#intra caribbean migration

[jeeve05]

The Atlantic Slave Trade and its Impact on Spanish America

The Atlantic Slave Trade played a crucial role in shaping the socio-economic fabric of Spanish America. This extensive trade network, which spanned centuries, had implications on both the African and American continents. This article looks into the intricate details of this historical event, outlining its origins, evolution, and enduring effects on the Spanish colonies in the Americas. The content of this article was taken from a lecture by Dr Kate Quinn (UCL), and Dr. André Jockyman Roithmann (UCL), as well as secondary readings we were required to complete, and additional secondary readings that were optional (all linked below).

In the late 15th century, the European powers began exploring new territories, driven by the pursuit of wealth, power, and religious expansion. Christopher Columbus' voyage in 1492 marked the beginning of the European colonization of the Americas, leading to the establishment of several European empires. In the late 15th century, the European powers began exploring new territories, driven by the pursuit of wealth, power, and religious expansion. Christopher Columbus' voyage in 1492 marked the beginning of the European colonisation of the Americas, leading to the establishment of several European empires.

By the start of the 16th century, Spain's attempts at enslaving indigenous populations were proving fruitless. The mounting demand for labor, particularly for mining and agriculture, led the Spanish to tap into a new labor force: African slaves. Several factors contributed to the selection of Africans as the primary labor source. The ocean currents facilitated the transportation of Africans to the Caribbean, and being from well-developed agricultural societies, Africans were well-versed in organised tropical agriculture. Now on the topic of the African slave trade, between 1492 and 1820, approximately 10 to 15 million Africans were forcibly transported to the New World, greatly exceeding the number of whites who migrated to the Americas before the 1830s. This massive influx of African slaves significantly shaped the demographic makeup of the Spanish colonies in the Americas, as there were now more Africans on the land than indigenous or Spanish citizens. The African slaves brought to the Spanish Americas hailed from diverse regions across the African continent. The initial generations of slaves in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru mainly originated from Upper Guinea. However, by the mid-seventeenth century, when the intra-American trading routes emerged, a significant influx of diverse African cultures and peoples began. The Spanish derived a concept for this "intermingling" of people - Mestizaje (the intermixing of indigenous peoples, Africans, and Europeans), which contributed to the overall diversity of the Spanish Empire's population. This process of racial and cultural fusion resulted in a highly mixed African-descended population in Spanish colonies, unlike in other European colonies where the population was predominantly African or European.

It is safe to say that the Spanish empire benefitted greatly from the slave trade, both economically and socially through its standing in the New World. Spanish America, stretching from California to Buenos Aires, was the largest and most populous European imperial domain in the New World till at least 1810. The economic power of the Spanish colonies was deeply intertwined with the African slave trade. While indigenous peoples mined most of the silver, the backbone of colonial exports, enslaved Africans played a significant role in other economic sectors. They were instrumental in the cultivation of sugar, coffee, and tobacco – the first goods sold to a mass consumer market. The Spanish colonies continued to expand, largely due to their black populations. This growth defies the common misconception that the Spanish Empire's links with Africa waned after 1640. In fact, the slave trade remained of central importance throughout all four centuries of Spanish colonialism in the New World.

Overall, the Atlantic Slave Trade left an indelible mark on Spanish America, influencing its demographics, economy, and social structure. The forced migration of millions of Africans to the New World significantly shaped the Spanish colonies' development, leaving a lasting legacy that continues to resonate in contemporary societies.

Sources

Lecture by Dr Kate Quinn

Lecture by Dr André Jockyman Roithmann

Eltis, D. (1993). Europeans and the Rise and Fall of African Slavery in the Americas: An Interpretation. The American Historical Review., 98(5). https://doi.org/10.2307/2167060

Bergad, L. (2007) The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (New Approaches to the Americas). doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511803970.

Borucki, A. (2015). Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America. The American Historical Review., 120(2), 433–461. https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/120.2.433

Newson, Linda A., and Susie Minchin, editors. From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century. Brill, 2007. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv29sfpzt. Accessed 5 Dec. 2023.

[khalilhumam]

The Economic Impact of COVID-19 around the World: Remittances, Updated Growth and Poverty Projections, and the Reintroduction of Barter in Fiji

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The Economic Impact of COVID-19 around the World: Remittances, Updated Growth and Poverty Projections, and the Reintroduction of Barter in Fiji

As we reach 4.79 million cases of coronavirus infection and more than 318,000 deaths around the world, low- and middle-income countries continue to wrestle with the economic fallout from the pandemic and the responses to it. Food supply disruption, rising poverty, and deteriorating industries remain top concerns, as countries consider “exit strategies” for reopening business and lifting lockdowns in a bid to avoid the worsening economic crisis. Here is a roundup of the most recent analysis from Africa, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, divided into sections: growth and income analysis, sector and sub-population analysis, economic policy responses, and commentary.

Global

Growth, poverty, and food security analysis

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) “estimates that the global economic impact of COVID-19 could reach $5.8 trillion (6.4% of global GDP) under a 3-month containment scenario, and $8.8 trillion (9.7% of global GDP) under a 6-month containment scenario” in an updated report. “ADB’s new estimate is more than double the World Bank’s 16 April 2020 estimate of a 2%–4% decline in global GDP, and higher than the IMF’s April 2020 World Economic Outlook estimate of 6.3% decline in global GDP.” (ADB)

Mercy Corps reports on economic and food security impacts of the pandemic including rising prices of food staples, reduced purchasing power, unequal impact on businesses “with larger, more formal and better networked firms faring better than their informal counterparts,” liquidity challenges for financial service providers, and an expected drop in remittances. The data come from Mercy Corps’ 22 country offices. (Mercy Corps)

The World Food Programme reports on the economic and health impacts the pandemic may have on food and nutrition security: “Increased reprioritisation of national expenditure towards control of COVID19 will affect allocations to other sectors such as agriculture which would have long-term effects on food production and supply.” The decline in tourism, potential drop in remittances, and high dependence on commodity exports leave some countries particularly vulnerable. (WFP)

Sulser and Dunston model the potential effects export constraints have on prices of rice and wheat. “Some governments have responded to alarms about possible COVID-19-related food shortages much as consumers would: By trying to hoard food… [Sulser and Dunston] conclude that international rice markets are particularly sensitive to such restrictions by large exporters—modeling shows they could significantly boost global prices and push millions of poor rice consumers into hunger.” (IFPRI)

Pate and Van Nieuwkoop warn that “unhealthy diets are contributing to pre-existing conditions” that put people at risk. They provide three policy recommendations on “how nutrition can protect people’s health during COVID-19”: securing food at affordable prices, ensuring better nutrition through bio-fortified crops and improving supply chains, and realigning public spending to health and nutrition goals. (World Bank)

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reports that “world food prices fell for a third consecutive month in April, hit by the economic and logistical impact of the coronavirus pandemic… Sugar price index fell to a 13-year low… The vegetable oil price index fell 5.2%... [and] the meat index shed 2.7%.” (Reuters)

Policy responses

Pangestu provides three policy priorities in reducing the impact of the pandemic on the most vulnerable and most insecure: ensuring access and financing for farm inputs, prioritizing transportation of food to ensure produce reach markets, and ensuring social safety nets are in place so people have the money to purchase food items. (World Bank)

Perakis, Khosla, and Bari document how education organizations are providing relief packages (Luminos in Liberia) and cash transfers (The Citizens Foundation in Pakistan) to poor communities. (CGD)

Commentary

Clemens discusses the World Bank’s estimates that remittances will fall by nearly a quarter this year and what that means for global development: Big impacts on poverty, limited impacts on growth. He proposes three policy actions to mitigate the impacts. “This global lifeline for poor families will remain. But it will be more vulnerable now than ever in our lifetimes.” (CGD)

Africa

Growth and income analysis

The World Food Programme warns that over 40 million people in West Africa will face “desperate food shortages” in the coming months, especially in the lean season in June and August. (UN News)

Thurlow reports findings from country studies showing that “the current crisis is leading to much larger and more rapid contractions of economic activity than seen in previous crises, including the global food crisis of 2007-2008 and the 2009 recession. In addition, unlike in previous crises, it is domestic policies, rather than global shocks, such as trade disruptions and reduced remittances, that are imposing most of the economic costs, at least for now.” (IFPRI)

Sector and sub-population analysis

Cocoa planters in Côte d'Ivoire fear a drop in income due to restrictions imposed by mitigation efforts against the pandemic. Border closures and traffic disruptions could “reduce the workforce available at the start of the mid-crop harvest of cocoa beans… [introduce] delays or a slowdown in bean purchases…[and] affect the delivery of beans to the country's ports.” (Market Screener)

The Tanzanian government warns that tourism revenue will shrink by 77 percent, with 477,000 jobs at stake. “The Natural Resources and Tourism minister…said the number of people who will lose jobs accounts for 76 percent of the total direct employment in the sub-sector…The number of tourists anticipated visiting Tanzania during that period will decline from 1.9 million to 437,000.” (Ventures Africa)

Madagascar lost “half a billion dollars in much-needed tourism revenue since the start of 2020 because of the COVID-19 crisis...There is uncertainty around future funding for conservation in Madagascar, which leans heavily on foreign financing. At the same time protecting natural resources will become more challenging if economic hardship intensifies in one of the poorest countries in the world.” (Mongabay)

The “South African gambling industry sees major impact due to Covid-19 outbreak and restrictions…. Horse racing and sports events have been cancelled or postponed indefinitely since the coronavirus outbreak, and … casinos, bingo halls and other gambling establishments have been closed until further notice.” (Intrado)

Kenya, the world’s second largest tea exporter after China, sees no disruption to its tea export so far. “Due to its designation as an essential service, the tea industry is excluded from the nationwide dawn-to-dusk curfew and the ban on all movement into the four areas worst hit by coronavirus.” (African Business)

Economic policy responses

Malawi’s National Planning Commission released a rapid cost-benefit analysis enumerating the costs of a moderate lockdown strategy such as “less health outreach and more malnutrition, causing more deaths from malaria, from TB and from child mortality along with… extra maternal deaths” against reduced Covid-19 death toll, and ”the social cost of closing schools for Malawi will be around $5.2 billion – the present value of income loss for 6 million children over the next 50 years.” The report concludes that “the costs vastly outweigh the benefits from moderate lockdown that promotes social restrictions.” (NPC)

The IMF approves $411 million in emergency assistance for Ethiopia. “It also approved Ethiopia’s request for a suspension of debt service payments of about $12 million to the IMF under the IMF's Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust for poor countries.” (IMF News)

Zimbabwe and Uganda call on international creditors for debt relief “to ease the economic distress caused by the outbreak of the novel coronavirus.” (VOA, Reuters)

South Africa seeks $5 billion in financing from multilateral banks to support the country’s $26 billion stimulus package. (Moguldom Nation)

Zambia also seeks additional funding from the IMF, as it struggles “with a growing public debt even before the new coronavirus outbreak forced lockdowns across the globe, delivering a big blow to demand for raw materials. Zambia is Africa's second biggest copper producer.” (Nasdaq)

Commentary

Bouët and Laborde echo a previous warning that “border policies create problems for African trade and economic pain for communities…Stricter sanitary border controls on the transport of products should slow down intra-African trade. In addition, prohibiting people from crossing the border stops one means of informal trade, widely practiced in Africa and often the main source of income for a family.” (IFPRI)

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa released lockdown exit strategies for Africa. The report highlights “excruciating trade-offs”—“lockdowns impose extremely high costs on business and people…[but] lockdowns forestall severe vulnerabilities” in healthcare—and provides four strategies in reopening economies. (UNECA)

Copley, Decker, and Delavelle encourage support for African women considering the gendered consequences of the pandemic. They suggest research-based policy options “to build women’s economic resilience” such as cash transfers targeted to women and providing competition and business skills training to the self-employed. (World Bank)

Asia and the Pacific

Growth and income analysis

The Asian Development Bank’s new report projects an estimated 4.6 to 7.2 percent GDP decline in the region from a non-COVID-19 baseline. (ADB)

The Japan Center for Economic Research reports that Japan’s inflation-adjusted GDP contracted 3.5 percent in March compared to the previous month. (Nikkei Asian Review)

India’s Chief Economic Adviser estimates the country’s GDP growth in April-June this year to be between 1 and 2 percent. He says, “the economy could pick up [in the next quarter] as industries restart their operations with the streamlining of supply chains and migrant workers getting back to their jobs.” (livemint)

Sector and sub-population analysis

CARE and UN Women released an analysis of the impact of the pandemic on women in Asia Pacific, including the challenges of “exacerbated burdens of unpaid care work on women and girls,” unmet needs of healthcare workers who are overwhelmingly women, and “increased risks of gender-based violence,” among other issues (CARE, UN Women)

Thailand reports suicides due to pandemic-related economic hardships. “Thailand is well known for having one of the highest wealth inequalities in the world and one of the highest suicide rates in Southeast Asia.” (The Diplomat)

Indonesia’s small seaweeds processors are hit by the crisis: “demand for raw materials has decreased and prices have fallen… by almost 50% since trade with China, the biggest export market, has been disrupted since February.” (Modern Diplomacy)

In India, “the country has entered into the third and a more relaxed phase of lockdown” but only 3,500 auto dealers, 20 percent of the country’s car shops, have opened up. (Times of India)

Shell Petroleum Corp will shut down one of the Philippines’ two oil refineries “in response to the drastic decline in local product demand and the significant deterioration of regional refining margins brought about the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Reuters)

Some Fiji residents return to a barter system through a Facebook group “in response to sharp falls in employment due to coronavirus” and the accompanying scarcity of cash. Some residents of Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu have started to do the same, mostly trading for groceries and food items. (The Guardian)

Economic policy responses

The Asian Development Bank has approved a $300 million loan for Pakistan and allocated a $1.36 million grant for Uzbekistan to support pubic health care capacity and help meet the needs of the poor segments of the population.

The ADB approved a $500 million loan to Bangladesh to support efforts to manage the pandemic’s impact. “The loan is expected to benefit over 15 million poor and vulnerable people in Bangladesh.” (Big News Network)

Myanmar will receive around $2 billion from international development organizations to assist in the country’s relief plan. (The Irrawaddy)

Bangladesh reopens an estimated 1,000 garment factories. “More than four million people, many of them women, work in the $34 billion apparel export sector in Bangladesh — the second-largest garment exporter in the world after China.” (WWD)

Bangladesh exempts personal protective equipment and surgical masks from value-added tax. (Prothomalo)

Malaysia’s central bank cuts key interest rate to 2 percent, lowest since 2009. (Reuters)

Indonesia prepares “exit strategies to reopen parts of the economy…from as early as June 1… There is mounting concern about the deepening economic impact of restrictions with at least 2 million people losing their jobs in the past six weeks and poverty increasing.” (Reuters)

Commentary

Kuriakose identify policy priorities as Malaysia reopens businesses to a “new normal.” (World Bank)

Fruman and Zhang identify seven research studies in South Asia aimed at ensuring food security in the midst of the pandemic, including research identifying drivers of malnutrition (such as gender) in the region, and impacts of a conditional cash transfer in Bangladesh, a dairy program in India, and a national nutrition assessment in Bhutan. (World Bank)

Indonesia might be facing a looming food crisis: “Indonesia’s food security has long been a source of concern due to the country’s reliance on staple food imports to meet domestic demand for commodities such as sugar, rice, corn, and beef.” (The Diplomat)

Middle East and North Africa

Growth and income analysis

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecasts negative growth in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, with Lebanon the hardest hit: an economic contraction of 11 percent in that country. Only Egypt retains slight positive growth of 0.5 percent for 2020. (EBRD)

This is older, but since we haven’t included the Middle East and North Africa before, the World Bank’s April report on the region suggested a reduction in economic output for 2020, in contrast to the 2.6 percent growth forecast from late last year. (World Bank)

Likewise, the IMF provides an overview of the dual shock hitting the region—COVID-19 and falling oil prices, along with country responses: “The pandemic crisis has manifested itself in severe trade disruption and losses, hurting job-rich sectors and business confidence.” (IMF)

Sector and sub-population analysis

Morocco’s flag carrier airline, Royal Air Maroc, is losing $5 million per day. “The COVID-19 crisis will see airline passenger revenues drop by $314 billion in 2020, a 55% decline compared to 2019.” (Morocco World News)

The United Arab Emirates announced a “four month ban on exports of ferrous scrap and recovered paper” to support demand for “supplies of raw materials which are required by the economic operators for their manufacturing activities due to the coronavirus outbreak.” “The impact will be felt in India, which relies on the UAE for about one-fifth of ferrous scrap imports.” (Recycling International)

Survey shows “Egypt’s non-oil private sector activity collapsed in April, hit by a shutdown in the tourism industry, weakening demand and the imposition of a curfew as the government battled the coronavirus pandemic.” (Middle East Eye)

Economic policy responses

Morocco will distribute $440 million to about 4.3 million households “to help them cope with the social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak.” “The 2.3 million households registered in the Moroccan Medical Assistance Regime and 2 million families working in the informal sector and not enrolled in RAMED [the Moroccan Medical Assistance Regime] will benefit.” (Xinhua Net)

Morocco’s net international reserves up almost 20 percent despite COVID-19 shocks. “Morocco’s central bank, Bank Al-Maghrib, announced it injected MAD 91 billion ($9.25 billion) from May 7 to 13. During the same period, the Dirham appreciated by 0.23% against the Euro and by 0.89% against the Dollar.” (Morocco World News)

“The International Monetary Fund approved a $2.77 billion loan to Egypt in an attempt to prevent economic collapse in the Middle East’s most populous nation amid the coronavirus pandemic.” (Wall Street Journal)

Algeria cuts down the 2020 state budget by 50 percent. “The country is facing a combined shock from halving oil prices, a public health crisis and the consequences of global economic disruptions following the covid-19 outbreak.” (North Africa Post)

Commentary

Dridi writes that “Tunisia’s economic fallout from a coronavirus outbreak and the rise of unemployment claims will further compound social and regional inequalities across the country.” The lockdown hits the informal, tourism, and industrial sectors, “worsening the economic woes Tunisia has faced since the Arab Spring.” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Latin America and the Caribbean

Growth and income analysis

Estimates for Latin America and the Caribbean project poverty rising from 30.3 percent in 2019 to between 33.7 and 35.8 percent in 2020, depending on the scenario. For extreme poverty, the numbers go from 11.0 percent in 2019 to between 13.0 and 14.2 percent in 2020. CEPAL provides country-specific estimates and a roundup of policy responses. (CEPAL)

Estimates for Mexico specifically put between 6.1 and 10.7 million additional people in poverty. (Coneval)

“New York rating agency Standard and Poor’s estimated that Mexico will be the Latin American country with the weakest economic recovery after the coronavirus health crisis passes.” (infobae)

Díaz Cassou and others put out detailed economic impact analysis—including measures countries are taking to mitigate those impacts—for the Andean countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. (IDB)

In Chile, residents of a poor neighborhood rioted: “This isn’t against the quarantine. It’s against hunger,” said one protestor. (BBC)

Growth projections for Chile were reduced to -3.9 percent by the agency Fitch, currently lower than the projection of -2 percent from the Central Bank of Chile. (La Tercera)

Debt from Chilean businesses rose to 131 percent of gross national product at the close of the first trimester of the year, largely due to the depreciation of the peso relative to the dollar, according to the Central Bank of Chile. (notimérica)

International ratings agencies are wary of the rise in public debt in Brazil when gauging the future of the country’s economy. (Quintino)

The Central Bank of Honduras has predicted that gross national product will fall between 2.9 and 3.9 percent this year. (el diario)

The President of Peru announced that the economic impact of the virus may be comparable to the economic impact of Peru’s war with Chile in the 1880s. (El Comercio)

Sector and sub-population analysis

The economic impact on electricity distributors in Brazil rose to 5,411 billion reais ($950 million) between mid-March and last week, most of it due to delinquency in payments by users, according to a bulletin from the Ministry of Mines and Energy. (O Liberal)

Crude steel production fell 8 percent in the region in the first trimester. Refined steel fell 3 percent. Consumption in the region and the world are down. (Milenio)

The Colombian airline Avianca declared bankruptcy due to COVID-19. (El País)

Latin America’s coffee industry has been suffering from labor shortages during the harvest, but prices have also risen because of increased coffee consumption in homes. The president of the Council of Coffee Exporters of Brazil, Nelson Carvarlhaes, says that “Coffee has always been a great companion in times of crisis.” (El Economista)

The nongovernment organization Action Against Hunger “has drawn attention to the situation of the 900,000 Venezuelan migrants in Peru, since ‘one in three has been left unemployed during the quarantine.’” (notimérica)

Remittances to Venezuela have seen a large downturn as Venezuelan migrants have lost work and many have returned home. “Some 20,000 Venezuelans have returned home since early March, according to the Colombian government, which has paid about 396 bus tickets to take them to the Venezuelan border.” (Telemundo51)

The telecom sector in Latin America could see a loss of $4.3 billion in 2020 due to COVID-19, largely due to business closures. (Convergência Digital)

Economic policy responses

Peru is allowing participants in the private pension system to withdraw up to 25 percent of their accumulated funds. (El Universo)

A new bulletin proposes four phases of response to the livelihood and food security impacts of COVID-19, with best practice examples from Latin America and the Caribbean for each. (FAO and CEPAL)

The President of Mexico proposed a plan last week to transition to a “new normal,” with phased re-opening of the economy, starting with the 269 municipalities least affected by the virus. (DW)

Commentary

An editorial in the Financial Times is broadly critical of Latin America’s COVID-19 response, with positive exceptions for Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Still, “what no country in the region will escape is the devastating economic impact. Latin America was the world’s slowest growing region even before the coronavirus crisis. Now, Covid-19’s impact on commodity prices, tourism and remittances is hurting the region particularly hard. Fragile public finances and massive capital flight limit governments’ room for fiscal responses.” (Financial Times)

Cordero raises the concern of large internal displacement of informal workers in Peru in the context of the crisis and calls for action. (nodal)

Fiorito sums up the biggest economic risks and challenges for Latin America, three policy actions that countries can take, and the role of credit agencies and the IMF. (CGD)

The order of names on this post was, as usual, determined randomly.

[edisonashley]

Tracing Root of Movement Rights: EU and Mercosur

By Kim Rust

The attribution of regional free movement rights is not a European phenomenon. Academia and political discourse, however, often frame EU policy as the masterpiece among a sparse variety of approaches which grant free movement rights to regional nationals. The oscillations of Brexit and wave of refugees into Europe over recent years have brought to the surface tensions and uncertainty surrounding movement rights in the EU, which Ursula von der Leyen and a newly composed Commission will be called upon to respond to in the near future. This blog post is a reorientation in our approach to free movement, stepping away from the euro-centric approach which often characterises academic and political discussion. The following contribution offers a comparison between free movement in the EU and Mercosur. South America is ill-explored in migration literature, though it represents a rich ground for comparison. This blog builds upon the work of Dr Diego Acosta in his recent publication The National versus the Foreigner in South America, and strives to map a series of “membership configurations” in the EU and Mercosur. These configurations help to identify the bases of movement rights for regional nationals, test the strength and accessibility of these rights and draw conclusions as to whether movement rights can be more concretely guaranteed, and liberally, indiscriminately attributed.

Part I: Free Movement in the EU

Several examples of attempts to strengthen intra-regional movement rights have emerged across the globe, from the renowned EU policy, to established free movement regimes in Mercosur, ECOWAS and the Caribbean, among others. The following covers a spectrum of policies, examining supranational and transnational mechanisms which give rise to movement rights.

Supranational Citizenship: The EU Paradigm

The configuration below will be familiar to many.

Article 8 TFEU marks the transition from movement rights exclusively for the economically active, to movement rights for all nationals of Member States. Entry for all, subject only to an identification document under Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC (“Citizenship Directive”), is followed by a familiar narrowing of rights, with financial hurdles demarcating the attribution of temporary, long-term, and permanent residence rights. Aside from these financial obstacles, restrictions to free movement are exceptionally narrow, extending only as far as public health, policy and security justifications (Articles 27-29 of the Citizenship Directive) and abuse of free movement (Article 35 of the Citizenship Directive).

In spite of the model above guaranteeing some level of rights to all regional nationals, configuration (a) suffers weaknesses. The bond between individuals and the Union is precarious and almost wholly determined by States themselves. States alone are competent to determine nationality, the link binding individuals to the Union, a truth which has led to incongruity interpreting the status of European citizens.

2. Residence Procuring Rights: The EU Paradox

We seem little more certain of Brexit’s implications on citizenship than we were at the time of Gareth Davies’ contribution to this site in early 2018, exploring the potential ramifications of Brexit on citizenship. However, there has been a repeated intention to protect the rights of EU citizens who have made their home in the UK, and their UK counterparts within the EU. This has led to the emergence of configuration (b).

  The above represents the upmost protection of movement rights for a qualifying remnant of EU citizens. One might perceive this either to be ultimate strengthening of supranational citizenship, extending the Ruiz Zambrano principle that national dispositions should not affect enjoyment of citizenship rights, or otherwise support for the position that residency has superseded nationality in the attribution of rights. Irrespective of which view readers take, the configuration has the potential to remedy deficiencies in configuration (a), partially realising proposals from academics to strengthen supranational citizenship, through formal recognition of ties between mobile citizens and host States. The scope of configuration (b) as yet remains unclear, and whilst undeniably saturated with exclusivity, and inaccessible for the majority of EU citizens, it offers an entrenched, strengthened attribution of rights.

Brexit represents configurations (a) and (b) working simultaneously in parallel. For the majority of EU citizens, configuration (a) acts as Velcro, or tape; supranational citizenship is unilaterally ripped away by the UK, demolishing any link between individuals and the Union, making much noise, and leaving a painful mark. By contrast, configuration (b) is more comparable to shoe laces, in that residence and assimilation weave links between individuals and host States. The more intertwined these parties are, the harder it becomes to disentangle movement rights from individuals.

The Root of Rights Under EU Law: Supranationalism

Supranational citizenship is the axis on which European free movement turns. Built on mutual recognition and belonging,[1] citizenship at the European level is a manifestation of Arendt’s celebrated expression that citizenship is “the right to have rights.”  Repeatedly, the EU machine associates citizenship rights with fundamental rights. The Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91 (para 46) paints a picture of European Citizens across the continent declaring “civis europeus sum” in vehement protection of their fundamental rights. Movement rights, derived through citizenship, are so closely interwoven with fundamental rights that they are enshrined under Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

In order to protect enjoyment of rights, citizenship forms a vertical link between individuals and the Union, enabling access to a comprehensive framework of judicial protection. A train of familiar jurisprudence (such as Ruiz Zambrano; Jipa C-33/07; D’Hoop C-224/98; and Garcia Avello, C-148/02) has safeguarded enjoyment of (movement and post-movement) rights, enforcing State duties and obligations outlined in European legislation, facilitating well-protected regional free movement, under which citizens can be certain of their rights.

This reconceptualisation of citizenship as a framework of rights, rather than an identity gives rise to asymmetries. Whilst any national of a Member State can access European citizenship, the status of supranational citizenship does not carry with it equal rights for all. Articles 7(1) and 14(1) of the Citizenship Directive outline the scope of movement rights, which appear to favour the financially secure. Though citizenship suggests equal access to rights for all, residency beyond three months is accessible only for those unlikely to become “burdens” to the host State.

Kochenov helpfully explains this misguided perception of citizenship as an element which slots neatly into the framework of the internal market, rather than a stand-alone strategy working alongside the internal market.[2] Thus, internal market-thinking shapes and restricts the scope of citizenship, and barriers remain steadfast until this changes. A natural extension of this asymmetry is the division which arises between the economically active, mobile minority, and sedentary citizens, policy appearing to favour the former. Much attention has been drawn to the above asymmetries, with only recent literature, framing the transnational stakeholder, perhaps offering an innovative and optimistic outlook, adding value to static citizenship, whilst overturning conceptions of gains and “burdens”[3]

Part II: Free Movement in Mercosur

South America represents a rich ground for migration studies, yet often remains absent from academic and political discussion on regional free movement. A different context to the European model, its approach challenges prevailing restrictive tendencies of migration policy, and aims to reverse a history of narrow migration laws. A poignant neo-liberal rhetoric supports a human right to migrate. National legislations such as Argentine Law 25.871/2004 (Article 4); Ecuadorian Constitution (Article 40); Uruguayan Migration Act 18.250 January 2008; Bolivian Law 370/2013 Article 12(II)(1); and Paraguayan Migration Law Proposal, Ministry of the Interior, Article 7 2016, have been supported by regional commitments to broaden rights to free movement, reducing barriers and more fervently guaranteeing the security of rights for regional nationals. Mercosur’s 2002 Residence Agreement (“Residence Agreement”) represents the most developed regional free movement regime on the continent. The policy has been built to combat issues of irregular migration, aspiring to terminate criminalisation of free movement, and grant access to rights for all.

Nationality: The Mercosur Paradigm

Liberal attributions of entry rights and temporary residence rights for all nationals of Mercosur Member States, and in many cases associated Member States, is subject only to an identification document and a clean criminal record for the five years preceding movement (Article 4(1) of the Residence Agreement). The policy displays a palatable absence of financial conditions, which are only assessed upon application for permanent residence; yet, even at this stage, transition from long-term to permanent residency is remarkably fluid (Article 5(3) of the Residence Agreement). Financial prerequisites at any stage earlier than this have been deemed unnecessary, and possibly detrimental to the effectiveness of free movement, given the dominant casual labour market in South America and fewer social assistance regimes across the region.

The configuration does exhibit a surprising distinction, at least for Western readers. Historically, and contemporarily, divisions have been made between natives and the naturalised in South America, with no clear dichotomy between national, foreigner and citizen statuses.[4] A regional preference for ius soli has led to a configuration which grants natives instant access to movement rights, trumping the rights of naturalised persons who face a temporal condition of up to five years residence before accessing equivalent rights, (Article 2 of the Residence Agreement). The effects of the above native-naturalised dichotomy refute common assumptions that naturalisation completes the rite of passage from foreigner to national, derived principally from European law. Article 5(2) of the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Nationality goes so far as to explicitly forbid such a distinction between naturalised and native nationals. Naturalisation procedures remain incongruous, even absent in some Mercosur States, in contradiction to regional attempts at openness. Importantly, the region is no longer a prominent receiver of immigrants, a contextually significant fact, which renders inconsistent naturalisation procedures of considerably less weight than might be the case in other parts of the world. Argentina receives most immigrants of the Mercosur States, but with only 5% of the population not born on Argentinian soil, and 90% of these fellow South Americans, most immigrants can access sufficient movement rights without naturalising, based on rights guaranteed under the Residence Agreement. Consequently, naturalisation forms only a minor element of policy. Inversely, regularisation has been a central focus, facilitating this intra-regional shift of persons. Argentine policy has been specifically acknowledged by Acosta who claims the State has “dramatically shift[ed] the balance from expulsion to regularisation,”[5] an important, though incomplete, step toward legitimate exercise of movement rights for all South American nationals.

Citizenship: The Mercosur Paradox

South America has exhibited opposition to European migration policy, Ecuadorian President Correa going so far as to label Directive 2008/115/EC (“Returns Directive”) the “Directive of Shame.” In spite of this, South American entities have expressed growing enthusiasm for the development of a South American citizenship. The most advanced articulation of this is the Mercosur 64/10 Action Plan (“Plan”), striving to establish supranational citizenship by 2021. The Plan outlines goals for the free movement of persons and deepening social integration, yet little substantive action to has been taken to achieve these objectives.

Nationality à Supranational citizenship à Entry and Residence Rights

The above configuration demarcates what the policy is likely to look like. Much like the EU model, attribution of supranational citizenship, derivative of nationality, forms the root of movement rights. This should extend beyond economic migrants, though worryingly, only free movement of workers is specifically listed, under Article 3.5.1 of the Plan. If an employment criterion were introduced, the configuration would look more like the example below.

Nationality – Supranational citizenship – Employment hurdle – Entry & Residence Rights

The Plan in many ways looks more like a streamlining of the Residence Agreement than a revolution. It is plagued with uncertainty, failing to establish the impact of citizenship in relation to associate member states, or confirm whether the current distinction between natives and naturalised persons would remain in place. There is no substantive policy outline on how to achieve regional free movement, save for promises to simplify and speed up current free movement mechanisms (Article 3.1 of the Plan) harmonise identification documents (Article 3.3 of the Plan), and clarity that the policy shall not be one of open borders (Article 3.2 of the Plan). Regional entities, including the South American Conference on Migration, have called for mutual cooperation between Member States to better define ambiguities within the agreement.[6] Until this happens, illustration of an accurate configuration remains challenging.

The Root of Rights Under Mercosur’s Law: Transnationalism Aspiring to Supranationalism

Neither the Residence Agreement, nor the Plan is supranational in nature. Though policies extend beyond the borders of single Member States, these transnational approaches. An absence of supranational enforcement leaves States laterally bound and free to retract or amend their assent to free movement. Unlike in the EU, a Mercosur national does not have an enforceable right to movement, which will be protected by an extensive supranational court system, the right is discretionary, dictated by the will of home and host States.

Transnational policy in South America boasts little of the security the European system lavishes on citizens, appearing comparatively fragile. Top-down intergovernmental approaches are wrought with incongruity and considerable implementation gaps, in some States. Shortcomings and inconsistencies characterise barriers to free movement, naturalisation and regularisation procedures, in spite of their integral importance to regional free movement. Whilst supranational courts exist at the CAN level, the absence of Mercosur supranational courts elevates the key role of national courts in facilitating regional free movement. The Inter-American Courts have enforced adherence to international human rights regulations, especially in the domain of post-movement rights, even for undocumented workers, in Advisory Opinion 18/03. Yet, the competence of international courts cannot stretch to enforce a right to migrate which goes unrecognised in international law. Protection of such a right seems possible only through the creation of South American supranational courts, or at the very least, an examination of the legality of national dispositions which so clearly contravene an established enshrinement of a right to migrate at the constitutional level.

Discursive crevasses have opened up between constitutional values, which endorse a human right to migrate, and political discourse through which a rising wave of right-wing governments challenge this premise. Macri’s presidency in Argentina has underlined this fissure; in spite of being considered the region’s liberal leader and a crucial player in Mercosur’s policymaking, the 70/17 Decree, since declared unconstitutional, proposed measures promoting more restrictive migration policy. The Decree proposed amendments to Law 25.871/2004, aiming to broaden grounds on which to expel migrants, simplify the process of expulsions and reduce family-member waivers to expulsion. Not only does this contravene the region’s established liberal position on regional free movement, tipping the scales once more in favour of States, but has been widely criticised as contrary to human rights law, gravitating toward criminalisation of free movement.  The aftermath of Bolsonaro’s electoral success remains largely to be seen, but the Brazilian leader seems an unlikely candidate to further free movement, regionally or internationally.

Transnationalism has not yet succeeded in developing deep-set roots for supranational citizens which mitigate States’ sovereign capacity to unilaterally switch off citizenship rights. South America has merely exhibited this same reality in reverse to Europe. Whilst Brexit demonstrates the UK unilaterally tearing itself apart from the EU, dragging the majority of its citizens with it, and reducing free movement rights for most other EU citizens, Mercosur has suspended Venezuela’s enjoyment of membership rights, giving rise to equivalent effects.

This fragile transnationalism fractures under the weight of crises, mass immigration from Venezuela challenging free movement policy and theory, especially given the State’s precarious membership status. Whilst most States have taken in substantial numbers of fleeing Venezuelans, barriers are being erected, with the burden unevenly distributed throughout South America.

Conclusion

Regional free movement policies display an ambition to move closer to the below configuration, within a demarcated geographic space. Policies seek to link individuals to a regional right to movement, subject to as few hurdles as possible. This is positive at an economic and human level. The economic foundations of many regional entitles render free movement of goods, capital and human capital attractive, given the effects of stimulated trade and increased regional solidarity. At a personal level, free movement means broader horizons, families part and reunite, study becomes international, ideologies, cultures and languages are shared and learned, job prospects and quality of life potentially increase.

Personhood à Movement rights

Personhood remains an insufficient status to procure migration rights in regional policy, which is “internally inclusive” and “externally exclusive,”[7] rejecting access for third country nationals (TCNs). A complete assessment of just how far regional free movement policy brings us to the above configuration would require a thorough assessment of TCN movement rights alongside rights granted to those who can prove a regional identity as the root to their rights.

For regional nationals, it is clear that neither supranational citizenship, nor international treaties, have yet succeeded in eradicating hurdles for regional free movement. Perhaps only open borders can achieve the utopian configuration above, rendering borders permeable for all, eradicating irregular migration in the process.[8] The absence of such a migration policy in South America, whilst perhaps unsurprising, remains disappointing, given the continent’s repeated commitments to regional free movement for all. However, claims that Mercosur shows signs of “innovative and exceptional” policymaking are not unfounded.[9] Having drawn migration configurations rather differently to European models, which have wrongfully come to be synonymous with global paradigms, Mercosur has fashioned a new design for migration policy. Working to a more open, liberal goal, it has strived to reduce hurdles to regional free movement and has, in some cases, momentarily succeeded in doing so. Ecuador, for example, exercised short-lived open-borders from 20 June 2008.  Both European and South American migration policy face increased nationalism, xenophobia and the weighty burden of international crises, threatening liberal regional migration promulgations. Yet Mercosur’s models of free movement offer a glimmer of hope that perhaps migration policy can be more inclusive and expansive, subject to fewer hurdles. The world seems far from agreeing on a human right to migrate. A regional right to migrate, however, may be a feasible and realistic step in the right direction.

[1] For a developed theory of supranational citizenship as a mutual recognition of belonging see Francesca Strumia, Supranational Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity-Immigrants, Citizens and Member States in the EU, (2013) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

[2] Dimitry Kochenov, “The Citizenship Paradigm,” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 15 (2013).

[3] For an innovative introduction to this theory, within the scope of technology see Francesca Strumia, “Global Citizenship for the Stay-at-Homes” in Debating Transformations of National Citizenship (Springer, 2018) edited by Rainer Bauböck, (pp. 279-284).

[4] For a complete typology of acquisition and loss of national membership in South America see Diego Acosta, Regional Report on Citizenship: The South American and Mexican Cases, EUI, EUDO, Florence.

[5] Diego Acosta and Luisa Freier, “Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox Upside Down? Populist Liberalism and Discursive Gaps in South America,” International Migration Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2015).

[6] Declaration of the South American Conference on Migration X, Cochabama, 25-26 October 2010.

[7] Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Ch 1.

[8] Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics, Vol.49, No. 2 (1987): pp.251-272.

[9] Diego Acosta, The National Versus the Foreigner in South America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p.200

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