#FISA Report

[mariacallous]

The need for good intelligence has never been more visible. The failure of the Israeli security services to anticipate the brutal surprise attack carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023 reveals what happens when intelligence goes wrong.

In contrast, in late February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s planned three-day “special military operation” to invade Ukraine and topple the government was pushed onto the back foot by the U.S. and U.K. intelligence communities. While Putin’s rapid seizure of Crimea by a flood of “little green men”  in 2014 was a fait accompli, by the time of the 2022 invasion, anticipatory moves including the public declassification of sensitive intelligence ensured that both the intelligence community and Ukraine remained a step ahead of Putin’s plans.

Yet, despite the clear and enduring need for good intelligence to support effective statecraft, national security, and military operations, U.S. intelligence agencies and practitioners are undermined by a crisis of legitimacy. Recent research investigating public attitudes toward the U.S. intelligence community offers some sobering trends.

A May 2023 poll conducted by the Harvard University Center for American Political Studies and Harris Poll found that an eye-watering 70 percent of Americans surveyed were either “very” or “somewhat” concerned about “interference by the FBI and intelligence agencies in a future presidential election.”

A separate study, conducted in 2021 and 2022 by the Intelligence Studies Project at the University of Texas at Austin and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, found that only 56 percent of Americans thought that the intelligence community “plays a vital role in warning against foreign threats and contributes to our national security.” That number is down 10 points from a previous high—if it can even be called that—of 66 percent in 2019, and the downward trend does not give us cause for optimism. Reframed, that statistic means that in 2022, an alarming (in our view) 44 percent of Americans did not believe that the intelligence community keeps them safe from foreign threats or contributes to U.S. national security.

Worse, despite abundant examples of authoritarian aggression and worldwide terror attacks, nearly 1 in 5 Americans seem to be confused about where the real threats to their liberty are actually emanating from. According to the UT Austin study, a growing number of Americans thought that the intelligence community represented a threat to civil liberties: 17 percent in 2022, up from 12 percent in 2021. A nontrivial percentage of Americans feel that the intelligence community is an insidious threat instead of a valuable protector in a dangerous world—a perspective that jeopardizes the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies.

The most obvious recent example of the repercussions of the corrosion of trust in the intelligence community is the recent drama over reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). First introduced in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Section 702 is an important legal authority for the U.S. intelligence community to conduct targeted surveillance of foreign persons located outside the United States, with the compelled assistance of electronic communication service providers. According to a report published by Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 702 is “extremely valuable” and “provides intelligence on activities of terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, spies, malicious cyber actors, and other foreign adversaries.”

Section 702 was scheduled to “sunset” at the end of 2023 if not reauthorized. Yet Congress failed to reauthorize 702 by the end of 2023, electing to punt the decision—as is so often the case—to this spring, when it was finally reauthorized (with some important reforms) in late April 2024, but it was only extended for two years instead of the customary five. An unusual alliance of the far right and the far left squeezed centrists and the Biden administration, which was strongly pushing for a renewal that would protect the civil liberties of U.S. citizens and not needlessly hobble the intelligence community in protecting the United States itself.

But the frantic down-to-the-wire negotiations about reauthorizing some recognizable form of 702 obscured a deeper problem at the heart of the contemporary Americans’ relationship with intelligence that has been brewing over the last decade: The fundamental legitimacy of a strong intelligence community—and the integrity of its practitioners—has been questioned by U.S. lawmakers on the far left and the far right, perhaps reflecting a misguided but increasing consensus of tens of millions of Americans.

This trend is now a crisis.

Section 702’s troubled journey faced queries from the privacy-oriented left, where those with overblown concerns about potential abuse by the intelligence community viewed reauthorizing 702 is tantamount to “turning cable installers into spies,” in the words of one opinion contributor published in The Hill. The intelligence community’s revised authorities (some adjustments were required given the 15 years of communications technology development since the amendment was first passed) were called “terrifying” and predictably—the most hackneyed description for intelligence tools—“Orwellian.” On the power-skeptical right, Section 702 is perceived as but another powerful surveillance tool of the so-called deep state.

In response to legitimate concerns about past mistakes, the intelligence community has adopted procedural reforms and enhanced training that it says would account for the overwhelming majority of the (self-reported) mistakes in querying 702 collection. According to a report from the Justice Department’s National Security Division, the FBI achieved a 98 percent compliance rate in 2023 after receiving better training. Further, the Justice Department and the DNI have gone to unprecedented lengths to publicly show—through declassified success stories—the real dangers that allowing 702 to lapse would bring to the United States and its allies.

Never before has an intelligence community begged, cajoled, and pleaded with lawmakers to enable it to do its job. After all, a hobbled intelligence community would still be held responsible should a war warning be missed, or should a terrorist attack occur.

For instance, Gen. Eric Vidaud, the French military intelligence chief, was promptly fired over intelligence failings related to Putin’s (re)invasion of Ukraine despite the Elysée’s criticisms of the warnings made by the United States and United Kingdom as “alarmist.” And Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, director of Israeli military intelligence, recently resigned over the Oct. 7 attacks despite the fault probably lying across Israel’s political landscape as well. Intelligence professionals pay more than their share of the bill when their crystal ball stays cloudy.

The hullabaloo over 702 is not the only recent instance painting the actions of the U.S. national security apparatus as questionable state activity conducted by dishonest bureaucrats, and some recent history helps put the recent events into a broader downward trend in trust.

In 2013, National Security Agency (NSA) mass-leaker Edward Snowden, a junior network IT specialist with a Walter Mitty complex, sparked a needed but distorted global conversation about the legitimacy of intelligence collection when he stole more than 1.5 million NSA documents and fled to China and ultimately Russia. The mischaracterization of NSA programs conveyed by Snowden and his allies (painting them as more intrusive and less subject to legal scrutiny than they were) led to popular misunderstandings about the intelligence community’s methods and oversight.

It was not only junior leakers whose unfounded criticism helped to corrode public faith in intelligence; it has also been a bipartisan political effort. In 2009, then-U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi claimed that the CIA had lied to her after she wished to distance herself from the agency’s “enhanced interrogation techniques”—which critics call torture. But Pelosi’s comments earned a “false” rating from Politifact’s “truth-o-meter.” Then-CIA Director Leon Panetta countered that “CIA officers briefed truthfully.”

Some suspicion of a powerful intelligence community stems from genuine failings of the past, especially the CIA’s activities in the early and middle stages of the Cold War, which included some distasteful assassination plots, the illegal collection of intelligence domestically (such as surveillance of Americans on political grounds, including illegally opening their mail), and the LSD experimentation on unwitting Americans as part of its infamous MKULTRA program.

Most of these excesses—characterized as the CIA’s “Family Jewels”—were reported to Congress, which held explosive hearings in 1975 to publicize these activities, bringing the intelligence agencies into the public realm like never before. Images of Sen. Frank Church holding aloft a poison dart gun, designed by the CIA to incapacitate and induce a heart attack in foreign leaders, became front page news. These serious failings in accountability were the dawn of rigorous intelligence oversight.

Public trust in government was already sinking when, in 1971, the Pentagon Papers revealed that politicians had lied about US activities in the deeply unpopular Vietnam war. The Watergate scandal the following year added fuel to fire. Although the CIA was not directly involved in Watergate, the involvement of former agency employees led to a wider belief that the agency was tainted. And in the late 1970s, CIA morale sank to an all-time low when then-President Jimmy Carter began the process of sharply reducing its staff, attributing the decision to its “shocking” activities.

In response to congressional findings and mountains of bad press, subsequent directors of the CIA considered the criticisms and made numerous changes to how the intelligence community operates. While the intelligence community (and its leaders) made good-faith efforts to operate strictly within its legal boundaries, be more responsive to congressional oversight, and embrace some level of transparency, the public image of the CIA and the broader intelligence community didn’t change. After the Cold War ended, the preeminent vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, called twice for the disbanding of the CIA. Such political pummeling of the role of intelligence and the integrity of its practitioners was bound to leave a mark.

The politics of distrust are back to the bad old days. By 2016, distrust of the intelligence community had returned with a vengeance: then-presidential candidate Donald Trump claimed that NSA was circumventing domestic legal constructs to spy on his campaign through its close partnership with the Government Communications headquarters (GCHQ), the British signals intelligence agency. (The NSA said those claims were false and GCHQ called them “utterly ridiculous”.) As president-elect, Trump also compared U.S. intelligence to “living in Nazi Germany.” Once Trump entered the Oval Office, the FBI was a frequent target for his invective thanks to the investigation into possible Russian interference in the 2016 election.

While the intelligence community is a long way away from the excesses of the 1970s, it is not perfect. Intelligence is an art, not a science. It is not prediction so much as narrowing the cone of uncertainty for decision-makers to act in a complex world. Even when acting strictly within the law and under the scrutiny of Congress and multiple inspectors general, the intelligence community has been wrong on several important occasions. It failed to stop the 9/11 attacks, got the assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction spectacularly wrong, and was made to look impotent by Osama bin Laden for nearly a decade before the U.S. Navy SEALs caught up with him on a CIA mission in Pakistan in May 2011.

Errors still happen because intelligence is hard, and the occasional failure to warn, to stop every attack, or to prevent every incorrect search query is inevitable. Today, mistakes are self-reported to Congress; they are no longer hidden away as they sometimes were in the past. Yet the intelligence community has done a poor job telling its own story and self-censors due to widespread over-classification—a problem that the DNI has acknowledged, if not yet remedied. It has only belatedly begun to embrace the transparency required for a modern intelligence apparatus in a democratic state, and there is much work yet to be done.

It is the job of the intelligence agencies to keep a calm and measured eye on dark developments. In a world in which the panoply of threats is increasing, the role of the intelligence community and its responsibilities within democratic states has never been greater. If the community cannot be trusted by its political masters in the White House and Congress, much less the American people, then it will not be given the ability to “play to the edge,” and the risk is that the United States and its allies will be blind to the threats facing them. Given the adversaries, the consequences could be severe.

U.S. intelligence has had a rebirth of confidence since 9/11 and the incorrect judgments of the Iraqi weapons program. It was intelligence and special operations that hunted and killed bin Laden, U.S. law enforcement that has kept the U.S. homeland safe from another massive terror attack, and the intelligence community correctly predicted the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

That increased sense of purpose and morale is moot if the U.S. people, Congress, or the president (sitting or future) do not trust them. This crisis of legitimacy is a trend that may soon hamper the intelligence community, and the results could be unthinkable. Getting the balance between civil liberties and security right isn’t an easy task, but the intelligence community must have the tools, trust, and oversight required to simultaneously keep faith with the American people while serving as their first line of defense.

[thoughtportal]

This week, Congressional leaders are again trying to quietly and quickly get Congress to approve unconstitutional, warrantless mass surveillance.1

Rather than allowing debate on major privacy protections, some members are trying to jam an extension of a controversial warrantless surveillance power — Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) — into a “must-pass” defense authorization bill.1

Section 702 has been abused in ways that violate Americans’ fundamental civil liberties and civil rights. FBI agents have used 702 to search through troves of warrantlessly acquired communications for conversations with tens of thousands of protestors, racial justice activists, journalists, donors to a Congressional campaign, and countless others.2

We must fight for privacy protections and stop Congress from sneaking 702’s extension into “must-pass” legislation!

Warrantless government surveillance of Americans under Section 702 is out of control, and particularly hurts marginalized communities. The large number of documented abuses by agencies like the NSA, CIA, and FBI include searches for: 141 racial justice protestors, two men “of Middle Eastern descent” who were handling cleaning supplies, mosques that were intentionally mislabeled to prevent oversight, and a state court judge who reported civil rights violations to the FBI.2

Even though the Fourth Amendment protects our right to keep our information private, the government is collecting troves of our data without a warrant.

Any extension of Section 702 would allow the government to obtain new year-long Section 702 certifications at the beginning of the year — allowing this unaccountable, abusive government spying to continue into 2025.

Congressional leaders know that mass surveillance is unpopular, which is why they want to quietly slip it into the defensive authorization bill. We need to let them know that we’re watching and won’t let it happen.

Sources:

Brennan Center, "Coalition Letter Urges Congressional Leaders to Keep Reauthorization of Section 702 Out of NDAA," November 21, 2023.

Brennan Center, “FISA Section 702: Civil Rights Abuses,” November 27, 2023.

Click here to sign

[dertaglichedan]

MASSIVE REVELATION! James O’Keefe Releases Undercover Video of CIA Contractor Admitting CIA Director Withheld Info from Trump and Spied on His Presidency

ames O’Keefe last Friday warned he was about to release the most important story of his entire career.

“I have evidence that exposes the CIA, and it’s on camera. I am working on releasing a story that I believe is the most important of my entire career,” O’Keefe said on Friday.

“Do you think it’s a coincidence that right at this moment I am subject to an endless series of attacks?” he said. “This is obviously a sophisticated information operation designed to stop me from releasing this story. I’m sure you recognize they are masters of using half-truths and innuendos to raise doubt against people who don’t deserve it. It’s meant to consume my time and energy and make me back down.”

“But I’m not going to let it work. Rest assured, nothing will stop me from releasing this story,” O’Keefe said.

O’Keefe Media Group on Wednesday released part one: Exposing the CIA: A project manager working in cyber operations told OMG’s undercover journalist that the Director of the CIA would keep information from Trump.

He also said the CIA spied on Trump’s presidency and is still monitoring him to this day.

“So the agencies kind of, like, all got together and said, we’re not gonna tell Trump…Director of the CIA would keep [information from Trump]…” Amjad Fseisi, a project manager working in Cyber Operations for the CIA with top-secret security clearance told an undercover journalist.

Amjad Fseisi said Trump is a “Russian asset” – “He’s owned by the f*cking Russians,” he told the undercover journalist.

Per James O’Keefe:

Amjad reveals to OMG’s Undercover American Swiper that intel agencies not only kept intelligence information from a sitting United States President and Commander-In-Chief, they also used FISA to spy on President Trump and his team and are still monitoring President Trump according to Amjad who says, “We monitor everything.” Amjad adds “we also have people that monitor his ex-wife. He likes to use burner phones” – information only an insider with access to highly sensitive information would state. “We steal it [information]” and “We hack other countries just like that,” Amjad, who states he currently works on the CIA’s China Mission Center, explains how intel agencies obtain information. He also describes a broken intelligence system where “We don’t share information across agencies” because the CIA is “very reluctant” to share information with the “careless” NSA. O’Keefe Media Group’s bombshell undercover footage supports earlier reports by investigative journalists Michael Shellenberger, Matt Taibbi, and Alex Gutentag that revealed how the American intelligence community illegally ran a spy operation against then-candidate Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016 and illegally acquired intelligence that was later used to justify the Federal Bureau of Investigation (@FBI) official probe, “Crossfire Hurricane,” which in turn led to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation that ultimately did not find evidence of Russia collusion by the 2016 Trump campaign. Contractors like Fseisi hold the duty to withhold sharing confidential or national security information. In denying his statements, Fseisi may have realized he could be held liable for violating internal agency provisions and federal laws like the Executive Agency ethics provisions, which restrict what he may share with others outside of his contracted-to agency. Additionally, any government worker or agency head who withheld information from a superior (i.e. President Trump) may violate: (a) obstruction of justice by deception (18 USC 1512); (b) conspiracy to obstruct (18 USC 371); and false statements (18 USC 1001). Agency regulations may also provide offenses related to insubordination, reflecting poorly on the agency in public, or misrepresentation or dishonesty. When James O’Keefe caught up with Amjad Fseisi on the streets of Washington, D.C., Fseisi could not tell O’Keefe whether he had top secret clearance, denied making statements clearly caught on camera, and would not even confirm it was him on the video saying only “It looks like me.” When asked directly if he works at the CIA, Fseisi said, “I can’t tell you that.”

[1americanconservative]

https://x.com/WallStreetApes/status/1701806830538928388?s=20

BUSTED: Matt Gaetz Rips FBI Director Christopher Wray A New One “Over 200,000 ILLEGAL FISA Inquiries Have Occurred Under Your Watch” This is real documented evidence, how has Christopher Wray not been impeached? “I will make certain that between the man sitting next to me and every person he knows and my ability to forever hold a grudge that you will regret not following my direction. I am sitting here waiting for the call with my father. Sounds like a shakedown, doesn't it, Director? ‌ I'm not going to get into commenting on that. You seem deeply uncurious about it, don't you? Almost suspiciously uncurious. Are you protecting the Bidens? Absolutely not. The FBI does not and has no interest in protecting anyone politically. You won't answer the question about whether or not that's a shakedown and everybody knows why you won't answer it. Because to the millions of people who will see this, they know it is. And your inability to acknowledge that is deeply revealing about you. But let's go from the uncurious to the downright nosy. ‌ How many illegal FISA queries have occurred under your leadership of the FBI? ‌ Well, there are reports that have come out with different numbers about compliance incidents. More than a million illegal ones? Because that's what the Inspector General said. The Inspector General said that in the 3.4 million of these queries, more than a million were in error. Do you have any basis to disagree with that assessment by the Inspector General? I'm not sure actually that's a correct characterization of the Inspector General's findings on that. The internet will remind you of that in moments. ‌ But let's now go to what the court said. The court said it was over 200,000 that have occurred on your watch. Do you have any basis to disagree with that assessment? Again, I don't have the numbers I sit here right now. What I can say is- Seems like a number you should know. How many times the FBI's breaking the law under your watch? Especially if it's like over a million to not know that number. And I'm worried about your veracity on the subject as well. ‌ Play the video. ‌ Letters for the capital. I don't believe FISA is remotely implicated in our investigation. So there Senator Lee is asking you whether or not FISA was in any other way involved in your January 6 investigation and you say no. Was that truthful? I said that I did not believe it was. Okay so now let's pull up what the court said, which is something a little different than what you said. So here, nope, that's not the right one. ‌ Yeah, here we go, right there it says, the government has reported additional significant violations of the querying standard, including several relating to the January 6, 2021 breach of the Capitol. So I guess the question, Director Ray, is did you not know when you were answering these questions that the FBI was engaging in these illegal searches, or did you perjure yourself to Senator Lee? ‌ I certainly didn't perjure myself at the time that I testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I didn't have that piece of information. I will add. Well, that was a court order. You didn't have that piece of information because the court hadn't yet rendered a judgment. Did you not know when you gave the untruthful answer before Senator Lee that this was going on? It was a truthful answer. I did not believe FISA had been involved in January 6th. But it was. So you didn't. The answer is the FBI has broken so bad that people can go and engage in queries that when you come before the Congress to answer questions you're like blissfully ignorant. You're blissfully ignorant as to the unlawful queries. You're blissfully ignorant as to the Biden shakedown regime. And it just seems like it gets into a kind of a creepy place as well. Go to our next.” FISA Is The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

[crystalracing]

Video ideas

How bad was Max Verstappen's dad in F1?

The story of the Japanese Kimi Raikkonen (Tora Takagi)

Why Ocon & Gasly's rivalry means nothing (Peterson, de Angelis, Heidfeld & Fisichella)

How unlucky was Fernando Alonso's F3000 rival in F1 & Indycar? (Bruno junquiera)

How unlucky was Senna's local rival in F1 & Indycar? (Raul Boesel)

When did Fernando Alonso peak in F1?

How 2003 Australian Grand Prix changed F1 forever

How bad was Kevin Magnussen's dad in F1?

Why have Japanese & Asian drivers never won in F1?

How 1999 French GP nearly led to F1's greatest underdog champions (Frentzen & Jordan)

How Ronnie Peterson's death changed F1 safety forever

How Niki Lauda's crash changed F1 completely

How AJ Foyt vs Mario Andretti made Indy 500 America's most famous car race

How great was Audi in 1930s F1?

Why the greatest Italian driver would destroy today's F1 stars (Tazio Nuvolari)

How bad was Nelson Piquet Jr in F1?

How good was Johnny Herbert in F1?

How unlucky was Lewis Hamilton in 2012?

How a politician nearly became Argentina's 2nd F1 champion (Reutemann & FISA-FOCA war)

How Ferrari destroyed Vettel for good

How great was Kimi Raikkonen in F1?

How good was Kimi Raikkonen's hero in F1 (James Hunt)

How good were BAR-Honda in F1?

How good were BMW in F1?

How Ford Cosworth changed F1 forever

How Lotus & Colin Chapman changed F1 forever

How Ayrton Senna's death killed off independent F1 teams

Why Lewis Hamilton is wrong about diversity in F1 (Story of Prince Bira)

How McLaren redefined professionalism in F1 (Lauda, Prost & Ron Dennis)

Why Paul Tracy wrongly lost 2002 Indy 500 (CART vs IRL)

How Gilles Villeneuve’s death nearly ended Ferrari & F1 (FISA-FOCA war)

How Prost & Senna made F1 so popular (how the media reported on their rivalry)

Was Keke Rosberg lucky to win 1982 F1 championship?

How Nico Rosberg's 2016 championship win changed F1

How Toyota changed F1 for worse (and ruined independent teams)

From Jordan to Aston Martin: victory against all odds

The story of F1's forgotten Robocop (Alessandro Nannini)

What Fernando Alonso's success taught F1 about marketing (Spain)

How Daniel Ricciardo redefined marketing in F1

The story of how the Finnish Ayrton Senna (Kimi) became an internet meme

How the Japanese Lance Stroll heralded the rise of F1 pay drivers (Satoru Nakajima, Pedro Diniz, Montermini, Ghinzani, Tarquini, Schneider, Dalmas, Zunino & Rebaque)

How a Brazilian backmarker was sacrificed for Michael Schumacher (Roberto Moreno)

How good were Michael Schumacher's team-mates in F1?

How bad was Michael Schumacher at Mercedes?

Why Sergio Perez proves how midfielders are overrated in F1 (Fisichella, Johansson, Bottas)

How a Belgian prisoner handed Michael Schumacher his F1 break (Bertrand Gachot & Jean-Marc Bosman)

Why we will never see a race like 1996 Monaco GP again

How 1997 Canadian GP destroyed France's next superstar (Olivier Panis)

Why Juan Pablo Montoya was feared by Schumacher, Alonso & Kimi (old school)

How Jacques Villeneuve changed F1 social media without even trying

How Mansell & Piquet became tabloid heroes & villains in F1

How a fat Australian set Williams on the path to F1 glory (Alan Jones)

How 1984 Monaco GP redefined rookies in F1 (Senna & Bellof)

How Brazil's original Senna changed F1 & Indycar for better & worse (Emmo Fittipaldi, his team sucked & he became the first foreign Indycar champion)

How 1989 Ferrari reworked F1 car design

How Jenson Button made rookies hot property in F1

How 1998 Belgian GP lost Jordan another Schumacher (how Ralf left for Williams)

Who was better: Hakkinen or Raikkonen?

Who are Ferrari's true rivals in F1? (Clue: themselves)

Why the French Fernando Alonso should have won 7 F1 world titles (Prost)

How the death of Helmut Marko's friend changed F1 forever (Jochen Rindt)

How 1999 Malaysian GP changed F1 forever (new circuit, title fight, Schumi's return from injury)

Why F1 flopped in America before Liberty Media (DTS, poor tracks, 2005 Indygate, few American drivers, NASCAR & Indycar)

Why are there no more Fangios in F1 from Argentina nor South Africa?

How F1 contributed to the rise of Russia & Putin (Max Mosley, Life F1, Hungarian GP, China, Middle East & Marussia, Midland)

How an Australian farmer upset the odds in F1 (Jack Brabham)

How a fat Italian redefined F1 team management (Flavio Briatore)

How a motorcycle dealer made F1 popular (Bernie Ecclestone)

How Red Bull & F1 made each other BIGGER brands

Why F1, Ferrari & Mercedes are synonymous with each other

Aston Martin & Honda: A recipe for F1 disaster?!

Have Red Bull ruined their rookies' F1 careers? (Answer: No)

How Ferrari crushed the F1 career of their last Italian driver (Ivan Capelli)

Why Alfa Romeo failed in F1 again (50s & 80s, brand image and Ferrari)

How a Frenchman dominated Indycar & flopped at Red Bull F1's B team (Bourdais)

Why Silverstone, Monaco & Monza mean EVERYTHING to F1

He won Le Mans 6 times & Dakar, but never a F1 title (Jacky Ickx)

How sacking a Spanish backmarker helped Lewis Hamilton in F1 (de la Rosa)

How an American's tantrum led to Red Bull domination (Scott Speed)

How Jules Bianchi's death killed off the independent F1 teams forever

Why Lewis Hamilton DOMINATES F1 social media

How Max Verstappen became the antithesis to Lewis Hamilton in F1

How McLaren & Kimi Raikkonen nearly wrecked each other in F1

Why was Mika Hakkinen rated as Schumacher's greatest rival in F1?

How 2007 damaged Fernando Alonso's F1 career

Why did Mario Andretti's son fail in F1?

How Senna & Berger became the original F1 social media pals

How a lost diamond made Jaguar quit F1 (2004 Monaco)

How this Ferrari legend became a voice for disability (Clay Regazzoni)

The Damon Hill of WRC: the tragic tale of Richard Burns

[icontherecord]

ODNI Releases 25th and 26th Joint Assessments of FISA Section 702 Compliance

  September 29, 2023

In accordance with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ), is making publicly available, with redactions, the 25th and 26th Semiannual Assessments of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“Joint Assessments”) submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). These Joint Assessments cover the periods of 1 June 2020 through 31 May 2021.

About the Joint Assessments

Section 702(m) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, requires the Attorney General and the DNI to assess the Government’s compliance with the Section 702 targeting, minimization, and querying procedures, as well as the Attorney General’s Section 702 Acquisition Guidelines, at least once every six months. A joint team of experts from the DOJ National Security Division and ODNI conduct regular assessments to review compliance and evaluate how agencies that receive unminimized Section 702 collection implement the authority. DOJ and ODNI submit their assessments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), relevant congressional committees, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board semi-annually through the Joint Assessments. The Joint Assessments describe how those agencies that receive unminimized information acquired under Section 702—the National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—implement their authority under Section 702, including agencies’ internal compliance efforts, training efforts, and responsive actions to prevent recurrence of compliance issues. The Joint Assessments also include metrics and narratives describing the Government’s compliance with Attorney General Guidelines and with FISC-approved targeting, minimization, and querying procedures.

Key Findings of the 25th and 26th Joint Assessments

DOJ and ODNI assessed that NSA, FBI, CIA, and NCTC continued to implement the Section 702 procedures and follow the relevant guidelines in a manner that generally reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702.

Due to the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, DOJ and ODNI note that caution is warranted when drawing conclusions regarding some of the compliance trends from the 25th and 26th Joint Assessments. While the total number of reported compliance incidents decreased significantly, the joint oversight team was not able to determine to what extent the decrease reflects changes in the number of compliance incidents that occurred—whether as a result of the coronavirus pandemic or other factors—as opposed to difficulties in discovering and reporting compliance incidents as a result of the pandemic. For example, while the number of NSA targeting compliance incidents fell sharply, most of the NSA targeting decisions covered by the 25th and 26th Joint Assessments occurred during the pandemic. If a Section 702 target travels to the United States, NSA must detask—or stop collection on—that target while the target is in the United States. Reduced travel during the pandemic likely resulted in fewer Section 702 targets traveling to the United States, thus reducing the likelihood that detasking delays would occur as a result of such travel.

Similarly, while the number of FBI querying incidents reported in the 25th and 26th Joint Assessments was significantly lower than pre-pandemic, the decline may be attributable to difficulties in discovering and reporting querying compliance incidents. FBI field office reviews have been responsible for discovering a significant portion of FBI querying incidents. DOJ suspended its reviews at FBI field offices for eight of the 12 months covered by the 25th and 26th Joint Assessments and was able to conduct only four query audits of FBI field offices during this time. By contrast, DOJ conducted query audits of 27 FBI field offices in 2019 and 29 FBI field offices in 2018. Additionally, the FBI querying compliance incidents discussed in these Joint Assessments occurred prior to the corrective measures FBI implemented in mid-2021 and 2022. Thus, these Joint Assessments do not reflect the effects of FBI’s corrective measures.

Additional Information

The 25th and 26th Joint Assessments are posted in full-text searchable format on Intel.gov.

25th Joint Assessment (dated April 2022): Reporting Period 01 June 2020 - 30 November 2020

26th Joint Assessment (dated August 2022): Reporting Period 01 December 2020 - 31 May 2021

[lepartidelamort]

Cocksucking Four-Eyed Faggot Johnson Condemns Russians and Chinese People as Evil, Demands Ukraine Money

By Andrew Anglin

Well, that didn’t take long.

RT:

In a dramatic break from his party’s hardline conservative base, US House Speaker Mike Johnson this week praised the country’s deep state, called Russia, China, and Iran an “axis of evil,” and vowed to put his job on the line to funnel more than $60 billion to Kiev. For months, Johnson has resisted bringing a $95 billion foreign aid bill to a vote, arguing that neither he nor his fellow Republicans could support the bill – which would give $14 billion in military aid to Israel and $60 billion to Ukraine – without it being tied to an overhaul of US border security. However, after a series of recent meetings with US intelligence chiefs, Johnson has changed his tune. “This is a critical time right now, a critical time on the world stage,” Johnson told reporters on Wednesday. “I think providing lethal aid to Ukraine right now is critically important. I really do. I really do believe the intel and the briefings that we’ve gotten.” “I believe [Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] and [Russian President] Vladimir Putin and Iran really are an axis of evil,” he continued. “I think they’re in coordination on this. I think that Vladimir Putin would continue to march through Europe if he were allowed.”

Oh, fuck you, faggot.

Ironically, the fact that these people keep saying that in order to justify attempting to destroy Russia actually justifies Russia marching through Europe.

What sort of adult says people are “evil”? What does that even mean?

Does he mean they are possessed by demons and/or worship Satan? What is an “evil person”?

In case anyone isn’t aware, let me tell you: this guy took this Speaker position from Kevin McCarthy on the promise of not funding the Ukraine. McCarthy was an extremist war shill, and was removed because he was out of control, just funding everything Brandon wanted.

Now, it turns out, Johnson is the exact same thing. This cocksucker came down from his Speaker seat to break a tie on an amendment to FISA which required the government to get a warrant before spying on people, voting in favor of no warrant.

Democracy is always tyranny. It doesn’t matter what you want. It doesn’t matter who you vote for. The people you vote for will just continue doing the things you don’t want. First they will lie to you, and try to convince you that you actually do want these things, and if that doesn’t work, they just do it anyway.

Neocon Jew David Frum coined the term “Axis of Evil” to describe a series of Islamic countries the US wanted wars with more than 20 years ago. Now here we are, yet again, with a completely unregulated government obsessed with wars for the Jews.

The Ukraine money doesn’t actually mean anything. It’s a long story that many people have already broken down in detail, so I won’t do it here, but the short story is that this is just a payout to people in Washington and to arms manufacturers. They don’t have the weapons to send.

“Funding Wars Good for the Economy”

The fact that they are actually saying “this is good for the military industrial complex and therefore the American economy” is still incredible. I heard this the first time a few months ago from some Jew promoting this bill, or maybe it was Mitch McConnell, and I was shocked. For the longest time, people would complain about US war projects and say “this is just a payout to the military industrial complex,” and now the government just says “yeah, you’re right – and that’s good!”

Biden just made a statement about the bill, saying it is going to build American jobs manufacturing weapons. I don’t think it will actually do that, but even if it did, how is “we should fight wars to help our economy” something that is justifiable?

War is horrible. Look at the videos from Gaza and the Ukraine. This is a nightmare. People should not be promoting war. It is psychopathic to have a national policy that says “we need more wars because it’s good for our economy.” It’s not good for the economy. There is some weird myth about how World War II ended the Great Depression. Insofar as that is true, it’s because the entire economy was shut down and turned into a war machine.

There is no specific profit for a nation in fighting wars. Especially not in the current year. Living space is not an issue because people are willing to live in midrise condos. Furthermore, global trade makes stealing people’s resources pointless, especially in light of how expensive modern war machines are. Faggots used to say that the war with Iraq was “about oil,” which is so retarded it makes your skull numb to try and think about it. Saddam was selling oil very cheap. US spent trillions of dollars fighting a war against Iraq – orders of magnitude more than they could ever spend on Iraqi oil (and then didn’t even keep control of the oil fields anyway).

Chinese people are obsessed with money, and they are also obsessed with avoiding wars. It’s because wars are bad for business. Look at the difference between China’s economic growth and US economic growth over the last 50 years. It’s a ridiculous thought to even compare the two.

The reason the US wants wars is that they can’t think of anything else. Yes, the US has a very powerful “economy,” but it is an absurd monstrosity that is not capable of real world honest competition. The US has to maintain the position of global military superpower, or the dollar fails and the US economy and therefore the state fails. The only way to do that is through war.

The Trump 2016 platform was an actual plan to shift the US into a mode of actually being competitive economically and ending the wars. That could have worked back then. It wouldn’t work now. Now, America is very doomed, and their only remaining idea is to light the whole world on fire and hope their enemies are the ones who suffer the worst burns.

All of these government people are morons and lunatics and they all belong in jail.

[dontmeantobepoliticalbut]

Donald Trump in the final days of his presidency repeatedly threatened to out government sources involved in the Trump-Russia investigation, an anti-Deep State revenge fantasy he still obsesses over to this day, according to two former senior Trump aides and another person familiar with the matter.

One of these sources tells Rolling Stone that in the days after the Jan. 6 Capitol riot, the then-president, sometimes while brandishing pieces of paper, would loudly complain that none of the identifying facts in the highly sensitive Russia documents should be blacked-out. Trump would insist, the source says, that it should “all be out there” so that the American people could see the truth of who “did it” to the President.

Ultimately, top intelligence officials and other Trump lieutenants talked him out of publicizing the sources’ identities before he left the White House, the sources say. Instead, Trump’s team bargained him down to vetting a series of heavily redacted reports that they argued would help safeguard the work and safety of Russia-related informants.

But a third source familiar with the situation says that this obsession with outing the confidential sources is ongoing. The former President, the source says, still sporadically talks about the need to get “the names” out into the public record. A Trump spokesperson did not immediately respond to Rolling Stone’s request for comment.

As Trump faces accusations that he hoarded sensitive classified documents at his private residence in Florida, the last-minute battle over redactions highlights how his disregard for security concerns at times has even rattled aides close to him.

Trump’s threats to out sources were part of a broader push during the chaotic end of his presidency. In December of 2020, as the odds against a successful overturning of the election grew longer, Trump and his chief of staff Mark Meadows pushed the Justice Department to declassify a binder full of records related to the FBI’s 2016 Russia investigation. In his memoir, Meadows described himself in the final hours of the Trump presidency going line by line through the “notes, memos and emails” in the binder to ensure it “would not inadvertently disclose sources and methods.”

With hours left before President Joe Biden took office in Jan. 2021, the White House sent a presidential memo to the Director of National Intelligence, CIA director, and acting Attorney General. The memo ordering the declassification of the binder references concern from the FBI, which stated its “continuing objection to any further declassification” of the binder on the grounds that specific passages “included Intelligence Community equities.” In an apparent nod to the efforts to walk the then-president back from outing “the names,” the memo says his declassification order “does not require the disclosure of certain personally identifiable information.”

The order also exempts from declassification any material that “must be protected from disclosure pursuant to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,” according to the memo.

At the same time, Trump gave conservative reporter John Solomon access to some of the documents. In a statement to Rolling Stone, Solomon says that on January 19, 2021, Trump allowed him “on two occasions, to briefly review a stack of documents that I was told were the declassified documents” and that he received “a small subset of the declassified documents” from the Justice Department in the mail at the time.

Through his outlet, Just The News, Solomon subsequently reported that the documents included “transcripts of intercepts made by the FBI of Trump aides” and “a declassified copy of the final FISA warrant approved by an intelligence court.” The Justice Department also mailed him a declassified transcript of FBI informant Stefan Halper’s conversations with former Trump campaign advisor Carter Page and notes of an FBI interview with Christopher Steele, the former British intelligence officer who circulated a dossier with allegations about Trump’s relationship with Russia, both of which featured in Solomon stories in 2021.

The binder of materials that Trump obsessed over in the waning days of his presidency was never released in full, but Trump and his allies’ interest in getting access to the records has continued since he left the White House.

Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) wrote to the Justice Department earlier this year complaining that the Department has “failed to declassify a single page” since Trump issued his memo. In attempting to review the documents, the Senators said their staff had spent “multiple days and countless hours in the Department’s classified facility” trying to locate documents purportedly covered by the order as Justice Department officials had “failed to identify” them.

Solomon, appointed as Trump’s designee to the National Archives this summer, says he has continued to seek access to memos from tranche of documents but that the Archives has told him one set is not available in an “easily discernible manner” while another set that remains with the Justice Department awaits “requested Privacy Act redactions.”

Trump, meanwhile, has reportedly continued to seek the release of Russia investigation-related documents. The former President reportedly tried to barter with the National Archives to hand back presidential records held at his Mar-a-Lago residence in exchange for the release of an unspecified batch of documents he believed would reflect poorly on the FBI’s 2016 Russia investigation, according to The New York Times.

[mariacallous]

Last month, US president Joe Biden signed a surveillance bill enhancing the National Security Agency’s power to compel US businesses to wiretap communications going in and out of the country. The changes to the law have left legal experts largely in the dark as to the true limits of this new authority, chiefly when it comes to the types of companies that could be affected. The American Civil Liberties Union and organizations like it say the bill has rendered the statutory language governing the limits of a powerful wiretap tool overly vague, potentially subjecting large swaths of corporate America to warrantless and secretive surveillance practices.

In April, Congress rushed to extend the US intelligence system’s “crown jewel,” Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The spy program allows the NSA to wiretap calls and messages between Americans and foreigners abroad—so long as the foreigner is the individual being “targeted” and the intercept serves a significant “foreign intelligence” purpose. Since 2008, the program has been limited to a subset of businesses that the law calls “electronic communications service providers,” or ECSPs—corporations such as Microsoft and Google, which provide email services, and phone companies like Sprint and AT&T.

In recent years, the government has worked quietly to redefine what it means to be an ECSP in an attempt to extend the NSA’s reach, first unilaterally and now with Congress’ backing. The issue remains that the bill Biden signed last month contains murky language that attempts to redefine the scope of a critical surveillance program. In response, a coalition of digital rights organizations, including the Brennan Center for Justice to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is pressing the US attorney general, Merrick Garland, and the nation’s top spy, Avril Haines, to declassify details about a relevant court case that could, they say, shed much-needed light on the situation.

In a letter to the top officials, more than 20 such organizations say they believe the new definition of an ECSP adopted by Congress might “permit the NSA to compel almost any US business to assist” the agency, noting that all companies today provide some sort of “service” and have access to equipment on which “communications” are stored.

“Deliberately writing overbroad surveillance authorities and trusting that future administrations will decide not to exploit them is a recipe for abuse,” the letter says. “And it is entirely unnecessary, as the administration can—and should—declassify the fact that the provision is intended to reach data centers.”

The Justice Department confirmed receipt of the letter on Tuesday but referred WIRED to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which has primary purview over declassification decisions. The ODNI has not responded to a request for comment.

It is widely believed—and has been reported—that data centers are the intended target of this textual change. Matt Olsen, the assistant US attorney general for national security, appeared on an April 17 episode of the Lawfare podcast to say that, while unable to confirm or deny any specifics, data centers today store a significant amount of communications data and are an “example” of why the government viewed the change as necessary.

A DOJ spokesperson pointed WIRED to an April 18 letter by Garland that claims the new ECSP definition is “narrowly tailored.” The letter includes written reflections on the provision by the assistant attorney general, Carlos Uriarte, who writes that the “fix” is meant to address a “critical intelligence gap” resulting from changes in technology over the past 15 years. According to Uriarte, the DOJ has committed to applying the new definition internally “to cover the type of service provider at issue” before the court.

Ostensibly this means the government is promising to limit future surveillance directives to data centers (in addition to the companies traditionally defined as ECSPs).

The surveillance court that oversees FISA and the appeals court that reviews its decisions sided two years ago with an unidentified company that fought back after being served an NSA order. Both courts ruled that it did not, in fact, appear to meet the criteria for being considered an ECSP, as only part of its function was storing communications data. Finding the government’s interpretation of the statute overly broad, the court reminded the government that only Congress has the “competence and constitutional authority” to rewrite the law.

Digital rights groups argue that declassifying additional information about this FISA case may help the public understand which types of businesses are actually subject to NSA directives. Practically speaking, they say, that information is no longer a secret anyway. “Declassifying this information would cause little if any national security harm,” the letter says. “The New York Times has already revealed that the relevant FISC case addressed data centers for cloud computing.”

In the aftermath of the FISA court’s ruling, the NSA and other spy agencies began lobbying the House and Senate intelligence committees to aid the administration in redefining what it means to be an ECSP. Members of both committees have subsequently portrayed the court’s ruling as a “directive” that Congress needs to expand the NSA’s reach. In a floor speech last month, Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said, “So what happened was, the FISA Court said to Congress: You guys need to close this loophole; you need to close this and change this definition.”

But in fact what the court asserted was that the government had exceeded its authority and that it was Congress’ job, not the Justice Department’s, to revise the law. “Any unintended gap in coverage revealed by our interpretation is, of course, open to reconsideration by the branches of government whose competence and constitutional authority extend to statutory revision,” the court said.

This would culminate in new language being proposed that quickly alarmed legal experts, including top civil liberties attorneys who’ve appeared before the secret court in the past. The surveillance fears quickly spread to Silicon Valley. The Information Technology Industry Council, one of the tech industry's top lobbying arms, warned that companies like Facebook and IBM were interpreting the bill as having “vastly expanded the US government’s warrantless surveillance capabilities.”

This expansion, the firm added, would also hinder the “competitiveness of US technology companies” and arguably imperil the “continued global free flow of data between the US and its allies.” Customers internationally, it argued, would likely begin taking their business elsewhere should the US government turn data centers into surveillance watering holes.

Concerns about the new ECSP definition have been circulating since December. While largely dismissing them, members of the House and Senate intelligence committees made a few adjustments in February, exempting a handful of business types. This came in response to popular concerns that Starbucks employees and hotel IT staff might be secretly conscripted by the NSA. FISA experts such as Marc Zwillinger—a private attorney who has appeared twice before the FISA Court of Review—noted in response to those adjustments that Congress’ rush to exempt a handful of businesses only served to demonstrate that the text was inherently too broad.

Intelligence committee members kept the pressure on lawmakers to reauthorize the Section 702 program with the sought-after language, going as far as to suggest that another 9/11-style attack might occur if they failed. The power of the committees was on full display, as while neither actually have primary jurisdiction over FISA, a majority of the Section 702 bill that passed was authored by intelligence committee staff.

Even while supporting the new framework and dismissing the intensity of civil society’s concerns, Warner did eventually step forward to acknowledge the new ECSF definition needed additional tweaking. First, on the Senate floor in April, he said that Garland shared his “view” that the language “could have been drafted better.” Later, in response to questions from reporters, he added: “I’m absolutely committed to getting that fixed.”

That appears unlikely to happen soon. According to The Record, Warner indicated that the best time to update the language again would be in the “next intelligence bill,” presumably referring to legislation this fall broadly reauthorizing the intelligence community’s work.

In the meantime, however, more than half of Congress is running for election, and the next US president will have greater surveillance powers than any other before. No one can say for sure who that president will be or how they’ll make use of that authority.

[researchcompany]

Non-Recliner Train Seat Market

Reed Intelligence has recently added a new report to its vast depository titled Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market. The report studies vital factors about the Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market that are essential to be understood by existing as well as new market players. The report highlights the essential elements such as market share, profitability, production, sales, manufacturing, advertising, technological advancements, key market players, regional segmentation, and many more crucial aspects related to the Non-Recliner Train Seat Market.

Get Free Sample Report PDF @ https://reedintelligence.com/market-analysis/global-non-recliner-train-seat-market/request-sample

Non-Recliner Train Seat Market Share by Key Players

Freedman Seating Co.

Grammar AG

KTK Group Co., Ltd.

GINYO Transport Facilities Co., Ltd

Transcal Ltd.

Franz Kiel GmbH

FISA Srl.

Fenix Group LLC

Saira Seats

Important factors like strategic developments, government regulations, market analysis, end users, target audience, distribution network, branding, product portfolio, market share, threats and barriers, growth drivers, latest trends in the industry are also mentioned.

Non-Recliner Train Seat Market Segmentation

The report on Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market provides detailed segmentation by type, applications, and regions. Each segment provides information about the production and manufacturing during the forecast period of 2024-2032. The application segment highlights the applications and operational processes of the industry. Understanding these segments will help identify the importance of the various factors aiding to the market growth.

The report is segmented as follows:

By Type

High-speed Train

Light Train

Tram

By Application

OEM

Aftermarket

Non-Recliner Train Seat Market Segmentation by Region

North America

U.S.

Canada

Europe

Germany

UK

France

Asia Pacific

China

India

Japan

Australia

South Korea

Latin America

Brazil

Middle East & Africa

UAE

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Get Detailed Segmentation @ https://reedintelligence.com/market-analysis/global-non-recliner-train-seat-market/segmentation

The market research report on the Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market has been carefully curated after studying and observing various factors that determine the growth, such as environmental, economic, social, technological and political status of the regions mentioned. Thorough analysis of the data regarding revenue, production, and manufacturers gives out a clear picture of the global scenario of the Non-Recliner Train Seat Market. The data will also help key players and new entrants understand the potential of investments in the Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market.

Key Highlights

It provides valuable insights into the Global Non-Recliner Train Seat Market.

Provides information for the years 2024-2032. Important factors related to the market are mentioned.

Technological advancements, government regulations, and recent developments are highlighted.

This report will study advertising and marketing strategies, market trends, and analysis.

Growth analysis and predictions until the year 2032.

Statistical analysis of the key players in the market is highlighted.

Extensively researched market overview.

Buy Non-Recliner Train Seat Market Research Report @ https://reedintelligence.com/market-analysis/global-non-recliner-train-seat-market/buy-now

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[trendtrackershq]

𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 𝑲𝒆𝒚 𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝑫𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒐𝒕 𝑹𝒖𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒊𝒏 2024

𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝑭𝑹𝑬𝑬 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆: https://www.nextmsc.com/hot-runner-market/request-sample

As the global manufacturing landscape evolves, the 𝑯𝒐𝒕 𝑹𝒖𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 is experiencing significant growth and innovation. Let's dive into some of the key trends and factors driving this expansion:

𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑨𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔: With continuous improvements in automation and precision engineering, hot runner systems are becoming more efficient and reliable. Innovations in temperature control and material flow are reducing waste and increasing productivity.

𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑭𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒔: As industries strive to meet environmental goals, hot runner systems are playing a crucial role in minimizing plastic waste. By eliminating the need for runners and sprues, these systems help manufacturers achieve more sustainable production processes.

𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒈: The automotive and packaging sectors are major contributors to the growth of the hot runner market. The demand for lightweight, high-quality components is pushing manufacturers to adopt advanced hot runner systems for improved performance and cost-efficiency.

𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑭𝒍𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚: The market is seeing a rise in customized hot runner solutions tailored to specific applications. This flexibility allows manufacturers to optimize their production lines and meet unique customer requirements.

𝑮𝒍𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏: Emerging markets in Asia-Pacific and Latin America are witnessing rapid industrialization, leading to increased adoption of hot runner systems. This global expansion is opening new avenues for growth and collaboration.

𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕: https://www.nextmsc.com/report/hot-runner-market

𝑲𝒆𝒚 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒓𝒔: The market comprises of various players such as Barnes Group Inc., CACO PACIFIC Corporation, Milacron, Husky Injection Moulding Systems Ltd, EWIKON Molding Technologies, Inc., Fast Heat UK Limited, Fisa Corporation, Yudo Hot Runner India Pvt. Ltd., HASCO, INCOE Corporation, and Seiki Corporation.

[mongowheelie]

Trump allies hope to use new spy powers debate to their political advantage: report - Alternet.org

[icontherecord]

Release of 2021 FISA Section 702 FISC Order

July 21, 2023

Consistent with the Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community, ODNI, in consultation with DOJ, is also today making publicly available, with redactions, a 2021 FISC Order that examined certain FBI compliance errors involving the querying of U.S. person information. The errors discussed in the 2021 FISC Order preceded the FBI remedial reforms discussed in the 2023 FISC Opinion, which were initially deployed during the summer of 2021, and the 2021 FISC Order thus does not reflect the current status of FBI compliance. Moreover, the compliance issues discussed in the 2021 FISC Order are some of the same compliance issues discussed in the FISC’s April 2022 Section 702 Opinion, which the ODNI released on May 19, 2023. See 2022 Mem. Op. at 26–28. Nonetheless, the Government has chosen to make the 2021 FISC Order publicly available to provide the public with additional information about Section 702.

Additional Information

The documents are posted in full-text searchable format on intel.gov.

2021 FISA Section 702 FISC Order

  Background on Section 702

Section 702 was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) and most recently reauthorized by the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. Section 702 permits the Attorney General and the DNI to jointly authorize, through certifications, the targeting of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States (iii) to acquire foreign intelligence information. These certifications are accompanied by targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and querying procedures that are each designed to ensure that the Government’s collection is appropriately targeted against non-United States persons located overseas who may possess or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information and that any such collection is appropriately handled in a manner that protects privacy and civil liberties.

Under Section 702, the FISC reviews the certifications and accompanying documents to ensure that they meet all the requirements of Section 702 and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s review is not limited to the procedures as written, but also includes an examination of how the procedures have been and will be implemented. Accordingly, as part of its review, the FISC considers the compliance incidents reported to it by the Government through notices and reports.

Additional Information about FISA Section 702 and how the Intelligence Community uses its surveillance authorities may be found in the FISA Resource Library.

[wushigod]

President Joe Biden signed a bill Saturday that extends and modifies the Foreign Surveillance Act, ending a legislative saga that earlier involved multiple failed efforts by lawmakers to advance the bill and former President Donald Trump who claimed it was used to spy on his campaign urging Congress to “kill” it. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., called for amendments to the legislation and said lawmakers supporting the law “want no warrants, and they want nothing to protect the Americans.” Paul reportedly objected to a White House statement claiming the “situation could turn very bad and dangerous very quickly” if the law didn’t pass. “This is an argument that has been forced upon us by the supporters of FISA who want no debate and they want no restrictions,” Paul said. KEY FACTS TO KNOW! Biden signed the bill extending Section 702 of the FISA law for two years hours after the Senate’s approval, which came shortly after the law expired late Friday. The law allows intelligence agencies to conduct “targeted surveillance” on non-U.S. citizens overseas using an FBI database without a warrant. The House voted to renew FISA last week following multiple failed attempts, including an earlier version of the legislation that would have reauthorized Section 702 for five years. National security adviser Jake Sullivan said FISA allows the U.S. to “retain essential authority” in understanding and protecting against a “wide range of dangerous threats to Americans” while protecting privacy and civil liberties. KEY BACKGROUND Section 702 of FISA was authorized by Congress in 2008 to monitor noncitizens outside of the U.S., though it has faced criticism since its inception. A 2023 report from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found the FBI misused the law’s tool nearly 300,000 times between 2020 and early 2021, including the collection of information on Jan. 6 rioters and Black Lives Matter protesters. Earlier this month, Trump called on lawmakers to “kill” the legislation which was briefly extended in December and incorrectly said it was used to improperly spy on his campaign. The Justice Department previously determined the FBI improperly obtained two warrants to spy on a former aide to his campaign, though the warrants were obtained under a different section of FISA, Title I.