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raat-jaaga-paakhi · 3 months ago

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you mentioned harivansha and from what i know of scholarly stuffs it's much older than bhagavata purana so why do you think it isn't prominently considered for krishna's life? and what translations of harivansha do you use for your studies? i'm sorry if this seems too eager lololol

I'm answering this ask a year late, so I suppose that offsets your zeal (in a really horrible way)? This has been in my drafts, I just forgot about it entirely, thank you for coming to my inbox to remind me again. <3

Yes, Harivamsha was written much prior to Srimad Bhagavata Purana, and is considered some sort of appendix to the Mahabharata, which again is of greater antiquity. We can only speculate as to its relative lack of popularity, and I would like to mull over my own thoughts on this a bit more. I'll make a separate post, possibly. Let me just give a small introduction on the Harivamsha instead.

A Guide to Harivamsha

REFERENCES I USE IN MY STUDIES: (in no particular order)

1. Harivamsha Critical Edition (as edited by BORI, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute), EN-translated by Bibek Debroy.

Above-average translation quality. Compared to the others, the only benefit of this reference is that it lets one know what sections BORI cleaved—regarding which one must keep in mind that, as Debroy himself noted and as I observed in the course of reading as well, the editing of Harivamsha Critical Edition was in no way as well and expertly done as that of the Mahabharata Critical Edition (BORI).

2. Harivamsha Purana, Gita Press

The only complete and accessible translation (Hindi) of HV that there is. Great translation quality. You usually don't have to second-guess each line (like I have to, with No. 1).

3. Chitrashala Press edition of Harivamsa, Online EN translation by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao, A. Purushothaman & A. Harindranath. https://www.dvaipayana.net/harivamsa/harivamsa-cs-index.html

Very helpful, as you get the Sanskrit verses alongside the translated English ones, for comparison/tallying purposes.

4. Harivamsha Purana, EN-translated by M. N. Dutt (https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/harivamsha-purana-dutt)

Most accessible translation; no big differences from No. 3 in interpretations. (I will take this opportunity to recommend Wisdomlib to practically everyone in this fandom.)

5. Krishna’s Lineage: The Harivamsha of Vyāsa’s Mahābhārata. EN translation by Simon P. Brodbeck.

Good translation, good language, immensely well-organised. Has family trees in a genealogical appendix.

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF HARIVAMSHA'S STRUCTURE:

The text is divided into 3 parvas, as follows -

Harivamsha Parva - This contains a lot of background information through the genealogies and stories interspersed in all the lineage talk. We get some important backstory for MBh, and we get some stories which you may find in most other Puranas. (Interestingly, this contains the Syamantaka incident. It was a really big deal, is all.)

Vishnu Parva - The main section of Krishna's non-MBh life-story, starting from his birth, the Mathura-era exploits (Kamsavadh, Jarāsandha's attacks), Rukmini-harana (my beloved), the Pārijāta story, and dealing with Pradyumna (his firstborn) and Aniruddha's (Pradyumna's son) lives as well.

Bhavishya Parva - The first chapters of this section are indeed about "bhavishya" (things that happen or "will happen" post-Swargārohana, prophecies about Kali Yuga, etc). Then there's a set of chapters that go into some of Vishnu's avatars (Varāha, Narasimha, Vāmana, in particular). These two sets of chapters are translated in almost all versions. Then comes the dicey part, the set of chapters translated only in Gita Press Harivamsha, and ironically, the most important part of Bhavishya Parva in my opinion (because it has major portions of Krishna's life-story. This section contains Paundraka's (and Ekalavya's) siege on Dwāraka, the killing of Hamsa-Dimbaka (Jarāsandha's closest allies that Krishna speaks of to Yudhisthira in MBh's Sabhā parva) etc. Invaluable for better understanding of Yādava politics, and kind of ties up some loose ends from MBh.

Lovers and collectors of obscure Krishna-katha (or even just Purana-katha in general), Harivamsha is the place for you! <3

#it's a queue peepuls #krishna #harivamsa #harivamsha #harivansha #bhagavata purana #translation #mahabharata #medha answers #(after a year and a few months)#puranas #hindublr

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butchnavi · 5 months ago

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"nee narasimha rao oda vaaris pa" - my dad, 2024

#._.#context he asked me to do something and i was so confused and kept asking for clarifications so he just got up and did it himself #liveblogging.pdf

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buzz-london · 9 months ago

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Indian Prime Ministers

A rich person can become Prime Minister This was proved by Nehru. A poor person can become Prime Minister This was proved by Shastri Ji. An old person can become Prime Minister This was proved by Morarji. A young person can become Prime Minister This was proved by Rajiv Gandhi. A woman can become Prime Minister This was proved by Indira Gandhi. A farmer can become Prime Minister This was proved by Chaudhary Charan Singh. A person from a *royal family can become Prime Minister This was proved by V.P. Singh. An educated and multifaceted person can become Prime Minister This was proved by P.V. Narasimha Rao. A poet can become Prime Minister This was proved by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Anyone can become Prime Minister This was proved by HD Devegowda.

There is no need for a Prime Minister This was proved by Dr. Manmohan Singh.

A country can be ruled even without becoming a Prime Minister This was proved by Sonia Gandhi.

But a tea seller can become Prime Minister and do better work than all and raise the flag of Bharat Mata all over the world This was proved by Narendra Modi.

#indian politics

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youremyheaven · 10 months ago

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Hello, I read your post that you follow tantra meditation and I wanted to ask do you practice only the meditation or are you following the tantra path for spirituality?

I am trying these days to know more about tantra sadana and when I saw that you do tantra meditation I got curious 😅😅 and the previous ask about PV narasimha rao astrologer I looked into his website he considers ' swami vimalandha' as his guru who is a tantric , he's also guru to Robert svoboda who wrote ' aghora : the trilogy ' and a tantric as well.

What really piqued my interest in tantra is the whole different perspective of looking at life , at first was I was afraid of even the word 'tantra' ( is such a taboo in India) . Now I feel so much respect for it , how they give importance to women in sadana ( obviously they pray to 10 MAHAVIDHYAS ) and I know some rituals are not for the faint heart but tantra in itself is so vast , beautiful and vv hard but also very fast result giving path . Sorry for the yapping but if you already know about tantra , cool. If not I suggest watching RAJASHRI NANDY podcast episodes on TRS channel he's awesome, and the aghora trilogy by Robert svoboda

I thought it'd be awesome to share with you. Love each and every post of yours, keep doing it ! ❤️❤️❤️

i only practice the meditation

ive heard of robert svobodha!!

ive actually watched that episode, Rajshri sir is very eloquent and explains concepts well!!

here it is for anyone who is interested (theyve done several episodes together including one about vedic astrology if you want to watch)

tysm <33 hope you have a good day tomm<3

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mariacallous · 1 year ago

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India’s Middle East policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is often seen as both successful and perplexing. The governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to which Modi belongs, has a nationalist Hindu-right bent, and yet India’s outreach toward the Persian Gulf region under the current government, particularly to the Arab world, has been a defining success over the past decade.

The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, sparked by the latter’s audacious strike on Oct. 7, has brought under the spotlight New Delhi’s diplomatic balance between a “new” Middle East and its traditional support for the “old.” The new is defined by New Delhi’s increasingly close proximity to the security ecosystem of the United States, while the old is highlighted by a visible shift away from the idea of nonalignment. India’s participation in new tools of economic diplomacy—such as the I2U2 minilateral between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States, as well as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) announced on sidelines of the G-20 summit in September—are evidence of these not-so-subtle changes in posture, led by a burgeoning consensus between New Delhi and Washington to push back against an increasingly aggressive China.

India has been a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause since its independence, viewing the crisis through moral support for Palestinian sovereignty and as an anti-colonial struggle. In 1975, India became the first non-Arab state to grant full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its then-chief, Yasser Arafat, regularly visited New Delhi. That relationship has become more complicated.

Last month, Modi condemned Hamas terrorism just weeks before the youth wing of Jamaat-e-Islami in the southern state of Kerala, which has close ties with the Gulf, hosted a virtual talk by former Hamas leader Khaled Mashal—showcasing the wide range of views that have long existed within India.

After decades of leaning toward the Arab world, in 1992, then-Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic ties with Israel. This was done at a time of great change in the across the subcontinent, marked by the country’s economic liberalization following years of crisis. However, Israel was quietly building a strong foundation for this eventuality over the previous decades, supplying India with military aid in two crucial wars that it fought against Pakistan in 1971, before normalization, and then again in 1999, after full diplomatic ties were established.

This normalization forced India to perform a balancing act between three poles of power in the region: the Arab world, Israel, and Iran. All three remain important to Indian interests. The larger Arab world hosts more than 7 million Indian workers, who send back billions of dollars into the Indian economy as remittances; Israel remains a critical technology and defense partner; and Iran’s strategic location helps promote Indian interests in both Central Asia and a now much more volatile Afghanistan under a Taliban regime.

Fast-forward to 2023, and Indian foreign policy toward the region increasingly looks more pragmatic in design, balancing opportunities and challenges in an increasingly fractured global order, or what scholars Michael Kimmage and Hannah Notte have aptly termed “the age of great-power distraction.” As India’s economy rapidly grows, setting its sights on becoming the third largest in the world by 2030, so does its desire for influence. And the Middle East, from a foreign-policy perspective, is where a lot of this influence is being tested.

A recent spat between India and Qatar offers an interesting example for managing inflection points. In October, Doha announced a verdict of death sentences for eight former Indian Navy officials who were working for a private contractor involved with Qatar’s defense modernization. They were charged, according to reports, of spying on behalf of Israel. Since then, New Delhi has responded legally, appealing the Qatari court’s verdict while both countries continue to keep the judicial verdict confidential.

This is not the first time New Delhi has become embroiled in the regional fissures of the Middle East. In 2012 and 2021, Israeli diplomats were targeted in bombings in the capital, and in both cases, India hinted at Iranian involvement and having to delicately manage the situation behind closed doors—effectively telling Iran and Israel not to let their conflict spread to Indian soil.

Today, India is becoming more of an economic stakeholder in the Middle East, and by association, its security postures. This is not just the result of New Delhi’s reoriented foreign policy designs, but also depends on the personal involvement of Modi himself.

In 2017, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. Considering his brand of politics, he also visited Ramallah in the West Bank in 2018 to maintain India’s diplomatic consistency. He hosted Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2019 at the height of the Jamal Khashoggi murder scandal, when the Saudis were not welcome in most capitals. And finally, Modi has visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) five times since taking charge in 2015, and is often found referring to UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan as “brother.”

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Modi has talked to six regional leaders to put India’s position across, from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The Modi government has attempted to walk a fine line between Israel’s counterterrorism aims against Hamas and the Palestinian humanitarian crisis. Countering terrorism has been an important tool for Modi’s international diplomacy, coming from India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally for its state-sponsored terrorism.

But Indian diplomacy in the Gulf also has another objective: strengthening India’s position on Kashmir, which defines the India-Pakistan conflict, and weakening Islamabad’s case within organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In February 2019, India’s then-Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj became the first Indian minister to be invited to speak at the organization since 1969, an event hailed as a major victory of Indian diplomacy; Pakistan was represented by an empty chair during Swaraj’s speech.

New Delhi’s other expanding relationship has been with the United States. In Asia, the institutionalization of mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has brought Washington and New Delhi closer than ever before as both look to work together to counter an increasingly erratic China. India’s buy-in with the United States has not been just about the Asian theater, but the Middle East as well, with measures such as the I2U2 and IMEEC taking shape.

However, India’s own domestic politics have often also presented a challenge. In 2022, comments made by a BJP spokesperson against the Prophet Mohammed invoked widespread condemnation by Islamic nations, including those building close partnerships with India. Previously, in private, Anti-Muslim narratives in Indian domestic politics have been an area of discussion between Arab states and New Delhi. During this period, India has also pushed back against reports by the U.S. State Department on what the department described as the country’s deteriorating religious freedoms, criticizing them as “biased.” Despite these differences, strategic cooperation has remained steadfast.

The establishment of I2U2 was a direct result of the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2021. Both Israel and the UAE have been quick to establish a strong economic bilateral relationship since then. The accords have also helped countries such as India to increase economic and political cooperation with greater ease.

It is important to note here that while the I2U2 is seen as an economic cooperation platform, all member states, have taken part in expansive military maneuvers in the region in some shape or form. And this includes India, where all three services of its armed forces, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, have increased their outreach and participation.

Beyond the I2U2, the announcement of the IMEEC is New Delhi’s latest sign of alignment with U.S. geoeconomic objectives. Already positioned by some as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the idea is to connect the Middle East with Europe and India through a trade corridor that can rival the centrality of the Suez Canal.

But countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, central to IMEEC, are also members of the Belt and Road Initiative and have interest in developing close partnerships with Beijing. Propaganda outlets of the Chinese Communist Party have already labeled IMEEC as a mere “castle in the air” The European Union, the United States, and India alike have marketed the corridor as the next intracontinental highway for digital and economic connectivity. However, IMEEC is in nascent stages of development, and no blueprint is currently on offer on how it is going to function.

These new economic highways, minilaterals, and reoriented geopolitics are transforming Indian foreign policy from one that has always been risk-averse to one that is willing to be a little more adventurous. Today, India is much closer to the United States than it has been at any point in its independent history.

Between its increasingly West-centric defense and technology shopping list—a historical break away from having a predominantly Soviet-era military ecosystem that continues to rely on Russian know-how even today—and the India-U.S. 2+2 dialogues regularly setting new precedents, it is not that surprising to see India partner with the United States in theaters such as the Middle East, where the Abraham Accords have leveled the playing field in a limited fashion between Israel, the United States, and a part of the Arab world.

Simultaneously, a counterargument against deeper U.S. collaboration from India also comes from the time that India helped the United States with the Iran nuclear deal prior to its unceremonious end in 2018. New Delhi had let go of significant diplomatic access to align with U.S. requirements by ending nearly all oil imports from Iran, which has vast reserves, offers good deals, and is geographically conveniently located. This fed into the then-U.S. policy of strong sanctions against Tehran to push it to negotiate with the U.N. Security Council’s group of permanent members. Experiences such as the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal continue to fuel a strong undercurrent of distrust toward Washington in Indian political circles.

India’s own position of upholding its strategic autonomy and self-styled leadership of the global south may find it often at odds with its strategic role in the Middle East as a partner of the United States. One of India’s longest-serving successes in this region has been its embrace of nonalignment. The fact that the I2U2 was almost immediately identified by some observers as the Middle East Quad gave it a texture of being an extension of a core U.S. interest—that of containing China. While India has never officially used such terminology, these portrayals in the media were detrimental to the kind of neutrality that New Delhi still hopes to preserve.

Finally, India’s outlook toward the Middle East is looking beyond the traditional centrality of energy and migration. Today, from the beginning, it wants to be a partner in the region’s post-oil growth designs. Indian diplomats in the region, earlier almost exclusively bogged down with migrant matters, are now tasked to secure foreign direct investments from the large Arab sovereign wealth funds. Modi’s majority government, in power since 2015, has been palatable to Arab monarchs who do not have to navigate a labyrinth of India’s coalition politics looking for fast decision-making, which they are accustomed to.

Whether its own leaders like it or not, India has bought into aspects of future security architectures with its membership of the I2U2 and IMEEC in one of the world’s most flammable regions. This is a bold and commendable posture for an economy that will require significant global input for its challenging future economic goals. It is also palatable for the Middle East to have India as a major energy market to diversify its exports and offset Chinese influence over critical commodities such as oil and gas.

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livetimesnewschannel · 18 days ago

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Who is the Only Living Ex-PM to resign as CM and Lead India

Introduction

Former PM HD Deve Gowda : भारतीय राजनीति के इतिहास में 90 का दशक काफी उथल-पुथल भरा रहा. जहां पर देश में 1991 से लेकर अक्टूबर 1999 तक 8 सालों में 6 प्रधानमंत्रियों को शपथ दिलानी पड़ी थी. राजनीतिक अस्थिरता आने की वजह से देश के आर्थिक विकास में कई तरह की चुनौतियों का सामना करना पड़ रहा था और उस वक्त राजनीतिक विश्लेषक भी दावा नहीं कर पा रहे थे कि यह संकट कब खत्म होगा. इसी संकट की घड़ी में थर्ड फ्रंट से प्रधानमंत्री पद के लिए एचडी देवगौड़ा का नाम सामने आया वह उस वक्त दक्षिण की राजनीति में एक बड़ा चेहरा थे और कर्नाटक के मुख्यमंत्री पद पर भी विराजमान थे. उनसे पहले पामुलपर्थी वेंकट नरसिम्हा राव (PV Narasimha Rao) की अगुवाई वाली सरकार ने 1991-1996 तक 5 सालों का कार्यकाल पूरा किया.

Table Of Content

VP सिंह और ज्योति बसु को भी दिया ऑफर

पूर्व पीएम एचडी देवगौड़ा का जीवन

ऐसा रहा पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री का करियर

पीएम के लिए किसने आगे बढ़ाया नाम

राजनीति में आने से पहले क्या करते थे देवगौड़ा

VP सिंह और ज्योति बसु को भी दिया ऑफर

देश की दो राष्ट्रीय पार्टियों (BJP और कांग्रेस) की सरकार नहीं बनने के बाद देश में संयुक्त मोर्चा या थर्ड फ्रंड के रूप उभरकर आया जहां उन्होंने सबसे पहले पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री विश्वनाथ प्रताप सिंह और वामपंथी नेता ज्योति बसु को ऑफर दिया लेकिन दोनों नेताओं ने ऑफर को ठुकरा दिया. वहीं, वीपी सिंह से बार-बार अनुरोध किया गया कि वह प्रधानमंत्री पद ग्रहण करें लेकिन उन्होंने इसे अस्वीकार कर दिया. इसी बीच जनता दल के वरिष्ठ नेता एचडी देवगौड़ा प्रधानमंत्री बनाने का फैसला लिया गया और उस दौरान वह कर्नाटक के मुख्यमंत्री भी थे. इसके बाद एचडी देवगौड़ा को मुख्यमंत्री पद से इस्तीफा दिलवाया गया और संसद के ऊपरी सदन राज्यसभा का सदस्य बनाकर प्रधानमंत्री की कुर्सी तक पहुंचाया दिया.

पूर्व पीएम एचडी देवगौड़ा का जीवन

यह भी पढ़ें- MP की मोहन सरकार का बड़ा फैसला, धार्मिक शहरों में होगी शराबबंदी, बनाई जा रही है योजना

ऐसा रहा पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री का करियर

साल 1962 में 28 साल की उम्र में देवगौड़ा ने कर्नाटक विधानसभा का निर्दलीय उम्मीदवार के रूप में चुनाव लड़ा और जीतने के बाद पहली बार विधानसभा पहुंचे. इस दौरान उन्होंने वक्ता के रूप में अन्य राजनीतिक पार्टियों के वरिष्ठ नेताओं को प्रभावित किया. इसके बाद वह लगातार तीन बार होलेनारसिपुर निर्वाचन क्षेत्र से (1967-1971), (1972-1977) और (1978-1983) चुनाव जीतकर विधानसभा जाते रहें. इसके अलावा पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री ने मार्च 1972 से मार्च 1976 और 1976 से दिसंबर 1977 तक प्रतिपक्ष नेता के रूप में भी लोगों को ध्यान का अपनी ओर आकर्षित किया. देवेगौड़ा ने 22 नवंबर 1982 को छठी विधानसभा की सदस्यता छोड़ दी. 7वीं और 8वीं विधानसभा के सदस्य रहते हुए लोक निर्माण और सिंचाई में मंत्री पद संभाला.

सिंचाई मंत्री रहते हुए उन्होंने कई परियोजनाओं को शुरू किया और 1987 में सिंचाई के लिए अपर्याप्त धन आवंटन करने के चलते उन्हें भारी विरोध का सामना करना पड़ा और उसके बाद उन्होंने अपने पद से इस्तीफा दे दिया. स्वतंत्रता और समानता के समर्थक गौड़ा को 1975-76 में केंद्र सरकार की नाराजगी का सामना करना पड़ा और उन्हें पुलिस ने गिरफ्तार करने के बाद जेल में डाल दिया जहां उन्होंने अपना पूरा समय अध्ययन में लगा दिया. जेल से छूटने के बाद उनके व्यक्तित्व में एक बड़ा बदलाव देखा गया ज��सकी वजह से वह परिपक्व और दृढ व्यक्तित्व के साथ अपनी राजनीति का झंडा गाढ़ने में सफल रहे.

यह भी पढ़ें-नीतीश की ‘ना’, लालू-मीसा की ‘हां’, बिहार में दही-चूड़ा भोज से सियासी संदेश, क्या चुनाव में होगा खेला?

पीएम के लिए किसने आगे बढ़ाया नाम

यह भी पढ़ें-‘PoK के सभी लॉन्च पैड के बारे में हमें पता’, अब कांपेगा पाकिस्तान, रक्षा मंत्री ने दे दी अंतिम चेतावनी

राजनीति में आने से पहले क्या करते थे देवगौड़ा

यह भी पढ़ें- मिल्कीपुर में BJP का दलित दांव! चंद्रभान पासवान को दिया टिकट, जानें क्यों दिलचस्प हुआ मुकाबला

Conclusion

मध्यम वर्गीय परिवार से संबंधित रखने वाले एचडी देवगौड़ा भारत के 11वें प्रधानमंत्री बने और उन्होंने यह पद मुख्यमंत्री पद से इस्तीफा देने के बाद ग्रहण किया. समानता और किसानों के उत्थान के समर्थक रहे रहने वाले देवगौड़ा ने कर्नाटक में सिंचाई मंत्री के दौरान किसानों के लिए कई कार्य किए. इसके बाद वह कर्नाटक में चार बार विधायक का चुनाव जीते. यही वजह थी कि देवगौड़ा दक्षिण भारत की राजनीति का एक मुख्य चेहरा बन गए.

कर्नाटक में वह दो बार प्रतिपक्ष नेता भी रहे जहां उन्होंने अपने वक्तव्य से सबका ध्यान अपनी ओर आकर्षित किया. आपको बताते चलें कि 91 वर्षीय एचडी देवगौड़ा वर्तमान की राजनीति में सक्रिय हैं और जनता दल सेक्युलर (JDS) के अध्यक्ष हैं. साथ ही मोदी लहर के दौरान 2014 में उन्होंने एक बार फिर हासन सीट से जीत दर्ज की, लेकिन 2019 के लोकसभा चुनाव में देवगौड़ा तुमकुर सीट से हार गए. उन्हें भारतीय जनता पार्टी (BJP) के उम्मीदवार रहे जीएस बासवराज ने हरा दिया था. हालांकि वह राज्यसभा के माध्यम से संसद में पहुंच गए. देवगौड़ की शादी चेन्��म्मा नाम की महिला से हुई है और उनके उससे 4 बेटे और 2 बेटियां हैं. देवगौड़ा का एक बेटा कुमारस्वामी कर्नाटक के दो बार मुख्यमंत्री रहे हैं. एक समय ऐसा भी था जब देवगौड़ा की नेतृत्व वाली पार्टी JDS BJP के खिलाफ मुखर होकर चुना लड़ती थी लेकिन बदलते वक्त में उन्होंने उसी पार्टी के साथ गठबंधन करके विधानसभा और लोकसभा चुनाव लड़ा.

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