#the building was 24-stories and had no sprinklers no alarm to alert the residents and no fire escapes
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#a swedish documentary podcast i follow released a new episode today#today’s episode is about the grenfell tower fire in 2007#it’s been 6 years! 6. years! since it happened and the victims and their families still haven’t gotten justice#it’s utterly atrocious#72 lives were lost and another 70 people were injured#not to mention the hundreds of people who were directly affected#by a tragedy that was absolutely preventable#the building was 24-stories and had no sprinklers no alarm to alert the residents and no fire escapes#only one staircase which had been pointed out by residents for years#but no one listened to them#it’s infuriating#prob tbd
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New top story from Time: ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die.’ 6 People Hospitalized Fleeing High-Rise Fire in Los Angeles
LOS ANGELES — Firefighters made a dramatic ladder rescue of a man about to jump from a burning Los Angeles high-rise apartment building Wednesday and helicopters plucked 15 people from the roof as other terrified residents fled through smoke-choked stairwells to safety.
Six people were hospitalized, two in critical condition, including the would-be jumper, in the fire that occurred in a building where a similar blaze broke out seven years ago, authorities said.
Residents described a frightening flight to safety, as they tried to move down crowded stairwells that forced some to turn back and go to the roof. Firefighters were coming up the stairs as people with children, pets and the some elderly tenants moved slowly downward.
A panicked Cecilee Mathieson tried to push past in her rush from her 25th floor penthouse. When she reached the floor on fire, she could see the orange glow under the door.
“I really thought I was going to die today,” Mathieson said hours later.
Firefighters had been at an office building fire two blocks away when the blaze broke out on Wilshire Boulevard on the edge of the tony Brentwood section of the city, allowing a rapid response.
Gavyn Straus was swimming in the pool in the courtyard when he saw black smoke waft by. As the smoke grew rapidly, Straus knew it was no kitchen fire and he ran into the building dripping wet to alert staff.
A woman at the front desk was calling police, so he hopped on an elevator with a maintenance man to alert residents on the 8th floor, where they thought the fire was coming from. A man who had been sleeping answered the first door they pounded on and they realized they were above the blaze and ran for the stairs.
They were overwhelmed with smoke when they opened the door to the burning floor below.
“It was a black wall,” Straus said hours later as he stood barefoot on the sidewalk, still wearing his surf trunks with only a towel draped over his shoulders and goggles around his neck. “Someone ran out from that side and they were completely covered in black char and they could barely breathe.”
The person said their friend was still inside, but Straus said he couldn’t help because he couldn’t see anything and it was too hot.
Instead, he ran to the 21st floor, where he lives, to alert friends and other tenants he knew. No alarm had yet been sounded and he was surprised to hear laughter coming through the doors as people ate breakfast unaware of the danger below.
“Get out, there’s fire. Get out,” he yelled.
Dr. Tom Grogan, an orthopedic surgeon who works in the building next door, was arriving at his office when he saw flames shooting from the building. His office manager called 911 and Grogan, who had seen the building burn in 2013, watched as firefighters struggled to get water to the fire on the 6th floor.
A resident of the building with burns on his arms was hanging from a window as if he was going to jump. Firefighters inflated an airbag below but managed to get a ladder to him to save him.
“It was scary to watch,” Grogan said.
More than 330 firefighters responded and it took about 90 minutes to knock down the blaze, Deputy Fire Chief Armando Hogan said. Arson investigators are looking into whether it was deliberately set.
“It is suspicious right now,” Fire Chief Ralph Terrazas said.
Two 30-year-old men who were in the apartment where the fire began were in critical condition, and one was described as grave. Fire crews had to crawl on their bellies using bottled oxygen to reach the apartment where the blaze began. Five others were treated at the scene.
The fire left windows blown out and heavy black smoke or burn marks on three sides of building. Residents who fled in whatever they wearing or could quickly get into — some in pajamas and exercise clothes — gathered on nearby street corners and looked up as helicopters hovered and hoisted rooftop evacuees and small white dog to safety.
A fire at the Barrington Plaza high-rise in 2013 injured several people and displaced more than 100. The complex has 240 units that range in rent from $2,350 to $3,695 per month, according to Zillow.
Fire officials said the building was not equipped with sprinklers. It was built in 1961 before regulations required fire-suppression systems in buildings taller than 75 feet (22.8 meters) feet.
The building owners did not immediately return messages seeking comment.
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Associated Press writers John Antczak, John Rogers and Christopher Weber in Los Angeles contributed to this report.
via https://cutslicedanddiced.wordpress.com/2018/01/24/how-to-prevent-food-from-going-to-waste
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Why Grenfell Tower Burned: Regulators Put Cost Before Safety
By David D. Kirkpatrick, Danny Hakim and James Glanz, NY Times, June 24, 2017
LONDON--The doorbell woke Yassin Adam just before 1 a.m. A neighbor was frantically alerting others on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower about a fire in his apartment. “My fridge blew up,” the man shouted.
Residents of Grenfell Tower had complained for years that the 24-story public housing block invited catastrophe. It lacked fire alarms, sprinklers and a fire escape. It had only a single staircase. And there were concerns about a new aluminum facade that was supposed to improve the building--but was now whisking the flames skyward.
The facade, Mr. Adam said, “burned like a fire that you pour petrol on.”
The incineration of Grenfell Tower on June 14, the deadliest fire in Britain in more than a century, is now a national tragedy. The London police on Friday blamed flammable materials used in the facade for the spread of the blaze and said the investigation could bring charges of manslaughter. Hundreds of families were evacuated from five high-rises that posed similar risks.
Flames consumed the tower so quickly that arriving firefighters wondered if they could even get inside. People trapped on the higher floors screamed for their lives through broken windows. At least 79 people died, a toll that is expected to rise as more bodies are recovered. Survivors have charged that the facade was installed to beautify their housing project for the benefit of wealthy neighbors.
A formal government inquiry into the fire has just begun. But interviews with tenants, industry executives and fire safety engineers point to a gross failure of government oversight, a refusal to heed warnings from inside Britain and around the world and a drive by successive governments from both major political parties to free businesses from the burden of safety regulations.
Promising to cut “red tape,” business-friendly politicians evidently judged that cost concerns outweighed the risks of allowing flammable materials to be used in facades. Builders in Britain were allowed to wrap residential apartment towers--perhaps several hundred of them--from top to bottom in highly flammable materials, a practice forbidden in the United States and many European countries. And companies did not hesitate to supply the British market.
The facade, installed last year at Grenfell Tower, in panels known as cladding and sold as Reynobond PE, consisted of two sheets of aluminum that sandwich a combustible core of polyethylene. It was produced by the American manufacturing giant Alcoa, which was renamed Arconic after a reorganization last year.
Arconic has marketed the flammable facades in Britain for years, even as it has adjusted its pitch elsewhere. In other European countries, Arconic’s sales materials explicitly instructed that “as soon as the building is higher than the firefighters’ ladders, it has to be conceived with an incombustible material.” An Arconic website for British customers said only that such use “depends on local building codes.”
For years, members of Parliament had written letters requesting new restrictions on cladding, especially as the same flammable facades were blamed for fires in Britain, France, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and elsewhere. Yet British authorities resisted new rules. A top building regulator explained to a coroner in 2013 that requiring only noncombustible exteriors in residential towers “limits your choice of materials quite significantly.”
Fire safety experts said the blaze at Grenfell Tower was a catastrophe that could have been avoided, if warnings had been heeded.
“How could that happen in our country at this time?” asked Dennis Davis, a former firefighter who is vice chairman of the nonprofit Fire Sector Federation.
Mr. Adam, 44, had seen posters hung by the management company telling tenants to shut their doors and stay inside in the event of a fire. But Mr. Adam, his wife, his daughter and his pregnant sister ignored the instructions and ran.
“Anyone who listened to the fire brigade and stayed where they are,” Mr. Adam said in an interview the next day, “they lost their lives.”
The first call to the London Fire Brigade came at 12:45 a.m., according to an official statement. Six minutes later, as the first firefighters reached the scene, brigade veterans struggled to fathom the speed of the blaze.
“That is not a real block with people in it!” one firefighter exclaimed, his astonishment captured in a video that later was shown on the BBC and Sky News and was shot inside his vehicle as it sped toward the building.
Other firefighters in the vehicle were heard gasping in horror.
“There are kids in there,” one said.
“How is that possible?”
“It has jumped all the way along the flats--look!”
How “are we going to get into that?” another asked, using an expletive.
Flames in an ordinary fire burst out of windows, moving from the inside out. Grenfell Tower burned in reverse, moving inward from the building’s exterior. The flames quickly tore upward in streaks through the facade, filling apartments with toxic black smoke. Torrents of orange and red branched out of the first streaks and shot upward. The flames encased the building in a cylinder of fire.
“I have never seen such a phenomenal fire, a building engulfed top to bottom in flames,” Dany Cotton, the London fire commissioner, said later that day. More than 200 firefighters battled the blaze. They brought 40 fire engines and other vehicles.
“Committing hundreds of my firefighters into a building that at points looked like it couldn’t possibly stand up due to the level of fire--I actually felt physically sick with anxiety about what was happening,” Ms. Cotton added. But the firefighters went in.
The building they entered was built in 1974 in an architectural style known as Brutalism, and the original concrete structure, built without cladding, was designed to contain a fire in one apartment long enough for firefighters to prevent it from spreading very far. But the building’s floor plan gives a picture of what happened. Refrigerators in most apartments appear to have been positioned against an exterior wall, next to a window and just a few inches from the cladding installed in the renovation.
When the refrigerator on the fourth floor burst into flames, the fire ignited the flammable cladding and shot up the side of the building. The London police confirmed that on Friday and identified the refrigerator brand as Hotpoint. But experts who saw footage of the blaze had known the culprit at once. “You can tell immediately it’s the cladding,” said Glenn Corbett, an associate professor of fire science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York.
The first well-known use of aluminum cladding on a high-rise was on the Alcoa Building, in Pittsburgh, erected as the manufacturer’s headquarters. Makers of cladding promoted it as both aesthetically striking and energy-efficient, because the aluminum surface reflects back heat and light. Demand for cladding surged with rising fuel costs and concerns about global warming, and over time, producers began selling it in a thin “sandwich” design: Two sheets of aluminum around a core made of flammable plastics like polyethylene.
The cladding is typically paired with a much thicker layer of foam insulation against the building’s exterior wall, as was the case at Grenfell Tower. Then the cladding may be affixed to the wall with metal studs, leaving a narrow gap between the cladding and the insulation.
But by 1998, regulators in the United States--where deaths from fires are historically more common than in Britain or Western Europe--began requiring real-world simulations to test any materials to be used in buildings taller than a firefighter’s two-story ladder. “The U.S. codes say you have to test your assembly exactly the way you install it in a building,” said Robert Solomon, an engineer at the National Fire Protection Association, which is funded in part by insurance companies and drafts model codes followed in the United States and around the world.
No aluminum cladding made with pure polyethylene--the type used at Grenfell Tower--has ever passed the test, experts in the United States say. The aluminum sandwiching always failed in the heat of a fire, exposing the flammable filling. And the air gap between the cladding and the insulation could act as a chimney, intensifying the fire and sucking flames up the side of a building. Attempts to install nonflammable barriers at vertical and horizontal intervals were ineffective in practice.
As a result, American building codes have effectively banned flammable cladding in high-rises for nearly two decades. The codes also require many additional safeguards, especially in new buildings or major renovations: automatic sprinkler systems, fire alarms, loudspeakers to provide emergency instructions, pressurized stairways designed to keep smoke out and multiple stairways or fire escapes.
And partly because of the influence of American architects, many territories around the world follow the American example. But not Britain.
British schoolchildren study the Great Fire of London, in 1666, the way American pupils might learn about the Boston Tea Party or the first Thanksgiving. But the legacy of the fire is also still felt in Britain’s building codes, experts say. London’s original great fire leapt across wooden buildings. And since then, British building codes have focused primarily on the principle of stopping the spread of flames between buildings or, within larger structures, between units.
With fire prevention in Britain, “you put all your eggs in one basket,” said Edwin Galea, director of the Fire Safety Engineering Group at the University of Greenwich. And for decades, this was fairly effective. Britain has long reported far fewer deaths from fires relative to population than the United States, and typically, fewer than 350 residents die each year in fires (compared with more than 3,000 in the United States).
But as early as 1999, after a fire in Irvine, Scotland, British fire safety engineers warned Parliament that the advent of flammable cladding had opened a dangerous loophole in the regulations. The Irvine fire saw flames leap up panels at Garnock Court, a 14-story public housing block. One resident died, four others were injured and a parliamentary committee investigated the causes.
“To a certain extent, we are hoisted by the petard of what happened here in 1666, the Great Fire of London, and we look at fire as a horizontal problem, with a fire in one building affecting the exterior of another building,” Glynton Evans, a fire safety adviser to the firefighters’ union, said to Parliament. “The problem with cladding is that it will, if it is able, spread fire, and it will spread it vertically.”
The firefighters and engineers warned Parliament that British codes required only that the aluminum used in cladding resist ignition, even though the heat of a fire would breach the surface and expose the flammable material inside. Nor did the British rules require a test to evaluate risks in real-world conditions.
“If the cladding cannot resist the spread of flame across the surface, then it will vertically envelop the building,” Mr. Evans warned, in testimony that now seems prophetic. “In other words, the fire will spread to the outside of the building, and it will go vertically.” Many other fire safety experts would repeat those concerns in the following years.
But manufacturers argued against new tests or rules. Using fire-resistant materials was more expensive, a cost that industry advocates opposed.
“Any changes to the facade to satisfy a single requirement such as fire performance will impinge on all other aspects of the wall’s performance as well as its cost,” Stephen Ledbetter, the director of the Center for Window and Cladding Technology, an industry group, wrote in testimony to Parliament.
“Fire resistant walls,” he added, “are not economically viable for the prevention of fire spread from floor to floor of a building,” and “we run the risk of using a test method because it exists, not because it delivers real benefits to building owners or users.” (In an interview last week, Mr. Ledbetter said his group had updated its position earlier this year to warn against the type of cladding used at Grenfell Tower.)
Business-friendly governments in Britain--first under Labor and then under the Conservatives--campaigned to pare back regulations. A 2005 law known as the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order ended a requirement for government inspectors to certify that buildings had met fire codes, and shifted instead to a system of self-policing. Governments adopted slogans calling for the elimination of at least one regulation for each new one that was imposed, and the authorities in charge of fire safety took this to heart.
“If you think more fire protection would be good for U.K. business, then you should be making the case to the business community, not the government,” Brian Martin, the top civil servant in charge of drafting building-safety guidelines, told an industry conference in 2011, quoting the fire minister then, Bob Neill. (“Should we be looking to regulate further? ‘No’ would be my answer,’” Mr. Neill added.)
Mr. Martin, a former surveyor for large-scale commercial projects like the Canary Wharf, told his audience to expect few new regulations because the prime minister at the time, David Cameron, wanted to greatly reduce the burden on industry, according to a report by the conference organizers.
Two years later, in 2013, a coroner questioned Mr. Martin about the application of building regulations in the case of another London fire, which killed six people and injured 15 others at a public housing complex called Lakanal House. Mr. Martin defended the existing regulations, including the lack of a requirement for meaningful fire resistance in the paneling on the outside of an apartment tower.
A questioner told him that the public might be “horrified” to learn that the rules permitted the use of paneling that could spread flames up the side of a building in as little as four-and-a-half minutes. “I can’t predict what the public would think,” Mr. Martin replied, “but that is the situation.”
Moving to a requirement that the exterior of a building be “noncombustible,” Mr. Martin said, “limits your choice of materials quite significantly.”
After the coroner’s report, a cross-party coalition of members of Parliament petitioned government ministers to reform the regulations, including adding automatic sprinklers and revisiting the standards for cladding. “Today’s buildings have a much higher content of readily available combustible material,” the group wrote in a letter sent in December 2015 that specifically cited the risk of chemicals in “cladding.”
“This fire hazard results in many fires because adequate recommendations to developers simply do not exist. There is little or no requirement to mitigate external fire spread,” added the letter, which was first reported last week by the BBC.
In 2014, the Fire Protection Research Foundation, an organization in the United States, counted 20 major high-rise fires involving cladding. In at least a half-dozen--in France, Dubai, South Korea, the United States and elsewhere--the same type of panels installed at Grenfell Tower caught fire. A 2014 fire in Melbourne, Australia, resulted in multiple investigations into the dangers of combustible cladding. Another fire broke out in Dubai, around a 60-story skyscraper, on New Year’s Eve of 2015, and yet another, around a 70-story skyscraper there, this April.
But in Britain, still no changes were made. “The construction industry appears to be stronger and more powerful than the safety lobby,” said Ronnie King, a former fire chief who advises the parliamentary fire safety group. “Their voice is louder.”
As recently as March, a tenant blogger, writing on behalf of what he called the Grenfell Action Group, predicted a “serious and catastrophic incident,” adding, “The phrase ‘an accident waiting to happen’ springs readily to mind.”
For many tenants, an object of scorn was Grenfell Tower’s quasi-governmental owner, the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization. It was created under legislation seeking to give public housing residents more say in running their buildings, and its board is made up of a mix of tenants, representatives of local government and independent directors. But Kensington and Chelsea is the largest tenant management organization in England, a sprawling anomaly supervising roughly 10,000 properties, more than 30 times the average for such entities. Tenants came to see it as just another landlord.
The organization had promised residents of Grenfell Tower that the renovation last year would improve both insulation and fire safety. Board minutes indicate that it worked closely with the London Fire Brigade throughout the process, and local firefighters attended a briefing afterward “where the contractor demonstrated the fire safety features.” During a board meeting last year, the organization even said it would “extend fire safety approach adopted at Grenfell Tower to all major works projects.”
But the principal contractor, the Rydon Group, based in East Sussex, England, assigned the facade work to a specialist firm that was struggling financially during the project. The firm, Harley Curtain Wall, went out of business in 2015 and transferred its assets to a successor, Harley Facades.
Another subcontractor, Omnis Exteriors, said on Friday that it had not been told that the flammable Reynobond cladding was going to be combined with flammable interior insulation. That was a problem, the firm said in a statement, adding that the cladding “should only be used in conjunction with a noncombustible material.”
The cladding itself was produced by Arconic, an industry titan whose chief executive recently stepped down after an unusual public battle with an activist shareholder. Arconic sells a flammable polyethylene version of its Reynobond cladding and a more expensive, fire-resistant version.
In a brochure aimed at customers in other European countries, the company cautions that the polyethylene Reynobond should not be used in buildings taller than 10 meters, or about 33 feet, consistent with regulations in the United States and elsewhere. “Fire is a key issue when it comes to buildings,” the brochure explains. “Especially when it comes to facades and roofs, the fire can spread extremely rapidly.”
A diagram shows flames leaping up the side of a building. “As soon as the building is higher than the firefighters’ ladders, it has to be conceived with an incombustible material,” a caption says.
But the marketing materials on Arconic’s British website are opaque on the issue.
“Q: When do I need Fire Retardant (FR) versus Polyethylene (PR) Reynobond? The answer to this, in part, depends on local building codes. Please contact your Area Sales Manager for more information,” reads a question-and-answer section.
For more than a week after the fire, Arconic declined repeated requests for comment. Then, on Thursday, the company confirmed that its flammable polyethylene panels had been used on the building. “The loss of lives, injuries and destruction following the Grenfell Tower fire are devastating, and we would like to express our deepest sympathies,” the company said. Asked about its varying product guidelines, the company added, “While we publish general usage guidelines, regulations and codes vary by country and need to be determined by the local building code experts.”
Hassan Ibrahim, who lived in an apartment on the 23rd floor of Grenfell Tower, was traveling outside England the day of the fire. His wife, Rania, and their two small children were not so lucky. As the smoke and flames drifted upward, Ms. Ibrahim debated with a neighbor whether to risk opening her door.
“Don’t open the front door,” her neighbor told her. “You are not going to be able to breathe--you are just going to bring the smoke in. You have your children. Standing near the door with all the smoke is not going to help you.”
“Maybe someone outside?” Ms. Ibrahim asked plaintively.
For a moment, she threw the door open. “Hello! Hello! Come here,” she shouted into the blackened hallway. Then she gave up and retreated. “O.K., O.K., I closed it,” she said. “I am not going to go.”
Ms. Ibrahim recorded a video as she fretted over what to do--and then posted it online as the fire was still raging.
The fire service said it received 600 calls from the building that night, some lasting an hour. Speaking in Arabic over a telephone, Ms. Ibrahim said: “We are on the last floor. The last floor is the one that has not caught fire yet.”
Then, a few moments later, she said: “It’s over. It is here.”
“Pray for us,” she added.
Her husband arrived at the charred hulk of the building the next day. Today, his wife and children are still among the missing.
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London Fire Death Toll Rises to 17; Government Is Criticized
By Dan Bilefsky, NY Times, June 15, 2017
LONDON--The death toll rose to 17 and rescue workers continued to search for the missing on Thursday after a lethal fire in a West London apartment tower, as Prime Minister Theresa May came under pressure over whether the tragedy could have been prevented.
The blaze at the 24-story Grenfell Tower injured dozens of people, and fire officials warned that the number of dead was likely to grow: Many residents of the building were still unaccounted for. As of Thursday morning, 37 people were in hospitals, including 17 in critical care.
Firefighters said Wednesday afternoon that there was no hope of finding additional survivors, but the government has appealed for residents to call a hotline as they tried to account for everyone who might have been in the building when the fire broke out. Among those still missing were a young Italian couple who moved to the building several months ago, Italian news outlets reported. The building housed people from many countries, including Eritrea, the Philippines, Somalia and Sudan.
Mrs. May, already under pressure after a series of terrorist attacks and an election in which her Conservative Party lost its majority, visited the area of the fire, in the North Kensington neighborhood on Thursday, as did the leader of the opposition Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn. The political fallout from the tragedy intensified as members of Parliament demanded to know why fire safety standards at the tower had not been more rigorous.
The Grenfell Action Group, an association of residents of Grenfell Tower, had complained for years that the local council, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which owns the building, and the company that managed the property had repeatedly ignored their concerns that the building posed a fire hazard.
The cause of the fire is still under investigation, but the police have ruled out terrorism.
The many questions being asked include whether a “stay put” fire protocol, which called for residents to remain in their apartments if there was a fire elsewhere in the building, might have turned a lethal fire even more deadly; what role aluminum exterior cladding, installed as part of a renovation completed last year, might have played in the fire’s rapid spread; and whether sprinklers and alarm systems had been in place and functioning properly.
Meriam Antur, who lived on the 19th floor of the tower, was one of many residents who said she was told to stay put, despite sirens and smoke that created panic. “My friend came in and said we had to wait for the firemen and couldn’t go down,” she said, recalling that as smoke entered the apartment, she tried to block it with a wet towel under the door, and began to pray.
“My children were crying, and I’m pregnant,” she said, clasping her belly. “I was so scared. I thought we were going to die.”
Matthew Needham-Laing, an architect and engineering lawyer who specializes in cases dealing with building defects, said the dark smoke that had engulfed the building was a telltale sign of burning cladding material.
“It looks to me like a cladding fire,” he said. The material in the cladding, he added, is “flame retardant, so it doesn’t catch fire as easily, but the temperatures you’re talking about are often 900, 1,000 degrees centigrade, and in those conditions, any material will generally burn.”
Sian Berry, chairwoman of the Housing Committee of the London Assembly, said that she was dismayed that no central fire alarms and fire drills were required for residential buildings, unlike in office buildings, and she expressed alarm that concerns about fire safety voiced by residents of Grenfell Tower before the tragedy had been ignored.
David Lammy, a Labour lawmaker representing Tottenham, in Northeast London, told the BBC that he considered the fire to be “corporate manslaughter.” “This is the richest borough in our country treating its citizens in this way, and we should call it what it is,” he said. “It is corporate manslaughter. That’s what it is. And there should be arrests made, frankly. It is an outrage.”
He said that after knocking on housing estate doors across the country during recent elections, he had seen that many buildings had antiquated fire standards and poor conditions.
“Those ‘70s buildings, many of them should be demolished,” he told the BBC. “They have not got easy fire escapes. They have got no sprinklers. It is totally, totally unacceptable in Britain that this is allowed to happen and that people lose their lives in this way. People should be held to account.”
Eddie Daffarn, a 16th-floor resident who is a member of the Grenfell Action Group, said he was only alerted to the fire by his neighbor’s smoke detector.
“The only alarm that went off was my neighbor’s smoke alarm. I thought he had burned some chips,” he said, referring to French fries. “I opened the door and there was smoke, loads of smoke, so then I closed it and thought: This is a real fire, not my mate’s chip pan.”
A friend who lived on the fifth floor phoned and urged him to flee, he said.
“I wrapped a towel around me, and opened the door,” Mr. Daffarn recalled. “The smoke was so thick and heavy I couldn’t see anything. I thought: ‘This is me, I’m a goner.’”
He finally descended and was helped by a firefighter.
“I am lucky to be alive,” he said.
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