#India-China Standoff
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jasminewilson143 · 1 month ago
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India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability
India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability In a significant development in India-China relations, the two nations have reached an agreement to disengage their troops and establish new patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This decision, announced by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, marks a crucial…
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todayworldnews2k21 · 1 month ago
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Can India trust China amid talks over disengagement along LAC? What experts say
In a major diplomatic breakthrough, the government on Monday announced that India and China have reached an agreement to resume patrolling at the remaining friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, where tensions have persisted since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. In a press briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said the agreement marks a significant step…
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werindialive · 2 years ago
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“The prime minister misled the country by saying that no one has entered our territory.” AIMIM chief Owaisi
All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) president Asaduddin Owaisi once again hit out at the centre on Monday for not holding debate in the parliament over the recent skirmish between Indian and Chinese soldiers along the Line of Actual Control or LAC in Arunachal Pradesh's Tawang. He alleged that the Prime Minister Narendra Modi “misled the country by saying that no one has entered our territory”.
He said that the Indian Army is very courageous and it is the Government, Prime Minister which is weak and scared of China.
“The prime minister misled the country by saying that no one has entered our territory. There are satellite images that show that Chinese soldiers have occupied Depsang and Demchok. They will continue to grab our land yet the trade imbalance with them will continue?” ANI quoted Owaisi as saying.
He demanded an all-party meet or a debate in the parliament and said, "The government should tell us what decision it is taking on China. If the government shows political leadership, then the entire country will support them. The army is very powerful but the government is very weak and is scared of China.”
 He also said that the centre is foul playing and has kept the countrymen and the opposition in the dark about the situation at the border.
"The Modi government has kept the people and the Parliament in the dark. Why is it scared of the truth about China coming out? What is Modi's interest in hiding the facts about Chinese aggression?" tweeted Owaisi and attached a snippet of a news article regarding "Chinese aggression" along the LAC in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
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abhishekjagranplay · 2 years ago
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Some Best Intermittent fasting Apps has lately come one of the most popular buzzwords in India and the world. These applications help in following up the most popular diet among the fitness enthusiasts, which allows an individual to limit the time of eating in a day to a certain window.
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rei-ismyname · 2 months ago
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The Fantastic Four & Krakoa Part 1
I find it revealing, but entirely in character, that the Fantastic Four had a very *liberal* attitude towards Krakoa from the jump. To clarify, by liberal I mean *centrist* or middle class. Historically beneficiaries under most status quo and unreliable allies at best to anyone who doesn't.
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BONK!
In House of X #1, the helmet bros send a strike team to steal the plans for Sol's Hammer - a Dyson Sphere around Sol designed by *a* Reed Richards Tony Stark - from Damage Control. ORCHIS built one and they need to avoid genocide. Toad, Mystique, and Sabertooth successfully copy the blueprints but Creed gets carried away killing people. Many different groups had the same idea (looting Reed and Tony's IP) but they manage to get out. The FF do a solid cop impression and try to stop them. Toad and Mystique make it to the gate, and Sabertooth does not.
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Just me or were they ready to fight whoever came through the gate?
Creed is detained by Sue and then Cyclops comes to greet the four. All is friendly as befits lifelong friends and Slim shows off his fancy social skills. The four do the same, except Reed. You'd think he'd be used to it considering DOOM is always let go.
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'So...' 'So.'
Nobody is surprised in the least when the true reason for his visit is revealed. Reed especially, with his crossed arms and complete silence until the 'so.' Jonathan Hickman knows how to write Reed Richards and The Avengers - if he wanted this to be Tony Stark or whoever it'd be them instead. Of course he knows what amnesty is and Krakoa is MASSIVE global news at this point, so either he's being a dick (possible) or he just doesn't care for that law and is willing to use force to subvert it. These crimes were on camera with many witnesses, there's zero reason for the FF to be handling this incident. A utilitarian might even say that providing medical care would save lives (his super science is incredibly effective.) Maybe he's irked that it's his/Tony's stuff being taken, but he doesn't mention that. Just a stated 'problem with that' then this standoff.
Keep in mind over 150 countries have recognised Krakoa at this point, including the USA, China, India, The UK, Canada. Recognition gets you a trade agreement for Krakoan miracle medicine and two other things.
1. Any mutant can claim Krakoan citizenship by birth.
2. An unstated but limited amnesty period for any and all crimes, the idea being that human bias against mutants makes justice impossible. All mutants from treaty countries are made available for extradition so the nation of Krakoa can judge them.
Is it ballsy as hell? Absolutely, but it's law. Seems very hypocritical to pick and choose, especially when you're enforcing it yourself. Do Reed and co know better than the US government or the United Nations? Eh, probably not. *Cough* ILLUMINATI *cough.* They could be the living tribunal and it wouldn't make this any less hypocritical. They're placing themselves above it here and I can't see why they'd go that far.
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Cyclops puts his hands up and backs off, still very politely. That's that settled. Without acknowledging that or missing a beat Sue says her piece. 'What are all of you thinking?' 'Of course not, but...' I really wish Sue didn't get cut off there. I'd have to do a lot less speculating.
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What a find!
My read on the subtext is that this engagement started off tense AF, and the FF were not interested in being diplomatic. Johnny and Ben barely speak, Cyclops' politeness and personal, first name greetings compared to 'Slim' and then 'Cyclops.' One would expect the mood to lighten somewhat after he concedes that they're a country unto themselves, but it doesn't. I get the impression Sue's not really listening to Scott, and after the 'but...' he stops trying to meet them halfway. It's impossible to say if he still would have said that about Franklin (AKA the last thing these NIMBYs want to hear) but it wouldn't surprise if it's a subtle 'hey idiots, you're invested in this too. Hope you don't treat your son like this.' (They do.)
Next time we'll find out if they've budged when it comes to their mutant son. (Spoilers, they invade Krakoa.)
It is a recent-ish development, and humans/people are great at kneejerk reactionary initial responses, so maybe I'm being unfair. Honestly, I don't think so. The FF have rarely lifted a finger for mutants and it's obvious this is a subject they've discussed and reached a consensus on. Besides, if you're appointing yourself AmbassadorCop you need to be prepared to deal with situations like this. Krakoa is a country not a treehouse. Regardless of what anyone thinks of Krakoa, by the internal rules of 616 they're as legit as any other country, legally.
Also, Reed should not be surprised by this. Chuck bought up Krakoa at an Illuminati meeting years ago. We don't see the rest of the discussion but I'm pretty sure he knew before Magneto did, for example.
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mariacallous · 8 months ago
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It was only a matter of time before Russia’s fast-growing shadow fleet, a group of vessels whose owners do their utmost to conceal their identity while carrying oil to evade sanctions on Moscow, started becoming a serious maritime risk. Russian vessels are now regularly turning down pilotage in Danish waters, the Financial Times reports—a practice that not only breaches maritime etiquette but could also lead to a disastrous accident.
The collision involving a container ship and Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge in the United States on March 26 demonstrates the dangers involved when bulky ships vessels through difficult waters. Indeed, the Dali struck the bridge despite being steered by two pilots. Even if just a small share of vessels turn down pilotage, similar disasters risk becoming commonplace.
International maritime rules strongly recommend the use of pilots with specialized local knowledge for most vessels sailing through Denmark’s Great Belt, the narrow passage between the country’s largest islands. The Great Belt is not just narrow—it also has treacherous waters and is extremely busy: Every year, some 70,000 vessels pass through the Great Belt and the nearby Sound (Oresund), which sits between the shores of Denmark and Sweden.  It’s standard practice to follow international maritime recommendations and take on an experienced local pilot when it comes to difficult navigation routes, whether that’s the Great Belt or the Suez Canal.
The Geography of the Danish Straits
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For the sake of maritime order and safety, Copenhagen could block ships that refuse pilotage. That, though, might trigger a standoff with Russia—if Moscow admits its role as a patron of the shadow fleet. Indeed, blocking these rule-breaking vessels would itself violate international maritime rules. Before forcing such a choice, however, the open-source intelligence community could help by revealing the identities and whereabouts of shadow vessels’ owners.
Since the beginning of this year, at least 20 tankers that are suspected to be shadow vessels transporting Russian oil have refused to take Danish pilots on board, according to internal reports leaked to the Financial Times and the Danish research group Danwatch.
That’s at least 20 tankers that have sailed through the Baltic Sea—in most cases via the Gulf of Finland, passing through the exclusive economic zones of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and Germany—into Danish waters and the Great Belt, from which they have traveled on to Kattegat (comprising Danish and Swedish waters) and Skagerrak (Danish and Norwegian waters) and into the North Sea and the oceans that will bring them to their buyers in countries such as India and China.
Shadow vessels are clapped-out ships that spend their last remaining years providing transportation to and from sanctioned countries that official vessels and their owners won’t touch. The risk that these and other dark vessels pose to coastal states is further increased by the fact that they sail under the flags of countries unlikely to come to anyone’s aid if they cause accidents or incidents (Gabon is a particular favorite) and don’t undergo regular maintenance. Any accident—be it a collision or an oil leak—is likely to be doubly disastrous as a result.
Add to that the fact that their owners are hard to track down—and that they lack proper insurance. If a shadow vessel were to sustain a massive oil spill in, say, Finnish waters, Finnish authorities and taxpayers would end up on the hook. And shadow vessels are more likely than law-abiding ones to be involved in accidents since they frequently turn off their AIS (automatic identification system), a GPS-like navigation tool that allows vessels to see one another.
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s attempts—often successful—to avoid sanctions have caused the shadow fleet to balloon; it’s currently thought to encompass some 1,400 vessels, though like all illicit activities, it’s impossible to measure precisely. (My report about the shadow fleet from last December provides an in-depth examination of the ships and the threats posed by them.)
If oil spills do occur, the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds assist the countries affected. But if oil and other toxic spills increase substantially, as they’re likely to do as a result of the shadow fleet, the fund won’t have enough money to compensate everyone.
So should Denmark simply block shadow vessels refusing pilotage, or all shadow vessels for that matter?
Not so fast. Yes, shadow vessels violate international maritime rules and conventions—but the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives all vessels the right of so-called innocent passage, meaning the right to sail through other countries’ territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. The fact that shadow vessels violate maritime rules doesn’t give coastal states the right to violate the rules in turn.
And, noted retired Rear Adm. Nils Wang—a former chief of the Danish Navy, which also covers a range of coast guard tasks—“according to international law, the Danish Straits are international straits and are not under Danish jurisdiction. For this reason, too, Denmark doesn’t have the legal right to force ships to use pilots.”
Though most ships follow the IMO’s recommendations and use pilotage, for which they pay a fee, over the years there have been some cheapskates that turned down pilotage.  In some cases, those ships caused oil spills. “Every time there’s a leak from a vessel that didn’t use pilotage, there’s an outcry to ban offenders, but we can’t,” Wang said.
Then, in the mid-2010s, the number of cheapskates traveling without pilotage grew.
Danish authorities got creative and announced that if ships with drafts (the amount that the extends beneath the waterline) of more than 11 meters (about 36 feet) didn’t request pilotage, then the Danish authorities would call them on VHF, the radio used by sailors, and remind them that they weren’t following international recommendations, and that Denmark would report them to their flag state and the IMO.
What’s more, a call on VHF allows every vessel in the vicinity to hear the conversation. “And then we started doing it,” Wang said. “And it changed behavior, because it was embarrassing for the ships and the captains to be called out like this. But if you’re part of the dark fleet, you don’t give a damn. Calling these vessels out won’t make a difference.”
Coastal states do have the right to block access in their territorial waters in certain cases—such as if transiting vessels are in poor repair or lack proper insurance. But when nations agreed and signed UNCLOS in 1982, a situation in which a country systematically evades globalization-based economic sanctions by using a fleet of dark vessels was inconceivable.
In response to the emergency of the shadow fleet, the world’s UNCLOS signatories could convene to make pilotage in sensitive waters mandatory. But such negotiations would take a long time, and under the current geopolitical conditions may never reach a conclusion. And because the Danish Straits are international waters, Denmark can’t impose new rules on its own.
This is globalization in a fiercely geopolitical era: Russia can invade Ukraine and evade the resulting sanctions by means of a fleet that sails through law-abiding countries’ waters—and their governments can’t stop it. On the contrary, with Russia now having joined Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea in using a shadow fleet, more countries will conclude that misbehaving and incurring economic sanctions is no big deal. And trade using dark vessels is cheaper than using legally operating ones.
An even larger shadow fleet would, of course, increase the risks both for marine wildlife and regular shipping. If a Russian shadow vessel collides in the Danish Straits with a legal merchant vessel, or even a Danish Navy vessel, what would Denmark do? What would NATO do?
But for now, there’s one group of dark-fleet operators that can be targeted completely legally and without risk of geopolitical escalation: the shadow vessels’ owners. They are plentiful and hide behind post office box addresses in countries such as the United Arab Emirates—because they don’t want to emerge from the shadows.
On the good side in this standoff, though, we have a large and growing community of open-source investigators, both professionals and amateurs. These investigators should take on a good deed for the global maritime order and investigate shadow-vessel owners, then share their identity and activities. Some may be hardened criminals immune to the embarrassment of public scrutiny, but many others may simply be ordinary businesspeople who have spotted an opportunity.
Just as with the ships once called out on Danish radio, public shame may be one way to force people to act for the better.
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printscore25 · 2 years ago
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LAC : Sino India Relationship
Over the past 3 years, the two asian giants are locked in a standoff. The standoff which started with provocative action by PLA led to casualties on both sides. Even after 3 years and 17 rounds of commander level meeting the issue remains unsolved in Debsang Bulge and Demchok.And both sides seem adamant for their part in the negotiations.One point worth discussing is that it's disengagement and moving behind a few kilometres not de-induction.
What is even more interesting is the reason for the entire fiasco by the chinese side. Experts have claimed multiple reasons for the action by the Chinese side.While we keep reading about headlines like it was purely a propaganda coup due to internal problems in china due to covid, some say due to abrogation of Article 370, etc. However, these could have played a part if we look at other aspects for standoff could be India's improved Infrastructure all along the LAC, a growing chinese assertiveness all along the areas of dispute whether be SCS or ECS or spartly islands dispute.Another reason could be to test India's preparedness in case of all out war for Taiwan & India's ability to change status quo of LAC during the taiwan conflict.
Also, at times the newspaper headline flashes with articles "India lost 1000's of sq. km of area."However, if we were to look at the actual ground situation then we could make much more pragmatic analysis of the entire standoff. The standoff resulted in areas of no patrolling which lead to very small pockets of grey areas where the border remains undefined.It is important to note that due to different line of perception, before the standoff both sides had patrolling rights to the current buffer zones created.
However, the bigger points of friction like that of Demchok and Debsang could not be looked through the same prism where line of perception varies vastly.
The chinese side seems to have not gained much strategic advantage with the entire standoff. For them it's a slap on the face as India is neither intimidated nor seems to give in to the pressure tactics. Rather it has led to unprecedented response from the Indian side to deter the PLA.
On the other hand, another interesting aspect is how western countries still have not gotten out of their western centric view assuming India needs their help to tackle the standoff.
Instead the army launched an operation called "Snow Leopard" in response to the unilateral action by china and took chinese by surprise and forced the chinese side for negotiations.
In the last 3 years the Army has inducted state of the art military equipment, has upgraded the existing airfields and the Advanced Landing Ground (ALGs) and built new Helipads, airstrips and improved connectivity with modern infrastructure even in the remotest areas of the Eastern sector.
What lays ahead for both sides is to resolve the remaining disputes and demarcate the boundary as neither has gained much and the entire standoff has resulted in stalemate.
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kneedeepincynade · 2 years ago
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India must understand that China is stronger,China can defeat it and China will, India must decide if join the prosperity of the multipolar world or become a smoldering ruin of the unipolar one
The post is machine translated
Translation is at the bottom
The collective is on telegram
⚠️ LA "TATTICA DELL'AFFETTARE IL SALAME" DELL'ESERCITO POPOLARE DI LIBERAZIONE NEI TERRITORI CONTESI CON L'INDIA NAZIONALISTA PORTA I SUOI FRUTTI | L'INDIA PERDE 26 DEI 65 PUNTI DI PATTUGLIAMENTO NEL LADAKH ORIENTALE ⚠️
🇮🇳 L'India ha perso 26 dei 65 Punti di Pattugliamento nel Ladakh Orientale, lungo il confine con la Repubblica Popolare Cinese 🇨🇳
📄 È quanto scaturito da un Rapporto di un Alto Ufficiale di Polizia alla Conferenza Annuale dei Massimi Ufficiali di Polizia dell'India Nazionalista, tenutosi a Delhi - alla presenza del Primo Ministro Narendra Modi, del Ministro dell'Interno e del Consigliere per la Sicurezza Nazionale 🇮🇳
💬 "Attualmente ci sono 65 Punti di Pattugliamento a partire dal Passo di Karakorum fino a Chumur che devono essere pattugliati regolarmente dalle Forze Armate. Su 65, abbiamo perso la presenza in 26 Punti, a causa di un pattugliamento restrittivo o assente", ha affermato l'ufficiale.
⭐️ L'Esercito Popolare di Liberazione, nei Territori Contesi, e al confine con l'India Nazionalista (descritta come un paese-chiave su cui far leva per il sentimento anti-Cinese da Mike Pompeo) ha rafforzato la sua presenza - come si può leggere qui - e conduce una tattica definibile con l'espressione "affettare il salame", ovvero accaparrarsi - senza sparare un colpo - centimetro per centimetro, portando il nemico a perdere il controllo su certe aree 🪖
📟 Inoltre, l'EPL sta costruendo e posizionando sempre più apparecchiature di sorveglianza nelle "zone cuscinetto", con l'obiettivo di monitorare i movimenti delle Forze Armate Indiane 🇮🇳
🇨🇳 La scorsa settimana, Xi Jinping ha tenuto una video-conversazione con i soldati di stanza lungo il Confine Conteso tra Cina e India nel Ladakh Orientale, sottolineando l'importanza della preparazione e della prontezza al combattimento 🔥
📄 Per chi volesse approfondire il Tema dell'India Nazionalista e della Cooperazione Indo-Statunitense in funzione Anti-Cinese, così come i movimenti dell'Esercito Cinese sul confine con l'India, può rifarsi a questi post del Collettivo Shaoshan:
🔺Il Rapporto Indo-Statunitense in funzione anti-Cinese ⚔️
🔺 Tensioni tra la Repubblica Popolare Cinese e l'India Nazionalista - progetto ferroviario indiano al confine, territori contesi, presenza dell'EPL lungo la "linea di controllo effettivo", Pangong, Quartier Generale, Ponti e Stazioni Radar, Supporto Aereo: I, II, III, IV.
🌸 Iscriviti 👉 @collettivoshaoshan
⚠️ THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY'S "SALAMI-SLICING TACTICS" IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES WITH NATIONALIST INDIA BRINGS FRUIT | INDIA LOSES 26 OF 65 PATROL POINTS IN EASTERN LADAKH ⚠️
🇮🇳India has lost 26 out of 65 Patrol Points in Eastern Ladakh, along the border with the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳
📄 This is what emerged from a Report by a Senior Police Officer at the Annual Conference of the Chief Police Officers of Nationalist India, held in Delhi - in the presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister and National Security Advisor 🇮🇳
💬 "Currently there are 65 Patrol Points starting from the Karakoram Pass up to Chumur that need to be patrolled regularly by the Armed Forces. Out of 65, we have lost presence in 26 Points, due to restricted or no patrolling," he said officer.
⭐️ The People's Liberation Army, in the Disputed Territories, and on the border with Nationalist India (described as a key country to leverage anti-China sentiment by Mike Pompeo) has strengthened its presence - how can read here - and carries out a tactic that can be defined with the expression "slicing salami", or rather grabbing - without firing a shot - centimeter by centimetre, leading the enemy to lose control over certain areas 🪖
📟 Also, the PLA is building and placing more and more surveillance equipment in the "buffer zones", aiming to monitor the movements of the Indian Armed Forces 🇮🇳
🇨🇳 Xi Jinping held a video conversation with soldiers stationed along the Sino-Indian Border in Eastern Ladakh last week, emphasizing the importance of preparedness and combat readiness 🔥
📄 For those wishing to learn more about Nationalist India and Indo-US Cooperation in an Anti-Chinese function, as well as the movements of the Chinese Army on the border with India, you can refer to these posts from the Shaoshan Collective:
🔺 The Indo-US Report in anti-Chinese function ⚔️
🔺 Tensions between PRC and Nationalist India - Indian railway project on border, disputed territories, PLA presence along "Line of Effective Control", Pangong, HQ, Bridges and Radar Stations, Air Support: I, II, III, IV.
🌸 Subscribe 👉 @collettivoshaoshan
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darkmaga-returns · 25 minutes ago
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By Brahma Chellaney
A new age of international relations is dawning. With the West accounting for a declining share of global GDP, and the world becoming increasingly multipolar, countries are jostling to establish their positions in the emerging order. This includes both the emerging economies, which are represented by the recently expanded BRICS grouping and seek a leading role in writing the rules of the new order, and the smaller countries attempting to cultivate relationships that can safeguard their interests.
With the BRICS, what began as an asset class has become a symbol of the yearning for a more broadly representative global order, a hedge against Western-led institutions and a means of navigating growing geopolitical uncertainty. All this has proved highly attractive. Earlier this year, the BRICS expanded from five countries (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa) to nine (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates). And almost three dozen more countries—including NATO member Turkey, close US partners Thailand and Mexico, and Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country—have applied to join.
While the diversity of the grouping’s members (and applicants) highlights the broad appeal of the BRICS+, it also creates challenges. These are countries with very different political systems, economies and national goals. Some are even at odds with each other: China and India have been locked in a military standoff in the Himalayas for more than four years, following China’s stealth encroachments on Indian territory.
Translating shared interests into a common plan of action and becoming a unified force on the global stage was difficult even when the BRICS had just five members. With nine member countries, and possibly more, establishing a common identity and agenda will require sustained effort. But other multilateral groupings that are not formal, charter-based institutions with permanent secretariats, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G20 and even the G7, also struggle with internal divisions.
Moreover, the BRICS have demonstrated considerable resilience. Western analysts have been predicting from the start that the grouping would unravel or drift into irrelevance.
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news365timesindia · 6 days ago
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[ad_1] Defence Minister Rajnath Singh engaged in bilateral talks with his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun on Wednesday in Vientiane, Laos, during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus). #WATCH | Defence Minister Rajnath Singh held a bilateral meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, in Vientiane, Lao PDR. pic.twitter.com/ZbyusUrGKu — NewsMobile (@NewsMobileIndia) November 20, 2024 This meeting comes at a significant time, following the recent agreement between India and China to resolve the border standoff by repositioning their troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to pre-2020 positions. This move follows the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in 2020, which had worsened relations between the two countries. The discussions between Singh and Dong Jun are considered vital, as they are expected to focus on advancing the peace process along the LAC. This meeting follows similar high-level talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS summit in late October. Both leaders had discussed improving bilateral relations, and the Defence Minister’s dialogue is seen as a continuation of these efforts. A significant outcome from recent military engagements was the agreement for coordinated patrols in Demchok and Depsang areas of Eastern Ladakh, marking a crucial step towards de-escalation. In line with the agreement, Indian and Chinese forces will take turns conducting weekly patrols in these regions. The first round of these joint patrols was completed in early November. Click here for Latest Fact Checked News On NewsMobile WhatsApp Channel For viral videos and Latest trends subscribe to NewsMobile YouTube Channel and Follow us on Instagram [ad_2] Source link
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news365times · 6 days ago
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[ad_1] Defence Minister Rajnath Singh engaged in bilateral talks with his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun on Wednesday in Vientiane, Laos, during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus). #WATCH | Defence Minister Rajnath Singh held a bilateral meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, in Vientiane, Lao PDR. pic.twitter.com/ZbyusUrGKu — NewsMobile (@NewsMobileIndia) November 20, 2024 This meeting comes at a significant time, following the recent agreement between India and China to resolve the border standoff by repositioning their troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to pre-2020 positions. This move follows the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in 2020, which had worsened relations between the two countries. The discussions between Singh and Dong Jun are considered vital, as they are expected to focus on advancing the peace process along the LAC. This meeting follows similar high-level talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS summit in late October. Both leaders had discussed improving bilateral relations, and the Defence Minister’s dialogue is seen as a continuation of these efforts. A significant outcome from recent military engagements was the agreement for coordinated patrols in Demchok and Depsang areas of Eastern Ladakh, marking a crucial step towards de-escalation. In line with the agreement, Indian and Chinese forces will take turns conducting weekly patrols in these regions. The first round of these joint patrols was completed in early November. Click here for Latest Fact Checked News On NewsMobile WhatsApp Channel For viral videos and Latest trends subscribe to NewsMobile YouTube Channel and Follow us on Instagram [ad_2] Source link
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todayworldnews2k21 · 2 months ago
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Air Force Facing Supply Chain Breakdown Issue Due to Wars, Says Air Chief
New Delhi: Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh Friday said due to the two ongoing wars between Russia and Ukraine as well as Israel and Hamas, the force is facing issues concerning a breakdown of supply chains. He also said that the standoff situation with China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh remains the same and that it is developing the infrastructure there…
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updatesandnews · 25 days ago
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odnewsin · 1 month ago
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India, China begin troop disengagement at friction points: Sources
New Delhi: India and China have begun troop disengagement at the two friction points at Demchok and Depsang Plains in eastern Ladakh, official sources said Friday. The process follows an agreement firmed up between the two countries on patrolling and disengagement of troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, a major breakthrough to end an over four-year standoff. The…
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24x7newsroom · 1 month ago
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LAC Tensions Ease with Landmark Deal
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The significant agreement reached between India and China this week to resolve one of the longest military standoffs in recent history received formal approval on Wednesday from PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. This bilateral meeting at the BRICS Summit marked their first encounter in five years, during which they endorsed the deal. According to the Indian side, this endorsement from the highest level is expected to further alleviate tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
During their 50-minute discussion in Kazan, the leaders agreed to promptly hold Special Representatives (SRs) talks on the India-China boundary issue, which has not occurred since 2019. They emphasized the need to advance relations from a “strategic and long-term perspective,” enhance strategic communication and explore collaborative efforts to tackle developmental challenges.
The Special Representatives, Ajit Doval, and Wang Yi have met multiple times on the sidelines of various multilateral events, including a meeting last month in St. Petersburg, but not within the formal SR talks framework.
In the Indian readout, Modi expressed his support for the agreement concerning complete disengagement and the resolution of issues that emerged in 2020 in eastern Ladakh, which included the deadly Galwan clash that year. He stressed the importance of properly managing differences and disputes to maintain peace and tranquility.
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that Modi also expressed India’s full support for China’s presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2025. China characterized the meeting as constructive and of great significance. Read More-https://24x7newsroom.com/pm-modi-and-xi-finalize-lac-agreement-committing-to-restore-relations/
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mariacallous · 1 year ago
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As Ukraine accelerates its counteroffensive across several sections of the front, a rational person might conclude that 2023 must surely be the last year of Russia’s war against its neighbor. Russian military resources are depleted, Moscow’s long and bloody winter offensive in the Donbas has yielded meager results, and Russian society longs for the return of prewar stability. Logic dictates that the Kremlin has no better option than to seize any opportunity to cut short its disastrous war, saving face as far as possible by clinging to the shreds of its territorial gains. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken echoed this line of thinking at a press conference this week, when he said that a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could have the effect of “causing Putin to finally focus on negotiating an end to the war that he started.”
Such calculations, however, are based on rational cost-benefit analysis and underestimate the extent to which this war is the personal project of one man: Russian President Vladimir Putin. He started it single-handedly, based on his own distorted perceptions and disregarding the opinion of Russian society and ruling elites. He has continued to wage it for more than a year, defying all common sense, and there is no indication that he will ever wish to stop it. Indeed, continuing the war brings him numerous political benefits, while stopping it would offer him little but new risks.
There is no doubt that Russian elites and society largely share Putin’s resentment of the West, disregard for Ukrainian statehood, and belief that Russia is a great power entitled to use military force against other states at will. There is little sympathy for the plight of the Ukrainians among Russians of all social standing, and even less appetite for turning Russia into a democratic and responsible member of the international community. Still, many Russians significantly diverge with Putin on how much they are prepared to sacrifice in the standoff with the West.
With all the caveats about conducting opinion polls in authoritarian states, surveys indicate that steadfast popular support for Putin does not preclude the majority of Russians from perceiving their current situation as extremely stressful and welcoming immediate peace talks with Ukraine—whatever that may mean, as it’s unclear how many Russians would support giving up any of the conquered territories. Private conversations among the Russian elites also reveal major discontent with the mounting costs of the war and no understanding of its purpose. Still, the invasion goes on according to Putin’s wishes, and no one in Russia has the means to override his will.
For Putin, the invasion presents an easy way to implement the goals he had struggled for years to realize in peacetime. This has always been Putin’s trademark style of ruling: He believes that direct attempts to steer the leviathan of the Russian state are futile, and instead prefers to force the system to adapt to crises and faits accomplis he himself created.
With the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has honed this managerial approach to perfection. With one decision, he created enough momentum to send Russia hurtling in the direction of developments he has long wanted to see. Take the reorientation of Russia’s foreign trade to make it less dependent on the West, which Putin has aimed for since 2014. Eight years of devising strategies, elaborating policies, and taking various piecemeal steps all achieved less than one year of all-out war. In 2022, the country’s trade turnover with Europe more than halved, while trade with China grew by more than 40 percent and grew 2.6 times with India.
For years, Russia’s businesses and inept bureaucracy struggled to develop the infrastructure needed for cooperation with Asia. But the war has led Russia to mobilize its resources and finance a range of Asia-oriented transport projects, from a railway link to the Indian Ocean via Iran and Azerbaijan (which had been discussed since 2005) to a new gas pipeline to China, which is now within reach after more than a decade of talks. Decreasing Russia’s dependency on the U.S. dollar and Western financial system has been the government’s priority since the 1990s, but it took a full-scale war to reduce the share of Russian exports paid in U.S. dollars or euros from nearly 90 percent in January 2022 to below 50 percent in December of the same year.
Objectives such as substituting Western imports with domestic products, having Russians vacation inside the country, and restoring the prestige of the Russian armed forces have been on Putin’s agenda for decades, but in the end, only war proved capable of making Russian bureaucrats, businessmen, and wider society implement them for real. Parts of the Moscow elite might still enjoy their Italian villas, Mediterranean yachts, and French delicacies, but their numbers shrink every time the West introduces another package of sanctions.
The international developments brought on by the war dovetail even more closely with Putin’s long-held ambitions. Minsk’s involvement in the aggression against Ukraine has sealed Belarus’s isolation from the West and pushed the country into unprecedented integration with Russia—with little pressure required from Moscow. Meanwhile, Europe’s loss of access to cheap Russian gas is a permanent thorn in the side of trans-Atlantic unity, potentially creating new sources of tension between Europe and the United States.
The freezing of the Russian Central Bank’s foreign reserves has flamed fears around the globe that Washington and Brussels will weaponize their currencies for other purposes. Russia’s war has also created a new bone of contention between the West and China. Many developing countries have seized on it to be more assertive toward the United States and Europe.
In reality, of course, none of these developments are as straightforward as they may look to Putin—and their costs for Russia are immense. But the key lesson he has drawn from Russian history is that if you want to achieve something worthy in such a vast and disorganized country, the cost will inevitably be high. While the losses will fade with time, the achievements will be remembered by later generations. And even if the costs are high, Putin has not found anything that can rival the war in its destructive efficiency for shaping the history of Russia and the world.
In contrast, Putin himself has little to gain from stopping the war any time soon, especially if the Ukrainian counteroffensive proves successful. Sure, ending the war would save thousands of lives, significantly relieve the pressure on the Russian economy and society, allow Russia to stabilize its international position, and so on. But for Putin personally, putting a stop to the conflict would be a disaster for his position in Russian domestic politics and history.
No matter how repressive the Russian regime has become, ending the war would inevitably prompt public reflection. There would be many questions about the invasion’s purposes, its high cost, and whether the result justified that cost. Moreover, Putin would have to face those questions in a situation where it would no longer be possible to justify harsher repression by citing the exceptional circumstances of war.
Regardless of how worn-out Russians may be, therefore, Putin will stick to his selective perception of reality, looking for reasons for and ways to further escalate his addictive crusade against the current world order. Putin has not even made any bones about his intentions: His key decisions over the past months—from tightening the military draft system to massively investing in weapons production—clearly indicate that he is bracing his country for a long war. It is hard to see how the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive could affect these calculations, regardless of how successful it turns out to be.
No one in Russia appears to be able to stop Putin, but that is not to say they are eager to continue his undertaking once he is out of the picture. Even then, Russia is unlikely to get a democratically inclined, let alone pro-Western leadership. Rather, Putin will most likely be succeeded by a group of his henchmen who share a similar world outlook, including his view of the West and Ukraine. Still, even if autocratic and paranoid, the next Russian leadership is bound to be less oriented toward a single man at the top. It has been a consistent pattern in Russian and Soviet history that harsh autocratic rulers purged any potential rivals so thoroughly that their departure was inevitably followed by a less powerful, more collective leadership, with none of its members able to impose their whims on all the others. By the very fact of being a collective, Russia’s rulers after Putin will inevitably tread more cautiously, elaborate decisions more thoroughly, and react more rationally, especially on the issues related to the war.
This difference may prove decisive. Given the current state of ever-increasing tensions, it is worth pondering the question of who in Russia is more likely to press the nuclear button: a lonely autocrat obsessed with historical grandeur, or a group of gray apparatchiks bogged down in their internal squabbles? The wrong answer may cost us the planet.
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