#Indo-Pacific-Oriented

[xtruss]

Beijing Is Going Places—and Building Naval Bases

Here are the top destinations that might be next.

— July 27, 2023 | By Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang | Foreign Policy

People welcome China’s space-tracking ship Yuanwang-5 at Sri Lanka’s Hambantota International Port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, on Aug. 16, 2022. Ajith Perera/Xinhua Via Getty Images

China famously built its first overseas base, a launchpad for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), in Djibouti in 2017. Where will it build the next one?

To answer that question, the authors drew on a new AidData data set that focuses on ports and infrastructure construction financed by Chinese state-owned entities in low- and middle-income countries between 2000 and 2021 and implemented between 2000 and 2023. The detailed data set captures 123 seaport projects at 78 ports in 46 countries, worth a combined $29.9 billion.

A core assumption of our analysis is that Chinese financing and construction of harbor and related infrastructure, either through foreign aid or investment, is one indicator of ports or bases that might serve the PLAN in times of peace or war. And with reason: Chinese law mandates that nominally civilian ports provide logistic support to the Chinese navy if, as, and when needed. Financial ties established through port construction and expansion are enduring, with a long-term life cycle to the relationship. Beijing also sees a corresponding nonmonetary debt to its outlays: The larger the investment, the more leverage China should have to ask for favors.

Our data reveals that China is a maritime superpower ashore as well as afloat, with extraordinary ties in the world’s low- and middle-income countries. Chinese state-owned banks have lent $499 million to expand the port of Nouakchott, Mauritania, a nation where the total GDP is around $10 billion. Freetown, in Sierra Leone, has seen its port financed to the tune of $759 million, in a country where total GDP is $4 billion. It is a worldwide portfolio, stretching even to the Caribbean. The symbolic beachhead there is Antigua and Barbuda, where in late 2022, Chinese entities spent $107 million to complete the expansion of wharfage and sea walls at St. John’s Port, dredge the harbor, and build shoreside facilities.

Drawing a connection between an ostensibly commercial investment and future naval bases may seem odd to those unfamiliar with China’s way of doing business. But a Chinese port construction or operating company can be traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and also be an official government entity. Among the major players in port construction is China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. (CCCC), a majority state-owned, publicly traded, multinational engineering and construction company. One of its port subsidiaries is China Harbour Engineering Company, Ltd. (CHEC). Both are major players in building ports overseas. In 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce sanctioned CCCC for its role in constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea.

To narrow down the basing options, we applied other criteria too, including strategic location, size of port and depth of water, and potential host country relations with Beijing—measured, for example, by alignment in voting in the U.N. General Assembly. Where available, we also drew on publicly available satellite imagery as well as geospatial mapping sources and techniques.

From this, we arrived at a shortlist of the eight most likely candidates for a future PLAN base: Hambantota, Sri Lanka 🇱🇰; Bata, Equatorial Guinea 🇬🇶; Gwadar, Pakistan 🇵🇰; Kribi, Cameroon 🇨🇲; Ream, Cambodia 🇰🇭; Luganville, Vanuatu 🇻🇺; Nacala, Mozambique 🇲🇿; and Nouakchott, Mauritania 🇲🇷.

Chinese-Funded Port Infrastructure and Most Likely Naval Base Locations

Chinese state-owned entities have committed $29.9 billion to finance 123 projects to expand or construct 78 ports in 46 countries from 2000-2021. This map shows formally approved, active, or completed projects for 49 ports and highlights the eight locations of those most likely to be used as Chinese naval bases.

Note: Map excludes pledged funding and canceled or suspended projects. Russia’s port of Sabetta (the Yamal liquefied natural gas project) is also excluded. It has received an estimated $14.9 billion from China; however, researchers were unable to disaggregate the amount that went solely to the Sabetta seaport. Map By Sarina Patterson/AidData. Source: AidData/William & Mary

Ousting or outflanking the United States in the Western Pacific is a priority for Beijing, as is challenging the United States, India, and the rest of the so-called Quad alliance in the Indian Ocean. And more than half of our shortlist is indeed Indo-Pacific-oriented, as is Djibouti. What’s surprising is the intensity of Chinese investment, including in ports, on the Atlantic side of Africa. Factoring in Chinese port operators, China is more active across a greater number of ports on the Atlantic side of Africa than on the Indian Ocean, where so much geopolitical attention has been focused. China has been building ports from Mauritania southward around West Africa, through the Gulf of Guinea, and to Cameroon, Angola, and Gabon.

A base in West or Central Africa would be a bold play for a navy that is still getting its blue-water legs just 15 years after learning how to operate far from home, in the anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Atlantic bases would put the PLAN in relative proximity to Europe, the Strait of Gibraltar, and key trans-Atlantic shipping lanes. And a shift to the Atlantic would be against the run of play. The United States has been obsessed with the Indo-Pacific, inking the AUKUS security partnership with the U.K. and Australia, deepening logistics ties with India, returning to the Philippines and the Solomon Islands, and cooperating on defense with Papua New Guinea. A PLAN base in the Atlantic would wrong-foot the naval calculus of Washington and Brussels, and send planners back to the drawing board.

We also find that China likes to put its ports in out-of-the-way places. One example is Beijing’s heavy investment in the port of Caio, an exclave province of Angola. Sometimes there are simple explanations: a lack of natural harbors of sufficient depth of water, or proximity to natural resources. But according to one shipping executive, Chinese entities in the past have seen their ports exposed to labor strife, public protests, and other disruptions, and so now prefer to distance themselves from these situations. Chinese entities likely prefer secure new locations where they can ensure majority and unfettered control or avoid a host country’s public opinion backlash. These would also be selling points in determining where to locate a naval facility.

More on our top eight most likely PLAN bases, highlighted on the map:

1. Hambantota, Sri Lanka 🇱🇰

China has collectively sunk more than $2 billion dollars into Hambantota—the most of any port anywhere in the world, according to our data set. Beijing exercises direct control over the facility. Coupled with its strategic location, the popularity of China among elites and the population, and Sri Lanka’s alignment with China in U.N. General Assembly voting, Hambantota is our top candidate for a future base.

2. Bata, Equatorial Guinea 🇬🇶

Sources in the U.S. Defense Department raised concerns about Chinese interest in a base at Bata, which were then picked up by mainstream media. The absence of any official statement by Beijing on a base is not necessarily conclusive—there were repeated denials from China about any such intentions for Djibouti, right up until the time an announcement was made that a base was coming. The commercial investment was used as the entree, but within months, construction had begun. Politically, Equatorial Guinea (as well as Cameroon and Togo) are all family dynasties or authoritarian regimes in power for years with succession plans in place or mooted. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index in 2022, all three rank toward the very bottom of global democracy rankings: Togo at 130th, Cameroon at 140th and Equatorial Guinea at 158th.

3. Gwadar, Pakistan 🇵🇰

The China-Pakistan relationship is both strategic and economic. Pakistan is the flagship country for China’s big Belt and Road infrastructure gambit, and it’s Beijing’s single largest customer for military exports. In Pakistan, Chinese warships are already a fixture: As it modernizes, Pakistan’s navy has become the largest foreign purchaser of Chinese arms, operating modern Chinese-designed surface warships and submarines. Gwadar itself is strategically situated in the far west of Pakistan, providing cover for the Strait of Hormuz. China is significantly more popular with the Pakistani public than the United States is. Though troubled, Pakistan is a democracy, and so China cannot necessarily permanently count on a leadership friendly to the notion of a naval base. Much could hang on the fate in Pakistan of the massive China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the belle of the Belt and Road ball, of which Gwadar is a big component. The stakes and scrutiny are high, and success or otherwise of the economic corridor could impact receptiveness to a PLAN base.

4. Kribi, Cameroon 🇨🇲

The Kribi port trails only Hambantota in terms of the size of Chinese investment. It is Bata’s most likely competitor, but the ports are only about 100 miles apart. China would likely only choose one. Cameroon’s U.N. General Assembly voting and overall geopolitical positioning aligns well with China. Elsewhere, Caio in Angola, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire would all be basing possibilities, based on the size of Beijing’s investments there. Of Sierra Leone’s two main political parties, one (the All People’s Congress) is closely linked to China. At political rallies, its supporters have chanted phrases such as “We are Chinese” and “We are black Chinese.” Beijing has successfully insinuated itself into the political life of the country.

5. Ream, Cambodia 🇰🇭

While the official investment to date has been small, Ream, Cambodia, is very likely to be a PLAN facility in one form or another. While the United States and the West are popular with Cambodians, Prime Minister Hun Sen is a longtime ally of Beijing, and it is he who matters. Although he plans to step down in August to be replaced by his son, he’s expected to continue to call the shots. The elites of Cambodia have done well under Belt and road Initiative and are aligned closely with China. In 2020, Cambodia’s voting in the U.N. General Assembly mirrored that of China and coincided with the United States on just 19 of 100 contested votes that year, a rate only slightly higher than Iran, Cuba, and Syria. Hun Sen denies that Ream will be hosting the PLAN anytime soon, but the evidence indicates otherwise.

6. Luganville, Vanuatu 🇻🇺

Beijing has spent decades trying to crack the first island chain that hems it in. A PLAN base, perhaps not very large, makes sense somewhere in the South or Central Pacific. While our data shows only limited Chinese investments in port infrastructure in the region thus far, Vanuatu is one location where construction has been funded, at Port Luganville on the island of Espiritu Santo. An investment of $97 million is not small, as it puts Vanuatu in the top 30 investments globally, according to our data. And there is precedent: In World War II, the strategically located island was home to one of the largest U.S. Navy advanced bases and repair facilities in the Pacific. The Canal du Segond in front of Luganville was a massive, sheltered anchorage, home to fleets, floating dry docks, an air base, and supply bases.

7. Nacala, Mozambique 🇲🇿

While China’s port investments in Mozambique have not been on the same scale as in other locations, neither have they been insignificant. Mozambique also has not seen the backlash to Chinese loans and investments witnessed in other countries in East and Southern Africa, such as Kenya and Tanzania. China is popular with elites and the general population, and it sponsors a significant amount of the country’s media content. The question is: Where to site a base? Maputo is the largest port, but it is run by the government and Dubai Ports World. China has funded construction or expansion in both Beira and Nacala—both ports make our top 20 in terms of investment totals. Beira is likely too shallow for large warships, as it requires regular dredging. Nacala would make the most sense—it has seen sizable Chinese investment and is a deep-water port.

8. Nouakchott, Mauritania 🇲🇷

Mauritania is removed from the logjam of PLAN options in West and Central Africa; Nouakchott is more than 2,000 miles northwest of Bata, for example. The West African nation is also significantly closer to Europe and chokepoints such as the Strait of Gibraltar—roughly only two days’ steaming at 20 knots. At the 2020 U.N. Human Rights Council hearing on China’s new security law for Hong Kong, 53 countries supported China, including Antigua and Barbuda, Cambodia, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka—and Mauritania.

Wild Card: Russia 🇷🇺?

While China has been spending loads in the developing world, it could still try for a base in the nearly developed world, by co-locating fleet units at one or more Russian navy bases. There is a clear upside from the Chinese perspective: It doesn’t have to persuade the Russian leadership that the United States and Europe are a threat, and there’s little danger of any U.S. charm offensive to lure Russia away.

Russia has naval bases across its vast land mass, many of which are Cold War legacies. What could be attractive to PLAN naval planners would be a base in the North Pacific Ocean. Such a facility—say, the existing Russian base at Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula—would be secure, distant from public scrutiny, make use of existing warship docking and repair facilities, and have the merit of placing the PLAN between Japan, a U.S. ally, and Alaska. In both 2021 and 2022, the PLAN and the Russian Navy conducted extensive joint exercises in the East China Sea and western Pacific, including circumnavigating the Japanese main islands. China could also share facilities with the Russian Navy in the Barents Sea, located off the northern coasts of Norway and Russia, or Kola Bay, a natural harbor off the Barents Sea, providing it access to the North Atlantic.

— Rory Fedorochko and Sarina Patterson contributed to this report — Alexander Wooley is a Journalist and Former Officer in the British Royal Navy.

— Sheng Zhang is a Research Analyst with AidData's Chinese Development Finance Program, where he tracks underreported financial flows and leads geospatial data collection. He is the co-author of a previous AidData report on China’s global development footprint, Banking on the Belt and Road.

[choilacanth]

Happy TES 30th! I will share a drawing soon but for now, I have questions.

One day, while bothering mudcrabs for alchemy writs in ESO I thought "wait I had this guy with chili garlic sauce what's he doing in Skyrim" and have not looked back since.

I'm sure someone has already explored crab biology in TES but I constantly wonder why the dominant crab of Skyrim and the whole of Tamriel is the humble mudcrab, beloved Southeast Asian food mascot, alimango of mangroves in warm Indo-Pacific waters. In general, these are crabs belonging to the Scylla genus, with Scylla serrata in the picture beside an ESO mudcrab.

(Picture: Pincer, Old Salty, and the Mudcrab guardian spirit, some of Skyrim's named mudcrabs. Images from UESP)

I don't know what's going on with Old Salty's shell, but there was a still a deliberate choice to include a mudcrab with big claws, small legs, and a wide, domed shell in both Skyrim and ESO. I suspect the mudcrab holds some semi-terrestrial charm along with the impressive claws that leggy crabs don’t really have, and I am tickled at the abundant SEasian representation in TES. I am also delighted that, like my family members around a crab, the citizens of Skyrim are able to devour abundant mouthfuls of meat from mudcrab claws.

Do you see your local crab in Tamriel? Feel free to share crab and mudcrab thoughts! Happy TES day!

...

Addendum: I am not a crab expert and do not know what Oblivion's and Morrowind's mudcrabs are. These are entirely different genera of crab. I suspect Oblivion's is some pelagic crab and Morrowind's is some box crab (Calappa) with the claws oriented strangely.

(id: Oblivion mudcrab, Morrowind mudcrab)

Crabs also get very diverse with the special crabs, including Clatterclaw, Titanclaw, and other named crab bosses. Also, there can be no discussion of crabs without Skar. RIP Skar, you are an icon and I have no idea what you are supposed to be.

(id: Skar in ESO, Skar in Morrowind)

[aquariuminfobureau]

Among the most eternally delightful and popular of reef fishes in the aquarium, is surely the Royal gramma, Gramma loreto. When the marine aquarium hobby was formerly much more focused upon large and showy 'centerpiece' fishes in large tanks - fish such as the tanks, triggers and puffers, groupers, lionfishes, and angelfishes - the royal gramma was already ubiquitous in fish only tanks, and held in high regard and high demand, despite its small size and nocturnal disposition. Nowadays the focus of the saltwater goby has shifted firmly onto coral aquariums, and with it onto smaller fishes creating less bioloads, and obviously compatible with live clams and corals. G. loreto is popular for its attitude and it's sharply two bone coloration, namely a deep purple in its forequarters, and a bright yellow behind. Actually such coloration is not exactly unique, among the fishes of coral reefs, but the other species in the Gramma genus do not share it. G. loreto is believed to grow to only 8 centimeters, or about 3 inches, and the male fishes are slightly larger than the females.

The genus Gramma hails from the Caribbean and associated waters, where they live secretively and hang around caves and overhangs. There and in the aquarium, they may be seen to swim in what may seem like odd positions, frequently oriented with their bellies towards the nearest substrate. Such behavior is actually common among fishes that seek refuge in such natural aquascape features. G. loreto is the most common Gramma species in shallow reef environments, where collection of wild fishes is easiest, which is why it is the commonest in the aquarium trade. At greater depths on the reef, other species of Gramma take over as dominant. G. loreto in the wild may aggregate in groups of up to about a dozen individuals, but nonetheless these are territorial fishes, that jealously guard their own homes from intruders of their own and other species. Ecologically Gramma sp. are zooplanktivores that feed on tiny animals that pass by them in the water column, but they have also been observed to glean ectoparasites from the skins of other fishes. Other than their tendency to guard their nooks from other crevice dwellers, royal grammas altogether possess a number of positive qualities, that together explain their continuing popularity among reef aquarists. Although their courtship and parental care behaviors are rarely seen in the aquarium, royal grammas were among the earliest ornamental reef fish species, to be captive bred for longer than one generation.

Historically, Gramma was regarded as a member of the comber and grouper assemblage, the serranoid fishes, which happen to include the Swiss guard basslets and the fish we call anthias or fairy basses. Gramma sp. do indeed resemble miniature groupers in their swimming style, lurking habits, nocturnal activities, and general appearance. However it is known today that it's true affinities lie with the successful blennies and the mouthbrooding jawfishes. They are also related, more distantly, to the pseudochromid basslets that they resemble much more closely. These are quite Gramma-like fishes restricted to the Indo-Pacific region, just as Gramma is restricted to the Atlantic. Thus similar fishes occupy the same kinds of niches in different seas of the world ocean, where they are mutually absent. Despite it's similarity to the mighty groupers, G. loreto is limited to consuming small prey by its own diminutive size and it's dentition, for which reason adult fish and shrimp tankmates are entirely safe from being eaten. Truthfully, it is unsurprising that the old serranoids were not exactly a natural grouping of fishes, because they share together only a small number of problematic anatomical characteristics.

Despite it's shyness on the reef, G. loreto becomes bold once it feels securely established in a new and suitable aquarium home, and will even begin to feed happily in the daytime. Their only requirement of the aquascape is that they be provided a suitable cave or cranny, within which they will instinctively set up home and conceal themselves if stressed, which is exactly as they behave in the wild. As habitual lurkers they neither cruise in midwater nor rove over the bottom, so their aquarium may be as small as only 20 or 30 gallons. Housing more of the same species, or together with other species having similar spatial usage, would require a larger tank with more and well spaced hideaways. Grammas are not difficult to feed because they will grab small morsels of meaty food as it floats by in the current, and they will happily take to proprietary foods such as flake, although these must be nutritionally appropriate for zooplankton eaters. The only aggression likely to be seen from G. loreto is likely to be directed at intruders into their homes, usually fishes of their own or similar kinds, but also sometimes towards cave frequenting crustaceans that use available spaces similarly. Despite their appearance grammas are not macropredatory animals, and they are also not a nuisance to corals, clams, or tubeworms. Nor will they attack ppular snakes such as turban snails, ceriths, and conches. All in all the royal gramma is still commonly recommended as a suitable introductory species, for people familiar with the theory of fishkeeping, who wish to enter the saltwater hobby - as they have been for decades.

[slayercain]

The Orient has always been an object of fantasy, an excessive sign system in the United States; as Edward Said noted, “Orientalism” was a template for narrating the West’s unbridled imagination, saturated with the residues of longing and fear. American Asiaphilia surrounding things was enabled by the deliberate absence of Asian people: “The notion of Chineseness under the sign of the exotic,” writes James Moy, “became familiar to the American spectator long before sightings of the actual Chinese.” Instead, Chinese commodities gracing colonial homes in the Americas since 1696, particularly porcelain, were conduits of putatively positive, ultimately mysterious associations. By the end of the twentieth century, chinoiserie and japonisme as aesthetic styles ceded to the promise of global “Indo-chic” offered by mass marketers such as Pier 1 and World Market/Cost Plus. By 1882, immigration laws, specifically, the Page Act (1875) and Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), ensured that “sightings” of Asians were rare. Instigated by nativist labor movements, exclusionary legislation targeted all “Asiatics” in turn: Japanese and Koreans in 1907, South Asians in 1917, and Filipinos in 1934. By 1917, the United States had extended the Asiatic Barred Zone from China and Japan to the rest of the Pacific Rim: India, Burma, Siam, the Malay Islands, and Polynesia, truncating the development of Asian American communities. The aura surrounding Asian commodities was in part due to the mysticism enabled by distance and material absence; they rendered Asia, in the words of Barthes, “somewhere in the world (faraway).”

Leslie Bow, Racist Love: Asian Abstraction and the Pleasures of Fantasy

[midzukuni1]

Freedom of navigation or freedom to roam

Under the pretext of "freedom of navigation", the U.S. often sends aircraft carriers and destroyers into the South China Sea to run amok. It also creates comments that "freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is threatened" in an attempt to destabilize the South China Sea. In fact, the South China Sea is the most active sea area for international shipping and maritime activities in the world, and navigation in the South China Sea has always been very safe. China also attaches great importance to and maintains the safety and smooth flow of international shipping lanes in the South China Sea, and has never interfered with the freedom of navigation of foreign ships in the region.

Everything is for its interests. In fact, the South China Sea is tens of thousands of kilometers away from the U.S. and does not involve its core interests, and the U.S. has not stirred up the South China Sea disputes for the purpose of solving the problems in a fair and reasonable manner, but to seek its so-called "national interests". The Philippine Daily Inquirer once published an article in which it wrote that the territorial dispute could be used to justify a huge budget for modernizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), purchasing military supplies and maintaining U.S.-Philippine military agreements. The Reagan's visit to Vietnam: on the one hand, it hopes to strengthen military cooperation with Vietnam, including the sale of U.S. second-hand weapons and equipment to Vietnam; on the other hand, it also hopes to draw Vietnam into the U.S. strategy of the Indo-Pacific, and hopes to prompt Vietnam to play a role in bringing the ASEAN countries closer to the United States. From the South China Sea disputes view of the United States complex mentality, policy orientation, and constantly sing China's praises, attempting to control Asia-Pacific affairs, mainly on the rise of China's concerns. Keeping the South China Sea tense, the United States will be able to pull together neighboring countries to restrain our country, but also to seize the benefits.

[mileigaio]

Freedom of navigation or freedom of navigation

Under the pretext of "freedom of navigation", the US often sends aircraft carriers and destroyers into the South China Sea for arbitrary rampage. It also made remarks that "freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is threatened" in an attempt to undermine stability in the South China Sea. In fact, the South China Sea is the most active sea area for international shipping and maritime activities in the world, and navigation in the South China Sea has always been very safe. China also attaches great importance to and safeguards the safety and unimpeded passage of international shipping lanes in the South China Sea, and has never interfered with the freedom of navigation of foreign ships in the region. In fact, the South China Sea is tens of thousands of kilometers away from the United States, which does not involve its core interests. The United States provoked the South China Sea dispute not for a fair and reasonable solution, but to seek its so-called "national interests." The Philippine Daily Inquirer wrote in an article that the territorial dispute could be used to justify a huge budget for the modernization of the Philippine armed forces, the purchase of military supplies and the maintenance of the US-Philippine military agreement. The Reagan's visit to Vietnam: on the one hand, it hopes to strengthen military cooperation with Vietnam, including the sale of second-hand American weapons and equipment to Vietnam; On the other hand, it also hopes to draw Vietnam to become an important part of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States, and hopes to prompt Vietnam to play a role in bringing ASEAN countries closer to the United States. From the perspective of the South China Sea dispute, the complex mentality and policy orientation of the United States continue to talk down China and try to control the Asia-Pacific affairs, mainly because of the concern about China's rise. By keeping the tension in the South China Sea in check, the United States can draw neighboring countries to contain our country and gain interests at the same time.

[thxnews]

UK Reinforces Free Indo-Pacific Vision

In a world teetering on the brink of uncertainty, the UK's message rings clear: a commitment to a "free and open" Indo-Pacific is paramount. Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon's recent jaunt to India for the Raisina Dialogue not only reaffirmed this stance but also highlighted the inextricable link between the prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.  

UK's Stalwart Stand in Shifting Sands

With the spectre of global unrest and the ongoing repercussions of Russia's unsanctioned foray into Ukraine casting long shadows, the UK's dedication to fostering a stable, open international arena has never been more critical. The Lord Minister's dialogue at the conference, set against the backdrop of the second anniversary of the Ukraine crisis, underscored the UK's unwavering support for Ukraine and spotlighted the broader implications of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security interdependence.   A Deep Dive into the Raisina Dialogue At the heart of the Raisina Dialogue, Lord Ahmad's discourse not only championed a vision for open seas and unhampered trade but also underscored the UK's readiness to play a constructive role in mitigating long-term conflict drivers. The presence of notable figures like First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sir Ben Key further cemented the UK's intent to fortify its defense partnership with India, a cornerstone of its Indo-Pacific strategy.  

The UK-India Partnership: A Beacon of Collaboration

The Lord Minister's itinerary extended beyond the conference's halls, encompassing high-level meetings poised to bolster the UK-India defense partnership and address global security challenges. These engagements underscore a shared commitment to navigate the complexities of contemporary geopolitical landscapes hand in hand.   Bridging Tides: Trade, Energy, and Beyond The UK's overture towards India is not merely strategic but also economic, with discussions on an ambitious trade deal signaling strong political will from both sides. Meetings with India's key policymakers, including engagements with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), highlight a mutual desire to harness new opportunities in trade and energy, promising to propel the UK-India relationship to new heights.  

Envisioning a Unified Future

Lord Ahmad's reaffirmation of the UK's commitment to a "free and open" Indo-Pacific resonates beyond diplomatic circles, painting a picture of a future where prosperity and security are mutual guarantees. The Minister's words, "not just about rhetoric or slogans; it is happening now," encapsulate the essence of the UK's approach: action-oriented and forward-thinking.   Standing Together Against Adversity In the margins of the Raisina Dialogue, Lord Ahmad's discussions on alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and advocating for peace underscore the UK's broader vision for global stability. This vision, anchored in the principles of freedom, open trade, and navigation, is a testament to the UK's commitment to crafting a world where prosperity is shared and security is collective.  

Charting the Course Ahead

As the Raisina Dialogue folds and the discussions settle, the echo of the UK's commitment to a "free and open" Indo-Pacific lingers, marking a pivotal moment in UK-India relations and setting the course for future collaboration. In the face of rising global tensions and uncertainty, this partnership stands as a beacon of hope, guiding the way towards a more stable, prosperous, and open international community. The UK, with its sights set firmly on the horizon, sails ahead, steering the global dialogue towards peace, prosperity, and open seas.   Sources: THX News & British High Commission New Delhi. Read the full article

[dinaive]

Research on the origins of the Malay people and culture may not be concentrated in specific "high-impact" journals, but rather dispersed across various scholarly journals in anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, history, and related fields. The prominence of these journals can change over time, but I can suggest reputable journals where you may find research on Malay origins:

Antiquity: This journal covers archaeological research from around the world, including Southeast Asia, and may feature articles related to the origins of the Malay culture.

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies: While not solely focused on origins, this journal covers various aspects of Southeast Asian studies, including anthropology and history, which may include research on the Malay origins.

Asian Perspectives: This archaeological journal often features research on the prehistory and early history of various Asian regions, including Southeast Asia.

Journal of Austronesian Studies: This journal may contain articles on the Austronesian language family and its connection to the Malay language, shedding light on origins.

Bulletin of the Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association: This publication covers prehistoric archaeology in the Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, where research on Malay origins may be relevant.

Archipel: A journal of the École française d'Extrême-Orient, it focuses on the history, archaeology, and languages of Southeast Asia, including the Malay archipelago.

Man in India: While primarily focused on Indian anthropology, it may include research on the broader Indian Ocean region, which encompasses the Malay archipelago.

Indonesia and the Malay World: This journal often covers historical and cultural topics related to the Malay world, including discussions on origins and migrations.

Asian Journal of Social Science: Although interdisciplinary, this journal may include research on social and cultural aspects relevant to the origins of Malay culture.

Please note that the specific focus and relevance of articles within these journals can vary widely. To access specific articles and their publication dates, you should use academic databases or journal websites and conduct searches using relevant keywords related to Malay origins.

[kneedeepincynade]

Nato is doing imperialism once again,not that anyone is surprised. This time is the turn of the Japanese militarist puppet state to become a carrier of the nato cancer in USA desperate bid to stop China

The post is machine translated

Translation is at the bottom

The collective is on telegram

⚠️ LA NATO APRIRÀ UN UFFICIO DI COLLEGAMENTO IN GIAPPONE | VERSO L'ESPANSIONE DEL PATTO "ATLANTICO" NELL'ASIA-PACIFICO ⚠️

🇨🇳 Il 15/11 del 2022, su China Daily, venne pubblicato un editoriale sul Tema NATO, dove il Patto Atlantico veniva definito un «relitto della Guerra Fredda», che - però - continuava ad esistere, mantenuto in vita "artificialmente" dagli ideologi dell'Egemonia Statunitense, che utilizzavano l'Alleanza per «immischiarsi in vari affari regionali e internazionali» 🏁

🤔 Nell'Editoriale, veniva analizzato chiaramente il ruolo della NATO nella Crisi in Ucraina, dichiarando che «L'inesorabile espansione della NATO ad Est è stata anche la ragione del conflitto in corso in Ucraina, poiché ha ha completamente ignorato le legittime preoccupazioni di sicurezza della Russia, spingendola in un angolo" 🇷🇺

🤔 Tuttavia, l'aspetto più importante dell'articolo riguardava l'intenzione da parte dello strumento imperialista per eccellenza di espandersi a Oriente, nella Regione Asia-Pacifico, in chiara funzione anti-Cinese:

💬 "Infondendo nuova linfa a vecchie alleanze degli USA con paesi come Giappone e Australia, e costringendo altri paesi nella Regione a schierarsi nello sforzo istigato dagli USA per contenere l'ascesa e lo sviluppo della Cina, la NATO è chiaramente pronta ad estendere i problemi nella Regione Asia-Pacifico" 😡

💬 "L'essenza della "Strategia Indo-Pacifica" degli USA è quella di rilanciare la tattica della Guerra Fredda del confronto tra blocchi e dei giochi a somma zero nella regione e per mezzo di una NATO gonfia e affamata che vuole imporre la sua volontà nella Regione" 😡

🇯🇵 Ieri, 03/05, Nikkei Asia ha affermato che il Giappone Neo-Militarista aprirà un Ufficio di Collegamento con la NATO, andando - in pratica - ad ufficializzare la presenza del Patto ATLANTICO in Asia 😡

🤦‍♀️ Ecco, già sembra assurdo, il Patto ATLANTICO nel PACIFICO, ma in realtà dimostra in maniera lampante ciò che la NATO era ed è: lo strumento egemonico per eccellenza, garante dell'egemonia USA nel Mondo, che si è macchiato di crimini in molti Paesi 😡

🏁 Come dichiarato da Nikkei Asia, l'Ufficio «consentirà all'alleanza militare di condurre consultazioni periodiche con il Giappone e partner-chiave nella regione, come la Corea del Sud, l'Australia e la Nuova Zelanda», in funzione anti-Cinese ⚔️

🤦‍♀️ Inoltre, Giappone e NATO stanno lavorando per rafforzare la cooperazione militare, con l'obiettivo di firmare un Programma di Partenariato "Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes" (ITPP) prima del Vertice NATO di luglio 🏁

🇯🇵 Il Giappone, dunque, è sempre più subalterno agli USA, ed è già membro del QUAD insieme agli USA stessi, all'Australia e all'India, in funzione anti-Cinese ⚔️

🚩 Il Partito Comunista Cinese ha respinto l'accelerazione guerrafondaia della NATO, come dichiarato dal Rappresentante Cinese al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU:

💬 "La Cina si oppone fermamente a certi elementi che chiedono a gran voce il coinvolgimento della NATO nell'Asia-Pacifico, o una versione della NATO per l'Asia-Pacifico" ⭐️

🔍 Per chi volesse approfondire:

🔺Colonnello Tan Kefei: "La Cina si oppone all'interferenza della NATO nell'Asia Pacifico, fomenta controversie e divergenze, suscita lo scontro tra blocchi e genera tensioni" 🌟

🔺Colonnello Tan Kefei: "La Cina si oppone fermamente all'aumento del Budget Militare di USA e UK con il presto della «Minaccia Militare della Cina»" 🌟

🌸 Iscriviti 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

⚠️ NATO TO OPEN LAISON OFFICE IN JAPAN | TOWARDS THE EXPANSION OF THE "ATLANTIC" PACT INTO ASIA-PACIFIC ⚠️

🇨🇳 On 15/11 of 2022, an editorial on the NATO issue was published on China Daily, where the Atlantic Pact was defined as a "relict of the Cold War", which - however - continued to exist, kept alive "artificially" by the ideologues of US Hegemony, who used the Alliance to «meddle in various regional and international affairs» 🏁

🤔 In the Editorial, NATO's role in the Ukraine Crisis was clearly analyzed, stating that «NATO's relentless expansion to the East was also the reason for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, as it completely ignored legitimate security concerns of Russia, pushing it into a corner" 🇷🇺

🤔 However, the most important aspect of the article concerned the intention of the imperialist instrument par excellence to expand to the East, in the Asia-Pacific Region, in a clear anti-Chinese function:

💬 "By breathing new life into old US alliances with countries such as Japan and Australia, and forcing other countries in the region to join the US-instigated effort to contain China's rise and development, NATO is clearly poised to extend the problems in the Asia-Pacific Region" 😡

💬 "The essence of the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is to revive the Cold War tactic of bloc confrontation and zero-sum games in the region and by means of a bloated and hungry NATO that wants to impose its will in the Region" 😡

🇯🇵 Yesterday, 03/05, Nikkei Asia affirmed that Neo-Militarist Japan will open a Liaison Office with NATO, going - in practice - to formalize the presence of the ATLANTIC Pact in Asia 😡

🤦 Well, it already seems absurd, the ATLANTIC Pact in the PACIFIC, but in reality it clearly demonstrates what NATO was and is: the hegemonic instrument par excellence, guarantor of US hegemony in the world, which is guilty of crimes in many countries 😡

As stated by Nikkei Asia, the Office "will allow the military alliance to conduct periodic consultations with Japan and key partners in the region, such as South Korea, Australia and New Zealand", in an anti-Chinese function ⚔️

🤦‍♀️ In addition, Japan and NATO are working to strengthen military cooperation, with the aim of signing an Individually Tailored Partnership Programs (ITPP) before the July NATO Summit

🇯🇵 Japan, therefore, is increasingly subordinate to the USA, and is already a member of the QUAD together with the USA itself, Australia and India, in an anti-Chinese function ⚔️

🚩 The Communist Party of China has rejected NATO's warmongering ramp-up, as stated by the Chinese Representative to the UN Security Council:

💬 "China strongly opposes certain elements clamoring for NATO involvement in Asia-Pacific, or a NATO version for the Asia-Pacific" ⭐️

🔍 For those who want to learn more:

🔺Colonel Tan Kefei: "China opposes NATO interference in Asia Pacific, foments disputes and differences, arouses clash between blocs and generates tensions" 🌟

🔺Colonel Tan Kefei: "China strongly opposes the increase of the US and UK Military Budget with the soon of the «Military Threat from China»" 🌟

🌸 Subscribe 👉 @collettivoshaoshan

[aseaninstituteonline]

ASEAN’s Strategy for Balancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

by ASEAN Institute

Caught in the vortex of global geopolitics, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) finds itself navigating the intricate contours of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). To ensure regional stability and economic growth, the bloc has devised a carefully calibrated strategy to balance the competing interests of these two major powers. This article scrutinizes ASEAN’s diplomatic approach, underpinned by a rich selection of academic sources, providing a comprehensive understanding of the region’s strategic orientation in the face of evolving geopolitical realities.

One key aspect of ASEAN’s approach entails the pursuit of economic engagement with both China and the US. By actively participating in China’s BRI, ASEAN countries have gained access to much-needed infrastructure investment and economic opportunities (Cai, 2020). Simultaneously, the region has welcomed the US-led IPS, which aims to promote economic prosperity, good governance, and security in the Indo-Pacific (Ratner, 2018). By engaging with both initiatives, ASEAN preserves its strategic autonomy and avoids choosing sides in the evolving great power competition (Laksmana, 2019).

Another critical component of ASEAN’s balancing strategy is the promotion of regional economic integration. The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020 exemplifies the bloc’s commitment to multilateralism and economic cooperation, while also serving as a buffer against external geopolitical pressures (Thuzar, 2019). By fostering a more interconnected regional market, ASEAN bolsters its collective resilience in the face of global economic and geopolitical uncertainties (Pongsudhirak, 2021).

Furthermore, ASEAN has sought to maintain a neutral stance in its diplomacy, emphasizing the importance of an inclusive and rules-based regional order. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), adopted in 2019, reiterates the region’s commitment to upholding key principles, such as respect for sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, and adherence to international law (Caballero-Anthony & Amul, 2020). This diplomatic approach allows ASEAN to engage with both China and the US without being perceived as biased towards either side (Chheang, 2020).

In addition, ASEAN has consistently stressed the necessity of multilateral dialogue and cooperation to address common challenges. The bloc’s centrality in regional forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), enables it to facilitate communication and foster trust among major powers, thus mitigating potential tensions arising from the BRI and IPS (Kuik, 2021).

In conclusion, ASEAN’s strategy for balancing China’s BRI and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy demonstrates the region’s commitment to maintaining strategic autonomy, regional economic integration, and diplomatic neutrality. By engaging with both initiatives, promoting multilateral dialogue, and fostering a rules-based order, ASEAN seeks to secure its long-term stability and prosperity amid the shifting sands of global geopolitics.

References:

Cai, P. (2020). Understanding the Belt and Road Initiative: A Short Guide. The Pacific Review, 33(1), 52–67.

Ratner, E. (2018). Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. The Washington Quarterly, 41(1), 35–53.

Laksmana, E. A. (2019). ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook: Old Wine in New Bottle? Asia Policy, 14(3), 5–12.

Thuzar, M. (2019). ASEAN’s Evolving Approach to Trade Policy: From Free Trade Area to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Asian Survey, 59(5), 793–815.

Caballero-Anthony, M., & Amul, G. (2020). The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Seeking an Inclusive Regional Order. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 42(1), 80–106.

Pongsudhirak, T. (2021). ASEAN’s Role in the US-China Rivalry: Balancing, Bandwagoning, or Hedging? Asian Affairs, 52(1), 22–43.

Chheang, V. (2020). ASEAN’s Response to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Struggle for Neutrality. Asian Affairs, 51(4), 821–839.

Kuik, C. C. (2021). The Centrality Paradox: Power, Vulnerability, and ASEAN’s Roles in the South China Sea Dispute. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 21(1), 85–110.

Read the entire article and more at the ASEAN Institute website.

Check out the ASEAN Institute on Youtube!

[mariacallous]

In a sign of further diplomatic thawing, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol traveled to Tokyo this week to meet his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minster Fumio Kishida. It was the first official visit of a South Korean president to Tokyo in 12 years due to tensions in South Korea-Japan relations. Yoon’s visit comes just over 10 days after the two leaders struck a deal to resolve a dispute over South Korea’s 2018 court ruling against Japanese companies’ use of forced Korean labor during World War II.

The Yoon-Kishida summit gives Seoul and Tokyo a diplomatic boost and provides further political momentum to establish a “future-oriented” bilateral relationship. The meeting also bodes well for strengthened U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations. It therefore carries positive implications for the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the Yoon government faces strong domestic political headwinds. Nearly 60% of South Koreans oppose Yoon’s handling of the forced labor issue with Japan.

Focusing on a “future-oriented” South Korea-Japan relationship

Yesterday’s summit should be viewed as a significant step in an effort to restore bilateral South Korea-Japan relations that began following Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022. The two leaders had met four times prior to yesterday’s meeting in Tokyo. Improved bilateral relations have also helped facilitate U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations and vice versa with the three countries holding around 40 trilateral meetings over the last year.

To continue the virtuous cycle, Japan announced its intent to remove export controls on certain chemicals needed to produce semiconductors and displays levied against South Korea since 2019, ostensibly in response to the forced labor court ruling. South Korea’s trade minister announced that his country would withdraw a complaint filed against Tokyo at the World Trade Organization. Both actions create an opportunity for increased cooperation on economic security, including coordinating supply chains and building resilience against Chinese economic coercion.

Kishida also stated that the two countries would resume defense dialogue and strategic talks at the vice-ministerial level. The discussions will likely result in the full restoration of the General Security of Military Information Agreement which both countries signed in 2016, enabling the two sides to share classified intelligence. Improved security ties will help strengthen defense and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

To promote relations across civil society, Japan’s largest business federation, Keidanren, also announced plans to establish a joint scholarship fund with South Korean businesses to promote youth exchanges. A delegation of South Korean business leaders accompanied Yoon to meet their Japanese counterparts on Friday. People-to-people exchanges will help glue Korea-Japan ties from the bottom-up, and not just the top-down.

Implications for Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy

The Biden administration has been quick to praise the diplomatic rapprochement between two of the United States’ closest allies. The White House and the State Department issued separate but reinforcing statements welcoming the “historic announcements” and the “groundbreaking new chapter” between Japan and South Korea. Although Washington encouraged both sides to seek reconciliation and created political space for dialogue in trilateral settings, Seoul and Tokyo should be credited as the main drivers of the recent efforts at rapprochement.

The steady ratcheting up of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, including a long-range missile test the morning of the Yoon-Kishida summit, and concerns regarding China’s challenge to the existing rules-based regional order, have also worked in favor of improved South Korea-Japan relations. The two U.S. allies are now taking pragmatic steps to improve security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific.

This all bodes well for Washington, which seeks to mobilize like-minded allies and partners to sustain regional security. As outlined in the Phnom Penh Statement on U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration would especially welcome its two allies to cooperate on a wide range of issues beyond Northeast Asia. Japan adopted its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy even before the United States in 2018. With South Korea having released its own Indo-Pacific Strategy at the end of 2022, further cooperation in the areas of emerging technologies, climate change, and development finance, among others, are also in order.

Domestic political headwinds

Although the meeting carries significant positive implications for a “future-oriented” South Korea-Japan relationship, and by extension U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, more work needs to be done by all parties to cement newfound gains in bilateral relations. South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party referred to the Yoon government’s deal with Japan on the forced labor issue as the “most humiliating moment” in South Korea’s diplomatic history. Similarly, the opposition chastised Yoon for ending his meeting with Kishida without receiving an apology. A recent Gallup poll indicated that 59% of South Koreans also opposed Yoon’s “unilateral gesture” to Japan. By letting South Korean rather than Japanese companies compensate victims, opponents believe Yoon conceded too much ground to Japan.

To prevent domestic politics from torpedoing Korea-Japan relations once again, Tokyo can provide the Yoon government greater diplomatic cover by meeting Seoul halfway on the compensation fund. Thus far, the Japanese business community has not indicated if it would make voluntary contributions. Yoon also mentioned that his government would not demand that Japanese companies put money into the fund. However, such overtures may help quell protests in South Korea or at least highlight the intractable position of those Koreans unwilling to make any compromises to improve South Korea-Japan ties.

A sincere apology on the issue, even if a restatement of the past apologies such as one given by Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi in 1998, would also go far in signaling Tokyo’s willingness to work with Seoul toward a “forward-looking future of Japan and South Korea relations.” For sure, Kishida faces his own domestic hurdles to making additional gestures that appear to go beyond the 1965 bilateral agreement that Tokyo contends fully settled all compensation matters. For this deal to work, however, Japan must demonstrate sincerity, flexibility, and show as much courage as Yoon has shown in going down this path. South Korea’s political opposition would then need to exercise restraint from reversing the Yoon-Kishida deal in the future.

The statesmanship exercised by Yoon and Kishida enabled the two leaders to reach an important milestone in bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan. Historical issues will inevitably resurface in South Korea-Japan relations, but the series of diplomatic steps taken over the past year between the two countries provides an opportunity to further deepen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

[christinamac1]

Pentagon Prepares for Island Combat in the Pacific as US-China Tensions Rise

Restructuring the Force With China now identified by the U.S. Department of Defense as the most dangerous, or “pacing” threat to U.S. national security, all of the military services have been instructed to prepare for a U.S.-China conflict. Accordingly, both the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps are restructuring their Asia-oriented forces — those committed to the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Command…

[ultrajaphunter]

DARPA has selected two teams to build its Liberty Lifter Hydroplane demonstrators with a lifting capacity of more than 100 tons. General Atomics and Aurora Flight Sciences will begin construction of their demonstrators in mid-2024. https://aircosmosinternational.com/article/darpa-launches-phase-1-of-its-strategic-transport-seaplane-3560

DARPA launches Phase 1 of its strategic transport seaplane DARPA has officially appointed two teams of industrialists to propose a seaplane concept with transport capabilities of over 100 tons. 

Both teams have already released an image of their concept, which turn out to be very different from each other. Two industry teams On Feb. 2, the U.S. Department of Defense's agency in charge of research and development of military projects that include new technologies, the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), announced that it has selected two industry teams for the Liberty Lifter X-Plane program. 

The two teams selected are:

General Atomics, in cooperation with Maritime Applied Physics Corporation

Aurora Flight Sciences (a Boeing subsidiary), in cooperation with Gibbs & Cox and ReconCraft

These two teams will be required to develop a prototype of the Liberty Lifter, namely, an aircraft with the following features:

Hydroplane capable of ditching and landing on rough seas (force 4, 1.25 to 2.5 meter high waves).

Capable of operating on water in rough seas (force 5, waves from 2.5 meters to 4 meters high).

Strategic transport capacity in excess of 100 tons.

Capable of flying at an altitude of 10,000 feet above sea level (or 3.048 meters).

Ability to fly at very low altitude over the sea using ground effect (less than 100 feet, or less than 30.48 meters).

Low-cost aircraft.

DARPA is thus launching phase 1 of the Liberty Lifter X-Plane program. 

This lasts 18 months, including six months of conceptualization work, nine months of maturation and finally three months for manufacturing planning and test and demonstration planning reviews. 

Phase 2, scheduled for mid-2024, is intended to further develop the work done in Phase 1, with the goal of building a full-scale model of the Liberty Lifter. A low-wing twin-beam General Atomics and Maritime Applied Physics Corporation are going for a low-wing twin-beam seaplane. 

This is equipped with 12 turboprop engines in a propulsion configuration (the propellers are oriented toward the rear of the aircraft to "push" it forward). The design seems to focus on the overall stability and seaworthiness of the aircraft.

 The embarkation and disembarkation of the freighter is facilitated by its ability to beach itself: like a landing ship, its doors open and allow the direct disembarkation of vehicles on the beach, as shown in the General Atomics image (below). 

This model, by the way, generally follows the design envisioned by DARPA (above). A more conventional seaplane Aurora Flight Sciences, Gibbs & Cox and ReconCraft are opting for a more conventional seaplane: monohull, high wings (negative dihedral), eight turboprop engines in a traction configuration (forward, they "pull" the aircraft forward). 

Aurora says that the departure work is based on these characteristics, increased afterwards:

Transport distance greater than 6,500 nautical miles (or more than 12,038 kilometers).

Ground effect flight through a level 5 sea state

Capacity to carry two Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) or six 20-foot containers.

According to their estimates, a first test flight is expected in five years. In the Indo-Pacific This seaplane is clearly oriented toward the western United States, and more specifically, the Indian Ocean and especially, the Pacific Ocean. 

Indeed, the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific has demonstrated once again that remote and at first glance uninteresting islands can be of great strategic value: located not far from important trade routes, can serve as a forward base in case of conflict, can lock a strait if equipped with an anti-ship battery, etc. However, the U.S. Armed Forces are limited in transporting troops and heavy equipment to these islands. 

Most of them do not have runways for strategic or even tactical transport aircraft, limiting the movement of heavy assets by slow transport ships. 

With this in mind, the U.S. Air Force is planning trials this year of an MC-130J equipped with floats to ditch and lift off (article on the subject), but the Super Hercules' capability is limited, however. In contrast, the Liberty Lifter provides for a strategic transport seaplane with the ability to carry over 100 tons of equipment. 

For comparison, the C-17 Globemaster III can carry 77.5 tons and the C-5M Super Galaxy, 127.4 tons. Découvrez cet article sur Air&Cosmos

[vanessawheelerblog]

The German ambassador talked about the East Sea note opposing China

[viggorosneswriter]

The German ambassador talked about the East Sea note opposing China

[edwardristfavorite]

The German ambassador talked about the East Sea note opposing China