#Semovente 75/18

[captain-price-unofficially]

A M7 Priest self-propelled 105mm howitzer passes a destroyed Italian assault gun, El Alamein, 1942

[chicagodice]

Rubicon Models Semovente da 75/18

Italian armor is often overlooked - let's shed some light on this little SPG.

[carbone14]

Des chars Fiat M14/41 et des canons automoteur Semovente 75/18 de l’Armée Royale d’Italie dans un entrepôt logistique – Italie – Septembre 1943

Photographe : Baitz

©Bundesarchiv – Bild 101I-568-1536-31

[eltee1]

Italian Semovente 75/18 M42 at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. (June 2018)

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Asi Milishow 2021

A collection of restored WW2 armor, mostly Italian: L3/35 tankette, L3/38 tankette, Semovente da 75/18 self-propelled gun, M15/42 medium tank, AB43 armored car, Universal Carrier and Humber Light Reconnaissance Car.

[ww2photoarchive]

Italian Semovente da 75/18 self-propelled gun

[greatworldwar2]

• Battle of Kasserine Pass

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was a series of battles of the Tunisia Campaign of World War II that took place in February 1943. Covering Kasserine Pass, a 2-mile-wide (3.2 km) gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains in west central Tunisia.

U.S. and British forces landed at several points along the coast of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8th, 1942, during Operation Torch. This came only days after the breakthrough of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery) following the Second Battle of El Alamein. In response, German and Italian troops were ferried in from Sicily to occupy Tunisia, one of the few easily defended areas of North Africa and only one night's sail from bases in Sicily. The Run for Tunis in November and December 1942 is the term for an attempt to reach Tunis before German and Italian reinforcements could arrive. Because of the poor road and rail communications, only a small, division-sized Allied force could be supplied, and, due to the excellent defensive terrain, small numbers of German and Italian troops were sufficient to defeat the attempt. The Allied build-up continued, more aircraft became available and new airfields in eastern Algeria and Tunisia were built. The Allies reduced the flow of Axis troops and equipment into Tunis and Bizerta, but a sizable Axis force was already ashore.

Allied troops had already crossed the Atlas Mountains and set up a forward base at Faïd, in the foothills on the eastern arm of the mountains, an excellent position to thrust east to the coast, split the Axis forces in southern Tunisia from the forces further north, and cut the line of supply to Tunis. Elements of the 5th Panzer Army, headed by General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, reached the Allied positions on the eastern foot of the Atlas Mountains on January 30th. The 21st Panzer Division met French troops at Faïd, and, despite excellent use of the French 75 mm (2.95 in) guns, which caused heavy casualties among the German infantry, the defenders were easily forced back. U.S. artillery and tanks of the 1st Armored Division then entered the battle, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder into what appeared to be a headlong retreat. This was, however, a trap, and when the 1st Armored Division gave chase it was engaged by a screen of German anti-tank guns, and sustained heavy casualties. The 21st Panzer Division resumed its advance towards Faïd. Several attempts were made by the 1st Armored Division to stop the German advance, but all three combat commands found that each defensive position they tried to occupy had already been overrun, and they were attacked by German troops with heavy losses. The Allies held the interior of the roughly triangular Atlas range, but with the exits blocked this was of little advantage to the Allies. For the next two weeks, Rommel and the Axis commanders further north debated what to do next.

Rommel did not consider the Eighth Army a serious threat because, until Tripoli was open, Montgomery could maintain only a small force in south Tunisia. Ships commenced unloading on February 9th, but the port was not fully operational until the end of the month. On February 14th, the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions began the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, about 10 mi (16 km) west of Faïd, in the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains. The U.S. tanks were defeated and the infantry, poorly sited on three hills and unable to give mutual support, was isolated. A counterattack the next day was easily repulsed and on February 16th, the Germans advanced towards Sbeitla. After several further withdrawals the U.S. II Corps was able to concentrate at the Kasserine and Sbiba Passes, on the western arm of the mountains. U.S. casualties were 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, three anti-tank guns.

At this point, there was some argument in the Axis camp about what to do next; all of Tunisia was under Axis control, and there was little to do until the Eighth Army arrived at Mareth. Rommel decided to attack through the Kasserine Pass into the main force of the U.S. II Corps at Tébessa to capture U.S. supplies on the Algerian side of the western arm of the mountains, eliminate the Allied ability to attack the coastal corridor linking Mareth and Tunis and threaten the southern flank of the First Army. On February 18th, Rommel submitted his proposals to Albert Kesselring, who forwarded them with his blessing. In the early hours of February 19th, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps Assault Group from Feriana to attack the Kasserine Pass. The 21st Panzer Division at Sbeitla was ordered to attack northward through the pass east of Kasserine which led to Sbiba and Ksour. The Kampfgruppe von Broich, the battlegroup released by Arnim from 10th Panzer Division, was ordered to concentrate at Sbeitla, where it would be ready to exploit success in either pass.

The Sbiba area was attacked by Battle Groups Stenkhoff and Schuette, remnants of the 21st Panzer Division. Facing the German armored advance was the British 6th Armoured Division (less the 26th Armoured Brigade which except for the tanks of the 16/5th Lancers had been sent to Thala). Also in the line was the 18th Regimental Combat Team from the U.S. 1st Infantry Division; and three battalions of infantry from U.S. 34th Infantry Division. There were also three U.S. Field Artillery battalions, elements of two British anti-tank regiments and some French detachments. The Germans made little progress against the combined firepower of the defending force which had also laid minefields.

Defending the pass was a force consisting of the U.S. 1st Battalion, 26th Regimental Combat Team, the U.S. 19th Combat Engineer Regiment, the 6th Field Artillery Battalion, a tank destroyer battalion and a battery of French artillery. On the hills to their west was French General Welvert's Task Force Welvert comprising a U.S. Ranger and infantry battalion, three French infantry battalions, two U.S. field artillery battalions, four French artillery batteries and engineer and anti-aircraft detachments. Furthest west was Task Force Bowen (consisting of the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regimental Combat Team), blocking the track from Feriana towards Tebessa. An attempt to surprise the Kasserine defenses by the 33rd Reconnaissance Unit into the pass failed and a battalion of Panzer grenadiers was ordered into the floor of the pass and another onto Djebel Semmama, the hill on its eastern flank and slow progress was made against artillery fire. The tanks of 8th Panzer Regiment were committed at noon but little further progress resulted against stubborn defense. Rommel decided to commit his units from the 10th Panzer to the Kasserine Pass the next morning in a coordinated attack with the Afrika Korps Assault Group, which was to be joined by elements of the Italian 131st Armored Division Centauro.

During the night, the American positions on the two shoulders overlooking the pass were overrun and at 8:30 am German panzer grenadiers and Italian Bersaglieri resumed the attack. At 10:00am Brigadier Dunphie judged that Colonel Alexander Stark's force was about to give way and ordered Gore Force to the Thala side of the pass as elements of the Centauro Division launched their attack towards Tebessa and continued it during the afternoon. At 1:00 pm Rommel committed two battalions from 10th Panzer which overcame the defense. Tanks and Bersaglieri from the Centauro Division advanced along Highway 13 and overran the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment. The U.S. survivors made a disorganized retreat up the western exit from the pass to Djebel el Hamra, where Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division was arriving.

The Afrika Korps Assault Group began moving along the Hatab River valley towards Haidra and Tebessa in the early afternoon of February 21 and advanced until they met defenders consisting of the U.S. 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division and Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division at Djebel el Hamra. The German–Italian force was halted and, despite heavy pressure including air attacks, failed to dislodge the American defenders. Having brought the Axis drive towards Tebessa to a halt, General Paul Robinett and General Terry Allen now turned their attention to planning a counterattack that was to take place the next day, February 22nd. Plans made by both sides were upset by the battle, and the Axis forces (5 Bersaglieri, a Semovente group from Centauro and 15 Panzer) launched another assault on the U.S. position on the morning of the 22nd. Although the American defenders were pressed hard the line held and, by mid-afternoon, the U.S. infantry and tanks launched a counterattack that broke the combined German and Italian force. More than 400 Axis prisoners were taken as the counterattack was pressed into the Afrika Korps position.

Overextended and with supplies dwindling, pinned down by the Allied artillery in the pass in front of Thala and now facing U.S. counterattacks along the Hatab River, Rommel realized his attack had been stopped. At Sbiba, along the Hatab River and now at Thala, the efforts of the German and Italian forces had failed to make a decisive break in the Allied line. With little prospect of further success, Rommel judged that it would be wiser to break off to concentrate in South Tunisia and strike a blow at the Eighth Army, catching them off balance while still assembling its forces. At a meeting at Rommel's Kasserine HQ on February 23rd Kesselring and his Chief of Staff Siegfried Westphal tried to change Rommel's mind, arguing that there were still possibilities for success. Rommel was adamant; Kesselring finally agreed and formal orders were issued that evening calling off the offensive and directing all Axis units to return to their start positions. On the 23rd, a massive American air attack on the pass hastened the German retreat and by late on February 24th, the pass had been reoccupied, Feriana was in Allied hands; Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeitla followed soon after.

German losses at Kasserine were 201 killed, 536 wounded and 252 missing, totalling 989 casualties. In material Germans lost 20 tanks, 67 vehicles and 14 guns. Allied forces captured 73 German and 535 Italian soldiers. American losses totalled 300 killed, 3,000 wounded, and 3,000 missing. Losses were so high that an additional 7,000 replacements were needed to recover units to their original strength. The French losses on the 34th Division totalled 50 killed, 200 wounded and 250 missing. Material losses of the US II Corps were staggering, in total 183 tanks, 104 half tracks, 208 guns and 512 trucks and motor vehicles were lost, some of them captured by the Germans. The allies also lost supplies and fuel, over 215 cubic meters of gasoline and lubricants were seized. Rommel had hoped to take advantage of the inexperience of the new Allied commanders but was opposed by Arnim who, wanting to conserve strength in his sector, ignored Kesselring's orders and withheld the attached heavy tank unit of 10th Panzer. Rommel felt that most U.S. units and commanders had showed their inexperience, losing sight of the broader picture. Rommel was later impressed with how quickly U.S. commanders came to understand and implement mobile warfare and also praised U.S. equipment: "British experience has been put to good use in American equipment". The Allies studied the results equally seriously. Positioned by senior commanders who had not personally reconnoitered the ground, U.S. forces were often located too far from each other for mutual support. It was also noted that U.S. soldiers tended to become careless about digging in, exposing their positions, bunching in groups when in open view of enemy artillery observers.

[mav-it]

Italian self-propelled gun comparison: semovente 75/18 M42M (left) alongside the prototype of the future semovente M42L (right) then renamed semovente M43 105/25 to the Ansaldo workshops. Genoa, Italy, February 1943.

German designation: beutepanzer, StuG M42 mit 75/18 850 (i) and StuG M43 mit 105/25 853 (i).

[captain-price-unofficially]

Semovente 75/18 destroyed in an open field. Most likely somewhere in Italy

[rusti-k]

Semovente M42 da 75/18 (Sturmgeschütz M 42 mit 75/18) #semovente #m42 #sturmgeschütz #italiantank #warthunder #ww2tanks #wwii #ww2pictures #ww2 #worldwar #ww2vehicles #ww2inphotos #rustik #tank #tanquedeguerra #panzerwaffe #armored #italianarmy #italiano #italia #sgm #secondworldwar #segundaguerramundial #panzer #carrodecombate #blindado #battletank #mainbattletank #militarytank #military — view on Instagram https://ift.tt/2TwZNGb

[claudio82clod]

Riprendiamo questa sera la serie riguardante i mezzi corazzati italiani della seconda guerra mondiale. Quello che vedete è l'evoluzione del semovente 75/18 di cui vi ho parlato qualche sera fa. Rispetto a quest'ultimo monta un cannone più lungo, 34 calibri rispetto 18. Venne nominato M42 M, e verso la fine della guerra ne furono prodotti alcuni esemplari su scafo M43. E' forse il miglior mezzo italiano. Il cannone e il proiettile erano molto validi rispetto i loro concorrenti. #storie #storia #storieefoto #history #war #ww2 #worldwar2 #worldwartwo #worldwar #tank #italian #semovente #fascism #fascist #nazi #artillery #army https://www.instagram.com/p/BsBqq_nHouP/?igshid=c49crwdcyvtg

[funobject]

1/144 Metal Troops Creation Italian Army Self-propelled Gun Semovente 75/18 M41

http://dlvr.it/PfpTgS

[cheesecakeshop]

1/144 Metal Troops Creation Italian Army Self-propelled Gun Semovente 75/18 M41

http://dlvr.it/PMnF8F

[alien-xcom]

1/144 Metal Troops Creation Italian Army Self-propelled Gun Semovente 75/18 M41

http://dlvr.it/PN2hKK

[pinturas-sgm-tanques]

1942 El Alamein, Semovente da 75/18,  Division Ariete  - Don Greer - Squadron Signal

[superkimster]

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