#gezi park protests

[workingclasshistory]

On this day, 28 May 2013 during the Turkish Occupy Gezi protests, the "woman in red", Ceyda Sungur, was pepper sprayed by police. The photograph of the event, by Osman Orsal, became the defining image of the movement. The protests began against development of Gezi Park in Istanbul but transformed into a national movement against the increasing authoritarianism of the right-wing government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A university worker, Sungur didn't want notoriety, saying "a lot of people who were at the park and they were also tear-gassed… There is not (a) difference between them and I." She was subsequently arrested for “provoking people to disobey laws”, although the following year the charges were dismissed. More information, sources and map: https://stories.workingclasshistory.com/article/10042/%22woman-in-red%22-pepper-sprayed https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=633798268793392&set=a.602588028581083&type=3

[hadleysmis]

Türkiye:

Protest using 'Do you hear the people sing': https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5Mo1w4Fxjc

This protest was done during the Gezi Park protests in 2013, lasting for just over 2 months, which is still remembered today:

The goals in the Gezi Park protests were:

Protecting Gezi Park and the public places

Defending freedom of speech and right to assembly

Banning the usage of chemical gas by state forces against protesters

Resignation of Erdoğan's government

Free media

Fair elections

With the subsequent results:

Occupation of the park and adjoining Taksim square ended by force, smaller scale protests gradually die out, the park remains open to the public and plans for its destruction are cancelled

Government passed several bills to increase the government's ability to control the Internet, to expand the police's abilities and to criminalise the provision of emergency medical care during protests.

Timeline of events:

"Nov. 8, 2012: Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş announced that a shopping mall could be built in place of Gezi Park[...] planned to be rebuilt as part of the renovation project.

May 27, 2013: A group activists from Taksim Solidarity[...] gathered in Gezi Park after bulldozers came to the area to cut down the trees in the park."

For more, read below.

Violence towards protesters by the Turkish police:

Violence against protesters by the police:

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ten-years-after-turkeys-gezi-protests-some-say-vote-chance-justice-2023-05-26/

Continuing effect, article written in 2024:

"The crowd carried photos of those who lost their lives during the Gezi protests and those imprisoned in the Gezi trials[...] signs reading "Justice for Gezi,"..."

"Taksim Solidarity called for justice in its press statement and emphasized that the Gezi protests were Turkey’s most democratic, participatory, and peaceful popular movement....“left a deep and colorful mark on the country’s political, social, and cultural history, symbolizing the determination and hope of the millions who filled the squares.”"

Research paper on how Türkiye government tried to forbid peaceful protest, imploying of censorship, and what they should've done instead:

(The source above is very long.)

"Park protests clearly show what happens when poorly trained, poorly supervised police officers are instructed to use force[...] safe in the knowledge that they are unlikely ever to be identified or prosecuted for their abuses,“

Specifically in relation to Les Misérables (it's Buzzfeed though, but the article is fine):

But does that mean Türkiye was becoming more authoritarian?

Yes. How? See:

I will check and go through these things to polish up on the information. This is so far mainly from the chat.

There is also a 1967 movie, a Turkish adaptation of Les Misérables: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bxb-mEt5ZyQ

The subtitles should be available via auto-subtitle settings.

Please tell me of everything I have stated incorrectly so I can fix it asap. I am sorry to place a burden.

[voluptuarian]

"New Turkey" Introductory Reader

I did so much research for my paper that the final product barely scratched the surface of what I've read or looked up in the course of writing it. As such, I feel like the scope of my paper is very basic compared to the depth of the issue. (And considering how quickly I wrote it, frankly I'm not that sure of its actual writing quality.)

My research topic was current Turkish politics, centering on recent policies of President Erdogan and his party, the AKP, who have dominated the country since the mid-2000s. In particular I wanted to look into the roots of, and meaning behind a sort of party motto/discourse/policy umbrella which started in 2014 when Erdogan became president and announced the arrival of a "New Turkey."

This motto has frequently been compared to "Make America Great Again," and is just as bold and lacking in specific meaning. It is also the mission statement behind much of what's happening in Turkey's social and political climate right now, so for anyone interested in what's been going on in Turkey in the recent past, or curious about where the country's current direction is leading, the "New Turkey" idea is central to everything.

Rather than just delete all my references I thought I would share them here for anyone who's interested. Consider this a bit of "New Turkey" intro. It includes most of what I used in my bibliography and some other sources I looked at but didn't get to include.

I'm including some newspaper articles here-- these are all very introductory-- they're helpful for people with no background at all on Turkey, as well as for anyone who's interested and doesn't want to go through an entire paper's worth of books and articles. All these should be accessible for most people, I think.

“Erdogan Elected Turkey’s President, Promises ‘New Era.’”

"21st Century Will Be the Century of Türkiye: Erdoğan."

"Recep Tayyip Erdogan Sworn in as Turkish President; Swearing-in Ceremony Caps Monthslong Campaign."

"Erdoğan's split personality: the reformer v the tyrant"

"Turkey, lavish new presidential palace proves divisive."

"Turkey Rages at Shoddy Construction of 'Earthquake-Proof' Homes."

(Also looking up information on the Gezi Park protests from 2013 or Fethullah Gülen and his movement will be helpful for newbies as well.)

Behind the cut is all the more scholarly stuff. I've included entries in citation form so all the info you could need is there; I've also included links to everything but I don't know how many will be accessible everywhere, or to people without accounts, or even usable (I had a couple links stop working during the process of writing this.) Hopefully even if you can't access them all through the links provided, looking up the article information or even reaching out to the author will get you access. Happy reading!

The progression and consolidation of erdoğanist authoritarianism in the New Turkey - Bilge Azgın https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2020.1764277

Bâli, Aslı Ü., 'The “New Turkey” At Home and Abroad', in Amal Ghazal, and Jens Hanssen (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle Eastern and North African History, Oxford Handbooks (2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 9 June 2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199672530.013.29‌

Bourcier, Nicolas. “Erdogan, the Enduring Reinterpreter of Turkish History.” Le Monde.fr, October 29, 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/29/erdogan-the-enduring-reinterpreter-of-turkish-history_6212761_4.html.

Cagaptay, Soner. “Making Turkey Great Again.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 43, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 169–78. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289835.

Çevik, S. B. (2024). Grandiose dreams, mega projects: Ottoman nostalgia in ‘new Turkey’. International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 21(1), e1846. https://doi.org/10.1002/aps.1846

Heper, M., & Toktas, S. (2003). Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Muslim World, 93(2), 157-185. http://proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/islam-modernity-democracy-contemporary-turkey/docview/216437044/se-2

ERDOGAN'S GRAND VISION: Rise and Decline - Hillel Fradkin, Lewis Libby (2013)https://www.jstor.org/stable/43556162?searchText=&searchUri=&ab_segments=&searchKey=&refreqid=fastly-default%3A07607ba3d65e40f3231e2694b7b6b306&seq=2

Eissenstat, Howard. "Recep tayyip erdoğan: From 'illiberal democracy' to electoral authoritarianism (born 1953)" in Dictators and Autocrats: Securing Power Across Global Politics, ed. Klaus Larres (Abingdon, Oxfordshire, U.K: Routledge, 2021) https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003100508-25/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9Fan-howard-eissenstat

Cinar Kiper, “Sultan Erdoğan: Turkey’s Rebranding into the New, Old Ottoman Empire”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-Erdoğan-turkeys-rebranding-into-the-new-old-ottoman-empire/274724/

Kocamaner, Hikmet. “How New Is Erdoğan’s ‘New Turkey’?” Middle East Brief, no. 91 (April 2015): 1–9. https://doi.org/https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb91.pdf.

‌McKernan, Bethan. 2019. “From Reformer to ‘New Sultan’: Erdoğan’s Populist Evolution.” The Guardian, March 11, 2019, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/from-reformer-to-new-sultan-erdogans-populist-evolution.

Populism, victimhood and Turkish foreign policy under AKP rule - Mehmet Arısan https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2022.2106131?src=recsys

Development of the 'New Turkey' Media Image: Substantive Aspect - N. E. Demeshko; V. A. Avatkov; A. A. Irkhin https://eds.s.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=ea94c4bc-4632-4ee4-a8c2-df8b9f5973bf%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=edsdoj.

Smith Reynolds, Aaron. “The ‘New Turkey’ Might Have Come to an End: Here’s Why.” giga. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/giga-focus/the-new-turkey-might-have-come-to-an-end-heres-why.

Solomon, Hussein. “Turkey’s AKP and the Myth of Islamist Moderation.” Jewish Political Studies Review 30, no. 3/4 (2019): 128–35. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26801121.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision.” Die Welt des Islams 56, no. 3–4 (November 28, 2016): 438–65. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-05634p08.

Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State - Bilge Yesil https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=w3tMDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22new+turkey%22+origins+erdogan&ots=iqHojS41ci&sig=KC201icwuSS6tseeNml_IFMnZWU#v=onepage&q=%22new%20turkey%22%20origins%20erdogan&f=false

Yilmaz, Ihsan. "Islamic Populism and Creating Desirable Citizens in Erdogan’s New Turkey." Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2018): 52-76. muse.jhu.edu/article/717683.

The AKP and the spirit of the ‘new’ Turkey: imagined victim, reactionary mood, and resentful sovereign- Zafer Yilmaz https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2017.1314763

[alanshemper]

Vincent Bevins is back with a new book

sounds fucking lit

The story of the recent uprisings that sought to change the world – and what comes next

From 2010 to 2020, more people participated in protests than at any other point in human history. Yet we are not living in more just and democratic societies as a result. IF WE BURN is a stirring work of history built around a single, vital question: How did so many mass protests lead to the opposite of what they asked for?

From the so-called Arab Spring to Gezi Park in Turkey, from Ukraine’s Euromaidan to student rebellions in Chile and Hong Kong, acclaimed journalist Vincent Bevins provides a blow-by-blow account of street movements and their consequences, recounted in gripping detail. He draws on four years of research and hundreds of interviews conducted around the world, as well as his own strange experiences in Brazil, where a progressive-led protest explosion led to an extreme-right government that torched the Amazon.

Careful investigation reveals that conventional wisdom on revolutionary change is gravely misguided. In this groundbreaking study of an extraordinary chain of events, protesters and major actors look back on successes and defeats, offering urgent lessons for the future.

[warningsine]

Philanthropist and businessperson Osman Kavala, who has been convicted of aggravated life in prison over the alleged charge of attempting to overthrow the government, has penned a letter from prison where he is being kept for 2000 days.

Kavala said he has been in prison for 2000 days on unlawful and unreasonable allegations and accusations.

The 65-year-old Kavala said “The acquittal decision in the first Gezi trial, which was unanimously given, clearly stated that there is no concrete evidence linking me to any crime. My ongoing imprisonment despite this fact that should be apparent to anyone who reads the indictments and that gained a legal grounding with the two legally-bounding decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), is an act of torture realized through the misuse of judicial authority. It is a manifestation of a perspective that disregards the value of human life.”

“I fervently hope that after May 14 (elections), a new perspective that upholds legal norms, human dignity, and human rights will prevail within the judiciary and all other public offices. And I believe that thousands of our fellow citizens who have also been imprisoned without any evidence linking them to the alleged crimes share this expectation,” he added.

Kavala was arrested in 2017 on charges that he helped to plan the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey. He was cleared of these charges in February 2020 but immediately arrested on charges that he orchestrated the July 2016 coup attempt, seen at the time as a way of getting around the ECHR's 2019 ruling that called for his immediate release.

In April 2022, an Istanbul court sentenced Kavala to aggravated life in prison without parole on charges of attempting to overthrow the government.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan previously said they will not respect ECHR’s decision, triggering proceedings which could result in Turkey's suspension from the Council of Europe, of which it is a founding member.

Main opposition bloc Nation Alliance’s presidential candidate and Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has expressed on several occasions that political prisoners such as Osman Kavala and former Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş will be released should he assume power.

[mostlysignssomeportents]

This day in history

#20yrsago Turing Machines aren’t as universal as they could be https://www.coherenceengine.com/blog/2003_06_01_archive.html#105547327596834731

#15yrsago Ancient Roman D20 for sale, $18,000 https://www.christies.com/lot/lot-4205385/?intObjectID=4205385

#15yrsago Diesel Sweeties: the ten-volume free Creative Commons licensed collection edition https://www.dieselsweeties.com/ebooks/

#15yrsago Canadian DMCA is worse than the American one https://www.michaelgeist.ca/2008/06/canadian-dmca-fine-print/

#10yrsago Sesame Street’s materials for kids with an incarcerated parent https://web.archive.org/web/20130629061517/https://www.sesamestreet.org/parents/topicsandactivities/toolkits/incarceration

#10yrsago Roundup of responses to the Snowden/NSA leaks https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/12/anger-mounts-congress-telephone-surveillance-programmes

#10yrsago Photos from #OccupyGezi https://occupygezipics.tumblr.com/post/52730157891/taksim-rainbow-tuesday-evening

#10yrsago Greek government shuts down state broadcaster, police force journalists out of the building https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/06/11/ert-greek-state-tv-radio-is-dead-a-blacklisted-persons-lament/

#10yrsago Former UK drug czar calls banning marijuana and psychedelics “the worst case of scientific censorship since the Catholic Church banned the works of Copernicus and Galileo” https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/the-worst-case-of-scientific-censorship-since-the-catholic-church-banned-the-works-of-galileo-scientists-call-for-drugs-to-be-legalised-to-allow-proper-study-of-their-properties-8654514.html

#10yrsago Why are the protesters in Gezi Park? https://technosociology.org/?p=1349

#5yrsago Reddit sounds the alarm: the EU internet proposal would end the net as we know it! https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/8qfw8l/protecting_the_free_and_open_internet_european/

#5yrsago LA’s high-tech, thoughtful water management is cause for cautious optimism about adapting to climate change https://www.wired.com/story/la-is-doing-water-better-than-your-city-yes-that-la/

#5yrsago Feds indict Florida police chief who framed a teen for burglaries so he could boast about perfect record https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/06/11/police-framed-a-teen-for-four-burglaries-so-chief-could-tout-perfect-clearance-rate-feds-say/

#5yrsago Empirical evidence for the Peter Principle (or, why bosses are so incompetent) https://hbr.org/2018/03/research-do-people-really-get-promoted-to-their-level-of-incompetence

#5yrsago The EU’s terrible copyright proposal will “carpet bomb” the whole world’s internet with censorship and surveillance https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2018/06/11/eu-copyright-law

#5yrsago 70+ internet pioneers to the EU: you are transforming the internet into a “tool for automated surveillance and control” https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/internet-luminaries-ring-alarm-eu-copyright-filtering-proposal

#5yrsago The Freeze-Frame Revolution: mutineers unstuck in time, strung out across an aeon https://memex.craphound.com/2018/06/12/the-freeze-frame-revolution-mutineers-unstuck-in-time-strung-out-across-an-aeon/

#5yrsago Eh, too: Canadians will also suffer under the EU’s proposed copyright rules https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-monday-edition-1.4700930/how-canadians-could-get-caught-up-in-the-eu-s-proposed-copyright-law-1.4700935

#1yrago The Geico STD story is the new McDonald’s Hot Coffee story https://pluralistic.net/2022/06/12/hot-coffee/#mcgeico

[allegrasloman]

hands up for the whirl of it all

fuck me but when the Turks protest they do it in fucking style - June 2 2013 Gezi Park

[istanbulstreetphotography]

#occupygezi: Gezi Park Protests 2013

A wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on 28 May 2013, initially to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. The protests were sparked by outrage at the violent eviction of a sit-in at the park protesting the plan. Subsequently, supporting protests and strikes took place across Turkey, protesting a wide range of concerns at the core of which were issues of freedom of the press, of expression, assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkey's secularism. With no centralised leadership beyond the small assembly that organized the original environmental protest, the protests have been compared to the Occupy movement and the May 1968 events. Social media played a key part in the protests, not least because much of the Turkish media downplayed the protests, particularly in the early stages. 3.5 million of Turkey's 80 million people are estimated to have taken an active part in almost 5,000 demonstrations across Turkey connected with the original Gezi Park protest. 11 people were killed and more than 8,000 were injured, many critically. (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests) 

İstanbul, 2013

[mariacallous]

Turkish Supreme Court of Cassation ruled on Wednesday for a second time that the Constitutional Court’s order to release MP Can Atalay from jail has “no legal value”.

“There is no legal value in the second violation decision issued by the Constitutional Court for Can Atalay,” the court said, reported the pro-government daily Sabah.

Accordingly, the third chamber at the Supreme Court of Cassation has decided not to comply with the Constitutional Court decision for the immediate release of Atalay, an MP for the Workers’ Party of Turkey, TIP

Turkey’s top court ruled on October 25 and again on December 27 that the “right to vote and be elected” and the “right to personal liberty and security” had been violated in the case of the imprisoned MP.

However, the Supreme Court of Cassation did not comply with the ruling.

In its second decision, the Constitutional Court said in its ruling published on December 27 that the Supreme Court of Cassation has no authority over the jailed MP, but despie that the local court again referred the case to the Court of Cassation.

According to the constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest court in the country and its decisions are final. There is no right to appeal.

Lawyers, experts and the opposition accused the Cassation Court of staging a de facto judicial coup attempt. However, President Erdogan and his nationalist allies have supported the Court of Cassations and have called for the termination of the Constitutional Court.

Atalay has been in prison for more than a year. He was jailed for 18 years for his role in the so-called Gezi Park protests of 2013. The government classified the protests, the first nationwide uprising against President Erdogan’s rule, as an attempted coup.

Atalay was convicted in April 2022 in a trial that also saw the philanthropist and human rights activist Osman Kavala sentenced to life in prison for allegedly trying to overthrow Erdogan’s government.

Atalay was elected as an MP in the May 14 elections. His status as a legislator was approved by the Supreme Election Council and by parliament.

[dmcreativestudio]

Tactical Media

"what happens when the cheap 'do it yourself' media, made possible by the  revolution in consumer electronics and expanded forms of distribution (from  public access cable to the internet) are exploited by groups and  individuals who feel aggrieved by or excluded from the wider culture.  Tactical media do not just report events, as they are never impartial they  always participate and it is this that more than anything separates them  from mainstream media." (Lovink, Geert; Garcia, David)

"digital media archive of social movements appeared following the massive urban protests known as Gezi Park Resistance. By collectivizing knowledge and memory and operating as a space of empowerment bak.ma radicalizes the politics of the archive and indicates possibilities for creating a living memory of the social movements."

[delectablywaywardbeard-blog]

Turchia, ergastolo per il miliardario Osman Kavala per le proteste di Gezi Park

ISTANBUL  – La Corte di Cassazione della Turchia ha confermato l’ergastolo aggravato, una sorta di 41 bis, per il filantropo Osman Kavala, che nel 2022 era stato condannato per “tentativo di rovesciare il governo”, a causa del suo sostegno alle proteste anti-governative scoppiate nel parco Gezi di Istanbul del 2013. Come fanno sapere vari media turchi, la Corte ha confermato anche le sentenze per…

[bonpourlorient]

Quick Thoughts About the Elections

Here are some disorganized thoughts I jotted down in the aftermath of the elections in Turkey. These aren’t in anyway authoritative. Just my hotcakes (with apologies to Sera).

1.      It feels like shit.

Some have described what has taken place in Turkey over the last election cycle as a historic defeat. For my part I can only say that electoral losses, while familiar by now, also feel like shit. Talking to other friends from Turkey, especially people who I’ve organized with, been in political parties with, protested with, this feeling seems to rıng true for others.

There are immediate material reasons that account for why the results feel so shit – a new regime of austerity, broader immiseration, worsened conditions of exploitation, further policing and violence against migrants, an enduring violence against women and LGBTQ people, the continuation of the Turkish state’s war against the Kurdish freedom movement… This seems to be the immediate future of Turkish politics.

In addition to all of this, I think the sense of despair I see in the Turkish left is an acknowledgement, in affective terms, of the ongoing foreclosure of the capacity to act collectively. This suspension is especially frustrating because at various times over the past 20 years, multiples centers of power on the left have found ways to mobilize despite adverse conditions. The election was especially frustrating, in other words, because it immediately followed the mobilization that the left in Turkey helped organized in the immediate aftermath of the February 6th earthquakes. It was shitty to witness Erdoğan win on the day the Gezi Park protests started. It’s additionally shitty that the mainstream opposition abandoned the more organized forms of collective resistance that have persisted throughout the 20 years of the AKP; especially queer liberation and the Kurdish freedom movements were not actively acknowledged or mobilized as bases of power.

Sure, all electoral politics are inherently liberal and almost always entail a foreclosure of radical politics in the long run. In this sense, elections will seldom ever be not disappointing. But there are two mechanisms that amplified this in the recent elections in Turkey. First is the amount of effort and attention that elections suck up. In an increasingly authoritarian regime like that of the AKP, where the party itself exercises sole authority over all state institutions, it takes a fuck ton of effort and time from hundreds of thousands of volunteers to hold elections. Second is that getting rid of Erdogan becomes such an overwhelming priority for so many people that actual matters of political contention are constantly suspended. The first dynamic I think is easier to make sense of. The AKP stuffs ballots, monopolizes all apparatuses of the state, dominates majority of news media through direct and indirect forms of control and economic pressure, intimidates voters especially in Kurdish majority regions, once elected mayors in Kurdish majority towns are suspended by the state and replaced with appointed trustees. But in a sense all of that is to be expected from this regime. What feels more shitty is the suspension of political priorities on the left, perhaps a deliberate almost strategic inaction.

2.      The Myth of Authoritarian Ineptitude

One common story that was told about the elections was that the government was already bound to lose the elections, that economic conditions were so bad, that poverty had worsened to such a degree, that jailing of reporters and dissidents had gotten so bad, that Erdogan and the regime oriented around him had finally lost so much credibility that it was bound to lose. This intuition that the AKP were “gidici” (on their way out) was something I heard over and over again during my time in Turkey.

I think what subtends this sense that the AKP were “gidici” is a of myth of authoritarian ineptitude. Maybe you’ve heard of the myth of fascist efficiency – the idea that, yes, fascists are terrible but at least they kept the trains running on time. I think there is a similar myth of authoritarian ineptitude – that regimes like that of Erdogan are so inept, so organized around a single charismatic figure, so ready to hallow out state institutions that they will, given time, self-annihilate. The sentiment that the JDP was bound to lose, that they were “gidici” given “objectively” how bad conditions are I think is in part related to this narrative of ineptitude.

The narrative betrays a liberal understanding of authoritarianism as a kind of irrational “populism” that rears its ugly head whenever experts are dismissed and strong men take charge. And of course it is wrong; the AKP regime and Erdogan are neither bumbling buffoons nor fascist masterminds but are responding to the realities of class politics, neoconservatism and racialization and the unfolding crises tendencies of capitalism as they manifest in a credit dependent, growth obsessed, hooked on cheap labor regime like that of Turkey.

Yet perhaps even more so, it misses the multiple power formations and forms of rightwing politics operating within the AKP regime. In fact, what has been especially instructive in the 20 years of the AKP era has been the constant dialectic between fascism and authoritarianism; the fascism of unrestrained credit backed by state power; of broadened immiseration but secured employment, of the dream of corporate sovereignty that wrests economic power away from international flows of capital (described as “the West” or the “interest lobby” by the AKP) on the one hand; the authoritarianism of controlled investment; of rising interest rates; of austerity and unemployment; of a rule based market-system on the other. I think what is hard for many liberals to accept is that this dialectic is one that is wholly internal to capital; it is a kind of double movement of capital.

In this sense, the AKP has always already been about its own self-reform. Party leaders routinely promise a return to the party’s “factory settings”; back to the early 2000s when the JDP promised a happy union between neoconservatism and neoliberalism; party leaders routinely admit that the regime needs restoration; are able to change policies and easily adapt. Similarly, today, the JDP are signaling a more “mainstream” economic policy, that will rise interest rates, seek to discipline labor, will increase unemployment. In many senses, this is the economic policy that the opposition also endorsed. Opposition political leaders and economic advisors often described the “bitter pill” (read austerity and unemployment) that would need to be swallowed to bring the Turkish economy under control. Under such conditions the regime’s plan of austerity wrapped up in narratives of economic sovereignty, megaprojects and neoconservative familial belonging might even be more palatable.

Opportunism; cynicism; pragmatism. These affects are part and parcel of contemporary capitalism even when this capitalism is articulated in more openly authoritarian hues.

3.   The Shitiness of Strategic inaction

This sentiment that the JDP were on their way out lead to a politics of strategic inaction – whereby oppositional actors of all political persuasions decided to suspend political action instead focusing narrowly on electoral results. Which lead to an incredible resurgence of rightwing sentiment of all kinds during the course of the last election.

Perhaps the most obvious case of such inaction was on the issue of refugees. The mainstream opposition openly embraced anti migrant rhetoric the main opposition party CHP even hung a poster with the phrase “borders are our virtue” on it from their party headquarters. They promised to “send back Syrians and Afghanis” within 2 years, later revised to 1 year in an attempt to court more far right voters. I honestly don’t know how one can carry out such promises without committing major human rights violations. This contributed to an atmosphere where anti migrant sentiment became the tip of the spear of far right politics in Turkey and helped become one of the main narratives through which opposition against the JDP was articulated. Inflation and rising cost of rent was articulated as a problem of migration. Increased political violence was articulated as a problem of migration. Even the opposition losing the elections was attributed to migrants being registered to vote for the JDP.

What’s frustrating about all of this is that the JDP’s migrant policy sucks. It effectively turns Turkey into the colonial office that contains and polices migrants on behalf of European nations. It denies migrants passage to Europe in return for financial aid to Turkey. It moreover denies migrants refugee status and forces migrants to act as a cheap labor force that helps discipline labor in Turkey. Last, it condones the Turkish military and state’s foreign interventions that act to cause migration in the first place.

What is frustrating is that strategic inaction refuses to politicize such issues. It refuses to imagine how migrants can become subjects of politics in Turkey rather than a problem to be solved. It refuses to imagine how to mobilize with migrants rather than silently condoning others mobilizing against them. Even when parties had progressive policies and stances against migrants we saw them reluctant to advocate or voice such policies instead choosing strategic inaction. More than the CHP for example it was disappointing that other, ostensibly socialist, and radical parties refused to openly politicize the issue.

A similar story is true about class politics more generally. In the aftermath of the pandemic, when inflation sky rocketed, a number of important workers strikes, protests and social reproduction struggles around rent materialized throughout Turkey. The opposition chose to deliberately ignore these in fears that they would distract from voting AKP out. What is more there was no compelling vision of what socialist parties would do for workers in Turkey. Beyond a generalized discourse about poverty and inequality there was no compelling vision of class politics. I think this is also true for how parties organized. The Turkish Labor Party who’s operations I have followed more closely and can speak more freely about, seemed to have embraced a tactic that was reminiscent of Justice Democrats in the US. Nominating charismatic, social media savvy MPs and seeking to grow participation through the “buzz” and interest this would generate. The flipside of such a tactic is that there is no strong class base for this kind of politics, you are beholden to what these charismatic figures individually say or do. Sure, they talk about “class” but there’s no class politics happening in the party structure, rather the party is composed of people who have found the idiosyncrasies of these media figures individually interesting or compelling. There weren’t really any overarching policies that became prominent during the campaigning stage – apart form we will oust Erdoğan and the AKP and will hold them to account after.

Last, neoconservative politics has been an important force in Turkey. In his victory speech on May 28th Erdogan directly targeted LGBT people in Turkey, rallying to “defend the family”. The same strategic inaction was also visible in this front. Mainstream opposition parties were almost wholly silent in response. But even more oppositional parties like the coalition of Kurdish, socialist and green left politics HDP/YSP and the socialist/populist TIP despite nominating trans and queer people as members of parliament didn’t openly vocalize an LGBTQ politics in their campaigns.

I think all of this also contributes to the shitty feeling. The story that the Turkish left collectively told itself was that once Erdoğan was ousted we could finally start to act politically once again.

I think it’s important to sit with this shitty feeling. And rather than paper over it with cheap optimism maybe once again ask, what does it mean to act?

[hadleysmis]

Türkiye's protest

If you're interested in "do you hear the people sing" used in contemporary politics, here's one of Türkiye:

This protest was done during the Gezi Park protests in 2013, lasting for just over 2 months: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests

According to Wikipedia, the goals of the protesters were:

- Protecting Gezi Park and the public places

- Defending freedom of speech and right to assembly

- Banning the usage of chemical gas by state forces against protesters

- Resignation of Erdoğan's government

- Free media

- Fair elections

With the subsequent results:

- Occupation of the park and adjoining Taksim square ended by force, smaller scale protests gradually die out, the park remains open to the public and plans for its destruction are cancelled

- EU-Turkey relations deteriorated

- Government passed several bills to increase the government's ability to control the Internet, to expand the police's abilities and to criminalise the provision of emergency medical care during protests.

- Court acquits Gezi Park protest leaders

To see current political state, see:

[eggi1972]

[Podcast] Last Park Standing oder alles ist möglich auch in der Türkei

Und wieder grüßt das Stadttheater, das Kleine Haus mit der Aufführung des Stückes „Last Park Standing“ ein Schauspiel von Ebru Nihan Celkan. Diesmal tue ich mir mit der Einführung etwas schwer, aber nicht, weil die Einführung schlecht war, sondern weil ich nicht wirken möchte, als wolle ich mich einschmeicheln, da sie von Simone Sterr, der Intendantin des Stadttheaters, selbst gestaltet wurde. Die Technik hat hier so ihre Tücken gehabt. Die Anlage hat noch Musik eingespielt, während sie bereits gesprochen hat, aber das war innerhalb von Sekunden geklärt. Und nun komme ich zu etwas, was ich bewundere, komplett freies Sprechen. Da war kein Text, kein Papier da. Sie nimmt einen mit in den Gezi Park 2013 und erzählt über den Park, der gerodet werden soll und in dem dann die Proteste für ein freieres Land entstanden. Was daraus geworden ist, wissen wir leider alle. Es hat leider nicht lange angehalten bzw. Erdogan hat es irgendwie geschafft, das alles niederzuknüppeln. Sie erzählt von den beiden Frauen, Umut und Janina, die sich kennenlernen und verlieben. Sie erzählt von den fünf Jahren zwischen Euphorie im Juni 2013, der Hoffnung im Juni 2015 und der Ernüchterung im Jahre 2018. Sie betrachtet sowohl die die Türkei allgemein, aber auch die Liebe zwischen Umut und Janina. Aber ich schweife schon wieder ab und greife vor. Für mich eine perfekte Einführung. Ich hatte zu 100% das Gefühl, Frau Sterr kennt das Stück komplett. Sie benötigt keinen Text. Sie hat es offenbar einfach im Laufe der Zeit komplett verinnerlicht. Mich beeindruckt es einfach, wenn Menschen frei über das reden können, was sie machen und vorstellen. ( Last Park Standing ) Lesen Sie den ganzen Artikel

[kubrauzunn]

Cruising Gezi Park

Cruising Gezi Park is an installation that refers to both Gezi Park in Istanbul and Oosterpark in Amsterdam, examines concepts such as queer cruising, visibility, safety, and the regulation of public space.

Sexuality and urban intimacy have deep ties to activism and resistance. In order for a protest movement to grow, sex is often kept out of the narrative. Safety is not provided by depending on the state or institutional powers; safety is mainly intramurally negotiated. Therefore, the way LGBTQI+ bodies inhabit and shape public space is easily forgotten.

In 2013, the visible presence of LGBTQI+ communities at the protests in Gezi Park in Istanbul was internationally celebrated as a sign of emancipatory potential.

Kübra Uzun and Simon(e) van Saarloos take a nightly walk around Gezi Park, nowadays surrounded by police. Uzun shares her teenage memories, cruising after school hours. Uzun’s stories are both nostalgic and full of present-day fire: gay and queer sex is still happening, love is in the air and so is the resistance multiplied by the queer presence.

Instead of listening to Uzun’s story at length, visitors might pass by the work more quickly, briefly noticing a sound recording of a sunny afternoon in Oosterpark, Amsterdam. In 2017, Jan Majdanski was robbed and murdered while visiting a cruising spot in the city’s park. The police of Amsterdam responded by proposing extra lights at night.

Presented at Refresh Amsterdam exhibition, Amsterdam Museum, 2020.