#US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

[xtruss]

“War Criminal, Hypocrite, Hegemonic, Two-Faced, Liar, Conspirator and Fake Democracy Preacher United States” Reopens Ports to Russian Oil Despite Sanctions

The United States has imported Russian oil for the first time since April 2022. The imports, totaling 36,800 barrels in October and 9,900 barrels in November, were conducted for $2.7 million and $749,500, respectively.

The US imposed a ban on the import of oil, gas, and other energy resources from Russia in March 2022 as part of sanctions related to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Нowever, specific licenses from the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) have now made such imports possible.

According to the data, the US purchased Russian oil for consumption in both October and November. At the same time, one barrel of Russian oil cost the US $74 in October and $76 the following month. This is significantly higher than the "price cap" set by the country at $60 per barrel.

In 2022, the US, along with other G7 countries, the EU, Switzerland, and Australia, implemented price ceilings on Russian oil to reduce Moscow's income. Companies from these nations were prohibited from providing transportation, insurance, and financial services for Russian oil sold above the set limit of $60 per barrel. The price ceilings for petroleum products vary by type, with diesel capped at $100 per barrel and discounted fuel oil at $45 per barrel.

— Thursday January 11, 2024 | Sputnik International

[timesofocean]

Microsoft to pay $3.3M to resolve violations of US export controls, sanctions

New Post has been published on https://www.timesoftehran.com/microsoft-to-pay-3-3m-to-resolve-violations-of-us-sanctions/

Microsoft to pay $3.3M to resolve violations of US export controls, sanctions

New York (The Times Groupe)- U.S.-based multinational technology corporation Microsoft is imposed a total of $3.3 million in civil penalties for its alleged and apparent violations of US export controls and sanctions laws, Treasury and Commerce departments said Thursday in a joint statement. ofac bis

According to the statement, Microsoft self-disclosed the alleged violations to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

It added that the tech firm cooperated with the joint investigation conducted by BIS and OFAC, and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which predated the export controls and sanctions imposed in connection with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

While BIS imposed an administrative penalty of more than $600,000 on Microsoft involving its subsidiary Microsoft Rus LLC, or Microsoft Russia, the company also settled with OFAC and agreed to an almost $3 million civil penalty to resolve 1,339 violations of sanctions regulations involving Ukraine/Russia, Cuba, Iran, and Syria.

Microsoft was given a $276,000 credit by BIS, contingent upon Microsoft fulfilling its requirements under the OFAC settlement agreement, according to the statement.

“U.S. companies will be held accountable for the activities of their foreign subsidiaries,” said Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. “As this coordinated resolution demonstrates, BIS and OFAC will work together to ensure that U.S. export control and sanctions laws are enforced effectively, wherever in the world the underlying conduct occurs.”

Employees of Microsoft Russia caused another Microsoft subsidiary to enter into or sell software licensing agreements that would allow the transfer or access to software on seven occasions between December 2016, and December 2017, said the Treasury.

OFAC Director Andrea Gacki said Microsoft’s case underscores the risks technology companies may face when engaging through foreign subsidiaries, distributors, and resellers.

[notaplaceofhonour]

SAMIDOUN DOWN 🥳

Samidoun, a front that exists to funnel money to the PFLP, has been officially designated a “sham charity” fundraiser for the PFLP (which is already a designated terrorist organization) in the US and a “terrorist entity” in Canada.

[fuckyeahmarxismleninism]

NLG Condemns the US Government Attack on Samidoun and the Palestinian Solidarity Movement, Calls for an End to Resurgent McCarthyism

The National Lawyers Guild strongly condemns the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designation of Samidoun as “a sham charity that serves as an international fundraiser for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization,” and the listing of long-time Palestinian- Canadian activist Khaled Barakat “as associated with terrorism.” 

Done in coordination with the government of Canada, this designation will have a broad chilling effect on Palestine solidarity work in North America.  Above all, it is designed to disrupt the unprecedented global tidal wave of support for the liberation of Palestine.  The crackdown on our constitutionally protected speech is a worrisome development at any moment in time but in particular right now as social movements confront the US-backed Israeli genocide in Gaza, the Israeli war on Lebanon, and the general global trend toward fascism.

[mariacallous]

[aqlstar]

Win

Samidoun cannot operate financially within the US, Canada, or Germany 👍

[vague-humanoid]

“Samidoun Is a Collective Act “ - On the Futility of Repressing Palestinian Organization

In this episode we interview Mohammed Khatib and Thomas Hofland from the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network.

This is our third interview with members of Samidoun since October 7th 2023, and we will link the others in the show description.

Mohammed Khatib is a Palestinian refugee from Ain el-Helweh camp in Lebanon. He lives in Belgium and is the European coordinator for Samidoun.

Thomas Hofland is the coordinator of Samidoun Netherlands.

Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network organizes solidarity with Palestinian political prisoners and their struggle for freedom and liberation. The network was founded in 2011 and since then expanded to more than a dozen countries.

As Samidoun write, “On October 15, the United States and Canada sanctioned Samidoun in an attempt to repress political organizing in support of the Palestinian people’s struggle against genocide, colonialism and occupation, and the more than 10.000 Palestinian political prisoners that are being tortured and killed by the Zionist entity. In the US, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the sanctions, while the Canadian government has listed Samidoun as a “terrorist entity” under its criminal code.” (See full release here)

November 14th Charlotte Kates - the international coordinator for Samidoun who we’ve previously interviewed on two occasions - had her house raided by Vancouver Police in British Columbia. While there is no official statement on this matter yet by Samidoun, we just want to say that we denounce this escalating repression on the Palestinian movement, and send our solidarity to Charlotte and her family, and to Samidoun and to all people who have been organizing on behalf of the Palestinian people who are facing repression by these imperialist genocide supporting states.

Nothing reveals the nature of the imperialist countries we live in, in the so-called global north, like the fact that as states like the US, Canada and Western European countries provide billions of dollars in arms to the genocidal zionist garrison that calls itself Israel that they also have to suppress civil society organizations like Samidoun who advocate for the political prisoners held by that same genocide enacting garrison.

In this interview we get into how Samidoun understands these repressive actions and how we collectively can and must fight back as the state’s efforts to quell support for Palestinians amid the attempts by western governments to complete their genocidal siege and ethnically cleanse the Palestinian people in Gaza.

As the interview mentions, Samidoun is part of the Masar Badil – The Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement. The Masar, founded in 2021, aims to organize and support the Palestinian diaspora as a crucial force of the national liberation struggle.

And as the interview mentions while these restrictions may prevent folks in some places from being able to materially support Samidoun as an organization, what you can do is continue to “Support the steadfastness of Palestinian people in Gaza by all means” and “Practice your right to resist.”

[theculturedmarxist]

In 2013 the CIA was handing out TOW anti-tank missiles to 'moderate rebel' groups who were fighting the government in Syria. These groups were allegedly 'vetted' before they receive money and weapons. Unfortunately 'vetting' was something the CIA had never been good at.

One of the groups that received such support was the Hamza Division:

Hamza Division (Forqat al-Hamza – فرقة الحمزة): An FSA-banner group composed of six substituent brigades that operate mostly in the environs of Inkhil, Daraa. The Hamza Division has received TOW ATGMs and it works under the supervision of the Daraa Military Council. They receives foreign support from Western and Arab state backers and are a member of the Southern Front coalition. The Southern Front has stated their commitment to a civil state, and have released a comprehensive political program in support of democratic reform. The Division came together with the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the 1st Artillery Regiment to create the 1st Army, which later disbanded. The Hamza Division continues using the 1st Army imagery alongside its own while the other former substituents do not. Social Media: YouTube; YouTube (older channel)

Hamza was later also supported by the Pentagon. Without such support the group would never have become a viable entity. Things got a bit complicated when militias armed by the Pentagon started to fight those armed by the CIA.

Later Hamza was sponsored by the Turkish state. This again made things a bit complicated:

Elijah J. Magnier @ejmalrai - 17:39 · Oct 16, 2019 Do you remember when the #US spent $500 million to train/arm Al-Hamza Division? Well the US-trained "Moderate rebels" are fighting - under a NATO flagged country (#Turkey) - the US-trained Kurdish YPG in the area occupied by the #US. I'll make it even easier: A few minutes ago, #US Prsdt @realDonaldTrump said the "PKK is far more dangerous than #ISIS (The Islamic State)". The US trained & armed Syrian Kurds proxies, the YPG, are the Syrian branch of the PKK that Trump considers far more dangerous than ISIS.

Ten years after being 'vetted' the Hamza division is again receiving U.S. attention. This time from the Department of the Treasuries:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating two Syria-based armed militias and three members of the groups’ leadership structures in connection with serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria. An auto sales company owned by the leader of one of the armed groups is also being designated. ... The Hamza Division, another armed opposition group operating in northern Syria, has been involved in abductions, theft of property, and torture. The division also operates detention facilities in which it houses those it has abducted for extended periods of time. During their imprisonment, victims are held for ransom, often suffering sexual abuse at the hands of Hamza Division fighters. The Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza Division are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for being responsible for or complicit in, or for having directly or indirectly engaged in, the commission of serious human rights abuses against the Syrian people. ... Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr is the leader of the Hamza Division and its public face, appearing in numerous propaganda videos produced by the Hamza Division. While Abu Bakr has been commander, the Hamza Division has been accused of brutal repression of the local population, including kidnapping Kurdish women and severely abusing prisoners, at times leading to their death. Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13894 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Hamza Division.

The AP report about the new sanctions does not mention any Pentagon or CIA support the groups had previously received.

One wonders how long it will take until the U.S. will sanction the fascists militia it has and is now arming and sponsoring in Ukraine.

[newsclickofficial]

Follow Aaron on Nostr or X. The news got buried in part due to Trump’s inauguration and subsequent rumblings of a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve (SBR), but developer b10c recently published research showing that F2Pool — a mining pool representing ~11% of hash power on the Bitcoin network — is censoring OFAC-sanctioned transactions… again.In case you don’t know what this means: the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) maintains a list of sanctioned entities, including a number of Bitcoin addresses; it’s illegal to do business with these entities under US law. It’s actually unclear if this means miners cannot include transactions to and from these addresses in blocks they produce — but F2Pool appears to be rather safe than sorry.Now, as long as it’s just F2Pool applying this policy, this is not really an issue. Some transactions will be delayed by about ten minutes or so, once in a while, but that’s about it.If more pools start doing it, the delays will get longer and more frequent — but still not terrible. Not even if it’s a majority of pools.The real issue will arise if a majority of mining pools not only censors transactions, but also refuses to build on top of blocks that do include these transactions. If this were to happen, these transactions wouldn’t confirm at all anymore… not for as long as these mining pools remain a majority. Bitcoin would no longer be censorship-resistant.I can’t really fault F2Pool for adopting their policy. Although I would much prefer it if no mining pools censor, we unfortunately live in a world where even open source software developers may face prison time for enabling users to transact freely.Rather than flirting with an SBR, it would be great if the new Trump administration first just stopped such state attacks on Bitcoin.This article is a Take. Opinions expressed are entirely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.

[dinaritexch]

Is it Legal to Buy Iranian Rials in the USA?

When it comes to trading currencies like the Iranian Rial or Iraqi Dinar people ask about the legality, logistics, and practicality of such transactions. Among those questions, the question "Is it legal to buy Iranian Rials in the USA?" is one of the most asked.

The Iranian Rial (IRR) saw dramatic fluctuations from 2000 onwards. The exchange rate ranged from 1,750 to 44,070 IRR per US dollar. Today, one US dollar equals about 42,091.797 IRR as of January 2025. The exchange rate has remained stable around 42,000 IRR since April 2018. US economic sanctions against Iran have been in place for decades. The rial is now a blocked currency that doesn't trade freely on global foreign exchange markets.

The US Department of State has also issued a Level 4 Advisory for Iran. They warn against travel because of terrorism risks, civil unrest, and possible arbitrary arrests of US citizens. This article will focus on the legality of buying the Iranian Rial in the USA, trading it against other currencies on Forex, and how it compares to similar markets like the Iraqi Dinar. And also the legal framework, restrictions, and compliance requirements for Iranian currency transactions in the United States. Readers will learn what current regulations allow them to do.

Legality of Buying Iranian Rial in the USA

The legality of buying Iranian Rial in the US is tied to broader US sanctions on Iran. Since the Iranian government and its financial institutions are under strict economic sanctions due to geopolitical tensions, the US Department of the Treasury has imposed restrictions on Iranian Rial transactions.

Under current laws, it is generally not legal for U.S. residents to engage in financial transactions involving the Iranian Rial unless specific permissions are obtained through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The restrictions are to prevent financial support to flow to the Iranian government or entities tied to its economy.

It is not illegal to have Iranian Rials but buying or trading them in the US through regulated channels is a legal gray area mainly because of restrictions on dealing with Iranian banks or financial institutions. So individuals who want to buy Iranian Rial must be cautious and consult with legal or financial experts to ensure compliance with US laws.

Trading Iranian Rial Against Other Currencies on Forex

Trading Iranian Rials against other currencies on Forex may seem exciting but the reality is more complicated. Unlike widely traded currencies like US Dollar (USD), Euro (EUR) or Japanese Yen (JPY) Iranian Rial is not freely traded on international Forex platforms. Here’s why:

Sanctions on Iran: Most Forex brokers globally avoid offering Iranian Rial because of the same sanctions that restrict its use in the US. So it’s hard to trade Rial against US Dollar or Euro.

Extreme Volatility: Iranian Rial is one of the most volatile currencies in the world due to economic and political instability in Iran. Its value fluctuates wildly and is risky for traders and investors.

Lack of Accessibility: Even outside the US, Forex platforms that list exotic currencies like Rial are few. Traders focus on more liquid and accessible currency pairs.

While trading Iranian Rial against other currencies may be attractive for high risk traders, the limited availability and legal implications make it impractical for most.

Current Legal Framework for Iranian Currency

The US exercises tight control over Iranian currency transactions through multiple regulatory frameworks. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) specifically prohibits U.S. financial institutions from processing transactions involving the Iranian rial.

US Treasury regulations

The Treasury Department enforces detailed restrictions on Iranian rial transactions. Foreign financial institutions risk severe penalties if they knowingly conduct significant transactions related to purchasing or selling Iranian rials. Additionally, maintaining substantial rial-denominated accounts outside Iran is prohibited. These regulations stem from Executive Order 13846, which specifically targets Iran's currency operations.

State department guidelines

The State Department's rules focus on limiting economic activities between U.S. citizens and Iran. U.S. citizens cannot engage in most economic transactions with Iran. The Department provides detailed guidance through OFAC's Iran sanctions resource page and offers direct help through their Compliance Programs Division.

International sanctions impact

These international sanctions have hit Iran's economy and currency stability hard. The Iranian economy shrank by 15-20% compared to pre-2012 sanctions levels, which led to a $160 billion loss in oil revenue alone. The effects go beyond direct financial measures, with more than $100 billion of Iran's assets frozen in restricted accounts worldwide.

The European Union works closely with U.S. measures and has put in place restrictions that are "nearly as extensive as those of the United States". These joint efforts have created major economic problems:

The rial lost 56% of its value between January 2012 and January 2014

Prices rose by about 40% during this period

Job losses pushed unemployment to around 20%

This sanctions framework keeps changing through executive orders and congressional legislation. The president can waive almost all sanctions by citing "national interest." However, removing terrorism-related sanctions would need Iran's removal from the state sponsor list.

Restrictions on Buying Iranian Rial

Strict rules control all transactions with the Iranian rial. Complete restrictions affect both direct purchases and financial intermediaries. The U.S. Treasury Department has put broad controls on rial-related activities, which marks the first time sanctions have directly targeted trade in Iranian currency.

Direct purchase limitations

Foreign financial institutions can't easily handle Iranian rial transactions. These institutions might face penalties if they knowingly conduct major transactions related to buying or selling Iranian rials. They also risk penalties for maintaining substantial rial-denominated accounts outside Iran. The Treasury Department wants to make the currency unusable beyond Iran's borders.

Indirect transaction rules

Rules go beyond direct purchases to include various transaction types. U.S. depository institutions can process transfers with Iran only under specific conditions:

The transfer must arise from an authorized underlying transaction

The process cannot involve debiting or crediting an Iranian account

The transaction must comply with specific license requirements

Financial institution policies

Banks and financial institutions need strict compliance measures for dealing with Iranian currency. The Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) sets clear guidelines for both U.S. and foreign financial institutions.

Banks face heavy penalties for violations, including:

Civil penalties up to $250,000 or twice the transaction value

Criminal penalties reaching $1 million and 20 years imprisonment for willful violations

The rules target major transactions, especially those with the purchase or sale of Iranian rials or derivatives based on the rial's exchange rate. Financial institutions must keep thorough due diligence procedures and detailed documentation of all consignees and intermediaries involved in transactions.

These restrictions have created complex compliance requirements. Foreign financial institutions must avoid new activities that could trigger secondary sanctions while winding down their existing Iran-related business operations.

Impact on Different Transaction Types

U.S. regulations apply different levels of scrutiny to financial transactions with Iran. Understanding these differences is vital to comply with federal laws.

Commercial transactions

The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) closely monitors commercial dealings. U.S. depository institutions can process transfers only under two main conditions:

The transfer must come from an authorized underlying transaction

The process must not involve debiting or crediting an Iranian account

These institutions face heavy penalties if they break the rules. Civil penalties can reach $250,000 or twice the transaction value.

Personal remittances

Personal, non-commercial remittances have slightly more flexible rules. U.S. depository institutions and registered brokers can handle these transactions if they meet specific criteria. In spite of that, these transfers must avoid:

Money service businesses or hawalas anywhere

Blocked persons under various sanctions programs

Iranian financial institutions blocked under specific regulations

People can carry personal remittances to Iran by hand, but this only works when they carry funds for themselves. The rules don't allow carrying funds for family members or others.

Investment considerations

Investment activities face the toughest restrictions. The rules ban many investment-related transactions, including:

Property purchases, business investments, and fund commitments in Iran need special OFAC licensing. Opening accounts in Iranian banks or depositing funds breaks the rules on new investments.

Foreign financial institutions risk losing their correspondent and payable-through accounts if they knowingly take part in big rial-related transactions. The same applies if they keep large rial-denominated accounts outside Iran. The Treasury Department looks at several factors to judge how significant a transaction is. These include its size, frequency, complexity, and management awareness.

Compliance Strategies and Best Practices

Financial institutions need reliable compliance procedures to handle transactions that might connect to Iranian currency. These procedures include complete record-keeping, careful transaction monitoring, and detailed regulatory reporting.

Record keeping requirements

Banks must keep detailed records for at least five years from their creation date. These records should contain:

Transaction documentation for any amount with Iranian rial

Foreign bank certifications and responses to questions

Supporting documentation for all reports filed

Original business records or equivalents

Banks can maintain easy-to-access records without creating duplicate documentation. They should produce required information during examinations.

Transaction monitoring

Extra due diligence applies to monitoring transactions that could link to Iranian activities. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has seen Central Bank of Iran officials use regional financial institutions to hide illicit transactions.

Banks should follow these monitoring practices:

Ask correspondents for more details about transaction nature and involved parties

Check accounts and transactions for exchange houses that violate sanctions

Reach out to correspondents who enable suspicious third-country transactions

Regulatory reporting

Banks must file reports for different transaction types based on specific characteristics. The reporting requirements for electronic funds transfers include:

SWIFT transfers under $10,000 CAD with Iranian rial

Cash receipts of any amount with Iranian connections

Virtual currency exchanges involving Iranian rial

Banks should treat all Iran-linked transactions as high-risk and watch them for suspicious activity. The institution's financial crimes compliance team must know about any transactions involving Iran.

Commercial aviation services need extra watchfulness because designated Iranian airlines have tried to dodge sanctions before. Banks should look at additional signs and circumstances, like customer history and other red flags, to decide if a transaction seems suspicious.

Future Outlook and Regulatory Changes

The Iranian government's latest currency regulations show the most important changes in the financial world. Iranian authorities have tightened their grip on foreign currency exchanges. They now treat unauthorized transactions and online advertisements as criminal offenses.

Pending legislation

The Central Bank of Iran's new decree makes several activities illegal without proper permission:

Unauthorized currency transactions in virtual spaces

Online buying and selling of currency

Futures trading and brokerage services

Currency transfer promotions

These rules hit small currency exchange businesses hard. They now risk criminal charges and could lose their licenses. Tehran seems to focus on lifting the rial's value through domestic measures rather than seeking relief from sanctions.

Policy trends

Iran's government has approved rules for cryptocurrency trading, which marks a new direction in financial policy. The country can now process import payments using digital currencies. We saw this in action with the first official $10 million automobile import order paid in cryptocurrency.

Local banks, currency exchanges, and licensed miners have received permission from Iran's Central Bank to handle import bills through cryptocurrencies. The country has also set rules for bitcoin mining and lets miners use subsidized energy.

Market implications

The economic outlook for 2024 looks tough. Experts predict:

GDP growth will average 1.9% year-over-year

Inflation will hover around 30% after hitting 45% in 2023

Black market rates will move between 500,000 and 600,000 rial to the dollar

High money supply growth and sanctions continue to drive inflation higher. The government needs to remove fuel subsidies to manage energy use. This change will push inflation up and reduce how much people can spend.

Iran's currency has lost more than 90% of its value since sanctions returned in 2018. This drop points to bigger economic troubles, with Iran's official inflation rate reaching about 35%.

Iran's economic path raises red flags as investment drops and inflation eats away at living standards. The government tried to control the exchange market but faced setbacks. Almost half of the country's exchange offices closed last year.

The economy might grow if sanctions on Iranian oil ease up. Yet people will still struggle through 2024 with high inflation and weaker buying power. These factors suggest Iran's currency markets will stay volatile, affecting both local and international deals.

Comparing the Iraqi Dinar and Iranian Rial

The Iraqi Dinar has gained some popularity among speculative Forex traders, with several online exchange services offering Dinar trading options. These platforms often boast low fees, moderate commission structures, and detailed guides to trading. Unlike the Iranian Rial, which is heavily restricted, the Iraqi Dinar can legally be purchased and traded in the USA. Here are some key distinctions:

Legal Accessibility:

Iraqi Dinar: Legal to buy, sell, and trade through authorized brokers and exchange platforms.

Iranian Rial: Subject to U.S. sanctions; trading or buying is generally prohibited.

Market Stability:

Iraqi Dinar: Relatively more stable, with moderate fluctuations.

Iranian Rial: Known for extreme volatility due to political and economic instability.

Trading Platforms:

Iraqi Dinar: Available on several top online Forex services with transparent fee structures.

Iranian Rial: Rarely found on Forex platforms due to sanctions and limited global demand.

Tips for Trading Foreign Currencies

If you’re interested in foreign currency trading, consider the following:

Choose a licensed broker offering Iraqi Dinar exchange services with low fees and transparent commission rates.

Research top online Forex services for Iraqi Dinar or other accessible currencies that fit your investment goals.

Be cautious of online platforms promising guaranteed profits from speculative currencies.

Stay updated on international sanctions and their impact on the currency market.

Conclusion

U.S. regulations on Iranian Rial transactions need careful analysis of several key aspects. OFAC and Treasury Department guidelines enforce a strict legal framework that substantially restricts direct purchases and financial intermediary involvement. These limits apply to commercial deals, personal money transfers, and investments.

Banks and financial institutions must stick to strict compliance rules. They need to keep detailed records and watch transactions closely. Anyone breaking these rules faces tough penalties - fines up to $250,000 or double the transaction value, plus possible criminal charges.

The Iranian Rial faces tough times ahead in 2024, according to market forecasts. Financial experts expect inflation to hover around 30% while the currency's value drops further. Dinarit.com offers reliable updates on currency rates and regulations for readers who want to learn more.

Iranian currency transactions exist in a complex world shaped by local policy shifts, crypto adoption, and international sanctions. U.S. citizens can still make personal, non-commercial money transfers with some flexibility. Yet they should be extra careful and follow all current rules before getting involved with any Iranian Rial activities.

Source: Dinarit

[third-new]

Financial Sanctions Against Salt Typhoon Hacking Group Behind Breach of Major US Telecoms

The US government has announced sanctions against a hacker group linked to Salt Typhoon. The biggest telecom hack in US history. the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); It was announced on Friday. A China-based cybersecurity company called Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology has been sanctioned for its direct links to the Salt Typhoon hacking group. The largest…

[newtras]

Financial Sanctions Against Salt Typhoon Hacking Group Behind Breach of Major US Telecoms

The US government has announced sanctions against a hacker group linked to Salt Typhoon. The biggest telecom hack in US history. the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); It was announced on Friday. A China-based cybersecurity company called Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology has been sanctioned for its direct links to the Salt Typhoon hacking group. The largest…

[satrthere]

Financial Sanctions Against Salt Typhoon Hacking Group Behind Breach of Major US Telecoms

The US government has announced sanctions against a hacker group linked to Salt Typhoon. The biggest telecom hack in US history. the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); It was announced on Friday. A China-based cybersecurity company called Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology has been sanctioned for its direct links to the Salt Typhoon hacking group. The largest…

[masr356]

Treasury sanctions Salt Typhoon hacking group behind breaches of major US telecom firms | masr356.com

The US government announced sanctions on a Chinese organization with links to Salt Typhoon, the hacking group responsible for… The largest telecommunications hack in US history. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Announced on Friday It has imposed sanctions on a China-based cybersecurity company known as Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology, which it says is…

[trendtoday]

Treasury sanctions Salt Typhoon hacker group after breaches of major US telecom firms

The US government has announced sanctions against a Chinese organization linked to Salt Typhoon, the hacker group responsible for the largest telecom hack in US history. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced Friday that it had sanctioned a China-based cybersecurity company known as Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology that it says is directly linked to the…

[mariacallous]

In July 2016, Ekaterina Zhdanova’s star was rising. The glamorous socialite and entrepreneur, who had opened a series of hotels and leisure businesses across Moscow, was splashed across the cover of N Style, a Russian fashion and culture magazine.

“I dreamed of business since childhood,” she explained in the now inaccessible interview, as she described her ambitions and love for Russia. She partied with famous Russian TV and pop stars, and posed with expensive watches over the coming years—a world apart from her upbringing in a Siberian town.

But Zhdanova had a secret, and the first cracks were beginning to show.

As her social clout grew, she posted on social media about buying “huge volumes” of cryptocurrency, asking sellers to contact her. “It all depends on the mood,” Zhdanova told N Style when asked if she was a risk taker. “I'm probably a chameleon.”

International authorities believe she was much more than that. At the end of 2023, the United States government hit Zhdanova with economic sanctions for her alleged role in a crypto money-laundering operation used by Russian oligarchs, ransomware gangs, and other criminals. Today, Western law enforcement officials have gone even further, claiming that Zhdanova has acted as the head of a sophisticated money-laundering network that swaps cash for cryptocurrency, the likes of which law enforcement has never seen.

On Wednesday, Britain’s National Crime Agency (NCA), along with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), as well as authorities in Ireland and France, revealed that they have taken action against two massive Russian money-laundering networks that handle billions of dollars every year and have their tentacles in more than 30 locations.

The two alleged money-laundering networks—identified by a law enforcement action called Operation Destabilise—include the Smart Group, which officials say Zhdanova runs, and TGR Group, a series of companies led by George Rossi, who is either a Russian or Ukrainian national, according to authorities. The networks are distinct but often work together, officials say. As a result of Operation Destabilise, OFAC has imposed new sanctions against Rossi, four associated companies, two other members of TGR staff, and two individuals authorities say are linked to Zhdanova.

Over the course of several months, officials from the NCA provided WIRED with rare detail into their investigation and how the alleged money-laundering schemes operate. This includes tracing illicit transactions from Russian cybercriminals, finding payments linked to Kremlin propaganda outlet RT, and identifying links to organized crime in South America and the notorious Irish Kinahan crime group. The NCA also says the money laundering has also funded Russian espionage, although it refused to provide any more information.

Perhaps the most unusual element of the laundering, according to investigators, is how huge sums of Russian cryptocurrency are sent to criminal groups, often drug gangs, operating across Europe, where operators swap it for equivalent sums of cash to help obscure the money’s origins. In short: Criminals are trading bags of cash for crypto.

“This methodology of money laundering is new,” Will Lyne, head of cyber intelligence at the NCA, tells WIRED.

In addition to the newly issued sanctions, Lyne says Operation Destabilise has disrupted all parts of the money-laundering pipeline. The “head” of an intermediary network that works with one of the money-laundering groups has been arrested, the NCA says, and authorities have arrested dozens of people internationally and seized tens of millions in cash and crypto in the UK over the past two years.

Crypto Shuffling

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than 1,000 days ago, the country’s economy has been squeezed by sanctions—and cryptocurrency payments are banned domestically. However, increasingly, digital currencies are being used to move Russian money internationally.

“There is growing evidence that Russia is embracing cryptocurrencies and other alternative payment systems in order to circumvent sanctions and transfer funds around the world,” says Ben Cowdock, a senior investigations lead at the UK branch of anticorruption organization Transparency International. “While the Kremlin’s been closed out of the conventional banking sector, this does not mean it can no longer make international payments.”

Money laundering plays its part. By its very design, laundering is vastly complex and deceptive—and that can be exaggerated when crypto is used. Broadly speaking, money laundering takes place in three phases: placement, where money is added to financial systems; layering, where sums are shuffled between accounts or crypto wallets to hide its origin; and integration, where “clean” money can be spent freely.

The NCA’s Lyne says the two money-laundering networks are helping Russian elites to use their money outside of Russia. “This is definitely being utilized as a vector for sanctions evasion—and it’s perfect for that,” Lyne says. Investigators say the networks operate in different parts of the laundering chain: The Smart Group, allegedly run by Zhdanova, is at the top of the funnel, dealing with money from Russians, plus directing cash exchanges involved in the layering. The newly sanctioned TGR companies are often involved in integration, it is alleged.

NCA investigators started unraveling the two networks at the end of 2021, Lyne says, after spotting that ransomware payments linked to the Ryuk group were allegedly being further channeled to Zhdanova. At around the same time, authorities intercepted the first cash handovers in the UK. The lengthy investigative process used staff from across the NCA and drew upon open source data, messages from seized mobile phones, cryptocurrency and blockchain tracing and analysis, and physical investigative work and surveillance.

Through the Smart Group, Lyne alleges, Zhdanova can take Russian cryptocurrency from elites or ransomware groups and start routing it around the world. This often happens using a broker, known as an international controller, in the UAE, which has positioned itself as friendly to cryptocurrencies. The head of an international controller network has been arrested as part of the law enforcement action, the NCA says without providing any more information on their identity, location, or specific activity.

The money-laundering groups, officials at the NCA say, frequently use the Tether stable coin (known as USDT), which has a $130 billion market cap and is reportedly being investigated by the US government for the cryptocurrency’s potential to be used in money laundering and sanction violations.

According to details shared by the NCA, both the Smart Group and TGR have a “heavy exposure” to Russian cryptocurrency exchange Garantex, which was itself sanctioned by the US in 2022 for its links to cybercrime and illicit payments.

After The Wall Street Journal reported that Tether is under investigation, the company called it “wild speculation” and denied having “knowledge of any such investigations into the company.” A spokesperson for Tether tells WIRED it “unequivocally condemns the illegal use” of stable coins and works to combat money laundering, including having frozen all cryptocurrency addresses included in the sanctions against Garantex.

“You see direct exposure, so point to point, from Garantex to these criminals’ accounts,” says the NCA’s tactical lead for Operation Destabilise, whom WIRED granted anonymity due to the sensitivity of their work. The tactical lead says the two networks have copied techniques from traditional laundering processes, but using crypto means they don’t have to worry about banks detecting the activity and freezing payments.

“There’s so much layering that goes on,” the tactical lead says. “They’ll send funds through maybe three or four crypto addresses that we believe may be their own cold storage addresses before they go into an exchange,” they say of some of the activity around TGR. The groups are involved in the movement of “single-figure” billions of dollars each year, the official says, adding that it is hard to calculate an overall figure due to the layering.

Kathryn Westmore, a senior research fellow at the defense and security think tank Royal United Services Institute, says money laundering is often built upon trust and personal relationships, but the two networks have “industrialized money laundering” on a scale that hasn’t previously been understood. “I don’t think anyone could anticipate the size and complexity of this operation, the huge amounts of cash involved, and the number of different organized criminal gangs which used the services,” Westmore says.

As well as moving money—using cryptocurrency and through more traditional Russian financial systems—the Smart Group allegedly also coordinates with cash handlers in European cities. “Smart are orchestrating those cash-for-crypto swaps,” Lyne says. The network could, for example, arrange for Russian cybercriminals with cryptocurrency to exchange it for cash held by a drug gang in the UK, before the money is further laundered. Criminal gangs can, the NCA says, use the crypto to further buy drugs or guns.

A cryptocurrency investigator at the NCA, who also asked not be named for security reasons, showed WIRED a review of cryptocurrency wallets that have been allegedly linked to the Destabilise investigation. One wallet had more than £800 million ($1 billion) linked to it; another had £169 million. “The amount of activity is huge—it is daily,” the investigator says.

Zhdanova’s alleged involvement in crypto laundering was revealed in OFAC’s November 2023 sanctions. At the time OFAC claimed she laundered $2.3 million on behalf of a Ryuk ransomware affiliate; was asked by a Russian oligarch to move more than $100 million in wealth to the UAE; helped another Russian to obscure payments of more than $2.3 million to Western Europe; and provided tax residency services and UAE identification cards for Russian clients.

Operation Destabilise investigators say that Zhdanova, along with members of the TGR companies, used cryptocurrency and the traditional UK finance system in March 2022 to move more than £2 million ($2.5 million) into the country to buy properties for an elite Russian client. They allegedly tried to hide the source of the funds and bypass customer authentication checks, according to the NCA.

The sanctions issued by OFAC also name two other individuals, Khadzi-Murat Magomedov and Nikita Krasnov, who allegedly worked with Zhdanova as part of the money laundering. The NCA claims Zhdanova and Magomedov would broker deals, while Krasnov would work with courier networks in the UK. Magomedov could not be immediately reached for comment, and Krasnov did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Investigators believe Zhdanova may have split time in recent years between Russia and the UAE. A review of available material from data breaches provided by Constella Intelligence shows Zhdanova’s Gmail address, which was previously published by OFAC, is the last seven digits of her phone number, and is linked to a Telegram account called Smart Group.

On Telegram, the Smart Group account has been a member of Russian-language channels focused on cryptocurrencies and life in Dubai and the UAE. The account has posted publicly about hiring a personal assistant and childcare issues in the region. Other publicly available information linked to Zhdanova shows a 13-room Moscow hotel for sale; a Facebook page for a travel business with one “like”; and a variety of online accounts from Chess.com to Instagram, where she has several thousand followers.

Zhdanova did not respond to WIRED’s requests for comment. The Smart Group Telegram account displays a message saying it was “last seen a long time ago.”

The NCA says that Zhdanova is in “pre-trial detention” in France, after she was arrested for separate offenses—it did not detail what those suspected offenses are. A spokesperson for the French Gendarmerie declined to comment, citing an ongoing judicial investigation.

Bags of Cash

Towards the end of 2022, investigators followed a van from Kensington, in London, on a 300-mile round trip to Oldham in the north of England. Saju Sasikumar, an operations manager with the NCA who has been involved in Destabilise and showed WIRED surveillance footage captured during the investigation, says when the vehicle arrived back in the capital, bags removed from it contained more than £200,000. An associated apartment, he says, contained a cash counting machine and empty bags, while another address contained around £400,000 in cash.

Officials ultimately identified Semen Kuksov, now 24, and Andrii Dzektsa, now 28, who were sentenced to five years in jail each after pleading guilty in February this year for their role in this money laundering and organizing cash couriers. Over a 74-day period, the NCA says, the pair helped launder £12.3 million. Information provided by the NCA says it has connected cryptocurrency wallets to Kuksov that have received more than £30 million and that he has allegedly coordinated with Krasnov, the associate of Zhdanova.

Sasikumar says Kuksov, who is the son of a former Russian oil executive and admitted to running an “underground” cryptocurrency exchange to investigators, abandoned his work phone, allowing officials to download data from the device and get a glimpse of the operations. “He was conducting cash handovers on a very global scale,” Sasikumar says.

On the phone they found evidence for cash exchanges all across Europe, including in cities in Germany, France, Portugal, and Spain. Cash couriers were hired through advertisements in group chats, with people putting in bids for each of the handovers, Sasikumar says. “There’s clear instructions about what happens,” he says, adding that individuals could be given a percentage of the cash transfer they were involved in. Kuksov’s operations used ripped bank notes as tokens during the cash handovers—both sides of the swap would have part of the ripped note and then match them up before money changed hands.

Vast sums of crypto being shuttled between digital wallets can be traced, but it is not as blatant as stuffing thousands of bank notes into gym bags. In total, Operation Destabilise has led to 84 arrests, with more than £20 million of cash and crypto being seized by UK law enforcement. Across the country, at least 22 criminal actors have been linked to the money laundering, officials say, with one courier network conducting 55 cash handovers in just four months.

The UK, and London in particular, has long been a home to dirty money and laundering, with cryptocurrencies apparently increasingly being linked to cash in the capital. When cash has been handed over by the money-laundering networks, investigators observed an almost immediate movement of cryptocurrency for the same amount. Lyne estimates the networks may have moved more than £100 million in the UK every year.

The NCA says it and international law enforcement bodies have arrested multiple couriers linked to the money-laundering operations. The NCA points to a case where a courier, Fawad Saiedi, was found with more than £250,000 in cash in his car in November 2021—he was sentenced to four years in prison after pleading guilty in May 2022. The NCA says it is believed he processed more than £15 million and was “directed” by Zhdanova and Krasnov.

Across the UK, investigations have uncovered a van with more than a dozen washing powder boxes containing £1 million in cash, a vehicle with £350,000 under its passenger seat, and another van with £2.1 million hidden inside a door. Of the 84 arrests, the NCA’s tactical lead says that the majority of the potential prosecutions are still ongoing.

Close Connections

While investigators say the Smart Group is involved in moving money and other assets largely from people in Russia, the second money-laundering network targeted by Western officials operates at the other end of the spectrum. Law enforcement officials say George Rossi and TGR are allegedly involved in integrating money into financial networks.

NCA officials say Rossi has used identity documents from other countries besides Russia, including Ukraine, and a LinkedIn profile lists him as the founder of TGR. He’s also a member of a startup organization in Dubai, and his companies have previously partnered with blockchain and cryptocurrency events in Dubai. He has also faced bankruptcy proceedings in the UK in recent years.

OFAC announced sanctions against the founder, as well as Elena Chirkinyan and Andrej Bradens, who also goes by the surname Carenoks, both of whom work for TGR—Chirkinyan is described as Rossi’s “second in command.” Four companies tied to Rossi and TGR have also been included on sanctions lists: TGR Partners Ltd, TGR Corporate Concierge, TGR DWC LLC, and Siam Expert Trading Company Ltd. The companies, on their websites, claim to provide a range of financial services, events management, and similar corporate services.

“What TGR will do is provide an interface to be able to take illicitly generated cash and put it into the legitimate banking system, although that might be in jurisdictions of risk for example,” Lyne from the NCA says. In 2023, the sanctions claim, TGR’s Chirkinyan allegedly helped transfer funds out of Russia, from Russian state-media media outfit RT, which has been widely sanctioned by Western governments, to help fund a Russian-language media organization in the UK.

However, the sanctioned TGR companies are likely the tip of a dense iceberg, with multiple legal identities linked to the brand name or company records. Archived versions of the now sanctioned TGR Partners’ website have in the last few years claimed the business has “partner” offices in the UK, Singapore, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, the UAE, Latvia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, and the US. (The most recent version of the website only includes the UK and UAE addresses.)

TGR Corporate Concierge, which was also sanctioned, was previously called TGR Wealth Solutions, according to public company records. Many of the businesses linked to TGR—which also includes those not sanctioned by officials—share the same phone numbers, legal addresses, and similar website designs, a WIRED review shows.

Bradens also owns at least 50 percent of Pullman Global Solutions LLC, a Wyoming-based entity, according to OFAC.

Rossi and Bradens did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Chirkinyan could not be immediately reached for comment.

The companies have a limited public presence. Many of the websites do not contain many specifics about what the businesses do and often include boilerplate-style text. The TGR Partners website also includes a peculiar series of blog posts from early 2020, listing the most expensive wines in the world, Europe’s best virtual museums and galleries, and the winners of the 2020 Oscars. “I think that is very typical of traditional money-laundering typologies, where a website will simply be lifted, a new company will be put on there, and the images and text won't necessarily correlate to what the company purportedly does,” the NCA’s tactical lead for the operation says.

While both TGR and the Smart Group are separate but linked entities, the tactical lead says there may be times where they work together using “each other’s specific capabilities” for those they work on behalf of. The official says that social connections likely also help to power what they do and generate business, and that some of the networks, and those linked to them, are likely still operating.

“Street-level harm is being enabled and is being powered by these types of networks,” Lyne says, emphasizing that the NCA operations, US sanctions, and arrests internationally have limited the entire network. Officials say that during their investigations over the last two years, they have seen individuals being more reluctant to operate in the UK, as more arrests have taken place and the risk of laundering has risen.

With Zhdanova also in French custody, there could be greater limits on how the networks operate. Although with legal cases ongoing, many details about the total money movements in recent years remain unknown, but Zhdanova’s chameleon nature appears to be coming into focus, as are her alleged ambitions.

“Sometimes I worry that I lack a flight of fantasy,” she said in the 2016 N Style interview. “Then I lie down and always come up with something at night.”