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[edward-sonbati]

Triune & Interpersonal Indwelling in Orthodox Liturgical Theology

���Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?” (John 14:10). In St. John’s Gospel, these are the words of our Lord Jesus in His final gathering with the disciples prior to the crucifixion. According to Orthodox Triadology, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit enjoy an eternal communion of love, dwelling within one another. This doctrine is what the theologians call the divine perichoresis. Likewise our Lord, seeking to graft all His followers into the divine life of the Trinity says: “He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him” (John 6:56).

This notion of interpersonal indwelling, not simply of the persons of the Trinity within each other, but of Christ within the believer is the fundamental basis of all Orthodox spirituality and soteriology. Our salvation is not merely some legal declaration of justification in the divine courtroom. Rather, for the Orthodox worshipper, the goal of the Christian life is to be united to and to dwell in Christ, both in this life and the next. In the same way the divine persons commune with and indwell one another, Christ desires for us to participate in this communion and indwelling.

But if the goal of the Christian is the life in Christ and communion with the All-Holy Trinity, what are the means by which the seeds of this life, of theosis, are planted? It is through the Church’s rites of initiation, namely: baptism, chrismation, and, (chief of all) the holy eucharist, by which this indwelling and communion with Christ is mediated. The birth into this life in Christ begins in the waters of the baptismal font. As His Eminence Metropolitan Hierotheos states: “man is born two times: the first biological birth from his (natural) mother and the second spiritual birth from his spiritual mother, which is the Church” (O’Grady, Select Texts, p. 293). We are baptized into Christ by participating in His death and resurrection through immersion in the sacred waters (Gal. 3:27, Rom. 6:3).

Building on an analogy used by Nicholas Cabasilas, Metropolitan Hierotheos explains that while baptism is the means by which man is born spiritually, chrism is the means by which man is endowed with spiritual movement; man is sealed with the gift of the Holy Spirit upon being anointed with the oil of God. Upon receiving the seal of the Holy Spirit, we are told that the Spirit Himself dwells within the Christian (2 Tim 1:14).

We will now devote the rest of this piece to the most glorious of all the divine mysteries: the holy eucharist. It is through this mystery that, according to Cabasilas, our union with Christ is made perfect and all-sufficient: “the Saviour is present in every fashion with those who dwell in Him, that He supplies their every need and is all things to them” (Cabasilas, The Life in Christ, p. 47). It is through this most awe-inspiring mystery that Christ Himself dwells in us and confers upon us the fullness of His divine-human hypostasis:

He who is all and more than all draws near, and becomes permanently one with us: one soul, one body. He gives His soul and body, the whole of His divinity and His humanity to us (Archimandrite Vasileios, Hymn of Entry, p. 64).

It is through the mysteries of the Church that we fulfill our mission as Christians by being grafted into the divine life of our Master, being made “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4). Our Lord Jesus Himself illustrates beautifully when He says: “I am the vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit” (John 15:5). Could it possibly be a coincidence that our Lord uses the imagery of a grapevine to illustrate our life with and dwelling in Him? No (O’Grady, Lecture: Foundation of the Eucharist in Scripture and Tradition). Rather, it is our partaking of the fruit of the vine contained in the sacred chalice which allows Christ to abide in us and us in Him. The common thread here is that interpersonal indwelling is fundamental to the structure of the cosmos, being intrinsic to the life of the eternal and worshipped Trinity. Christ calls each of us to participate in and enjoy this indwelling, for it is this indwelling and communion which undergirds all Orthodox spirituality and soteriology.

[edward-sonbati]

The Existence of Evil Does Not Justify Atheism

The Existence of Evil Does Not Justify Atheism 

In this essay I will argue that the existence of evil does not justify atheism. I will also seek to provide an adequate explanation of how a Theistic God could co-exist with evil. In order to do this, I will first analyze the logical argument from evil as propounded by Epicurus and Mackie, which maintains that the coexistence of God with evil is logically impossible. I will then examine the more moderate and arguably stronger evidential argument from evil advocated by Rowe, which maintains that -while the coexistence of the God of classical theism with evil is not logically impossible- it is at the very least highly unlikely. I will also take a look at popular theistic counterarguments to the problem of evil and their strengths and drawbacks. Lastly, I will devote special attention to the skeptical theist and felix culpa theodicies and argue that they are the best solutions to our classical problem. 

Believers in the classical theistic creeds maintain that God is the absolute sovereign of the cosmos, perfect in power, wisdom and goodness. However, given the ubiquity of evil and suffering in the world, there appears to be (at least at face value) a clear discrepancy between this claim and observed reality. The Greek philosopher Epicurus, who is credited with being the first thinker to exposit the problem of evil, said: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” From the 1 Epicurean trilemma we see that the existence of evil alongside an all-powerful and good God 

1 Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. 3rd Ed. Routledge, 1990, p. 310.

forms an “inconsistent triad,” whereby if two of the propositions are true, the third must be false. Given that the existence of evil is clearly and observably true, it follows that one of God’s essential attributes -be it his power, his goodness, or both- is compromised. 

Drawing from Epicurus’ trilemma, skeptics of theistic claims have formulated what is known as the logical problem of evil, which argues that the existence of the theistic God is logically impossible given the existence of evil and suffering in the universe. In standard form, the argument runs as follows: 2 

(1) God is all-powerful 

(2) God is all-good 

(3) Evil exists 

(4) A sequence of statements is not logically consistent if and only if: (a) that sequence violates the law of noncontradiction or (b) a clear contradiction can be deduced from that sequence. 

(5) If God is all-powerful, he would be able to prevent all the evil that occurs in the universe (6) If God is all-good, he would desire to prevent evil when possible 

(7) If God is capable of preventing all evil from occurring and does not, he is not all-good (8) If God desires to prevent all evil but cannot, he is not all-powerful 

(9) If evil and suffering exist, God is either not all-powerful or not all-good (10) Evil and suffering exist 

(11) God is therefore either not all-good or not all-powerful 

(12) God is all-good and all-powerful 

(13) P11 and P12 constitute a contradiction 

The first four premises constitute the underlying assumptions of the argument. P11 is deduced from P5-P10. The conjunction of the first two premises leads us to P12. The final two premises of the argument constitute a logical contradiction. The argument’s form is valid, with the conclusion following necessarily given the truth of its premises. 

In attempt to rebut the above argument, theistic thinkers have sought to challenge one or more of its premises, particularly P7. Indeed, the success of the entire argument seems to 

2 P1-P12 taken verbatim from the author’s second take-home exam.

rest largely on the assumption that God should necessarily want to prevent all evil on account of his omnibenevolence. The premise in question is quite controversial, and opponents argue that God has perfectly sound, justifiable reasons for allowing evil to exist. 

Advocates of the free will defense, for instance, maintain that God, out of his love and benevolence, allows human beings to freely choose good or evil. A world with human volition, some argue, is a more valuable and overall better state of affairs than an otherwise equally good world entirely without evil. Some tease this out by arguing that the triumph over evil by mankind is conducive to man’s “soul-building” or edification. That is to say, that when people overcome evil, it strengthens and builds up their character, bringing forth second-order goods -goods that are a reaction to evils- such as perseverance, vigilance and humility that would not have been produced otherwise. Others argue that evil exists as a logically necessary counterpart to good, much in the same way relative greatness and smallness serve to contrast each other. Advocates of this view maintain that good can only be perceived and freely chosen comparatively along a continuum of virtue or vice. It is this comparison and contrast between the two that allows humans to recognize and come to know the difference between good and evil, with the hope that this will enable or woo them into to choosing the former over the latter. 

None of these arguments are without objections. The free will defense, for instance, falls short in explaining the anguish and suffering caused by natural disasters and disease. While the misuse of human volition does account for much of the evil observed in the world, it fails to explain these particular evils. It also fails to explain why God couldn’t omit moral monsters -those who perpetrate evils far beyond what is necessary for soul-building or the

bringing about of second-order goods- from existence or bring about a state of affairs whereby everyone freely chooses good. 

While the claim that God could omit moral monsters from existence or that he could somehow bring about a world whereby everyone freely chooses good over evil has some merit, it seems lacking. In both cases, God would be bringing about a state of affairs whereby good is the only viable option, effectively hindering or putting a cap on man’s free choice. 

With respect to the point about natural disasters and disease, it is of genuine merit. Hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes and horrible illnesses of every sort, all of which are unaccounted for by human choice, comprise a great deal of the evil and suffering in the world and we would expect that an all-powerful and all-loving God would prevent these evils. However, even this objection is not without potential solutions, taking a more anthropo-cosmic approach, some (particularly Christian) philosophers of religion argue that such natural evils are caused by the fall of man from God’s grace and favor. Advocates of such approaches claim that God made a perfect world whereby man was placed in paradise and created without want, free from disease, disaster or any source of distress or suffering. Man, by virtue of his free choice, turned away from God’s commandments and fell from divine grace, and thereby caused his world to likewise fall into corruption and become susceptible to evil and disease. This argument is promising in that it reconciles the existence of natural evils with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent creator. A more in-depth look at this argument, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 3 

The soul-building defense has its own difficulties given the magnitude of the suffering 3 For a thorough treatment of this subject, cf. The Problem of Evil by Peter van Inwagen

and anguish in the observed world. The early Christian writer and philosopher Paul of Tarsus says in his first letter to the Corinthians says: “No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it.” Many argue that this claim is simply untrue and that the amount of suffering and hardship 4 in the world far exceeds what is necessary to edify and strengthen the character of human beings. Rather than using the loss of a child, or a battle with cancer to cultivate virtues such as strength, patience, long-suffering and perseverance, why can’t God bring about these qualities using a far less arduous and taxing state of affairs? Further, while some who do suffer such ordeals are built up and strengthened, many victims of such tragedies are more likely to have their souls destroyed rather than built up and develop worse moral characters as a result of their suffering. 

Additionally, the idea that evil serves as a logical and necessary counterpart to good is problematic on many fronts; intuitively it seems unconvincing, it is unclear if it works even on its own terms and it seems to conflict with fundamental theistic assumptions about God. Firstly, if this claim is true, then God is not really the active force or agent of goodness in the world, he simply facilitates a state of affairs whereby good is brought about. This conclusion would be unattractive to most theists who maintain that God is both all-good and the source of all that is good in the world. Secondly, in order for this claim to work it must first be established that a quality or substance (in this case, good) can only come about given the presence of its opposite (namely, evil). Thirdly, it seems to entail unattractive consequences 

4 1 Corinthians 10:13, taken from the New King James Version

about God’s existence and essential attributes. If good can only exist alongside evil, what of the all-good God who is said to have preexisted all things? Did evil eternally preexist alongside him? Is his goodness contingent upon and only exemplified by its coexistence with an equally evil existent? It seems, therefore, that the claim that evil must exist as good’s necessary counterpart seems like a non-starter for classical theists. 

All of the defenses provided above are much debated and have each been the subject of much scrutiny in theological and philosophy of religion circles. However, some (such as the free will defense used in conjunction with the belief in man’s fall) are more effective than others and provide us with good reason to at least entertain the idea that P7, arguably the foundation of the entire argument, is of questionable truth value and that it is possible that an omnibenevolent God has justification for allowing evil to occur. 

This leaves us with the more moderate evidential argument from evil, which uses the existence of evil to build an inductive case against God’s existence (whereas the Epicurean argument attempts a deductive case). According to this argument, while the coexistence of the theistic God with evil is not logically impossible, it is, at the very least, highly unlikely. Succinctly stated, it is as follows: 5 

(1) God is the all-powerful and all-good sovereign of the universe 

(2) If God (all powerful & all good) exists, then he probably would prevent gratuitous evils without jeopardizing some greater good or causing some greater evil 

(3) Gratuitous evils exist. 

(4) If (1) and (2), then God probably doesn’t exist. 

(5) God probably doesn't exist. 

That is to say, a) there are gratuitous and pointless evils b) if God exists, gratuitous and 5 P1-P3 taken verbatim from the author’s second take-home exam.

pointless evils probably would not c) it is unlikely, therefore, that God exists. Looking at the original argument: P2 is uncontroversial while P1 is highly contested. However, if P1 can be proven, P3 follows logically given P1 and P2. In support of P1, the philosopher William L. Rowe gives the following example of what he considers to be a gratuitous evil: 

Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering been prevented. 6 

At face value, Rowe’s point seems very compelling. To the best of our knowledge, the fawn’s pain and suffering cannot be linked to the prevention of an evil of equal or greater severity nor can it be said to be the cause of a greater good. However, in order for this argument to work we must first establish that we are in an adequate epistemic position to make such a judgment. 

 Enter skeptical theism, which states that human beings are not in a justified epistemic position to know God’s intentions and purposes for allowing evil to occur. The skeptical theist approach, as pioneered by Stephen Wykstra, rests primarily on the condition of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA for short) which states: 

On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim "It appears that p" only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. 7 

In other words, we are only entitled to claim that certain evils are gratuitous and/or pointless if our cognitive faculties— and our use of them— allow us to reasonably discern such a claim. 

6 William L. Rowe’s The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism 

7 The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of "Appearance"

For Wykstra and other skeptical theists, Rowe’s fawn example, and indeed all examples of seemingly gratuitous evils, do not meet this condition. We are not epistemically justified in assuming that if God -who is infinitely greater than any human being in his wisdom and discernment- did allow certain evils to happen for some justifiable reasons that said reasons would always be discernible to us. In other words, it is possible that the suffering and pain of Rowe’s fawn can be connected with either the prevention of a greater evil or the cause of a greater good, we simply lack access to that knowledge. If true, this would effectively negate the fundamental assumption of the evidential argument: that gratuitous evils exist. 

Skeptical theism, however, is not without its detractors. If one were to grant the truth of its premises, it could be argued that it leaves its advocates in an epistemological black hole. If God has perfectly justified reasons for allowing seemingly gratuitous evils to happen, it could very well be argued that he also has perfectly justified reasons (that we cannot possibly know) for deceiving us about a seemingly infinite number of issues, be it common sense, chemistry, physics, morality or even cardinal religious doctrines. 8 Does this mean that skeptical theism leads its proponents to a radical, global skepticism? 

The skeptical theist’s answer is “no.” Simply because we do not know God’s reasons for allowing evil to happen does not entail that we have any positive evidence to believe that he would deceive us about all of our insights and that, in fact, we have good reason to think otherwise (be it by inference, an appeal to his goodness, revelation, etc.). Furthermore, whatever reasons one might have for rejecting global skepticism, the skeptical theist is entitled to hold to the same reasoning. 

8 Cf. Hud Hudson’s The Father of Lies?

What about issues concerning divine revelation? Core theistic beliefs (take the Christian doctrine of Jesus’ bodily resurrection, for example) can only be known on account of God’s revelation to man. While skeptical theists might be able to successfully avoid global skepticism, do their suppositions logically lead one to a certain religious skepticism, whereby God might well have good reason to deceive us about issues concerning divine revelation? The answer for the skeptical theist is once again a resounding “no.” This dilemma can be circumvented by appealing to a variety of epistemological theories. Perhaps the skeptical theist can hold to a non-reductionist view of testimony -an essentially innocent-until-proven-guilty epistemology- whereby one is justified in accepting divine revelation as true in the absence of reasons to think otherwise. Better yet, an appeal to proper functionalism -a theory of knowledge that states that one has prima facie justification for holding a belief produced by reliable, truth-seeking cognitive faculties- can allow the skeptical theist to maintain that said reliable, truth-seeking cognitive faculties lead one to accept divine revelation as true in the absence of reasons to think that it is false. Some might further argue that there are independent, evidential bases for accepting aspects of revelation (in the case of the resurrection, for example, the historical testimony of those who claimed to see Jesus after the crucifixion). 

So while not entirely without its drawbacks, the skeptical theist approach to the problem of evil does seem thus far to be the most impregnable and stalwart defense to the age-old dilemma. It, used in tandem with the felix culpa defense, constitutes what I consider to be the best response to the issue. 

Having said all of this, we are now ready to discuss the theodicy we alluded to earlier both in the opening paragraph and in our discussion on second-order goods: Felix culpa or

“happy fault” is the thesis that God allows evil to bring about a greater and more valuable good. The early African Christian theologian and philosopher Augustine of Hippo says: “For God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist.” Putting it 9 all together we come to this conclusion, that God, in his benevolence, wisdom and power, allows evils of all sorts to occur in order to bring forth a greater good that otherwise would not have come about if evil didn’t exist at all. Because he is incomprehensibly greater than man in his wisdom and discernment, how he does this and his reasons for doing so are often unknown to us. 

From the above arguments, I conclude that existence of evil does not in and of itself justify atheism. In this paper, we have seen that the central premise of the logical problem of evil— -that God cannot be all-good if he is capable of preventing all evil and does not—- is suspect as there could be justified reasons for allowing such evils to occur, for instance, using that evil to bring about a greater good that could not have otherwise occurred in the absence of evil or using said evil to prevent an evil greater evil from occurring. We then -looking through the lens of skeptical theism- saw that the evidential problem of evil rests on the unestablished and faulty assumption that if God were to use evil to bring forth some greater good that his reasoning or mechanism for doing so would always be discernible to us. We instead argued that we are not epistemically justified in assuming God’s reasons or purposes for allowing evils to occur. We then combined this approach with the felix culpa thesis to show that is possible that an all-loving, all-powerful and all-wise God uses evil to bring forth greater good, the how and why of which are unbeknownst to us. 

9 Augustine, Enchiridion, viii.