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brightquang · 5 years ago

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To prove the defendant's US has betrayed the Republic of Vietnam by this presidential archivist which is why the Paris Peace Accords was not carried out by the defendant's US. In his opinion that the Vietnam War is under the mask of enslaving war (neo-slaving war) of the United States, or the so-called is not more than the slave traders were covered by the political ideology to let America fool the Republic of Vietnam and the worldwide which great power America is a modern civilized and progressive sciences, but America is defeated a war by a less progressive million fold North Vietnam's communist. In order to prove discussion between the White House Ford, the US Senate, and others the US Department and other world organs because these are belonged to the international protocols. Therefore, the Vietnam War is the neo-slave war of America when the American slaved traders were sentenced by the African American society. As a result, the Government of the United States has changed by the war-slave in which America has so much neo-slavery without had no high price. In fact, when America betrayed the Republic of Vietnam, America has been earned so much slavery, but the Government of the United States has never paid any pennies. For that reason, he has realized that the great power of America has used the Republic of Vietnam in the war for two causes: first is America has avoided confrontation with Soviet-Union, second, 's America secretly negotiated with mainland China in order to be peaceful Coexistence. Therefore, America has transferred the Republic of Vietnam to China. After that, America was noisily transferring all of the high-technologies to China and America recognized one mainland China to let America will not recognize independent Taiwan. For that reason, The Battle of the Paracel Islands was a military engagement between the naval forces of China and South Vietnam in the Paracel Islands on January 19, 1974. The battle was an attempt by the South Vietnamese navy to expel the Chinese navy from the vicinity which is why America did not help the South Vietnamese navy to expel the Chinese navy. Even though, President Nguyen Van Thieu has requested help from America. Therefore, his opinion that conspiracy theory of America is peaceful coexistence together with Soviet-Union and mainland China when America secretly changed the Vietnam War to a neo-slave war. In spite of that, the neo-slave war of America in the Republic of Vietnam in which America has taken advantage of the exploitation of the political ideology of both Vietnamese ideological schools. One is North Vietnamese communists that secretly helped from SoViet-Union and mainland China. Another side, the Republic of Vietnam has helped by Americanism. Ironically, America did think that Vietnam to be a good battle to let America consume so much weapon of surplus and scrap after World War II has done. Next, America has secretly been destroyed all of the natural resources and environments and made to ruin the Southern people of the poverty-stricken. As a result, Southern Vietnam must go after in order to catch the American leg- after that, America is, easy operations, controlling for the South government. In fact, all of the multilateral, bilateral, and international relations protocols of America had bullied the Republic of Vietnam. Even worse, America has used assassination a Vietnamese leadership, the coup has been exchanged for many rebellious generals when they fought for supremacy, and threatened to behead a Southern president Nguyen Van Thieu. Let America change to neo-slave war, but the South Government had never understood the conspiracy theory of America. In prove, the conspiracy theory of America forcefully controlled the South Government that forms President Nixon and the United States Congress to let him prove the US Department files archivist in the Vietnam War- and here are:

Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 on the basis of his claim to have a plan to end the war in Vietnam, which had dragged on for years and deeply divided the country. However, once in the White House, he continued the war, and on July 25, 1969, set forth what became known as the Nixon Doctrine: “The United States would assist in the defense and developments of allies and friends,” but would not “undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.” This meant in general that allies would share defense burdens with the U.S. and in specific Vietnamization of the war (having South Vietnam forces continue the war with the U.S. help, as the U.S. began to withdraw some ground troops). He confirmed this approach on November 3, 1969, in a televised address, outlining Vietnamization of the war and asking that it be given a chance. This led to massive anti-war demonstrations in mid-late November. On April 30, 1970, Nixon asked the American people to support his decision to widen the war by sending troops into Cambodia in response to North Vietnam’s presence in that country. That decision led to more dissent, anger on both sides of the issue, and to the shootings at Kent State in May. And so the war, and a severely divided nation, continued (perhaps hobbled) into 1971

On February 9, 1971, Nixon issued his Second Annual Report to Congress on American Foreign Policy, which confirmed the Nixon Doctrine and expanded on it in crucial ways. The report maintained: “The Doctrine seeks to reflect these realities: –that a major American role remains indispensable. –those other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours. –that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines. –that the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.” Thus, as far as Vietnam, the report meant that the U.S. would not abandon its military role, though it would expect South Vietnamese forces to pull their weight so that the U.S. ground troops could be withdrawn. And that would take time, which would not satisfy those with doubts about the war. On the other hand, it clearly maintained that there must be a change in relations between the United States, and both China and the Soviet Union, stating: “I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People’s Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations,” signaling that the U.S. was ready to a detente with China. In fact, that very month feelers went out that would soon lead to Nixon’s being invited to Beijing. As for the Soviet Union, the report said: “There need be, in all this, no irreconcilable conflict between Soviet interests in Asia and our own,” signaling a willingness to thaw out the Cold War with them as well.

Then in a radio address to the nation on February 25, Nixon summarized the report. Because American allies and friends had “gained new strength and self-confidence” and were “able to participate much more fully not only in their own defense” Nixon said, and because American “adversaries no longer present a solidly united front,” the United States no longer had to be the leader and “the primary supporter and defender” of the free world. Thus, although the United States would keep its commitments and would “make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs”, it would “look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense.” Nixon threw a sop to widespread anti-war sentiment by saying, “We have learned in recent years the dangers of over-involvement,” but countered with a plea for continued involvement: “The other danger—a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid—is under-involvement. After a long and unpopular war, there is the temptation to turn inward—to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.” He added a claim that the United States was succeeding in its plans to withdraw from the war in Vietnam, but that North Vietnam refused to accept American peace proposals. In fact, by the end of two more months, he said, the United States would have brought home 260,000 of the 550,000 American soldiers who were in Vietnam when he took office. With American air support but without either American ground troops or advisors, Nixon said, South Vietnamese troops were disrupting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Communist supply line, which would “save lives and ensure the success of our withdrawal program next year.” The United States, he added, had tendered a broad, five-point peace proposal, and that proposal was “supported by every government in Indochina except one – the Government of North Vietnam.” This all amounted to a continuation of the war until the North Vietnamese would withdraw their forces, which they would not do, and the South Vietnamese could defeat them without many American ground troops. All this he claimed would take just another year.

Nixon viewed his knowledge of foreign affairs as his “political strong suit.” Foreign policy issues, he said, are “the most important decisions a President faces.” One of his advisors on these issues was Llewellyn E. Thompson, who was one of the most important American diplomats of the 20th Century. Thompson was the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, serving two separate tours in the administrations of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. Few Ambassadors faced as many crises as Thompson did in Moscow – the shooting down of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Russia, the great confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union over Berlin and the building of the Berlin Wall, very difficult summits between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and tensions over the Vietnam War. Thompson ended his first tour in Moscow in 1962, when President Kennedy brought him home to Washington to become his Ambassador-at-Large, as a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, advising the President on Soviet affairs. Shortly after returning to Washington, Thompson provided Kennedy with advice that was crucial to avoiding nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson appointed him to the ambassadorship to Moscow in 1967, when he arranged for the Glassboro summit between LBJ and Soviet Premier Kosygin, and he served until 1969.

Nixon knew Thompson well and appreciated his “strong and active interest in our country's efforts to further the cause of peace and international understanding.” In 1956, Thompson, then the Ambassador to Austria, assisted then-Vice President Nixon on his 1956 inspection trip to survey the refugee situation when 180,000 Hungarians fled to Austria as the Soviet Union militarily crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Three years later, Thompson accompanied Vice President Nixon at the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, part of cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was at that exhibition that Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev engaged in a series of impromptu hard-hitting ideological debates that covered the range of Soviet-American relations from the threat of atomic war, to the economic progress in both nations. Thompson again helped Nixon when, as a private citizen, Nixon visited the Soviet Union in March 1967 in the first of four foreign study trips that he used as the springboard to launch his campaign for 1968 Republican presidential nomination. As president, Nixon brought Thompson out of retirement to advise him on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations with the Soviet Union, with Thompson representing the United States in the SALT talks from 1969 until his death in 1972.

Typed Letter Signed, on White House, Washington, March 10, 1971, to Thompson, sending him his Annual Report to Congress on American Foreign Policy, and very unusually, personally endorsing it by tying it to his own career and experience. “On February 25 I sent a special message on the American foreign policy to the Congress. This report describes our approach to a changing world, notes the progress we have achieved during the past year, and sets forth our assessment of the tasks that lie ahead. In view of your strong and active interest in our country’s efforts to further the cause of peace and international understanding, I wanted you to have a copy of the report.

“While this document is long, over 60,000 words, I would strongly urge when you have a free evening that you read it carefully. Not only does it set forth in-depth the Administration’s policies and the reasons for these policies; it also is an accurate reflection of my personal convictions with regard to our national security after almost twenty-five years in public life – as a Congressman, as a Senator, as a participant in decision-making and policy determination at the highest level, and also as one who reflected often on these problems during the years between as a private citizen. I also want to emphasize that the review does not simply represent the views of the President and the White House. The State Department, the Defense Department and other agencies in government, where their interests were involved, participated fully in the months of discussion which resulted in our final conclusions. Consequently, it can truly be said that this document represents the views of the entire Administration.”

The Nixon Doctrine articulated here was in a partial success and in part proved wishful thinking. The successes related to his sage realization that The Communist world was not monolithic, and was in fact fragmenting; and that this fragmentation presented an opportunity for the U.S. On July 15, 1971, Nixon announced that he has been invited to China, ending a quarter of a century of hostility in Sino-American relations. And on October 12 of that year, there was a joint announcement issued in Washington and Moscow confirming that Nixon would visit the Soviet Union three months after returning from China. These visits were widely seen as paradigm-shattering and beneficial. The failure: South Vietnam proved unable to survive without American troops.

January 22nd, 1969

President Nixon Appoints Henry Cabot Lodge the Chief American Negotiator to the Paris Peace Talks to End the War in Vietnam

The only official, public negotiations to end the War, and Lodge the sole chief negotiator to meet with the N. Vietnamese in a plenary session.

In February 1953, Henry Cabot Lodge was named the U.S.

Ambassador to the United Nations by President Eisenhower, with his office elevated to Cabinet level rank. The position then was high profile, and Lodge often engaged in debates with the UN representatives of the Soviet Union that were broadcast or covered on television. On the front lines in the Cold War, in 1959 he escorted Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on a highly-publicized tour of the United States. Lodge left the ambassadorship during the election of 1960 to run for Vice President on the Republican ticket headed by Richard Nixon. Nixon selected Lodge because the latter had made a name for himself at the United Nations as a foreign-policy expert.

President Kennedy appointed Lodge to the position of Ambassador to South Vietnam, which showed the import U.S. policymakers were coming to place on that nation. Lodge held the post from 1963 to 1964, and again from 1965 to 1967. As ambassador there, Lodge supported President Johnson’s decision to escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War, believing that a Communist takeover in the South would be disastrous for U.S. foreign policy goals.

The original appointment of “Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts” as “Ambassador to head the United States Delegation at the Paris Meetings on Vietnam.”

President Johnson and American military leaders had long insisted that the Vietnam War was going well, and that they could see the light at the end of the tunnel. But in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in February 1968, when the Communists were able to initiate coordinated attacks on all the regional capitals throughout Vietnam, even in the American compound in Saigon itself, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford issued a report to the President in mid-March that the United States could not win the war. Johnson was stunned, and he in turn stunned a nationwide audience on March 31, 1968, announcing he would cease bombing north of the 20th parallel, initiate peace talks to end the war, and not seek denomination or reelection in 1968. The peace talks commenced in Paris on May 10, 1968, with W. Averell Harriman leading the U.S. delegation.

From the outset, the talks were fraught with difficulties. The U.S. insisted on mutual withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese forces, which would leave the Saigon government in control. The North Vietnamese refused to negotiate anything until all bombing of North Vietnam was halted. When the U.S. finally agreed to that condition, the Johnson administration was unable to persuade, cajole, or coerce South Vietnam and its leader President Thieu to participate unless it was recognized as a legitimate party by its foes. It was alleged at the time that both candidates in the 1968 election were using the talks as a political football, with Hubert Humphrey seeking to appeal to pro-peace voters by insisting that the South Vietnamese participate, and more germane, with Nixon leading the South Vietnamese to understand that his administration would give them a better deal if they would continue to delay. Formal negotiations would not begin until January 18, 1969, two days before Nixon took office.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1968 election, it seems that Lodge was Nixon’s foremost advisor on Vietnam. He urged Nixon to appoint a man of stature to negotiate in Paris, and warned him away from a trip to Saigon for strategic reasons. Nixon adopted these suggestions. In fact, on January 5, 1969, fifteen days before his inauguration, President-elect Nixon named Lodge himself to succeed Harriman as chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks. This signaled that Nixon was likely to take a hard line in the talks, considering Lodge’s background as a proponent of American policy in Vietnam as promulgated by President Johnson and his chief military commander, Gen. William Westmoreland.

Document Signed as President, Washington, January 22, 1969, just two days after his inauguration, being the original appointment of “Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts” as “Ambassador to head the United States Delegation at the Paris Meetings on Vietnam.” The wording here is highly politically indicative, showing that Nixon avoided using the terms “peace,” “talks,” “negotiations,” or “war.” These were simply “Meetings on Vietnam,” nothing more to be implied. The document is countersigned by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

On January 25, the first fully attended meeting of the formal Paris peace talks was held. Ambassador Lodge urged an immediate restoration of a genuine Demilitarized Zone as the first “practical move toward peace.” He also suggested a mutual withdrawal of “external” military forces and an early release of prisoners of war. Tran Buu Kiem and Xuan Thuy, heads of the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese delegations respectively refused Lodge’s proposals and condemned American “aggression.”

Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, developed a two-track policy where under the Paris negotiators would discuss military matters, while the real political decisions would be made privately, out of the public eye, by the leadership in Washington and Hanoi directly. This would avoid public pressure from all directions, while also preventing the junior partners on either side, South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, from exercising power to preclude a deal from happening. Nixon liked the idea and determined that political negotiations would emanate from the White House. So as Lodge continued treating with the North Vietnamese in Paris, starting in early August, Kissinger was secretly meeting with North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho. As the summer turned to fall, however, Kissinger’s approaches to Hanoi failed to elicit an acceptable response, and Nixon adopted a get-tough policy to force accommodation on his terms. In early October the President told Lodge to break off the talks by staging a walk-out at the October 23 plenary session. On the appointed day, Lodge insisted that the talks be adjourned, which they were immediate. Lodge himself had not favored this action, and he suggested that the President use him as a personal intermediary to Hanoi’s leaders who were frequently in Paris. Nixon declined.

The only official, public negotiations to end the Vietnam War were over, never to resume. Nixon went directly to Camp David to work on a foreign policy address to the nation which he delivered on November 3. Dubbed the Silent Majority speech, in it he asked the American people to support his decision to continue the war until the North Vietnamese would accept “honorable” peace terms. On November 20, 1969, seeing no role remaining for a peace negotiator, Lodge resigned. The war did not end until January 23, 1973, four years and one day after Nixon had appointed Lodge to help end the conflict.

Again, the petitioner proves the Vietnam War;

This file contains selected documents regarding the signing of the "Paris Peace Accord" to end the hostilities in South Vietnam.

The file contains the following items: These are to be in-laws of the United States of America.

(1) Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, January 5, 1973.

[Reassuring Vietnam of US support.]

(2) "Peace With Honor": Radio-television broadcast, President Nixon re: initialing of the Vietnam Agreement, 23 Jan. 1973

(3) News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

January 24, 1973.

[Chapter-by-Chapter analysis of the Paris Agreement, excerpts.]

(4) Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed in Paris and entered into force January 17, 1973.

(5) Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, Signed at Paris and entered into force March 2, 1973

(6) Complaints of Violations of the Cease-fire: United States

Note Verbale transmitted April 10, 1973 for delivery to participants in the International Conference on Vietnam.

We, the Southern Officers’ prisoners of war, would like to carry out the ICJ Article 38, paragraph c in which says, “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;” Therefore, we do prove that the orders of American presidents have spoken out that's particular as American law.

First, President Kennedy has sent his secret letter to the American ambassador in the Republic of Vietnam-so his order recorded and said, “On one tape-recorded November 4, 1963, Kennedy (170) dictates a memo seeming to regret the assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, following a coup Kennedy, endorsed.” So President Kennedy went against his Constitution one’s self. Second, President Nixon did not only distort his constitution but also violated this nation's human rights. In fact, President Richard Nixon threatened to behead off President Nguyen Van Thieu in a private letter if his refusal to sign any negotiated peace agreement would render it impossible for the United States to continue assistance to South Vietnam.

Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had been working behind the scenes in secret negotiations with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris to reach a settlement to end the war. However, Thieu stubbornly refused to even discuss any peace proposal that recognized the Viet Cong as a viable participant in the post-war political solution in South Vietnam because of President Thieu is one of among patriotic Vietnamese leaders. When he does not only respect his self-determination but also has protected the national core of interests and sovereignty.

President GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Well, it's a big gamble on my part.

O'REILLY: No, it isn't, not really though. You, we talked four and a half years ago...

BUSH: I'm teasing...

O'REILLY: The South Vietnamese didn't fight for their freedom, which is why they don't have it today.

____________

(170) See 96 or CNN - Kennedy White House tapes offer new insight ...

www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/Stories/1998/11/25/Kennedy.tapes/Index.html

Nov 25, 1998 · Kennedy White House tapes offer new insight By Bill Delaney/CNN. BOSTON (November 24) -- The Kennedy Library has released 37 hours of tape

President Nixon threatens President Thieu - HISTORY

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nixon-threatens-president-thieuPresident Richard Nixon warns South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in a private letter that his refusal to sign any negotiated peace agreement

Nixon and Kissinger have been posted these words into the Paris Peace Accords to why a great power's America has fooled the small Republic of Vietnam in war, in the United States treaties, and in the International Agreements?

As it turned out, the secret negotiations were not close to reach an agreement because the North Vietnamese launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam in March 1972. With the help of the U.S. airpower and advisers on the ground, the South Vietnamese withstood the North Vietnamese attack, and by December, Kissinger and North Vietnamese representatives were back in Paris and close to an agreement. As a result, the arrogance of America did not respect South Vietnam sovereignty and self-determination, but President Nixon also calls for respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam and self-determination. Ironically, among Thieu’s demands was the request that all North Vietnamese troops had to be withdrawn from South Vietnam before he would agree to any peace settlement. The North Vietnamese walked out of the negotiations in protest. In response, President Nixon initiated Operation Linebacker II, the massive bombing campaign against Hanoi, to force the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. After 11 days of the intense bombing, Hanoi agreed to return to the talks in Paris. When Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the main North Vietnamese negotiator, met again in early January, they quickly worked out a settlement. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 23 and a cease-fire went into effect five days later. To exactly prove the super commander- in -chief of the American Army Forces and at the head of the United States Constitution, and behalf of the American people, President Nixon has been confirmed the Paris Peace Accords with his colleague's President of the Republic of Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu. Especially, President Nixon has guarantee been sent his letters to President Nguyen Van Thieu, and here are:

(To be read by Ron Nessen at the Press Briefing - April 9, 1975)(171)

Assurances to the Republic of Viet Nam as to both U.S. assistance and U.S. enforcement of the Paris agreement was stated clearly and publicly by President Nixon. The publicly stated policy and the intention of the United States government to continue to provide adequate economic and military assistance and to react vigorously to major violations of the Paris agreement reflected~ confidential exchanges between the Nixon Administration and President Thieu at the time. In substance, the private exchanges do not differ from what was stated publicly. The law of 1973, of course ruled out the possibility of American military reaction to violations of the agreement.

___________

(171) See attachments of the whole letters’ President Nixon sent to President Nguyen Van Thieu

(Citations from U.S.-South Vietnamese communique, President Nixon's news conference, and President Nixon's foreign policy report to be distributed to the press.)

Again, President Thieu refused to sign the Accords, but Nixon promised to come to the aid of South Vietnam if the communists violated the terms of the peace treaty, and Thieu agreed to sign. Unfortunately for Thieu and the South Vietnamese, Nixon was forced from office by the Watergate scandal in August 1974, and no U.S. aid came when the North Third, President Gerald R. Ford has broken a promise when his letter on October 24, 1974, has confirmed with President Nguyen Van Thieu in which he promised to protect the Republic of Vietnam if North Vietnam violated the Paris Peace Accords, but when North Vietnam strongly attacked South Vietnam. He didn't protect the Republic of Vietnam. Fourth, President Bush's son defamed the Southern officers after America betrayed the Republic of Vietnam. He said, “The South Vietnamese didn't fight for their freedom, which is why they don't it today.”

The self-evident truths of the proxy war's America when Advisor Kissinger of masterminds self-confessed wrongful actions. Because America did not only respect self-determination but also approved Vietnamese National rights, but no one shall be imprisoned, nationalized, and murdered by each other. When a modern civilized nation has played a war game in the Republic of Vietnam, let’s prove Advisor Kissinger who did not only represent a modern civilized America but also had behalf the American justice and super values of American dignity and said:

News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 24, 1973.

(Presidential Documents, Vol. 9 (1973), pp. 64-70)

(Excerpts)

DR. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, the President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly what these texts contain, and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read.

PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

Chapter 1: Vietnamese National Rights

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, agreements that established two zones, divided by a military demarcation line.

Chapter II: Ceasefire and Withdrawal

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock Washington time on Saturday night

[January 27]. The principal provisions of Chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the

Obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Vietnam within a period of 60 days.

And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for re-supply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Vietnam from outside of South Vietnam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements replacements or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a the one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side, three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

Chapter III: Return of POWs

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Vietnam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations, presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained-partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Vietnam.

This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues that were settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians are separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of 3 months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the 3 month period.

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame from the return of American prisoners, which is unconditional.

We expect that American prisoners will be released at intervals of 2 weeks or fifteen days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane.

There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27, in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I, have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocols.

Chapter IV: Self-determination for South Vietnam

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Vietnam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political tendency on the South Vietnamese people.

The other principal provisions of the agreement are that in implementing the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections, for offices to be decided by the two parties, at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides, which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties, who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days.

Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this part of the agreement is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Vietnam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Vietnam.

If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; secondly, that the political future of South Vietnam depends on the agreement between the South Vietnamese parties and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that are organized will be conducted properly, is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties have a veto.

The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces, and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized.

Chapter V: Reunification and the DMZ

The next chapter deals with the reunification of Vietnam and the relationship between North and South Vietnam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Vietnam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind. I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Vietnam, and that the future unity of Vietnam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Vietnam, that it will not be achieved by military force, indeed, that the use of military force with respect to bringing about unification, or any another form of coercion is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement.

Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the Demilitarized Zone. There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th Parallel provisional, which means pending reunification.

There is a specific provision that both North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the Demilitarized Zone is in all circumstances prohibited.

Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what our position has been with respect to the DMZ. There has been a great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about the issue of legitimacy, which is to say which government is in control of South Vietnam, and, finally, about why we laid such great stress on the issue of the Demilitarized Zone.

We had to place stress. On the issue of the Demilitarized Zone because the provisions of the agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replacement, with respect to any of the military provisions, would have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarcation line that defined where South Vietnam began. If we had accepted the proposition that would have in effect eroded the Demilitarized Zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to restrictions about the introduction of men and materiel into South Vietnam would have been unilateral restrictions applying only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore, if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential that there was a definition of where the obligations of this agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement, the principles that we defended were essentially achieved.

Chapters VI and VII: International Machinery; Laos and Cambodia

Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of the agreement.

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing the agreement-that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the United States-those measures that they can take which affect the situation in Laos and Cambodia.

A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must involve as well the two Laotian parties and the innumerable Cambodian factions.

Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the future in Laos and Cambodia.

The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and

Cambodia reaffirm, as an obligation to all the parties, the provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality and right to self-determination of those two countries. They are, therefore, consistent with our basic position with respect also to South Vietnam.

In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other operations against any of the signatories of the Paris Agreement or against any other country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia.

There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into Vietnam or, for that matter, into any other country.

Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

Now, as to the conflict within these countries which could not be formally settled in an agreement which is not signed by the parties of that conflict, let me make this statement, without elaborating it: It is our firm expectation that within a short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos which, in turn, will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor of infiltration.

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because there are several parties headquartered in different countries. Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.

Our side will take the appropriate measures to indicate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force. We have reason to believe that our position is clearly understood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this in my statement.

Chapters VIII and IX: Normalizing Relations; Implementation

Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

As I have said in my briefings on October 26 and on December 16, and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last.

And, therefore, it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina, and we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace.

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual implementing provision.

So much for the agreement.

PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS

Prisoners of War

Now, let me say a word about the protocols. There are four protocols or implementing instruments to the agreement: on the return of American prisoners, on the implementation and institution of an international control commission, on the regulations with respect to the cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a joint military commission among the concerned parties, and a protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines.

I have given you the relevant provisions of the protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American authorities and not to American private groups. They will be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners held in the southern part of South Vietnam, which will be released at designated points in the South, again, to American authorities.

We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held throughout Indochina. And both parties, that is to say, all parties have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about the location of graves of American personnel throughout Indochina.

The International Commission has the right to visit the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as the place from which they are released.

International Commission of Control and Supervision [ICCS]

Now, to the International Control Commission, you will remember that one of the reasons for the impasse in December was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese about the size of the International Commission, its function, or the location of its teams.

On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely for its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating; and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place.

We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission. Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160, drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Vietnam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable.

There are 12 teams at border crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for Article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Vietnam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs, and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except for the fact that it occurred.

This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission. And, of course, the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned.

There is one reinforced team located at the Demilitarized Zone and its responsibility extends along the entire Demilitarized Zone. It is in fact a team and a, half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made, between our insistence on two teams and their insistence on one team. By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half.

With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However, each member is permitted to submit his own opinion, so that as a practical matter any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report, in the first instance to the parties.

The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. An international conference will take place, we expect, at the Foreign Ministers' level within a month of signing the agreement.

That international conference will establish a relationship between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating. But, for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report. Cease-fire and Joint Military Commissions

In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but, as a practical matter, it is supposed to conduct the preliminary investigations, its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and, moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not.

After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceases operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being. Hovering U.S. Army helicopters pour machine-gun fire into a tree line to cover the advance of South Vietnamese ground troops in an attack on a Viet Cong camp 18 miles north of Tay Ninh, near the Cambodian border, in March of 1965.

In conclusion, the proxy war of America has the self-evident truths does not only archive in the American treasure nation but also summarized the eventful truths of the proxy war's America in the Republic of Vietnam when these archived in the American national treasure - as those exact truths are to be American laws to have occupied the Republic of Vietnam expressly without had denied in no disputed the American compensation of the Southern Officer’s prisoners of war when America does not only have a modern civilized nation but also ruled the Republic of Vietnam by the great power's America. On the other hand, we, the Southern Officers' prisoners of war, have been a burden of suffering for a long time of the American war policy in the Republic of Vietnam-therefore; we do need equality of the law of war and the supreme law of the land. In fact, the much evidence America freely undertakes a war in the Republic of Vietnam when America always solemnly declares and says that we always respect self-determination and sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam which is why America freely occupied, freely negotiated with the foreign opposition and freely cut and run out off the Republic of Vietnam, so we would like to summarize the self-evident truths of America to operate illegal war in the Republic of Vietnam. Whenever American official notice is received at the National Archives and Records Administration (173) that any achievements proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Archivist of the United States shall begin to be the legal American law to let’s prove the legal documents below:

On May 07, 1954, Viet Minh forces won the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and ended French involvement in Indochina. This victory led to the Geneva Conference where the French and Viet Minh negotiated a ceasefire agreement. Under the terms of Geneva Accords, France agreed to withdraw its troops from Indochina while Vietnam was temporarily divided into North and South Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai respectively, at the 17th parallel. Civilians were able to move freely between two states for a 300-day period. General elections were to be held within two years, by July 1956, to unify the country.

However, the accords apparently did not please the United States. First, they feared that the general elections would not be fair and free under the communists’ influence. Second and most importantly, if the communists won in Vietnam, communism could spread throughout Southeast Asia and become a greater threat to the U.S. In a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem – the new Prime Minister of the Bao Dai government on October 23, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised American support to his government to ensure a non-communist Vietnam.

Following through on that commitment, American aid to South Vietnam began as early as in January, 1955. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was also re-organized into MAAG, Vietnam to train South Vietnamese army.

An American officer serving with the South Vietnam forces poses with group of Montagnards in front of one of their provisionary huts in a military camp in central Vietnam on November 17, 1962. They were brought in by

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(173) 1 U.S. Code § 106b.Amendments to Constitution

Whenever official notice is received at the National Archives and Records Administration that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Archivist of the United States shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States.

government troops from a village where they were used as labor force by communist Viet Cong forces. The Montagnards, dark-skinned tribesmen numbering about 700,000, live in the highlands of central Vietnam. The government was trying to win their alliance in its war with the Viet Cong.

By early 1955, Diem had consolidated his power and control over South Vietnam. He also launched many political repression and anti-communist campaigns across the country, in which 25,000 anti-government activists and communists were arrested and more than 1,000 killed as claimed by the communists. In return, communist insurgents also assassinated hundreds of South Vietnamese officials. In July 1955, Diem rejected the national election, claiming South Vietnam was not bound by the Geneva Accords. In October, he easily ousted Bao Dai and became President of the new Republic of Vietnam (ROV).

Nevertheless, Diem’s political repression and attacks on the Buddhist community made him more and more unpopular among ordinary South Vietnamese people. Realizing the increasing unpopularity of Diem regime, Hanoi established the National Liberation Front (NLF), better known as the Viet Cong, on December 20, 1960, which consisted of all anti-government activists – both communists and non-communists, as a common front to fight against Diem.

Vietnamese airborne rangers, their two U.S. advisers, and a team of 12 U.S. Special Forces troops set out to raid a Viet Cong supply base 62 miles northwest of Saigon, on August 6, 1963. As the H-21 helicopters hovered six feet from the ground to avoid spikes and wires and under sniper fire, the troops jumped out to attack.

In May 1961, Kennedy sent 400 U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Beret) troops into South Vietnam’s Central Highlands to train Montagnard tribesmen in counterinsurgency tactics. He also tripled the level of aid to South Vietnam. A steady stream of airplanes, helicopters, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and other equipment poured into the South. By the end of 1962, there were 9,000 U.S. military advisers under the direction of a newly‐created Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), commanded by U.S. Army Gen. Paul Harkins. Under U.S. guidance, the Diem government also began construction of “strategic hamlets.” These fortified villages were intended to insulate rural Vietnamese from Vietcong intimidation and propaganda.

U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders were cautiously optimistic that increased U.S. assistance finally was enabling the Saigon government to defend itself. On 2 January 1963, however, at Ap Bac on the Plain of Reeds southwest of Saigon, a Viet Cong battalion of about 320 men inflicted heavy damage on an ARVN force of 3,000 equipped with troop‐carrying helicopters, new UH‐1 (“Huey”) helicopter gunships, tactical bombers, and APCs.

Ap Bac represented a leadership failure for the ARVN and a major morale boost for the anti government forces. The absence of fighting spirit in the ARVN mirrored the continuing inability of the Saigon regime to win political support. Indeed, many South Vietnamese perceived the strategic hamlets as government oppression, not protection, because people were forced to leave their ancestral homes for the new settlements.

A South Vietnamese Marine, severely wounded in a Viet Cong ambush, is comforted by a comrade in a sugar-cane field at Duc Hoa, about 12 miles from Saigon, on August 5, 1963. A platoon of 30 Vietnamese Marines was searching for communist guerrillas when a long burst of automatic fire killed one Marine and wounded four others.

While Viet Cong guerrillas scored military successes, leaders of Vietnam’s Buddhist majority protested against what they saw as the Diem regime religious persecution. In June, a monk dramatically burned himself to death at a busy Saigon intersection. The “Buddhist crisis” and dissatisfaction with Diem by top Vietnamese Army leaders made U.S. officials receptive to the idea of a change in South Vietnam’s leadership. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not interfere as a group of ARVN officers plotted a coup.

On 1 November 1963, the generals seized power, and Diem and his unpopular brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were murdered. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated, and U.S. policy in Vietnam was again at a crossroads. If the new government in Saigon failed to show progress against the insurgency, would the United States withdraw its support from a lost cause, or would it escalate the effort to preserve South Vietnam as an anti communist outpost in Asia?

Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the Vietnam dilemma. As Senate majority leader in the 1950s and as vice‐president, he had supported Eisenhower and Kennedy’s decisions to aid South Vietnam. Four days after Kennedy’s death, Johnson, now president, reaffirmed in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273 that the U.S. goal was to assist South Vietnam in its “contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy.” U.S. policy defined the Vietnam War as North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam.

Napalm airstrikes raise clouds into gray monsoon skies as houseboats glide down the Perfume River toward Hue in Vietnam on February 28, 1963, where a battle for control of the old Imperial City ended with a Communist defeat. Firebombs were directed against a village on the outskirts of Hue.

North Vietnam infiltrated troops and matériel into South Vietnam by sea and along the so‐called Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Throughout his administration, Johnson insisted that the only possible negotiated settlement of the conflict would be one in which North Vietnam recognized the legitimacy of South Vietnam’s government. Without such recognition, the United States would continue to provide Saigon as much help as it needed to survive.

The critical military questions were how much U.S. assistance was enough and what form it should take. By the spring of 1964, the Vietcong controlled vast areas of South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet program had essentially ceased, and North Vietnam’s aid to the southern insurgents had grown. In June, Johnson named one of the army’s most distinguished officers, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then commandant of West Point, as commander U.S. MACV.

Westmoreland immediately asked for more men, and by the end of 1964 U.S. personnel in the South exceeded 23,000. Increasingly, however, the U.S. the effort focused on the North. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other key White House aides remained convinced that the assault on South Vietnam originated in the ambitious designs of Hanoi backed by Moscow and Beijing.

Thich Quang Duc, a Buddhist monk, burns himself to death on a Saigon street on June 11, 1963, to protest alleged persecution of Buddhists by the South Vietnamese government. President Ngo Dình Diem, part of the Catholic minority, had adopted policies that discriminated against Buddhists and gave high favor to Catholics.

Throughout 1964, the United States assisted South Vietnam in covert operations to gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and harass the North. On the night of 2 August, North Vietnamese gunboats fired on the USS Maddox, a destroyer on an intelligence‐collecting mission, in the same area of the Gulf of Tonkin where South Vietnamese commandos were conducting raids against the North Vietnamese coast. Two nights later, under stormy conditions, the Maddox and another destroyer, the Turner Joy, reported a gunboat attack.

Although doubts existed about these reports, the president ordered retaliatory airstrikes against the North Vietnamese port of Vinh. The White House had expected that some type of incident would occur eventually, and it had prepared the text of a congressional resolution authorizing the president to use armed force to protect U.S. forces and to deter further aggression from North Vietnam. On 7 August 1964, Johnson secured almost unanimous consent from Congress (414–0 in the House; 88–2 in the Senate) for his Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which became the principal legislative basis for all subsequent military deployment in Southeast Asia.

Flying low over the jungle, an A-1 Skyraider drops 500-pound bombs on a Viet Cong position below as smoke rises from a previous pass at the target, on December 26, 1964.

Johnson’s decisive but restrained response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents helped him win the 1964 election, but Saigon’s prospects continued to decline. The president wanted to concentrate on his ambitious domestic program, the Great Society, but his political instincts told him that his leadership would be damaged fatally if America’s client state in South Vietnam succumbed. Instability mounted in South Vietnam as rival military and civilian factions vied for power and as Vietcong strength grew.

A consensus formed among Johnson’s advisers that the United States would have to initiate air warfare against North Vietnam. Bombing could boost Saigon’s morale and might persuade the North to cease its support of the insurgency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) favored a massive bombing campaign, but civilians in the State and Defense Departments preferred a gradual escalation.

Using as a pretext a Vietcong attack on 7 February 1965 at Pleiku that killed eight American soldiers, Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing north of the Demilitarized Zone along the 17th parallel that divided North and South Vietnam. Within a week, the administration began ROLLING THUNDER, a gradually intensifying air bombardment of military bases, supply depots, and infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Flying out of bases in Thailand, U.S. Air Force fighter‐bombers—primarily F‐105 Thunder chiefs and later F‐4 Phantoms—joined U.S. Navy Phantoms and A‐4 Skyhawks from a powerful carrier task force located at a point called Yankee Station, seventy‐five miles off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Partially covered, a dying Viet Cong guerrilla raises his hands as South Vietnamese Marines search palm groves near Long Binh in the Mekong Delta, on February 27, 1964. The guerrilla died in a foxhole following a battle between a battalion of South Vietnamese Marines and a unit of Viet Cong.

In 1965, U.S. aircraft flew 25,000 sorties against North Vietnam, and that number grew to 79,000 in 1966 and 108,000 in 1967. In 1967 annual bombing tonnage reached almost a quarter million. Targets expanded to include the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and factories, farms, and railroads in North Vietnam.

From the beginning of the bombing, American strategists debated the effectiveness of air power in defeating a political insurgency in a predominantly agricultural country. Despite the American bombs, dollars, and military advisers, the Vietcong continued to inflict heavy casualties on the ARVN, and the political situation in Saigon grew worse. By June 1965, there had been five governments in the South since Diem’s death, and the newest regime, headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, inspired little confidence.

As U.S. “Eagle Flight” helicopters hover overhead, South Vietnamese troops wade through a rice paddy in Long An province during operations against Viet Cong guerrillas in the Mekong Delta, in December of 1964. The “Eagle Flight” choppers were loaded with Vietnamese airborne troops who were dropped in to support ground forces at the first sign of enemy contact.

To stave off defeat, the JCS endorsed Westmoreland’s request for 150,000 U.S. troops to take the ground offensive in the South. When McNamara concurred, Johnson decided to commit the forces. The buildup of formal U.S. military units had begun on 8 March 1965, when two battalions of Marines landed at Da Nang. In June, Marine and army units began offensive unit operations—“search and destroy” missions. On 28 July, Johnson announced that 50,000 U.S. troops would go to South Vietnam immediately. By the end of the year, there were 184,300 U.S. personnel in the South.

Although Johnson’s actions meant that the United States had crossed the line from advising the ARVN to actually fighting the war against the Vietcong, the president downplayed the move. The JCS wanted a mobilization of the reserves and National Guard, and McNamara proposed levying war taxes. Such actions would have placed the United States on a war footing. With his ambitious social reform program facing crucial votes in Congress, the president wanted to avoid giving congressional conservatives an opportunity to use mobilization to block his domestic agenda. Consequently, he relied on other means. Monthly draft calls increased from 17,000 to 35,000 to meet manpower needs, and deficit spending, with its inherent inflationary impact, funded the escalation.

A father holds the body of his child as South Vietnamese Army Rangers to look down from their armored vehicle on March 19, 1964. The child was killed as government forces pursued guerrillas into a village near the Cambodian border.

With U.S. bombs pounding North Vietnam, Westmoreland turned America’s massive firepower on the southern insurgents. Johnson’s choice of gradual escalation of bombing and incremental troop deployments was based upon the concept of limited warfare. Risks of a wider war with China and the Soviet Union meant that the United States would not go all out to annihilate North Vietnam. Thus, Westmoreland chose a strategy of attrition in the South. Using mobility and powerful weapons, the MACV commander could limit U.S. casualties while exhausting the enemy that is, inflicting heavier losses than could be replaced.

Escalation of the air and ground war in 1965 provoked Hanoi to begin deploying into the South increasing units of the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA), or People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), as it was called. In October, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the PAVN commander, launched a major offensive in the Central Highlands, southwest of Pleiku. Westmoreland responded with the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). Through much of November, in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, U.S. and North Vietnamese forces engaged each other in heavy combat for the first time.

Marines wade ashore with heavy equipment at first light at Red Beach near Da Nang in Saigon on April 10, 1965.

The Americans ultimately forced the NVA out of the valley and killed ten times as many enemy soldiers as they lost. Westmoreland used helicopters extensively for troop movements, re-supply, medical evacuation, and tactical air support. USAF tactical bombers and even huge B‐52 strategic bombers attacked enemy positions. The battle convinced the U.S. commander that “search and destroy” tactics using air mobility would work in accomplishing the attrition strategy. Soon, after the PAVN departed the battlefield- however, so too did the American air “cavalry.” Clearly, control of territory was not the U.S. military objective.

During 1966 Westmoreland requested more ground troops, and by year’s end the U.S. ground force level “in country” reached 385,000. These were organized into seven divisions and other specialized airborne, armored, Special Forces, and logistical units. With U.S. aid, the ARVN also expanded to eleven divisions, supplemented by local and irregular units. While MACV was getting men and munitions in place for large‐unit search and destroy operations, army and marine units conducted smaller operations. Although the “body count”—the estimated number of enemy killed—mounted, attrition was not changing the political equation in South Vietnam. The NLF continued to exercise more effective control in many areas than did the government, and Viet Cong guerrillas, who often disappeared when U.S. forces entered an area, quickly reappeared when the Americans left.

In 1967, Westmoreland made his big push to win the war. With South Vietnam’s forces assigned primarily to occupation, pacification, and security duties, massive U.S. combat sweeps moved to locate and destroy the enemy. In January, Operation Cedar Falls was a 30,000‐man assault on the Iron Triangle, an enemy base area forty miles north of Saigon. From February through April, Operation Junction City was an even larger attack on nearby War Zone C. There was major fighting in the Central Highlands, climaxing in the battle of Dak To in November 1967.

With the persuasion of a Viet Cong-made spear pressed against his throat, a captured Viet Cong guerrilla decided to talk to interrogators, telling them of a cache of Chinese grenades on March 28, 1965. He was captured with 13 other guerrillas and 17 suspects when two Vietnamese battalions overran a Viet Cong camp about 15 miles southwest of Da Nang air force base.

U.S. forces killed many enemy soldiers and destroyed large amounts of supplies. MACV declared vast areas to be “free‐fire zones,” which meant that U.S. and ARVN artillery and tactical aircraft, as well as B‐52 “carpet bombing,” could target anyone or anything in the area. In Operation RANCH HAND, the USAF sprayed the defoliant Agent Orange to deprive the guerrillas of cover and food supplies. Controversy about the use of Agent Orange erupted in 1969 when reports appeared that the chemical caused serious damage to humans as well as to plants.

Late in 1967, with 485,600 U.S. troops in Vietnam, Westmoreland announced that, although much fighting remained, a cross‐over point had arrived in the war of attrition; that is, the losses to the NVA and Vietcong were greater than they could replace. This assessment was debatable, and there was considerable evidence that the so‐called “other war” for political support in South Vietnam was not going well. Corruption, factionalism, and continued Buddhist protests plagued the Thieu‐Ky government.

Despite incredible losses, the Vietcong still controlled many areas. A diplomatic resolution of the conflict remained elusive. Several third countries, such as Poland and Great Britain, offered proposals intended to facilitate negotiations. These formulas typically called upon the United States and DRV to coordinate mutual reduction of their military activities in South Vietnam, but both Washington and Hanoi firmly resisted even interim compromises with the other. The war was at a stalemate.

Thousands attend a rally on the grounds of the Washington Monument in Washington on April 17, 1965, to hear Ernest Gruening, a Democratic senator from Alaska, and other speakers discuss U.S. policy in Vietnam. The rally followed picketing of the White House by students demanding an end to Vietnam fighting.

A nurse attempts to comfort a wounded U.S. Army soldier in a ward of the 8th army hospital at Nha Trang in South Vietnam on February 7, 1965. The soldier was one of more than 100 who were wounded during Viet Cong attacks on two U.S. military compounds at Pleiku, 240 miles north of Saigon. Seven Americans were killed in the attacks.

Flag-draped coffins of eight American Servicemen killed in attacks on U.S. military installations in South Vietnam, on February 7, are placed in transport plane at Saigon, February 9, 1965, for return flight to the United States. Funeral services were held at the Saigon Airport with U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and Vietnamese officials attending.

Injured Vietnamese receive aid as they lie on the street after a bomb explosion outside the U.S. embassy in Saigon, Vietnam, on March 30, 1965. Smoke rises from wreckage in background. At least two Americans and several Vietnamese were killed in the bombing.

Four “Ranch Hand” C-123 aircraft spray liquid defoliant on a suspected Viet Cong position in South Vietnam in September of 1965. The four specially equipped planes covered a 1,000-foot-wide swath in each pass over the dense vegetation.

A Vietnamese battalion commander, Captain Thach Quyen, left, interrogates a captured Viet Cong suspect on Tan Dinh Island, Mekong Delta, in 1965.

A strategic air command B-52 bomber with externally mounted, 750-pound bombs heads toward its target about 56 miles northwest of Saigon near Tay Ninh on November 2, 1965.

General William Westmoreland talks with troops of first battalion, 16th regiment of 2nd brigade of U.S. First Division at their positions near Bien Hoa in Vietnam in 1965.

Flares from planes light a field covered with the dead and wounded of the ambushed battalion of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang Valley, Vietnam, on November 18, 1965, during a fierce battle that had been raging for days. Units of the division were battling to hold their lines against what was estimated to be a regiment of North Vietnamese soldiers. Bodies of the slain soldiers were carried to this clearing with their gear to await evacuation by helicopter.

A Viet Cong fighter in Vietnam in an undated photo

A U.S. Marine newly arrived in South Vietnam on April 29, 1965, drips with perspiration while on patrol in search of Viet Cong guerrillas near Da Nang air base. American troops found 100-degree temperatures a tough part of the job. General Wallace M. Greene Jr., a Marine Corps commandant, after a visit to the area, authorized light short-sleeved uniforms as aid to troops’ comfort.

In Berkeley-Oakland City, California, demonstrators march against the war in Vietnam in December of 1965.

A Vietnamese litter bearer wears a face mask to keep out the smell as he passes the bodies of U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers killed in fighting against the Viet Cong at the Michelin rubber plantation, about 45 miles northeast of Saigon, on November 27, 1965.

Pedestrians cross the destroyed Hue Bridge in Hue, Vietnam, in an undated photo.

Wounded and shocked civilian survivors of Dong Xoai crawl out of a fort bunker on June 6, 1965, where they survived murderous ground fighting and air bombardments of the previous two days.

A U.S. Air Force Douglas A-1E Skyraider drops a white phosphorus bomb on a Viet Cong position in South Vietnam in 1966.

A Vietnamese girl, 23 years old, was captured by an Australian patrol 30 feet below ground at the end of a maze of tunnels some 10 miles west of the headquarters of the Australian task force (40 miles southeast of Saigon). The woman was crouched over a World War II radio set. About seven male Viet Cong took off when the Australians appeared—but the woman remained and appeared to be trying to conceal the radio set. She was taken back to the Australian headquarters where she told under sharp interrogation (which included a “water probe”; see her wet clothes after the interrogation) that she worked as a Viet Cong nurse in the village of Hoa Long and had been in the tunnel for 10 days. The Australians did not believe her because she seemed to lack any medical knowledge. They thought that she may have possibly been the leader of the political cell in Long Hoa. She was being led away after interrogation, clothes soaked from the “water probe” on October 29, 1966.

Left: Pilot Leslie R. Leavoy in flight with other jets in the background above Vietnam in 1966. Right: Army nurse 2nd Lieutenant Roberta “Bertie” Steele in South Vietnam, on February 9, 1966.

Women and children crouch in a muddy canal as they take cover from intense Viet Cong fire at Bao Trai, about 20 miles west of Saigon, on January 1, 1966. Paratroopers, background, of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade escorted the South Vietnamese civilians through a series of firefights during the U.S. assault on a Viet Cong stronghold.

A napalm strike erupts in a fireball near U.S. troops on patrol in South Vietnam in 1966.

A Marine, top, wounded slightly, when his face was creased by an enemy bullet, pours water into the mouth of a fellow Marine suffering from heat during Operation Hastings along the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam on July 21, 1966.

Left: A Vietnamese child clings to his bound father who was rounded up as a suspected Viet Cong guerrilla during “Operation Eagle Claw” in the Bong Son area, 280 miles northeast of Saigon on February 17, 1966. The father was taken to an interrogation camp with other suspects rounded up by the U.S. 1st air cavalry division. Right: The body of an American paratrooper killed in action in the jungle near the Cambodian border is raised up to an evacuation helicopter in War Zone C, Vietnam, in 1966.

The singing group the “Korean Kittens,” appear on stage at Cu Chi, Vietnam, during the Bob Hope USO Christmas show, to entertain U.S. troops of the 25th Infantry Division.

A grim-faced U.S. Marine fires his M60 machine gun, concealed behind logs and resting in a shallow hole, during the battle against North Vietnamese regulars for Hill 484, just south of the demilitarized zone, on October 10, 1966. After three weeks of bitter fighting, the 3rd battalion of the 4th Marines took the hill the week of October 2.

Lieutenant Commander Donald D. Sheppard, of Coronado, California, aims a flaming arrow at a bamboo hut concealing a fortified Viet Cong bunker on the banks of the Bassac River, Vietnam, on December 8, 1967.

A U.S. Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter comes down in flames after being hit by enemy ground fire during Operation Hastings, just south of the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, on July 15, 1966. The helicopter crashed and exploded on a hill, killing one crewman and 12 Marines. Three crewmen escaped with serious burns.

A man brews tea while a U.S. Marine examines a pinup in Vietnam in September of 1967.

A trooper of the U.S. 1st cavalry division aims a flamethrower at the mouth of cave in An Lao Valley in South Vietnam, on April 14, 1967, after the Viet Cong groups hiding in it were warned to emerge.

Sergeant Ronald Payne, 21, of Atlanta, Georgia, emerges from a Viet Cong tunnel holding his silencer-equipped revolver with which he fired at guerrillas fleeing ahead of him underground. Payne and others of the 196th light infantry brigade probed the massive tunnel in Hobo Woods, South Vietnam, on January 21, 1967, and found detailed maps and plans of the enemy. The infantrymen who explored the complex are known as “Tunnel Rats.” They were called out of the tunnels on January 21, and nauseating gas was pumped in.

Military police, reinforced by Army troops, throwback anti-war demonstrators as they tried to storm a mall entrance doorway at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on October 21, 1967.

Rick Holmes of C Company, 2nd battalion, 503rd infantry, 173rd airborne brigade, sits down on January 3, 1966, in Vietnam.

U.S. Navy Douglas A-4E Skyhawk from Attack Squadrons VA-163 Saints and VA-164 Ghost Riders attack the Phuong Dinh railroad bypass bridge, 10 kilometers north of Thanh Hoe, North Vietnam, on September 10, 1967. Note the attacking Sky hawk in the lower right and one directly left of the explosions on the bridge.

U.S. troops of the 7th and 9th divisions wade through marshland during a joint operation on South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, in April of 1967.

In the protocols International relations are between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam that have never had sold the Republic of Vietnam to communism herein: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

108. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright)1

Washington, March 14, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In Governor Harrimanʼs absence, I am forwarding the Departmentʼs replies to the questions which were presented to him as a result of the executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee concerning Viet-Nam.2 The questions were those put by Senator Morse at the meeting and then by letter subsequently.

The enclosed material is provided with the understanding that those portions which are classified are for the sole information of the Committee.

If I may be of further assistance, I will appreciate your letting me know.

Respectfully,

Frederick G. Dutton3

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