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classyfoxdestiny · 3 years ago

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Has the first-past-the-post system polarised Indian politics?

Politicising social divides and failings of the parliamentary system have led to this situation

India’s parliamentary democracy is going through a phase of intense confrontation between the dominant ruling party and a weakened but belligerent Opposition. Is this situation a consequence of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, where a party with the the highest votes gets the seat even if it doesn’t win a majority? Suhas Palshikar and E. Sridharan address this question in a discussion moderated by Srinivasan Ramani. Edited excerpts:

Prof. Palshikar, you had written recently about the emergence of a second dominant party system with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) becoming the central pole of Indian politics ever since it came to power at the Centre in 2014. Even if the BJP has now lost ground, with its vote share reducing in various State elections, it did retain its highest average cumulative vote share for election cycles. That said, what similarities and dissimilarities do you see with the hegemonic period of the Congress of the 1950s and ’60s?

Suhas Palshikar: The similarity is in the vote share numbers garnered by the dominant party and in its capacity to fragment the Opposition. In terms of numbers, a dominant party gets a disproportionately larger share in seats in legislatures compared to its vote share. The other similarity is in its ability to remain dominant by fragmenting the Opposition and so we see the recent discussions on Opposition unity.

The dissimilarities are evident in the roots of the dominance and the journeys towards it. The Congress emerged as a dominant party as a result of its contribution to the freedom struggle; the roles that Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and others played then. It converted that legitimacy into electoral dominance. The BJP emerged in 2014 as electorally dominant and has since been trying to establish its hegemony. That is why I have argued that its hegemony is still in the making while it has become dominant electorally.

Dr. Sridharan, the hegemony enjoyed by the Congress in the 1950s and ’60s gave way to trends in Indian politics such as federalisation and regionalisation. So, even if we had the FPTP system, there was a certain degree of diversification that allowed for newer forces to emerge organically. Since 2019, the fact that the BJP has garnered a disproportionate seat share relative to its vote share has revived the critique of the FPTP. Your view?

E. Sridharan: The BJP’s dominance in both 2014 and 2019 was based on a plurality of votes (31% and 37%) converting into a majority of seats and is similar to the Congress’s dominance from 1952 to 1984 which was also based on vote share pluralities converting to seat majorities (sometimes two-thirds to three-fourths majority). The FPTP system tends to magnify the seat share of the party with the largest vote share, while parties receiving a lower vote share tend to get a much lower seat share. There are exceptions such as the Karnataka Assembly elections of 2008 and the Madhya Pradesh elections of 2018 where the party which got a slightly higher vote share got a lower seat share.

The BJP is today not as hegemonic as the Congress of the past. Forty-two of the 303 seats that it won in 2019 were in three States — Maharashtra, Punjab and Bihar — and were at least partially due to vote transfer from allies; seat shares have not reached two-thirds majority; and the party’s spread across States is less than the Congress’s in its heyday.

Also read | What is Proportional Representation?

As for the FPTP system, I would like to introduce Duverger’s law to your readers. [Maurice] Duverger, a French political scientist, argued that the FPTP system tends to bring about a two-party system at the constituency level. In countries like India, this translated into the establishment of a two-party system at the State level which happened between 1967 and 1989. Post-1990, this produced three kinds of bipolarity: Congress versus BJP in a number of States, Congress versus the Left in three States, and Congress versus regional parties in other States. This was an outcome of Duverger’s law operating at the State level.

At the national level, 2014 marked the end of a 25-year period of a coalition/minority government. And post-2014, there was the emergence of a second dominant party system. I don’t think that FPTP necessarily produces polarisation. If you look at the proportional representation (PR) system in Europe and elsewhere, where seats are allocated roughly in accordance with the vote share, that also produces distinct polarisations. Look at the 1978 Sri Lankan Constitution which instituted the PR system. Since then, there has been ethnic polarisation despite the small parties getting seat shares higher than what they would have received in a FPTP system. Similarly in Israel, which also enjoys a thoroughgoing PR system, there is severe polarisation in ethnic, religious and political terms.

The FPTP system can’t be blamed for polarisation. Polarisation is linked to the politicisation of certain social cleavages. These cleavages are sometimes dormant in society and can become active or can be activated through mobilisations. When certain social cleavages are activated, that is when they get magnified by the electoral system.

Prof. Palshikar, today there is little dialogue between the ruling party and the Opposition. What explains this stasis?

Suhas Palshikar: I agree with Dr. Sridharan that it is not FPTP that is creating polarisation. One of the general reasons for the adversarial relations between the ruling party and the Opposition is the failure in institutionalising the parliamentary system, which presupposes a certain negotiation, a spirit of give and take and continuous deliberation between the ruling party and the Opposition.

We have failed in generating an institutional pattern for this tendency. I would locate the beginning of this as the time around the Emergency period when the spirit of dialogue dissipated. Since then, the dialogue process has been up and down. If you come to the current moment, I think it is the distrust between the ruling party and the Opposition that has produced this stasis. The problem is not about the institutional mechanisms that we adopt; it is in the processes that we implement those mechanisms. Those process-related issues can be located in social and other cleavages and how they play out in competitive politics. It is the extreme competitive nature of our polity and the frustrations that come with the presence of a dominant party in the system besides the arrogance that stems from electoral dominance that leads to an inability to engage with the Opposition.

E. Sridharan: The confrontational situation in Parliament and other legislatures has heightened in the last couple of years. This is due to the sharpening of the ideological level in politics, which reflects the cleavages in the society, and to the suspicion that the fundamentals of the system are being sought to be changed.

The ruling BJP is not a similar hegemonic force as the Congress in the sense that it had in its manifesto issues such as the Citizenship Amendment Bill and the abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. In a way, the BJP has an agenda that is beyond the constitutional consensus that guides the policies of most political parties in India. Is this a reason for the current state of affairs too?

Suhas Palshikar: Just to supplement what Prof. Sridharan said, we witness today a new phase that is marked by a confrontation that is not merely one of political contestation in the ordinary sense of the term. Here is a party that wants to change the entire system fundamentally and other parties are still not sure how to respond to that. They instinctively oppose it but at the same time they understand that the difference is in the approach of the dominant party, that they have to adapt/adjust to that stance so that they garner enough votes in the next election. This confusion among the non-BJP parties produces not just distrust but lack of clarity on what ideological positions they must take during the ideological onslaught or the offensive of the BJP. The BJP has now changed the terms of how the political contestation will be held ideologically, and the inability of the non-BJP parties to appreciate and respond to this and to produce an alternative narrative has led to a frustration that is reflected in their various responses to the BJP.

E. Sridharan: There is a perception that the ruling party is pushing against the constitutional consensus, which is fairly strong in our system. There are about three and a half layers of protection to the basic structure of our Constitution. The government needs a two-thirds majority in both Houses subject to the presence of at least 50% of the House in attendance. The government has a clear but not a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. It doesn’t have a majority in the Rajya Sabha. In order to make constitutional amendments, it must get the support of smaller parties, which it has been able to get so far.

Then, it has to go through judicial review — the courts have so far not pronounced on some of the controversial issues that have come up in the last few years.

Finally, for some articles on Centre-State relations, it has to pass them through half the State Assemblies.

There are ideological shifts going on and new social cleavages that have been activated that have changed the political landscape.

Can it be said that federal issues are emerging as the area of contestation with the BJP on the one side and regional parties on the other?

Suhas Palshikar: In principle, the flashpoint in the next five years or so could be the federal relations between the Centre and the States on fiscal or other administrative and political matters. The various State parties are still not sufficiently aware of this possibility and therefore they are busy buying peace with the ruling party at the Centre, rather than confronting it. I don’t see any direct flashpoint emerging politically between the State parties and the BJP immediately, though.

Also, the ability of the BJP or any Central government in the last three decades to directly transfer resources to local bodies in the States bypassing the State government besides controlling the administrations of the States has weakened the State parties’ ability to take on the Central government. Objectively, they are not in a position to do so and subjectively, they are not sure how to pitch the fight. Therefore, we have a fascinating period where there is all the making of a federal flashpoint, but at the same time, the actual flashpoints may be somewhere else in reality.

Do you see a mixture of postures — negotiation, confrontation and adjustment by various regional parties vis-à-vis the Centre? The Biju Janata Dal (BJD), YSR Congress Party (YSRCP), Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) using one ploy, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Trinamool Congress (TMC) using another, and so on?

Suhas Palshikar: I would use the word ‘acquiescence’ to describe how the BJD, YSRCP and the TRS’s relations are with the Centre.

To bring the discussion back to the electoral system, is a FPTP system with a preference rule system to go along with it a better form of voting than the FPTP system?

E. Sridharan: The Australian electoral system is fairly similar to what you talk about, where the first choice party with the plurality vote share will receive second/third choices of the voter in a process of elimination from the bottom, till it reaches the 50% threshold to be declared the winner. I think such an alternative system should be assessed in terms of the ease of its use for the voters. It would not be easy to operate in India. Second, as regards the provision that a party must get 50% of the votes through preference voting, this would actually make it easier for the leading candidate to bridge the gap between, say, 40% to 50% as compared to someone else who gets 25% and could possibly contribute to the same kind of magnified majoritarianism that FPTP does in its own institutional way. So, it may not be that different.

Suhas Palshikar: To put an extra burden on the voter in the act of voting is unfair and that is why this is not to my liking. Second, the 50% mark, as Prof. Sridharan pointed out, is artificially achieved.

We need to go back to the drawing board on what is the real issue with FPTP, which is the disproportionate number of seats accrued by a party despite a lower vote share. However, if the political system is adequately competitive, that aspect of the FPTP system gets politically neutralised and parties tend to get a share of seats which is roughly commensurate to their vote share also.

The other issue with the FPTP is that the threshold is so high that newer parties cannot enter the fray. Therefore, I suggest that rather than the alternative you are talking about, one can talk about a system that will supplement FPTP — let’s say have 10% of the seats in the legislature which are included based on the parties’ vote shares. This will ensure an entry point for smaller/ newer parties and keep the political system more competitive.

The larger point is if we artificially try to make the political system fairer, the natural competitiveness gets distorted and that is why I would generally prefer FPTP, both on the grounds of voters’ convenience and a natural competitiveness being allowed in the system.

E. Sridharan: I think there is sufficient diversity at the societal level. There is the theory that in a socially diverse country, the party system will be diverse — it will not be limited to a two-party system. India seems to support the effective production of multiple parties at the national level even if the FPTP system limits the competition to a bipolar system in the States because these are a multiplicity of bipolarities (for example, BJP-Congress, BJP-regional party, etc.) and not the same bipolarity.

E. Sridharan is Academic Director and Chief Executive at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India, and Editor-in-Chief of India Review; Suhas Palshikar taught political science at Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, and is chief editor of Studies in Indian Politics

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gretonew · 3 years ago

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johnvazhathara · 4 years ago

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Suprio Basu, Jyoti prasad Chatterjee, Shreyas Sardesai and Suhas Palshikar

There is no denying that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has massively increased its vote and seat share in West Bengal compared to the 2016 Assembly election, and this has largely been on the back of a strong Hindu consolidation behind it (50%), as per the Lokniti-CSDS’s post-poll survey. But the party failed to retain the level of Hindu support (57%, or nearly three-fifths) it had secured in the 2019 Lok Sabha election, thus ending up faring way below its own expectations and its performance in the last general election.

The Trinamool Congress was a direct beneficiary of this erosion of votes, with the party registering an increase in Hindu support from 32% in 2019 to 39% this time. This seven-percentage-point shift from the BJP to the Trinamool happened despite the former running a high-pitched Hindutva campaign that was aimed at exciting Hindus through Jai Shri Ram slogans, talk of illegal migration, allegations of ‘Muslim appeasement’ against the ruling party, and anti-Muslim dog whistles, such as raising the spectre of West Bengal becoming a ‘mini-Pakistan’ and calling Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee ‘begum’ and ‘khala’.

The post-poll survey conducted by Lokniti-CSDS and data from our study after the 2019 Lok Sabha election together point to the story of limited Hindu consolidation. This has also to do with the way the Hindu mind in West Bengal seems to be working at the moment.

In our 2019 survey, we asked respondents in West Bengal (and the rest of the country) a set of questions to gauge their views on secularism, the temple-mosque dispute and minority rights. Surprisingly, despite political polarisation, full-fledged communalisation had not occurred in the State, as it was found that many Hindus, including those who voted for the BJP, gave highly secular and pluralistic answers to most of these questions, and far more so than their counterparts in other regions of the country.

For instance, on a question on the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition, only one in every five Hindus in Bengal had said that demolition was justified, as opposed to two-fifths in the rest of the country. Similarly, a huge majority of Hindus in Bengal (81%) held that India is a country of all religions, and not just Hindus. The same figure among Hindus in the rest of the country was 74%.

On the issue of protecting minority rights, 38% of Hindus in West Bengal agreed with the proposition that even if it is not liked by the majority community, the government must protect the interests of minorities. This sentiment, in fact, strengthened further to 58% this time, when we repeated this question in our survey.

What these responses indicate is that even as average Bengali Hindus may have supported the BJP in large numbers in 2019, the reasons for doing so were different and not necessarily an endorsement of the BJP’s Hindutva agenda. This perhaps explains why the BJP’s support among Hindu voters declined this time instead of increasing. Heavily polarising rhetoric by the BJP in the recent election may well have alienated the liberal tolerant section of the Bengali Hindus from the BJP, particularly the traditional Left voters, who had shown interest in the party in 2019. It also seems to have had the effect of scaring Muslims who consolidated in even larger proportions (75%) behind the Trinamool Congress than they had in 2019. The Trinamool, thus, ended up benefiting both ways.

The story, of course, has another side. There is some traction to the idea that the government accorded undue favours to minorities. While a majority of the Hindus in the rest of the country had no problem with it, in West Bengal, the support for the idea was lukewarm, with many being ambivalent on the issue. In fact, in the 2021 survey, most Hindus, even the ones who ended up voting for the Trinamool Congress, agreed with the proposition that the party had given undue favours to Muslims during its tenure, an issue that the BJP had raised. It is nonetheless interesting that many of them continued to vote for the Trinamool despite holding this view.

None of this is to say that there was no polarisation on religious lines in this election. But the divide was mostly restricted to seats where the Muslim population was higher in proportion. It is also important to note that the Hindu share in the Trinamool’s votes was 57% this time and the Muslim share was 42%; in 2019, it had been 50% for each.

In sum, the BJP, which prides itself on knowing the Hindu mind, may have failed spectacularly in deciphering the Bengali Hindu psyche. It has been unable to transform the majority community into a minority-hating monolith.

Moreover, the majority community was also divided on the basis of caste, class, gender and other social identities, and the Hindutva campaign clearly fell short in catering to everyday concerns around development and livelihood. In the cultural rubric of Bengal’s politics, there was limited room for uni-dimensional religious polarisation, a fact that the BJP took very lightly.

Suprio Basu is with the Department of Sociology, University of Kalyani; Jyotiprasad Chatterjee is Associate Professor of Sociology at Barrackpore Rastraguru Surendranath College; Shreyas Sardesai is a Research Associate at Lokniti-CSDS, Delhi; Suhas Palshikar is the Co-Director of the Lokniti programme

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havensoscom · 4 years ago

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India and Brazil show that right-wing nationalists failed during the pandemic. But they weren’t the only ones.

“Within a span of 15 months, our government has presented a textbook lesson in misgovernance,” wrote political scientist Suhas Palshikar in the Indian Express. First, …

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diaspora9ja · 4 years ago

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By agreeing to negotiate with the farmers, the BJP government has taken the risk of denting that image

Written by Suhas Palshikar | Up to date: December 11, 2020 9:16:45 am

Sufficient media yarn will likely be spun if and when a negotiated settlement takes place.

With the federal government attempting to make concessions, the farmers refusing to budge and awkward voices grumbling about democracy obstructing reforms, is the political narrative set to vary? Is the BJP blinking, or will it hit again?

For the second December in a row, the Narendra Modi authorities finds itself within the midst of a protest. Final 12 months, the anti-CAA mobilisation could possibly be dubbed as an agitation by Muslims. The failure of non-Muslims to see it as an vital problem supplied the federal government a chance to present it an appropriate label. This December, the farmers are up in opposition to the federal government. It could be a vital take a look at for non-farmers — first, whether or not non-farmers admire the issues of farmers, and secondly, whether or not the farmers’ proper to protest is recognised by non-farmers.

Inside days of the farmers’ protests, the federal government started negotiations. That is one thing the current authorities has seldom accomplished. Subsequently, in itself, the negotiations have achieved one thing very priceless: They’ve introduced again the relevance of the politics of lodging. The controversial farm laws is showcased as “daring reform” — a trait for which the prime minister is known since his time as chief minister of Gujarat. What he has by no means been identified for is the power to just accept that there may be variations over reforms and these must be reconciled.

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After six adamant years of expelling protest and negotiation from politics, the federal government needed to climb down and start negotiations. Subsequently, no matter the result of the protests and no matter which aspect of the brand new farm coverage one is on, this must be a second of quiet realisation that insurance policies shouldn’t be rammed by way of by state energy alone.

The current regime seems to be upon any distinction or protest by way of a three-dimensional prism: First, the prism of righteous monopoly over knowledge — no one else is aware of something higher. Second, the prism of ill-will. Having arrogated to your self monopoly over knowledge, it’s a small step to saturate your self with malice. This proneness to ill-will was on show the second it introduced the “Ok” phrase into the discussions of farm protests. The conversion of “kisan” into “Khalistan” can solely be understood if one takes under consideration an obsession with majoritarian nationalism. The third dimension of the prism is that of brutality coupled with concern of the “individuals”. This was on full show when the federal government determined to maintain Delhi out of bounds for the protestors and didn’t hesitate to make use of water cannons. As farmers harden their stance, one might count on bare repression.

The spirit of final 12 months’s protesters and the resilience of this 12 months’s protesters however, they’ve each chosen to stay politically in a nowhere land. Whereas the federal government operates astutely throughout the framework of get together politics, it is unnecessary for the agitation to stay non-party — and for different events additionally to maintain a decent distance whereas supporting the agitation.

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True, the Akalis pulled out of the NDA, Badal senior gave up his Padma award, and most non-BJP events are making the right noises. However the protests have been a non-party agitation thus far. There may be not a lot to jot down house about our events — a lot much less in regards to the “opposition” events — whereas the stamina, willpower and political acumen proven by collaborating organisations is unquestionably one thing to observe. But the repeatedly renewing romance with non-party politics is unlikely to take the protests anyplace. This division between the vitality of protesters and rhythm of routine get together politics can solely dissipate each. This might assist the federal government divide the protesters; the protests would fail to the touch upon bigger questions of coverage and politics.

The involvement of events is critical if farmers (and even non-farmers) throughout states are to be mobilised. Within the absence of the management and involvement of events, the present protests will grow to be political folklore however fail to provide the brand new churning that we urgently require. Up to now, there doesn’t appear to be a bigger mobilisation occurring in lots of states; nor any chance of forging broader alliances between farmers and farm labourers or agriculturists and non-agrarian poor. Each these — relocating the protests past Delhi’s vicissitudes and past farmers — may have the potential to provide political change.

The change that’s wanted isn’t solely about farm insurance policies, however about politics itself. Prior to now six years, in addition to shifting resolutely within the route of an exclusionary majoritarian nationalism, the federal government has additionally pushed the polity perilously towards the trail of electoral authoritarianism. Certainly, the BJP authorities has introduced us right here, however the broader tendency of accepting electoral authoritarianism is way extra harmful. Whereas the BJP is responsible of practising and legitimising it, many different events can’t be absolved from the temptation of utilizing the identical path. When the TRS authorities in Telangana refused to speak to employees on strike, it was doing precisely what the central authorities is doing in Delhi. The report of many state governments is tainted with intolerance towards protests and political opposition.

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Lastly, the continuing farmers’ agitation will likely be carefully noticed for but another excuse. The mantra that “the chief can do no flawed” reverberates by way of all governance. The federal government and the prime minister just lately “commemorated” the anniversary of demonetisation as one thing daring, important and useful. This staunchness is glorified as decisiveness. By agreeing to barter with the farmers, the BJP authorities has taken the danger of denting that picture.

Sufficient media yarn will likely be spun if and when a negotiated settlement takes place. But, the agitation might have lastly pressured the messiah to be decreased to a mere prime minister who has to think about the exigencies of politics. In itself, a first-rate minister agreeing to barter isn’t a shortcoming, however after having constructed an aura of non-negotiability about his knowledge, a settlement would imply step one in changing the omnipotent and all-knowing supreme chief right into a extra routine political participant.

If that occurs, that may be a small starting within the route of a considerably “regular” politics the place debates occur, variations exist, compromises happen and management isn’t based mostly on the picture of unbending inflexibility. In spite of everything, nobody is elected completely, and nobody has the monopoly over nationwide curiosity; nobody personifies nation; nobody precludes the knowledge of others. If that ordinary politics begins, no matter whether or not one agrees with the result of negotiations, the farmers’ agitation may have signalled a distant spring amid India’s democratic winter — supplied that there isn’t a vengeful crackdown.

This text first appeared within the print version on December 11, 2020 beneath the title “Democracy’s distant spring”. The author, based mostly in Pune, taught political science and is at the moment chief editor, Research in Indian Politics.

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disembodiedapparition · 4 years ago

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India’s Most Powerful Politician

India’s most popular politician made headlines in late September for making it onto Time’s 100 Most Influential People list for 2020, but not for the best reasons. While the majority of the list is filled with change-makers, visionaries, and pioneers, the reasons that Prime Minister Modi is considered influential are not flattering. Karl Vick, his nominator, writes, “though almost all of India’s Prime Ministers have come from the nearly 80% of the population that is Hindu, only Modi has governed as if no one else matters.”

Who is Modi, and how did he rise to power?

Narendra Modi grew up in a small village in Gujarat. At age 8, he joined the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), a Hindu nationalist organization that has advocated for the rebuilding of India as directed by Hindu culture and the establishment of a strong unified state. He famously grew up as a child of tea stall owners, and eventually paved his way into politics via his association with the RSS. In 2001, M0di was appointed as Gujarat’s Chief Minister, and was soon after elected to the legislative assembly. In Gujarat, Modi was widely praised for the state’s economic growth – however, his administration was criticized and even considered complicit in the devastating 2002 Gujarat riots, a three day long period of communal chaos which cost 1,044 people their lives, a large majority of them Muslim. After the riots, Narendra Modi was formally accused of initiating and condoning violence, though he was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing in 2012 by the Supreme Court of India.

In September 2013, the Bharatiya Janata Party named Narendra Modi as their candidate for the office of Prime Minister ahead of the 2014 Lok Sabha election. Modi’s personal attributes and ability to resonate with the citizens of India proved to be incredibly useful during this election campaign, with a sizable percentage of voters admitting that they only voted for BJP because Modi was their candidate. During his speeches, he spoke at lengths about the deep ridden corruption that his predecessors, the Indian National Congress, had been infamous for, thus triggering what many political analysts viewed as a protest vote against corruption. However, analysts also unanimously agreed that the main reason for Modi’s landslide 2014 victory had nothing to do with his party’s politics, and had everything to do with him.

Until his run for Prime Minister, India’s lasting impression of Modi had been the haunting visuals and stories from the chaos in 2002. However, his expensive campaign (which spent over 700 million USD) successfully switched gears and rebranded him as the savior of India’s economy and the oracle of India’s tilt away from socialism and towards neoliberalism. His campaign especially resonated with India’s youth and the middle class.

Modi’s dubious history with secularism:

Modi’s complicated history with Hindu nationalism has plagued his career for decades. After the 2002 riots, the sitting Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, began distancing himself after Modi ignored his pleas for tolerance. Even internationally, Modi’s reputation resulted in him becoming the only person to be barred from legally entering the United States, in accordance with recommendations from the Commission on International Religious Freedom. Similarly, the UK and the European Union also refused him entry on the basis of what they viewed as his role in the 2002 riots. These bans stayed in place until October 2012 and March 2013 respectively, as his popularity in India began to skyrocket. Modi wasn’t allowed back into the United States until after he’d won his 2014 election bid.

As Prime Minister, one of Modi’s first moves was to initiate a nationwide ban on beef. Though justified as a move against animal cruelty, his administration made no move to curb the production of seafood, chicken, pork, or mutton; nor did they acknowledge that the vast majority of cattle being slaughtered for food were nearing the end of their productive lives anyway. Cows are sacred animals in Hindu culture, and this directive (which was later repealed) cemented his image as a Hindu nationalist and his desire to promote Hindutva throughout the nation.

What is Hindutva, and what does it mean for India?

Hindutva is an ideology that characterizes India as the homeland of the Hindus. According to its followers, non-Hindus only get to live in the country due to the mercy of Hindus. Though this may be true for India, with a population of 1.36 billion people of which 80% are Hindu, this outlook goes against the principles the Constitution was founded on.

Mahatma Gandhi, though deeply religious, was one of the nation’s strongest supporters of Muslim-Hindu unity. The British’s attempts to divide the Indian people on the basis of religion were suddenly coming to light, and he was determined to put an end to it. Despite his best efforts though, Muslim-Hindu animosity only grew - especially following the creation of the Al-India Muslim League that demanded a separate state for Muslims. As Muslims began ganging up, so did the nation’s fiercest Hindus, prompting the creation of several Hindu nationalist groups who deeply opposed Mahatma Gandhi’s repeated calls for secularism and cooperation. Eventually, his beliefs led to his death; he was shot and killed by Nathuram Godse, a member of the RSS.

Though largely unpopular in during the first few decades of Indian independence, it began attracting a sizable voter base in the early 1990s. Triggered especially by the willingness of certain secular administrations to pander to the Muslim minority, Hindu nationalists quickly began cultivating a solid base, which peaked in 2014 with Modi’s historic victory. Many political analysts mark Modi’s victory as a watershed moment marking the turn away from secularism towards a populist, Hindu orientated future.

Conclusion:

Modi’s command over the Indian people doesn’t seem to be going away anytime soon. To most, Modi is the best politician India has ever had – he’s a strong leader who has solidified the nation’s trust in the government that had been broken by the past corruption ridden party. A 2017 report by the CSDS showed that respondents who supported democracy in India had dropped from 70% to 63% between 2005 and 2017. A Pew report in 2017 found that 55% of respondents backed a "governing system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts". Modi has invigorated a large coalition of voters from all over the country, a feat that not many politicians have been able to accomplish. Under Modi, the BJP commands an overwhelming majority in parliament as the first party, and there are no equals. Political scientist Suhas Palshikar believes India could be moving towards a one-party dominant state, just like how the Congress ruled back in the day. Regardless of whether the BJP remains in power, it’s clear that Modi’s influence and impact on Indian politics won’t be fading away anytime soon.

#modi #narendra modi #india #RSS #hinduism #hindu #muslim #hindutva #secularlism #hindu muslim riots #gujarat #politics #partisian #populism #fascism #democracy #bharatiya janata party #BJP

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googlenewson · 5 years ago

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Cheers rang out in ballrooms across the country as Narendra Modi and his party were declared as the winners of the majority of seats in the 2019 Indian elections last week. Supporters of his main rival, the Congress Party's Rahul Gandhi or other candidates up for Prime Minister, took to public spaces in emotional shows of disappointment with world's largest democracy as well. These scenes did not take place in India though, but all over the U.S.

For months leading up to the seven rounds of voting held over several weeks, Indians across America belonging to the international arm of the two main political parties in India: Modi's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and his rival Rahul Gandhi's Congress Party were hosting events akin to political rallies from the Bay Area to Edison, N.J., and even the Colorado Rockies while riding atop snowmobiles. There were canvassing strategy sessions over tea and snacks and making phone calls to friends and family back in their motherland on behalf of candidates.

These Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) are often green card holders, if not full-fledged U.S. citizens, but the interest in working on campaigns continents away in their motherland appears to be driven most by a sense of patriotism and duty to the country of their birth and early years. But there are economic considerations as well. It is an immigrant phenomenon driven by connections maintained through frequent flights, e-mail and Whatsapp, global entertainment and business ties, and social media.

Since his visit in 2014, which was greeted by throngs of NRIs in Madison Square Garden and watching on screens in Times Square, he has been somewhat of a sensation in the American diaspora. American politicians, from the likes of Senators Cory Booker and Tulsi Gabbard to Bill and Hillary Clinton, also seemed enamored with the celebrity status Modi enjoyed in the U.S. the past few years.

That is in large part due to the majority of the American diaspora being vocal about their support for him and the BJP. They often call themselves chowkidars, the Hindi word for watchmen, of India's future and Krishna Reddy Anugula of New Jersey is one of them.

Anugula is the president of the Overseas Friends of the BJP (OFBJP) and following the party's resounding victory in all but a few Indian states, he said in a statement that Modi will "take India to the next level with the proposed investments in infrastructure, health care, and farming sectors."

He told Fortune he and fellow supporters made weekly phone calls to family, friends, acquaintances, and business associates back in India and even held several chai pe charcha, the Hindi phrase for conversations over tea, to educate NRIs and strategize about how to best reach voters in India. The purpose of all this: to talk about the benefits of voting for the BJP, and by extension Modi for those living outside of the Prime Minister's home state of Gujarat, was for a "stable government" for the next five years.

The idea, according to Anugula, is to have an India that is "friendly for…market and businesses at the same time, [while] uplifting poor people" in a way he felt had not happened under the previous party's rule. He noted that businesses are individuals are more likely to invest in India's development and its companies if there is some familiarity with the prime minister and his policies.

"What we have seen in the last five years [under Modi] is a big shift in terms of the way we think, the way we do things, and how we can change the country," Anugula said with the enthusiasm of any door-to-door canvasser you may encounter during an election in the U.S., rattling off several of Modi's "achievements," from opening 240 million bank accounts for lower-income Indians who receive government aid to improved sanitation access.

The calls the OFBJP made were usually greeted with enthusiasm, even from those they do not know well.

"They are excited to receive a call from the U.S.," Anugula noted. The conversations often go like the one he had with Fortune, touting figures on improved access to sanitation and the construction of a national highway system "like Eisenhower did" in the U.S. He explained they rarely get asked why they are campaigning from so far away, an understanding of the ties to India seeming to be appreciated even if not fully understood.

For Anugula and friends, though, one of the more tangible advantages to keeping Modi in office seems to be the way NRIs are treated around the world. He cited evacuations of Indian citizens during times of conflict in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, which "may have previously been done" but said Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and the Indian consulates abroad had taken to being "more proactive…and community friendly" in addressing the diaspora's issues with passports, visas, property ownership, investments, voting by proxy for NRIs, and even potential dual U.S. citizenship since Modi has come into power.

However, critics have long tied Modi's rise in popularity to the rise of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, in India where 20% of the growing population identify as Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, Jain, or other religions.

"While many people may not have any emotional connect with the idea of Hindutva, a majority certainly has emotional investment in the idea of nation," wrote Suhas Palshikar in an academic journal in 2018. And as Anugula noted, OFBJP canvassers usually do not get asked about Islamophobia on their phone calls but he also said he does not think of it is as a "phobia" in the U.S. either.

It is a matter of "perception," he said. In the U.S., for instance, Islamophobia has been made into an issue because of "one leader" and his advisers, but it is not reflective of a pervasive problem in American society as a whole. In India, Anugula said, riots "between Hindus and Muslims" were far more frequent in the 1990s but "fear mongering" among politicians opposed to Modi was done in order to drum up votes. Anugula contends India is a country of "everyone gets the same thing" equality.

India, though, is nothing if not diverse and complicated, and that is reflected in the immigrants who have to the U.S. Representing every one of the countries myriad languages, dialects, religions, and cultures, there are immigrants who have varied political stances as well.

Though the majority of NRIs appear to support the BJP, there are plenty who were campaigning for the Congress Party's center-left position, seen as more progressive and opposing Hindutva. Raj Boda, an IT professional who lives in Minnesota, told Fortune that it was Congress party rule which "built the country from scratch" after independence in 1947.

Roy Manthena, part of the leadership of the Indian Overseas Congress (IOC) and specifically a convener for the south Indian state of Telangana, told Fortune that for he and his colleagues it is not just a love of his birthplace but also a way "to give back" to India after spending half his life in the U.S.

Manthena, an Illinois resident, said choosing to support Congress was not a difficult one because he admires the political process in the U.S. and believes that can help improve the lives of all Indians. Congress "is the party which is secular, democratic, inclusive, diverse…this is the party which built the rivers, roads, and bridges of India," he said.

Diversity and inclusion are particularly important platform issues for Telangana--the southern Indian state's capital Hyderabad has long been home to many Muslims.

Manthena spoke of Gandhi, the grandson of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, as someone "kind and compassionate" who is focused on development, farmers, employment, and women. According to the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy, the country lost as many as 11 million jobs in 2018 alone, the overwhelming majority of which were in rural areas. Women experienced a loss of 9.9 million of the jobs.

Dr. Mohammed Jameel, a physician and Maryland resident and IOC co-convener, told Fortune: "I believe in the Constitution of India…which has solemnly resolved to be sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. So, the word secular is under threat" as the BJP comes into another five years of power.

Jameel said he sees his role as "an activist…trying to educate the masses back home" on what secularism and "having value for human dignity while developing economically" can look like since they live in countries like the U.S. and Canada. He also said his position as a minority at home and in India also informed his decision to support the Congress party, as he does Democrats in the U.S.

Unlike the OFBJP, the IOC focuses more on furthering social causes in India rather than holding rallies. Jameel noted: "being social activists we took a very clear stance…don't send money from America" to political candidates or anyone who could influence voters. Instead all efforts are focused on specific projects concerning water access, education, and women's empowerment.

Manthena said the group does make some canvassing phone calls to family, friends, and associates back in India, but noted it was more for "sharing knowledge" rather than just campaigning for Congress candidates. "We are creating a bigger impact" beyond just securing votes, he noted. Much of the IOC's work centers around social media, primarily through Facebook and WhatsApp groups.

One of the issues the IOC works to educate voters about is corruption in the political system and how it can mean voting against their interests though there may be an immediate reward. Manthena pointed to some candidates from other parties--not Congress--in this year's election buying everything from air conditioners to pieces of silver jewelry to essentially "bribe" potential voters.

Unfortunately the group's work did not translate at the polls, as Congress only held strong in two states but the IOC, its supporters, and those generally opposed to Modi and the BJP appear to remain undeterred.

In New York's Washington Square there was a small group of mostly NRIs gathered to show solidarity with those fighting what they deemed the BJP's Hindu extremism, shouting into a megaphone:

Suchitra Vijayan, a New York-based lawyer and founder of the hybrid research and journalism non-profit Polis Project, was in attendance and told Fortune the Indian diaspora will play a key role over Modi's next five years in power.

Vijayan said not only does the diaspora help with fundraising--through in-kind contributions or donations to particular causes in India--and have a strong Congressional "political clout" to lobby for his positions, but the majority who support the BJP also see Modi as " as the man poised to “remake the Indian political universe" after decades of Congress rule.

However, she noted, "there are a growing number of individuals and organizations who are… mobilizing and organizing to counter the politics of hate." She and others at the rally see "a growing recognition that the fight is going to be fought both in India and in the diaspora communities" against the tide of Islamophobia, homophobia, government corruption, and money in politics.

If the disappointment and general mood was reminiscent of the days following Donald Trump's victory in November 2016, this small group's rhetoric and sentiments almost mirror those in the U.S. opposed to Trump in the intervening years; the "resistance" as it were.