#Lexi Blackstone
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am0ngtheb0nes · 2 years ago
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There’s something special about the memories made in a breath of sunlight.
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p21blackandgold · 4 months ago
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Assign a solo choreographer to each of these dancers (one they haven’t had do a solo for them ever)
1. gracyn
2. ellie
3. regan
4. sara
5. avery
6. lexi
7. stella
8. leighton
9. bristyn
10. berk
Gracyn: Talia
Ellie: Talia
Regan: Courtney
Sara: Al Blackstone (she hasn’t had a solo by him, right?)
Avery: Lucy Valley
Lexi: Lowkey think she’d eat a Kirsten Russell solo
Stella: Chantel Aguire
Leighton: Danny Lawn
Bristyn: Chelsea Jennings
Berk: Kenzie or Ricky Ubeda
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forthedancingandthethriving · 6 months ago
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"What if.. I.. gave up!"
"Valeria, what?" Bedelia looks at the rebellion leader, confused. "Why are you saying that?"
"Child soldiers, Bedelia!" Valeria swims over and grips her second-in-command's shoulders. "The empire has child shoulders — they're fucking 15!" The fins on the sides of her face lower. "15..."
Bedelia looks at Valeria with a frown. "I know, but those two are safe with us now. We'll start treating Celeste and see what Lexi knows."
The rebellion leader sighs, closing her eyes. "Yeah, that.. that sounds good." She releases the other's shoulders and looks at her apologetically. "I'm sorry. I shouldn't have gotten so overworked."
"It's okay!" The SIC shakes her head. She giggles a bit. "Just surprising to see you the nervous one."
Valeria nods. "I know.. It's just.. heartbreaking. Learning the extent of the brainwashing that's been done to these poor children."
Bedelia nods in agreement, but before she can get another word out, a siren is swimming up to them, his eyes wide. "Valeria! Bedelia! You need to head to Ghost's Crag now!"
"Why?" The two are instantly on high alert. "What's happened? Did someone fall in?"
"No!" The siren shakes his head. "I-Its worse! There's a group of people trapped down there!"
○●○
Valeria had never swam faster in her life, with Bedelia right behind her. They soon got to Ghost's Crag, a giant crevice in the ocean floor. It was said to be caused by a fight between Empress Moria and a siren who could shape-shift.
Apparently, their fight lasted for eight days and eight nights, and Moria emerged victorious, and with the infamous Storm Trident in her possession.
She shudders as she remembers the lightning it could summon. The typhoons it made with a single wave.
"Down there!" Bedelia snaps her out of her thoughts, and the two swim further down.
Ghost's Crag was given its name due to the toxic fumes that came from small vents. They were small but numerous. The fumes made you hallucinate, see things that weren't there. Those who lived purely in the sea had evolved to not be affected, but those above land tended to be badly affected.
But people being trapped? How could that even happen?
In a flurry a bubbles, Valeria's weapon appears. She was blessed to have one that changes like the water, and she let's it shift to that of a large war hammer. "Bede, get ready to move and use your whip to grab them!"
"Got it!" Bedelia nods, her whip appearing in a flurry of bubbles as well.
The two dive deeper down, and she can hear voices. Discussing, talking, wondering where they are.
"Hey!" Valeria shouts once she gets to the thinnest rocks. "Hey, can you hear me?"
"Hello?!" A male's voice calls out. "Is someone there!"
"Yes, I'm real!" She assures the voice. "Listen, I'm going to smash this rock in, which is gonna flood in water. You'll need to hold you breath. My friend is going to grab you with her whip to get you guys out as fast as we can, okay?"
After noises of agreement, Valeria swims back. With a low grunt, she swings the hammer, slamming it into the rocky wall. It crumbles like paper, and Bedelia acts quickly, her whip shooting out and wrapping around many wrists.
They begin to swim, swim as fast as they can.
When they breach the surface, Valeria finally gets a good look at them.
And she feels her heart skip a beat because she's sure that she's seen those faces before. But from where? A mural, maybe?
○●○
Lexi prides herself in being very, very sneaky. You don't become a Tigerfish from brute strength alone. No, you sneak and around and figure things out on your own.
The purple octoling peers her head around the doorway, red eyes glancing around. The room she was peering into was large and open air, with what she presumed to be magic, making a dome overhead, keeping the water of the outside out.
In the center, on a pedestal, was a crown. It wasn't anything grand. It was a blackstone crown, floating in a bubble. Two rings of water circled around it, like a protection.
Lexi narrows her eyes. That must be what's keeping their base hidden. With how big this place is, it makes sense.
She looks around with a huff. The room being completely devoid of water surprised her, but she guessed it made sense. Mermaids and sirens could transform to have legs if they so wished.
Sparing one glance back towards the crown, she rushes off. Completely missing the mural in the back, show casing a giant siren wielding the Storm Trident and fighting against what seemed to be a.. younger Moria.
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jessymael · 2 years ago
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Blackstone - Lexie Shirt Dress - Fatpack par jessy Via Flickr : ❀ Lexie Shirt Dress ! ★ 20 colors options sold separately or Fatpack. ​In Fatpack and Single Color ★ 20 color options for Corset - 20 color options for Buttons - 4 metal options - 10 Gems color for Corset. ★ 100% Original Mesh. ★ For Maitreya Lara - Legacy Body - Kupra Original. ★ Taxi: maps.secondlife.com/secondlife/Eventive/166/46/1208
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A Look At Trump’s Pardon Of Steve Bannon
By Rosaura Ritger, American University Class of 2021
January 26, 2021
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We recently witnessed the inauguration of a new president this past Wednesday, January 20th. And while many look ahead to the future, it is important not to gloss over what happens in the final days and hours of a president’s term. Former President Donald Trump, specifically, made several last-minute presidential pardons and had even considered pardoning himself. Among the last-minute pardons was Steve Bannon, one of Trump’s political allies and former White House Chief Strategist. [1] This is nothing new for Trump, pardoning other political allies such as Michael Flynn and Roger Stone in the last few months of 2020. [2] Despite the obvious red flags of a president pardoning political allies, Trump has also pardoned Charles Kushner in December of 2020. That name probably sounds familiar and that’s because it is. Charles Kushner is the father of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.
Taking a closer look at the pardon power granted to the president, the Constitution explicitly states that the “Power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment,” is reserved for the sitting president. [3] This power, as stated, is only applicable to federal crimes – “offences against the United States.” [4] Thus, the scope of the pardon power is limited in this context. Any other checks on this power are up for debate among the courts and legal scholars. It is yet another vague and implied presidential power that Trump has utilized in ways that were unexpected compared to the centuries of the United States’ presidential history.
Northwestern Law Professor, Steven G. Calabresi, recently gave his legal opinion on Trump’s use of the pardon power in a New York Times article entitled “The Problem with Trump’s Odious Pardon of Steve Bannon.” Calabresi argues that the pardon of Steve Bannon may be unconstitutional and should be challenged by the courts for two reasons. First, Anglo-American law principles are referenced where “no one can be a judge in his own cause.” [5] Calabresi implies that this principle has been broken in Trump’s pardoning of individuals – like Bannon – who may testify against him. Second, there is an originalist check on the pardon power that requires specificity in documentation. In other words, a pardon must explicitly pardon a specific crime such as murder or fraud. Mr. Calabresi quotes notable legal scholar, William Blackstone, who said “A pardon of all felonies will not pardon a conviction 
 but the conviction 
 must be particularly mentioned.” This is significant in Bannon’s case because while he was formally charged with largescale fraud, his case was still ongoing, and no conviction had been made prior to the issuance of Trump’s pardon. Thus, no specific conviction could have been mentioned in the documentation of his pardon since his case had only made it to the bond hearing where formal charges were brought, and his bail was set as he awaited trial.
Only time will tell if Steve Bannon’s pardon will stand considering all of these legal arguments as to the invalidity and the unconstitutionality of it. It will be up to the federal courts to take a look into it, but with the COVID-19 pandemic still ongoing it may be quite a while before anything is done, if at all.
______________________________________________________________
[1] Lemire, J., Tucker, E., & Colvin, J. (2021, January 20). Trump pardons ex-strategist Steve Bannon, dozens of others. Retrieved January, 2021, from https://apnews.com/article/steve-bannon-trump-pardons-broidy-66c82f25134735e742b2501c118723bb
[2] Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump. (2021, January 24). Retrieved January, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump
[3] Eisen, L., Bell, J., & Stroud, H. (2021, January 21). Presidential Pardon Power Explained. Retrieved January, 2021, from https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/presidential-pardon-power-explained
[4] Holland, S. (2021, January 20). Trump pardons ex-aide Bannon but not himself or family. Retrieved January 24, 2021, from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN29P0BE
[5] Steven G. Calabresi and Norman L. Eisen. (January 20, 2021 Wednesday). The Problem
With Trump’s Odious Pardon of Steve Bannon. The New York Times. https://advance-lexis-com.proxyau.wrlc.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:61TF-5CV1-JBG3-6473-00000-00&context=1516831.
Photo Credit: Gage Skidmore
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collmemsrae · 5 years ago
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Day 3, I nominate Stephanie Harpe for the 10 day performance photo challenge. Post a photo/video/film/art/ that you created to raise awareness for the Arts for the next 10 days and nominate someone else each day. It was August 12, 2011 and I saw that Stephanie Harpe was asking for “extras” to be on the Blackstone TV Series. I had always wanted to be an extra, so I packed two suitcases of clothing to take to the set. I had heard that if you want to be in many scenes, then try to have many outfits to appear as a different person, this worked. I was prego with Jack and I loved every minute of being on set for 15 hours! I met so many actors; Carmen Moore, Andrea Menard, and actually spoke with Tantoo Cardinal and talked with Cameron Bancroft who played Dr. Kurt Ellis. Cameron talked about how he worked with my House on the Prairie star Melissa Gilbert! I was a little starstuck that day! I also met some cool extras; Lexi Pendzich, Jonathan Jespersen, Donnalynn Clark and Dean & Carole Torresan. #artsawareness #blackstone #extras https://www.instagram.com/p/B6t6JW4AN7C/?igshid=181q8f0jm6ip9
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moohnshinescorner · 5 years ago
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💙 NEW COVER + SALE 💙 ESCAPE, book 2 in the Blackstone Series by @j.l.drake not only has a NEW COVER & BLURB, but it's on sale for #99c! #OneClick over at #AMAZON! . We were back on a mission
 . It was an endless battle with the cartel, defusing bombs and trying to stay alive while we saved others. . Ten years ago, I made the best and worst decision of my life. I joined the Army and left the love of life behind
Lexi. . When I returned home years later, I was told she was dating the leader of a local gang, Almas Perdidas, and that she wanted nothing to do with me. . After Lexi got a beating for not following the rules, I tried to remind her of what we once had, who we once were together. But she refused to listen. . Little did I know she was carrying a secret of her own that would end in bloodshed. . I needed to make a decision. Leave and continue my life as a solider or stay and fight for the woman I loved and help her escape. . 💙 Cover Photographer: @allanspiersphoto . 💙 Cover Designer: Deranged Doctor Designs . 💙 Cover Model: Bradley McGury . 💙 Publisher: @limitlessbooks . 💙 Social Media Blast Hosted by @HEAPRMore . #RomanticSuspense #MilitaryRomance #HEAPR #authorsofinstagram #bookstagram #amreadingromance #bookbloggers #booksworthreading #TBRlist #bookworm #booknerd #bookshelfie #booksofinsta #booksofinstagram https://www.instagram.com/p/B16uItAADTw/?igshid=tt4vpwg04nky
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kennethmjoyner · 6 years ago
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As Thomson Reuters Readies Layoffs of 3,200, What’s It Mean for Customers?
Thomson Reuters, the dominant provider of research and information services for the legal profession, last week announced plans to reduce its workforce by 3,200 and close 30 percent of its offices by the end of 2020. What is going on and what does it mean for the company’s customers?
The timing of the news, announced at a meeting of investors, seemed befuddling. Just two months ago, TR closed a major deal to sell 55 percent of its Financial & Risk unit to private equity firm Blackstone Group, in a deal that valued the F&R business (now rebranded as Refinitiv) at about $20 billion and that returned some $10 billion to TR’s shareholders.
On top of that, just three weeks ago, TR was touting what it characterized as “overwhelming” sales — 1,500 legal organizations in 15 weeks — of its new Westlaw Edge research platform, which it launched in July.
At the Dec. 4 investors’ meeting, TR presented details on why it is making these reductions in staff and offices and what they mean for the company and its customers. The overall goal, the company said, is to create a leaner, more agile organization that will allow it to better serve its customers and shift its orientation from a content company to a software company.
“As the velocity of technology change increases and the iteration cycles become ever shorter, the new Thomson Reuters needs to run leaner, be faster and more effective,” Neil T. Masterson, co-COO, told the investors. TR plans to accomplish that through three “levers” which will result in a headcount reduction of 12 percent by 2020:
Lever 1 is aimed at improving the speed and nimbleness of the organization by reducing management layers.
Lever 2 focuses on consolidating staff into 30 percent fewer locations.
Lever 3 is an acceleration of product convergence (reducing the number of products) and a shift to public cloud, to simplify product offerings and increase the number that are SaaS based.
“So by 2020, we are targeting a 12 percent reduction in headcount, an 11 percent reduction in the number of products, a 30 percent reduction in the number of locations, a reduction in management layers to an average of six and a reduction in CapEx as a percentage of revenue from 10 percent to between 7 percent and 8 percent,” Masterson said.
The majority of the headcount reduction “has been communicated” already and 90 percent of the site consolidation is already underway, he said.
None of these reductions, he told investors, will impact TR’s “go-to-market capacity.”
TR’s New Organizational Structure
At the outset of the investors’ meeting, James C. Smith, TR’s president and CEO, outlined the company’s new five-part organizational structure following the sale of its F&R business. The company now has five units, with most of its revenues coming from the three that focus on law and tax:
Legal professionals, with $2.3 billion in revenue in 2017.
Corporates, with $1.2 billion in revenue.
Tax professionals, with $800 million in revenue.
Reuters News, with $300 million in revenue.
Global Print, with $800 million in revenue.
TR enjoys “a highly attractive business model,” Smith told investors. Seventy-five percent of its revenues are recurring in nature and “produce very consistent free cash flow.” It has some 460,000 customers and a customer-retention rate of 90 percent overall. In the markets in which it competes, TR generally holds the number one or two position. The company has $2 billion in cash available for future acquisitions, and expects to spend most of that over the next 12-24 months.
But TR sees opportunities to grow its revenue even more, by pushing into new market segments, increasing cross-selling of its products (the average customer uses just one or two TR products), optimizing its pricing, improving retention, and better serving its customers through a “customer-first approach.”
“What do we mean by that?” Smith said. “We mean providing unmatched customer experience from the front end to the back end. It means taking a programmatic approach to increasing things like cross-selling, optimizing our offerings and getting the pricing right in ways that improve retention. And by serving customers in a way they want to be served, that means supporting the deep relationships that we have with efficient and effective digital channels and improving the customer experience.”
No More Silos
Co-COO Brian Peccarelli told investors that TR’s restructuring is aimed at eliminating product silos in order to better serve customers.
“The new structure 
 puts a laser focus on the customer,” Peccarelli said. “It allows us to view the world through the eyes of the customer in order to better align ourselves to do business with them the way they want to do business with us, a customer-centric approach.”
TR believes this new structure will drive growth in four ways:
Enable it to sell more to existing customers through cross-selling and up-selling of products.
Acquire more customers in the lower end of its market segments. Among smaller law firms, there are over 100,000 that buy nothing from TR, Peccarelli said. The plan to reach them is to “optimize and price our products in a way that’ll be compelling for them.”
Improve retention through a better customer experience, including better digital experience, removing friction from renewals and simplifying commercial policies.
Further tailor products and pricing to the unique needs and financial constraints of different customer segments.
Legal is Largest
The Legal Professionals segment makes up TR’s largest market. (Of course, many customers of its tax and corporate segments are also legal professionals, including corporate counsel, who fall under its corporate segment.) The Legal Professionals division grew 2 percent in 2017 and growth accelerated to 4 percent for the first nine months of 2018. TR divides this segment into five subsegments, as show here:
Peccarelli said that TR expects to continue to grow in this segment, and to do so from various sources:
Continue to invest organically, including building AI-enhanced software products such as Westlaw Edge. That is expected to help drive growth over the next few years.
Invest inorganically to supplement product offerings and seek to further distribute non-jurisdictional software products, including Elite and Contract Express, outside of the U.S. core market.
Reimagine and streamline legal workflow products.
The changing legal market presents new opportunities for growth, Peccarelli told investors. Opportunities come from customers’ interest in adopting more advanced technology such as AI, analytics, cloud and blockchain. Opportunities also come from potential changes in regulation of the legal profession and new business models for delivering legal services, such as alternative legal services providers and non-traditional law firms.
Peccarelli also sees opportunities in the growing numbers of startups active in the legal space. “This environment actually plays to our advantage, as our clients value a partner they trust that can provide more integrated solutions and that can provide the quality of service that they need and they demand.”
Part of improving the customer experience, Peccarelli said, will be to reduce the numbers of sales people approaching them and centralize around a single point of contact.
“One recurring theme is we have had multiple salespeople reaching out to customers, each selling specific products in an uncoordinated fashion,” he said. “A big priority in our customer-centric realignment is to make sure we coordinate internally and have a holistic view of our customer without losing the product-specific knowledge and relationships that customers value most.”
Moderation on Westlaw Edge
Despite the press release I mentioned at the outset in which TR touts the overwhelming success of its newly launched Westlaw Edge, CEO Smith was more moderate when asked by an investor how Westlaw Edge’s higher subscription price would contribute to revenue growth.
“I’m not prepared to share projections for Westlaw Edge simply because it’s real early in the exercise,” Smith said. “It’s really encouraging. But we are deliberately being patient as we roll that out and we’re looking at different ways to maximize the value we can get out of that product while delivering real value for our end customers. So we’ll see how those price points hold up.”
Another investor asked about how Westlaw Edge’s AI and machine-learning capabilities compare to those of LexisNexis and whether Westlaw Edge has a “secret sauce” that TR can maintain.
Andy Martens, global head of legal product and editorial, answered that he believes Westlaw Edge has a very defensible market position. “I do think that we do have some defensible positions based largely on the differences between our collection of editorial assets and Lexis’s. I think you’d find that ours are significantly richer. And we’re also in the process of tweaking our editorial processes to make our data even more optimized for machine learning than it is today.”
The Bottom Line
So should customers be concerned about TR’s reductions in staff, offices and products?
If you accept the information its executives provided to its investors, then the answer is no — at least not for the immediate future. With the sale of the F&R business and the resulting restructuring of its remaining business units, some office closings and even layoffs should not be cause for customer concern.
In fact, if the company is able to become leaner and more agile, as it says it will do, customers could benefit from more responsive product development and more targeted product pricing, not to mention a more streamlined sales process.
And there’s no ignoring the fact that this is, as I said at the outset, the dominant provider of research and information services for the legal profession, with the number one market position in several product areas and healthy recurring revenue.
But I strongly agree with Jean O’Grady that TR “needs to manage this message.” It needs to manage the message not only for its investors, as it did in this recent meeting, but also for its customers. The biggest question, as Jean points out, is: What products will be cut?
I first asked TR about layoffs in mid-October, when some TR employees in Eagan had already been told of their layoffs. A top TR communications executive responded that he was “unaware” and passed my inquiry to a colleague. That colleague sent me the same boilerplate response every other journalist has received:
Thomson Reuters is routinely looking at ways to run our global business operations more efficiently and effectively. This disciplined approach sometimes includes the need to make personnel, or other, changes which allow us to balance our internal resources with the needs of our customers in a highly competitive environment.
Throughout the investors’ presentation, TR executives repeatedly emphasized the importance of its relationships with its customers. “Our customers know they can count on us,” said CEO Smith, “and that is an enormous competitive advantage.”
Customers have lots of questions. TR should be out front in explaining these changes to them and answering the questions they raise. Boilerplate doesn’t do that.
[Image of Thomson Reuters building by ProducerMatthew – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, Link.]
from Law and Politics https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/12/thomson-reuters-readies-layoffs-3200-whats-mean-customers.html via http://www.rssmix.com/
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am0ngtheb0nes · 2 years ago
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Our life: Forever and Always has consumed my life so ive done a little doodle of my MC - Lysander Blackstone. A lovely ball of chaos.
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nicholerestrada · 6 years ago
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A Summary of Virginia Medical Malpractice Laws
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In many respects, Virginia has been more conservative about modifying the common law than its sister states. To the extent modifications have been approved, many restrict rather than expand the rights of the victims of medical negligence. For example, Virginia has adopted three major modifications of medical malpractice law: a damage cap, screening of proposed lawsuits by a medical review panel, and a state fund to compensate victims of birth-related neurological injuries. Much of the legislation specific to medical malpractice can be found in the Medical Malpractice Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20.
Statutes of Limitations
All medical malpractice actions for injury (as opposed to death) must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). In § 8.01-230, a cause of action “accrues” at the time of injury: “the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person
 and not when the resulting damage is discovered.”
This two-year limitation has long been applicable, and strictly enforced, in Virginia. Virginia is one of the minority states that use the “date-of-the-act” rule, which means that the plaintiff must file suit within two years of the date of the injury regardless of how obscure or undiscoverable the injury might have been. Exceptions to the two-year rule are (i) cases involving minors or mentally incompetent people who are in law regarded as unable to know their legal rights and (ii) cases where the injury was fraudulently concealed from the person.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the judicial adoption of a discovery rule, Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 492 S.E.2d 126, (1997), but held that “continuing treatment for the same conditions” tolls the statute of limitations until treatment ends. Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988). The court defined “continuous treatment” as not “mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship; we mean diagnosis and treatment for the same relating illness or injuries, continuing after the alleged act of malpractice.” The court acknowledged, however, the rule would not apply to a single, isolated act of malpractice. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979). In other words, when an act of malpractice occurred and that physician continued to see the patient over a course of years for an unrelated condition, the rule would not apply.
In foreign object cases (surgical sponges, needles, etc.) and cases of fraud or concealment (i.e., alteration of medical records) the statute is extended to one year from the date the object or injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. However, this extension is subject to a ten-year limit from the time the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C).
In cases in which the health care provider’s negligence caused the patient’s death (Wrongful Death Claims), suit must be filed within two years of death. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244(B).
If a person entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pending before the expiration of [the two-year] limitation period
 then an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the limitation period
 or within one year after his qualification as personal representative, whichever occurs later.
However, § 8.01-229(B)(6) states that:
[i]f there is an interval of more than two years between the death of any person in whose favor . . . a cause of action has accrued or shall subsequently accrue and the qualification of such person’s personal representative, such personal representative shall, for the purposes of [the statute], be deemed to have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.
A parent’s action for medical expenses caused by injury to a minor must be brought within five years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B). A minor’s medical malpractice action for injury or death must be commenced within two years from the date of the last act of negligence, unless the child is less than eight years of age, in which case the action must be brought by the child’s tenth birthday. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.1. The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 561 S.E.2d 705 (2002). Incapacity (typically a substantial mental or physical handicap) also tolls the running of the statute of limitations during the period of incapacity. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(A).
Contributory or Comparative Negligence
Virginia recognizes the doctrine of contributory negligence in medical malpractice cases. A plaintiff’s contributory negligence may bar her recovery entirely, but the patient’s negligence must be concurrent with the defendant’s negligence. Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 563 S.E.2d 748 (2002); Ponirakis v. Choi, 262 Va. 119, 546 S.E.2d 707 (2001).
Joint and Several Liability
Virginia imposes joint and several liability on joint tortfeasors. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-443. Thus, any joint tortfeasor against whom judgment is entered is liable to the plaintiff for the entire judgment, regardless of the tortfeasor’s degree or percentage of fault. For example, in a hospital setting, if the attending doctor and nurse are both negligent, then each one can be held responsible for the patient’s entire injury even if part of that injury was caused by the other’s negligence.
Vicarious Liability
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals in Virginia are vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees but not that of independent contractors. McDonald v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 254 Va. 79, 486 S.E.2d 299 (1997). Whether a physician should be considered an employee is a question of fact not to be determined by whether the hospital calls him one, but by the factors of selection and engagement, payment of compensation, power of dismissal, and (most importantly) power to control the physician’s work. A physician’s exercise of professional judgment in the performance of professional duties is a factor, but not the only factor, in deciding whether the hospital has the power to control his work. There is also authority for holding a hospital liable for the act of a physician on the theory of negligent credentialing. Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 501 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2001)(affirmed at 2004 Va. LEXIS 99 (2004). In other words, a hospital can be held legally responsible for granting hospital admission and treatment privileges to an unqualified physician.
Expert Testimony
Except for rare cases within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors, expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the proximate cause of injury. Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Center, Inc., 264 Va. 408, 568 S.E.2d 703 (2002). To testify as an expert on the standard of care a witness must demonstrate expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant’s specialty and have had an active clinical practice in either the defendant’s specialty, or a related field of medicine, within one year of the date of the alleged act or omission. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.20.
Damage Caps
Virginia imposes a cap (limit) on damages of all kinds in medical malpractice cases. For claims arising out of acts or omissions prior to August 1, 1999, the damage cap is $1 million. For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and before July 1, 2000, the cap is $1.5 million. The cap is increasing by $50,000 every July 1. Two final increases of $75,000 beginning in 2007 will bring the damage cap to $2 million for acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15. The Virginia Supreme Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
A settlement with one defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, because the cap limits the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the number of theories or defendants. FairfaxHospital System v. Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995). This includes punitive damages. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990). In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health care provider” was broadened in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1, a physician’s professional corporation may be subject to uncapped liability. Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827 (1997).
Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. This cap has also been determined to be constitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wackenhut Applied Technologies Center, Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Systems, Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
Statutory Cap on Attorneys’ Fees
There is no Virginia statute setting a limit on attorneys’ fees in medical malpractice actions.
Periodic Payments
Periodic payments or structured settlements are allowed, but not required in Virginia. A settlement agreement on behalf of a disabled person, including the situation where the plaintiff is a minor (under the age of 18) involving periodic payments must be reviewed by the court and secured by a bond or insurance. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-424.
Collateral Source Rule
Virginia recognizes the collateral source rule, under which the plaintiff’s receipt of collateral payments (health insurance, paid leave of absence from work, etc.) does not reduce his recovery. This protection is statutory for lost income (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-35) but the courts follow the rule for all damages in tort cases. Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 Va. 472, 369 S.E.2d 172 (1988).
Pre-Judgment Interest
In Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998), which was not a malpractice case, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest on the unliquidated part of the damages, stating, “Generally, prejudgment interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages in dispute between the parties.” This should apply to most medical malpractice claims. However, the decision also notes that Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-382 leaves the date from which interest should run to the sound discretion of the trial court. In Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999), the court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest because it exceeded the damage cap, but did not comment on whether such interest should have been awarded at all. In cases where pre-judgment interest is proper, the rate is six percent. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-330.54.
Birth Injury Claims
Virginia does not have a general patient compensation fund covering all medical malpractice claims. However, the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5000 to 38.2-5021), covers infants who suffer permanent, disabling damage to the brain or spine caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. This no-fault program is the exclusive remedy for such infants and their parents against participating physicians and hospitals, who must pay an annual assessment. Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5001 and 38.2-5002. A claim filed under this statute proceeds in an adversarial fashion and the Virginia Attorney General represents the Fund in opposing the infant’s claim.
If the claim is determined to be compensable, the Fund provides for lifetime medical expenses as well as one-half of the Virginia average weekly wage after the child reaches age eighteen. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5009. Many hospitals and physicians choose not to participate. In cases arising prior to April 1, 2000, a participating physician’s professional corporation may be sued even in cases otherwise covered exclusively by the fund. Jan Paul Fruiterman, M.D. & Associates v. Waziri, 259 Va. 540, 525 S.E.2d 552 (2000). Although the legislature promptly closed this loophole by expanding the definition of “participating physician” in Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5001, the Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the amendment retroactively. Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408, 579 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
Immunities
Virginia has waived sovereign immunity in tort cases, subject to significant limitations. No claimant may recover more than $100,000 or the limits of applicable insurance, whichever is greater. In medical negligence cases, the immunity most often comes into consideration when there is a claim against the Medical College of Virginia or the University of Virginia Health System. For example, sovereign immunity has been applied to protect hospital administrators as well as surgical interns and residents at the University of Virginia Hospital. Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973), overruled on other grounds, First Virginia Bank v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983); Hall v. Roberts, 548 F. Supp. 498 (W.D. Va. 1982). This immunity may extend to other physicians employed by the state, depending on the degree of control exercised over them, Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642, (1993), but never to independent contractors. Atkinson v. Sachno, 261 Va. 278, 541 S.E.2d 902 (2001). Virginia has not waived sovereign immunity for local units of government. Municipalities are immune for negligence in the performance of governmental functions, including the operation of a hospital. Edwards v. Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 375 S.E.2d 747 (1989) (dictum).
A charitable entity is not liable to its beneficiaries for the negligent acts of its agents if due care has been exercised in their selection and retention. Mann v. Sentara Hospitals, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 433, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 363 (2002) (discussing application of the doctrine to a medical faculty foundation). However, charitable immunity has been withdrawn from hospitals, except where a hospital renders exclusively charitable medical services, or where the patient signed an express agreement providing that all medical services would be supplied on a charitable basis. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.
Medical Review Panels
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act provides for a system of medical malpractice review panels to assess the validity of medical malpractice claims. At the request of either party, the Supreme Court of Virginia appoints a panel to review the claim, consisting of two doctors, two lawyers, and a non-voting judge as chairman. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.2 and 8.01-581.3. The panel determines whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the health care provider failed to comply with the relevant standard of care and whether that failure proximately caused the injury. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.7. The findings of the panel are non-binding and the claimant has the option of filing a lawsuit after the panel has made its ruling. However, any opinion of the medical review panel is admissible as evidence in a subsequent action. Both parties have the right to call panel members, except the chairman, as witnesses. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.8.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a process by which potential litigants can resolve their dispute without resorting to the civil court system. In most arbitration cases, the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute after the event occurs and the claim arises. However, parties may also agree in advance of treatment to binding arbitration of any claim, so long as the patient has the option to withdraw from the agreement within 60 days after the termination of treatment. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.12.
Source by Dan Frith
Source: https://garkomedia.com/2018/11/30/a-summary-of-virginia-medical-malpractice-laws/
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michaeljtraylor · 6 years ago
Text
A Summary of Virginia Medical Malpractice Laws
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In many respects, Virginia has been more conservative about modifying the common law than its sister states. To the extent modifications have been approved, many restrict rather than expand the rights of the victims of medical negligence. For example, Virginia has adopted three major modifications of medical malpractice law: a damage cap, screening of proposed lawsuits by a medical review panel, and a state fund to compensate victims of birth-related neurological injuries. Much of the legislation specific to medical malpractice can be found in the Medical Malpractice Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20.
Statutes of Limitations
All medical malpractice actions for injury (as opposed to death) must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). In § 8.01-230, a cause of action “accrues” at the time of injury: “the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person
 and not when the resulting damage is discovered.”
This two-year limitation has long been applicable, and strictly enforced, in Virginia. Virginia is one of the minority states that use the “date-of-the-act” rule, which means that the plaintiff must file suit within two years of the date of the injury regardless of how obscure or undiscoverable the injury might have been. Exceptions to the two-year rule are (i) cases involving minors or mentally incompetent people who are in law regarded as unable to know their legal rights and (ii) cases where the injury was fraudulently concealed from the person.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the judicial adoption of a discovery rule, Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 492 S.E.2d 126, (1997), but held that “continuing treatment for the same conditions” tolls the statute of limitations until treatment ends. Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988). The court defined “continuous treatment” as not “mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship; we mean diagnosis and treatment for the same relating illness or injuries, continuing after the alleged act of malpractice.” The court acknowledged, however, the rule would not apply to a single, isolated act of malpractice. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979). In other words, when an act of malpractice occurred and that physician continued to see the patient over a course of years for an unrelated condition, the rule would not apply.
In foreign object cases (surgical sponges, needles, etc.) and cases of fraud or concealment (i.e., alteration of medical records) the statute is extended to one year from the date the object or injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. However, this extension is subject to a ten-year limit from the time the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243©.
In cases in which the health care provider’s negligence caused the patient’s death (Wrongful Death Claims), suit must be filed within two years of death. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244(B).
If a person entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pending before the expiration of [the two-year] limitation period
 then an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the limitation period
 or within one year after his qualification as personal representative, whichever occurs later.
However, § 8.01-229(B)(6) states that:
[i]f there is an interval of more than two years between the death of any person in whose favor 
 a cause of action has accrued or shall subsequently accrue and the qualification of such person’s personal representative, such personal representative shall, for the purposes of [the statute], be deemed to have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.
A parent’s action for medical expenses caused by injury to a minor must be brought within five years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B). A minor’s medical malpractice action for injury or death must be commenced within two years from the date of the last act of negligence, unless the child is less than eight years of age, in which case the action must be brought by the child’s tenth birthday. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.1. The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 561 S.E.2d 705 (2002). Incapacity (typically a substantial mental or physical handicap) also tolls the running of the statute of limitations during the period of incapacity. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(A).
Contributory or Comparative Negligence
Virginia recognizes the doctrine of contributory negligence in medical malpractice cases. A plaintiff’s contributory negligence may bar her recovery entirely, but the patient’s negligence must be concurrent with the defendant’s negligence. Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 563 S.E.2d 748 (2002); Ponirakis v. Choi, 262 Va. 119, 546 S.E.2d 707 (2001).
Joint and Several Liability
Virginia imposes joint and several liability on joint tortfeasors. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-443. Thus, any joint tortfeasor against whom judgment is entered is liable to the plaintiff for the entire judgment, regardless of the tortfeasor’s degree or percentage of fault. For example, in a hospital setting, if the attending doctor and nurse are both negligent, then each one can be held responsible for the patient’s entire injury even if part of that injury was caused by the other’s negligence.
Vicarious Liability
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals in Virginia are vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees but not that of independent contractors. McDonald v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 254 Va. 79, 486 S.E.2d 299 (1997). Whether a physician should be considered an employee is a question of fact not to be determined by whether the hospital calls him one, but by the factors of selection and engagement, payment of compensation, power of dismissal, and (most importantly) power to control the physician’s work. A physician’s exercise of professional judgment in the performance of professional duties is a factor, but not the only factor, in deciding whether the hospital has the power to control his work. There is also authority for holding a hospital liable for the act of a physician on the theory of negligent credentialing. Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 501 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2001)(affirmed at 2004 Va. LEXIS 99 (2004). In other words, a hospital can be held legally responsible for granting hospital admission and treatment privileges to an unqualified physician.
Expert Testimony
Except for rare cases within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors, expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the proximate cause of injury. Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Center, Inc., 264 Va. 408, 568 S.E.2d 703 (2002). To testify as an expert on the standard of care a witness must demonstrate expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant’s specialty and have had an active clinical practice in either the defendant’s specialty, or a related field of medicine, within one year of the date of the alleged act or omission. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.20.
Damage Caps
Virginia imposes a cap (limit) on damages of all kinds in medical malpractice cases. For claims arising out of acts or omissions prior to August 1, 1999, the damage cap is $1 million. For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and before July 1, 2000, the cap is $1.5 million. The cap is increasing by $50,000 every July 1. Two final increases of $75,000 beginning in 2007 will bring the damage cap to $2 million for acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15. The Virginia Supreme Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
A settlement with one defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, because the cap limits the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the number of theories or defendants. FairfaxHospital System v. Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995). This includes punitive damages. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990). In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health care provider” was broadened in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1, a physician’s professional corporation may be subject to uncapped liability. Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827 (1997).
Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. This cap has also been determined to be constitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wackenhut Applied Technologies Center, Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Systems, Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
Statutory Cap on Attorneys’ Fees
There is no Virginia statute setting a limit on attorneys’ fees in medical malpractice actions.
Periodic Payments
Periodic payments or structured settlements are allowed, but not required in Virginia. A settlement agreement on behalf of a disabled person, including the situation where the plaintiff is a minor (under the age of 18) involving periodic payments must be reviewed by the court and secured by a bond or insurance. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-424.
Collateral Source Rule
Virginia recognizes the collateral source rule, under which the plaintiff’s receipt of collateral payments (health insurance, paid leave of absence from work, etc.) does not reduce his recovery. This protection is statutory for lost income (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-35) but the courts follow the rule for all damages in tort cases. Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 Va. 472, 369 S.E.2d 172 (1988).
Pre-Judgment Interest
In Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998), which was not a malpractice case, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest on the unliquidated part of the damages, stating, “Generally, prejudgment interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages in dispute between the parties.” This should apply to most medical malpractice claims. However, the decision also notes that Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-382 leaves the date from which interest should run to the sound discretion of the trial court. In Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999), the court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest because it exceeded the damage cap, but did not comment on whether such interest should have been awarded at all. In cases where pre-judgment interest is proper, the rate is six percent. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-330.54.
Birth Injury Claims
Virginia does not have a general patient compensation fund covering all medical malpractice claims. However, the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5000 to 38.2-5021), covers infants who suffer permanent, disabling damage to the brain or spine caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. This no-fault program is the exclusive remedy for such infants and their parents against participating physicians and hospitals, who must pay an annual assessment. Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5001 and 38.2-5002. A claim filed under this statute proceeds in an adversarial fashion and the Virginia Attorney General represents the Fund in opposing the infant’s claim.
If the claim is determined to be compensable, the Fund provides for lifetime medical expenses as well as one-half of the Virginia average weekly wage after the child reaches age eighteen. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5009. Many hospitals and physicians choose not to participate. In cases arising prior to April 1, 2000, a participating physician’s professional corporation may be sued even in cases otherwise covered exclusively by the fund. Jan Paul Fruiterman, M.D. & Associates v. Waziri, 259 Va. 540, 525 S.E.2d 552 (2000). Although the legislature promptly closed this loophole by expanding the definition of “participating physician” in Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5001, the Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the amendment retroactively. Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408, 579 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
Immunities
Virginia has waived sovereign immunity in tort cases, subject to significant limitations. No claimant may recover more than $100,000 or the limits of applicable insurance, whichever is greater. In medical negligence cases, the immunity most often comes into consideration when there is a claim against the Medical College of Virginia or the University of Virginia Health System. For example, sovereign immunity has been applied to protect hospital administrators as well as surgical interns and residents at the University of Virginia Hospital. Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973), overruled on other grounds, First Virginia Bank v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983); Hall v. Roberts, 548 F. Supp. 498 (W.D. Va. 1982). This immunity may extend to other physicians employed by the state, depending on the degree of control exercised over them, Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642, (1993), but never to independent contractors. Atkinson v. Sachno, 261 Va. 278, 541 S.E.2d 902 (2001). Virginia has not waived sovereign immunity for local units of government. Municipalities are immune for negligence in the performance of governmental functions, including the operation of a hospital. Edwards v. Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 375 S.E.2d 747 (1989) (dictum).
A charitable entity is not liable to its beneficiaries for the negligent acts of its agents if due care has been exercised in their selection and retention. Mann v. Sentara Hospitals, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 433, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 363 (2002) (discussing application of the doctrine to a medical faculty foundation). However, charitable immunity has been withdrawn from hospitals, except where a hospital renders exclusively charitable medical services, or where the patient signed an express agreement providing that all medical services would be supplied on a charitable basis. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.
Medical Review Panels
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act provides for a system of medical malpractice review panels to assess the validity of medical malpractice claims. At the request of either party, the Supreme Court of Virginia appoints a panel to review the claim, consisting of two doctors, two lawyers, and a non-voting judge as chairman. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.2 and 8.01-581.3. The panel determines whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the health care provider failed to comply with the relevant standard of care and whether that failure proximately caused the injury. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.7. The findings of the panel are non-binding and the claimant has the option of filing a lawsuit after the panel has made its ruling. However, any opinion of the medical review panel is admissible as evidence in a subsequent action. Both parties have the right to call panel members, except the chairman, as witnesses. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.8.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a process by which potential litigants can resolve their dispute without resorting to the civil court system. In most arbitration cases, the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute after the event occurs and the claim arises. However, parties may also agree in advance of treatment to binding arbitration of any claim, so long as the patient has the option to withdraw from the agreement within 60 days after the termination of treatment. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.12.
Source by Dan Frith
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garkomedia1 · 6 years ago
Text
A Summary of Virginia Medical Malpractice Laws
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In many respects, Virginia has been more conservative about modifying the common law than its sister states. To the extent modifications have been approved, many restrict rather than expand the rights of the victims of medical negligence. For example, Virginia has adopted three major modifications of medical malpractice law: a damage cap, screening of proposed lawsuits by a medical review panel, and a state fund to compensate victims of birth-related neurological injuries. Much of the legislation specific to medical malpractice can be found in the Medical Malpractice Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20.
Statutes of Limitations
All medical malpractice actions for injury (as opposed to death) must be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). In § 8.01-230, a cause of action “accrues” at the time of injury: “the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person
 and not when the resulting damage is discovered.”
This two-year limitation has long been applicable, and strictly enforced, in Virginia. Virginia is one of the minority states that use the “date-of-the-act” rule, which means that the plaintiff must file suit within two years of the date of the injury regardless of how obscure or undiscoverable the injury might have been. Exceptions to the two-year rule are (i) cases involving minors or mentally incompetent people who are in law regarded as unable to know their legal rights and (ii) cases where the injury was fraudulently concealed from the person.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the judicial adoption of a discovery rule, Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 492 S.E.2d 126, (1997), but held that “continuing treatment for the same conditions” tolls the statute of limitations until treatment ends. Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988). The court defined “continuous treatment” as not “mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship; we mean diagnosis and treatment for the same relating illness or injuries, continuing after the alleged act of malpractice.” The court acknowledged, however, the rule would not apply to a single, isolated act of malpractice. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979). In other words, when an act of malpractice occurred and that physician continued to see the patient over a course of years for an unrelated condition, the rule would not apply.
In foreign object cases (surgical sponges, needles, etc.) and cases of fraud or concealment (i.e., alteration of medical records) the statute is extended to one year from the date the object or injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. However, this extension is subject to a ten-year limit from the time the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C).
In cases in which the health care provider’s negligence caused the patient’s death (Wrongful Death Claims), suit must be filed within two years of death. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244(B).
If a person entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pending before the expiration of [the two-year] limitation period
 then an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the limitation period
 or within one year after his qualification as personal representative, whichever occurs later.
However, § 8.01-229(B)(6) states that:
[i]f there is an interval of more than two years between the death of any person in whose favor . . . a cause of action has accrued or shall subsequently accrue and the qualification of such person’s personal representative, such personal representative shall, for the purposes of [the statute], be deemed to have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.
A parent’s action for medical expenses caused by injury to a minor must be brought within five years. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B). A minor’s medical malpractice action for injury or death must be commenced within two years from the date of the last act of negligence, unless the child is less than eight years of age, in which case the action must be brought by the child’s tenth birthday. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.1. The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 561 S.E.2d 705 (2002). Incapacity (typically a substantial mental or physical handicap) also tolls the running of the statute of limitations during the period of incapacity. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(A).
Contributory or Comparative Negligence
Virginia recognizes the doctrine of contributory negligence in medical malpractice cases. A plaintiff’s contributory negligence may bar her recovery entirely, but the patient’s negligence must be concurrent with the defendant’s negligence. Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 563 S.E.2d 748 (2002); Ponirakis v. Choi, 262 Va. 119, 546 S.E.2d 707 (2001).
Joint and Several Liability
Virginia imposes joint and several liability on joint tortfeasors. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-443. Thus, any joint tortfeasor against whom judgment is entered is liable to the plaintiff for the entire judgment, regardless of the tortfeasor’s degree or percentage of fault. For example, in a hospital setting, if the attending doctor and nurse are both negligent, then each one can be held responsible for the patient’s entire injury even if part of that injury was caused by the other’s negligence.
Vicarious Liability
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals in Virginia are vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees but not that of independent contractors. McDonald v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 254 Va. 79, 486 S.E.2d 299 (1997). Whether a physician should be considered an employee is a question of fact not to be determined by whether the hospital calls him one, but by the factors of selection and engagement, payment of compensation, power of dismissal, and (most importantly) power to control the physician’s work. A physician’s exercise of professional judgment in the performance of professional duties is a factor, but not the only factor, in deciding whether the hospital has the power to control his work. There is also authority for holding a hospital liable for the act of a physician on the theory of negligent credentialing. Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 501 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2001)(affirmed at 2004 Va. LEXIS 99 (2004). In other words, a hospital can be held legally responsible for granting hospital admission and treatment privileges to an unqualified physician.
Expert Testimony
Except for rare cases within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors, expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the proximate cause of injury. Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Center, Inc., 264 Va. 408, 568 S.E.2d 703 (2002). To testify as an expert on the standard of care a witness must demonstrate expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant’s specialty and have had an active clinical practice in either the defendant’s specialty, or a related field of medicine, within one year of the date of the alleged act or omission. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.20.
Damage Caps
Virginia imposes a cap (limit) on damages of all kinds in medical malpractice cases. For claims arising out of acts or omissions prior to August 1, 1999, the damage cap is $1 million. For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and before July 1, 2000, the cap is $1.5 million. The cap is increasing by $50,000 every July 1. Two final increases of $75,000 beginning in 2007 will bring the damage cap to $2 million for acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15. The Virginia Supreme Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
A settlement with one defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, because the cap limits the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the number of theories or defendants. FairfaxHospital System v. Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995). This includes punitive damages. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990). In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health care provider” was broadened in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1, a physician’s professional corporation may be subject to uncapped liability. Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827 (1997).
Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. This cap has also been determined to be constitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wackenhut Applied Technologies Center, Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Systems, Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
Statutory Cap on Attorneys’ Fees
There is no Virginia statute setting a limit on attorneys’ fees in medical malpractice actions.
Periodic Payments
Periodic payments or structured settlements are allowed, but not required in Virginia. A settlement agreement on behalf of a disabled person, including the situation where the plaintiff is a minor (under the age of 18) involving periodic payments must be reviewed by the court and secured by a bond or insurance. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-424.
Collateral Source Rule
Virginia recognizes the collateral source rule, under which the plaintiff’s receipt of collateral payments (health insurance, paid leave of absence from work, etc.) does not reduce his recovery. This protection is statutory for lost income (Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-35) but the courts follow the rule for all damages in tort cases. Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 Va. 472, 369 S.E.2d 172 (1988).
Pre-Judgment Interest
In Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998), which was not a malpractice case, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest on the unliquidated part of the damages, stating, “Generally, prejudgment interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages in dispute between the parties.” This should apply to most medical malpractice claims. However, the decision also notes that Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-382 leaves the date from which interest should run to the sound discretion of the trial court. In Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999), the court reversed an award of pre-judgment interest because it exceeded the damage cap, but did not comment on whether such interest should have been awarded at all. In cases where pre-judgment interest is proper, the rate is six percent. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-330.54.
Birth Injury Claims
Virginia does not have a general patient compensation fund covering all medical malpractice claims. However, the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5000 to 38.2-5021), covers infants who suffer permanent, disabling damage to the brain or spine caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation. This no-fault program is the exclusive remedy for such infants and their parents against participating physicians and hospitals, who must pay an annual assessment. Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5001 and 38.2-5002. A claim filed under this statute proceeds in an adversarial fashion and the Virginia Attorney General represents the Fund in opposing the infant’s claim.
If the claim is determined to be compensable, the Fund provides for lifetime medical expenses as well as one-half of the Virginia average weekly wage after the child reaches age eighteen. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5009. Many hospitals and physicians choose not to participate. In cases arising prior to April 1, 2000, a participating physician’s professional corporation may be sued even in cases otherwise covered exclusively by the fund. Jan Paul Fruiterman, M.D. & Associates v. Waziri, 259 Va. 540, 525 S.E.2d 552 (2000). Although the legislature promptly closed this loophole by expanding the definition of “participating physician” in Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5001, the Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the amendment retroactively. Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408, 579 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
Immunities
Virginia has waived sovereign immunity in tort cases, subject to significant limitations. No claimant may recover more than $100,000 or the limits of applicable insurance, whichever is greater. In medical negligence cases, the immunity most often comes into consideration when there is a claim against the Medical College of Virginia or the University of Virginia Health System. For example, sovereign immunity has been applied to protect hospital administrators as well as surgical interns and residents at the University of Virginia Hospital. Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973), overruled on other grounds, First Virginia Bank v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983); Hall v. Roberts, 548 F. Supp. 498 (W.D. Va. 1982). This immunity may extend to other physicians employed by the state, depending on the degree of control exercised over them, Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642, (1993), but never to independent contractors. Atkinson v. Sachno, 261 Va. 278, 541 S.E.2d 902 (2001). Virginia has not waived sovereign immunity for local units of government. Municipalities are immune for negligence in the performance of governmental functions, including the operation of a hospital. Edwards v. Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 375 S.E.2d 747 (1989) (dictum).
A charitable entity is not liable to its beneficiaries for the negligent acts of its agents if due care has been exercised in their selection and retention. Mann v. Sentara Hospitals, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 433, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 363 (2002) (discussing application of the doctrine to a medical faculty foundation). However, charitable immunity has been withdrawn from hospitals, except where a hospital renders exclusively charitable medical services, or where the patient signed an express agreement providing that all medical services would be supplied on a charitable basis. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.
Medical Review Panels
The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act provides for a system of medical malpractice review panels to assess the validity of medical malpractice claims. At the request of either party, the Supreme Court of Virginia appoints a panel to review the claim, consisting of two doctors, two lawyers, and a non-voting judge as chairman. Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-581.2 and 8.01-581.3. The panel determines whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the health care provider failed to comply with the relevant standard of care and whether that failure proximately caused the injury. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.7. The findings of the panel are non-binding and the claimant has the option of filing a lawsuit after the panel has made its ruling. However, any opinion of the medical review panel is admissible as evidence in a subsequent action. Both parties have the right to call panel members, except the chairman, as witnesses. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.8.
Arbitration
Arbitration is a process by which potential litigants can resolve their dispute without resorting to the civil court system. In most arbitration cases, the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute after the event occurs and the claim arises. However, parties may also agree in advance of treatment to binding arbitration of any claim, so long as the patient has the option to withdraw from the agreement within 60 days after the termination of treatment. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.12.
Source by Dan Frith
from RSSUnify feed https://garkomedia.com/2018/11/30/a-summary-of-virginia-medical-malpractice-laws/
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juditmiltz · 7 years ago
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After the inauguration, New York, LA and South Florida real estate rewarded Trump with even more money
From left: Geoff Palmer, Joe Cayre, Bennett Lebow, President Donald Trump and Richard LeFrak (Photo illustration by Lexi Pilgrim for The Real Deal | Credit: Getty Images)
The coastal elite real estate moguls that helped bankroll Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential victory didn’t stop cutting the checks after their candidate entered 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
A review of federal contributions records for the Trump Victory fund, a joint committee of the Trump campaign and the Republican Party that allows for nearly $450,000 to be donated per individual, shows that since the inauguration at least 21 percent of the $16.4 million raised for the fund came from New York, Los Angeles or South Florida real estate interests.
Many of the top donors to the fund last year were also rather generous with their pocketbooks during the 2016 election and the inauguration. The biggest spender of that crew in 2017 was Blackstone Group CEO Stephen Schwarzman, who gave $344,400 to the Trump Victory fund after already giving $250,000 to Trump’s inaugural committee a year ago. Two other previous top donors, Midtown Equities’ Joseph Cayre and Vector Group’s Bennett Lebow, gave $170,000 and $135,000, respectively. Florida-based Nicholas Mastroianni, the founder of the EB-5 visa fundraising group U.S. Immigration Fund that’s hyperactive around the New York area, gave $150,000. Vornado Realty Trust’s Steve Roth, who was previously an economic advisor to the Trump campaign, gave $100,000.
For others close to the president, it was a family affair. Developer Richard Lefrak, who co-chaired Trump’s short-lived infrastructure advisory council with Roth, joined in with two of his sons to give a total of $350,000. The family members of James Dolan, best known for formerly owning Cablevision but who also own Madison Square Garden and other sports properties, gave $250,000. Red Apple Group’s John Catsimatidis, his wife Margo and son John Jr. together gave $100,000.
Howard Lorber, CEO of Vector Group and chairman of Douglas Elliman (and whom President Trump appointed to chair the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), gave $35,000. As did Elliman CEO Dottie Herman.
Others in the New York property crowd giving substantial money include Stanley and Frieda Chera ($100,000), Steve Witkoff ($94,400), Eliot Tawil ($50,000) and Lloyd Goldman ($35,000). Chera and Witkoff were also among the fund’s largest real estate donors during the campaign.
Lesser known names from New York real estate included Coleman Burke, the head of a commercial real estate company called Waterfront NY that owns the Terminal Stores in Chelsea, who gave $35,000. Arnold Gumowitz, president of AAG Management, gave $74,000. And as was previously reported in USA Today, the would-be developers behind something called “China City” in the Catskills, a $6 billion multi-use development project that had been seeking financing through the EB-5 visa program, gave a staggering $600,000.
Los Angeles real estate developers and executives were also among major donors. Developer Geoffrey Palmer, one of Trump’s biggest donors during the election, gave $100,000. Peninsula Beverly Hills hotel owner Robert Zarnegin and his wife also contributed $100,000. Michael and Miriam Miller, the parents of White House aide Stephen Miller who run the multifamily real estate company Cordary, gave $40,000.
One of the biggest donors from Southern California, however, is a name that few will be familiar with. As Politico previously reported, a Lily Tang and Ben Tang of Upland, California gave $300,000 to the fund. Contributions records list Lily Tang’s occupation as real estate and her employer as the brokerage Coldwell Banker.
The largest Florida real estate donor was sugar baron and developer José Fanjul, who gave $200,000. His company is currently building a 271-unit rental project in Palmetto Bay.
Per federal election rules, some of the money raised by the joint committee will go directly to the Trump’s re-election campaign, while the bulk of it will go to Republican National Committee and state parties, which then have limitations on how they can spend it. In addition to Trump Victory, Trump and the party have another joint committee, Trump Make America Great Again, which raised more money last year but with much smaller individual contributions.
Several of the Trump Victory donors have publicly expressed their support of Trump’s major policy priorities, especially tax reform, which is expected to benefit most commercial real estate investors. The EB-5 visa program, meanwhile, faces the possibility of major reforms or even dissolution by Congress that would come as a shock to the many developers that have tapped it for financing, as well as to the world of brokers and middle-men that built their businesses around the program. Trump has never officially commented on the program, but a Trump-branded rental tower in New Jersey, that was built by his son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner’s Company, received $50 million in construction financing through EB-5.
from The Real Deal Miami https://therealdeal.com/2018/02/01/after-the-inauguration-new-york-la-and-south-florida-real-estate-rewarded-trump-with-even-more-money/#new_tab via IFTTT
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tastywordgasms · 7 years ago
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Book Blitz for ESCAPE by J. L. Drake. Lita T's and Bettina A's Reviews are included @jodildrake_j @EJBookPromos #BettinaA'sReview #LitaT'sReview
Book Blitz for ESCAPE by J. L. Drake. Lita T’s and Bettina A’s Reviews are included @jodildrake_j @EJBookPromos #BettinaA’sReview #LitaT’sReview
Title: Escape Series: Blackstone Series #2 Author: JL Drake Genre: Romantic Suspense Release Date: June 21, 2016  Publisher: Limitless Publishing
  One decision will haunt Blackstone soldier Keith for a lifetime
 Keith left behind the feisty love of his life, Lexi Klein, ten years ago when he chose to become a soldier and leave for Iraq, but after a tragedy struck Lexi’s family and

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badwolfwritergirl · 7 years ago
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Escape - Blitz
Escape – Blitz
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Title: Escape Series: Blackstone Series #2 Author: JL Drake Genre: Romantic Suspense Release Date: June 21, 2016
Publisher: Limitless Publishing
One decision will haunt Blackstone soldier Keith for a lifetime
 Keith left behind the feisty love of his life, Lexi Klein, ten years ago when he chose to become a soldier and leave for Iraq, but after a tragedy struck Lexi’s family and

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traciesbookspot · 7 years ago
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Blitz Package: Escape by JL Drake
Blitz Package: Escape by JL Drake
Title: Escape Series: Blackstone Series #2 Author: JL Drake Genre: Romantic Suspense Release Date: June 21, 2016  Publisher: Limitless Publishing One decision will haunt Blackstone soldier Keith for a lifetime
 Keith left behind the feisty love of his life, Lexi Klein, ten years ago when he chose to become a soldier and leave for Iraq, but after a tragedy struck Lexi’s

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