#cfit mode

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[spicynbachili1]

U.S. Army pilot tests ALIAS’ autonomy capabilities in demonstration flight – Defence Blog

An S-76B business helicopter flew over a small crowd gathered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, landed in an adjoining subject after adjusting to overlook a automobile, and rose as much as hover completely immobile for a number of minutes.

The mid-October demonstration was exceptional as a result of the pilot carried out the maneuvers utilizing supervised autonomy in an plane outfitted with DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS). He operated the system by way of novel management interceptors and a pill he had used for the primary time simply three days beforehand.

U.S. Military pilots exercised supervised autonomy to direct an optionally-piloted helicopter (OPV) by means of a sequence of missions to display expertise developed by Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin firm (NYSE: LMT) and the Protection Superior Analysis Tasks Company (DARPA). The sequence of flights marked the primary time that non-Sikorsky pilots operated the Sikorsky Autonomy Analysis Plane (SARA), a modified S-76B business helicopter, as an OPV plane.

“Future vertical carry plane would require sturdy autonomous and optimally-piloted programs to finish missions and enhance security,” mentioned Chris Van Buiten, vp, Sikorsky Improvements. “We couldn’t be extra thrilled to welcome Military aviators to the cockpit to expertise first-hand the reliability of optimally-piloted expertise developed by the revolutionary engineers at Sikorsky and DARPA. These aviators skilled the identical expertise that we’re putting in and testing on a Black Hawk that can take its first flight over the following a number of months.”

SARA, which has greater than 300 hours of autonomous flight, efficiently demonstrated the superior capabilities developed as a part of the third part of DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS) program. The plane was operated at totally different occasions by pilots on board and pilots on the bottom. Sikorsky’s MATRIX Expertise autonomous software program and , which is put in on SARA, executed varied eventualities together with:

Automated Take Off and Touchdown: The helicopter autonomously executed take-off, traveled to its vacation spot, and autonomously landed

Impediment Avoidance: The helicopter’s LIDAR and cameras enabled it to detect and keep away from unknown objects reminiscent of wires, towers and transferring automobiles

Computerized Touchdown Zone Choice: The helicopter’s LIDAR sensors decided a protected touchdown zone

Contour Flight: The helicopter flew low to the bottom and behind timber

The latest Mission Software program Flight Demonstration was a collaboration with the U.S. Military’s Aviation Improvement Directorate, Sikorsky and DARPA. The Military and DARPA are working with Sikorsky to enhance and broaden ALIAS capabilities developed as a tailorable autonomy package for set up in each mounted wing airplanes and helicopters.

Over the following few months, Sikorsky will for the primary time fly a Black Hawk outfitted with ALIAS. The corporate is working intently with the Federal Aviation Administration to certify ALIAS/MATRIX expertise in order that it is going to be obtainable on present and future business and navy plane.

“We’re demonstrating a certifiable autonomy answer that’s going to drastically change the best way pilots fly,” mentioned Mark Ward, Sikorsky Chief Pilot, Stratford, Conn. Flight Take a look at Middle. “We’re assured that MATRIX Expertise will permit pilots to concentrate on their missions. This expertise will in the end lower cases of the primary reason for helicopter crashes: Managed Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).”

By means of the DARPA ALIAS program, Sikorsky is creating an OPV method it describes as pilot directed autonomy that can give operators the arrogance to fly plane safely, reliably and affordably in optimally piloted modes enabling flight with two, one or zero crew. This system will enhance operator choice aiding for manned operations whereas additionally enabling each unmanned and diminished crew operations.

from SpicyNBAChili.com http://spicymoviechili.spicynbachili.com/u-s-army-pilot-tests-alias-autonomy-capabilities-in-demonstration-flight-defence-blog/

[mehmetkali]

Uçaklar neden çok güvenli? http://ift.tt/2vsTXIz

Uçakların birçok ulaşım ağına göre daha güvenli olduğu herkes tarafından bilinen bir gerçek. Peki, uçakların bu kadar güvenli olmasını sağlayan teknolojik uygulamalar neler? 

Gazete Habertürk’ten Güntay Şimşek  köşe yazısında bu konuya değindi. İşte o yazı…

Uçakların en güvenli seyahat aracı olduğu, teknolojinin gelişimine paralel olarak da kaza oranlarının giderek azaldığını istatistikler ortaya koyuyor.

Amerika Ulusal Ulaşım Güvenlik Kurulu’nun (National Transportation Safety Board – NTSB) son yaptığı araştırma, uçak kazası geçirecek kadar şanssız biri olsanız dahi, bu kazalardan sağ çıkma ihtimalinin de son yıllarda ciddi oranda yükseldiğini gösteriyor. Bir yandan uçaklar daha güvenli hale geldiği için kaza ihtimalleri düşerken, diğer taraftan da teknolojik iyileştirmelerle olumsuz bir durumun yaşanması halinde hayatta kalma ihtimalleri de yükseliyor.

Ancak sektörün ve uçakların, bu derece güvenli hale gelmesinin arka cephesinde elbette yıllar süren deneyimler, çalışmalar var. Modern uçakların, her biri yedekli olan onlarca sisteme sahip olmasıyla birlikte, bu sistemler de kendi içlerinde dahi iyi teknolojilerle donatılıyor. Şimdi uçakları ve havacılık sektörünü çok daha güvenli hale getiren bazı önemli gelişmelere bir göz atalım…

YANGINA DAYANIKLI KOLTUK MİNDERLERİ

Araştırmalara göre uçak kazalarındaki ölümlerin çoğu yangın sebebiyle meydana geliyor. Çünkü kanatlarda yer alan yakıt depolarının herhangi bir hadise sonrası alev alması, ölüm oranlarının da yüksek olmasının en önemli nedeniydi. 1980’lerin başında, Amerikan Federal Havacılık Dairesi (FAA), kabin içi yangın durumunda, hangi koltuk minderi malzemesinin aleve karşı daha dayanıklı olduğunu belirlemesi için NASA’yı görevlendirdi. Bu çalışma sonrasında günümüzde üretilen ve uçağa yerleştirilen her koltuğun, FAA’nın “Koltuk Minderleri İçin Yanmazlık Testi”ni geçmesi gerekiyor. Artık uçak koltuğu üreticileri de muhtemel kazalarda bu testi geçecek malzemeleri kullanmak zorunda.

UÇAKLARI MANİALARDAN KORUMA SİSTEMLERİ

Kontrollü uçuşta yere çarpma (Controlled Flight Into Terrain – CFIT), uçuşa elverişli bir hava taşıtının, pilot kontrolündeyken bir mâniaya (dağ vb.) çarpması veya suya düşmesiyle sonuçlanan kaza türünün genel adıdır. Bu kaza türünde pilotlar genellikle son ana kadar tehlikenin farkına varamazlar. Boeing’in 1999 tarihli bir raporunda, ticari jet operasyonlarının başlangıcından bu yana, CFIT kategorisindeki kazalar sonucunda yaklaşık 9 bin kişinin hayatını kaybettiğine dikkat çekiliyor.

Bu tür kazalar, genelde kötü görüş şartlarının bir sonucu olarak meydana geliyor. Bu tespitlerden hareketle FAA, 2000 yılında, tüm ABD tescilli yolcu uçaklarının “Arazi Farkındalığı Uyarı Sistemleri” (TAWS) ile donatılması şartı getiriyor. Gelişmiş cihazlar, artık uçağın yüksekliğini, hızını ve açısını takip ederek tehlikeli derecede yere yaklaşıldığında ya da engellerle karşılaşıldığında pilotu sesli ve görsel mesajlar yoluyla uyarıyor.

PİLOT YORGUNLUĞUNU İZLEME 

İngiliz Hava Yolu Pilotlar Birliği tarafından yapılan bir araştırma, pilotların yüzde 56’sının uçuş esnasında uyuduğunu itiraf etmesi gibi ilginç bir tabloyla neticelendi. Katılımcı pilotların yüzde 29’u da kokpitteki diğer pilotun uyuduğunu, kendisinin uyandığı anlarda fark ettiğini açıkladı.

Bu nedenle, kokpit ekibini zinde ve uyanık tutmak için tasarlanmış yazılımlar yaygınlaşıyor. Örneğin, Boeing Uyarı Modeli (The Boeing Alertness Model) kokpitteki gösterge ve kontrol aletlerine herhangi bir pilotun belirli bir süre dokunmamasının ardından, pilotların uyumuş olduğunu düşünerek “Crew Alert Pro” uygulaması devreye girerek alarm çalıyor.

UÇAKLARDAKİ RÜZGAR SANTRALİ

Uçakların seyir esnasında tüm motorlarının durması çok ender rastlanan bir durumdur. Son teknoloji ürünü uçakların çoğunun kanadında veya gövdesinde yer alan küçük bir pervane bulunur. Ram Hava Türbini (RAT) olarak bilinen bu cihaz, küçük bir rüzgâr santral gibi işlev görür. Bu türbin, uçaktaki tüm güç sistemlerinin devre dışı kalması durumunda, uçağı kontrol altında tutmak ve ardından güvenli bir şekilde yere indirinceye kadar kullanılması gereken hidrolik sistemler için yeterli gücü/enerjiyi üretir.

Yazının tamamı için tıklayınız. 

  from Aeroportist I Güncel Havacılık Haberleri http://ift.tt/2uuan6i via IFTTT

[educationasiain-blog]

Are you dreaming to choose engineering as the career? Then, JEE Main is the most important examination for you and is the gateway to IITs, NITs and CFITs.  The National Testing Agency (NTA) is the conducting body of the JEE Main. Earlier it was being conducted by the central board of secondary education (CBSE).  This change must have been raising many doubts in the minds of aspirants.

Students work hard day & night for months and years for JEE preparation but sometimes due to some silly mistakes or not having the clarity about the procedure, they do get rejected or don’t get the chance to appear in the exam.

As the exam will be conducted twice a year, there are lot of questions bound to rise in the minds of students related to the number of attempts, how to prepare, changes if any in syllabus, pattern, eligibility and more.

JEE aspirants are thinking of applying for the NITs, IIITs and GFTIs and about to appear for JEE Advanced after qualifying in the exam can check the relevant NTA JEE Main FAQs 2019 for better clarity. We have prepared some FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) and answers so that it will be easier for the aspirants while preparing for JEE Main.

Question 1: What’s the mode of the Exam? Offline or Online!

Answer     :  The exam will be conducted in Computer Based (Online) Mode.

Question 2:  If a candidate has passed JEE Main 2018 and want improvement, can he be eligible to appear for JEE Main 2019?

Answer    :  Yes, he or she can.

Question 3: How many times a student can appear for JEE Main in one year?

Answer:  As per the guidelines of NTA, JEE Main will be held twice a year. Candidates can appear in both, not necessarily both the exams.

Question 4: What is the state of eligibility for the Improvement candidates or Institution abroad or NIOS?

Answer:

If a candidate has passed the 12th or equivalent exam from one state but appeared for improvement from another state then the state of eligibility for such candidate will be from where he or she has passed class 12th or equivalent exam.

If any Indian national has passed equivalent qualifying exam from an institution abroad, State of Eligibility will be considered on the basis of permanent address in India as mentioned Passport of the candidate.

If a candidate has passed 12th or equivalent qualifying examination from NIOS, then the state of eligibility will be according to the state of his or her study center. The state of eligibility is not applicable to candidates from countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, foreign, OCI and PIO.

Question 5: What’s the eligibility for Diploma students in JEE Main?

Answer: Diploma holders can apply for JEE Main for appearing in JEE Advance 2019. But their rank or score won’t be declared as the diploma holders cannot apply for admission in NITs and CFTIs through JEE Main.

Question 6: How is Normalization score decided?

Answer:  You can download the Normalization Procedure-NTA Score from the Home Page of JEE Main website i.e. https://jeemain.nic.in/webinfo/Public/Home.aspx.

Question 7: How can you apply for JEE Main 2019?

Answer: The application form for JEE Main will be submitted online through the official website www.nat.ac.in. All the details related to JEE Main application procedure are available in the application form page. Aspirants need to visit the page for all the details related to JEE Main 2019.

Question 8:  What are the images to be uploaded in the JEE main 2019 Application form?

Answer: The candidates will have to upload the scanned images of their photograph, their signature and their Father’s or Mother’s or Guardian’s signature in the JEE Main Application form 2019.

Question 9:  Will the photograph without name and date of photograph be accepted?

Answer:  There are clear instructions in clause-5.3 of information bulletin how to upload the photograph. If any candidate wants to upload the photograph without date and time carelessly, the same will also be accepted.

Question 10:  Why options for Date and Shift are not given in JEE Main 2019?

Answer: The random allotment will be made by the software as per decision made by the NTA because it’s prerequisite that NTA score will be determined on the basis of two attempts.

Question 11: Is there any change to the syllabus of JEE Main 2019?

Answer: No change to the syllabus of JEE Main 2019.

Question 12: Whether calculator is allowed?

Answer: Neither Calculator, nor any electronic devices are allowed.

Question 13: If a candidate appears in both the exams of JEE Main, which score of the candidate will be considered?

Answer: Higher score of the exam will be considered for the merit list.

Question 14: If a candidate has no access to the computer or internet, how can he be able to prepare for online examination?

Answer: NTA will identify schools and institutions with internet connections and computer facilities which can be used as TCPs (Test Practice Centers). Aspirant will get the opportunity to practice on every Saturday and Sunday free of cost.

Question 15: What is the examination pattern for JEE Main 2019?

Answer: The JEE main examination will have two papers. Paper 1 for BE/B.Tech and paper 2 for B.arch/B.Planning. Candidates can take papers according to courses they are seeking admission to. The other details related to subjects and marks are given below.

Paper 1 (B.E/B.Tech)

Subjects: Physics, Chemistry and mathematics.

Type of questions: Objective type questions with equal importance to all the subjects.

Mode of examination: Computer-based ( Online)

Paper 2 (B.Arch/B.Planning)

Subjects: mathematics (part I), Aptitude test (part II), Drawing test (part III)

Type of questions: Objective type for the part I and II, Questions to test drawing aptitude for part III.

Mode of examination: Computer-based for the part I and II, on a drawing sheet (offline mode) for part III.

Type of questions: Objective type questions with equal importance to all the subjects.

Mode of examination: Computer-based ( Online)

Question 16: Will the JEE exams get tougher from 2019 onwards as NTA is conducting?

Answer: No. The syllabus and the exam pattern of the examination will remain the same.

Question17: Will the application of JEE Main 2019 be rejected in the event of filling of duplicate forms?

Answer:  Multiple forms will lead to cancellation of Application Form of JEE Main 2019. NTA will issue the Admit card on filling of one application form only.

[courtneytincher]

U.S. Army pilot tests ALIAS’ autonomy capabilities in demonstration flight

An S-76B commercial helicopter flew over a small crowd gathered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, landed in an adjacent field after adjusting to miss a vehicle, and rose up to hover perfectly motionless for several minutes.

The mid-October demonstration was remarkable because the pilot carried out the maneuvers using supervised autonomy in an aircraft equipped with DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS). He operated the system via novel control interceptors and a tablet he had used for the first time just three days beforehand.

U.S. Army pilots exercised supervised autonomy to direct an optionally-piloted helicopter (OPV) through a series of missions to demonstrate technology developed by Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company (NYSE: LMT) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The series of flights marked the first time that non-Sikorsky pilots operated the Sikorsky Autonomy Research Aircraft (SARA), a modified S-76B commercial helicopter, as an OPV aircraft.

“Future vertical lift aircraft will require robust autonomous and optimally-piloted systems to complete missions and improve safety,” said Chris Van Buiten, vice president, Sikorsky Innovations. “We could not be more thrilled to welcome Army aviators to the cockpit to experience first-hand the reliability of optimally-piloted technology developed by the innovative engineers at Sikorsky and DARPA. These aviators experienced the same technology that we are installing and testing on a Black Hawk that will take its first flight over the next several months.”

SARA, which has more than 300 hours of autonomous flight, successfully demonstrated the advanced capabilities developed as part of the third phase of DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS) program. The aircraft was operated at different times by pilots on board and pilots on the ground. Sikorsky’s MATRIX Technology autonomous software and hardware, which is installed on SARA, executed various scenarios including:

Automated Take Off and Landing: The helicopter autonomously executed take-off, traveled to its destination, and autonomously landed

Obstacle Avoidance: The helicopter’s LIDAR and cameras enabled it to detect and avoid unknown objects such as wires, towers and moving vehicles

Automatic Landing Zone Selection: The helicopter’s LIDAR sensors determined a safe landing zone

Contour Flight: The helicopter flew low to the ground and behind trees

The recent Mission Software Flight Demonstration was a collaboration with the U.S. Army’s Aviation Development Directorate, Sikorsky and DARPA. The Army and DARPA are working with Sikorsky to improve and expand ALIAS capabilities developed as a tailorable autonomy kit for installation in both fixed wing airplanes and helicopters.

Over the next few months, Sikorsky will for the first time fly a Black Hawk equipped with ALIAS. The company is working closely with the Federal Aviation Administration to certify ALIAS/MATRIX technology so that it will be available on current and future commercial and military aircraft.

“We’re demonstrating a certifiable autonomy solution that is going to drastically change the way pilots fly,” said Mark Ward, Sikorsky Chief Pilot, Stratford, Conn. Flight Test Center. “We’re confident that MATRIX Technology will allow pilots to focus on their missions. This technology will ultimately decrease instances of the number one cause of helicopter crashes: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).”

Through the DARPA ALIAS program, Sikorsky is developing an OPV approach it describes as pilot directed autonomy that will give operators the confidence to fly aircraft safely, reliably and affordably in optimally piloted modes enabling flight with two, one or zero crew. The program will improve operator decision aiding for manned operations while also enabling both unmanned and reduced crew operations.

from Defence Blog

An S-76B commercial helicopter flew over a small crowd gathered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, landed in an adjacent field after adjusting to miss a vehicle, and rose up to hover perfectly motionless for several minutes.

The mid-October demonstration was remarkable because the pilot carried out the maneuvers using supervised autonomy in an aircraft equipped with DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS). He operated the system via novel control interceptors and a tablet he had used for the first time just three days beforehand.

U.S. Army pilots exercised supervised autonomy to direct an optionally-piloted helicopter (OPV) through a series of missions to demonstrate technology developed by Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company (NYSE: LMT) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The series of flights marked the first time that non-Sikorsky pilots operated the Sikorsky Autonomy Research Aircraft (SARA), a modified S-76B commercial helicopter, as an OPV aircraft.

“Future vertical lift aircraft will require robust autonomous and optimally-piloted systems to complete missions and improve safety,” said Chris Van Buiten, vice president, Sikorsky Innovations. “We could not be more thrilled to welcome Army aviators to the cockpit to experience first-hand the reliability of optimally-piloted technology developed by the innovative engineers at Sikorsky and DARPA. These aviators experienced the same technology that we are installing and testing on a Black Hawk that will take its first flight over the next several months.”

SARA, which has more than 300 hours of autonomous flight, successfully demonstrated the advanced capabilities developed as part of the third phase of DARPA’s Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS) program. The aircraft was operated at different times by pilots on board and pilots on the ground. Sikorsky’s MATRIX Technology autonomous software and hardware, which is installed on SARA, executed various scenarios including:

Automated Take Off and Landing: The helicopter autonomously executed take-off, traveled to its destination, and autonomously landed

Obstacle Avoidance: The helicopter’s LIDAR and cameras enabled it to detect and avoid unknown objects such as wires, towers and moving vehicles

Automatic Landing Zone Selection: The helicopter’s LIDAR sensors determined a safe landing zone

Contour Flight: The helicopter flew low to the ground and behind trees

The recent Mission Software Flight Demonstration was a collaboration with the U.S. Army’s Aviation Development Directorate, Sikorsky and DARPA. The Army and DARPA are working with Sikorsky to improve and expand ALIAS capabilities developed as a tailorable autonomy kit for installation in both fixed wing airplanes and helicopters.

Over the next few months, Sikorsky will for the first time fly a Black Hawk equipped with ALIAS. The company is working closely with the Federal Aviation Administration to certify ALIAS/MATRIX technology so that it will be available on current and future commercial and military aircraft.

“We’re demonstrating a certifiable autonomy solution that is going to drastically change the way pilots fly,” said Mark Ward, Sikorsky Chief Pilot, Stratford, Conn. Flight Test Center. “We’re confident that MATRIX Technology will allow pilots to focus on their missions. This technology will ultimately decrease instances of the number one cause of helicopter crashes: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).”

Through the DARPA ALIAS program, Sikorsky is developing an OPV approach it describes as pilot directed autonomy that will give operators the confidence to fly aircraft safely, reliably and affordably in optimally piloted modes enabling flight with two, one or zero crew. The program will improve operator decision aiding for manned operations while also enabling both unmanned and reduced crew operations.

via IFTTT

[mrcoreymonroe]

Looking Into Controlled Flight Into Terrain

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Why do pilots continue flying into mountainsides with the airplane fully under control? The term controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) puts an objective and rather cold label on a type of accident which has defied prevention. For example, I was going through some old Civil Aeronautics Board documents and noticed that on March 1, 1938, a TWA DC-2 en route from San Francisco to Winslow, Arizona, crashed into a mountain in Yosemite National Park near Wawona, California. All nine on board were killed. The DC-2 departed visually but it soon entered instrument conditions and the weather kept deteriorating. The pilot elected to divert to Fresno but apparently became confused about his position in relation to the Fresno Radio Range. The airplane's wreckage was located about three months later about 200 feet below the summit of the mountain.

It's not as if we don't have better charts and moving maps and VOR and GPS and RNAV and other technology which the pilot of that DC-2 couldn't imagine. Fast forward to April of this year and aviation seems to be still stuck where it was 80 years ago. April is when the NTSB released its report on a Part 135 CFIT accident along with Safety Recommendations which included a call for better training of Part 135 pilots in CFIT accident avoidance.

A crash scene photo from Ravn Connect flight 3153.

It was on October 2, 2016, at about 11:57 a.m. that Ravn Connect flight 3153, operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., of Anchorage, Alaska, flew into steep mountainous terrain about 10 miles northwest of the Togiak Airport (PATG), Togiak, Alaska. The Part 135 flight was operating under VFR. There were two pilots and one passenger; all were killed.

The airplane was a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan. The 1995 turboprop was powered by a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-114A engine. The Cessna 208B could be configured with two pilot seats and as many as eight passenger seats depending on the mission and whether it was for passengers, cargo or a mix.

The airplane could be flown by one pilot, but Hageland often had a second-in-command on board.

The airplane had accumulated 20,562 hours total time, and the next maintenance/inspection was due at 20,600 hours. It was being flown with its ADS-B system inoperative, and the repair had been deferred since ADS-B wasn't required by the airplane's minimum equipment list.

The airplane had a Garmin GNS 430W and a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KLN 89B for GPS navigation, a Garmin GMX 200 multifunction display (MFD), a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KGP 560 general aviation enhanced ground proximity warning system (GA-EGPWS) that provided terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) capabilities, and a MidContinent MD41-1200-series terrain awareness annunciation control unit.

The GMX 200 MFD had a custom map function, which used shades of green, brown, and blue to depict terrain and water. Traffic information could also be displayed on the custom map page. The terrain function would show the pilot a terrain map related to what was around the airplane’s position. Yellow depicted terrain that was within 1,000 feet below the airplane’s altitude, and red depicted terrain 100 feet below and well above the airplane’s altitude. The MFD relied on an internal terrain database.

The airplane met its requirement under Part 135 to be equipped with an approved Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) by having a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KGP 560 General Aviation Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (GA-EGPWS).

The equipment used an internal GPS receiver and terrain database to define conflicts. It could check on what was ahead of the airplane's lateral and vertical paths to provide alerts if a CFIT threat existed. If the airplane was more than 15 miles from an airport and it got within 700 feet of ground level, an alert would go off. The system would provide an alert if the airplane was with a minute of hitting terrain ahead and more intense alerts when the airplane was about 30 seconds from terrain.

When using the custom map or most other functions of the GMX 200, a terrain thumbnail would appear in the upper left corner of the display. A white advisory flag would appear when the airplane would be within 100 feet of a terrain hazard within about 2 minutes of flight in any direction. The white terrain advisory flag would flash for about 10 seconds then turn solid as long as the advisory remained valid.

The Honeywell KGP 560 would produce voice messages which could be routed to pilot headphones or the cockpit speaker such as, “CAUTION TERRAIN (Pause) CAUTION TERRAIN” and the more urgent “OBSTACLE, OBSTACLE, PULL UP,” or “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP.”

Lights would appear on the annunciation control unit on the top left side of the instrument panel. An amber light meant caution; a red light indicated a terrain warning.

The terrain awareness annunciation control unit also provided a terrain inhibit (TERR INHB) switch that put the TAWS computer in standby mode. When the pilot pushed the switch, a white TERR INHB light would come on and remain on until the pilot pushed the switch again to again allow the alerts.

At the time of the accident, Hageland employed about 120 pilots and operated 56 airplanes based at various airports throughout Alaska. The company operated about 55,000 flights a year. More than two-thirds its destinations could not support Part 135 IFR operations.

Hageland pilots typically worked 15 days followed by 15 days off. When on duty, each pilot normally had a 14-hour duty day. A pilot normally had 8 hours maximum flight time, but that could be expanded to 10 hours if a second-in-command was along.

Hageland required that day VFR flights be flown no lower than 500 feet AGL and follow the shortest safe route or as assigned by air traffic control. According to Hageland's chief pilot and a safety pilot who gave testimony to the NTSB, while the company encouraged pilots to fly at higher altitudes, flights below 1,000 feet AGL took place all the time, especially when there was a low ceiling but visibility was “really good.”

Flight 3153 consisted of five scheduled segments, and the accident occurred during the third segment. Before the first segment, the pilot-in-command and the airline's operational control agent assigned to the flight reviewed the available weather information and completed a risk assessment that identified no hazards requiring management-level approval to proceed.

The first segment departed Bethel Airport, Bethel, Alaska, about 9:27 a.m., and arrived at PATG at 10:29. The second segment departed PATG at 10:44 and arrived at Quinhagak Airport (PAQH), Quinhagak, Alaska, at 11:25. The flight’s altitude for the second segment was about 4,500 feet MSL. While at PAQH, the crewmembers were on the ground for about 8 minutes. They unloaded cargo, boarded the passenger, and departed on the third segment for PATG.

According to flight tracking data from a commercial source, the accident flight proceeded southeast along a generally direct route toward PATG at about 1,000 feet MSL. The airplane’s last recorded location, at 11:53, was about 19 nm northwest of PATG at an altitude of 1,043 feet MSL.

A second Hageland flight crew in a Cessna 208B departed PAQH about 2 minutes after the accident flight. According to commercial and ADS-B data, they started out flying the same route taken by the accident airplane. At 11:56, as the second flight approached the mountainous terrain, it changed heading more toward the south, which allowed it to remain over lower terrain than did the accident flight.

According to the safety pilot on the second flight, they decided to change course to avoid clouds and follow a route that looked clearer. The pilot-in-command said he changed course when he saw valley fog and the potential for rain. The safety pilot stated that the clouds over the route the accident flight took were changing. The pilot-in-command said he did not see the accident airplane while in the mountains and could not recall hearing any specific radio communications from the accident pilot.

Ravn Connect Flight 3153 ended in a tragic crash.

When the second airplane arrived at PATG at about 12:16, and the pilots noted that the first airplane was not there.

About 12:14, the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) notified Hageland's director of operations that about 6 minutes earlier it received a 406MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal from the accident airplane. At about 12:31, the pilots of the first company airplane that had landed at PATG took off in search of the accident airplane. Clouds obscured the mountain from which the ELT signal was coming and they couldn't spot the wreckage.

At about 2:30 p.m., an Alaska State Troopers helicopter flew in from Dillingham, and started to search. By about 4:30, the weather had lifted sufficiently for the troopers to spot the wreckage. Other troopers were able to get there on the ground about an hour later.

The initial impact point contained scrape marks and pieces of the airplane's belly cargo pod. They were at an elevation of about 2,300 feet MSL on the northwest side of a steep, rock-covered ridge about 9 nm southeast of the airplane’s last position shown by the commercial tracking service.

The main wreckage was located on the southeast side of the ridge. It was at an elevation of about 1,500 feet, and the right wing was found about 200 feet below the main wreckage.

The engine was separated from the airframe and showed severe impact damage. Disassembly provided evidence that it was producing power at impact and the propeller showed evidence it was turning under power at impact.

The vertical speed indicator (VSI) from the left side of the cockpit had a needle mark indicating the airplane was climbing at 2,500 feet per minute when impact occurred.

The airplane’s terrain awareness annunciation control unit was badly damaged, but remains were recovered for laboratory examination. X-ray computed tomography images revealed that the inhibit switch on the unit was not engaged as found. This and the VSI climb indication might indicate that if the pilots had inhibited terrain warning system alerts early in the flight to stop nuisance warnings due to their being at low altitude, the system had been uninhibited shortly before impact. But, the NTSB pointed out that it did not have cockpit voice or image recordings which might have shed light on what actions the the pilots did or did not take during the flight.

The accident pilot was 43 years old. He held a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine, multi-engine land, and instrument ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate. His FAA second-class airman medical certificate was current.

At the time of the accident, the company recorded him having 6,465 hours, with 765 in the Cessna 208B. He had been employed by Hageland Aviation since November 2, 2015. His recurrent training included crew resource management (CRM) and CFIT-avoidance ground and simulator training. Records for his CFIT-avoidance flight simulator training indicated he performed the specified escape maneuvers with no difficulties.

Hageland records show that the pilot had flown between PAQH and PATG a total of 26 times in the preceding 11 months.

According to the pilot’s wife, after a few of his friends died in crashes, he became even more safety-conscious and did not take any chances. The pilot lived in Montana with his wife and was based in Bethel where he lived in a pilot dorm. Hageland pilots worked 2-weeks-on, 2-weeks-off schedules. He commuted by commercial carrier from Bozeman to Bethel.

The second-in-command, age 29, held a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. His second-class FAA medical was current. He had 273 hours with 84 in Cessna 208B aircraft.

This pilot's girlfriend told investigators he described his flying as like the “wild west,” flying in low visibility and below minimums. She said he told a friend that he would agree with what the captain of the flight wanted to do. The pilot and the girlfriend lived in Anchorage.

An automated weather observing station was located at PATG. Field elevation is 18 feet MSL and it is about 10 nm southeast of the accident location.

The 11:56 observation was: calm wind; visibility 7 miles in light rain; scattered clouds at 3,900 feet, overcast at 4,700 feet AGL; temperature 7 degrees C.; dew point temperature 6 degrees C.; altimeter 29.88. Rain began at 11:32.

Honeywell representatives developed GA-EGPWS simulations for the flight using an estimated cruise altitude of 1,000 feet MSL and the flight track as plotted from commercial data. The estimated terrain clearances were between 500 and 700 feet. The simulation assumed that the airplane entered a climb after the last known data point and achieved and maintained an altitude of 2,300 feet MSL beginning 3 nm from the initial impact point.

Under the simulation, the terrain warning equipment began providing continuous “CAUTION TERRAIN, CAUTION TERRAIN” alerts 46 seconds before impact. Then, 36 seconds before impact, the pilots would have heard “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP” with “PULL UP” repeated until impact.

The NTSB said the probable cause was the flight crew’s decision to continue VFR flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into instrument conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) Hageland’s allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility; (2) Hageland’s CRM training; (3) the FAA’s failure to ensure that Hageland’s approved CRM training contained all the required elements of FAR 135.330; and (4) Hageland’s CFIT-avoidance ground training, which was not tailored to the company’s operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.

CFIT-avoidance training was not required by regulation for Part 135 airplane operations. Hageland and many other Alaska operators provided CFIT-avoidance training through participation in the Medallion Foundation, an outside organization which gave a “star” to operators using Medallion guidance to create a CFIT-avoidance program. The operators were allowed to use the “star” in their advertising.

The NTSB criticized Hageland’s CRM training for not providing procedures for flight crew coordination, communication, and the division of crew duties. The Safety Board said it didn't provide flight crews with the skills to exercise good aeronautical decision-making and judgment to mitigate the risk of CFIT. It criticized the FAA for not providing proper oversight of the CRM training. That would seem to ignore the fact that the second Hageland crew flying the same route avoided a CFIT accident.

While the NTSB's prevention efforts stemming from this accident were focused on Part 135, it could just as easily served as a hook for a CFIT-avoidance alert for all pilots. After all, the threat of CFIT is so ubiquitous that completely eliminating it will require moving mountains.

Peter Katz is editor and publisher of NTSB Reporter, an independent monthly update on aircraft accident investigations and other news concerning the National Transportation Safety Board. To subscribe, visit ntsbreporter.us or write to: NTSB Reporter, Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 831, White Plains, NY 10602-0831.

The post Looking Into Controlled Flight Into Terrain appeared first on Plane & Pilot Magazine.

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[mrcoreymonroe]

Looking Into Controlled Flight Into Terrain

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Why do pilots continue flying into mountainsides with the airplane fully under control? The term controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) puts an objective and rather cold label on a type of accident which has defied prevention. For example, I was going through some old Civil Aeronautics Board documents and noticed that on March 1, 1938, a TWA DC-2 en route from San Francisco to Winslow, Arizona, crashed into a mountain in Yosemite National Park near Wawona, California. All nine on board were killed. The DC-2 departed visually but it soon entered instrument conditions and the weather kept deteriorating. The pilot elected to divert to Fresno but apparently became confused about his position in relation to the Fresno Radio Range. The airplane's wreckage was located about three months later about 200 feet below the summit of the mountain.

It's not as if we don't have better charts and moving maps and VOR and GPS and RNAV and other technology which the pilot of that DC-2 couldn't imagine. Fast forward to April of this year and aviation seems to be still stuck where it was 80 years ago. April is when the NTSB released its report on a Part 135 CFIT accident along with Safety Recommendations which included a call for better training of Part 135 pilots in CFIT accident avoidance.

A crash scene photo from Ravn Connect flight 3153.

It was on October 2, 2016, at about 11:57 a.m. that Ravn Connect flight 3153, operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., of Anchorage, Alaska, flew into steep mountainous terrain about 10 miles northwest of the Togiak Airport (PATG), Togiak, Alaska. The Part 135 flight was operating under VFR. There were two pilots and one passenger; all were killed.

The airplane was a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan. The 1995 turboprop was powered by a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-114A engine. The Cessna 208B could be configured with two pilot seats and as many as eight passenger seats depending on the mission and whether it was for passengers, cargo or a mix.

The airplane could be flown by one pilot, but Hageland often had a second-in-command on board.

The airplane had accumulated 20,562 hours total time, and the next maintenance/inspection was due at 20,600 hours. It was being flown with its ADS-B system inoperative, and the repair had been deferred since ADS-B wasn't required by the airplane's minimum equipment list.

The airplane had a Garmin GNS 430W and a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KLN 89B for GPS navigation, a Garmin GMX 200 multifunction display (MFD), a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KGP 560 general aviation enhanced ground proximity warning system (GA-EGPWS) that provided terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) capabilities, and a MidContinent MD41-1200-series terrain awareness annunciation control unit.

The GMX 200 MFD had a custom map function, which used shades of green, brown, and blue to depict terrain and water. Traffic information could also be displayed on the custom map page. The terrain function would show the pilot a terrain map related to what was around the airplane’s position. Yellow depicted terrain that was within 1,000 feet below the airplane’s altitude, and red depicted terrain 100 feet below and well above the airplane’s altitude. The MFD relied on an internal terrain database.

The airplane met its requirement under Part 135 to be equipped with an approved Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) by having a Bendix/King (Honeywell) KGP 560 General Aviation Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (GA-EGPWS).

The equipment used an internal GPS receiver and terrain database to define conflicts. It could check on what was ahead of the airplane's lateral and vertical paths to provide alerts if a CFIT threat existed. If the airplane was more than 15 miles from an airport and it got within 700 feet of ground level, an alert would go off. The system would provide an alert if the airplane was with a minute of hitting terrain ahead and more intense alerts when the airplane was about 30 seconds from terrain.

When using the custom map or most other functions of the GMX 200, a terrain thumbnail would appear in the upper left corner of the display. A white advisory flag would appear when the airplane would be within 100 feet of a terrain hazard within about 2 minutes of flight in any direction. The white terrain advisory flag would flash for about 10 seconds then turn solid as long as the advisory remained valid.

The Honeywell KGP 560 would produce voice messages which could be routed to pilot headphones or the cockpit speaker such as, “CAUTION TERRAIN (Pause) CAUTION TERRAIN” and the more urgent “OBSTACLE, OBSTACLE, PULL UP,” or “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP.”

Lights would appear on the annunciation control unit on the top left side of the instrument panel. An amber light meant caution; a red light indicated a terrain warning.

The terrain awareness annunciation control unit also provided a terrain inhibit (TERR INHB) switch that put the TAWS computer in standby mode. When the pilot pushed the switch, a white TERR INHB light would come on and remain on until the pilot pushed the switch again to again allow the alerts.

At the time of the accident, Hageland employed about 120 pilots and operated 56 airplanes based at various airports throughout Alaska. The company operated about 55,000 flights a year. More than two-thirds its destinations could not support Part 135 IFR operations.

Hageland pilots typically worked 15 days followed by 15 days off. When on duty, each pilot normally had a 14-hour duty day. A pilot normally had 8 hours maximum flight time, but that could be expanded to 10 hours if a second-in-command was along.

Hageland required that day VFR flights be flown no lower than 500 feet AGL and follow the shortest safe route or as assigned by air traffic control. According to Hageland's chief pilot and a safety pilot who gave testimony to the NTSB, while the company encouraged pilots to fly at higher altitudes, flights below 1,000 feet AGL took place all the time, especially when there was a low ceiling but visibility was “really good.”

Flight 3153 consisted of five scheduled segments, and the accident occurred during the third segment. Before the first segment, the pilot-in-command and the airline's operational control agent assigned to the flight reviewed the available weather information and completed a risk assessment that identified no hazards requiring management-level approval to proceed.

The first segment departed Bethel Airport, Bethel, Alaska, about 9:27 a.m., and arrived at PATG at 10:29. The second segment departed PATG at 10:44 and arrived at Quinhagak Airport (PAQH), Quinhagak, Alaska, at 11:25. The flight’s altitude for the second segment was about 4,500 feet MSL. While at PAQH, the crewmembers were on the ground for about 8 minutes. They unloaded cargo, boarded the passenger, and departed on the third segment for PATG.

According to flight tracking data from a commercial source, the accident flight proceeded southeast along a generally direct route toward PATG at about 1,000 feet MSL. The airplane’s last recorded location, at 11:53, was about 19 nm northwest of PATG at an altitude of 1,043 feet MSL.

A second Hageland flight crew in a Cessna 208B departed PAQH about 2 minutes after the accident flight. According to commercial and ADS-B data, they started out flying the same route taken by the accident airplane. At 11:56, as the second flight approached the mountainous terrain, it changed heading more toward the south, which allowed it to remain over lower terrain than did the accident flight.

According to the safety pilot on the second flight, they decided to change course to avoid clouds and follow a route that looked clearer. The pilot-in-command said he changed course when he saw valley fog and the potential for rain. The safety pilot stated that the clouds over the route the accident flight took were changing. The pilot-in-command said he did not see the accident airplane while in the mountains and could not recall hearing any specific radio communications from the accident pilot.

Ravn Connect Flight 3153 ended in a tragic crash.

When the second airplane arrived at PATG at about 12:16, and the pilots noted that the first airplane was not there.

About 12:14, the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) notified Hageland's director of operations that about 6 minutes earlier it received a 406MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal from the accident airplane. At about 12:31, the pilots of the first company airplane that had landed at PATG took off in search of the accident airplane. Clouds obscured the mountain from which the ELT signal was coming and they couldn't spot the wreckage.

At about 2:30 p.m., an Alaska State Troopers helicopter flew in from Dillingham, and started to search. By about 4:30, the weather had lifted sufficiently for the troopers to spot the wreckage. Other troopers were able to get there on the ground about an hour later.

The initial impact point contained scrape marks and pieces of the airplane's belly cargo pod. They were at an elevation of about 2,300 feet MSL on the northwest side of a steep, rock-covered ridge about 9 nm southeast of the airplane’s last position shown by the commercial tracking service.

The main wreckage was located on the southeast side of the ridge. It was at an elevation of about 1,500 feet, and the right wing was found about 200 feet below the main wreckage.

The engine was separated from the airframe and showed severe impact damage. Disassembly provided evidence that it was producing power at impact and the propeller showed evidence it was turning under power at impact.

The vertical speed indicator (VSI) from the left side of the cockpit had a needle mark indicating the airplane was climbing at 2,500 feet per minute when impact occurred.

The airplane’s terrain awareness annunciation control unit was badly damaged, but remains were recovered for laboratory examination. X-ray computed tomography images revealed that the inhibit switch on the unit was not engaged as found. This and the VSI climb indication might indicate that if the pilots had inhibited terrain warning system alerts early in the flight to stop nuisance warnings due to their being at low altitude, the system had been uninhibited shortly before impact. But, the NTSB pointed out that it did not have cockpit voice or image recordings which might have shed light on what actions the the pilots did or did not take during the flight.

The accident pilot was 43 years old. He held a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine, multi-engine land, and instrument ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate. His FAA second-class airman medical certificate was current.

At the time of the accident, the company recorded him having 6,465 hours, with 765 in the Cessna 208B. He had been employed by Hageland Aviation since November 2, 2015. His recurrent training included crew resource management (CRM) and CFIT-avoidance ground and simulator training. Records for his CFIT-avoidance flight simulator training indicated he performed the specified escape maneuvers with no difficulties.

Hageland records show that the pilot had flown between PAQH and PATG a total of 26 times in the preceding 11 months.

According to the pilot’s wife, after a few of his friends died in crashes, he became even more safety-conscious and did not take any chances. The pilot lived in Montana with his wife and was based in Bethel where he lived in a pilot dorm. Hageland pilots worked 2-weeks-on, 2-weeks-off schedules. He commuted by commercial carrier from Bozeman to Bethel.

The second-in-command, age 29, held a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. His second-class FAA medical was current. He had 273 hours with 84 in Cessna 208B aircraft.

This pilot's girlfriend told investigators he described his flying as like the “wild west,” flying in low visibility and below minimums. She said he told a friend that he would agree with what the captain of the flight wanted to do. The pilot and the girlfriend lived in Anchorage.

An automated weather observing station was located at PATG. Field elevation is 18 feet MSL and it is about 10 nm southeast of the accident location.

The 11:56 observation was: calm wind; visibility 7 miles in light rain; scattered clouds at 3,900 feet, overcast at 4,700 feet AGL; temperature 7 degrees C.; dew point temperature 6 degrees C.; altimeter 29.88. Rain began at 11:32.

Honeywell representatives developed GA-EGPWS simulations for the flight using an estimated cruise altitude of 1,000 feet MSL and the flight track as plotted from commercial data. The estimated terrain clearances were between 500 and 700 feet. The simulation assumed that the airplane entered a climb after the last known data point and achieved and maintained an altitude of 2,300 feet MSL beginning 3 nm from the initial impact point.

Under the simulation, the terrain warning equipment began providing continuous “CAUTION TERRAIN, CAUTION TERRAIN” alerts 46 seconds before impact. Then, 36 seconds before impact, the pilots would have heard “TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP” with “PULL UP” repeated until impact.

The NTSB said the probable cause was the flight crew’s decision to continue VFR flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into instrument conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were (1) Hageland’s allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility; (2) Hageland’s CRM training; (3) the FAA’s failure to ensure that Hageland’s approved CRM training contained all the required elements of FAR 135.330; and (4) Hageland’s CFIT-avoidance ground training, which was not tailored to the company’s operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.

CFIT-avoidance training was not required by regulation for Part 135 airplane operations. Hageland and many other Alaska operators provided CFIT-avoidance training through participation in the Medallion Foundation, an outside organization which gave a “star” to operators using Medallion guidance to create a CFIT-avoidance program. The operators were allowed to use the “star” in their advertising.

The NTSB criticized Hageland’s CRM training for not providing procedures for flight crew coordination, communication, and the division of crew duties. The Safety Board said it didn't provide flight crews with the skills to exercise good aeronautical decision-making and judgment to mitigate the risk of CFIT. It criticized the FAA for not providing proper oversight of the CRM training. That would seem to ignore the fact that the second Hageland crew flying the same route avoided a CFIT accident.

While the NTSB's prevention efforts stemming from this accident were focused on Part 135, it could just as easily served as a hook for a CFIT-avoidance alert for all pilots. After all, the threat of CFIT is so ubiquitous that completely eliminating it will require moving mountains.

Peter Katz is editor and publisher of NTSB Reporter, an independent monthly update on aircraft accident investigations and other news concerning the National Transportation Safety Board. To subscribe, visit ntsbreporter.us or write to: NTSB Reporter, Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 831, White Plains, NY 10602-0831.

The post Looking Into Controlled Flight Into Terrain appeared first on Plane & Pilot Magazine.

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[jacewilliams1]

Flight directors – a fatal attraction

My first encounter with flight directors was in 1966 while undergoing conversion to the Avro 748. The RAAF had seen fit to send me to Woodford in Cheshire, all the way from Australia, to ferry the second of several new 748s for the RAAF VIP squadron at Canberra. The conversion was conducted on a battered 748 demonstrator: G-ARAY, known as Gary. The contract allowed four hours of dual for the captains and nothing for the co-pilots. G-ARAY had the basic instrument flying panel of that era and no flight director.

Our instructors at Avro’s were well-known test pilots Bill Else, Tony Blackman and Eric Franklin. Jimmy Harrison was chief test pilot. Unlike the bog-standard civilian 748, the RAAF 748s were to be equipped with a Collins FD 108 FD. So the situation existed that the RAAF 748s had a British Smith’s autopilot system which was married (somewhat expensively and painfully) to the American Collins FD 108.

For the life of me, I could not see why a flight director was needed in the RAAF 748. After all, the approach speed was that of a DC-3 (80 knots) and the aircraft a delight to handle compared with the venerable Dak.

Did the Avro 748 really need a flight director?

In retrospect, I think the old Wing Commander Transport Ops at Department of Air, who was charged with the procurement of the 748 for RAAF service, and hadn’t flown for years, was perhaps conned by the Avro sales people, in conjunction with Collins, into buying the Collins systems. Certainly in my view as the squadron QFI, flight directors were not operationally needed. In the event, the RAAF machines came with Collins FD 108 flight directors and, as the contract specified, each captain would be given only one hour of dual instruction once the 748 came out of the factory. We needed to learn how to operate the FD.

First, a course was arranged at the Collins establishment at Weybridge in Surrey. The two RAAF captains and their co-pilots attended and our two navigators and our instrument fitters also turned up to enjoy the Collins hospitality. We learned about 45 degree automatic intercepts of the VOR and ILS beams and other goodies including V-bar interpretation. We were showered with glossy brochures of the flight director by white dust-coated lecturers and shown a film.

By lunch time, the presentation was complete and we were shouted to a slap up pub meal with lots of grog, all paid for by Collins. We asked what further lectures were to take place after lunch. We were told the course was over – it was just a morning’s job and we were free to leave unless we would like more drinks. Naturally it was churlish to refuse and hours later we staggered to the railway station (I think), smashed to the eye balls and having forgotten all about the marvels of 45 degree auto intercepts on the FD 108. I must say it was a bloody good three-hour course what with the free grog and all that.

A few weeks later, I flew the second RAAF aircraft out of the factory, A10-596, under the watchful eye of Eric Franklin DFC and he demonstrated flight director stuff. For example, to climb using the FD, you first put the aircraft into a normal climb and when settled you switched on the FD and carefully wound up the pitch knob so that the little aeroplane sat in the middle of the V-bars.

I quickly realised that you hand-flew the basic artificial horizon to whatever attitude was appropriate for the manoeuvre then told the FD 108 V bars where you wanted them. The ILS intercept of 45 degrees was never used because radar vectors didn’t do such angles. I became more and more convinced the 748 didn’t need flight directors and that they were a load of bollocks in that type of low speed aircraft. We were told the USAF used the FD 108 in its F4 Phantoms and that Collins was anxious to makes sales in the UK market.

The RAAF Wing Commander got sucked in by good sales talk and from then on all RAAF 748s became so equipped. I held personal doubts about the usefulness of flight directors in general as I could see even then their extended use could lead to degradation of pure instrument flying skills. Today’s flight director systems are light years ahead in sophistication compared with the old Collins FD 105 and 108 series. But the problem with blind reliance on FD indications and thus steady degradation of manual instrument flying skills is as real now as it was back in 1966.

Now to the present day – although first some background history. First published in 1967, Handling the Big Jets, written by the then British Air Registration Board’s chief test pilot David Davies, is still considered by some as the finest treatise still around on jet transport handling. Indeed, the book was described by IFALPA as “the best of its kind in the world, written by a test pilot for airline pilots… the book is likely to become a standard text book… particularly recommended to all airline pilots who fly jets in the future… valuable to those pilots who are active in air safety work.”

Do these flight directors make flying safer or pilots lazier?

All that was back in 1967 and little has changed since then – apart from an increasing propensity for crashes involving loss of control rather than simply running into hills. LOC instead of CFIT. Mostly these accidents were caused primarily by poor hand flying and instrument flying skills, which certainly explains why aircraft manufacturers lead the push for more and more automatics.

A colleague involved with Boeing 787 training was told by a test pilot on type, that the 787 design philosophy was based on the premise that incompetent crews would be flying the aircraft and that its sophisticated automatic protection systems were in place to defend against incompetent handling. Be it a tongue-in-cheek observation, it contains an element of truth. With the plethora of inexperienced low-hour cadet pilots going directly into the second-in-command seats in many airlines in Asia, the Middle East and Europe, these protection systems are important.

Towards the end of his book, David Davies discusses the limitations of the flight instruments in turbulence and in particular the generally small size of the active part of the basic attitude information or the “little aeroplane” as many older pilots will remember it. He continues: “The preponderance of flight director and other information suppresses the attitude information and makes it difficult to get at” and “the inability, where pitch and roll information is split, to convey true attitude information at large pitch and roll angles in combination.” Finally Davies exhorts airline pilots “not to become lazy in your professional lives… the autopilot is a great comfort, so is the flight director and approach coupler… but do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete a flight.” There is more but go and read the book.

Having done the unforgiveable and quoted freely from an eminent authority, it is time to say something original and accept the no doubt critical comment that is freely available. Flight Directors can be a fatal attraction to those pilots who have been brain-washed by their training system to rely on them at all times. While Boeing in their FCTM advise pilots to ensure flight director modes are selected for the desired manoeuvre, it also makes the point that the FD should be turned off if commands are not to be followed.

Recently a new pilot to the Boeing 737 asked his line training captain if he could turn off the FD during a visual climb so he could better “see” the climb attitude. His request was refused as being “unsafe” and instead he was told to “look through” the FD. I don’t know about you, but I find it impossible to “see” the little aeroplane when it is obscured by twin needles or V-bars. In fact, it takes a fair amount of imagination and concentration to do so. Which may be why Boeing recommends pilots to switch off the FD if commands are not to be followed.

I well recall my first simulator experience in the 737 of an engine failure at V2 where I was having a devil of a time trying to correct yaw and roll and the instructor shouting at me to “Follow the bloody flight director needles.” I learned a good lesson from that tirade of abuse on how not to instruct if ever I became a check pilot. In later years, having gravitated to the exalted – or despised maybe – role of simulator instructor, my habit was to introduce the engine failure on takeoff by first personally demonstrating to the student how it should be done on raw data; meaning without a flight director. I hoped by first demonstrating, the student could see the body angles or attitude rather than imagine them by trying to “look through” the dancing needles of the FD. I have always been an advocate of the Central Flying School instructional technique of demonstrate first so the student then knows what he is aiming for. Of course in the simulator, the instructor runs the risk of stuffing up (been there – done that!) but it at least proves he is human and not just another screaming skull.

General aviation pilots are no strangers to flight directors either, especially as glass cockpits become more popular.

Recently, a 250-hour pilot with a type rating on the 737-300 (and trained overseas) booked a practice session prior to putting himself up to renew an instrument rating. His last rating was on a BE76 Duchess. As part of the 737 instrument rating would include manual flying on raw data, he was given a practice manual throttle, raw data takeoff and climb to 3000 ft. He protested, saying he had never flown the simulator without the flight director.

His instructions were to maintain 180 knots with Flaps 5 on levelling. He was unable to cope and when the instructor froze the simulator to save more embarrassment, the student was 2000 ft above cleared level and 270 knots – still accelerating with takeoff thrust. The student had been totally reliant on following flight directors with their associated autothrottles during his type rating course, and without this aid he was helpless.

I believe this is more widespread than most of us would believe, especially as we tend to move in our own narrow circle of experience.

At a US flight safety symposium, a speaker made the point that it is the less experienced first officers starting out at smaller carriers who most need manual flying experience. And, airline training programs are focused on training pilots to fly with the automation, rather than without it. Senior pilots, even if their manual flying skills are rusty, can at least draw on experience flying older generations of less automated planes.

Some time ago, the FAA published a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) entitled Manual Flight Operations. The purpose of the SAFO was to encourage operators to promote manual flight operations when appropriate. An extract from the SAFO stated that a recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors and “the FAA believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations.” Now let me see, I recall similar sentiments nearly 50 years ago published in Handling the Big Jets when David Davies wrote that airline pilots should “not become lazy in your professional lives… the autopilot is a great comfort, so is the flight director and approach coupler but do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight.” See my earlier paragraphs.

It is a good bet that lip service will be paid by most US operators to the FAA recommendation to do more hand flying. It may have some effect in USA but certainly the majority of the world’s airlines, if they were even aware of the FAA stance in the first place (very doubtful), will continue to stick with accent on full automation from lift off to near touch-down and either ban or discourage their pilots from hand flying on line.

If you don’t believe that, consider the statement in one European 737 FCOM from 20 years ago that said: “Under only exceptional circumstances will manual flight be permitted.” After all, when at least two major airlines in Southeast Asia have recently banned all takeoff and landings by first officers because of their poor flying ability, then what hope is there to allow these pilots to actually touch the controls and hand-fly in good weather? One of those airlines requires the first officer to have a minimum of five years on type before being allowed to take off or land while the other stipulates the captain will do all the flying below 5000 ft. It might stop QAR pings and the captain wearing the consequences of the first officer’s lack of handling ability, but it sure fails to address the real cause and that is lack of proper training before first officers are shoved out on line.

Sometimes you have to put your hands on the controls and fly raw data.

I think the FAA missed a golden opportunity in its SAFO to note that practicing hand flying to maintain flying skills will better attain that objective if flight director guidance is switched off. The very design of flight director systems concentrates all information into two needles (or V-bar) and in order to get those needles centered over the little square box, it needs intense concentration by the pilot. Normal instrument flight scan technique is degraded or disappears with the pilot sometimes oblivious to the other instruments because of the need to focus exclusively on the FD needles. Believe me, we see this in the simulator time and again. Manual flying without first switching off FD information will not increase basic handling or instrument flying skills.

The flight director is amazingly accurate provided the information sent to it is correct. But you don’t need it for all stages of flight. Given wrong information and followed blindly, it becomes a fatal attraction. Yet we have seen in the simulator a marked reluctance for pilots to switch it off when it no longer gives useful information. Instructors are quick to blame the hapless student for not following the FD needles. This only serves to reinforce addiction to the FD needles as they must be right because the instructor keeps on telling them so. For type rating training on new pilots, repeated circuits and landings sharpen handling skills. Yet it is not uncommon for instructors to teach students to enter waypoints around the circuit and then exhort the pilots “fly the flight director” instead of having them look outside at the runway to judge how things are going.

First officers are a captive audience to a captain’s whims. If the captain is nervous about letting his first officer turn off the flight director for simple climbs or descents, or even a non-threatening instrument approach, then it reflects adversely on the captain’s own confidence that he could handle a non-flight director approach. The FAA has already acted belatedly in publicly recommending that operators should encourage more hand flying if conditions are appropriate. But switch off the flight directors if you want real value for money, particularly with low-hour pilots. It may save lives on the proverbial dark and stormy night and the generators play up.

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from Engineering Blog https://airfactsjournal.com/2018/04/flight-directors-a-fatal-attraction/