#Department of State v. Muñoz

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Michelangelo Signorile at The Signorile Report:

Four years ago, as she was ascending to the Supreme Court, I wrote right here on The Signorile Report that “Amy Coney Barrett will destroy marriage equality.” And now she’s appeared to confirm it’s coming, writing the majority opinion last week in Department of State v. Muñoz. Barrett and others in the majority were called out by the three liberals on the court in a powerful dissenting opinion—and even by Justice Neal Gorsuch to an extent, in a concurrence—who zeroed in on how Barrett and other conservatives unnecessarily, and disturbingly, stripped the rights of marriage in a ruling on an immigration case.

The case centered on Sandra Muñoz, a Los Angeles woman and U.S. citizen, who argued that her constitutional rights were violated when the federal government denied a visa to her Salvadoran husband, an undocumented immigrant. As The Los Angeles Times notes, the case is “a major setback for Americans with foreign spouses because it explicitly rejects the idea that a citizen has a constitutional right to attempt to bring their noncitizen spouse into the country.” More than that, as Justice Sotomayor wrote in her very strong dissenting opinion, which opened by quoting from the court’s Oberbefell marriage equality decision, the majority’s decision stripped marriage as a “fundamental” right that is a “matter of tradition and history.”

Muñoz demanded to know the reason why her husband was denied a visa, since, as is standard practice, the State Department would not tell her. Via her lawsuit, the claims of which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed—ruling her husband should get a visa because not doing so infringed on Muñoz’s marriage rights—she found out the dubious reason: The government claimed her husband had tattoos that were gang-related, something an expert on gangs refuted. And, as Gorsuch wrote, that should have been the end of the case. Muñoz got what she sought—the basis of the government’s denial—and, even as the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision, she and her husband could try to get a visa again. There was absolutely no reason for the Supreme Court to go any further than that.

[...] Biden and the Democrats got the “Respect for Marriage Act” passed—a bill that foresaw the possible overturning of Obergefell, after Thomas’s concurring opinion in Dobbs. The law will not stop states from banning marriage equality in their own states if the court sent the issue back to the states, as it did with the issue of abortion. But it codifies recognition by the federal government of same-sex marriage—for the purposes of Social Security survivorship, for example—and mandates that states that ban same-sex marriage in their own states must recognize marriages of gay and lesbian couples married in other states, even if their own residents go to another state to marry. You can bet that if Donald Trump and the GOP get into power, they'll repeal the Respect for Marriage Act. More than that, only with Democrats and Biden in power can we pressure both to finally move forward on expanding the Supreme Court.

As SCOTUS Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted in the dissent for the Department of State v. Muñoz case that cited Obergefell, marriage equality is under serious danger.

[cavenewstimes]

Sonia Sotomayor Just Sounded a Dire Warning About Marriage Equality

Jurisprudence Photo illustration by Slate. Photos by Alex Wong/Getty Images and Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States via Getty Images. The Supreme Court dealt a blow to the fundamental rights of married couples on Friday in an important and ominous immigration case, Department of State v. Muñoz. Justice Amy Coney Barrett held—over the dissent of all three liberals—that American…

[masterofd1saster]

CJ court watch - 4 good cases on 21jun24

None of the cases was a great surprise, in numerical order the cases were

Smith v. Arizona, a 6th Amendment confrontation case, United States v. Rahimi, a 2d Amendment case, Department of State v. Muñoz, a liberty interests case, and Erlinger v. United States, a jury trial right case.

***

Smith v. Arizona, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The Clause bars the admission at trial of “testimonial statements” of an absent witness unless she is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior opportunity” to cross-examine her. *** And that prohibition applies in full to forensic evidence. So a prosecutor cannot introduce an absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-court statements to prove the results of forensic testing.*** The question presented here concerns the application of those principles to a case in which an expert witness restates an absent lab analyst’s factual assertions to support his own opinion testimony.***

In December 2019, Arizona law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on a property in the foothills of Yuma County. Inside a shed on the property, they found petitioner Jason Smith. They also found a large quantity of what appeared to be drugs and drug-related items. As a result, Smith was charged with possessing dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) for sale; possessing marijuana for sale; possessing narcotic drugs (cannabis) for sale; and possessing drug paraphernalia. He pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for trial.*** But with three weeks to go, the State called an audible, replacing Rast with a different DPS analyst as its expert witness. In the time between testing and trial, Rast had stopped working at the lab, for unexplained reasons. And the State chose not to rely on the now-former employee as a witness. So the prosecutors filed an amendment to their “final pre-trial conference statement” striking out the name Elizabeth Rast and adding “Greggory Longoni, forensic scientist (substitute expert).”***

Because he had not participated in the Smith case, Longoni prepared for trial by reviewing Rast’s report and notes. And when Longoni took the stand, he referred to those materials and related what was in them, item by item by item. *** After thus telling the jury what Rast’s records conveyed about her testing of the items, Longoni offered an “independent opinion” of their identity. Id., at 46a–47a, 49a. More specifically, the opinions he offered were: that Item 26 was “a usable quantity of marijuana,” that Items 20A and 20B were “usable quantit[ies] of methamphetamine,” and that Item 28 was “[a] usable quantity of cannabis.”***

Hearsay means a statement made out of court which a party offers to prove the truth of what was said or written in the statement. In other words, if Pa Walton testifies that Ma Walton had said "John Boy killed me," and the prosecutor offers it to prove that John Boy killed her, that would be hearsay. If John Boy is charged with killing her at dinner time, but he calls Olivia to testify that she heard Ma say "goodnight, John Boy" at bed time, John Boy could offer it to proved that she was alive at bedtime, and Olivia's testimony would not be hearsay.

But truth is everything when it comes to the kind of basis testimony presented here. If an expert for the prosecution conveys an out-of-court statement in support of his opinion, and the statement supports that opinion only if true, then the statement has been offered for the truth of what it asserts. How could it be otherwise? “The whole point” of the prosecutor’s eliciting such a statement is “to establish—because of the [statement’s] truth—a basis for the jury to credit the testifying expert’s” opinion.*** Or said a bit differently, the truth of the basis testimony is what makes it useful to the prosecutor; that is what supplies the predicate for—and thus gives value to—the state expert’s opinion. So “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement” to “explain the basis of an expert’s opinion” and “disclosing that statement for its truth.”

Rast’s statements thus came in for their truth, and no less because they were admitted to show the basis of Longoni’s expert opinions. All those opinions were predicated on the truth of Rast’s factual statements. Longoni could opine that the tested substances were marijuana, methamphetamine, and cannabis only because he accepted the truth of what Rast had reported about her work in the lab— that she had performed certain tests according to certain protocols and gotten certain results. And likewise, the jury could credit Longoni’s opinions identifying the substances only because it too accepted the truth of what Rast reported about her lab work (as conveyed by Longoni). If Rast had lied about all those matters, Longoni’s expert opinion would have counted for nothing, and the jury would have been in no position to convict. So the State’s basis evidence—more precisely, the truth of the statements on which its expert relied—propped up its whole case. But the maker of those statements was not in the courtroom, and Smith could not ask her any questions. Approving that practice would make our decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming a dead letter, and allow for easy evasion of the Confrontation Clause***

The Court vacated the Arizona judgment and sent the case back to consider some additional aspects of the case that not previously been addressed.

The decision to vacate was 9-0, although some justices clearly did not like some things in the opinion of the court. I agree with Justice Gorsuch more than the opinion of the court or any of the concurrences.

***

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

*** In December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend, C. M., for lunch in a parking lot. C. M. is also the mother of Rahimi’s young child, A. R. During the meal, Rahimi and C. M. began arguing, and Rahimi became enraged.

He physically abused her and fired a shot from a pistol, and she sought and received a restraining order.

The order, entered with the consent of both parties, included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence.” App. 2. It also found that this violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or A. R. Id., at 2–3. Based on these findings, the order prohibited Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for two years or contacting C. M. during that period except to discuss A. R.***

Accordingly, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8) prohibited him from possessing a firearm. He didn't care. The Supreme Court noted him firing at others or threatening others with a firearm at least six different times. The 2d Cir. thought that he might have a 2d Amendment right to possess a firearm, but its analysis was weak, and the Supreme Court reversed.

In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation” to help delineate the contours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a challenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment. We also clarified that when the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to “justify its regulation.”***

if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding****

By the time of the founding, *** regulations targeting individuals who physically threatened others persisted. Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary criminal laws and civil actions, such as prohibitions on fighting or private suits against individuals who threatened others****

Finally, in holding that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Rahimi, we reject the Government’s contention that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.” *** “Responsible” is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rule would entail. Nor does such a line derive from our case law. In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “responsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. *** But those decisions did not define the term and said nothing about the status of citizens who were not “responsible.” The question was simply not presented.***

There were many concurrences qualifying the opinion of the court, but only J. Thomas dissented.

***

Department of State v. Muñoz, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

Sandra Muñoz wanted a visa so her husband could join her in the U.S. State declined her request because her husband was a member of MS-13. She argued that

The right to live with her noncitizen spouse in the United States is implicit in the “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment; the denial of her husband’s visa deprived her of this interest, thereby triggering her right to due process; the consular officer violated her right to due process by declining to disclose the basis for finding [her husband] inadmissible***

The 9th Cir., of course, thought Ms Munoz had a right to bring her man to the States. The Supreme Court begged to differ.

“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” *** Congress may delegate to executive officials the discretionary authority to admit noncitizens “immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” *** When it does so, the action of an executive officer “to admit or to exclude an alien” “is final and conclusive.” ***The Judicial Branch has no role to play “unless expressly authorized by law.” *** The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa; thus, as a rule, the federal courts cannot review those decisions. This principle is known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.***

[There is one narrow exception, when the denial affects a citizen's liberty interests.]

we hold that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country*** while Congress has made it easier for spouses to immigrate, it has never made spousal immigration a matter of right. On the contrary, qualifications and restrictions have long been the norm*** As the State Department observes, Muñoz’s claim to a procedural due process right in someone else’s legal proceeding would have unsettling collateral consequences. Consider where her logic leads: Could a wife challenge her husband’s “assignment to a remote prison or to an overseas military deployment, even though prisoners and service members themselves cannot bring such challenges”? *** Could a citizen assert procedural rights in the removal proceeding of her spouse? *** Muñoz’s position would usher in a new strain of constitutional law, for the Constitution does not ordinarily prevent the government from taking actions that “indirectly or incidentally” burden a citizen’s legal rights.***

J. Gorsuch concurred. The three left wing justices dissented. The court's opinion closed with the familiar words

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

***

Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

This case concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ACCA imposes lengthy mandatory prison terms on certain defendants who have previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. The question we face is whether a judge may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make that determination beyond a reasonable doubt.***

Paul Erlinger had many violent felony convictions, and he pleaded guilty. The only issue was whether any three of the convictions were committed on separate occasions. If you've ever heard of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), you'd know how this case was going to turn out.

The Sixth Amendment promises that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused” has “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Inhering in that guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous jury. *** The Fifth Amendment further promises that the government may not deprive individuals of their liberty without “due process of law.” It is a promise that safeguards for criminal defendants those procedural protections well established at common law, including the “ancient rule” that the government must prove to a jury every one of its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. *** The Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed the jury at the heart of our criminal justice system. From the start, those provisions were understood to require the government to include in its criminal charges “‘all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence.’” *** Should an “indictment or ‘accusation . . . lack any particular fact which the laws ma[d]e essential to the punishment,’ it was treated as ‘no accusation’ at all.” *** And at all times the “‘truth of every accusation’” against a defendant had to be “‘confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [his] equals and neighbours.’”

I guess the point here is that prosecutors must allege the prior convictions and their separateness in indictments. If the defendant wants to plead guilty, prosecutors should probably include those facts in the plea agreement and stipulation.

Weird ideological 6-3 breakdown: J. Jackson joined J.J. Alito and Kavanaugh in dissenting.

[derechointernacionalpublico]

The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces

The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces

Author: Edited by Dieter Fleck ISBN: 9780198808404 Binding: Hardcover Publication Date: 15 June 2018 Price: $165.00

The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces

Second Edition

Edited by Dieter Fleck

Comprehensively and authoritatively sets out the legal framework governing all aspects of visiting forces

Contains contributions from experts in the field of international and military law

Provides relevant and practical information and analysis for military and policy lawyers, as well as scholars

Features cases studies on Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Afghanistan

New to this Edition:

Fully updated covering new developments, including extensive coverage of new status-of-force agreements (SOFA)

Features four new chapters on immunity of visiting forces under international law; requirements for and existing practice of multinational units; the law of UN peace operations; and agreements conferring status similar to the status of administrative and technical staff of embassies (A&T Agreements)

Description

The legal position of visiting forces transcends domestic and international law and is of growing importance in our increasingly globalized and insecure world. ‘In area’ and ‘out of area’ operations, both for the purpose of establishing and maintaining peace and in connection with the conduct of other military operations and training, are likely to become more frequent for a variety of reasons. Finding where the applicable law places the balance between the interests, sensitivities and needs of the host state and the requirements, often practical in nature, of the visiting force is a key objective in ensuring that the relationship between hosts and ‘guests’ is and remains harmonious. All of this must be achieved in an increasingly complex legal environment.

This fully updated second edition of The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces addresses the issues surrounding visiting forces and provides a full overview of the legal framework in which they operate. Through an analysis of jurisprudence and historical developments, it offers a comparative commentary to the UN, NATO, and other SOFA rules. The Handbook then continues its analysis through cases studies of visiting forces in key countries, including a fully updated chapter on Afghanistan that considers the various stages of the conflict, before offering conclusions on the current state of the law and its likely future development.

Table of Contents

PART I. GENERAL 1. Introduction, Dieter Fleck 2. Historical Developments Influencing the Present Law of Visiting Forces, Peter Rowe 3. Multinational Military Operations, Dieter Fleck, Katarina Grenfell, and Michael A. Newton 4. UN Peace Operations, Michael Bothe 5. The Immunity of Visiting Forces and their Headquarters, Dieter Fleck PART II. COMMENTARIES TO TYPICAL SOFA RULES 6. General Overview, Dieter Fleck 7. Respect for the Law of the Receiving State, Andrés Muños-Mosquera 8. Members of Visiting Forces, Mette Prassé Hartov 9. Civilian Components, Andrés Muñoz-Mosquera and Nikoleta Chalanouli 10. Contractor Personnel, Joop Voetelink 11. Dependents, Mette Prassé Hartov 12. Entry and Departure, Dieter Fleck 13. Permits and Licenses, Paul J. Conderman 14. Vehicles, Paul J. Conderman 15. Uniform, Dieter Fleck 16. Communications, Vladimir Atanasov and Paul J. Conderman 17. Premises, Jonathan L. Black-Branch 18. Travel and Transport, Jonathan L. Black-Branch 19. Arms, Jarin Nijhof 20. Jurisdiction, Paul J. Conderman and Aurel Sari 21. Military Law Enforcement, Joop Voetelink 22. Claims, Jody M. Prescott 23. Logistic Support, Eduardo Martinez Llarena 24. Deceased Members, Katarina Grenfell 25. Tax and Customs Exemptions, Paul J. Conderman and Nikoleta Chalanouli 26. Foreign Exchange Regulations, Nikoleta Chalanouli 27. Financing Operations, Nikoleta Chalanouli 28. The Donald A. Timm 29. Supplemental Arrangements, Donald A. Timm 30. Settlement of Disputes, Frank Burkhardt 31. Territorial Applicability, Frank Burkhardt 32. Revision, Frank Burkhardt 33. Termination, Frank Burkhardt 34. Applicability During Crisis and War, Dieter Fleck PART III. HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENTS 35. Legal Issues Related to International Military Headquarters, Steven Hill and Federica Favuzza 36. United Nations Headquarters in the Field, Ben F. Klappe 37. NATO Military Headquarters, Andrés Muñoz-Mosquera and Mette Prassé Hartov 38. Other Military Headquarters 38.I. African Union, Daniel Rezene Mekonnen 38.II. Military Headquarters for EU Operations, Thierry Tardy 38.III. From the Commonwealth of Independent States to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov PART IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT 39. The International Committee of the Red Cross: Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities, Jean-Philippe Lavoyer and Sylvain Vité 40. Rights and Obligations of Foreign National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Heike Spieker PART V. CASE STUDIES 41. The Law of Stationing Forces in Germany: Six Decades of Multilateral Cooperation, Dieter Fleck 42. The Japan Experience with Visiting Forces: An Evolving Perspective, Junya Kawai, Dale Sonnenberg and Donald A. Timm 43. Visiting Forces in Korea, Hyun Kim and Donald A. Timm 44. Afghanistan, Jody M. Prescott and Jane M. Male 45. Russian Forces in the Former USSR and Beyond, Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov 46. Alternative Approaches to Certain Deployments: Agreements conferring status similar to the status of administrative and technical staff of embassies (A&T Agreements), Gunter Filippucci PART VI. CONCLUSIONS FOR THE PLANNING OF MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS 47. 39 Visiting Forces in an Operational Context, Dieter Fleck and Ben F. Klappe INDEX

Author Information

Edited by Dieter Fleck, Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War, Member of the Advisory Board, Amsterdam Center of International Law, Former Director International Agreements & Policy, German Ministry of Defence

Contributors:

Vladimir Atanasov, Legal Assistant, Office of Legal Affairs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels, Belgium (Chapter 16)

Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba (Chapters 17, and 18)

Michael Bothe, Professor (em.) of public law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, Germany (Chapter 4)

Frank Burkhardt, formerly Legal Advisor, Commander International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Deputy Director, International Agreements and Policy, German Ministry of Defence, Bonn, Germany (Chapters 30, 31, 32 and 33)

Nikoleta P. Chalanouli, Staff Legal Advisor, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command Operations, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium (Chapters 9, 25, 26, 27)

Paul J. Conderman, Attorney-Advisor, Special Advisor to the Judge Advocate, United States Army Europe, Wiesbaden (Chapters 13, 14, 16, 20 and 25)

Federica Favuzza, PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Law, Adjunct Professor of International Organizations, University of Milan ‘La Statale’, Italy; formerly at the Office of Legal Affairs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Chapter 35 III, IV 1-2, IV 5-6 and V)

Dieter Fleck (Chapters 1, 3 I, 3 II, 3 V, 3 VI, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 34, 41 and 47 I-III)

Gunter Filippucci, Chief of International Law, United States European Command (EUCOM), Stuttgart (Chapter 46)

Katarina Grenfell, Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations Secretariat, New York (Chapters 3 IV, 24)

Steven Hill, Legal Adviser and Director, Office of Legal Affairs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels, Belgium (Chapter 35)

Junya Kawai, Deputy Director, Chief of Cyber Policy Group, Strategic Planning Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense Tokyo (Chapter 42 I, III-V)

Hyun Kim, Office of the Judge Advocate for the United Nations Command / United States Forces Korea (Chapter 43)

Colonel Ben F. Klappe, Senior Military Expert, United Nations Secretariat, New York; formerly National Liaison Representative & Senior National Representative of the Netherlands, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Norfolk, Va., U.S.A. (Chapters 36, 47 IV)

Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, formerly Head of the Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross (Chapter 39)

Major Jane M. Male, International Operations Officer, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, Newport R.I., formerly?Provincial Team Chief, NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, Kunduz, Afghanistan (2011-2012) (Chapter 44)

Eduardo Martinez Llarena, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Logistics Division (Chapter 23)

Daniel R. Mekonnen, Executive Director of the Eritrean Law Society; formerly Senior Legal Advisor, International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI), Oslo, Norway (Chapter 38 I)

Andrés Muñoz-Mosquera, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Legal Advisor, Director, Legal Office, Allied Command Operations, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium (Chapters 7, 9, 37)

Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Chapter 3 III)

Jarin Nijhof, Director of the Expertise Centre on Military Criminal Law of the Netherlands Prosecution Service; former host nation attorney-advisor for the US Army 21st Theater Sustainment Command’s Netherland Law Center (Chapter 19)

Mette Prassé Hartov, Deputy Legal Advisor, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, Va. U.S.A. (Chapters 8, 11, and 37)

Jody M. Prescott, Associate Legal Advisor, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science and School of Environmental Studies, University of Vermont; Senior Fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law; formerly Chief, International and Operational Claims, US Army Claims Service, Europe; Chief Legal Advisor ISAF, Kabul; and part of the Specialist Team 007, which received the NATO Research and Technical Office award for scientific excellence in 2012 for its work on the NATO operations assessment supporting the transition from ISAF to the Resolute Support mission (Chapters 22 and 44)

Peter Rowe, Professor of Law (em), University of Lancaster, U.K. (Chapter 2)

Aurel Sari, Senior Lecturer in Law, Fellow, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, Law School, University of Exeter, U.K. (Chapter 20)

Dale L. Sonnenberg, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, United States Forces Japan (Chapter 42 I, II, V)

Heike Spieker,?Deputy Director, International Services / National Relief Division, German Red Cross, Berlin (Chapter 40)

Thierry Tardy, Senior Analyst, European Institute for Security Studies, Paris (Chapter 38 II)

Donald A. Timm, Former Special Advisor to the Judge Advocate, United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea and former Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate, United States European Command (Chapters 29, 42 I, II, V and 43)

Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Senior Research Fellow, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Judge (ret.) International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the Former Yugoslavia; Vice-President of the Russian Association of International Law (Chapters 38 III and 45)

Sylvain Vité, Legal Adviser, Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (Chapter 39)

Joop Voetelink, Associate Professor, Faculty of Military Science, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda (Chapters 10, 21)

[via International Law]

https://www.dipublico.org/110052/the-handbook-of-the-law-of-visiting-forces/

[myattorneyusa]

34 New Immigration Judges Sworn in During October and December 2020

On October 9, 2020, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) announced the investiture of 20 new immigration judges [link] at immigration courts across the country. On December 18, 2020, the EOIR announced the investiture of an additional 14 immigration judges. The October announcement explained that “[s]ince Jan. 20, 2017, the [Department of Justice] has increased EOIR's immigration judge corps from 306 to 520 adjudicators — an increase of nearly 70 percent.” In this post, we will consolidate the October 9 and December 18 immigration judge investiture announcements, covering all 34 new immigration judges and listing the immigration courts on which they will serve. Each of the 34 new immigration judges was appointed by now-former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr.

We will draw the list of judges and their basic biographical information from the EOIR's articles for October 9 [link] and December 18 [link].

Abbreviations Used in this Article

Many of the new immigration judges worked in various capacities for the DHS and DOJ prior to their appointments to the immigration bench. Below, you will find a list of abbreviations that we will use in their biographies, where necessary.

DOJ = Department of Justice

DHS = Department of Homeland Security

ICE = Immigration and Customs Enforcement

CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection

USCIS = U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

OCC = Office of Chief Counsel

OPLA = Office of Principal Legal Advisor

Immigration Courts Welcoming New Judges

Below, you will find the full list of immigration courts that welcomed new immigration judges in the October 9 and December 18 announcements. We will indicate in a parenthetical the courts that received multiple new immigration judges. We will use square brackets to indicate the state each immigration court is located in.

The three immigration court locations in Manhattan — Broadway, Federal Plaza, and Varick Street, received 10 new immigration judges combined between the October and December announcements.

Adelanto Immigration Court [CA]

Atlanta — W. Peachtree Street Immigration Court [GA]

Batavia Immigration Court [NY]

Chicago Immigration Court [IL]

Cleveland Immigration Court [OH]

Dallas Immigration Court [TX]

El Paso Immigration Court [TX]

Falls Church Immigration Adjudication Center [VA]

Fort Worth Immigration Adjudication Center [TX]

Harlingen Immigration Court [TX]

Houston Immigration Court [TX] (2)

Houston — S. Gessner Road Immigration Court [TX]

Imperial Immigration Court [CA]

Los Angeles — Olive Immigration Court [CA]

New York — Broadway Immigration Court [NY] (7)

New York — Federal Plaza Immigration Court [NY]

New York — Varick Immigration Court [NY] (2)

Otay Mesa Immigration Court [CA] (2)

Otero Immigration Court [NM]

Philadelphia Immigration Court [PA]

Port Isabel Immigration Court [TX]

San Antonio Immigration Court [TX]

San Francisco Immigration Court [CA] (2)

Seattle Immigration Court [WA]

New Judge for Adelanto Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Ravit R. Halperin (December Investiture)

2000-2020: Private practice (2008-2020 as the founder of an immigration law firm)

1992: Earned J.D. from the City University of New York Law School

New Judge for the Atlanta — W. Peachtree Street Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Blake L. Doughty (October Investiture)

2019-2020: Deputy chief counsel, OCC, OPLA, ICE, DHS in Atlanta, Georgia

2015-2019: Assistant chief counsel, OCC, OPLA, ICE, DHS in Atlanta and Lumpkin, Georgia

2014-2014: Local prosecutor

2009-2014: U.S. Army judge advocate

2008: Earned J.D. from Roger Williams University School of Law

New Judge for the Batavia Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Robert P. Driscoll (October Investiture)

1998-2020: Local prosecutor in Athens, Ohio

1993-1998: Private practice

1993: Earned J.D. from Capital University Law School

New Judge for the Chicago Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Brendan Curran (October Investiture)

2007-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OCC, OPLA, ICE, DHS in Chicago, Illinois

1999-2007: Local prosecutor in Cook County, Illinois

1994-1999: Served as an officer in the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the U.S. Navy

1994: Earned J.D. from DePaul University College of Law

New Judge for the Cleveland Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Donald Pashayan (December Investiture)

2012-2020: Assistant U.S. attorney in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force of the District of Arizona

2003-2012: Assistant U.S. attorney in the Southern District of Ohio and in the Middle District of Florida

2002-2002: Private practice

1999-2002: Judge advocate in the U.S. Navy

1999: Earned J.D. from the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

1994-1999: Police officer

New Judge for the Dallas Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Glen R. Hines

1997-Present: Judge advocate in the U.S. Marine Corps

2018-2020: Civilian legal counsel and policy advisor for the U.S. Department of Defense

2014-2018: Circuit military judge

2012-2014: Assistant U.S. attorney for the Western District of Arkansas

2005: Earned Master of Laws degree from the George Washington University School of Law

1994: Earned J.D. from the University of Arkansas

New Judge for the El Paso Immigration Court

Immigration Judge James J. Miller Jr.

1998-2020: Chief assistant U.S. Attorney for the U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Texas, Pecos Division, in Alpine, Texas

1994-1998: Senior Defense Counsel, Trial Defense Service, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps

1990-1994: Attorney and prosecutor with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps

Earned J.D. from Hamline University School of Law

New Judge for the Falls Church Immigration Adjudication Center

Immigration Judge Robert M. Lewandowski (December Investiture)

1986-2020: Judge advocate in the U.S. Marine Corps

2004-2020: Chief of staff, special assistant and senior advisor, for the U.S. Border Patrol, CBP, DHS, in the District of Columbia

1996-1994: Sector counsel for the Laredo, Texas Sector, U.S. Border Patrol, CBP, DHS

1989: Earned J.D. from the College of William and Mary

New Judge for the Fort Worth Immigration Adjudication Center

Immigration Judge Randall L. Fulke (October Investiture)

1990-2020: Assistant U.S. attorney at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Texas

1988-2018: U.S. Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps

1986-1990: Assistant district attorney for Lubbock and Midland Counties, in Texas

1984-1985: Private Practice

1984: Earned J.D. from Texas Tech University School of Law

New Judge for the Harlingen Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Mark K. Brooks (December Investiture)

2019-2020: Special trial attorney, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in Arlington, Virginia, on detail from USCIS

2017-2020: Immigration officer, Fraud Detection National Security Directorate, USCIS, DHS.

2012-2016: Private practice

2005-2012: Attorney advisor, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DHS, in the District of Columbia

2001-2004: State prosecutor serving in Maryland

1986-2001: Private practice

1986: Earned J.D. from the Antioch School of Law

Two New Judges for the Houston Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Joshua D. Osbourn (October Investiture)

2016-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OCC, OPL, ICE, DHS, in Los Angeles (Adelanto)

2009-2016: Local prosecutor in Arizona

2008: Earned J.D. from the University of Kansas, School of Law

Immigration Judge Christopher M. Schumann (October Investiture)

2000-2020: Attorney and military judge with the U.S. Air Force

2005: Earned Master of Laws from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School

1999: Earned J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law

New Judge for the Houston — S. Gessner Road Immigration Court

Immigration Judge DeLana M. Jones (October Investiture)

2013-2020: Special assistant U.S. attorney and assistant U.S. attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia

2010-2013: Law clerk for U.S. Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker, Northern District of Georgia, in Atlanta

2006-2010: Private practice

2006: Earned J.D. from Harvard Law School

New Judge for the Imperial Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Jeffrey V. Muñoz (December Investiture)

1995-2020: Active duty in the Marine Corps; including as a criminal defense attorney, prosecutor, general counsel, and military trial judge

2003: Earned J.D. from the University of Arizona College of Law

New Judge for the Los Angeles — Olive Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Wilbur Lee (October Investiture)

1998-2020: Judge advocate in the U.S. Marine Corps; including service as a military judge

2010: Earned Master of Laws from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School

1997: Earned J.D. from the Southwestern University School of Law

Seven New Immigration Judges for the Broadway — New York Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Erin L. Alexander (December Investiture)

2004-present: U.S. Navy in various active duty and reserve capacities, including as a judge advocate

2014-2020: Assistant district attorney in the New York County District Attorney's Office (Manhattan)

2012-2014: Private Practice

2010: Earned J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center

Immigration Judge John P. Burns (December Investiture)

2016-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in New York

2013-present: Officer in the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the New York Army National Guard

2010-2016: Attorney at the Social Security Administration

2009: Earned J.D. from Fordham University School of Law

Immigration Judge Edward P. Grogan (October Investiture)

2000-2020: Assistant U.S. attorney at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York

1994-2020: U.S. army judge advocate general officer

1993: Private practice

1992: Earned J.D. from Albany Law School

1984-1988: Army infantry officer

Immigration Judge Dawn M. Kulick (December Investiture)

2016-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in Miami and Philadelphia

2014-2016: Judicial law clerk for U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida

Before 2014: Assistant state attorney in the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office; Private practice

2003: Earned J.D. from New York Law School

1993-2001: Worked in corporate world, including for a publishing house

Immigration Judge Shirley Lazare-Raphael (December Investiture)

2019-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in New York

2001-2019: Private practice

2000: Earned J.D. from Brooklyn Law School

Immigration Judge Tanawa Lebreton (October Investiture)

2006-2020: Private practice in various positions; including 2017-2020 stint as practice group director with Inland Counties Legal Services, and 2008-2009 stint as staff attorney with Catholic Legal Services

2006: Earned J.D. from Ave Maria School of Law

Immigration Judge James R. McKee (October Investiture)

2018-2020: Chief, Foreign Law Branch, Department of Defense, in Germany and Florida

2016-2018: Served with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, DOJ

2012: Earned Master of Laws from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School

1994-2016: U.S. Army judge advocate in multiple positions

1989-2013: Enlisted infantry soldier in the New York Army National Guard

1991-1993: Clerk for the 60th Judicial District Court of Common Please, in Pike County, Pennsylvania

1991: Earned J.D. from the Syracuse University School of Law

New Judge for the New York — Federal Plaza Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Maria T. Ubarri (December Investiture)

2010-2020: State trial court judge in Puerto Rico

1995-2010: Private practice

1994-1995: Policy advisor to the Governor of Puerto Rico

1993: Legislative assistant for the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, U.S. House of Representatives

1991: Earned J.D. from the University of Puerto Rico Law School

Two New Judges for the New York — Varick Street Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Richard H. Drucker (December Investiture)

1981-2020: Private practice in Cleveland, Ohio

1981: Earned J.D. from Cleveland State University

Immigration Judge Thomas J. Mungoven (October Investiture)

2004-2020: Private practice; including 2004-2008 stint as staff attorney at Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Newark Immigrant and Refugee Services Division

2004: Earned J.D. from Saint John's University School of Law

Two New Judges for the Otay Mesa Immigration Court

Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Colleen M. Glaser-Allen (October Investiture)

2018-2020: Chief trial judge of the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

2016-2018: Served at the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, including from 2017-2018 as chief appellate judge

1995-2020: Active duty judge advocate in the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps

2007: Earned Master of Laws from the George Washington University Law School

1995: Earned J.D. from the University of Illinois College of Law at Urbana-Champaign

Immigration Judge Samantha L. Begovich (December Investiture)

1996-2020: Deputy district attorney for the Office of the District Attorney, San Diego, California

1994-1996: Trial attorney for the Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice

1994: Special assistant U.S. attorney at the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia

1994: Earned J.D. from Stanford Law School

New Judge for the Otero Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Ralph E. Girvin Jr. (October Investiture)

2018-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OCC, OPLA, ICE, DHS in El Paso, Texas

2016-2018: Assistant U.S. attorney for the Western District of Texas

2000-2016: Assistant attorney and chief of the Civil and Criminal Divisions, for the County of El Paso, Texas

1996-1999: Assistant district attorney for the 34th Judicial District of Texas

1995: Earned J.D. from St. Mary's University School of Law

1986-1992: Served in the U.S. Army Reserve and Texas Army National Guard

New Judge for the Philadelphia Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Patrick J. Ehlers (October Investiture)

2015-2020: Assistant U.S. attorney in Portland, Oregon; also resident legal advisor for the DOJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development

1998-2015: Assistant federal public defender in Portland, Oregon and previously in various locations in Oklahoma

1996-1998: Public defender in Oklahoma

1995-1996: Judicial assistant to judge for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

1993-1995: Post-conviction defense counsel for the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System

1993: Earned J.D. from the University of Oklahoma College of Law

New Judge for the Port Isabel Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Jefferson B. Brown (October Investiture)

1994-2020: Chief circuit trial judge, deputy circuit trial judge, appellate judge, trial judge, staff judge advocate, deputy staff judge advocate, appellate defense counsel, trial defense counsel, and prosecutor for the U.S. Air Force; retired with rank of colonel

1993: Earned J.D. from Vanderbilt Law School

New Judge for the San Antonio Immigration Court

Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Charles P. Koutras (October Investiture)

1997-present: Judge advocate for the U.S. Navy in active and reserve capacities

2006-2020: Attorney for U.S. Army South at Fort Sam Houston, Texas

2002-2004: Assistant city attorney for San Antonio, Texas

1997: Earned J.D. from St. Mary's University

Two New Immigration Judges for the San Francisco Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Samuel Y. Kim (December Investiture)

2018-2020: Private practice in San Francisco, California

2014-2018: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in San Francisco, California

2013-2014: Private practice in San Francisco, California

2011-2013: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in Los Angeles, California

2006-2011: Active duty as a judge advocate for the Marine Corps Forces Reserve

2004-2005: Private practice

2004: Earned J.D. from Washington University in Saint Louis School of Law

Immigration Judge Jason R. Masterson (December Investiture)

2011-2020: Active duty judge advocate in the U.S. Navy

2011-2013: Prosecutor and special assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California

2010: Earned J.D. from the University of Cincinnati College of Law

2009-2010: Cincinnati Prosecutor's office

2008-2009: Fellow with the Ohio Innocence Project

2004-2007: Substance abuse and mental illness case manager for non-profit

New Judge for the Seattle Immigration Court

Immigration Judge Hayden Windrow

2020: Trial attorney, District Court Section, Office of Immigration Litigation, DOJ

2015-2020: Assistant chief counsel, OPLA, ICE, DHS, in New York

2005-2015: Judicial law clerk at multiple Article III Courts

2005: Earned J.D. from New York University School of Law

Please visit the nyc immigration lawyers website for further information. The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC focuses vast segment of its practice on immigration law. This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.

Lawyer website: http://myattorneyusa.com

[justinspoliticalcorner]

David Badash at NCRM:

In a 6-3 decision along partisan lines the right-wing justices on the U.S. Supreme Court once again targeted the landmark 2015 Obergefell same-sex marriage decision, leading liberal Justice Sonia Sotomayor to sound “alarm bells” on marriage equality in her dissent a legal expert says, warning that they may try to “roll it back.”

The case involves Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen who argued that the federal government’s denial of a visa for her husband, who lives in El Salvador, deprives her of her constitutionally protected right to liberty. The right-wing majority in a decision written by Justice Amy Coney Barrett ruled: “A citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.” Friday’s ruling “undermines same-sex marriage,” Bloomberg Law reports Justice Sotomayor’s dissent warns. Slate senior writer Mark Joseph Stern has covered the courts since 2013, and is the author of a 2019 book on the Roberts Supreme Court. “Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, accuses the conservative supermajority of cutting back the rights guaranteed in Obergefell—the same-sex marriage decision—and of repeating ‘the same fatal error’ it made in Dobbs,” Stern writes. “A very ominous opinion.”

[...] “A traveler to the United States two centuries ago reported that ‘‘[t]here is certainly no country in the world where the tie of marriage is so much respected as in America.’ ‘ ” “Today,” Sotomayor continued, “the majority fails to live up to that centuries-old promise. Muñoz may be able to live with her husband in El Salvador, but it will mean raising her U. S.-citizen child outside the United States. Others will be less fortunate. The burden will fall most heavily on same-sex couples and others who lack the ability, for legal or financial reasons, to make a home in the noncitizen spouse’s country of origin.” Again quoting Obergefell, she adds, “For those couples, this Court’s vision of marriage as the ‘assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other’ rings hollow.” Stern warns: “I think Justice Sotomayor is clearly correct that the Supreme Court’s gratuitous attack on the constitutional rights of married couples in Muñoz—especially same-sex couples—suggests that the conservative justices hate Obergefell and may roll it back.” Sotomayor began her dissent also with a quote from Obergefell: “The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition.”

SCOTUS Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissent in the Department of State v. Muñoz case gave an alarming warning that the 6-3 radical right-wing majority's decision in Muñoz could imperil Obergefell v. Hodges and marriage equality.

See Also:

The Advocate: Justice Sotomayor: Supreme Court ruling in immigration case threatens marriage equality