#western bloc

[leeenuu]

well well well, look how the tables have turned

[fotos-art]

Ghost forest, Nienhagen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Germany

© mauritius images GmbH

Alamy

[springsteens]

if you have never been afraid that the leader of your country’s government opposition might get assassinated, then you’re privileged and I don’t even want to discuss any politics with you

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

"Although some countries had embraced lobotomy earlier, it was only after World War II that psychosurgery made a global breakthrough and spread across Africa, Asia, Oceania, North and South America. In Europe, this post-war surge in its use was not always welcomed with unadulterated enthusiasm. Greece introduced lobotomy in 1947 but the number of referrals was limited. Indeed, most Greek hospitals stopped performing lobotomies in 1951 “because of reports on the dangers of the operation and its unpredictable outcome for the patients.” The last of around 300 operations in the country was carried out in 1955. Psychosurgery was not widespread in neighbouring Turkey either. Approximately, 400 operations on psychiatric patients were performed there— the first in 1950, the last before the end of the decade.

Attitudes were mixed in several Eastern European countries, too. In Russia (the USSR), journals published articles on lobotomy in 1936, and followed up three years later with reviews of Freeman and Watts’s early works. Soviet reviewers were disturbed by the serious complications and high mortality rates reported by Freeman and Watts and concluded that there were “insurmountable obstacles” to recommending the use of lobotomy. None were attempted in the Soviet Union prior to 1944. Although psychosurgery was performed on patients after the war, it was only on a small scale. The precise number is unclear, but according to historian Benjamin Zajcek, a rough estimate based on available documentation suggests 5–600. Soviet psychiatrists did not all agree about lobotomy. Some viewed it as a treatment of “last resort,” and justified its use on the grounds that it helped make patients more manageable in hospitals and allowed some to return to work. Others questioned its efficacy and the theory behind it. During the late 1940s, these debates within Soviet psychiatry became politicised. In 1950, the Soviet Minister of Health signed a decree banning lobotomy. The decree stated that the treatment did not meet the standards of Soviet medical practice, because it was “theoretically unjustified” and “contradicts the fundamental principles of I. P. Pavlov’s physiological theory."

The picture was similar in other Eastern Bloc countries. Poland stopped the operation in 1951 (although it was not banned outright). The Polish critique of psychosurgery was based more on studies of Polish patients, who had derived little benefit from the operations, than on theoretical principles. As Kinga Jeczminska notes in her detailed study of the history of lobotomy in Poland: “the most important factor influencing the attitude of researchers to this method was the analysis of clinical psychiatric symptoms rather than theoretical orientation.” In total, just over 170 patients were lobotomised in Poland.

Psychosurgery seems to have been more widespread in Hungary, where the first operations were performed in Budapest in 1946. Two years later, 173 operations were conducted at six clinics and hospitals around the country. However, Hungarian psychiatrists remained somewhat reticent about the procedure. One article stated, “Prefrontal lobotomy is a method of last resort, and should be performed only after failure of other well-known treatments and prolonged illness."

In Spain, lobotomy was introduced at the National Asylum of Leganes in 1944, and well-known Spanish psychiatrists such as Juan José López Ibor promoted the surgical method. In 1948, Ibor reported on 60 lobotomies on inmates from his neuropsychiatric clinic in Madrid, including patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.

The idea of psychosurgery as a last resort also permeated articles from German- and French-speaking countries. In Austria, the first lobotomies were performed in Vienna in 1947. The total number is unknown, but historian Marietta Meier estimates around 500. In Switzerland, more than 1,200 operations were carried out between 1946 and 1971. 

Far more operations were performed in France where there were close ties between neurosurgeons and psychiatrists. Many of the early French neurosurgery pioneers like Pierre Puech, Marcel David, Jean Talairach and Jacques le Beau took up lobotomy and experimented with new techniques too. Historical works on French psychosurgery are lacking, but evidence suggests a high level of activity in France. According to a recent study on the history of psychosurgery in Paris, approximately 20,000 operations were performed in France in the period 1946 to 1976.

Like their French peers, British psychiatrists were enthusiastic about lobotomy. A major report on psychosurgical interventions in England and Wales concluded that more than 12,000 such operations were performed in the years 1942–1954. From 1948 onwards, the number exceeded 1,000 per annum. The report examined data on 10,365 patients. The authors concluded that “up to 1955 leucotomy was for most patients the last therapeutic resort beyond which lay a future with almost no hope of recovery and with considerable suffering,” and that “the survey shows that there was greater improvement than would have been expected without surgery.”

In some European countries, psychiatrists often claimed that they placed stricter requirements on indications than in England and the United States. Articles by Belgian, German, Austrian and Swiss doctors emphasised that psychosurgery should be a last resort, reserved for patients who had spent prolonged periods in hospital, and for whom all other treatments had failed. They also noted that their colleagues in England and the United States did not share this belief, as in these countries there was a more “indiscriminate use of the treatment.”"

- Jesper Vaczy Kragh, Lobotomy Nation: The History of Psychosurgery and Psychiatry in Denmark (Springer: 2021) p. 219-222.

[eccentrickleptomaniac]

ok fuck a lore post what if ostpolitik never happened and the eastern and western blocs never stopped existing because the berlin wall never fell

[szczekaczz]

i'm glad i decided to take this class on masculinity in ruslit because 1) i never perceived masculinity in any positive light nor thought about it deeply in general and being open to new concepts is the most important thing in life 2) the professor talks about the theory of literature in a really interesting way + i'm always hyped for comparing things from the "first" and the "second" world

[jadwiga-abremovic]

People automatically tagging slav folks random personal old photos as -

"#haunted #abandoned #chernobyl #totalitarian #depressing #dictatorship"

- has the same energy as white ladies putting their purses on the seats beside them whenever a black person gets on the bus.

[pietroleopoldo]

One of my biggest pet peeves is the fact that the term "first/third world" seems to have completely lost its original meaning. "The US are actually a third world country" I assure you that if there's a country on this planet that cannot be a third world country it's the US

[tunneldweller]

[image description: "you just die #fear is the mind killer, boomers have... a lot of fear #a lot of fear and hurt that they don't examine or know how to examine and it bleeds through #something something 'it all traces back to trauma' #it... we talk about this a lot" end ID]

I mean, we knew, but it's nice to hear so succinctly

[xtruss]

Fyodor Lukyanov: Contrary To Western Claims, The BRICS Has An Ideology And Here’s What It Is

The South Africa summit showed how the non-Western bloc will evolve over the coming years

— By Fyodor Lukyanov, the Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club | RT | August 30, 2023

A banner depicting the logo of BRICS is seen during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa © Sputnik International

Speaking at the end of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reassured those wondering what the acronym would sound like after the addition of six new letters: "Everyone is in favour of keeping the name the same, it has already become a brand". Whether he knew it or not, the diplomat had made an important point. The brand has taken on a life of its own, even though as an entity it no longer exists.

has given way to a new form. Continuing the metaphorical theme, we can say that the BRICS of the original model have transferred the franchise to another creation.

Until this month, BRICS was a group with the possibility of transforming itself into either a more or less structured organization or instead becoming a free-form community. The second option was chosen.

BRICS enlargement has been talked about for a long time. But discussions seemed pointless because there were no criteria for it to happen. The structure is deliberately informal, with no charter, procedures or coordinating bodies. Thus, classic diplomacy has been at work – with direct negotiations, without the involvement of international institutions – to reconcile national interests. The only platform where decisions are taken is at meetings of the leaders of the member states, and if they agree amicably it works. This is how the new states were invited — it was discussed and decided.

Of course, the selection caused confusion — why them, what is the logic? But there was none, it was just agreed.

This is a momentous event. It is not about the number and quality of the host powers, but about the choice of development model. Until now, BRICS has been a compact group whose members, for all their differences, have been united by their ability and willingness to chart an independent course, free from external constraints. There are few states in the world that can boast of this — some lack sufficient military and economic potential, and others already have commitments to other partners. But the five more or less fit the bill. For this reason, BRICS was seen as a prototype of a structure that would be a counterweight to the G7 (behind which there is a rigid Atlantic unity). Hence the expectation that BRICS would deepen and institutionalize interaction by creating common structures and gradually become a unified force on the world stage.

But such calculations were unfounded. Not so much because of the differences between the countries, but because of their size, which does not imply self-restraint for the sake of anyone, including like-minded people. The idea of giving BRICS a clear anti-Western bias was also incorrect – with the exception of Russia, no member now intends to pursue antagonism with the West. All in all, the BRICS-5 would have remained a promising and very symbolic prototype without the prospect of becoming a working model.

The forthcoming BRICS-11 – and beyond – is a different approach. Enlargement is hardly compatible with full-fledged institutionalization, because it would be too complicated. But there is no need for that; the expansion of the community's borders is now self-evident. Criteria are not essential. So what if Argentina or Ethiopia are in debt and have almost none of the things that were originally considered to be the hallmarks of the BRICS? But they, and probably some other candidates in the next wave, are expanding the sphere of non-Western interaction.

The other parameters are conditional.

China is the main proponent of enlargement. The new configuration is convenient for a power that promotes the slogan of an unspecified "common destiny" without commitments. The BRICS franchise is more in line with global trends than the previous type of BRICS. A rigid framework is unpopular; most countries in the world want a flexible relationship with maximum scope so as not to miss opportunities.

This new approach is acceptable to Russia. It is unrealistic to turn BRICS into a battering ram against Western hegemony. But it is in Russia's interest to expand the sphere of interaction by bypassing the West and gradually creating appropriate tools and mechanisms. In fact, it is in everyone's interest, because hegemony no longer warms anyone's heart, it only limits opportunities.

Success is not guaranteed; enlargement may lead to the automatic addition of new countries on a formal principle. But in general, the soft separation of the West and the non-West is an objective process for the coming years.

Thus, the popularity of the BRICS franchise will grow.

[zvaigzdelasas]

[NewYorkTimes is Private US Media]

Over the past month, we’ve watched an astonishing, high-stakes global drama play out in The Hague. A group of countries from the poorer, less powerful bloc some call the global south, led by South Africa, dragged the government of Israel and, by extension, its rich, powerful allies into the top court of the Western rules-based order and accused Israel of prosecuting a brutal war in Gaza that is “genocidal in character.”

The responses to this presentation from the leading nations of that order were quick and blunt.

“Completely unjustified and wrong,” said a statement from Rishi Sunak, Britain’s prime minister.

“Meritless, counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever,” said John Kirby, a spokesman for the United States National Security Council.

“The accusation has no basis in fact,” a German government spokesman said, adding that Germany opposed the “political instrumentalization” of the genocide statute.

But on Friday, that court had its say, issuing a sober and careful provisional ruling that doubled as a rebuke to those dismissals. In granting provisional measures, the court affirmed that some of South Africa’s allegations were plausible and called on Israel to take immediate steps to protect civilians, increase the amount of humanitarian aid and punish officials who engaged in violent and incendiary speech. The court stopped short of calling for a cease-fire, but it granted South Africa’s request for provisional measures to prevent further civilian death. For the most part, the court ruled in favor of the global south.[...]

The court was not asked to rule on whether Israel had in fact committed genocide, a matter that is likely to take years to adjudicate. Whatever the eventual outcome of the case, it sets up an epic battle over the meaning and values of the so-called rules-based order. If these rules don’t apply when powerful countries don’t want them to, are they rules at all?

“As long as those who make rules enforce them against others while believing that they and their allies are above those rules, the international governance system is in trouble,” Thuli Madonsela, one of South Africa’s leading legal minds and an architect of its post-apartheid Constitution, told me. “We say these rules are the rules when Russia invades Ukraine or when the Rohingya are being massacred by Myanmar, but if it’s now Israel butchering Palestinians, depriving them of food, displacing them en masse, then the rules don’t apply and whoever tries to apply the rules is antisemitic? It is really putting those rules in jeopardy.”[...]

The military campaign has “wreaked more destruction than the razing of Syria’s Aleppo between 2012 and 2016, Ukraine’s Mariupol or, proportionally, the Allied bombing of Germany in World War II,” the report quoted researchers as saying. The researchers, hardly some raving left-wing activists, are experts cited in one of the most respected news organizations in the world, The Associated Press.[...]

The International Court of Justice issued a nonbinding opinion in 2004 that the security barriers Israel was erecting in the West Bank violated international law, but that ruling has had no effect. The walls still stand.[...]

Indeed, what is a rules-based system if the rules apply only selectively and if seeking to apply them to certain countries is viewed as self-evidently prejudiced? To put it more simply, is there no venue in the international system to which the stateless people of Palestine and their allies and friends can go to seek redress amid the slaughter in Gaza? And if not, what are they to do?

For the cause of Palestinian statehood, every alternative to violence has been virtually snuffed out, in part because Israel’s allies have helped to discredit them. The most recent example is the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement that has, in many places, been successfully tarred as antisemitic or even banned altogether. Efforts to use the United Nations Security Council have drawn U.S. vetoes for decades. Is seeking redress at the appropriate venue for alleged violations of international law also antisemitic, as Israel’s defense minister said on Friday? Does no law apply to Israel? Are there no limits to what it may do to defend itself?[...]

The Biden administration has made the shoring up of the international rules-based order a centerpiece of its foreign policy but, unsurprisingly, has struggled to live up to that aspiration.[...]

Occasionally straying from your principles because circumstances require it is very different from being seen to have no principles at all, and that is precisely how much of the global south has come to regard the United States.

It seems especially shortsighted in these times that the Biden administration elected to wave away the carefully documented case prepared by South Africa. One of the biggest threats to the rules-based international order is the growing consensus in the poor world that the rich world will apply those rules selectively, at its discretion, when it suits the powerful nations that make up the global north, such as when Russia invaded Ukraine.[...]

As far as the rules-based order is concerned, when it comes to crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing, it simply does not matter who started it. [...] The best way to shore up the rules-based order is to be seen, in word and deed, as committing to the institutions and moral commitments of that order.

28 Jan 24

[gardengnosticator]

i love when western think tanks try to tackle the concept of socialist nostalgia in ex-socialist/eastern bloc nations and they go "oh well a majority of this is ironic because everyone KNOWS society is better off now" and just blatantly avoiding the fact that life for the majority was better and most people are just missing like... healthcare and a solid education system

[thenewsthaturdead]

friendly reminder that if ur a communist get off my blog or i will block u <3

didn't want to reblog it directly since I don't wanna start drama but

[mapsontheweb]

A breakdown of the “Current Cold War” alliances/allegiance structures.

This is including formalized military alliances, partnerships and coalitions as well as informal security relations as well.

by powerfulcountries

With the six primary “blocs” showcased above, we have split the blocs into two primary overarching blocs. We are fully aware that this is an oversimplified breakdown of alliance and allegiance structures, however this is what we felt was the easiest means to showcase such.

“Wild Card” countries are those who have increased complex statuses and/or have strong security ties ‘with powers in multiple competing blocs.

While the Indian and Saudi blocs are not necessarily aligned on their own, we placed them in the same overarching bloc due to them having increased overlap with the western bloc compared to other blocs.

The same premise as above goes for the Russian and Chinese blocs. Russia and China have distinct foreign policy and grand strategy goals (that may even put them at odds on occasion) but their overlapping goals against the western blocs have placed them into the same primary category alongside the Iran bloc.

We are aware that other countries can potentially be added to a bloc that otherwise weren't, so be sure to let us know what countries should have been included and why.

Remember, the governments and grand strategies of a country may not necessarily align with the people of said country. Alliances and allegiances can simply be for economic and/or strategic reasonings rather than cultural and/or historic reasonings.

[reasonsforhope]

Also, content-lock-free link. [Technically it's not a paywall but it is annoying]

Keep pressuring Western governments. This is proof that it can work.

--

"Canada will halt future arms sales to Israel following a non-binding vote in the house of commons. The foreign affairs minister, Mélanie Joly, told the Toronto Star her government would halt future arms shipments. “It is a real thing,” she said on Tuesday [March 19].

The decision follows a parliamentary motion, introduced by the New Democratic party (NDP), that called on the governing Liberals to halt future arms exports to Israel. The New Democrats, who are supporting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s minority government, have expressed frustration with what they see as his failure to do enough to protect civilians in Gaza.

The motion – which passed 204-117 with the support of Liberals, Bloc Québécois and the Green party – also called on Canada to work “towards the establishment of the state of Palestine.""

-via The Guardian, March 19, 2024

[probablyasocialecologist]

Androgen levels and chromosomal make-up have been among the markers that sporting bodies have used to ensure ‘fair competition’ in the female division. There is a long history of ‘gender testing’ in sport. From 1958 to 1992, all women Olympic athletes (except for Princess Anne, who was granted an exemption when she competed in 1976) were required to have their gender ‘verified’ by a chromosomal evaluation. Blanket tests have since been discontinued, but the IOC may still require athletes competing in the women’s division to undergo assessment if they are suspected to have an ‘unfair and disproportionate’ advantage over their competitors. It is no surprise, and certainly not a coincidence, that non-Western athletes have been unfairly and disproportionately targeted by eligibility rules. Compulsory gender testing was instituted as a result of Western European and US athletes being outperformed by their Eastern bloc competitors during the Cold War. Western media accused Eastern athletes of not being true women and threatening the integrity of their sports. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the athletes who have been banned or restricted from competing internationally as women (that we know about; it’s supposed to be confidential) have been from the Global South.

[...]

Those of us who are concerned about the reactionary weaponisation of gender might do better to rethink rather than cement our commitment to the category of womanhood. We should ask what being a woman means, how womanhood is defined, and against what (and whom) womanhood is ‘defended’. Instead of insisting that Khelif is a ‘real’ woman, we should ask how dichotomous ideas of gender have been solidified in the discourse that is being mobilised against her. We should interrogate the colonial roots of medical accounts of female and male embodiment, and the construction of femininity through (and conflation with) whiteness. We should listen to athletes whose womanhood is doubted not only because of their outstanding athletic performance, but because their bodies are at odds with Western notions of femininity. In 2009, when Semenya was banned from competing for eleven months after winning the 800m at the World Championships in Berlin, the head of South African athletics asked: ‘Who are white people to question the make-up of an African girl?’

14 August 2024