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(L-R): Meyrem Okay (born in 1936) and Ayşe Mustafa (born in 1933), taken in 1955 from Galinoporni/Kaleburnu.
The two young women are pictured wearing modern-sleeved dresses and traditional baggy pantaloons. This style of pantaloons was typically found in Karpasia/Karpaz. They are also wearing traditional headscarves (yemeni). This fashion style, a specific mesh of contemporary and traditional clothes, was not carried into the following decades, so this is a rare glimpse into a distinctive timeframe of Cypriot dress.
📸 source: The Aziz Damdelen Collection, Kioneli (Gönneli). Information provided by Euphrosyne Rizopoulou- Egoumenidou and Aziz Damdelen - ‘Turkish Cypriot dress: The Aziz Damdelen Collection’.
Disclaimer: Please note no copyright infringement intended, and I do not own nor claim to own any of the original images or information unless otherwise stated.
#cyprus#cypriot#cyprus archive#archive image#cypriot archive#cyprus history#cyprus fashion#cypriot heritage#turkish speaking cypriots#karpaz#karpasia#yemeni headscarf#galinoporni#kaleburnu#photography#history#archive
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She-Ra, Bow, and the archives: An "archivy situation," indeed
Lance and George show the Best Friend Squad (Bow, Adora, and Glimmer) First Ones artifacts
Recently, I published an article for ilovelibraries, a division of the American Library Association. In that article, I focused on the library themes in the She-Ra and the Princesses of Power, noting how the season two finale of the show, "Reunion," focused around the two middle-aged Black librarians, George and Lance, who have a library in the Whispering Woods, who are the fathers of Bow. In that episode, Bow, Adora, and Glimmer work to translate a message, with Bow reluctantly revealing his true identity after Adora releases an elemental monster, with his dads accepting him for who he is. I also noted how in the season five episode, "Return to the Fright Zone," with Bow and Glimmer looking for George and Lance, who recount a rebellion against the first settlers of the planet, the First Ones, and as I noted, an "existence of a fail-safe for the superweapon in the planet’s core." This becomes important, with the information they provided helping the show's protagonists, especially Adora and Catra, setting the stage for the final episode's groundbreaking kiss between Adora and Catra, which saves the world and universe from being destroyed by the villainy of Horde Prime. Even saying this, there is a lot more going on in this episode, with some in the archival field have talked about it, noting archival themes.
Reprinted from my Wading Through the Cultural Stacks WordPress blog. Originally published on Aug. 13, 2020.
The first of these is by Metadata Specialist Kathleen Smith of Treasures from the Archives, the blog of Old Dominion University Libraries Special Collections & University Archives. She writes enthusiastically about the episode, "Reunion," stating that Adora and Glimmer find Bow "in the archives," where they learn about ancient pottery and unique artifacts. She also states that she loves this episode most of all because it features a library/archive which is "complete with artifacts and rare books." She further states that the artifacts on display inside reminds her of the ancient Cypriot pottery in ODU's Special Collections’ Dudley Cooper collection while stating that she likes seeing "libraries and archives being represented animatedly." While I appreciate her words, I don't think she is completely right here, when it comes to calling the family library that Bow's dads run an "archive." I would call it a library/museum with archival qualities, which I'll expand on in the next couple paragraphs, with Bow's dads as self-defined historians of the planet's first settlers. I know that galleries, libraries, archives, and museums are "four types of cultural institutions that share a collaborative relationship stemming from their similar missions," otherwise known as GLAM, but these are not the same. The UK National Archives explains how libraries and archives are different,
The books in a library are often secondary sources of information, whereas the records in an archive are primary sources. Archives provide first-hand information or evidence relating to historical events or figures. Library books are arranged by subject and author, whereas information in archives is arranged according to the person or organisation that created it. This means that you will probably need to look at records from more than one source, or more than one archive, as you gather information.
Additionally, the SAA adds that while librarians and archivists both preserve, collect, and make materials accessible, they differ in ways they use, arrange, and use materials in their collections, with materials in archival collections often irreplaceable and unique, while "libraries can usually obtain new copies of worn-out or lost books." The same page talks about the difference between historians and archivists:
These two professions have a longstanding partnership. The archivist identifies, preserves, and makes records accessible for use; the historian uses archival records for research.
On another page, the SAA states that libraries can be defined, generally as "collections of books and/or other print or nonprint materials organized and maintained for use," with patrons accessing materials either in person, through the internet, or checking out materials for home use, with libraries existing to "make their collections available to the people they serve." They add that while archives to make their collections accessible, they differ in the types of materials they hold and how those materials are accessed.
With this being said, I think it is clear that Bow's dads operate a library, and it is what the American Library Association (ALA) calls a special library, which serves "particular populations, such as the blind and physically handicapped, while others are dedicated to special collections." Adding to this, a special library provides specific information on a particular subject, serving a specific group, and delivering services to that group. [1] In the case of the library in She-Ra, its only patrons were George, Lance, presumably Bow, and Bow's 12 brothers, before Adora and Glimmer came along, and its collections focused specifically on artifacts of the First Ones. At the same time, this library has a museum within it, which the CLIR defines as a place that identifies, acquires, preserves, and exhibits objects, while also:
[Promoting] cultural, community, and familial identity and understanding...[providing] experiences where visitors can make connections between content and ideas...[serving] as memory institutions for a culture...support[s] formal and informal learning and research...[and serving] as focal points for communities and promote community interests
While the museum in the family library does promote identity and understanding, while allowing visitors can make connections "between content and ideas," supporting learning and research, I'm not sure it is serving as a memory institution "for a culture," or a focal point for communities, as its original patrons were very limited, as I noted earlier. As such, the situation is archivy, and I'll expand on that later.
This brings me to what Samantha Cross, the Pop Archives guru, writes about the episode, "Reunion," on her blog, POP Archives, stating that while it seems like a stretch when she first considered the episode when she "witnessed the beauty that is Bow's historian fathers," she wanted to talk about it. She began by summarizing the show, noting that Bow's fathers, historians "who have no idea that he's a soldier in the resistance against the Hoard." She adds that the home of Bow's fathers is a museum/library/archive of "documents, research, and artifacts devoted to the enigmatic ancient-yet-advanced society" of the First Ones, with these dads believing Adora and Bow are Bow's schoolmates at the Academy of Historical Enterprises (an academy Bow made up), giving them a tour of their home. She further notes that even though George and Lance are called historians automatically doesn't take them out of the archives because "there are plenty of archivists who are historians and have a degree in history or started with a history major before moving into archives." Even so, she laments that the home of George and Lance isn't defined as a "particular institution," but is less thought to be an archives when a "museum or a library presents a less complex visual representation." She closes by noting the purpose of introducing Bow's family while adding that you have to "squint and imagine George and Lance appraising, selecting, arranging, and describing their First Ones collection," although she says she would enjoy seeing their "lavish history-based home in a future episode." And see that we do!
In the show’s last season, Bow’s family library makes an appearance in the episode, “Return in the Fright Zone.” In this episode, Bow and Glimmer teleport into the library to check up on his dads. The place has been abandoned and is a wreck. Thanks to a note left behind, both teleport to the Crystal Castle ruins, and find his dads there. Both recount their discoveries: an ancient rebellion against the planet’s first settlers and the existence of a fail-safe for the superweapon in the planet’s core. This information becomes vitally important in the effort by Adora, Catra, and her friends to save the world (and universe) from destruction.
Library as first seen in the episode "Reunion"
All of this begs the question: is Bow's family home a library, archives, or a museum? The fact it is basically a combination of three, it's kinda library-archives-museum hybrid, specifically a special library with a museum within and having archival qualities. This is much better than Star Wars which badly merged a library into an archives with a good number of stereotypes. Without a doubt, it is a positive depiction of libraries in animation, beginning when Glimmer and Adora entering the library unannounced at the beginning of the episode. We know that Bow's dads are academic in a sense as they are impressed by Bow going to an academy, even though it is a made-up one, and the majors his friends supposedly had. Later in the episode, George and Lance still help Adora, Glimmer, and Bow figure out a message, using a library projector, recognize it is a constellation, and where the message is being broadcast from. Of course, they both caution them to not travel there, but you can tell that they will go there anyway (as predicted in my friend's fan fiction), which happens at the beginning of Season 3.
Apart from this, I'd like to say that one of my favorite lines of the episode is uttered by Glimmer, who tells Adora "we have to find Bow and get him out of this...uh...library?" as is Adora's line about being scholars. I thought it was interesting that Glimmer is hurt by the deception from Bow, who claims she doesn't "know him" anymore, even though she misses the hints about where he came from, as Bow tells Adora in the show's second episode, "...I'm starting to get a little freaked out. I mean, I pretty much grew up in these woods and I've never even seen this part of them. I've heard of stories about weird stuff out here." Apart from saying all this, it is clear that Bow's home is, more than anything else, a giant and beautiful library, with its introduction which is proceeded by music trying to make it seem magical. It seems to be a welcoming place, where you can be offered food and drink, and full of knowledge. I also enjoyed how Adora aids Bow’s dads in translating a message as part of their three-person “Best Research Squad,” and she accidentally releases an elemental monster, causing havoc in the library.
Finally, my good friend broached this subject in a fan fiction, "The Library of the Whispering Woods," noting it had the "largest collection of artifacts and writings of the First Ones in all Etheria," and described it as "open to visitors and researchers." As my good friend envisioned it, this library had an open public access catalog (OPAC) allowing users to easily find relevant items and searchable, along with having many resources available so that people could continue their "quest for knowledge." This included video archives, various exhibits and rooms, and various processes in place to review their diverse and inclusive collections. My friend envisioned that Bow's dads were interested in the "open exchange of knowledge" in this special library with features which would be "befitting of an archives," with one of them even doing an oral history interview with one of the characters. This showed that this library was a "magical space with never-ending potential and promise" while it was also "a repository of knowledge which could help them all find answers." The library gave "them enough of an answer to move on to the next part of their quest."
To conclude this article, I tend to see Bow's family home as more a library than anything else, which is why, in the first version of the article I submitted to ilovelibraries, I called it a library/museum, although that was changed to a library in the published edition. There are undoubtedly archival qualities of the family library in the Whispering Woods, so it is understandable some in the field would see it as an archives. I would end by saying, from my analysis, the home itself is a special library with a museum, meaning that there are archival elements.
© 2022 Burkely Hermann. All rights reserved.
Notes
[1] Shumaker, David. "Special Libraries." In Encyclopedia of Library and Information Sciences, third edition, 4966-4974. New York: Taylor and Francis, 2011; Mount, Ellis, and Renée Massoud. Special Libraries and Information Centers: An Introductory Text. Fourth edition. Washington, DC: SLA Publishing, 1999.
#george x lance#lance x george#she ra#spop#she ra and the princess of power#libraries#archives#archival studies#archival science#artifacts#pop culture#reviews#catradora#i love libraries
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME' - FSM SMART, TRADE12, HQBROKER, MTI MARKETS, MX TRADE
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. It looks like this:
Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore: link and maybe Hong Kong: HK search:
Why Hong Kong? We will prove a point shortly. Here we will just complete this sentence with public document where a certain Mr. Avshalom from Israel is indicated as the President (wow!) of GWU MKTG CORP. 08F Clark Center Berthaphil III, JAS Ave., CFZP, pls see: PH alien employment permit filling. GWU MKTG Corp website, domain-big-data tool shows registration from Cyprus (?) in 2015 link, while the company website kind of gives it away, doesn’t it?
Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least. Let’s memorize these information permanently here:
TradingBanks, MXTrade, Trade12 … absolute and pure scams, tied directly to specific PH call center. Also, we encourage you to further check listed domains or check recorded Richard Bula’s mail address ([email protected]) , as you will find this as well link – www.easyoption.us (Israeli Spot Option binary options broker, roof of many, many scams since 2011), tied to link, link, also Mr. Bula’s details are falsely tied to non-existing London address Badenerstrasse 549. It is actually shared-virtual Regus office space in Switzerland link, one of many deceiving attempts of scammers to confuse any investigator. Not happening. Going further with the same checks of www.easyoption.us domain, we get this result:
This Christina Constantinou is Cypriot resident (perhaps AGP Law, maybe some other company), Exo Capital Markets Ltd, Marshal Islands was the declared operator of Trade12.com huge scam, HQBroker brand emerges for the first time tied to the scheme group… however you turn this around, it is always the same group and same crew. Also, here we can identify another company, part of this vast scam group, Eyar Financial Corp Limited, Vanuatu, struck-off in 2018.
PART 2 MTI Markets scam broker was a bit different setup, more Europe oriented, involving directly different people, but ultimately all being connected in this generic FSM Scheme. Allegedly ran via Marshal Islands company MTI Investments Llc (search, closed in 2018). Warnings and reviews: FPA, link with operator names. MTI Markets main domain was registered like this link. 2015 registrant is the Belize company MTI Group Ltd t/a MTI Markets: link, domains screaming with known ‘exo’ and ‘mti’ pretexts. Indicated people were: Mr. Armin Ordodary, (Iranian with Cyprus residency, former Windsor Brokers employee), Mr. Ali Mahmoudi (Iran) and Mr. Mathew Bradley (??). You are encouraged to browse domain big data tools, so you can find them all and see the connections, explore domains etc. We will focus our attention here to Mr. Armin Ordodary now. For a very good reason. Armin Ordodary, an Iranian national, with Cyprus residency, is in the business for a long time. Picture from Windsor Broker celebration link and other publicly available ones:
Benrich Holdings Ltd, Cyprus link
Benrich Trading Ltd, Cyprus link
Bythos Yacht Management OU, Estonia link, link
Siao Ltd, Cyprus (see more domains under this one, incl. Twitter acct link) link
AGFM Ltd, Cyprus link
Nepcore (essentially CRM gateway provider, reg. via A. Ordodary link)
Possibly Orden Capital HK (domain big data, linked to him, typical names like ordencapital, ordenholdings etc) link
BizTech DOO, Serbia link
BizServe DOO, Serbia, formerly known as Upmarkt DOO link
Here is where we get to the FSM Smart scam broker, FB page, LinkedIn page. While Siao, Nepcore, Orden and Bythos were reserved for CRM, PSPs, payment intermediaries, essentially different work within the scam group, Benrich offices, possibly AGFM and certainly BizTech/Serve offices were boiler rooms with agents working primarily on FSM Smart scam, while other 2 brands of the ‘fantastic scam trio’ (Trade12 and HQBroker) were handled via other arms of this vast scheme group (in BPOs located in Ukraine, Albania and Georgia, will be elaborated later on). And since Mr. Armin Ordodary directly holds ownership in both Benrich and both BizTech/Serve, directly or indirectly, this leads to the conclusion that this young man’s role in this scam scheme is for MTIMarkets and FSMSmart scams primarily. In fact, we have verified information that Benrich Holdings Cyprus was or still is a place where agents work, mainly in English and Italian language, while the Serbian subsidiary of Benrich, Upmarkt/Bizserve (allegedly closed due to bad results) was a so-called FTD center, acquiring new clients for FSM Smart scheme.
Serbian boiler room - Upmarkt doo Companies extracts prove Benrich holds stake in Serbian subsidiary and Armin’s ownership of another one, as well as local name change :
Cyprus boiler room – Benrich Holdings Ltd
A place where apparently Retention agents operated. Besides English language, this was or still is a place where most of FSM Smart scams in Italian language happen. Few of the agents operating at one point in that office, between 2018-2019, per LinkedIn reveal that a spinoff facility was probably used for scamming, as well - Topright Trading Limited Cyprus, link:
link retention agent (note previous engagement in exposed boiler Smardis doo)
I have not personally investigated all of the information in this thread. What I can tell you is that someone doesn't want you to see it. Someone went to a great deal of effort to try to get the FPA to remove all the information Scam Reporters posted here.
Another site owner filed a malicious and false DMCA against the FPA after Part 1 of this thread was posted. This site is filled with news items that appear to be borrowed or stolen from major news sites. In the middle of all of the latest major news items taken from news sites, a copy of Post 1 was retroactively inserted.
The complaining site is based on WordPress. WordPress makes backdating a post easy. Years ago, one of ForexGen's many spammers tried to "prove" something at the FPA had existed for more than a short period of time. The scammers behind that backdated a blog post to before the original ForexPeaceArmy.com registration date.
In this case, they first posted a backdated version of Part 1 of this post and DMCAed the FPA, demanding removal of material that was originally published here. The FPA disputed this, and then they followed up with a backdated copy of Part 2.
More details coming very soon.
PART 3
In this part, we will focus our attention to money flow in the FSM part, followed by more close ties between FSM SMART, TRADE12 and HQBROKER, obviously set for Part 4. We actually believe this entire FSM Scheme Thread will have at least parts 4 and 5. Maybe even 6? We told you it would be complicated, so hold on. And stay tuned. A lot more is coming. And a few surprise guests to back us up here with their stories and/or documents.
FSM SMART As we previously stated and proved, all of the 3 brands are part of the same scheme, same, for now unidentified UBOs in the end. Apparently, some dangerous people, as stated already. Ok, noted. We are neither 'impressed' nor frightened. In fact, it should be the other way around, if they have any 'smarts', because of the ongoing investigations. Slow, but getting there...
Now, let's see who are the operators (PSPs, intermediaries and a few more boiler rooms), where does the client money go and who receives it. These information may become crucial for anyone aiming to recover his ''lost'' (stolen) funds.
In the FSM Smart(s) T&C (here:link), bottom of the page 6, FSM Smart declares its operator/owner to be both FSMSmart Ltd (Marshal Islands) and Memphis Investments Sp. z o.o. (Poland).
T&C further point that in case of misunderstanding btw the Company and the Dear Valued Client that was just ripped off by the boiler room staff and FSM's rigged MT4 replenished by Virtual Editor (default losses with FSM usually happen on minors and exotics, like RON/USD or TRY/USD), the first instance would be https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/, followed by the Marshal Islands Court as the final destination.
This Polish legal entity Memphis Investments Sp. z o.o. points to a quite interesting direction. Company details here: link. Authorized person, a lady called Pawluk Patrycja. She holds other nominations in the registrar (link) so she is not that important (a nominee director/holder, so called 'monkey', paid to register a local company, however legally liable, weather she likes it or not). Those registered in the Memphis ownership structure, on the other hand, are important, as they lead to a new direction of the FSM SCHEME environment: Memphis breakdown. As any other similar company used for the same illicit business, first ones registered as owner(s) that committed capital, are quickly removed and an actual person or persons are delegated. They do the actual business. In Memphis Poland case, it was like this:
So, the Suliman's were another intermediary nominees, hence we won't bother with them as well. Mr Rosenbaum is obviously the main guy there. Mr Rosenbaum also holds position in Estonian company Quantum Team OU, link, financial, admin, support activities. This is actually a standard setup for scams, these companies are necessary for either moving the money or registering as a merchant with a PSP or crypto-platform (today its both), to be able to move money deposited by FSM scheme clients to far away destinations. And it's not just reserved for FSMSmart brand, no... Just with a simple google check of Enigma GRC Ltd shows warnings for illegal and fraudulent brands operated by Enigma GRC, hence here and now officially added to FSM Scheme scam list and from direct FSMSmart environment/operators:
- Income Class - True Capital Pro - Profitix
Valuable links of warnings and info: ASIC, NZ.FMA, Consob,...you get the picture. After this relatively short part, it can be more clear why would an offshore FSMSmart require UK arbitration, while at all times they claim to be located in Switzerland (Lucern), although off course they are not. However, Mr Mordechai Moshe Rosenbaum is in the UK. And possibly in the USA/Canada as well. Where actually most of the FSM Scheme client deposits went. But that's the story for the following parts.
PART 4
This part 4 will deal with Trade12, HQBroker and FSMSmart(s) ties more closely. As proved previously, the scams are a part of the same racket. FSMSmart is to some extent covered here. Let's move on to the other 2 ones.
HQBroker scam has many bad reviews and warnings worldwide, link. Google them if you like, here's FCA . Targeted countries mainly Canada, Australia, New Zealand, a bit of UK and maybe some other Asian countries. Operated nominally by Capzone Invest Ltd, Marshal Islands, with fake Hong Kong address on their website.
Capzone Invest Ltd is now defunct/closed, as of May 2020. HQBroker still operates normally.
Capzone's alleged website is also not accessible, www.capzone-invest.com, domain data shows no info. There is (was) apparently a company with the same name in Bulgaria, but official registrar does not show it existed, so possibly a shared space location, under another name:
Exo Capital Markets Ltd, to repeat here again, lists as registrant for many of the scheme scams: Exo on domain big data. Apparently, this Exo Capital Markets ltd is now changed with Trade12 scam to some Turbo Trading Limited
Time does fly...Finally, continuing part 4.
HQBroker brand, equally blatant scam as Trade12 and part of the very same scheme, was meant more for Asia-Pacific regions and the Americas (USA excluded, they were not that stupid). Europeans too but, mainly those regions. Aussies and Canadians were favorite, big money was taken few years ago.
Then 'bad times' hit Trade12/HQBroker scammers. Apparently, Trade12 got greedy and engaged with local people as leads to be scammed. Then in December 2018, an event took place in Ukraine, where the actual boiler rooms were located. Locals started complaining as they were loosing all money and eventually Ukrainian cyber police had to intervene - they raided offices, apartments and arrested many, seized money, IT equipment, drugs, documents and all sort of things a 'normal' boiler room contains.
Ukrainian delegated court was after that overwhelmed with things to process in this case, however it was not important to foreign victims as they could not legally participate, we were explained. Pity.
3 things are interesting regarding this short press release: 2 pieces of information from it and a chain of events triggered by it. First, the news comment section:
So, apparently the scam group walks free, which is not a surprise, as we have reviewed short version of the indictments of the Ukrainian court and it was very confusing, lacks consistency and does not determine who did what and to whom; furthermore, it is restricted only to Ukrainian citizens - victims of a scam, while many foreign victims are not even mentioned. The possible next scam comes in the form of this https://lblv.com/ LBLV Ltd, Seychelles. The broker does have a Seychelles FSA license, check via SFSA (better then nothing) but fails to state where the actual call center is (only registered Seychelles address indicated). This could be the standard business model, where IBs are engaged, which is fine, as long as the IB acts accordingly. Which they usually don't. Many brands were destroyed this way, but also raises the big question - does the broker know what the IB is doing in reality and how does the broker check their daily activities to ensure full compliance with the legal requirements across the globe are met? Finally, the Ukrainian financial authorities have warned the public about LBLV brand, which is in light of these events, very bad: link. But, we cannot conclude this, its just a hear say. Then, at the end of the Finance Magnates news, the reporter concludes with a note: 'After the publication of this article, Igor Pejovic, the alleged Director of HQBroker reached out to Finance Magnates. Pejovic claims that the offices raided by Ukrainian police belonged to an affiliate company, one that HQBroker does not own, which the broker uses to source data and leads. Finance Magnates cannot confirm the veracity of this claim and would add that reviews of HQBroker are overwhelmingly negative and replete with assertions that the broker operates fraudulently.' Although we cannot confirm 100%, the odds are that this gentleman is a Montenegrin citizen, holding a call center in Belgrade, Serbia, called THEIA DOO (Theia Ltd), established in May 2017 and with current address where several other boiler rooms are located already (confirmed in our other threads), for example Parogan DOO (address Boulevard Milutina Milankovica 9, Belgrade, RS). Unpleasant coincidence or how many coincidences till 'chance' is ruled out? Incorporation act, publicly available
Finally, the strange coincidence regarding an event that happened at the exact same time as the boiler room raid in mid December 2018. In the earlier parts of this long and exhausting thread (that will for sure require a summary in the end, to recap and digest the exposed), we pointed out that Mr Armin Ordodary's Serbian branch of Benrich Holdings Cyprus, called Upmarkt Ltd, that handled FSMSmart brand (FTD center) was closed due to quite bad results. However, it ceased operations suddenly and instantaneously, within a day or two, during early December 2018, which strangely coincides with the Ukrainian boiler room bust (first 2 weeks of December 2018). Tipped off by Kyiv 'friends'? Then, one more thing happened: another Armin Ordodary company, Estonian Bythos Yachts Management OÜ had a sudden first cash move on its bank account, in Q4 2018. We will assume it's very late 2018, December...payout, extracting money, moving it, or a lucky shot and a first yacht client of the company? Judge for your selves. For us, there are too many coincidences. Btw, apparently the company gains lots of clients with yachts in 2019 and 2020, perfectly normal to have increased turnover during covid lockdowns, while cruisers, cargos and air companies lay off staff massively, right?
Going forward, there is a FPA member Scam-Rescue, a Canadian guy, that got scammed and posted a review here but also started his own website, that we had the pleasure to see grow over the past few years, from simple and honestly angry post to a developed actions against such scams in general and possible ways through the system to retrieve lost funds (chargeback options). We are not promoting it here but state that this brave young man took a stand, all alone - and made it. Bravo! We'll show you some interesting info re his 'case'. Coming up soon...
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FSM Smart
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered.
And you can verify all via this link: ICIJ offshoreleaks. By the way, Belize IBCs are defunct now (check BZ reg). Grizzly Ltd was the operator of another big scam, TradingBanks, at the time falsely claiming to be incorporated in British Virgin Islands as some bogus St. World Trade Inc, receiving BVI FSC warning. Furthermore, FPA 1-star review, then multiple warnings from FSB, domicile MFSA (for both TradingBanks and MX Trade, warning), FINMA, CONSOB, even Belize IFSC (warning), tradingbanks warnings, give final 2016 verdict – pure scam, operated by the above people and companies, no doubt about it. Grizzly Ltd has a secretary listed, one Mr David Meli link, a lawyer from a famous Michael Kyprianou (MT, CY) law practice office, that was used as nominee registrar intermediary. Mr Meli has a long list of offshore incorporations for their clients (check offshore leaks) which is not forbidden off course, it’s a good business and a sensitive service. Furthermore, Michael Kyprianou & Co Llc is a member of such esteemed groups like IFG (International Fraud Group, link), where one learns the office expanded its subsidiaries from CY to Greece, Malta and Ukraine. No presumptions here, just pointing out the well-known fact that many scam operators choose Paphos, Kiev, and other locations for their business. Any conclusion drawn by the readers here is their free choice solely, we do not even insinuate any connection, but merely state the industry-wide known general facts. Especially when it comes to Paphos, CY…By the way, besides Malta, Mr. Avshalom holds positions in two more companies in Cyprus. In Paphos, Cyprus, to be precise: Tevtach Ltd link (completely new one, May 2020) and A.VV.L Investments Ltd link (fresh, 2019). Sidetrack - with this Tevtach Ltd registered persons, one name search show interesting results- if not a football player or self-proclaimed LinkedIn lawyer with 1 connection, then it is most probably this Elior Vaknin, from Israeli Bynet Group, link, link, link. Just wondering what is a customer care representative from Rad Bynet Group (telecommunication, BPO, telephony, internet, outsourcing/offshoring, IP phones, etc) doing serving as co-director with Mr Avshalom, proven to be involved in illicit and questionable businesses? But that would be his private matter, off course. Finally, maybe it’s not him. This cannot be confirmed now. But to prove we are not malicious at all, just try to state the facts or obvious indications, here is one nice achievement of Mr. Avshalom, proving he is an interesting individual indeed – a co-inventor of an important and useful patent: IL patent registrar 2018, combined scissors and comb for books.
Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore: link and maybe Hong Kong
Why Hong Kong? We will prove a point shortly. Here we will just complete this sentence with public document where a certain Mr. Avshalom from Israel is indicated as the President (wow!) of GWU MKTG CORP. 08F Clark Center Berthaphil III, JAS Ave., CFZP, pls see: PH alien employment permit filling. GWU MKTG Corp website, domain-big-data tool shows registration from Cyprus (?) in 2015 link, while the company website kind of gives it away, doesn’t it?
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The FSM SCHEME
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
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View note
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
1 note
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View note
Text
Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
1 note
·
View note
Text
Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered. Back to business. Following the trail of the lawyer and the Philippines address, we land at Pampanga, PH. A well-known place for numerous call-centers, as well as India for example, again industry-wide known facts. Truly a lot of customer care offices for hundreds of different businesses, an army of cheap multilingual workforce. Over the years, we all witnessed even some police raids to scam call centers, over there they even announce it on TV, with full press conference and detained agent’s close-ups on national frequencies. As for our story, the address in offshore leaks revealed Mr. Avshalom’s Pampanga address for BSD Trade Services Corp or rather, BSD Trading Services Corp. BSD Trading/Trade Serv. Corp is actually a Philippines BPO, a call-center, however incorporated in Singapore. Going back to already explained ties to BSD Trade Services Corp issue, a closer look at its nonfunctional website via domain-data tools, after checking this job add: call center job advertisement, one can learn quite a lot. Actually, too much… BSD Trade Services Corp domainbigdata check. The company registered a domain indicating a HK incorporation, domain is not privately registered but via the company (!), name and phone of the registrant also indicated, registrant’s name (2015) Mr. Richard Bula. Mr. Bula holds 31 registrations in his name, per same tool search: R-Bula-domain-registrations and the results are shocking, to say the least.
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Pro-Palestine demonstrations in Cyprus, 1980s found in The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) Collection.
Photo 1: Unidentified Palestine demonstration in Cyprus, 1980s.
Photos 2-3: Black-and-white photographs showing a student demonstration in Cyprus in remembrance of the Land Day, 1982-1988.
Image source and information by Samar Ozrail, "The Palestine Red Crescent Society Collection". Archival Inventory. 30 April- 5 June 2018. The Palestinian Museum Digital Archive.
#cyprus#cypriot#cyprus archive#archive image#cypriot archive#cyprus history#cyprus fashion#cypriot heritage#palestine#palestinian history#palestinians#palestinian cypriots#palestinian heritage#palestine protest#free palestine
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered.
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Exposing The 'FSM SCHEME'
Online trading scam broker called FSM Smart is part of an incredibly large scam group, rarely spoken of or systematically exposed, due to many illegal unconnected brands and quite complicated and fluid network of shells, off-shores, PSPs and BPOs worldwide. Indeed smartly put, the name serves them well. At the time, the Fintelegram did a good job in exposing some parts and initiating the public attention, that was previously restricted to warnings to particular brands and occasional info scattered across many different forums. Apparently, they had problems because of it. However, the full story is yet to be told. We hope to bring more clarity and tie the missing parts. For sure it will not be a complete report, but joint efforts bear fruits, eventually. The full story should be revealed by the Law, not us or others. So far, the representatives of the law have done very little, mainly due to scheme’s multi jurisdictional and transnational nature.
The beneficial owner(s) are well hidden and this vast group obviously has no intention to stop. We shall try to do our best to unmask this ‘giant’ as much as possible. For the purpose of clarity, we shall generically call them ‘’the FSM scheme’’ since its brand FSM Smart is probably the biggest and longest standing one. This thread will be quite long and posted in successive parts, due to the size on info we aim to display on FPA, so you are warned that it will take patience and attention to follow. No shortcuts here or easy solutions.
The named ‘FSM scheme’ is comprised of (up to now known) following scam brands/trading styles: 1. MTI Markets www.mtimarkets.com 2. TradingBanks www.grizzly-ltd.com also t/a www.tradingbanks.com (own trade platform+TradingBanks) 3. MX Trade www.mxtrade.com 4. Trade12 www.trade12.com 5. HQBroker www.hqbroker.com (up to this thread, probably never associated to FSM Smart brand before) 6. FSM Smart www.fsmsmart.com, www.fsmsmarts.com, www.it.fsmsmart.net, www.fsmsmart-ltd.com
We are positive that more brands are involved or were a part of this. This organization is truly like an Octopus. But as any other such group, made the same mistakes when registering various companies and using 3rd parties providers, leaving traces behind. Now days, scammers are much more cautious, in general, as there is more focus on scams, narrowing down their operating boundaries. First brand operator of MX Trade scam appeared to be a 2014 est.&CySEC regulated/FCA-passport company R Capital Solutions Ltd, FCA, CySEC, CY registrar. Owner was a Romanian citizen residing in Cyprus, Mr. Victor Florin Safta, who had another linked company in the UK, F Capital Solutions LtdCompanies House Reg. CySEC regulated R Capital Solutions claimed they never operated MX Trade by issuing a public statement:
Anyhow, whoever the scam operator was, once compromised, quickly switched to 2014 est.&Belize incorporated Lau Global Services Corpwww.lgs-corp.com (now defunct BZ reg.search) operating MX Trade as of April 2015 (per T&C archive) which is a standard next step that all scammers make, when the brand is exposed. Lau Global was a full scam from day one, FB page still online, ASIC warning, CySEC warningIFSC warning, FSMA warning revealing that deposits went to Taris Financial Corp, not present in offshore leaks, Cypriot, Vanuatu, Belize or Marshal Islands registers, but with bank account in Cyprus, meaning it had to be incorporated somewhere to obtain a bank account. Possible best match via google search would be a few companies named Taris from Riga, Latvia, or Sofia, Bulgaria, but it’s just a random speculation with no actual meaning, or any insinuation towards those companies. Whatever it is, it’s obvious that they continued a scam. Lau Global, thanks to ICIJ offshore leaks, can be de-masked fully: Offshoreleaks-LauGlobal. Lau Global was the sole shareholder of 2014 Malta-incorporated Grizzly Ltd. Looks like the entire structure from the start was prepared in 2014 and, once the time came, just relocated, implying a plan/intention, from the start. Grizzly Ltd has one owner, Mr. Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, an Israeli national, with Philippines address, per offshore leaks. This was very indicative to us, as we had the information some time ago to pursue some lawyers and Philippines call centers direction, to get to the bottom of this scheme setup. So we did. Others who looked into this information just continued with having a name from offshore leaks, but no more. Let’s have a look at this Mr Avshalom more, shall we?
In offshore leaks, Shlomo Matan Shalom Avshalom, linked to Philippines and Israel residency addresses, is the director and legal/judicial representative of Malta based Quick Solutions Ltd (2014) and Grizzly Ltd (2015), with his registered address (another company): BSD Trading Service Corp, Office O5M, Berthaphil Compound, Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines. Quick Solutions is owned by Belize IBC called High Moon International Inc, while Grizzly Ltd is owned by Belize IBC Lau Global Service Corp. Both Grizzly and Quick solutions have the identical Malta address registered.
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Greece activates S-300 against Turkish F-16s on the Aegean Sea
Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 08/28/2022 - 12:00 PM Military, War Zones
Turkey accused Greece of continuous "hostile acts" against Turkish jets, this time activating the Russian-made S-300 air defense system based on the island of Crete.
In previous incidents last week, Greek fighter jets twice harassed Turkish F-16s carrying out NATO missions in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.
Ministry of Defense sources reported on August 28 that Turkish jets carrying out a reconnaissance mission over the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean were placed under the radar blockade of the S-300 air defense systems. The incident occurred on August 23, while Turkish warplanes were flying 10,000 feet west of Rhodes, the ministry noted.
Greece implemented the Russian-made S-300 air defense system for Crete in the late 1990s, in order to overcome a major crisis between Turkey and the Greek side in Cyprus. The defense system was originally purchased by the Greek Cypriot administration, but Turkey's strong reaction caused them to change their plans. Greece once used the system for testing, but Turkey's statement shows that it activated the S-300s.
Turkish sources described Greek acts as "incompatible with the spirit of the NATO alliance" and "hostile" under NATO's rules of engagement. "Despite this hostile action, the Turkish jets completed their planned missions and returned to the base safely," sources said.
The Greek use of S-300 systems is also presenting an important double standard on the alliance side, as prominent allied countries, particularly the United States, have long reacted against the Turkish deployment of Russia's S-400 air defense systems, sources recalled.
Last week, the ministry announced that Turkish warplanes were harassed by Greek fighter jets on August 22 and 24, although they were carrying out NATO missions. He accused Greece of risking NATO activities and creating new provocations in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.
In an August 26 interview with the newspaper Hürriyet, Defense Minister Hulusi Akar strongly warned Greece to avoid new adventures that would result in a major defeat, as they had observed a century ago.
Source: Hurriyet Daily News
Tags: Military AviationF-16 Fighting FalconS-300TAF - Turkish Air Force / Turkish Air ForceWar Zones - Greece Turkey
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Fernando Valduga
Fernando Valduga
Aviation photographer and pilot since 1992, he has participated in several events and air operations, such as Cruzex, AirVenture, Dayton Airshow and FIDAE. He has works published in a specialized aviation magazine in Brazil and abroad. He uses Canon equipment during his photographic work in the world of aviation.
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Mycenaean Linear B tablet 1450-1100 BCE. National Archaeological Museum, Athens.
"The oldest Mycenaean writing dates to about 1450 BC. It is descended from the older Linear A, an undeciphered earlier script used for writing the Minoan language, as is the later Cypriot syllabary, which also recorded Greek. Linear B, found mainly in the palace archives at Knossos, Cydonia, Pylos, Thebes and Mycenae, disappeared with the fall of Mycenaean civilization during the Late Bronze Age collapse. The succeeding period, known as the Greek Dark Ages, provides no evidence of the use of writing. It is also the only one of the Bronze Age Aegean scripts to have been deciphered, by English architect and self-taught linguist Michael Ventris."
-taken from wikipedia
https://paganimagevault.blogspot.com/2020/03/mycenaean-linear-b-tablet-1450-1100-bce.html
#mycenaean#ancient greece#greek#europe#antiquities#pagan#history#linquistics#language#greek history#english history#paganism#15th century bce#14th century bce#13th century bce#12th century bce
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