#Nicomachean Ethics

[philosophybitmaps]

[hypergraphiacreads]

[lionofchaeronea]

I think the time has come to reread the Nicomachean Ethics. I'm embarrassed to say that the last time I read it cover-to-cover was about a decade ago, when I taught it in a humanities core class for college freshmen.

[quotessentially]

From Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

[void-thegod]

Reading the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle

I have an old classic version.

As you can see here, whether something is injustice isn't about intent.

It's about whether it was voluntary.

He speaks earlier on about free will.

About how much choice one has in virtue and vice.

I'll have to reread this whole thing again.

[crooked-wasteland]

Micro Essay: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Synopsis: Virtue Ethics and the moral obligation to “virtue” as a basis of privilege from the perspective of the Absurdist.

When Aristotle wrote about his philosophy in Nicomachean Ethics, he spoke of a variety of variability in what he called virtue. Specifically, he spoke at length of the epidemiology of ethics, talking of the potential of humanity and their capacity for good and how one becomes “good”. He wrote of how human nature exists as a dichotomy of man, both naturally inclined while unnaturally desired. With this foundation, Aristotle draws a distinct line between those who do good and those that simply are good, elevating the latter above the former. He delineates the difference when he writes, “These actions that produce moral value are not good in the same sense as those that flow from it … if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately” (Aristotle 146-147). In essence outlining that acting in the expectation of good that goes against one's nature or is in so many ways a product of what Aristotle called “passions” and “faculties” (174), that the actions themselves are held up by nothing. When virtue is a product of one's character, they will be consistent in their actions while those who lack such character are feckless do-gooders who cannot be relied upon to be good.

While I recognize Aristotle's hesitancy towards those who cannot be trusted to do good, I find it outside of our moral duty to hold others to the standard of virtuousness, nor our right to judge how or why someone chooses to behave a certain way. Aristotle's fixation on achieving a virtuous character, however, overlaps slightly with my own beliefs born from Camus’ writings on what he called Truth. Aristotle’s philosophy hinges on this idea of something innate and pure that moves us to do good, but is not so innate as to be natural from birth. This concept requires the idea of molding oneself into a person who merely is virtuous for its own sake and not for the value of that virtue. Aristotle dog-ears the idea of what a virtuous character is by describing it as, “Pleasure in doing virtuous acts” (Aristotle 146). Whereas the absurd belief in Truth is more about accepting what is, and that this truth has a multitude of ways it will be understood by others. Aristotle grounds his philosophy in an unattainable objectivity that is fundamentally fluid, which is where I disagree with it. And that concept runs aground with Aristotle's claims of certain actions being deplorable at all times. While I don't believe there is ever a time to justify adultery, I must side with Camus again when he writes, “Supposing that living in this way were not honorable, then true propriety would command me to be dishonorable” (Camus 63). Aristotle claims theft is never justifiable, but would it not be deplorable for a parent to do nothing to save their starving child in poverty? Would it not be wrong to take no action at all if it meant saving a life, even if that action was generally seen as morally conflicted?

In how Aristotle devalues good deeds through the lens of true character, he still argues for dishonesty of those who do not meet his standards and judges the people instead of the actions. Whereas Camus is not judging the moral value of people. Actions are either altruistic or cause harm, and the intent behind such actions is wholly irrelevant. The type of people we are amounts to the actions we commit in the presence of every different person. The truth is neither our own, nor consistent, and Aristotle's philosophy of virtue tries to take that in account while still dictating an objective reality that can only truly exist in privilege.

[thepastisalreadywritten]

“The beauty of the soul shines out when a man bears with composure one heavy mischance after another, not because he does not feel them, but because he is a man of high and heroic temper.”

— Aristotle (384–322 BC), ''Nicomachean Ethics''

[words-of-wonderland]

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book I

I find myself clashing quite often with the virtue theory Aristotle put forth in Nicomachean Ethics.

I do not agree that happiness is the greatest category of good on the grounds that it is complete without qualification ( Book I Chapter 7). I find that happiness cannot account for the actions we choose to complete for the sake of another such as the case of withholding a substance from an addict. This process causes painful withdrawal, sickness, unhappiness, etc with no promise of complete normalcy restored; and now with modern neuroscience, we know that even the physiological phenomenon of happiness and pleasure, at least the aspect dependent on neural transmitters, takes years to begin the restoration process of level regulation. All this is to say, we still find the act of enabling an addict deplorable and the act of aiding the weaning process good while by no means producing happiness. There is some other greater good we strive for when engaging in acts such as this. 

In the second part of Book I Chapter 7, Aristotle continues to expound that "human function is the activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason" and that "the human good proves to be an activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one." My first intuition is that this hierarchy of moral character should not determine the goodness of a life. I would argue that the life of an infant without conscious interaction with reason -- Aristotle does argue that one cannot be virtuous in sleep or other states of unconsciousness-- can still be good and live a good life. I would also argue that the less rationally equipped and those who "operate" outside of reason can be and live the greatest good. Aristotle does take the stance that a child cannot be happy "since his age prevents him from doing these sorts of actions" (Book I Chapter 9)

My third main contention is that Aristotle's conception of virtue itself is the outside perspective applied to the life and actions of another person. the fact that fortune, resources, and legacy can affect even in small portions the goodness of the life of a dead person is case enough. Moreover, as discussed both praisworthiness and honor are subjective to the context of the observers (Book I Chapter 12). Aristotle claims that virtue is beholden to honor, but context-subjectivity renders it useless as a measurement for the greatest good. 

But, I will forge ahead into Book II.

[jamesgraybooksellerworld]

Aristotle and Burley.

284J Aristotle , –Gualtherus Burlaeus. (Walter Burley (c. 1275–1344/5 )) Expositio Gualteri Burlei super decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis (Contains the text of Robert Grosseteste’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics) Venice: Simon de Luere for Andreas Torresanus, 4 September 1500            Price $15,500 Folio, 12 1/4 X 8 1/2 in.    A8 a6b-x8 y10.  Second edition after the first of…

[nochilleftb3hine]

"Virtue, then, is twofold, intellectual and moral. Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue result mostly from teaching-- hence it requires experience and time-- whereas moral virtue is the result of habit...What happens in the cities too bears witness to this, for by habituating citizens, lawgivers make them good, and this is the wish of every lawgiver; all who do not do this well are in error, and it is in this respect that a good regime differs from a bad regime."

-- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chapter 1

[mariathemillennial]

Bioethics, Orwell & Autumn

Reflecting on Literature and Languages #4 (September 2024) This is my fourth newsletter already! Time flies. September was a good reading month for me (I hope for you too). I have finished four books, and loved all of them! Most of my reading was thesis focused (so a lot of bioethics), however, since it’s finally Fall season, I have also tried to pick up some books and stories with an autumnal…

[philosophybitmaps]

[raffaellopalandri]

The Quiet Revolution: A Habit of Mind

Daily writing promptDescribe one habit that brings you joy.View all responses The human experience is a story written with countless coloured inks, each contributing to the intricate pattern of our lives. Photo by Antoni Shkraba on Pexels.com Habits emerge as among our most powerful tools, helping us shape our days, our characters, and ultimately, our destinies. While some habits are mere…

[itsmadhvi]

Aristotle's Friendship: Virtue, Love, and Happiness Explained

Ever wonder what happiness looks like? Happiness is friendship! If you are happy in someone’s company, what else might you need? Philosophers talk about virtue because they want to craft a good life. Without virtue, a good life is hardly possible. So, philosophers are looking at friendship through the lens of virtue. Do we have virtue in friendship? And if not, how could we cultivate virtue in…

[quotessentially]

From Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

[gettothedancing]

#ok aristotle literally said 'courage isn't doing things that defy great odds #it's doing stuff that makes sense within your limits' or some shit like that #you have to find that middle ground between cowardice and foolishness #but like. that line is going to change if you really have people to impress or you really care about your own life

Yeah okay “Homura,” if that IS your real name, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: BOOK III