I think it can be explained away via the ineffable plan. It is obvious that God still loves Crowley and shows him preferential treatment. It isn't outside the realm of possibility that she allowed him to keep certain parts of Lucifer as he Fell--especially if he was going to play the role as tempter on Earth. Clearly Crowley retained some of his angelic "goodness," which includes a unique moral code on Earth. Otherwise he'd be just like all the other demons. Crowley has to have enough good in him to appreciate humans, to be able to differentiate who should be tempted and how. He has to understand them in order to tempt them. This, I would argue, is the perfect punishment for an angel that questioned God's creation of man (but we know now he was just questioning the subsequent destruction of the universe he created). For daring to challenge her plan, God sends Lucifer (aka Crowley) to Earth to live among the humans he didn't value in Heaven. But, as we've seen, Crowley can still go up to heaven even when he's not in Aziraphale's body. Just like "morning star" Venus, Crowley can rise to the heavens, idle at the horizon, or fall into darkness. Even as "Crowley," Lucifer is still God's favorite.

So to go back up to where we started, it's possible that Hell ordered Crowley to tempt Aziraphale into falling, but God allowed Crowley to retain a sense of justice, and, perhaps more notability, his ability to love. I think Beelzebub and Gabriel's coupling is a sign that Heaven and Hell's hold on angels and demons weakens when they are confronted with human experiences, which would explain Crowley's very loose allegiance and Aziraphale's increasing discontent with Heaven. The difference between them is that Crowley--on some level--remembers what it's like to be an authority but not THE authority in Heaven, and he knows how fruitless Aziraphale's mission is. As the serpent, he has all this knowledge but Aziraphale is still very naïve, still devoted to the idea of "good" vs. "evil." He needs to see for himself that this dichotomy doesn't exist, even with him in charge. Once he's able to see this and understand what it means for his identity, I think we'll see the most elaborate "I Was Wrong" dance in history.

(Note: I didn't proofread this before posting, because I don't wanna. Now I'm going to devote a stupid amount of time trying to see if I can figure out what the damn J stands for.)

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Opinion: Brazil's President Is A Global Health Threat

Brazil is in critical condition. Latin America's largest country is experiencing record-breaking death tolls and its health system is teetering on the brink of collapse. On Wednesday, it reported over 1,900 deaths in a 24-hour period, the highest single-day tally on record. Brazil already has the world's second-largest COVID-19 death toll — 260,000 people — and more than 10.7 million infected. The failure to slow the outbreak coupled with an anemic vaccination campaign has not only created a domestic tragedy, but a full-blown global threat.

Much of the blame for Brazil's disastrous health crisis lies squarely at the feet of the country's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. Over the past year, he has downplayed the threat, peddled conspiracy theories, ridiculed health measures, denounced lockdowns, sabotaged vaccination efforts and even contracted the illness. Health authorities have implored federal and state government officials to impose stricter lockdown measures to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. In response, the president and his circle of advisers have urged supporters to resist mask-wearing and advocated the use of hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine, despite the evidence that they do not work, and could even be dangerous, when used to treat COVID-19.

His government's handling of the pandemic is considered the world's worst. Yet, when asked about the pandemic response, the president countered that "nobody would do better than my government is doing."

It is not just Brazil that is put at risk by Bolsonaro's reckless negligence, but the world. New variants such as P.1 have already spread from Manaus, the capital and largest city of Amazonas state, to the rest of Brazil and at least 15 other countries, including the United States. The P.1 strand is more transmissible, affects younger patients, weakens the protective effects of vaccines being rolled out in Brazil and appears to have the potential to reinfect people who have already contracted COVID-19.

Continue reading.

[btsvtworldsonfire]

chapter 8 — tear

As soon as the Latin command left Alex’s lips, Baekhyun and Eunwoo swiftly and quietly slipped out of the ballroom with the Familiar. Once Alex closed the door, all three of them broke into a sprint through the long, carpeted hallway that muffled their hurried footsteps. It was a good thing the Familiar knew the quickest way out of the huge manor and into the garden.

“I fucking knew it,” Baekhyun cursed. “I knew this day was going too well. I saw owls over the Wisteria Forest this morning.” Eunwoo was suddenly flooded with panic.

“Is that a bad thing?” Alex asked.

“Bad for New Gods. It’s a symbol of-”

Eunwoo failed to explain because the first thing that he saw was the chaos in the greenhouse. Baekhyun followed Alex’s hand and saw Jaehyun having a staredown with Lucas. Behind the demon stood Prince Ten, but strangely, behind Jaehyun was Fear’s older son, Kun. Baekhyun and Alex didn’t even bother questioning it and simply ran up to Jaehyun’s aid.

“Don’t!” Kun yelled then grabbed Alex by wrapping his arms around her before she can get any closer to Jaehyun. “It’s too dangerous.”

Baekhyun gulped as soon as he saw what was in Lucas’s hands. He had a theory in mind, but he didn’t want to say anything.

Meanwhile, back at the party, the three Healers simultaneously stopped whatever they were up to. Their breaths hitched in their throats. 

Seungkwan immediately stopped talking. His smile faded as his eyes filled with a mix of confusion and worry. Seokjin and Seokmin turned to each other, wondering what caused their friend to react this way.

Jimin was leading Bee to the dance floor when he felt it. His footsteps got slower and slower until he was standing completely still. He scrunched his brows together as he tried figuring out what was going on.

“Is everything okay?” Bee asked. Jimin’s trembling hand was the answer.

Hoseok was with Fey at one of the cocktail tables with a plate of hors d'oeuvres. “Say ah,” the Familiar hummed happily. The Healer smiled and was about to take the bite when he felt it. He slowly retracted, making Fey worry. She didn’t do anything wrong, so why did Hoseok seem so upset all of a sudden?

“Did I… do you not like deviled eggs?” she asked, giggling nervously as she tried to read his expression further.

“It’s not that. I think…” he looked up to her. “I felt something. Something strong.”

“My heart, i-it felt like it exploded in my chest,” Jimin said to Bee.

“It felt like somebody pulled my soul and slammed it into a void of despair,” Seungkwan thought out loud.

The people who were with the Healers looked more perplexed. What was going on? 

The Healers, who all stood in three different areas of the room, looked at each other.

“Something happened in the Death Realm,” the three of them said in chorus.

Back in the garden, Eunwoo arrived at the greenhouse to a scene of Clip stabbing a demon in the back and kicking it to the side. She moved quickly and pinned the foul creature down to the ground. Meanwhile, on top of some broken pots and unfortunate plants was Taehyung, wincing in pain.

“Which master do you serve?” Clip taunted.

The demon hissed. “Isn’t it obvious? I’m here with the ruler of the Shadow Realm. And I’m going to kill the Kim Performer.” It thrashed and screamed in an attempt to break free, but the Familiar was much stronger than the demon thought. 

“Oh yeah?” Clip sneered at its threat. “Sucks for you then, demon. Taehyung’s protractor is here.”

Eunwoo couldn’t help but chortle in the middle of such a serious scene. He moved to Taehyung and helped the guy get up on his feet. The Performer dusted himself off.

“What do we do?” Taehyung asked.

“Do you know the incantation for opening and shutting a portal?” Eunwoo said to him.

“There’s such a thing?! I thought only New Gods can do that!”

Eunwoo sighed. “Seriously, your entire kind is not utilizing the gifts from Rhetoric. You’re all so traditional.”

“Tell me about it.” Taehyung rolled his eyes. “But even if you do teach me, how sure are you that it’ll work? I mean can’t you do it instead?”

“You need to learn how. I’m not gonna stay with you forever.”

“Okay but-- but how are you so sure that I can do it? I don’t know. What if I can’t do it?”

Taehyung never acted like this in front of anyone. Never. As the gifted Performer that he is, he never backed down from a difficult lesson. He was always so willing to learn even the most advanced techniques both as a swordsman and as a Performer. That’s why he became so fluent in Latin before Seokmin started attending school. That’s why he was taught how to wield a sword while Joshua was still learning the basics of his powers.

Taehyung was always confident with himself, and Eunwoo, who knew the Performer even before he was born, was surprised by this.

“What? Why would you ask that?” Eunwoo asked. “You know what you’re capable of.”

“I do but this is something I haven’t done before. I haven’t practiced.”

“Just trust yourself, Taehyung. You can do it.”

“This is some high-level shit though.”

“So? That shouldn’t even be what’s on your mind right now! We’re dealing with a demon here!”

“But opening a portal? That sounds-”

“Kim Taehyung.” The New God said sternly. “I know you can do it. Wanna know why? Because Jaehyun’s father himself gave you your gifts.”

Both Taehyung and Clip looked at Eunwoo in surprise. Only now did the New God realized what had slipped from his mouth.

“... what?” Taehyung and Clip said at the same time.

Eunwoo sighed. “Truth is, some of the New Gods sensed that the Ancient One was going to win over the Human Realm during the next Ritual. That’s why Rhetoric decided to bless the next child of the Performers himself. He wanted to give the Families and the human race a fighting chance.”

Taehyung fell quiet. Meanwhile, Clip was jeering at the demon that she had pinned down.

“So please, Kim Taehyung. Give it a shot,” Eunwoo begged.

The demon screeched at Clip that nearly made her let go. She screamed back at it then turned to the two boys.

“Less talking, more opening of gateways to other dimensions please!” she shouted. The demon was able to free one of its hands from Clip’s grasp but the Familiar quickly pushed it down.

Taehyung gulped. “Okay, what do I do?”

Eunwoo smiled. “Muster up the same energy as you would when you puppet a demon. Only this time point your energy in front of you. The incantation is aperi paulo porta.”

The demon screamed once again. “HURRY UP!” Clip yelled.

Taking a deep breath in, Taehyung closed his eyes and gathered his energy. Happy memories of him with his family flashed in his head. He took another deep breath in and more memories flooded his mind. One last breath in, and he saw a vivid image of him on a picnic with his parents. He remembers this. It was one of the few times his uptight parents decided to spontaneously take him out somewhere. They brought little Taehyung to a field of tulips and enjoyed a picnic on a small hill overlooking the flowers.

“Always remember Taehyung. You’re not just a Performer. You mean the world to us.”

Taehyung immediately opened his eyes and shouted the incantation with Eunwoo with all of his might.

“Aperi paulo porta!”

A cloud of black smoke appeared before the two. It grew bigger and bigger and bigger until it was a full opening to the Shadow Realm. The wind blew violently and shattered more glass and pots. Plants flew everywhere. Muffled screams and cries of the evil spirits who resided there filled the greenhouse.

It was a mess.

Acting quickly, Clip grabbed the vial of rust from her pocket and threw its contents at the demon’s face. It let out another annoying scream as the powder temporarily blinded it. With the demon weakened, she dragged it to the portal by its hair.

“Begone forever, you foul creature!” she cursed at it before shoving it into the portal. It sensed what Clip was trying to do so it resisted.

But the Familiar was stronger. She kept kicking it and pushing it. Neither of the boys helped because she had the situation under control. She continued using her strength against the demon until nothing was left of it in the Human Realm.

“Now shout the incantation with me. Porta semper clauserunt,” Eunwoo instructed.

“Porta semper clauserunt!”

The portal to the Shadow Realm closed in on itself, and the violent wind stopped with it. All three left in the greenhouse were breathing heavily. Taehyung and Clip both collapsed from exhaustion. Eunwoo tried to hold himself up but his legs gave out.

While all of the chaos was going on in the greenhouse, Jaehyun and Baekhyun were preparing to fight Lucas. They knew it wasn’t going to be easy because the demon was wielding a New God’s weapon. Ten and Kun sensed the terror in the two. The younger prince smirked.

“You’re scared, I see.” The prince scoffed. “Afraid you’re going to end up like Chanyeol and Yixing?”

Baekhyun almost murdered Ten right there and then if it wasn’t for Jaehyun.

Alex turned to Kun. “What does he mean?”

“Another New God killed Baekhyun’s closest friends and Ten saw the whole thing. Okay look, I don’t know what you know about New Gods, but the ugly truth is we also die,” Kun explained.

“What? But aren’t you-”

“We’re flawed. We’re incredibly flawed,” he butted in. “I know it makes absolutely no sense because we’re supposed to be higher beings, but the Old Gods are too selfish to make us closer to them than to humans. That’s why we have Mendae--flaws that either weaken us or cause us to go out of control.”

Lucas lunged after Jaehyun with the scythe. The New God jumped to the side and delivered a powerful kick to the demon’s neck. Lucas stumbled a few steps, but he quickly gained back his posture and swung the scythe again. He continued throwing one attack to another and Jaehyun kept dodging. Avoiding the blade was a matter of life and death -- literally. Not because he was afraid of bleeding to death from a huge wound, but because that scythe was strong enough to rip out a human’s soul and kill a New God. Even the smallest scratch can hurt them.

Frustrated, Jaehyun yelled “Lacta creatura est quam maxime dolore.” Lucas flew back and crashed into Ten and Baekhyun, who were busy throwing punches at each other the whole time.

Ten had the upper hand. He was much faster than Baekhyun so by the time Lucas was sent flying across the garden, he already had the New God beaten up to a pulp. Baekhyun propped himself up with one arm. He groaned in pain, cursing Fear’s son in his mind as he tried to get up to continue fighting. Ten was amused. He wanted to see how much more Baekhyun can take, so he walked over to him and kicked his stomach.

Alex could only wince in pain and watched Ten mercilessly beat up the New God. Kun on the other hand was nervously watching Jaehyun try and steal back the scythe while avoiding getting killed by Lucas. He hasn’t noticed what his brother was up to.

“Kun?” Alex started. 

“Hmm?”

“Baekhyun… he mentioned something earlier. Something about seeing owls flying over the Wisteria Forest.”

“WHAT?!” He exclaimed, causing Ten to stop momentarily to look at his brother and for Baekhyun to recover from the painful beating. But he shrugged it off and went back to doing this thing.

“Is it bad?” Alex asked and turned to Kun. He had a deer in the headlights look on his face.

“Really bad. It’s-”

He was interrupted by the sound of a knife getting pulled out of its casing. He turned his head and saw that Ten was already approaching Baekhyun with his dagger.

“It’sasignthatanewgoddiedokaystayheredontmove-” Kun said in a panic before leaving Alex alone behind the force field. He didn’t even care anymore and threw himself onto Ten. Next thing he knew he was wrestling with Ten like when they were kids--except this time they’re trying to kill each other for real.

“Alex!” A deep and worried voice called out. The Familiar turned in the voice’s direction and saw someone running up to her.

It’s Wonwoo.

“Wonwoo! Thank god you’re here. Those New Gods are killing each other and I don’t know what to do!” Alex said to him.

He put one hand on her shoulder and gave her an assuring smile. He gently pulled her away from the force field and stood in her place. He carefully eyes Lucas, trying his best to read him. Wonwoo winced a bit because of Lucas’s resistance. He and Jaehyun were having a close fight but with Wonwoo’s interfering, Jaehyun got the upper hand and was able to stun Lucas with a non-verbal spell. Wonwoo finally got a good read of Lucas. Despite being terrified of what he just saw, he managed to weave a nightmare for the demon. It’s not as strong as he had hoped but it was enough to buy Jaehyun time to steal the scythe.

Jaehyun turned around and mouthed “thank you” to Wonwoo.

Kun had also won against Ten. Panting, he looked over to where Alex was and put down the protective force field. Once Jaehyun had Lucas properly restrained, Wonwoo releases the demon from the nightmare.

“I… what… how did you…” Lucas said in his dazed state. Jaehyun tightened the restraints.

“We’ll take it from here. Thank you for all your help Alex and Wonwoo,” Jaehyun said before taking the demon away. Eunwoo arrived at the scene and helped carry Baekhyun. Kun struggled a bit with Ten but the brothers quickly disappeared into the shadows and back into their Realm.

Something else happened as the New Gods finally left the Human Realm. A portal had opened in the mirror in the Familiar’s dorm. Jaemin, who was there the whole time, kissed the girl on the forehead and smiled. The kind of smile that made her wanna punch him again.

“This won’t be the last time you’ll see me. I know you’ll come back when the truth spreads to the others,” he said with a wink before slipping into the mirror for good.

Meanwhile, at the party, Yoongi and the eldest of each Family sprinted out to the garden to see what was going on. Hoseok immediately sensed that someone had fainted in the greenhouse, so he ran back to get Seungkwan and Jimin to help him heal.

Mark felt something sharp hit his chest. Odd, he wasn’t supposed to feel anything. But he was was sure he felt something sharp. And he felt it again. And again. And again. Not realizing that he was disappearing from Pau’s grasp and fading into nothingness.

“Mark! No!” Pau yelled, but it was too late. Mark was gone again.

“We’ll help find him later. Now c’mon! We have to follow the hyungs and your siblings!” Jungkook said to her while dragging her out of the ballroom.

“But-”

Everyone was gathered around Wonwoo and Alex who were trying to explain what happened. Alex recalled everything that happened. Soon Clip and Taehyung arrived and they too explained how they got attacked in the greenhouse. Seungcheol stepped away for a bit to speak to the Familiar who encountered the New God in their dorm.

As all of this was happening, Pau caught something moving in the corner of her eye. She jerked her head in its direction and once her eyes landed on whatever was moving, she felt a sense of expanding, exhilarating joy in her. Almost as if this feeling was lifting her above the ground.

“Mark!” she yelled out in elation.

Everyone turned their heads and couldn’t believe what they were seeing. There he was, the Keeper of the Shrine, in the flesh. Unlike his appearance earlier, he was dressed in the same clothes that he wore before he was attacked. He was looking at his hands like he’s never seen them before. He was still processing what on earth just happened to him.

He’s alive again.

When he looked up, the first thing he saw was Pau running up to him then enveloping him in her arms. It took him a few seconds to realize that he was actually feeling her embrace right there and then. He hugged her back, burying his head in her neck. His tears didn’t hesitate to spill out of his eyes. He couldn’t tell if they were tears of joy for being alive again…

Or if he was sobbing because of what he just went through. Probably both, he thought.

“I missed you.” These were his first words.

Mark pulled away shortly and locked eyes with her. His gaze was full of love and adoration for the girl in front of him. His eyes fell down to her lips and right before he could lean in, he saw a crowd walking up to the two of them. It’s a mix of the Familiars and some of the members of the Seven Families

Guess that kiss is gonna have to wait.

“Mark I… how? How was this possible?” Pau asked. Not that she didn’t want him but because it’s probably the question on everyone’s mind.

He paused for a moment to gather his thoughts. He was still processing what he just witnessed before he came back to life.

“Mark?” Pau called out to snap him out of his thoughts.

“Jenny. She brought me back,” he answered promptly. Pau sensed the fear in his voice.

The Familiars exchanged looks. Aly looked the most confused out of all of them. How could that be when his spirit was in the Min Mansion?

“Mark, something tells me there’s more to that,” Pau said gently. “Please tell us. What is it?”

“She’s gone. Lucas did it.”

[bimboficationblues]

a condensed taxonomy of liberalism

Two notes: First, there is an enormous deal of diversity and difference within each of these periods; these are useful conceptual categories and nothing more. Second, I’m focusing mostly on the history of liberal theory rather than the history of liberalism, because “actually existing liberalism” emerged and evolved in a multiplicity of ways across the globe - but I will make particular notes of significant events in its development, and the relationship between liberal theory and liberal practice is a reciprocal one.

Early or proto-liberalism is the term I prefer for the nascent period of liberalism, when it is not quite a fully developed political theory nor has it reached cultural, economic, or political hegemony yet. In Western Europe, this period roughly corresponds to the late fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, with the eighteenth marking the definitive break towards a new “type” of liberalism. The thinkers of this period are often not “liberals” in any recognizable contemporary sense but they introduce concepts that become formative to later forms of liberalism. Most of these thinkers take an atomized, individualistic, self-interested subject as the universal model of humanity; when these subjects are plopped into the conceptual device dubbed “state of nature”, either their human nature or environmental constraints (or both) result in the necessity and practicality of a centralized government, in the form of a state. But that government can only be legitimized through the consent of the governed (though this consent may be “tacit”). The other key principle of this period of liberal thought is toleration - primarily religious, but basically the idea of “negative liberty,” in which there are many domains in which the state cannot interfere due to “natural right.”

Key Proto-Liberal Thinkers: Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, John Calvin, arguably Renaissance humanists, arguably Martin Luther

Key Proto-Liberal Events: English Civil War, Dutch Revolt, Reformation, Peace of Westphalia, colonization of the Americas prior to the French & Indian War

Classical liberalism is a term I can’t stand because it’s overly broad in temporal scope, so I like to subdivide it in two: early and late.

Early classical liberalism is what most people associate with the revolutionary period, and I would argue is the point where it becomes a fully-realized political theory. Many of the proto-liberal concepts were expanded, edited, and developed. While many of the proto-liberal thinkers were not exactly free-traders, Locke’s “labor theory of property” and account of money and inequality became formative on liberal economic thought during this period. (Worth noting that capitalism and liberalism are historically co-extensive, informing each other in various ways.) Some of these liberals are more radical than others - early feminists operate in a liberal mode of thought, there were a number of radical factions in the French Revolution, and Thomas Paine is noted for his proto-socialism. One of the major struggles in liberal theory was the place of democracy, whether the public could be trusted or had to be guided. Hence, liberalism and democracy are not necessarily wedded, though their spreads have also been co-extensive - it is possible (as Shadi Hamid has noted) to have an illiberal political culture and a democratic system of governance, and vice versa. It’s also worth noting that on the whole, these liberals tend to emphasize particular positive liberties rather than the negative liberties which often characterized proto-liberal thought

Key ECL Thinkers: J.J. Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, Maximilien Robespierre, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, J.B. Say

Key ECL Events: Atlantic Revolutionary wave (American, Haitian, French), First Industrial Revolution, 1848 Revolutionary wave

Late classical liberalism is the period in which liberalism begins to spread in its hegemonic status, during the mid-to-late nineteenth century as well as the beginning of the twentieth. The concept of eternal growth and progress, inherited from Adam Smith, is lionized into gospel and serves as justification for the expansion of industrialization, the world market, and imperial powers - hence the association of the term “classical liberal” with laissez-faire economic policy. It is also marked by an increasing emphasis on positivism, the view that natural science is the highest form of human knowledge and the attempt to apply the scientific method to social and economic relations. Related theories that were seized upon by classical liberals were utilitarianism and Social Darwinism, which were used in the social engineering of the period.

Key LCL Thinkers: Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Frederic Bastiat, Manchester Liberalism

Key LCL Events: Latin American wars of independence, Opium Wars, American Civil War, Second Industrial Revolution, Scramble for Africa

Revisionist liberalism is a term that I have taken from philosopher Samuel Black to describe the forms of liberalism that emerge in the 20th century, especially after the Depression and World War II. I use this term instead of “left-liberalism” or “social liberalism,” which I think confuse more than clarify. “Revisionist” indicates that there is both continuity and rupture with the previous forms. While revisionist liberals seek to preserve a market economy and the rule of law within the state-form, they tend to pair this with a concern for individual citizen welfare and as such promote a more actively involved state, one that is willing to get involved in economic practice as well as expand and protect social, civil, and political rights. Subsequently, they place a much greater emphasis on pluralism and egalitarianism than earlier liberals. However, they retain many of proto-liberalism and classical liberalism’s premises. It is also often marked by a commitment to political as well as economic internationalism and associated with the rise of the Bretton Woods system.

Key RL Thinkers: Max Weber, John Maynard Keynes, John Rawls, ML King, Ronald Dworkin, Isaiah Berlin, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum

Key RL Events: New Deal, American South Civil Rights Movement, LBJ’s War on Poverty

Neoliberalism is the big term that makes people upset. In contradistinction to revisionist liberalism, neoliberalism is not interested in egalitarianism though it may be interested in certain kinds of pluralism; its primary aim is to strip away barriers to market expansion. Though this often manifests as “anti-statism,” neoliberals usually support the existence of a strong state that can defend private property rights, guarantee money, and create the conditions for market expansion. There is a sharp opposition to the central planning of 20th-century socialist countries as well as Keynesianism, allegedly out of concern for institutional capture by interest groups or giving way to totalitarianism. Neoliberal policy and philosophy seeks to privatize public goods and services, weaken the power of organized labor, create a “good business climate” through revision of tax codes, and scrap regulations where possible. It is, in many ways, a resurrection of the late classical liberal period in a new guise and under new conditions.

Key NL Thinkers: Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys, Robert Nozick, James Buchanan, Ayn Rand, Arthur Laffer, Karl Popper (yes, Popper is a neoliberal, eat my shorts)

Key NL Events: the past thirty to forty years (China getting Xiaopinged, Pinochet’s Chile regime, Reagan and Thatcher, 1970s recession, Bolivian water wars, structural adjustment programs and austerity measures round the globe)

Some contemporary reading recs that I thought of right now, feel free to add more:

- Liberalism: The Life of an Idea - Edmund Fawcett - Liberalism: A Counter-History - Domenico Losurdo - Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital - Vivek Chibber - A Brief History of Neoliberalism - David Harvey - Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy - Barrington Moore

[bucketjournal]

John Stuart Mill

1806–1873

Philosopher, Economist, Scholar, Author. Liberal feminist.

Topics: logic, epistemology, economics, social and political philosophy, ethics, and religion

BACKGROUND

Under the tutelage of his imposing father, himself a historian and economist, John Stuart Mill began his intellectual journey at an early age, starting his study of Greek at the age of three and Latin at eight. Mill’s father was a proponent of Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy of utilitarianism, and John Stuart Mill began embracing it himself in his middle teens. Later, he started to believe that his rigorous analytical training had weakened his capacity for emotion, that his intellect had been nurtured but his feelings had not. This perhaps led to his expansion of Bentham’s utilitarian thought, his development of the “harm theory,” and his writings in the defense of the rights of women, all of which cemented his reputation as a major thinker of his day.

James Mill spent considerable time educating his son John, who began to learn Greek at age three and Latin at age eight. By the age of 14, John was extremely well versed in the Greek and Latin classics; had studied world history, logic and mathematics; and had mastered the basics of economic theory, all of which was part of his father’s plan to make John Stuart Mill a young proponent of the views of the philosophical radicals.

Crisis and Evolution of the Thinker

In 1826, John Stuart Mill experienced what he would later call in his autobiography a “mental crisis,” during which he suffered a nervous breakdown marked by depression. It was likely triggered by the intense stress of his education, the continual influence of his domineering father, and other factors, but what emerged from this period is in the end more important than what caused it: Because of the depression, Mill started to rethink his entire life’s work thus far and to reformulate theories he had previously wholly embraced.

Mill’s new path began with a struggle to revise his father’s and Bentham’s work, which he suddenly saw as limited in a number of ways. This new drive was perhaps triggered by the poetry he had begun reading, most notably that of William Wordsworth. Mill found something of a mental balm in the verses of Wordsworth. Over the course of several months, his depression disappeared, and with it many of his former firmly held ideals.

Mill came to believe that he had been emotionally stunted by his father's demanding analytical training, that his ability to feel had been compromised by the constant cultivation of his intellect, and that this emotional component was lacking from what the radical philosophers had been espousing. He therefore sought a philosophy that could overcome the limits imposed by culture and history (e.g., natural rights) on any possible reform movement and would advance the roles of feeling and imagination.

Mill began to dismantle much of the negative (and therefore limited) polemic of Bentham and his father. He understood that fighting the negativity against which he was rebelling with more negativity was futile, so he allowed himself to see the good and to view the defenders of the old ways not as reactionaries but as those who have always advanced the good aspects of their generally flawed ways of thinking.

Mill must have considered his own role in advancing his formerly held beliefs, as he did not abandon Bentham’s utilitarianism entirely, but now centered his thoughts on its “positive” elements instead of attacking it critically and destructively; he focused on how its best parts could be used constructively in the creation of a new society. He advanced in his endeavor by immersing himself in the writings of a wide variety of thinkers (and corresponding with many as well), including John Ruskin, Auguste Comte and Alexis de Tocqueville, and editing a new journal that he co-founded with his father and Charles Molesworth, the London Review.

In 1851, Mill married Harriet Taylor. They had been close friends for 20 years, but were only able to marry when her first husband died. She was a great influence on his work, particularly in the area of women's rights, of which she was an early advocate. She died in 1858 and the following year he published 'On Liberty', his most famous work, which they had written together and which he dedicated to her.

[coolalternatehistories]

Fallout Lore: Before The Bombs Fell

It’s unclear exactly where the Fallout timeline diverts from our own, but we can estimate that the split happened sometime after World War 2 in the late 40s into the 50s and 60s. According the the Wikia page, the split may have happened in 1947 when the transistor wasn’t discovered like in our timeline. Wikia can be extremely unreliable at times, so I’m just treating that as a theory and not concrete evidence.

Anyway, after the 40s, the United States government tries to mitigate the influence of Communism by dividing the states among 13 different Commonwealths (an homage to the original 13 colonies), some time before 1969. In 1970, China fails to adopt any free-market reforms like in our timeline, leading them to dig even deeper into Communism. Things are kinds quiet for the next 21 years until another major difference occurs in 1991, as the Soviet Union doesn’t collapse in this alternate scenario. It merely becomes weaker, letting China take the wheel as America’s Cold War adversary.

Again, world events don’t hold anymore canonical importance until halfway through the 21st century. In 2052, many nations are suffering from severe oil shortages, leading to Middle Eastern countries raising prices in order to hoard the precious commodity for themselves. This draws the attention of the oil-hungry European Commonwealth (evolved European Union), who then send military forces into the Middle East to take the oil in a hostile takeover, beginning the Resource Wars.

The United Nations is powerless to stop the conflict, as many of its member nations withdraw to join the conflict. The organization disbands that same year.

Back across the Atlantic, the United States has nothing to do with the Resource Wars, but they’re still suffering from oil shortages. Desperate to keep a constant supply, the U.S. tries to bargain with their southern neighbor, Mexico. When the Mexican government refuses, American forces travel into the nation and force them to trade oil. This sends the Latin-American nation into further governmental and economic instability.

(You see the theme of America being kind of a bad guy? That comes into play later. Trust me.)

Now, the United States have a constant supply of oil from Mexico, Texas, and Alaska. At least for a few months. Texas’s wells run dry the same year, but that’s the least of their problems. In 2053, a devastating disease known as the “New Plague” (a spiritual successor to the medieval Black Death) ravages the nation. An estimated 200,000 people are killed, leading the government to close international borders.

Meanwhile, the Resource Wars turn radioactive. A terrorist organization uses a homemade nuke to destroy Tel Aviv in Israel, which causes a great wave of panic in the already devastated United States. These fears are only escalated when the Middle Eastern nations and the European forces launch nukes at each other on the front lines.

In what seemed like an attempt to provide safe asylum for the American people in case of a nuclear exchange, the government begins Project Safehouse. This project was planned to feature over 400 underground fallout shelters known as “Vaults.” However, the short time span before the Great War only allowed 122 to be completed.

In 2059, matters get worse. The United States sends a large number of troops into Alaska to protect their last steady supply of oil. This strains relations with Canada as America keeps pushing to have soldiers stationed on their soil. Seven years later, in 2066, the Middle Eastern countries all run out of oil. This leads to the end of the Resource Wars and the European Civil War. The nations of the European Commonwealth begin fighting amongst each other for control of what little oil remains. Fossil fuel prices increase as the supplies dwindle, leading to advances in nuclear technology. In America, the nuclear fusion engineer quickly replaces the internal combustion engine as the main power source for automobiles. Just when the Resource Wars appeared over for a couple of months, the People's Republic of China is going through its own oil shortage, merely holding its last reserves. They soon find a new target. The Communist country invades Alaska in an attempt to take America's last supply of oil, sparking the Sino-American war. This war would define the Fallout series. Some of the games' most iconic images, such as power armor, were created because of it. As the war drags on, America continues to strong-arm Canada into allowing the troops to pass through. The northern nation, already weakening, has no choice but to comply. Citizens begin referring to Canada as "Little America." This does not aid the situation in any way. The conflict comes to a head in 2072, when Chinese saboteurs attempt to destroy the American oil pipeline. America decides to try and gain a new foothold in the war. The country begins annexing Canada. The war goes on for 4 more years, with America sending power armor-enhanced soldiers into mainland China in 2076, causing them to retreat from Alaska. The war appears over, but the heads of the government know it's only a pause. Fearing nuclear war, the President and some of the top government officials have formed a group known as the Enclave. If nuclear war ever came, they would use the experiments in the Vaults to see how people could live together on a spaceship if they ever tried to recolonize another planet. Once China leaves Alaska, the Enclave retreats to the Poseidon oil rig off the California coast. The American public celebrates the end of the war. Countless people died in the conflict but it ended in an American "victory", so to them, the peace was won. Then......everything changed. On October 23, 2077, China and its ally, the Soviet Union, launched their entire nuclear arsenals at the United States, which in turn launched its entire arsenal as well. The Great War lasted only two hours. Every nation on Earth that possesses nuclear weapons launched them all, completely ending the world as they had known it. The Pre-War nations were gone, set ablaze by the nuclear fire. This isn't the end of the story, however. Out of the nuclear ashes, new factions arose, new societies were founded, and people tried to rebuild. In the next post, I'll go over some of these new things that appeared after the war. Thanks for reading!!!

[biofunmy]

From Underwear to Cars, India’s Economy Is Fraying

TIRUPUR, India — When Alan Greenspan ran a consulting firm and wanted to know where the economy was headed, he would often look at sales of men’s underwear as a guide.

Mr. Greenspan, who later served as chairman of the Federal Reserve, believed that when times were tough, men would stop replacing worn-out underwear, which no one could see, before cutting other purchases.

By that measure, India is in a serious slump.

“Sales are down 50 percent,” said Jeffrin Moses, gesturing toward the boxes of cotton briefs and tank tops bulging from the shelves of the Tantex undergarment emporium in Tirupur, the southern city where most of the country’s knitwear is made.

It’s not just underwear. Car sales plunged 32 percent in August, the largest drop in two decades, and carmakers are warning of one million layoffs as shoppers balk at rising prices and struggle to get loans from skittish lenders. Macrotech, a big real estate developer that has teamed up with President Trump on a residential tower in Mumbai, just laid off 400 employees as demand for new housing sinks.

Families are even skimping on the 7-cent packets of Parle biscuits that are a staple of India’s morning milk and tea. They are turning instead to even cheaper snacks made by local food vendors, according to Mayank Shah, a Parle executive. Biscuit sales are down about 8 percent, he said, and if current trends continue, the company may cut as many as 10,000 jobs.

Further darkening India’s outlook is the global economic slowdown, the recent spike in oil prices and the impact of Mr. Trump’s trade battles — including one with India.

On Friday, the Indian government, which spent months playing down evidence of a slowdown, finally acknowledged the depth of the problem, announcing a surprise cut in income taxes for all companies and additional incentives for manufacturers.

And this weekend, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is traveling to Houston to meet with Mr. Trump and try to resolve some of their trade disputes.

Until last year, India, with a population of 1.3 billion people, was the world’s fastest-growing large economy, routinely clocking growth of 8 percent or more. Now the government pegs the country’s growth at 5 percent. And the layoff notices are piling up, with unemployment at 8.4 percent and rising, according to the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy.

India’s reversal of fortunes, partly driven by domestic problems like neglected farmers, is ominous for other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America that are trying to navigate both the weakening global economy and Mr. Trump’s fusillade of trade conflicts.

“India is potentially a bellwether,” said Per Hammarlund, the chief emerging markets strategist at SEB, a Swedish bank. “It’s a sign of the global economic trend right now: Growth has slowed further this year than last year.”

As skittish global investors have flocked to the safety of the dollar, India’s rupee and other emerging-market currencies have plunged in value. That has made vital imports of energy, electronics and factory equipment more expensive. Last weekend’s attack on two Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, which sent the global price of oil soaring, underscored just how vulnerable India and other developing countries are to external factors beyond their control.

Like China and Indonesia, India is grappling with the fallout from years of excessive lending encouraged by the state. In India’s case, the overhang of bad bank loans, coupled with recent defaults by nonbank financial firms, has curbed lending to consumers and businesses.

Policy decisions by India’s central and state governments have worsened the country’s downturn, according to economists and business leaders.

Auto manufacturers, for example, were hit by a triple whammy: New safety and emissions standards increased the cost of vehicles, nine states raised taxes on car sales, and the banks and finance companies that fund dealers and 80 percent of consumer car purchases were paralyzed by the credit crunch.

“All of that coming in one year resulted in a normal cyclical recession becoming a deep depression in the auto sector,” said R.C. Bhargava, chairman of Maruti Suzuki, India’s largest automaker.

Some manufacturers are now begging the government to cut taxes on new car purchases or get old gas guzzlers off the road through a cash-for-clunkers program.

Mr. Modi was criticized in his first term for ignoring early evidence of a slowdown. After he won a sweeping re-election victory in May, many economists expected him to pass a short-term stimulus package and tackle longstanding issues like farm poverty and land reform.

Instead, he dealt the economy a blow with an unexpected tax increase on foreign investors, prompting them to dump Indian stocks and bonds. The rupee reeled.

More recently, the Modi administration has acknowledged the need for action. In addition to the tax cuts on Friday, the finance minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, recently promised that the government would step in to help automakers and speed infrastructure spending, and she has directed government-owned banks to make more loans. The government also reversed the new taxes on investors.

The textile industry, which employs about 45 million people and is India’s second-largest employer after agriculture, is emblematic of the country’s distress.

On an afternoon in early September, Tirupur’s market for wholesale, overstock and slightly defective clothing was deserted. Mr. Moses said that store owners and distributors typically traveled across India to place bulk orders for shirts, pants, dresses and fabric before the country’s September-to-November festival season.

“Now, people do not come,” he said.

The region’s spinning mills, which twirl cotton into yarn, are cutting production. Although the world price of cotton has plunged because of the increased American tariffs on Chinese textiles, owners say that yarn prices have also fallen, making it difficult for mills to profit.

At Dollar Industries, which has made men’s underwear for nearly half a century, a 4 percent decline in sales last quarter was a shock.

“I haven’t seen a slowdown like this,” said Gaurav Gupta, a son of one of Dollar’s founders, as he walked through the company’s plants. “For a customer who used to buy six pairs of garments, now he has come down to probably four.”

Still, Dollar’s Italian-made cutting machines continue to slice colorful sheets of fabric for undershirts and underpants, six days a week. About 100 workers sort the pieces and tie them into bales, ready for contractors who will sew them into finished garments.

Dollar has not laid off anyone yet, although it has cut work hours — and paychecks — by 10 to 20 percent. Mr. Gupta said his factories were switching to making thermal underwear for northern India’s chilly winters, and he hoped that the festival season would mark the beginning of a turnaround in sales.

Sambhu Karwar, a 22-year-old employee who smooths the fabric before it is cut, said the job was better than working in his family’s bakery in eastern India. Dollar pays him a monthly salary of 12,000 rupees, or about $167, and provides lodging and some subsidized food.

“It’s good living here,” said Mr. Karwar, whose brother also works at the factory.

The outlook is bleaker at Siva Exports, a contractor that stitches some of Dollar’s underwear.

Most of the sewing machines in the two-story factory sit idle. Siva’s owner, V. Murugesan, said he had to lay off about three-quarters of his tailors over the last six months after he lost his two biggest clients — clothing brands in Italy and France. He said he could not match the prices they could get in Bangladesh, where wages are far lower.

“It’s a buyer’s market,” Mr. Murugesan said. “Orders are very slow.” He urged the government to help small exporters like him with subsidies or other support.

Dollar said its distributors and retailers were having trouble borrowing money to finance inventory. The government’s lengthy delays in paying tax refunds to small businesses are increasing the cash crunch.

So Dollar is trying to step into the gap, allowing its partners to buy a few weeks’ worth of stock at a time instead of requiring them to buy three months of inventory as it did previously.

“We are trying to work in a different manner,” said Shashi Agarwal, Dollar’s senior vice president of corporate strategy.

With the cheaper rupee and the higher American tariffs on imported Chinese textiles that began Sept. 1, India has an opportunity to export more garments to the United States.

That’s the theory, at least.

But C. Anand, director of RTW Renaissance Asia, a Tirupur garment maker that focuses on exports to the United States, said that India could not compete on price alone against exports from Bangladesh or Vietnam or free-trade zones like Jordan or Haiti.

“You have to bring innovation to the market,” he said. For example, he said, his company has devised a way to process the cotton yarn and fabric for an American company’s work uniforms so that they can withstand at least 50 washings without significant wear.

Innovation may not be enough, however.

Vijay Varthanan, who was once a quality control manager at a garment factory and now runs a small grocery store in Tirupur, predicted that times would get worse before they got better.

Sales are down by about 50 percent in his shop, he said, and a lot of people are buying food on credit. Mr. Varthanan said that many workers would head back to their home villages next month for Diwali, India’s biggest holiday — and not come back.

“Everything is totally down,” he said. “People are just waiting for their Diwali bonuses.”

Ayesha Venkataraman contributed research from Mumbai, India.

Sahred From Source link Business

from WordPress http://bit.ly/2IjiTeh via IFTTT

[thisdaynews]

Trump's use of immigration as 2020 wedge could backfire on other policies

New Post has been published on https://thebiafrastar.com/trumps-use-of-immigration-as-2020-wedge-could-backfire-on-other-policies/

Trump's use of immigration as 2020 wedge could backfire on other policies

President Donald Trump’s laser focus on immigration could disrupt other foreign policy priorities and his 2020 bid. | Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images

foreign policy

Detractors and even some supporters say it has undermined everything from Trump’s effort to weaken Iran’s Islamist regime to his attempts to strike a trade deal with Mexico.

Donald Trump’s push to restrict immigration is clashing with policy goals in ways that detractors and even some supporters say could hurt his 2020 reelection bid.

It’s happened, they note, on everything from Trump’s effort to weaken Iran’s Islamist regime, to his attempts to strike a trade deal with Mexico, to his push to oust Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro. And it could happen on gun control, if Trump tries to wed expanded background checks with an immigration overhaul.

Story Continued Below

To pro-immigrant advocates, Trump simply wants to inject immigration into as many discussions to keep it alive an election wedge issue. They argue he’s blind to the consequences that is having on his other major initiatives.

“Everything you see is about 2020,” said David Leopold, a prominent immigration lawyer and Trump critic. “He uses the issue — a very serious policy issue, a complicated policy problem, immigration — he uses it for purely selfish political reasons, to throw red meat to his base.”

But others insist he is purely going off instinct. Mark Krikorian, the executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, which favors curbing immigration, laughed when asked if there was a strategy behind some of Trump’s moves.

“There are both supporters and detractors of his who imagine he’s playing 40-dimensional string theory chess, when in fact he’s just operating from his gut,” he said.

Regardless, Trump’s approach to immigration has — intentionally or not — gotten mixed up with his administration’s other initiatives.

One major Trump foreign policy goal is forcing out Maduro, whom Trump no longer recognizes as Venezuela’s president. Trump and his aides have pointed to Venezuela’s misery — an economic collapse, food and medicine shortages and corruption — as reasons why Maduro should be ousted.

But even as the Trump team has detailed the horrifying conditions that have led millions of Venezuelans to flee, it has ignored calls to grant Venezuelans in the United States “temporary protected status” so that they can stay in America even if they lack legal status.

In fact, Trump has been trying to dismantle the entire TPS program, which has also covered people from several other nations riven with violence or natural disaster. Trump is also trying to cut down on the number of people granted asylum in the U.S. just as Venezuela has become atop sourceof asylum applications filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Another Trump foreign policy goal is to weaken the Islamist government in Iran. Using primarily economic sanctions, the president and his team are raising pressure on the clerical regime, and they say they’re doing it in part to end the oppression of ordinary Iranians.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has even implied that deteriorating economic conditions in the country could cause Iranians to revolt against the regime. “I think what can change is the people can change the government,” Pompeo told CBS News earlier this year.

But Trump’s expressed love for Iranians — he’s called them “great people” — has been undercut by his decision to include Iranians in his infamous travel ban. Iranian activists point to the travel ban, and Trump’s tighter asylum policies, as evidence Trump doesn’t care about Iranians at all.

“It’s like a slap in the face. The Trump administration is asking Iranians to rise up against their cruel regime, and at the same time they are not allowing them to take safe haven in the United States,” said Leila Austin, executive director of the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans, a non-profit advocacy group.

Even some supporters of Trump’s overall tough policy toward Iran say the travel ban was a mistake, and that at the very least it should have been better tailored.

“Lift the travel ban & give thousands of H1B [visas] & green cards to ordinary Iranians,” Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which has backed Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign” against the Iranian regime,tweetedin April.“Ban regime connected officials & their families from entering US.”

Trump’s tough immigration policies have at times damaged his standing with people who voted for him. For instance, many members of America’s Iraqi Christian community supported Trump because he promised to do more to protect Christians overseas. That promise also led many evangelical Christians to support the president.

But as part of his immigration crackdown, Trump has been trying to deport hundreds of Iraqi Christians back to Iraq, where many fear they’ll face torture and death. Just this past week, a 41-year-old Michigan man deported to Iraq in June died, possibly because could not obtain insulin in Baghdad to treat his diabetes. While the man, Jimmy Aldaoud, was an Iraqi national, he had been in the U.S. since he was a young child and did not speak Arabic.

Aldaoud was one of an estimated 160,000 Chaldean Catholics in Michigan, many of whom supported Trump in 2016. They now feel betrayed.

“There’s a tremendous amount of anxiety in the community,”saidMartin Manna of the Chaldean Community Foundation earlier this week.

Also this past week, following deadly mass shootings in Texas and Ohio, Trump signaled that he might support expanding background checks for people seeking to buy guns. But he also briefly floated the idea of “marrying” gun control to an immigration overhaul. Such a linkage would likely kill chances for either proposal to succeed.

Trump’s campaign insists his strict approach to immigration is actually well-matched with the president’s other initiatives — both at home and abroad.

“President Trump’s first priorities will always be the safety and prosperity of the American people, which is why he has focused on border security and the enforcement of immigration laws,” a Trump campaign spokesperson said in a statement. “He will also stand in support of freedom over tyranny around the world. These principles are compatible.”

In the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections, Trump used immigration as a major talking point, regularly inveighing against “caravans” of migrants coming to the U.S. from Latin America. Despite Democrats racking up big wins in that election, Trump hasn’t abandoned his anti-immigration emphasis.

He shut down the federal government for a record 35 days in an unsuccessful bid to get Congress to fund the construction of a border wall with Mexico. The costly move angered workers in many industrial sectors, threatening a Republican talking point for 2020 about how well the U.S. economy is doing under Trump.

Trump then stunned Washington in May when he threatened to impose tariffs on Mexico if it didn’t do more to stop migrants from crossing into the United States.

Even Republican lawmakerswarnedthat the tariffs could threaten congressional approval of what Trump considers a top achievement: His negotiation of a new trade deal with Canada and Mexico. They also noted the tariffs could hurt American workers, including many farmers who have supported Trump.

Mexico has avoided the threatened tariffs so far by stepping up efforts to deter migrants from entering the U.S. But Trump’s threats may also have spooked China, another country with whom he’s engaged in trade talks, about whether he’s reliable.

“The message that was received was that deals that the president makes don’t stick. You’re always vulnerable to him coming back and wanting to change everything,” said Bill Reinsch, an Asia expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Trump is surrounded by some top aides, such as Stephen Miller, who are known to favor much tighter restrictions on immigration. But former Trump aides and even some of his critics say that at the end of the day, it’s Trump’s own political instincts that drive his message.

Trump’s instincts apparently tell him that revving up anti-immigrant attitudes among some in the Republican base will work for him in 2020 — even after the 2018 setback and even if it means undercutting other policy goals.

“I don’t think he cares about his legacy as much as he cares about the moment,” said Frank Sharry, founder and executive director of America’s Voice, a liberal group advocating for immigration reform.

Sometimes Trump’s immigration policy appears to undermine his immigration policy.

Krikorian pointed out that while Trump talks of ensuring Americans have access to jobs, the president has alsosuggestedthat he wants to let in more immigrants to fill certain positions, such as temporary jobs in landscaping and housekeeping.

And in June, the State Department confirmed that the United States will cut off future foreign aid funds to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras — three Central American countries that are a major source of migrants to the United States.

Trump says those countries aren’t doing enough to stop their citizens from fleeing to America. But Republicans and Democrats in Congress have criticized his decision to cut off the funding. They argue that by ending support for programs that try to reduce violence and ease poverty, Trump’s decision could spur even more people to migrate to the U.S.

Some Trump critics wonder if Trump is intentionally trying to exacerbate the migration crisis through such moves so that he can point to it — and his self-declared toughness on immigration — as a reason why he should be re-elected.

“I think it’s a terrible move,” Leopold said. “And he’s going to learn that in 2020.”

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[princessmommyofboys-blog]

Final Project Feminist Blog

The Period Poem

"The Period Poem" by Dominique Christina provided a personal background about her experience with the very female body function of menstruation.  She was angered by a "Twitter" of a man who made a disrespectful comment about his girlfriend that started her period while they were having sex so he "dumped" her immediately.  She addresses her poem to him in honor of her 13 year old daughter so she will know what is happening to her body is natural and beautiful.  She begins by sharing her experience when she first got her period, how she was shamed by boys in her class and later describes the anatomy of a woman's body and how it is a normal function for all girls and women.  She threw her daughter a period party with all of the attendees dressed in red with red food and drinks.  She was able to take a very sensitive subject, discuss it with humor in a way that everyone that views her video, will understand what a natural thing this is for women.  This is an example of intersectionality experienced by girls regarding this most feminine event into womanhood.  It's incredible that Dominique Christina was so in tune to the needs of her daughter, that she took time to address one of the most personal body functions and make it less terrifying for her.

Still I Rise                  

By Maya Angelou

You may write me down in history

With your bitter, twisted lies,

You may trod me in the very dirt

But still, like dust, I'll rise.

Does my sassiness upset you?

Why are you beset with gloom?

’Cause I walk like I've got oil wells

Pumping in my living room.

Just like moons and like suns,

With the certainty of tides,

Just like hopes springing high,

Still I'll rise.

Did you want to see me broken?

Bowed head and lowered eyes?

Shoulders falling down like teardrops,

Weakened by my soulful cries?

Does my haughtiness offend you?

Don't you take it awful hard

’Cause I laugh like I've got gold mines

Diggin’ in my own backyard.

You may shoot me with your words,

You may cut me with your eyes,

You may kill me with your hatefulness,

But still, like air, I’ll rise.

Does my sexiness upset you?

Does it come as a surprise

That I dance like I've got diamonds

At the meeting of my thighs?

Out of the huts of history’s shame

I rise

Up from a past that’s rooted in pain

I rise

I'm a black ocean, leaping and wide,

Welling and swelling I bear in the tide.

Leaving behind nights of terror and fear

I rise

Into a daybreak that’s wondrously clear

I rise

Bringing the gifts that my ancestors gave,

I am the dream and the hope of the slave.

I rise

I rise

I rise.

"Still I Rise" by Maya Angelou is a beautiful poem that is written about a tragic history of the African slaves and regardless what is done to them, they still rise from the ashes.  Angelou was an acclaimed American author, poet, historian and a civil rights activist. She was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Barack Obama in 2011 for her lifetime of achievements.  In this poem, Angelou uses standpoint theory to tell the truths and renounce all of the lies that are told about slavery history.  The lies can't keep them down, they know the truth and they still fight to share their ancestors story with their families so it isn't forgotten. She talks about the sassiness of a slave and does it upset the master.  She doesn't care because she won't be broken.  Her poem talks about all of the atrocities that can be done to her but she will still rise and overcome them all leaving behind only the memories to live on through their stories.    

  To be of use

By Marge Piercy

The people I love the best

jump into work head first

without dallying in the shallows

and swim off with sure strokes almost out of sight.

They seem to become natives of that element,

the black sleek heads of seals

bouncing like half-submerged balls.

I love people who harness themselves, an ox to a heavy cart,

who pull like water buffalo, with massive patience,

who strain in the mud and the muck to move things forward,

who do what has to be done, again and again.

I want to be with people who submerge

in the task, who go into the fields to harvest

and work in a row and pass the bags along,

who are not parlor generals and field deserters

but move in a common rhythm

when the food must come in or the fire be put out.

The work of the world is common as mud.

Botched, it smears the hands, crumbles to dust.

But the thing worth doing well done

has a shape that satisfies, clean and evident.

Greek amphoras for wine or oil,

Hopi vases that held corn, are put in museums

but you know they were made to be used.

The pitcher cries for water to carry

and a person for work that is real.

Marge Piercy is an American poet, novelist, and feminist.  She has written 17 novels and countless poems.  She credits her mother for making her a poet.  She lives in Cape Code and is very active in the women's movement. Her mother's family taught her to enjoy life because trouble is never far away.  She tries to add that to her poetry by giving thanks for what has been given to us as well as bearing witness to what is withheld or taken away from us.  "To Be Of Use" by Marge Piercy is a poem about  doing work that is meaningful and satisfying.  She talks about the people doing hard work and seeming to take the initiative and be motivated.  Regardless of how common the work is, she writes to make it well done.  This poem is about standpoint theory.  There is pride in what the writer is describing in the poem. She is describing people and they way she likes for them to work and act.  She is in essence, describing herself. She loves to garden on her property which she enjoys but is very exhausting and endless work. 

Christina Aguilera  “Can’t Hold Us Down”

 Christina Aguilera is an American songwriter, singer, and actress.  She has won Grammy awards, a Latin Grammy and a stay on the Hollywood walk of Fame.  She has avoided calling herself a feminist because she doesn't like labels.  She has released a duet with Demi Lovato in 2018 titled " Fall in Line" that has been dubbed a feminist anthem.  "Can't Hold Us Down" by Christina Aguilera is a song and video that was performed in 2009.  It takes place in "the hood" as she is crossing the street, a man grabs her behind.  She then begins to tell how men act when women don't put up with their degrading acts. She says they make up false rumors and call them names.  She goes on to point out that it's sad that you only get your fame through controversy. She tells throughout the song that regardless what you try to do to women, you can't hold them down.  This is an intersectional video as it is multiracial and a great example of hip-hop feminism.  

“This Is Not A Feminist Song”  - SNL

The SNL anthem "This Is Not A Feminist Song" is a 2016 satire to the need to have a song dedicated to all that is important to feminism.  The group says they wanted to make the song, but it was just too hard and they were afraid they would not do a good job.  There are representations of many women from all walks of life and ethnicities.  It displayed intersectionality among the women performers.  In the end, they are finally able to realize that all of the things they mention, are a part of a feminist song.  In the song they do pay honor to several feminists and women's rights activists such as Malala, Angelou and Albright.  They acknowledged how women can be strong and have the right to choose.  In closing, they admit writing a feminist song is tough and tricky. 

“The Rich Man’s House” by The Resistance Revival Chorus

The Resistance Revival Chorus formed after Trump's inauguration to bring protest songs to the women's revolution.   In this video, they are performing "The Rich Man's House" which is a traditional labor movement song had the lyrics changes to in response to Trump's presidency.  They attend various venues to elevate the protest songs for civil rights, women's rights, as well as #Me Too and #Times Up. The Chorus formed in New York but they hope to inspire other groups across the country to form their own groups and published a tool kit to assist.  They dress in white to symbolize peace and unity.  "The Rich Man's House"   lyrics were changed to going down to the White House to take back what they stole from me, took back my dignity, took back my humanity.  "Now he's under my feet and ain't gonna let the system walk all over me".  The Chorus is an example of intersectional and standpoint theory.  They formed because Trump has put civil rights at risk by discontinuing the funding of women's programs and programs that protect women from violence and sexual harassment.  

“Hidden Figures”

Hidden Figures is a beautiful movie about three African American women that are hired at NASA to work for the math department calculating figures for launching and landing the space ships. These women were hard working and were able to maintain a family life while working the long hours for NASA. These women faced segregation and frequent racial and sexual discrimination.  Katherine Johnson (Taraji P. Henson) was pivotal in the mathematical equations to look into calculations that didn't yet exist but were needed for John Glenn to go safely into orbit.  The women were not accepted by the men or the white women at NASA.  These women were finally given a chance to excel and in the process, were able to break down the doors of segregation at NASA.  Mary Jackson (Janelle Monae) was able to pursue her dream of becoming an engineer.  These women were able to change protocols at NASA to allow not only women but African American women in business meetings and command centers.  This intersectional movie is very inspirational to young women to continue to reach for dreams.

[nebris]

The Man from Red Vienna

December 21, 2017 Issue

Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left

by Gareth Dale Columbia University Press, 381 pp., $40.00; $27.00 (paper)

What a splendid era this was going to be, with one remaining superpower spreading capitalism and liberal democracy around the world. Instead, democracy and capitalism seem increasingly incompatible. Global capitalism has escaped the bounds of the postwar mixed economy that had reconciled dynamism with security through the regulation of finance, the empowerment of labor, a welfare state, and elements of public ownership. Wealth has crowded out citizenship, producing greater concentration of both income and influence, as well as loss of faith in democracy. The result is an economy of extreme inequality and instability, organized less for the many than for the few.

Not surprisingly, the many have reacted. To the chagrin of those who look to the democratic left to restrain markets, the reaction is mostly right-wing populist. And “populist” understates the nature of this reaction, whose nationalist rhetoric, principles, and practices border on neofascism. An increased flow of migrants, another feature of globalism, has compounded the anger of economically stressed locals who want to Make America (France, Norway, Hungary, Finland…) Great Again. This is occurring not just in weakly democratic nations such as Poland and Turkey, but in the established democracies—Britain, America, France, even social-democratic Scandinavia.

We have been here before. During the period between the two world wars, free-market liberals governing Britain, France, and the US tried to restore the pre–World War I laissez-faire system. They resurrected the gold standard and put war debts and reparations ahead of economic recovery. It was an era of free trade and rampant speculation, with no controls on private capital. The result was a decade of economic insecurity ending in depression, a weakening of parliamentary democracy, and fascist backlash. Right up until the German election of July 1932, when the Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag, the pre-Hitler governing coalition was practicing the economic austerity commended by Germany’s creditors.

The great prophet of how market forces taken to an extreme destroy both democracy and a functioning economy was not Karl Marx but Karl Polanyi. Marx expected the crisis of capitalism to end in universal worker revolt and communism. Polanyi, with nearly a century more history to draw on, appreciated that the greater likelihood was fascism.

As Polanyi demonstrated in his masterwork The Great Transformation (1944), when markets become “dis-embedded” from their societies and create severe social dislocations, people eventually revolt. Polanyi saw the catastrophe of World War I, the interwar period, the Great Depression, fascism, and World War II as the logical culmination of market forces overwhelming society—“the utopian endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system” that began in nineteenth-century England. This was a deliberate choice, he insisted, not a reversion to a natural economic state. Market society, Polanyi persuasively demonstrated, could only exist because of deliberate government action defining property rights, terms of labor, trade, and finance. “Laissez faire,” he impishly wrote, “was planned.”

Polanyi believed that the only way politically to temper the destructive influence of organized capital and its ultra-market ideology was with highly mobilized, shrewd, and sophisticated worker movements. He concluded this not from Marxist economic theory but from close observation of interwar Europe’s most successful experiment in municipal socialism: Red Vienna, where he worked as an economic journalist in the 1920s. And for a time in the post–World War II era, the entire West had an egalitarian form of capitalism built on the strength of the democratic state and underpinned by strong labor movements. But since the era of Thatcher and Reagan that countervailing power has been crushed, with predictable results.

In The Great Transformation, Polanyi emphasized that the core imperatives of nineteenth-century classical liberalism were free trade, the idea that labor had to “find its price on the market,” and enforcement of the gold standard. Today’s equivalents are uncannily similar. We have an ever more intense push for deregulated trade, the better to destroy the remnants of managed capitalism; and the dismantling of what remains of labor market safeguards to increase profits for multinational corporations. In place of the gold standard—whose nineteenth-century function was to force nations to put “sound money” and the interests of bondholders ahead of real economic well-being—we have austerity policies enforced by the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, with the American Federal Reserve tightening credit at the first signs of inflation.

This unholy trinity of economic policies that Polanyi identified is not working any more now than it did in the 1920s. They are practical failures, as economics, as social policy, and as politics. Polanyi’s historical analysis, in both earlier writings and The Great Transformation, has been vindicated three times, first by the events that culminated in World War II, then by the temporary containment of laissez-faire with resurgent democratic prosperity during the postwar boom, and now again by the restoration of primal economic liberalism and neofascist reaction to it. This should be the right sort of Polanyi moment; instead it is the wrong sort.

Gareth Dale’s intellectual biography, Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left, does a fine job of exploring the man, his work, and the political and intellectual setting in which he developed. This is not the first Polanyi biography, but it is the most comprehensive. Dale, a political scientist who teaches at Brunel University in London, also wrote an earlier book, Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market (2010), on his economics.

Polanyi was born in 1886 in Vienna to an illustrious Jewish family. His father, Mihály Pollacsek, came from the Carpathian region of the Hapsburg Empire and acquired a Swiss engineering degree. He was a contractor for the empire’s growing rail system. In the late 1880s, Mihály moved the family to Budapest, according to the Polanyi Archive. He magyarized the children’s family name to Polanyi in 1904, the same year Karl began studies at the University of Budapest, though he kept his own surname. Karl’s mother, Cecile, the well-educated daughter of a Vilna rabbi, was a pioneering feminist. She founded a women’s college in 1912, wrote for German-language periodicals in Budapest and Berlin, and presided over one of Budapest’s literary salons.

At home, German and Hungarian were spoken (along with French “at table”), and English was learned, Dale reports. The five Polanyi children also studied Greek and Latin. In the quarter-century before World War I, Budapest was an oasis of liberal tolerance. As in Vienna, Berlin, and Prague, a large proportion of the professional and cultural elite consisted of assimilated Jews. In the mid-1890s, Dale notes, “the Jewish faith was accorded the same privileges as the Christian denominations, and Jewish representatives were accorded seats in the upper house of parliament.”

Drawing on interviews and correspondence as well as published writings, Dale vividly evokes the era. Polanyi’s milieu in Budapest, known as the Great Generation, included activists and social theorists such as his mentor, Oscar Jaszi; Karl Mannheim; the Marxist Georg Lukács; Karl’s younger brother and ideological sparring partner, the libertarian Michael Polanyi; the physicists Leo Szilard and Edward Teller; the mathematician John von Neumann; and the composers Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály, among many others. In this hothouse Polanyi thrived, attending the Minta Gymnasium, one of the city’s best, and then the University of Budapest. He was expelled in 1907 following a shoving match in which anti-Semitic right-wingers disrupted a lecture by a popular leftist professor, Gyula Pikler. He had to finish his doctor of law degree in 1908 at the provincial University of Kolozsvár (today Cluj in Romania). There, he was a founder of the left-humanist Galilei Circle and later served on the editorial board of its journal.

Polanyi became a leading member of Jaszi’s political party, the Radicals, and was named its general secretary in 1918. He was drawn to the Christian socialism of Robert Owen and Richard Tawney and the guild socialism of G.D.H. Cole. He mused about a fusion of Marxism and Christianity. Polanyi is best classified as a left-wing social democrat—but a lifelong skeptic of the possibility that a capitalist society would ever tolerate a hybrid economic system.

After World War I broke out, Polanyi enlisted as a cavalry officer. When he came home in late 1917, suffering from malnutrition, depression, and typhus, Budapest was in the throes of a chaotic conflict between the left and the right. In 1918 the Hungarian government made a separate peace with the Allies, breaking with Vienna and hoping to create a liberal republic. Events in the streets overtook parliamentary jockeying, and the Communist leader Béla Kun proclaimed what turned out to be a short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Polanyi decamped for Vienna, both to recover his health and to get off the political front lines. There he found his calling as a high-level economics journalist and the love of his life, Ilona Duczynska, a Polish-born radical well to his left. Their daughter, Kari, born in 1923, recalls, as a preteen, clipping marked-up newspaper articles in three languages for her father. At age ninety-four, she continues to help direct the Polanyi Archive in Montreal.

Central Europe’s equivalent of The Economist, the weekly Österreichische Volkswirt, hired Polanyi in 1924 as a writer on international affairs. He continued his quest for a feasible socialism, engaging with others on the left and challenging the right in ongoing arguments with the free-market theorist Ludwig von Mises. The debates, published in agonizing detail, turned on whether a socialist economy was capable of efficient pricing. Mises insisted it was not. Polanyi argued that a decentralized form of worker-led socialism could price necessities with good-enough accuracy. He ultimately concluded, Dale recounts, that these abstruse technical arguments had been a waste of his time.1

A practical answer to the debate with Mises was playing out in Red Vienna. Well-mobilized workers kept socialist municipal governments in power for nearly sixteen years after World War I. Gas, water, and electricity were provided by the government, which also built working-class housing financed by taxes on the rich—including a tax on servants. There were family allowances for parents and municipal unemployment insurance for the trade unions. None of this undermined the efficiency of Austria’s private economy, which was far more endangered by the hapless policies of economic austerity that were criticized by Polanyi. After 1927, unemployment relentlessly increased and wages fell, which helped bring to power in 1932–1933 an Austrofascist government.

To Polanyi, Red Vienna was as important for its politics as for its economics. The perverse policies of Dickensian England reflected the political weakness of its working class, but Red Vienna was an emblem of the strength of its working class. “While [English poor-law reform] caused a veritable disaster of the common people,” he wrote, “Vienna achieved one of the most spectacular triumphs of Western history.” But as Polanyi appreciated, an island of municipal socialism could not survive larger market turbulence and rising fascism.

In 1933, with homegrown fascists running the government, Polanyi left Vienna for London. There, with the help of Cole and Tawney, he eventually found work in an extension program sponsored by Oxford University, known as the Workers’ Educational Association. He taught, among other subjects, English industrial history. His original research for these lectures formed the first drafts of The Great Transformation.

His mentor Oscar Jaszi was also now in exile and teaching at Oberlin. To supplement his meager adjunct pay, Polanyi was able to put together lecture tours to colleges in the United States. He found Roosevelt’s America a hopeful counterpoint to Europe. After war broke out, one of those lecture trips evolved into a three-year appointment at Bennington College, where he completed his book.

The timing of publication was auspicious. The year 1944 included the Bretton Woods Agreement, Roosevelt’s call for an Economic Bill of Rights, and Lord Beverage’s epic blueprint Full Employment in a Free Society. What these had in common with Polanyi’s work was a conviction that an excessively free market should never again lead to human misery ending in fascism.

Yet Polanyi’s book was initially met with resounding silence. This, I think, was the result of two factors. First, Polanyi belonged to no academic discipline and was essentially self-taught. Dale writes that when he was finally offered a job teaching economic history at Columbia in 1947, “the sociologists saw him as an economist, while the economists thought the reverse.” Midcentury America was also a period when political economy, institutionalism, the history of economic thought, and economic history were going into a period of eclipse, in favor of formalistic modeling. Polanyi’s was not a hypothesis that could be tested.

Second and more important, Polanyi’s ideological adversaries enjoyed subsidy and promotion while he had only the power of his ideas. Mises, like Polanyi, had no academic credentials. But he conducted an influential private seminar from his post as secretary of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce. The seminar developed the ultra-laissez-faire Austrian school of economics. Mises’s prime student was Friedrich Hayek. As a laissez-faire theorist financed by organized business, Mises anticipated the Heritage Foundation by half a century.

Hayek later contended in The Road to Serfdom that well-intentioned state efforts to temper markets would end in despotism. But there is no case of social democracy drifting into dictatorship. History sided with Polanyi, demonstrating that an unrestrained free market leads to democratic breakdown. Yet Hayek ended up with a chair at the London School of Economics, which was founded by Fabians; the “Austrian School” got dignified as a formal school of libertarian economics; and Hayek later won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The Road to Serfdom, also published in 1944, was a best seller, serialized in Reader’s Digest. Polanyi’s Great Transformation sold just 1,701 copies in 1944 and 1945.

When The Great Transformation appeared in 1944, the review in The New York Times was withering. The reviewer, John Chamberlain, wrote, “This beautifully written essay in the revaluation of a hundred and fifty years of history adds up to a subtle appeal for a new feudalism, a new slavery, a new status of economy that will tie men to their places of abode and their jobs.” If that sounds curiously like Hayek, the same Chamberlain had just written the effusive foreword to The Road to Serfdom. Such is the political economy of influence.

Yet Polanyi’s book refused to fade away. In 1982, his concepts were the centerpiece of an influential article by the international relations scholar John Gerard Ruggie, who termed the postwar economic order of 1944 “embedded liberalism.” The Bretton Woods system, Ruggie wrote, reconciled state with market by “re-embedding” the liberal economy in society via democratic politics.2 The Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen, a major historian of social democracy, used the Polanyian concept “decommodification” in an important book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), to describe how social democrats contained and complemented the market.3

Other scholars who have valued Polanyi’s insights include the political historians Ira Katznelson, Jacob Hacker, and Richard Valelly, the late sociologist Daniel Bell, and the economists Joseph Stiglitz, Dani Rodrik, and Herman Daly. On the other hand, thinkers who seem quintessentially Polanyian in their concern about markets invading nonmarket realms, such as Michael Walzer, John Kenneth Galbraith, Albert Hirschman, and the Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, don’t invoke him at all. This is the price one pays for being, in Hirschman’s self-description, a trespasser.

Having been exiled three times—from Budapest to Vienna, from Vienna to London, and later to New York—Polanyi had to move yet again when the US authorities would not grant Ilona a visa, citing her onetime membership in the Communist Party in the 1920s. They ended up in a suburb of Toronto, from which Polanyi commuted to Columbia until his retirement in the mid-1950s.

Though his enthusiasts tend to focus only on The Great Transformation, Dale’s book is valuable for his discussion of Polanyi after 1944. He lived for another twenty years, working on what was then known as primitive economic systems, which gave him yet another basis to demonstrate that the free market is no natural condition, and that markets in fact do not have to overwhelm the rest of society. On the contrary, many early cultures effectively blended market and nonmarket forms of exchange. His subjects included the slave trade of Dahomey and the economy of ancient Athens, which “demonstrated that elements of redistribution, reciprocity, and market exchange could be effectively fused into ‘an organic whole.’” Dale writes, “For Polanyi, democratic Athens was truly antiquity’s forerunner to Red Vienna.” Athens, of course, was far from socialist, but its precapitalist economy did blend market and nonmarket forms of income.

Dale also addresses Polanyi’s views on the escalating cold war and on the mixed economy of the postwar era that many now view as a golden age. The trente glorieuses, combining egalitarian capitalism and restored democracy, should have felt to him like an affirmation. But Polanyi, having lived through two wars, the destruction of socialist Vienna, the loss of close family members to the Nazis, four separate exiles, and long separations from Ilona, was not so easily convinced. While he admired Roosevelt, he considered the British Labour government of 1945 a sellout—a welfare state atop a still capitalist system.

Half a century later, that concern proved all too accurate. Others saw the Bretton Woods system as an elegant way of restarting trade while creating shelter for each member nation to run full-employment economies, but Polanyi viewed it as an extension of the sway of capital. That may also have been prescient. By the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank had been turned into enforcers of austerity, the opposite of what was intended by their architect, John Maynard Keynes. He blamed the cold war mostly on the Allies, praising Henry Wallace’s view that the West could have reached an accommodation with Stalin.

Dale makes no excuses for Polanyi’s blind spot about the Soviet Union. At various points in the 1920s and 1930s, he notes, Polanyi gave Stalin something of a pass, even blaming the 1940 Molotov–Ribbentrop pact on Whitehall’s anti-Sovietism. And he was sanguine about the intentions of the Russians in the immediate postwar period. As a member of the émigré Hungarian Council in London, he broke with its other leaders over whether the Red Army should be welcomed as a harbinger of democratic socialism. The Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe, Polanyi insisted, would bring “a form of representative government based on political parties.”

Having been proven badly wrong, Polanyi cheered the abortive Hungarian revolution of 1956, yet after it was crushed by Soviet tanks he also found reasons for hope in the mildly reformist “goulash communism” that followed. This was naive, yet not totally misplaced. Though Polanyi was no Marxist, there was enough openness in Hungary that in 1963, a year before his death and well before the Berlin Wall came down, he was invited to lecture at the University of Budapest, his first visit home in four decades.

On the centennial of his birth in 1986, Kari Polanyi-Levitt organized a symposium in his honor in Budapest. The conference volume makes a superb companion to the Dale biography.4 The twenty-five short articles are written by a mix of writers based in the West and several from what was still Communist Hungary—where Polanyi was widely read. The writing is surprisingly exploratory and nondogmatic. Even so, when her turn came to speak, Polanyi-Levitt took a moment to plead: “If I may be permitted one more request to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences…it is that The Great Transformation be made available to Hungarian readers in the Hungarian language.” This was finally done in 1990. Like many in the West, the Communist regime in Budapest was not quite sure what to do with Polanyi.

Today, after a democratic interlude, Hungary is a center of ultra-nationalist autocracy. Misguided policies of financial license played their usual part. After the 2008 financial collapse, Hungarian unemployment steadily rose, from under 8 percent before the crash to almost 12 percent by early 2010. And in the 2010 election, the far-right Fidesz Party swept a left-wing government out of power, winning more than two thirds of the parliamentary seats, which made possible the “illiberal democracy” of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. It was one more echo, and one more vindication, that Polanyi didn’t need.

What, finally, are we to make of Karl Polanyi? And what lessons might he offer for the present moment? As even his champions admit, some of his details were off. Earlier friendly critics, Fred Block and Margaret Somers, point out that his account of late-eighteenth-century Britain exaggerates the ubiquity of poor relief. His famous case of the poor law of Speenhamland of 1795, whose public assistance protected the poor from the early perturbations of capitalism, overstated its application in England as a whole. Yet his account of the liberal reform of the poor laws in the 1830s was spot on. The intent and effect were to push people off of relief and force workers to take jobs at the lowest going wage.

One might also argue that the failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Central Europe in the nineteenth century, which paved the way for right-wing nationalism, had more complex causes than the spread of economic liberalism. Yet Polanyi was correct to observe that it was the failed attempt to universalize market liberalism after World War I that left the democracies weak, divided, and incapable of resisting fascism until the outbreak of war. Neville Chamberlain is best remembered for his capitulation to Hitler at Munich in 1938. But at the nadir of the Great Depression in April 1933, when Hitler was consolidating power in Berlin and Chamberlain was serving as Tory chancellor of the exchequer in London, he said this: “We are free from that fear which besets so many less fortunately placed, the fear that things are going to get worse. We owe our freedom from that fear to the fact that we have balanced our budget.” Such was the perverse conventional wisdom, then and now. That line should be chiseled on some monument to Polanyi.

A recent article by three Danish political scientists in the Journal of Democracy questions whether it was reasonable to attribute the surge of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s to the long arc of laissez-faire and economic collapse.5 They reported that the well-established democracies of northwest Europe and the former British colonies Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand “were virtually immune to the repeated crises of the interwar period,” while the newer and more fragile democracies of southern, central, and eastern Europe succumbed. Indeed, fascists briefly assumed power in northwest Europe only through invasion and occupation. Yet that observation makes Polanyi a more prophetic and ominous voice for our own time. Today in much of Europe, far-right parties are now the second or third largest.

In sum, Polanyi got some details wrong, but he got the big picture right. Democracy cannot survive an excessively free market; and containing the market is the task of politics. To ignore that is to court fascism. Polanyi wrote that fascism solved the problem of the rampant market by destroying democracy. But unlike the fascists of the interwar period, today’s far-right leaders are not even bothering to contain market turbulence or to provide decent jobs through public works. Brexit, a spasm of anger by the dispossessed, will do nothing positive for the British working class; and Donald Trump’s program is a mash-up of nationalist rhetoric and even deeper government alliance with predatory capitalism. Discontent may yet go elsewhere. Assuming democracy holds, there could be a countermobilization more in the spirit of Polanyi’s feasible socialism. The pessimistic Polanyi would say that capitalism has won and democracy has lost. The optimist in him would look to resurgent popular politics.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/12/21/karl-polanyi-man-from-red-vienna/ @catcomaprada

[communistcountryclub]

From Donald Duck to Donald Trump, an unprecedented look at Latin American art holds up a mirror to the U.S.

So much about the tangled relationship between the United States and Latin America can be told through a surprising cultural character: Donald Duck.

The many lives of the hotheaded fowl serve as a curious case study on the enduring cultural links between the U.S. and Latin America. These links will surface repeatedly over the course of Pacific Standard Time: Los Angeles/Latin America, the series of art exhibitions across Southern California that officially debuts next week.

Donald Duck, star of the new PST: LA/LA exhibition “How to Read El Pato Pascual: Disney’s Latin America and Latin America’s Disney,” was created by Walt Disney and his animators in the company’s Silver Lake studio in the early 1930s. By 1937, he was headlining his own animated short: “Don Donald,” in which he plays a hapless caballero in a stereotypical Mexican town, complete with cactus and recalcitrant burro.

Donald’s dip into Latin American culture didn’t end there. In 1941, Disney took a tour of Latin America as part of a U.S. government effort to build solidarity in the Western Hemisphere during World War II. That journey inspired a pair of films that now serve as notable artifacts of the era of Good Neighbor policy: “Saludos Amigos” and “The Three Caballeros,” the latter of which features the hallucinatory convergence of Donald Duck cavorting with folksy Latin American locals and Busby Berkeley-style dance numbers.

“It’s like a hall of mirrors,” says Jesse Lerner, who with L.A.-based artist Rubén Ortiz-Torres curated “How to Read El Pato Pascual” : which is set to open Sept. 9 at the MAK Center for Art and Architecture in West Hollywood and the Luckman Fine Arts Complex at Cal State L.A.

“Disney borrows from Latin America, they turn it into something Hollywood, they send it back to Latin America, and the Latin Americans do something else with it and send it back.”

Disney characters have inspired bootleg T-shirts, critical theory and indigenous dances. For decades, Donald Duck served as a logo for the Mexican juice company Refrescos Pascual. (It now has its own duck, Pato Pascual, who sports a baseball cap.) And Donald was at the heart of the seminal leftist essay, “How to Read Donald Duck,” published in 1971 by Chilean-Argentinean thinker Ariel Dorfman and Belgian sociologist Armand Mattelart, who present Disney comics as ideological tools of capitalist propaganda.

One scholar has even theorized that Donald Duck may have been inspired by indigenous Latin American culture to begin with. Disney did not have an official comment on the matter, but as the story goes, an artist who worked for Diego Rivera gave a lecture on Mexican art to a group of employees at Disney Studios in the early 1930s. Among the visuals, there may have been an image of a pre-Columbian duck vessel from Colima. Made hundreds of years before the birth of Christ, it resembles a wide-eyed duck wearing what appears to be a small beanie.

“Disney appropriates and the people appropriate Disney,” says Ortiz-Torres. “It’s a constant dispute.”

It’s a similar back-and-forth that reflects the broader cultural exchange between the U.S. and Latin America, a relationship that over the decades has swung from fraternal to fraught and back again.

PST: LA/LA, which focuses on the work of Latin American and U.S. Latino artists, will examine this relationship in many ways. And it will be no small affair.

Funded by the Getty Foundation to the tune of $16 million, the series consists of dozens of exhibitions and events at more than 70 Southern California institutions, plus complementary programs at more than 65 commercial galleries. A launch party in Grand Park, a Latin music concert at the Hollywood Bowl (including Café Tacvba, Mon Laferte and La Santa Cecilia) and a contemporary music series at Walt Disney Concert Hall are also part of the lineup.

The shows touch on pre-Columbian artisanry, the U.S.-Mexico border, Chicano queer identity and the Asian diasporas of Latin America. Not to mention the “Pato Pascual” exhibition, which examines the potent repurposing of the world’s most iconic cartoon characters.

This all unfolds in a climate of intense anti-immigrant sentiment — from Donald Trump’s reference to Mexican immigrants as “rapists” during his 2015 campaign kick-off speech to the recurring nativist refrain of “build the wall.” Just this week, the Trump administration put an end to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which shielded young adults brought to the U.S. illegally as children from deportation.

“This was not anything that we anticipated six years ago when we started talking about this edition of Pacific Standard Time,” says Jim Cuno, president of the J. Paul Getty Trust. “But now that it’s here, it highlights the truth about borders — that they are political creations that don’t fit neatly on cultural populations.”

As the shows prepare to shine a light on the cultures of Latin America, they also will serve to hold up a mirror to the United States. First, because the Latino presence is so critical in the U.S., the second-largest Spanish-speaking country in the world. And because to be Latin American, in some ways, is to continuously contend with the outsize presence of the United States.

Among the tropes artists will be dismantling are what Los Angeles County Museum of Art curator Rita Gonzalez describes as the “entrenched notions of American exceptionalism.”

“This is 2017 and we are just catching up with Latin American art,” Gonzalez says. “And it is part of the history of the Americas, just like the United States is part of the history of the Americas. You’ll see that manifesting itself in these shows.”

Gonzalez co-curated LACMA’s “A Universal History of Infamy,” which opened late last month as an early entry in the PST: LA/LA series. It features the work of 16 contemporary U.S. Latino and Latin American artists whose work touches on a range of global concerns.

One project on view at the LACMA show, by Carolina Caycedo, a Colombian artist now based in Los Angeles, examines the nature of dam-building projects in Latin America — one of which, the Quimbo Dam on the Magdalena River, is located in the region her family is from.

In a video installation, she pairs views of rivers in natural and dammed states. On a table, a long, accordion-style book — which unfolds in the shape of a river — meanders through the gallery.

“We are building so many dams in South America, but decommissioning dams in the United States — so what does that mean?” she asks, sitting amid fishnet sculptures in her downtown Los Angeles studio. “It makes you think about energy slavery in the future. Will we bear the environmental consequences for energy production that will be consumed here in the United States?”

With the project, Caycedo aims to show how a dam in rural Colombia might link up with a light switch several nations away.

This notion of inter-connectedness, of the U.S. not being able to separate itself either physically or psychologically from the rest of the Americas, comes up in other exhibitions too.

“Video Art in Latin America,” which goes on view at LAXART in Hollywood Sept. 17, is part of an exhaustive effort by the Getty Research Institute to compile Latin American video art back to its origins.

In a work titled “They Call Them Border Blasters,” from 2004, Mexican conceptual artist Mario García Torres explores the U.S. radio stations that position themselves on the Mexican side of the border in order to skirt U.S. regulation. The border’s hard dividing line may limit human movement, but geographic proximity means that radio waves can travel back and forth unimpeded.

Even as it continuously looks to Europe, the United States is firmly part of the Americas.

“We are more similar to Latin America than we are to Europe,” says the show’s co-curator Glenn Phillips. “These are countries that have vast histories of migration, of slavery — there are so many parts of post-colonial history that are shared across the Americas and that the U.S. often thinks of itself as being apart from.”

And as the U.S. enters a period of profound self-questioning — of its culture, its institutions and its politics, the exhibitions of PST: LA/LA will provide an intriguing view of how Latin American societies have contended with these very same issues.

“Below the Underground: Renegade Art and Action in 1990s Mexico”is scheduled to open at the Armory Center for the Arts in Pasadena in the middle of October. It features experimental works of installation and performance by Mexican artists reacting to a period in which that country’s institutions had been weakened.

“In the 1990s, the artists we are looking at were responding to a climate that was dire in many ways,” says exhibition curator Irene Tsatsos. “There was a crisis in Mexico’s political system, an economic crisis, violence was everywhere, the drug trade was rampant and there was inadequate infrastructure in many respects. All of these things called upon citizens to perform, to come together in previously unforeseen ways. Artists were part of that.”

During that time, the collective Pinto mi Raya (which consists of Mónica Mayer and Victor Lerma), invited museum-goers to respond to a question about what steps they would take to achieve democracy and justice. “Justicia y Democracia” was first shown in Mexico in 1995. It will be reinstalled at the Armory Center, where visitors will be invited to post their replies — a timely work.

Also timely are many of the exhibitions featuring the work of U.S. Latino artists, a population that has long contended with issues of equity and representation.

The exhibition “La Raza” will reflect this. The show draws from a vast archive of photographs from the Lincoln Heights-based Chicano activist newspaper and will go on view at the Autry Museum of the American West on Sept. 16. The images chronicle issues of policing, civil rights and labor struggle.

“‘La Raza’ speaks through time of issues that have yet to be resolved: of work, of indigenous rights, of migration and immigration, of demanding access to a system that has typically denied access,” says Luis Garza, a former “Raza” photographer who serves as co-curator of the exhibition. “But 50 years past is present and is future. The very nature of what is contained in those photographs reflect what is going on in the country today.”

Most significantly, the very nature of the Getty’s PST: LA/LA project — with its sprawling exhibition program and its countless curatorial points of view — mean that the art of the continent will not be subject to a single defining conclusion.

“It’s so decentralized and so chaotic and everybody does their thing,” Ortiz-Torres says. “If the Museum of Modern Art did this, it would be, ‘These are the guys to follow. This is the canon.’ The thing I like about the Getty is that you will have these competing visions and they will force us to make sense of what’s going on.”

For Latin American art in the U.S., a rare moment of texture and nuance — one that may reveal something important about ourselves.

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History of Feudalism Research Paper

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Abstract

Feudalism has a wide variety of meanings. Traditionally it refers to the sociopolitical order of Western Europe in the central and later Middle Ages (c.900–1500), though it has also been used to characterize premodern Asian and African societies displaying similar features. The nature and relevance of feudalism as a model has been a subject of much debate and it is important to distinguish between three distinct (though broadly related) understandings of the term: the Marxist conception of feudalism as an economic system based on the ‘feudal mode of production’, the social historical model of ‘feudal society’ as something approximating a Weberian ideal type, and the legal definition of feudalism as a form of service tenement based on the fief.

Outline

Introduction

Feudalism: The Noun and Its Derivation

The Legal Model: Feudal Tenure and the ‘Feudo-Vassalic Contract’

The Marxist Model: The ‘Feudal Mode of Production’

Sociological Models: Feudal Society and the Annales School

Modern Criticism I: ‘The Tyranny of a Concept’

Modern Criticism II: Feudal Transformation

Overview

Bibliography

Introduction

Feudalism is a subject of enduring interest to historians, sociologists, and economists. Although definitions vary widely, the term generally designates the socioeconomic order of Western Europe in the central and later Middle Ages (c.900–1500). Feudalism has been the subject of intense debate and it is important to distinguish broadly between three models of the phenomenon (which amount, in effect, to different definitions of feudalism): the Marxist or historical materialist, the social historical/sociological, and the legal/tenurial (see Wickham 2001). Each of these is based on different premises, though all purport to describe aspects of European society in the Middle Ages.

Feudalism: The Noun and Its Derivation

Feudalism derives from the Medieval Latin feudum (plural: feuda), referring to a form of conditional land-tenure. Feudum is generally rendered into Modern English as ‘fief’ and is believed to derive from the Proto-Germanic *fehu, which originally meant cattle (cf Modern German Vieh), though it also came to have the broader connotation of ‘wealth’ or ‘property’ (cf Modern English ‘fee’) (Arcamone, 2001). As an abstract noun feudalism makes its first appearance in English in the nineteenth century, when it began to be employed as an equivalent to the French féodlité, which is attested about a century earlier. As originally employed, feudalism refers to a tenurial system based around fief-holding. It continues to be used in this (strict) legal sense, as we shall see, but has also taken on broader connotations.

The Legal Model: Feudal Tenure and the ‘Feudo-Vassalic Contract’

The pioneering work on feudalism was undertaken in eighteenth-century France. Within this context, the term (French: féodalité) was used to characterize the tenurial structure of the Ancien régime; feudalism was seen as the system of land holding, which evolved during in the Middle Ages. This legal-tenurial model of feudalism continues to be employed by historians and is sometimes termed feudalism in the ‘strict’ sense, since its places a strong emphasis on fief-holding as its defining characteristic (see Ganshof, 1961: pp. xv–xviii). In some languages this model is even distinguished from its other socioeconomic counterparts. Thus in German Lehnswesen denotes feudalism in a legal sense, while Feudalismus is preferred for other models, and in Dutch a similar distinction is made between leenstelsel and feodalisme.

According to the legal model, feudalism is characterized above all by feudal tenure: it is a system of land holding based on fiefs or benefices (beneficia (singular: beneficium): the latter term predominates in sources before the eleventh century), a form of conditional tenure, generally for one or more lifetimes. For tenure to qualify as truly feudal, however, the tenant must not only hold his land as a fief or benefice, but also be the vassal of his landlord. Thus feudalism combines a tenurial agreement with a social bond (in the technical language of feudal law these are referred to as ‘enfeoffment’ and ‘vassalage’ respectively). Traditional teaching holds that enfeoffment and vassalage were originally distinct, but came to be associated in the course of the seventh and eighth centuries, when the powerful Carolingian dynasty came to prominence in mainland Europe. This period saw much infighting within Francia (a region encompassing much of modern France as well as parts of Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, and northern Spain) as well as the rapid expansion of the Frankish realm from 751 onward. As a consequence – so the traditional wisdom – vassalage and fief-holding became associated: in order to attract ever larger numbers of warriors, the Carolingian rulers rewarded their followers with temporary landholdings in the form of benefices (generally taken from the Church). The result was that benefice-holding (or enfeoffment, as it would later be known) became related closely with vassalic status, eventually leading to the unification of the two phenomena (Ganshof, 1961: pp. 16–50, esp. 16–19; Mitteis 1933: pp. 521–524). This ‘union of fief and vassalage’, of a tenurial agreement and a personal bond of lordship, was the foundation of European feudalism. Although this first emerged in the Frankish heartlands, it was soon exported across the rest of Western Europe by means of conquest and settlement.

This form of tenure in exchange for service was defined by two rituals, homage and investiture, relating respectively to the two elements of the feudal relationship (the personal and the tenurial). The first forged the bond of service: by placing his hands within those of his lord and swearing fealty a man became a vassal. The second, which generally followed on from the first, enacted the property transaction: by handing over objects symbolizing tenure and service (often swords, spears, or banners), the lord invested his vassal in his fief or benefice. Together these acts created the so-called feudo-vassalic contract (Mitteis, 1933: pp. 481–518; Ganshof, 1961: pp. 70–72 and 133–142; Le Goff, 1980). There were important consequences of this for both sides: henceforth the lord could expect loyalty and service – the ‘advice and assistance’ (consilium et auxilium) mentioned in many contemporary texts – from his man; the vassal, on the other hand, could anticipate receiving support and protection from his lord. In theory, if either party failed in its obligations, then the contract was dissolved and the property reverted to the lord. The contract also came to an end upon the death of either party. In the early days of feudalism, the lord might then enfeoff a new vassal; however, fiefs had a tendency to become inheritable and from the late ninth century what tended to happen was that homage and investiture would be repeated whenever lord or man died (what in German is termed Herrenfall and Mannfall). In this manner the fiction of the fief’s reversion to the lord was retained, while the rights of the vassal’s heirs to inherit were respected. In some parts of Europe heirs also had to pay a special due in order to inherit (a ‘feudal relief’); nevertheless, the expectation of inheritance was generally strong (Mitteis 1933: esp. 135–146; Ganshof, 1961: esp. 133–139; cf Bonnassie, 1991: pp. 172–174).

The strength of this model of feudalism lies in its precision: it is possible to test for the presence of fiefs and vassalage empirically. Its greatest danger, however, lies in its prescriptiveness. The scholars responsible for it, above all the Belgian historian François Louis Ganshof and his German counterpart Heinrich Mitteis, tended to see feudal tenure in very legalistic terms. As a consequence, they frequently imposed modern tenurial and legal clarity onto affairs which were less formalized (indeed, in their work both scholars were forced to acknowledge many ‘anomalies’ and ‘regional variations’). More problematic, however, is the premise on which this model rests: namely, that benefice-holding and vassalic status coalesced in the eighth and ninth centuries. As we shall see, there is good reason to doubt that this took place (at least so early). Rejecting such an early unification of fief and vassalage has significant implications. Whereas Ganshof and Mitteis treated feudalism as an early medieval phenomenon, treating the development of rights of inheritance and the multiplication of vassalic bonds as signs of the weakening of this system in the central Middle Ages, it now seems that these latter phenomena an integral part of feudalism from the start. As a consequence historians increasingly see the central and later Middle Ages as the heyday of feudal tenure, rather than as a period of decadence and decline (Carpenter, 2000; Spieb, 2009, 2013).

The Marxist Model: The ‘Feudal Mode of Production’

As noted, beside the legal there are two other distinct models of feudalism: the historical materialist (or Marxist) and the social historical. These are broadly similar, insofar as they both treat feudalism as more than a form of tenure. Nevertheless, they are based on very different premises: the former on a Marxist understanding of society and economy as being shaped by distinctive ‘modes of production’, and the latter on a more sociologically inspired understanding of societal ‘ideal types’.

The defining feature of feudalism in the Marxist sense is the so-called feudal mode of production. According to Marx, a mode of production (German: Productionweise) is defined by productive forces (encompassing both human labor and tools and technology) and relations of production (the societal relations governing production). Marx postulated a number of different modes, the most important of which within this context are the slave (or antique) mode, the feudal mode and the (early) capitalist mode, each of which succeeded one another in Western Europe between Roman antiquity and the Early Modern period. In all of these modes agriculture is the main source of surplus; what distinguishes them is the means by which this is generated: in the antique mode it is slave labor which underpins production, in the feudal mode it is peasant tenant labor, and in the capitalist mode it is wage labor. Any society can therefore be considered ‘feudal’ in a Marxist sense if production within it is defined by the work of peasant tenants. One of the salient features of societies dominated by the feudal mode is a tendency for competition to emerge between central authority and the ruling classes (often in the form of a struggle between center and periphery); since the latter derive their wealth from the same sources and in the same manner as the state, centrifugal tendencies are common, though by no means inevitable (see, with different emphasis, Anderson, 1974; Haldon, 1993).

Although Marx was relatively uninterested in precapitalist modes, a rich literature has developed on the theme. The greatest problem here has been distinguishing between different modes, and these debates have important implications for our understanding of the feudal mode. Hence, though the feudal mode is often presented as a preeminently European and medieval phenomenon (e.g., Anderson, 1974), some now prefer to define feudalism more broadly, treating any society in which surplus wealth is generated primarily by peasant labor as feudal (Haldon, 1993; Wickham, 2005: pp. 259–261; 2008). Seen in these terms, the feudal mode is the most common precapitalist mode, which is attested not only in medieval Europe, but also across much of Asia and Africa before the modern era. Indeed, it has been suggested that we would do better to speak in terms of a ‘tributary’ rather than ‘feudal’ mode for this reason (Haldon, 1993: pp. 63–69 and 91–92). Though many societies may qualify as ‘feudal’ in this sense, important distinctions can be discerned among them. Chris Wickham points to the extraction of surplus in the form of rent and services rather than taxation as the defining feature of medieval European feudalism (Wickham 1984; Wickham, 2005: pp. 56–62; cf Blank, 2013). However, it is precisely the variety witnessed within the feudal mode thus conceived which has led some commentators to call for a more restricted usage of feudalism within Marxist analysis. Jairus Banaji, in particular, argues that feudalism is in danger of losing its explanatory force when defined so broadly, suggesting that such work underestimates the differences between medieval European feudalism and other tributary forms of society (Banaji 2010: esp. 181–250).

Sociological Models: Feudal Society and the Annales School

Perhaps the most widely employed model of feudalism is the sociological or social historical. Feudalism in this sense has been studied most diligently by historians of the Annales School, whose approach takes inspiration from sociology, treating feudalism something akin to a Weberian ‘ideal type’ (Wickham 2001: pp. 34–41). The starting point for this work was Marc Bloch’s monumental La société féodale (Bloch, 1962 (first published in French in 1939)). Within this work, Bloch aimed to present rather than define feudalism and it was only after having completed his two-volume survey that he felt in a position to summarize its salient features: a subject peasantry; the prevalence of the service tenements (fiefs); the dominance of a warrior aristocratic class; the prominence of personal ties of obedience (vassalage); the fragmentation of public authority; and the survival of other (earlier) forms of association (Bloch, 1962: p. 446). Another important feature of feudal society was manorialism, though this was not a defining characteristic thereof. Like historians of feudal tenure, Bloch saw this society as a preeminently Frankish phenomenon; however, unlike his more legally minded counterparts he did not believe that the history of feudal society could be reduced to the story of one form of service tenement (viz, the ‘feudo-vassalic contract’). According to Bloch, feudal society developed in two stages, neither of which could be defined by tenurial developments alone: a first feudal age, from the late Carolingian period up until the eleventh century, and a second, from the mid-eleventh to the thirteenth century. The first age witnessed the development of a feudal society: in the face of invasions by Vikings, Muslims, and Magyars, centralized authority began to decompose, giving way to a more localized and fragmented society, in which interpersonal bonds and regional power structures were predominant. The second feudal age saw the maturation and eclipse of this society: in this period a true hereditary nobility established itself and chivalric values developed; however, at the same time multiple vassalage and rights of inheritance began to threaten the centrality of the feudal relationships and mentalities. Bloch’s treatment of feudal society set the parameters from future work, particularly within the Francophone world. Particularly influential was his treatment of feudalism as phenomenon that embraced all of society, from the greatest lords down to the lowliest peasants.

The most influential subsequent contributions to the field have come from Georges Duby, who was a product of Bloch’s own Annales School. Duby developed and challenged Bloch’s arguments about feudal society in a number of respects. In particular, he placed a greater emphasis on regional studies than had his illustrious predecessor: whereas Bloch sought to generalize about feudalism across all of Western Europe, Duby’s most influential publication was his detailed study of the society of the Mâcon in Burgundy from the ninth to the twelfth centuries (Duby, 1971 (first published 1953)). Duby also parted ways with Bloch in other regards. He saw the development of feudalism in very different terms. Rather than postulating a first and second feudal age, Duby argued that feudal society emerged both later and more rapidly than Bloch had appreciated. His study of the Mâcon convinced Duby that public justice and authority, represented above all by the comital court or placitum, continued to operate well up until 980, suggesting that the decomposition of central authority diagnosed by Bloch had yet to set in at this point. Then, however, during a brief and tumultuous period between 980 and 1030 this system gave way to the (privatized) seigneurial system of justice, which was characteristically feudal (Duby, 1971: pp. 137–148). Other important changes could also be detected in these years: the disappearance of traditional forms of slavery and emergence of a servile peasantry, the formation of the nuclear family, and the development of a knightly class, to name but a few. Numerous scholars of the 1970s and 1980s followed Duby’s lead, tracing how and when similar transformations took place across other regions of France, Spain, and Italy. The result of was a relatively coherent model of sudden transformation, around the year 1000, which Duby termed a ‘feudal revolution’ and others referred to as the ‘feudal mutation’ (mutation féodale). Therein was sought the explanation for numerous developments, from the end of slavery, to the Peace of God (a movement aimed at curbing aristocratic violence), to the growth of heresy (Duby, 1980; Bonnassie, 1991; Poly and Bournazel, 1991; Bois, 1992; cf Toubert, 1973; Bonnassie, 1975–1976).

At their best, these models avoid the pitfalls of their legal and Marxist counterparts: they neither limit feudalism to cases of a certain form of tenure, nor do they generalize it to such an extent as to deprive it of all distinctiveness. Nevertheless, these models present their own dangers. In particular, the ‘feudal revolution/mutation’ paradigm risks reducing complex socioeconomic developments to what often amount to monocausal terms, as we shall see. Moreover, the use of the term feudal to describe this society raises the semantic issue of what is distinctively ‘feudal’ about it, if not the usage of service tenements in the form of fiefs. Nevertheless, despite these and other objections, it remains common to designate the society of the central Middle Ages feudal, particularly within Francophone scholarship (e.g., Mazel, 2010).

Modern Criticism I: ‘The Tyranny of a Concept’

The concept of feudalism has been subjected to much criticism, particularly since the 1990s. Within the Anglophone tradition this has tended to focus on two related issues: the theoretical problem of how (or whether) it is helpful to employ feudalism as a sociohistorical model; and the empirical issue of whether feudalism in the legal sense ever existed. It was the first of these that Elizabeth Brown first raised in her justly famous article of 1974. There she argued that the concept of feudalism had grown too nebulous to be a useful tool of analysis; ‘feudal’, she pointed out, was becoming little more than a synonym for ‘medieval’. Feudalism was, therefore, at risk of becoming a ‘tyrannous construct’, which inhibited rather than enhanced historical research. Brown’s core objection to the term was thus semantic, but her arguments also went much further. She pointed out that feudalism was often employed in a dangerously reified fashion within scholarship: historians wrote of it as if it had an independent historical existence, rather than being one model (among many) for understanding medieval society. Her ultimate conclusion was that historians should avoid the term feudalism altogether and restrict ‘feudal’ as an adjective to cases involving fiefs (Brown, 1974: p. 1086).

Criticisms of an altogether more fundamental nature were raised by Susan Reynolds in her 1994 monograph Fiefs and Vassals. Although Reynolds framed her arguments as a development of Brown’s earlier critique, her target was quite different. Whereas Brown’s criticisms were directed above all at historians who used feudalism as a socioeconomic model (who had tended to be most guilty of expanding the term’s semantic range), Reynolds’ were leveled at those who used feudalism in a legal/tenurial sense. In a nutshell, Reynolds’ thesis was that feudalism in this form had never existed. Her argument proceeded from the belief that the union of fief and vassalage, which as we have seen was the lynchpin of tenurial models of feudalism, never took place; although fiefs and vassals existed during the Middle Ages, they were never associated in the formalized and systematic manner postulated by feudal theory. As such, the ‘feudal system’ was not a medieval creation at all, but a chimera, invented by lawyers and historians between the later Middle Ages and Early Modern era. Reynolds argued that this model was born in two distinct stages. First, jurists of the central and later Middle Ages (especially those responsible for the Libri feudorum) began to systematize existing property relations into a more formal guise. Then, during the Early Modern period Francophone legal experts picked up these terms, further systematizing the evidence to hand in the process. Feudalism is therefore a product of two stages of modeling and systematizing and cannot be expected to conform to (or illuminate) property relations in the early and central Middle Ages.

Reactions to these lines of criticism have been predictably mixed. Brown’s arguments have been taken as a salutary warning about the semantic growth of the term feudalism and subsequent scholarship has employed it in a more cautious and self-conscious fashion (e.g., Wickham 2001). Nevertheless, her more strident calls to abandon the concept have found few supporters (Reynolds being perhaps the most prominent). Reynolds’ work, on the other hand, has occasioned stronger feelings. Elements of her thesis have been warmly received. In particular, her call for a more flexible approach to the legal culture of the early and central Middle Ages has met with wide approval. Her arguments about the unification of fief and vassalage have also achieved a degree of acceptance and most historians would agree that earlier scholarship erred in placing this development in the Carolingian period. Nevertheless, Reynolds’ more bold claims have met with resistance. In particular, her belief that fiefs and vassalage were never closely associated has convinced few (Barthélemy, 1997; Deutinger, 2002). Similarly, her insistence that feudalism tout court was an Early Modern invention has not been widely accepted (Wickham 2001; White, 2005b; nos. XI–XII; Patzold, 2012: pp. 43–94).

Modern Criticism II: Feudal Transformation

Criticism of a different nature has developed regarding the shift variously called the feudal revolution or mutation. As noted, it was Duby’s belief that feudal society emerged not in two stages, as Bloch had suggested, but in one rapid transition around the year 1000. In this he was joined by many prominent French historians of the 1970s and 1980s and in 1994 these voices were joined by that of the American scholar Thomas Bisson, who diagnosed what he saw as a sudden and revolutionary rise in lordly violence across Europe in the early eleventh century (Bisson, 1994). Since then, however, voices of dissent have been raised. Thus, in a series of provocative articles and monographs starting in 1992 Dominique Barthélemy has sought to dismantle almost all aspects of the ‘Duby thesis’. Like Brown, one of Barthélemy’s concerns was that fidelity to a particular model (in his case, of feudal revolution) was straight-jacketing scholarship: work produced within this framework tended to ask when and how transformation took place, without questioning the very mutationist paradigm on which it was built. In response, Barthélemy argued for a return to something closer to Bloch’s original model of feudalism: he suggested that the social and political landscape of France changed slowly and subtly between the early and central Middle Ages, starting in the ninth century and continuing through to the twelfth and thirteenth (Barthélemy, 1992, 2009). In this respect, he argued that many developments, which first come fully to light around the year 1000, were already taking place much earlier. The turning of the first millennium did not so much witness a sudden societal transformation, as an important shift in the nature of the historical evidence, a ‘documentary mutation’ (mutation documentaire), as Barthélemy has neatly termed it (Barthélemy, 1993: esp. 19–127; Barthélemy, 2009: pp. 12–36).

Barthélemy has not been alone. Concerns of a similar nature have been raised by a number of American historians since the 1990s. Foremost among these are Stephen White, Frederic Cheyette, and Jeffrey Bowman, all of whom have argued against the mutationist model. One of their main criticisms is that it depends heavily on an anachronistic distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’, treating early medieval comital courts as public institutions, but viewing their seigneurial successors as purely private. Yet, when examined closely, the operation of these courts reveals many similarities. Therefore, while there may have been developments in judicial practice around the turning of the millennium, to many lords and litigants such changes were probably neither so self-evident nor so fundamental as the mutationist paradigm proposes (White, 2005a: no. IX; Cheyette, 2002; Bowman, 2004). Indeed, it has been pointed out that the model of rapid transformation around the year 1000 runs the risk of oversimplifying change, presuming an a priori relationship between disparate religious, social, and economic developments (Bowman, 2004: pp. 226–227). More specific criticisms have been made of the feudal revolution as postulated by Bisson. Here it has been pointed out that the evidence for a sudden rise in violence in the eleventh century is probably more apparent than real (like the changes in documentary form diagnosed by Barthélemy), reflecting not only the increasing volume of source material, but also developments in approaches to historical writing. In this respect, it is important to note that most of our sources were written by monks and clerics, who had good reason to exaggerate (if not invent) the novelty of the forms violence they experienced at the hands of laymen (White, 2005a: nos. II–III; 2005b: no. XIII; Mazel, 2005).

Such criticisms have been well received and the proposition that all of Europe (or France) underwent a sudden feudal mutation around the year 1000 is no longer accepted. Nevertheless, the dangers of taking criticism too far have also been noted (Wickham, 1997; Fouracre, 2005). Indeed, there is no denying the changes which took place between the early and central Middle Ages and some recent work risks presenting a rather too static a picture of society in these years (Moore, 2000). In this respect, the antimutationist model is in danger of becoming just as monolithic as the revolutionary model it replaced.

Overview

Although the criticisms of feudalism– be they of the concept tout court or of the models used to frame it – have often sought to renounce the term altogether, in practice they have led to renewed interest in the subject. In particular, the work of Reynolds and Barthélemy has inspired scholars to return to first principles, revisiting the evidence for fiefs, vassals, and the complex interplay between these in the early and central Middle Ages. There is an emerging consensus that it is unhelpful to speak of feudalism in anything other than a Marxist sense before the central Middle Ages. Historians working within a legal-tenurial framework tend to see feudalism a development of the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Deutinger, 2002; Hyams, 2002; Dendorfer, 2004; Dendorfer and Deutinger, 2010; Roach, 2012), whereas those employing more sociologically informed models continue to see the eleventh century as the period in which classically ‘feudal’ forms of lordship emerged, though they emphasize the gradual and complex nature of developments (Kosto, 2001; Mazel, 2010; West, 2013). It would, therefore, seem that while ‘textbook feudalism’ never existed as such, something closely approximating it did. The relationship fiefs and vassalage is a case in point here: although it seems unlikely that these were ever as systematically associated as traditional teaching holds, it is equally clear that a close connection between the two developed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In this sense, there is something of an emerging reaction against what is perceived to have been the hypercriticism of the 1990s. However, above all recent work underlines the flexibility and adaptability of feudalism – as Steffen Patzold puts it, there was not so much one ‘feudalism’ as many forms of feudalism in Europe during the central and later Middle Ages (Patzold, 2012: pp. 120–121).

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