#but two of wellington running from soult

[josefavomjaaga]

Re-reblogging because I found the story again, and I totally misremembered: Lamarque does not claim to have it from Soult but to have heard the story from somebody else (who remains unnamed) and to only repeat it because... (?)

From "Mémoires et souvenirs du général Maximien Lamarque, volume 1", page 291

As I walked through the Marshal's first salon, I saw again the beautiful painting of the Ascent of the Virgin, a masterpiece that Gros, it is said, places above all the Raphaels, and I remembered a story that was told to me and that I will tell in my turn. It is said that an art lover admiring this painting dared to ask the marshal what he had paid for it: "It only cost me two ropes." - "Two ropes?" - "Yes, two ropes." - And his Excellency told the art enthusiast that two monks involved in a conspiracy were about to be hanged when the community offered to buy them out with this beautiful painting. The marshal allowed himself to be moved, accepted the painting and the two monks were not hanged.

Of course I do not know if Lamarque - or his family and friends - really is at the source of this. Though, frankly, the way this anecdote is inserted into the text does make it look a bit as if somebody wanted to start a rumour.

Nicole Gotteri did accept Soult telling this story as fact, though she assumes it was a rather morbid joke.

-- [Edit: I only now realize that Lamarque seems to refer to a different painting. Or he only misnames it?] --

As to the first story about the acquisition of the "Healing of the Paralytic", the painting surely was not in "some convent", and surely not in one where "Wellington and his redcoated rascals" could have pushed Soult 😋. It belonged to the church of a hospital run by the "Hermandad de la Santa Caridad" in Sevilla. As I don't speak Spanish I do not know if this brotherhood, like all monasteries, was dissolved under French rule or if they were allowed to continue to operate the hospital, and what happened to the church. As a matter of fact, there's rather little information about those two years except for "The French plundered everything!!!!!!111!!!").

Presumably, the paintings once more were taken for the museum, originally, not for Soult's personal collection.

(I do not want to make a guess or anything but I could imagine that during that long journey from Sevilla to Valencia in 1812, when Soult had to give up everything he had worked for because - in his eyes - Joseph was being a bitch, that during that journey a couple of paintings somehow moved from chests that were labelled "José I." to others labelled "Duc de Dalmatie"...)

How Marshal Soult purchased his Picture Gallery

(an alleged anecdote from the 1847 magazine Spirit of the Times; A Chronicle of the Turf, Agriculture, Field Sports, Literature and the Stage (1835-1861); New York Vol. 17, Iss. 9, (Apr 24, 1847): 99 original is a badly scanned pdf, i've attempted to transcribe it as best i can)

"People reproach me with having stolen pictures in Spain, but I bought them, sir - bought them!" "Indeed!" said the listener, with an incredulous elevation of the eyebrow. "Yes, I bought them, sir!" returned Soult. "There, for instance is Murillo, the famous Paralytic —it cost me two monks!" "Two monks!" exclaimed the listener. "Yes, two monks— two as fine, fat, sleek, oily men of God as you ever laid eyes on." "But two monks for a picture!" exclaimed the astonished listener. "Yes, I gave two monks for that picture, sir!" said Soult, "and it was in this way that the bargain was made:—(take some more of the Burgundy.) One evening, after having been pushed rather hard by Wellington and his redcoated rascals, I and a great number of my men took up our quarters in a convent. We made the lazy monks give us a good supper, and plenty of good wine, and then we went off to bed. Next morning when the men were mustered, it was reported to me that some twenty or thirty of my grenadiers had been found with their throats cut—the good monks had just severed their wind-pipes as they slept, and, sure enough, the poor fellows were as dead as slaughtered sheep. Well, I immediately had all the monks drawn up, and said to them: 'You infernal vagabonds, I can't afford to lose my grenadiers in this way, and to convince you of the fact, I intend hanging every one of you.' Such a wail of despair I never heard, followed by piteous supplications for pardon. After frightening them well, I consented so far to pardon them as only to hang the same number of them as they had killed of our men - it was twenty-off, and they were to draw lots. The doomed lot were soon set one side, the ropes knotted around their necks, and my men were just about stringing them up, when two of the victims declared themselves to be the Abbot and his assistant. 'Sorry I can't oblige you, gentlemen, but really (fill your glasses,) I must hang you.' 'Mercy, oh, save us!' 'Can't do it, gentlemen, you really must swing with the rest!' 'Listen,' said the Abbot, 'we have hid away Murillo's Paralytic—take the it as a ransom, and let us go.' I thought this was a far enough bargain, let off the two dignitaries, and up went the rest - thus giving the two monks for the Murillo. And yet people will say that I didn't buy my Spanish gallery.'"

the phrase "fine, fat, sleek, oily men of God" is currently sending me - i thought it might be "only"

but there's not actually enough room for an "n" in there

tagging @josefavomjaaga - this is an anglophone New York magazine in 1847 so it's probably not super accurate but it is very funny

[general-junot]

Now that You finally gotten rid of one rival I have some suggestions for the rest of them

- Pair Lannes up with Bagration and make sure they move to Georgia together

- Kill two birds with one stone by getting Josephine to marry Alexander (moving them to Russia)

- Marie Louise will probably not be that difficult , just release her from the chain that is probably holding her to Paris and watch her run away

- Wellesley (duke of Wellington) pair him with Soult

You can do this I believe in you <3

Thank you, kind anon, for these wonderful suggestions! I’ll start eliminating my rivals straight away >:)

@armagnac-army, hey have you ever considered moving to Georgia?

[josefavomjaaga]

That one time, when Soult accused Joseph of treason… (Part 1)

… needs a long disclaimer, I fear, and I’m not sure if I’m the best person to give it, or if I’ve only properly understood the military situation.

I’ve tried to explain it to myself in the most simplified way possible but I’m in no way sure that’s correct, so please, if somebody can explain it better, go ahead!

By spring 1812, the respective positions of the different armies were – I think - as shown in the map. Joseph was at Madrid, mostly undisturbed. At the border to Portugal, west of Madrid, was Marmont’s armée de Portugal, watching Wellington. In the south, Soult (armée du Midi) was all over the place, directing army movements from Estremadura to Murcia, running to whoever had last called for help, but mostly managing to keep things quiet. Between Marmont’s and Soult’s corps, keeping contact between them, there was Drouet’s corps d’observation of about 9,000 men, watching Hill’s British army across the border but not strong enough to go on the offensive. Not shown in the map: The region north of Madrid up to the French border (Valladolid, Burgos etc.) was all under French control.

The two main British corps could communicate freely and support each other at will, with the French usually only realizing it when it was too late. After the important border fortresses Badajoz and Ciudad-Rodrigo had fallen, both could march onto French controlled territory any time. Hill was ready to invade Andalusia, which is what Soult feared and why he had placed Drouet to watch him. At the same time, it was quite possible for Wellington to enter further north and threaten Marmont, which is what Joseph feared. And to Joseph’s credit, he was right, and Soult was wrong, the British adopted the second plan.

When it became clear that Wellington would be the one to act, Joseph wanted to reinforce Marmont’s army. He ordered Marmont to move north, in order to block Wellington’s path, sent orders to Soult to reinforce Drouet, and to Drouet to join Marmont. Drouet, however, would need to go to Madrid first and join Marmont from there (due to the Brits having destroyed the only bridge over the Tajo Drouet could have used).

At which point Soult protested that a) Joseph had no right to give orders to Drouet who happened to be under Soult’s command and b) this whole arrangement did not make the slightest bit of sense, as it left a huge gap in the French forces precisely where Hill’s army corps was lying in wait. Instead of moving north, Marmont should move south, thus getting closer to Drouet and Soult, and let Wellington try to move in – who would then get between two fires, from the French forces in Northern Spain and from Marmont’s corps, and would probably not even budge for fear of having his retreat cut off.

To which Joseph replied that a) he was the king here and that Napoleon on leaving for Russia had put him in command and b) thus he was to be obeyed, c) he was the king here, d) if Soult did not do as he was told he would be held accountable for anything bad that happened (which Soult knew he would be anyway), e) Soult was to either send Drouet to support Marmont, via Madrid, or to immediately send 10,000 men from his armée du Midi from Sevilla to Madrid, which would then join Marmont. And just in case Soult had forgotten: Joseph was the king here!

To which Soult replied that he had no 10,000 men to spare, because of the 20,000 men that Napoleon had intended as support for the Armée du Midi, not a single one had ever reached Sevilla, as they had all been taken in by the Armies in the North and by Joseph in order to guard Madrid. So his army was currently 20,000 men short, and if he had to deploy another 10,000 men, he could not guard Andalusia anymore and would need to evacuate it, which he would not do without an express order from the king, and that in any case he was offering his resignation.

To which Joseph replied that, being the king, he authorised Soult to evacuate whatever portion of Andalusia he deemed necessary to evacuate but that Soult was to immediately march to Madrid 10,000 men in support of Marmont’s army, or bear the consequences, and as to his resignation, Joseph would be only too glad to have it, as Soult had never shown the slightest inclination to respect Joseph’s authority, Joseph being, just in case Soult had forgotten, the king and also officially in command of the French forces in Spain ever since Napoleon had left for Rus…

At which point Marmont shouted from Salamanca: Guys? Remember that Wellington bloke? Well, he’s kinda he-ere…

Which caused Joseph to do something really, really extraordinary: He took the 13- to 14,000 troops that he had apparently had sitting around Madrid playing cards all this bloody time, basically next door to Marmont, and marched with them to reinforce the latter.

Something that, as Napoleon would later state, he f-ing could have done two weeks ago. (Well, Napoleon did not use the f-word. At least not in his official correspondence.)

Unfortunately, Joseph’s decision being a last minute one, the movement following no previously agreed plan and communications being what they were in Spain, Marmont never learned of Joseph coming to his aid, gave battle and was beaten by Wellington. (Napoleon actually accused Marmont of not having wanted to share the glory and thus not having waited for Joseph, because he could not imagine that Marmont had been completely left in the dark about Joseph coming to support him.)

That event is called the battle of Salamanca, or des Arapiles in France. Joseph learned of the defeat while on the march, habitually blamed Soult, and instead of trying to gather the remnants of Marmont’s corps and face the British forces, retreated north. (Another thing Napoleon would later critisize him for.)

Wellington was now free to move on to Madrid, and Joseph and Soult got into another long discussion. Joseph declared that Southern Spain, so far kept mostly under control by Soult, had to be given up because it would not be possible to maintain a line of communications to the French forces in the north with Madrid gone. Soult on the other hand suggested Joseph should come to the South, to Andalusia, as long as it was still possible, from where they could try to redeem the situation and wait for reinforcements from France.

Of course Joseph wanted to hear nothing of that. So Soult, in August, really had to evacuate Andalusia, and the French-controlled territory in one go shrank down to some northern and eastern provinces (Suchet’s territory) at the coast.

It was at this point that Soult started to get suspicious about Joseph. As he writes in his memoirs:

The king in two words gave me the order to evacuate Andalusia. As if he had not even thought about it, he did not say anything about what was to be done with the sick […], all the material, the enormous artillery in front of Cadiz, the ammunition, the siege and fortification works etc. He did not tell me any more about what he would do in order to support my retreat.

This attitude (just get out of Andalusia and come north), this lack of premeditation and planning to Soult seemed incomprehensible – and that’s what made him think that maybe there indeed was a plan:

It never occurred to me that the king maybe did not see all the consequences as clearly as I did. This was probably an error of mine. […] I could not help but to consider some connections. From Cadiz I received many rumours about secret negotiations between the king and the Cortès [i.e., the insurgents]. I knew that the crown prince of Sweden [Bernadotte], brother-in-law of the king, started to adopt a hostile attitude to France, that he served as intermediary between the emperor of Russia and general Moreau […]

Add to this the curious lack of interest that Joseph showed for the evacuation of Andalusia, the - to Soult - incomprehensible orders Joseph had given about how to manoeuvre, almost as if he wanted to compromise the army and be forced to retreat, the fact that he was on well enough terms with the enemy Cortès of Cadiz to ask them to send him an honour guard, his mouvements after the battle of Salamanca, and the fact that, as Soult puts it “the little work [Joseph’s] administration had to do was usually in opposition to the interests of the French army”, and you have more than enough food for thought for a notoriously distrustful character like Soult to suspect Joseph might be up to no good. Soult seriously wondered if Joseph was ready to compromise French interests in order to be granted a separate peace and some smaller Spanish territory to rule over by the insurgents and/or the Brits.

And that’s when he wrote a letter to Napoleon, and to Clarke. But I’ll get to that at a later date in another post, because it’s really a lot to chew on.

[josefavomjaaga]

First of all: Thank you, once more, for this excellent post! 💖

Second: No thanks at all to tumblr who seems more and more unwilling to show me the posts of people I explicitly chose to follow so I would see their posts! 😡

I'm so sorry to not have replied earlier but I surely did not ignore you on purpose. 😥

As to Buttery's summary, I'm always pleasantly surprised when an author writing in English takes into account any sources written in another language; I feel that's far from the norm, and I'm very willing to give him much credit for that! As I said, there's an abundance of sources for this incident, so I can fully understand him not checking every single one directly, but relying on secondary sources instead, especially as it's only a sideshow to the story he actually wants to tell.

I am a bit astonished so see British historian Napier listed as somebody who assumed Soult really had "ideas on the Portuguese throne". Unless there is more text that I could not find,Napier sums up the event in volume 2 of his "History of the War in the Peninsula" as follows:

This transaction [collecting petitions by Portuguese communities asking Napoleon for a new king of Napoleon's choice to replace the dynasty of Braganza] was the foundation of a story, credited even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown. The circumstances were suspicious, the conclusion was false.

As Napier had written his books with enormous help from Soult, among other French officers, and had developped a personal friendship with him, he probably would not even have accused Soult if he had indeed believed him guilty. In any case, his book clearly states that Soult was suspected erroneously.

As to Soult's decision to not march any further south from Oporto, I believe it was mostly due to circumstances. His army had only 24,000 men, plenty of which he would have to leave behind in order to garrison the towns he had occupied. And he did not receive any support whatsoever, neither from Ney nor from Victor, whom Joseph reluctantly had sent west, but who returned pretty soon without having contacted Soult.

Lisbon being without defences actually might have been a reason for Soult to proceed even with his greatly diminished force. So I guess that's the reason why Marbot and Thiébault cirtisized him and felt he could still have done more (would of course have turned into a disaster on running into the British forces, whose size was still unknown to Soult at that point).

Argenton goes to Wellesley saying that there are remnants of the army (mostly from Junot's original force) that are not happy with Soult and they know that he wants to declare himself King. However, he will not do so because he felt he wasn't in a good position yet so they want the British to make some moves and make Soult expose himself basically by declaring himself King because he now felt confident to do so.

Does Buttery give any source for this? Is it possibly in Wellington's dispatches? I would love to check this out! It contradicts directly what Soult himself writes (and Gotteri after him): That during his interview with Wellington, Argenton did not say a thing about Soult's alleged intrigues to gain a crown. To the contrary, according to Gotteri, Argenton argued that the marshal would have to be arrested or forced to join the army's uprising against Napoleon. - I would really love to know who is right 😋.

Update: I found it. Turns out, both are sort of right, as Argenton in his first meeting really does not mention any royal plans by Soult - but Gotteri ignored the second meeting of Wellington with Argenton, when Argenton indeed does speak of two parties within the army: one who wants to seize Soult in any case, and one who wants to seize Soult only if he makes himself king of Portugal. Which is why Argenton then demands that Wellington please use his influence on Portuguese towns and make them put Soult on the throne! Just so that there's more people ready to go with the mutiny 😁. To which a rather confused Wellington answers: Uhm... I think not.

In my personal opinion (greatly influenced by Gotteri and very much biased pro-Soult, of course ☺), plenty of people had an interest to put all the blame they could possibly manage on Soult, including accusations they had invented, in order to make Napoleon overlook their mistakes. In the first place, as always, Joseph, who did not take the least interest in whatever big brother was doing over there in Portugal, who busied himself with all kind of administrative tasks and did not pay any attention to the actual conquest of what he tried to administer. Communications with the army corps of Soult and Ney broke off almost as soon as Napoleon and Berthier had left the peninsula, and Joseph and Jourdan apparently only shrugged, c'est la vie.

I've come across at least two letters from Napoleon at this time, where he is openly furious about how Soult's corps was left completely alone, how nobody even tried to come to his assistance. This includes the two corps commanders who had been tasked with keeping contact with him, Victor and Ney.

And at Soult's army, there were several men more who may have had a reason to accuse others before anybody had time to accuse them. Loison's attitude seems to have been one of defiance, mostly - personally, I think he gave up his post at Amarante deliberately, just so the British could truly cut Soult's army off and force him to capitulate like Junot the year before. Argenton had two co-conspirators, apparently, that were reveiled, but if he really dreamt of starting a mutiny there must have been some more people involved. Soult puts much blame on general Mermet who, in the night before Soult's army was to leave Oporto, was tasked with observing and defending the river Douro, but did not keep a British regiment from crossing the river, and either really did not notice or pretended not to notice. Coincicentally, this general was among the first to inform Minister of War Clarke about Soult's alleged plans to gain himself a crown.

So, at the beginning of summer 1809, there may have been plenty of people who did not have a clear conscience and had no interest in somebody looking at their behaviour during the last weeks too closely. So what better distraction than enraging Napoleon against somebody else?

And I realize I'm babbling again 😁. Sorry, I did not mean to. Actually, all I wanted to do is thank you for all your informative posts and all the gems you discover! Lots of food for thought!

An Attempt At Consolidating the 'Roi Nicolas' Affair

Not my attempt but an author writing on Soult and Wellington during the second Portuguese invasion or the Porto campaign of 1809. As mention in this reblog, the book is "Wellington Against Soult: The Second Invasion of Portugal 1809" by David Buttery and this work is part of a three-volume series on the three most prominent French generals/marshals that faced against Wellington in Portugal.

Now, this work is purely military, covering mostly battlefield tactics and strategy but it does dedicate some pages to Soult's childhood, beginnings in the army, and rise to marshal. This coverage is not particularly extensive though and only comprises maybe around 30% of the book but this volume out of the three has a bit more of this, possibly because of the Roi Nicolas incident that Buttery dedicates a whole chapter to.

The chapter is called, "The Marshal Who Would Be King" which is a rather interesting title. I wanted to briefly summarise the entire chapter because my aim was to mostly give my opinions on it but it started to turn into a full-length summary so I had to scrap that. Instead I will just highlight some important things that we can take away from this chapter which can be used in further study for those who are interested.

Soult's decision to halt at Porto

Soult pondered his options carefully and later wrote in his memoirs (1) that he felt it would have been madness to move further south before garrisoning Porto and restoring his communications. After all, his forces were now distributed over a large area and it made sense to halt until he had consolidated his position. (2)

Soult probably knew what happened when Junot was in Lisbon the previous year and sought not to repeat it. The city of the Lisbon is special in that it has no city wall so it was hard to defend, leading to Junot quickly seeking terms with the British after the Battle of Vimeiro because it was becoming clear that the army could not possibly hold out in Lisbon. Soult probably thought it was wiser to get his ducks in a row before proceeding to march onto Lisbon. This decision though, was widely criticised by not just the British but also contemporaries such as Marbot.

2. Soult's attempt at getting Portuguese support

Just like Junot, Soult would seek out Portuguese friendly to the French and work together with them to get the people on their side. The difference was that Soult did not engage in the dumb things that Junot did with the parties and the blatant, "We are French people on your lands" parade that he did.

He was better informed and much more suitable for a political mission than Junot. He thought mainly of gaining the loyalty of the Portuguese. They were, of course, unlikely to get true liberty from a French dictatorship but many people were better disposed towards the illustrious power of Napoleon and his revolutionary code than the worn out ‘old regime’ of Portugal. (3)

3. Argenton's conspiracy against Soult

This was the lynch pin that tied this whole mess into a lovely bow. Argenton goes to Wellesley saying that there are remnants of the army (mostly from Junot's original force) that are not happy with Soult and they know that he wants to declare himself King. However, he will not do so because he felt he wasn't in a good position yet so they want the British to make some moves and make Soult expose himself basically by declaring himself King because he now felt confident to do so. Wellesley plays along and makes a couple of non-committal promises, saying that they will grant Argenton and his fellow conspirators safe passage to France, etc. but he really doesn't do anything major or said anything or importance.

The prudence of Wellington in dealing with people of this class is characteristically described by himself in allusion to this interview … ‘He gave me’ (says Wellington) ‘a good deal of information respecting the strength, the position, and the plans of the enemy, and of the detestation of Soult generally prevailing in the army … and I sent him back without his having seen any of our troops or knowing that we had such numbers collected here …’ (4)

4. Soult's response to the conspiracy against him

Unluckily, Argenton became sloppy as he tried to recruit one of his previous generals and that general informed Soult what was going on. As a result, Argenton is arrested and a huge investigation takes place.

Soult was astounded that his own officers were plotting to overthrow him and became understandably paranoid upon hearing this shocking news. While he could rely on the loyalty of men like Heudelet and Franceschi, he knew his relations with some high-ranking officers were strained and he wrote to King Joseph voicing suspicions about Mermet, Loison, Lahoussaye and Quesnel. Although these allegations were never proved, the strange performance of Loison in particular over the following weeks gives some grounds for suspicion (5). The unmasking of the Argenton Conspiracy at this point undoubtedly affected Soult’s performance as a commander. (6)

Some of Soult's problematic relationship with these generals started from the onset of the campaign, namely Loison, who Soult will always be wary of and would send him away form the main army column for reconnaissance missions often.

5. Napoleon's Response

It was only after the 1809 Austrian campaign that Napoleon started to take the accusations against Soult seriously. He first sent a letter via Berthier before sending a strongly worded one personally after meeting with Soult's ADC Brun de Villeret, showing his dissatisfaction with Soult's conduct and allowing Soult's chief-of-staff General Ricard too much free reign in his proclamations. Napoleon pointed out the Circulaire Ricard in particular, which could be why he became the fall guy in this Roi Nicolas incident.

An extract from one [the Circulaire Ricard] had particularly annoyed the emperor: ‘The Duke of Dalmatia would be asked to take the reins of government, to represent the sovereign, and to invest himself with all the attributes of supreme authority …’ Napoleon wrote that (7): If you had claimed supreme power for yourself proprio motu (9), it would have been such a crime as to oblige me to consider you guilty of lèse-majesté (9) and of a culpable attack on my authority. How could you have forgotten that the power you exercised over the Portuguese sprang from the command I entrusted you, and not from the play of passions and intrigue? (8)

Parentheses by me.

Continuing on:

‘You have undermined your own authority; for it would be difficult to say, after this circular of yours, whether any Frenchman could be blamed for ceasing to obey your orders …’ (8)

However, despite these reclamations, Napoleon eventually overlook the matter and allowed Soult to continue to operate in Spain.

6. Contemporaries' and historians opinions on the whole incident

Buttery dedicates the rest of the chapter into talking about the various viewpoints of Soult's fellow colleagues as well as the thoughts of some historians.

Laure Junot, Marshal Marmont and General Thiébault all believed that Soult wanted a throne while General Pierre Soult (courtesy of General Marbot) and Marshal Jourdan said that Soult was only interested in acting in political interest.

Laure Junot was biased towards her husband while General Thiébault didn't like Soult. Marmont was just bitter about life in general at the time of writing his memoirs . Pierre Soult is obvious while Marshal Jourdan who had every reason to not like Soult on account of his behaviour towards him, decided to defend him.

The historians Napier and Oman, said that Soult was too ambitious for his own good and made a mistake in having ideas on the Portuguese throne. Hayman however, said that the rumours were mostly due to Soult's many enemies in the army but acknowledges that Soult would have tried to incorporate Portugal into the empire if the Emperor wished it and if he were given the crown, he may have taken it.

7. My thoughts on the chapter

General speaking, this chapter of Buttery's book is decent. He lists a number of primary sources, including letters and memoirs from all parties involved to substantiate his conclusions. He does a good job in explaining the events as they unfolded and the consequences (of lack thereof) that happened afterward.

Sadly, he does not use the memoirs of Soult's ADCs such as Saint-Chamans, Brun de Villeret, Petiet, etc. nor does he use Nicole Gottéri's works. I can understanding missing out on some sources because this book is not a book on the Roi Nicolas affair exclusively or even on Soult's own life in general, but missing out on very important sources from the people close to Soult and a whole biography of his? I have a problem with that.

Therefore, I don't deem this chapter as the best informative source on the Roi Nicolas affair but it is the only English-language full consolidation of the incident I could find. It is very useful in understanding the events as a whole and can help those who want to know about it. In addition, if you also want to understand the 1809 Porto campaign in general, it is also very informative and useful.

(1) Louis and Antoinette de Sainte-Pierre (eds), Mémoires du Maréchal Soult: Espagne et Portugal (Paris, Hachette, 1955), p. 78.

(2) Buttery, David. Wellington Against Soult: The Second Invasion of Portugal, 1809 (p. 166). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.

(3) Pinheiro Chagas, Historia de Portugal, Vol. 8, pp. 13 and 26.

(4) Colonel James J. Graham, Military ends and moral means: exemplifying the higher influences affecting military life and character; the motives to enlistment; the use of stratagems in war; the necessity of standing armies; and the duties of a military force aiding the civil power (London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1864), p. 444.

(5) Peter Hayman, Soult – Napoleon’s Maligned Marshal (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1990), p. 116.

(6) Buttery, David. Wellington Against Soult: The Second Invasion of Portugal, 1809 (p. 173). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.

(7) Buttery, David. Wellington Against Soult: The Second Invasion of Portugal, 1809 (p. 174). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.

(8) J.M. Thompson (ed.), Letters of Napoleon (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1934), p. 249, taken from a letter written at Schönbrunn and dated 26 September 1809.

(9) Author's notes: From Latin, the words proprio motu translate as ‘own motion’ and lèse-majesté translates from French as ‘aggrieved majesty’ (or to give offence to the sovereign).