#339th squadron

[aviationgeek71]

Captain Clarence W Knott in his P-51D Mustang, 339th Fighter Group, 503rd Fighter Squadron, 1944.

[dronescapesvideos]

B-17 Flying fortress Of The 339th Bombardment Squadron, 96th Bomb Group, Flying Over Germany In The Summer Of 1944 VIDEO ➤➤ https://youtu.be/yYOf7rumdxM

[captain-price-unofficially]

B-17 of 339th Bombardment Squadron, 96th Bomb Group, over Germany, summer 1944.

[usafphantom2]

A P-38 Pilot Describes the Attack on Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

P-38 pilot Roger Ames participated in the shooting down of Japan’s most important admiral.

This article appears in: Fall 2012

By Robert F. Dorr

When American air ace Major John Mitchell led 16 Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters on the longest combat mission yet flown (420 miles) on April 18, 1943, Mitchell’s target was Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral considered the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mitchell’s P-38 pilots, using secrets from broken Japanese codes, were going after Yamamoto, the poker-playing, Harvard-educated naval genius of Japan’s war effort. Mitchell’s P-38s intercepted and shot down the Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bomber carrying Yamamoto. After the admiral’s death, Japan never again won a major battle in the Pacific War.

No band of brothers ever worked together better than the men who planned, supported, and flew the Yamamoto mission. Yet, after the war, veterans fell to bickering over which P-38 pilot actually pulled the trigger on Yamamoto.

There was one thing they never disagreed on. Like most young pilots of their era, they believed the P-38 Lightning was the greatest fighter of its time.

Roger J. Ames (1919-2000) flew the Yamamoto mission. This first-person account by Ames was recorded by the author in 1998 and appeared in his 2007 book, Air Combat: A History of Fighter Pilots; it has never before appeared in a magazine.

Intercepting a Crucial Japanese Radio Message

The downing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is arguably the most studied fighter engagement of the Pacific War. Yamamoto, 56, was commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet and the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack. He called himself the sword of Japan’s Emperor Hirohito. He claimed he was going to ride down Pennsylvania Avenue on a white horse and dictate the surrender of the United States in the White House.

Yamamoto studied at Harvard (1919-1921), traveled around America, was twice naval attaché in Washington, D.C., and understood as much about the United States, including U.S. industrial power, as any Japanese leader. In April 1943, Yamamoto was trying to prevent the Allies from taking the offensive in the South Pacific and was visiting Japanese troops in the Bougainville area.

On the afternoon of April 17, 1943, Major John Mitchell, commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron, was ordered to report to our operations dugout at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The 1st Marine Division had captured the nearly completed field the previous summer and named it for Major Lofton Henderson, the first Marine pilot killed in action in World War II when his squadron engaged the Japanese fleet that was attacking Midway.

Now Mitchell found himself surrounded by high-ranking officers. They told him the United States had broken the Japanese code and had intercepted a radio message advising Japanese units in the area that Yamamoto was going on an inspection trip of the Bougainville area.

The message gave Yamamoto’s exact itinerary and pointed out that the admiral was most punctual. They told Mitchell that Frank Knox, secretary of the Navy, had held a midnight meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarding the intercepted message. It was decided that we would try to get Yamamoto if we could. The report of the meeting was probably inaccurate because Roosevelt was on a rail trip away from Washington, but the plan to get Yamamoto unquestionably began at the top.

Eighteen P-38s Selected For the Mission

The Navy would never have admitted it, but the Army’s P-38 was the only fighter with the range to make the approximately 1,100-mile round trip. We were under the command of the Navy at Guadalcanal, so you can bet they’d have taken the job if they were able.

First Lieutenant Rex T. Barber, one of two Americans originally credited with shooting down Yamamoto. He later was given sole credit for the kill.

According to the intercepted message, Yamamoto and his senior officers were arriving at the tiny island of Ballale just off the coast of Bougainville at 9:45 the next morning. The message said that Yamamoto and his staff would be flying in Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bombers, escorted by six Zeros. The Yamamoto trip was to include a visit to Shortland Island and Bougainville.

Mitchell was to be mission commander of 18 P-38s that would intercept, attack, and destroy the bombers. That’s all the P-38s we had in commission.

The Plan of Attack

Led by Mitchell, we planned the flight in excruciating detail. Nothing was left to chance. Yamamoto was to be at the Ballale airstrip just off Bougainville at 9:45 the next morning and we planned to intercept him 10 minutes earlier about 30 miles out. To ensure complete surprise, we planned a low level, circuitous route staying below the horizon from the islands we had to bypass, because the Japanese had radar and coastwatchers just as we did.

We plotted the course and timed it so that the interception would take place upon the approach of the P-38s to the southwestern coast of Bougainville at the designated time of 9:35 am. Each minute detail was discussed, and nothing was taken for granted. Takeoff procedure, flight course and altitude, radio silence, when to drop belly tanks, the tremendous importance of precise timing and the position of the covering element: all were discussed and explained until Mitchell was sure that each of his pilots knew his part and the parts of the other pilots from takeoff to return.

Mitchell chose pilots from the 12th, 70th, and 339th Fighter Squadrons. These were the only P-38 squadrons on Guadalcanal. The only belly tanks we had on Guadalcanal were 165-gallon tanks, so we had to send to Port Moresby for a supply of the larger 310-gallon tanks. We put one tank of each size on each plane. This gave us enough fuel to fly to the target area, stay in the area where we expected the admiral for about 15 minutes, fight, and come home. The larger fuel tanks were flown in that night, and ground crews worked all night getting them installed along with a Navy compass in Mitchell’s plane.

Captain Tom Lanphier’s P-38 #122 Phoebe on Guadalcanal with the 339th Fighter Squadron. Lanphier was originally given credit for half a kill before investigations revealed that Barber was the sole marksman.

Four of our pilots were designated to act as the “killer section” with the remainder as their protection. Mitchell said that if he had known there were going to be two bombers in the flight he would have assigned more men to the killer section. The word for bomber and bombers is the same in Japanese. (Author’s note: Ames is incorrect on this point about the Japanese language).

Captain Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., led the killer section. His wingman was 1st Lt. Rex T. Barber. 1st Lt. Besby F. “Frank” Holmes led the second element. His wingman was 1st Lt. Raymond K. Hine.

The cover section was led by Mitchell and included myself and 11 other pilots. Eight of the 16 pilots on the mission were from the 12th Fighter Squadron, which was my squadron.

Although 18 P-38s were scheduled to go on the mission, only 16 were able to participate because one plane blew a tire on the runway on takeoff and another’s belly tanks failed to feed properly.

“Bogeys! Eleven O’Clock, High!”

It was Palm Sunday, April 18, 1943. But since there were no religious holidays on Guadalcanal, we took off at 7:15 am, joined in formation, and left the island at 7:30 am, just two hours and five minutes before the planned interception. It was an uneventful flight but a hot one, at from 10 to 50 feet above the water all the way. Some of the pilots counted sharks. One counted pieces of driftwood. I don’t remember doing anything but sweating. Mitchell said he may have dozed off on a couple of occasions but received a light tap from “The Man Upstairs” to keep him awake.

Mitchell kept us on course flying the five legs by compass, time, and airspeed only. As we turned into the coast of Bougainville and started to gain altitude, after more than two hours of complete radio silence, 1st Lt. Douglas S. Canning––Old Eagle Eyes–– uttered a subdued “Bogeys! Eleven o’clock, high!” It was 9:35 am. The admiral was precisely on schedule, and so were we. It was almost as if the affair had been prearranged with the mutual consent of friend and foe. Two Betty bombers were at 4,000 feet with six Zeros at about 1,500 feet higher, above and just behind the bombers in a “V” formation of three planes on each side of the bombers.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in dress whites, photographed on the morning he was killed, addresses a group of pilots at Rabaul, April 18, 1943. His death came as a tremendous blow to the Japanese.

We dropped our belly tanks. We put our throttles to the firewall and went for altitude. The killer section closed in for the attack while the cover section stationed themselves at about 18,000 feet to take care of the expected fighters from Kahili. As Mitchell said, “The night before we knew the Japanese had 75 Zeros on Bougainville and I wanted to be where the action was.

I thought, “Well, I’m going on up higher and we’re going to be up there and have a turkey shoot.’” We expected from 50 to 75 Zeros should be there to protect Yamamoto just as we had protected Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox when he came to visit a couple of weeks before. We’d had as many fighters in the air to protect Knox as we could get off the ground. I guess the Japanese had all their fighters lined up on the runway for inspection. Anyway, none of the Zeros came up to meet us. Our intercept force encountered only the Zeros that were escorting Yamamoto.

Lanphier and Barber: The First to Make Contact With the Enemy

Lanphier and Barber headed for the enemy. When they were about a mile in front and two miles to the right of the bombers, the Zeros spotted them. Lanphier and Barber headed down to intercept the Zeros. The Bettys nosed down in a diving turn to get away from the P-38s. Holmes, the leader of the second element, could not release his belly tanks so, in an effort to jar them loose, he turned off down the coast, kicking his plane around to knock the tanks loose. Ray Hine, his wingman, had no choice but to follow him to protect him. So Lanphier and Barber were the only two going after the Japs for the first few minutes.

Ground crewmen look over Lieutenant Robert Petit’s P-38, Miss Virginia, which Barber borrowed for the mission; he returned it to Henderson Field with over 100 bullet holes.

From this point onward, accounts of the fight get mixed up about who shot down whom. Briefly, here is probably what happened based on the accounts of all involved. I did not see what was happening 18,000 feet below me.

As Lanphier and Barber were intercepted by the Zeros, Lanphier turned head-on into them and shot down one Zero and scattered the others. This gave Barber the opportunity to go for the bombers. As Barber turned to get into position to attack the bombers, he lost sight of them under his wing, and when he straightened around he saw only one bomber, going hell bent for leather downhill toward the jungle treetops.

Barber went after the Betty and started firing over the fuselage at the right engine. And as he slid over to get directly behind the Betty, his fire passed through the bomber’s vertical fin and some pieces of the rudder separated from the plane. He continued firing and was probably no more than 100 feet behind the Betty when it suddenly snapped left and slowed down rapidly, and as Barber roared by he saw black smoke pouring from the right engine.

Shooting Down the Betty

Barber believed the Betty crashed into the jungle, although he did not see it crash. And then three Zeros got on his tail and were making firing passes at him as he headed toward the coast at treetop level taking violent evasive action. Luckily, two P-38s from Mitchell’s flight saw his difficulty and cleared the Zeros off his tail. Holmes said it was he and Hine that chased the Zeros off Barber’s tail. Barber said he then looked inland and to his rear and saw a large column of black smoke rising from the jungle, which he believed to be the Betty he’d shot.

As Barber headed toward the coast he saw Holmes and Hine over the water with a Betty bomber flying below them just offshore. He then saw Holmes and Hine shoot at the bomber with Holmes’ bullets hitting the water behind the Betty and then walking up and through the right engine of the Betty. Hines started to fire, but all of his rounds hit well ahead of the Betty. Then Holmes and Hine passed over the Betty and headed south.

Barber said that he then dropped in behind the Betty flying over the water and opened fire. As he flew over the bomber it exploded, and a large chunk of the plane hit his right wing, cutting out his turbo supercharger intercooler. Another large piece hit the underside of his gondola, making a very large dent in it.

Wreckage of Yamamoto’s “Betty” lies on the jungle floor on the island of Bougainville.

After this, he, Holmes, and Hine fired at more Zeros. Barber said that both he and Holmes shot down a Zero, but Hine was seen heading out to sea smoking from his right engine. As Barber headed home, he saw three oil slicks in the water and hoped that Hine was heading for Guadalcanal, but that was not the case.

Lanphier, having scattered the Zeros, found himself at about 6,000 feet. Looking down, he saw a Betty flying across the treetops, so he came down and began firing a long, steady burst across the bomber’s course of flight, from approximately right angles. In another account, Lanphier said he was clearing his guns. By both accounts, he said he felt he was too far away, yet, to his surprise, the bomber’s right engine and right wing began to burn and then the right wing came off and the Betty plunged into the jungle and exploded.

Return to Guadalcanal

Lanphier said that three Zeros came after him, and he called Mitchell to send someone down to help him. Then, hugging the earth and the treetops while the Zeros made passes at him, he unwittingly led them over a corner of the Japanese fighter strip at Kahili.

He then headed east and, with the Zeros on his tail, he got into a high-speed climb and lost them at 20,000 feet; he got home with only two bullet holes in his rudder. Contrast this to the 104 bullet holes in Barber’s plane, plus the knocked-out intercooler and the huge dent in his gondola.

Flying back to Guadalcanal, I heard Lanphier get on the radio and say, “That SOB won’t dictate peace terms in the White House.” This really upset me because we were to keep complete silence about the fact that we had gone after Yamamoto. The details of this mission were not to leave the island of Guadalcanal.

[airmanisr]

Pauline by Willard Womack Via Flickr: 339th Fighter Group, , 505th Fighter Squadron, 8th AF; code 6N-C. "Pauline"

[theworldairforce]

Lt. Col. Matthew Griffin, 339th Flight Test Squadron director of operations, and Maj. Gen. Kenneth Lewis Jr., Air Force Reserve Command deputy commander, recover and gather their belongings after flying in an F-15 Eagle aircraft, May 16, 2019, at Robins Air Force Base, Ga. The flight was Lewis’ final in a military aircraft after more than 34 years of service.

[nerdaces]

Major Michael McPharlin

Michael McPharlin, known as Mike or "Wee Mike" was a P/O on 71 Eagle Squadron RAF. He had joined the RCAF from Hastings, Michigan, and after completing his flying training he transferred into the Royal Air Force.

He named his plane "Wee Ginny". He made many close friends in the Eagles, but when his friends transferred to the newly-commissioned 4th Fighter Group, 334th Squadron, he did not, but was instead assigned to the 339th Fighter Group.

Nevertheless, he maintained an ongoing friendship with the 334th and was frequently loaned to and flew on missions with his 334th buddies.

On 19 August 1942 he had to bail out over Dieppe, but fortunately was returned to his squadron. On 6 June 1944, flying with his friends of 334th Squadron, in P-51B 42-106909 6N-Z 'Wee Ginny', he was not so lucky. He reported that his left magneto was out and he was heading for home nursing his rough engine. He was never heard from again.

He had 6.5 enemy aircraft to his credit.

Just five days after he was reported missing, on 11 June 1944, his wife Patricia gave birth to their daughter, Carleen.

[airwingspotter]

PHANTOM PHOREVER  – THE LEGEND LIVES ON

This legendary twin engine beast of Mc Donnell Douglas might not be the most versatile and agile fighter of the Hellenic Air Force, but it still remains an essential component of its Tactical Air Force planning. Today, HAF still maintains in front line service two F-4 Squadrons, while the aircraft is counting more than 40 years of service. The legend still lives on.

The history of the Greek Phantoms dates back to 1972, when Greece signed a contract with United States and Mc Donnell Douglas for the purchase of 36 F-4E. During that period of time, Greece made also a purchase of two other types of military aircraft, both of them highly capable and successful. These two aircraft were the French Mirage F-1CG and the American LTV A-7 Corsair II. During the late 70s and for more than a decade, Greece was one of the few countries in Europe with so many advanced and modern aircraft in its inventory, while it was the dominant force in the region of Balkans.

The new house of the Greek Phantoms was decided to be the 117 Combat Wing based in Andravida, close to Patra city. This airport had been built in 1955 and was used only as an Air Detachment unit. After this decision, the aerodrome of Andravida was completely renovated. The older infrastructure was reconstructed and new hangars were built for the aircraft maintenance along with modern shelters.

The pilots who were chosen to visit the United States to receive their training for the new aircraft were mostly ex F-84F pilots. The reason why these pilots were chosen was simply because this aircraft was the most numerous but at the same time the oldest aircraft in the inventory of HAF and was already being phased out. The first Squadrons which were destined to receive this modern aircraft were 338 and 339 Squadrons, both strike squadrons, equipped with the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak.

The first 36 pilots were sent initially to the United States in December of 1973 while the rest followed in January of 1974. All were transferred to Homestead AFB, close to Miami in Florida where 31st TFW was based, equipped with F-4C and F-4D aircraft. The program was named Peace Icarus Ι. The first aircraft destined for the HAF, with serial number 72-1500 took off for the first time from Lambert airport in St Louis on the 29th of January 1974, with the test pilot of McDonnell Douglas, E.D. Francis at the controls. The F-4E variant was the most capable variant of the Phantom series, which performed its initial flight on 30 June 1967. It featured:

The upgraded J79-GE-17A engines, with 17,900 lb afterburning thrust.

A General Electric M61A1 six-barreled 20-millimeter Gatling-type cannon on the underside of the nose, with 640 rounds of ammunition.

An AN/APQ-120 radar. This new radar was much more compact than its predecessors, allowing it to fit into the nose along with the cannon.

A Martin-Baker Mark 7 “zero-zero (zero altitude, zero speed) ejection seats.

A tailplane with a fixed slat attached under the leading edge. The slat provided improved control authority at high angles of attack (AOA).

A seventh fuel cell in the tail above the engine nozzles.

Manual wing fold, instead of hydraulic fold.

Another main design feature of this improved version was the implementation of the leading edge slats. Those leading-edge slats, were being extended automatically when the aircraft’s AoA was exceeding six degrees, and retracted when the AoA was going back to four degrees. This feature was firstly introduced to the F-4Es in mid-1972 and was retrofitted to the older E models. A historical moment for the Greek Phantoms was on the 5th of April 1974. During that afternoon, the first six aircraft touched down on runway 34 of Andravida airport. 15 days later, on Saturday, the 20th of April, the ceremony of the establishment of the first Phantom Squadron, 339 Sq, took place. Due to the increased tensions with Turkey, a decision for a second purchase was taken after the completion of the deliveries from the first order. On the 22nd of October 1976, the Greek government announced the need for the purchase of an extra number of Phantoms. Finally on the 16th of July 1977 a second contract was signed under the name Peace Icarus II for the purchase of 18 F-4E along with 8 RF-4E photoreconnaissance Phantoms. These later Phantoms were delivered between 1978 until 1979 completing the original Phantom orders for the HAF.

The RF-4Es were delivered to 348 Squadron “Eyes” at 110 Combat Wing in Larissa. The second batch of the F-4E from Peace Icarus II enabled the establishment of a third F-4 unit, 337 Squadron ‘Ghost’, based also in Larissa. This unit assumed primary responsibility for the defense of the central and northern Aegean. At the early 80s HAF had already three Squadrons of F-4E and one Squadron of RF-4E, making it one of the few Air Forces within NATO which had so many advanced Phantom aircraft. The serial numbers of the first batch of the F-4E aircraft from Peace Icarus I were starting from 72-1500 to 72-1535. The second batch of F-4E from Peace Icarus II had serial numbers 77-1743 to 77-1760 plus two other aircraft 74-1618 to 74-1619 which were originally ordered to cover two losses which had already taken place. The RF-4E had serial numbers 70357 and 70358 and from 71761 to 71766.

Picture Profile taken from Icarus Decals

                          All the F-4E Phantoms arrived in Greece with SEA camouflage (Vietnam) and had large light blue roundels. Later on many of them received an all dark blue camouflage, which was named “Aegean Blue”. In the late 1990s, the new camo of the so called “Aegean Ghost” was started to be applied to the Greek Phantoms. The process was not completed for all of them, because their retirement had already begun.

In July 1990, the US government decided to offer 28 F-4E from the Indiana Air National Guard under the Southeastern Regional Agreement (SRA). As a return, USA continued to operate its American Air Bases in Greece for another 8 years. The first 9 aircraft which belonged to the 131st Squadron of Missouri ANG, arrived in Andravida on the 3rd f August 1991. With their introduction, all the existing F-4s from the original Greek orders were allocated between 337 and 339 Squadrons, while 338 Sq received all the ex-US jets.

Despite the fact that the SRA F-4s were coming from  older production blocks (these aircraft were from Blocks No. 36 up to 41), they featured advanced Navigation and Weapon-Delivery System (NWDS), Airborne Video Tape Recorder (AVTR), Have Quick radios, and improvements to the AN/APQ-120 radar to make it more capable in the air-to-ground role. All the SRA Phantoms were wearing the standard USAF livery (American Hill Grey) while they were equipped with the smokeless J79. Their serial numbers of these aircraft were: – 67-0345, 0350, 0377,0381, – 68-0318, 0361,0363, 0381, 0393, 0394, 0402, 0405, 0408, 0412, 0424, 0426, 0432, 0438, 0440, 0442, 0444, 0445, 0480, 0481, 0496, 0506, 0515, 0517.

The F-4E SRA were finally withdrawn on the 16th of December 2005, when the 337 Sq temporary terminated its operation by withdrawing all 28 of them in order to start the preparations for the acceptance of the modern F-16C/D Block 52+, assuming its role as lead interception unit in the northern Aegean.

Two years later the 348 Squadron fleet was also enhanced with 27 RF-4Es from the German Luftwaffe. Under the NATO treaty, Germany granted a large number of RF-4E to Greece and Turkey which were being phased out of active service. These 27 examples started to arrive in the spring of 1993. Only twenty of them were used for service and equipped 348 Sq, which were added to the remaining 5 RF-4E (three of them had already been lost in accidents), while at the same time the remaining ageing RF-84F Thunderflashes, were finally retired from service. The rest of the German examples were used for spare parts. They were all wearing the “Lizard” livery. Later on some of them received a different kind of “Lizard” painting and some of them received a Vietnam camo. It is worth mentioning that HAF came twice very close to an agreement in obtaining other extra Phantoms. Once in 1987, when the Americans offered some F-4D which were being withdrawn from active service, but also from Great Britain which offered some F-4M Phantom FGR Mk 2, which were also being retired. Both offers were denied due to the fact that it was very expensive for the HAF to maintain all these different types in service.

Peace Icarus 2000: ‘The Legend Is Back!’

          After 23 years of presence over the Aegean Sea, HAF decided to upgrade the F-4E Phantom II. In the early 1990s, it began to search for an upgrade program of the existing Phantoms. That was quite logical due to the fact that the aircraft was still a very capable weapon but mainly because the replacement costs of this type were enormous. Finally when the Greek government approved the funds for this program, two candidates offered their proposals. These two were the German DASA and the American Rockwell. The first had already upgraded the German F-4F and the latter was lacking of experience but was mainly based in the knowledge and the know-how of the manufacturer McDonnell Douglas, which had recently acquired. The program was focusing mainly on the replacement of its radar, centered around the BVR capability with the utilization of the modern AIM-120 missiles. The upgrade of the electronic equipment and the extension of the service life of the fuselage. The final number of the aircraft which were going to be upgraded was 39! 29 examples from Ρeace Ιcarus Ι and 10 examples from Ρeace Ιcarus ΙΙ.

The winner was finally DASA (later on EADS), mainly because of its existed upgrade program. The contract, under the name Peace Icarus 2000, was signed on the 11th of August 1997, and the plan was that DASA was going to deliver all these aircraft by the end of 2000. The main systems supplier of the German company was the Israeli Elbit, which also had gained great experience through its own upgrade of the Israeli Phantoms, but also of the Romanian MiG-21s. Only one aircraft travelled to Germany and was used as a tested of the upgrading program, while the rest were upgraded in Greece in the facilities of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry in Tanagra. This aircraft was 72-1523 and it was nicknamed ‘Princess of Andravida’ and it served as the prototype of the program. The prototype first flew on the 28th of April 1999 and the tests took place in the facilities of DASA in Manching, near Munich, Germany.

Apart from the new electronics suite, a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was applied from the Hellenic Aerospace Industry to the entire fleet, in order to extend their structural life. One of the greatest tactical disadvantages of the Phantom, was the problem of its smoky engines. These aircraft were always spotted from miles away due to theirs smoke trails. This problem was greatly reduced from the modification of the existing J79-GE-17A to -17C standards. This modification was mainly the replacement of the ten combustion chambers, with newer ones along with the older fuel injectors and igniters. Some of the engines which were used to the upgraded Phantoms were -17C versions which had been taken from the retired F-4E SRA and some were modified version of the already existing -17As.

Fifteen months later and after the completion of 154 test flights, it was eventually returned back to Greece, where it continued some other trials for its weapons. Finally after two years of long delays the first aircraft were ready by the end of 2002. On December 18th, 2002, the delivery ceremony of the first upgraded aircraft from the Hellenic Aviation Industry was held in its facilities at Tanagra. At the end of this integration, the total number of the aircraft had been reduced to 36 examples due to three losses from accidents since the completion of this program.

The F-4E AUP (Avionics Upgrade Program) Phantoms were all delivered to 117th Combat Wing at Andravida and were all painted in the ‘Aegean Ghost’ scheme, similar to the one of the F-16s. With this upgrade program, this old second generation aircraft had become a very capable multi role fighter which could oppose any 3rd generation enemy aircraft.

The upgraded Phantoms were equipped with:

New multi-role radar APG-65GY of Hughes, which was also installed in the F/A-18C/D

New navigation system H-764G of Honeywell, which is a combination of  LINS and GPS

New datalink information system (DTS)

New radio altimeter ΑΝ/ΑΡΝ-232 CARΑ of NAVCOM.

New CPU-143/A central air data computer of GEC Avionics

New Multi Mode Radar Command of Elbit

New Have Quick II communication system AN/ARC-164 of Magnavox

New Collins TACAN navaids AN/APN-153Y

New multi-functional color displays on both cockpits

New Heads Up Display (HUD) of EL-Op

New Data Transfer Unit

New Hands On Throttle and Stick (HOTAS) system

New Hazeltine AN/APX-113(V) IFF advanced friend/foe identification system (AFIDS). This is the most disguisable feature of the upgraded F-4E ΡΙ 2000. There are four antennas on the top of the nose and are nicknamed “bird slicers”!

Concerning its weaponry, the main advantage is the ability to carry the new air – air BVR missile AIM-120B AMRAAM (it can carry up to four missiles), sacrificing their original AIM-7 capability. The aircraft can also carry the modern dispenser missile AFDS, AGM-65 missiles (A/B and G), smart bombs like GBU-10/24 Paveway II/III, Mk 20 Rockeye II along with other free fall bombs.

Compared with before the upgrade, the weapons system officer’s (WSO) role has now been upgraded to match the capabilities of the APG-65 radar that features multiple modes of operation. Furthermore, the use of the Litening pod is the WSO’s sole responsibility. An experienced WSO serves as the ‘brains’ of the tactical formation, providing regular situational awareness updates to other jets, increasing the probability of a kill in air-to-air missions or providing accurate attack parameters for air-to-ground missions. With this Litening II pod, F-4s can now also undertake non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR) duties and launch laser-guided bombs (or designate these weapons for other types).

Phantom Profile Shots

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Squadrons:

                338 Fighter Bomber Squadron

Callsign: Aris (Greek God of War)

The 338 Squadron was formed on December 24th, 1952, at Elefsis AB, as 338 Fighter Bomber Squadron, equipped with the F-84G Thunderjet aircraft. In May 1958 it was incorporated into the 115 CW at Souda AB till January 1960, when it was disbanded. It was formed again in August 1964 equipped with F-84F Thunderstreak aircraft.

In June 1974 the Squadron was redeployed at 117CW in Andravida AB, where the F-4E Phantom II were delivered. On 5th of August, 1991, the squadron replaced the old aircraft with upgraded version of F-4E coming from US stocks, the F-4E Southeastern Regional Agreement (SRA).

The emblem of the squadron took its present form in 1974. The God has been «modernized» in relation to the earlier emblem, since instead of a spear he is holding a 2000 lb bomb. At the background there is the international mascot of the F-4 Phantom, Spooky, as the squadron operates with this type of aircraft for more than 40 years. Inside the emblem there the inscription «H TAN H ΕΠΙ TAΣ», the phrase Spartan mothers used to say to their sons when they handed over the shield for the battle: «Return with the shield or (be carried) upon it».

338th Squadron Profile Shots

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                  339 All Weather Squadron

 Callsign: Ajax (the son of King Telamon of Salamis)

The 339 All Weather Squadron was formed on July 7th, 1952, in 112 CW at Elefsis AB. It was named initially 339 Fighter Bomber Squadron and it was equipped with F-84G “Thunderjet” aircraft, the first jets of the Hellenic Air Force. After being redeployed to several bases across Greece, in March 1971 it was finally redeployed to Andravida AB at 117 Combat Wing where it is based till today.

On April 1974 the first deliveries of F-4E Phantom II aircraft started, under the program Peace Icarus I. At the end of 1997, HAF decided to upgrade the aircraft purchased under the programs Peace Icarus I and Peace Icarus II. On December 18th, 2002, the delivery ceremony of the first upgraded aircraft was held in the Hellenic Aviation Industry facilities, and so began the integration of the upgraded aircraft in 117CW. The Squadron started to receive the upgraded aircraft in 2002 and the deliveries ended in October 2005.

Both Squadrons have dual tactical role of Ground Attack and Interception, but their main roles are Ground Attack for the 338Sq and Interception for the 339Sq.

S/N 71745 of 339th Squadron

  Epilogue:

The introduction of the F-4 in the Hellenic Air Force inventory in 1974 marked the beginning of a new era for the Hellenic Air Force. The new jet not only incorporated technological advances but also contributed to a major development in tactics and aviation mentality. At that time the Phantom was the most modern aircraft of the HAF but at the same time it was also a mature jet, battle-proven in the conflicts of South-East Asia, with multi-role capabilities and unique features.

For its time, the F-4E was comparable to the F-15E Strike Eagle of today. It featured two seats, twin engines, good performance, large payload, beyond visual range (BVR) capabilities, and day and night operational capability. Until the entry to service of the F-15, the Phantom was the fighter with the greatest possible thrust! Today, Greek financial problems have impacted the military, but the Phantom still plays an important role in the defence of Greek territory. The name ‘Phantom’ is usually synonymous with the old saying ‘drink, smoke and make noise’. And yet today this jet is capable of fighting against modern opponents on equal terms. Despite being a “dinosaur” of another era, is still capable of not only engaging with more modern aircraft but also be able to maintain its dominance.

F-4E Detail shots

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Article by

George Karavantos

Hellenic air force F-4 Phantom Report PHANTOM PHOREVER  – THE LEGEND LIVES ON This legendary twin engine beast of Mc Donnell Douglas might not be the most versatile and agile fighter of the Hellenic Air Force, but it still remains an essential component of its Tactical Air Force planning.

[militariacollectibles]

70's(F-4E era) 339th TAC FIGHTER SQUADRON(FIVE INCH) patch BUY IT NOW – 70's(F-4E era) 339th TAC FIGHTER SQUADRON(FIVE INCH) patch

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U.S. Department of Defense Lead Photos Update

U.S. Department of Defense Lead Photos Update

You are subscribed to Lead Photos for U.S. Department of Defense. This information has recently been updated, and is now available.

Parachute Inspection 04/25/2017 07:00 PM CDT

Air Force Staff Sgt. Scott Watson inspects a parachute at Robins Air Force Base, Ga., April 26, 2017. Watson is an aircrew flight equipment technician assigned to the 339th Flight Test Squadron. Air Force photo by Jamal…

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P-51D Mustang, 339th Fighter Group, 505th Fighter Squadron, "Little Phyl" LT Carl H Bungaard, Fowlmere, England. October 17, 1944.

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How America Planned the Ultimate Revenge of Pearl Harbor (Think Assassination)

Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. Some sixty-eight years before U.S. special forces killed Osama bin Laden, America conducted an assassination of another kind.This time, the target wasn’t a terrorist. It was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor operation. But the motive was the same: payback for a sneak attack on the United States.(This article originally appeared last year.)Recommended: America Has Military Options for North Korea (but They're All Bad)Recommended: 1,700 Planes Ready for War: Everything You Need To Know About China's Air ForceRecommended: Stealth vs. North Korea’s Air Defenses: Who Wins? In early 1943, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, was one of the most hated men in America. He was seen as the Asian Devil in naval dress, the fiend who treacherously struck peaceful, sleeping America. And when the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation. Hence a code name unmistakable in its intent: Operation Vengeance.As with today’s drone strikes, the operation began with an intercepted message. Except it wasn’t a call from a cell phone, but rather a routine military radio signal. In the spring of 1943, Japan was in trouble: the Americans had captured Guadalcanal despite a terrible sacrifice of Japanese ships and aircraft. Stung by criticism that senior commanders were not visiting the front to ascertain the situation, Yamamoto resolved to visit naval air units on the South Pacific island of Bougainville.As was customary, a coded signal was sent on April 13, 1943, to the various Japanese commands in the area, listing the admiral’s itinerary as well as the number of transport planes and fighter escorts in his party. But American codebreakers had been reading Japanese diplomatic and military messages for years, including those in the JN-25 code, used in various forms by the Imperial Navy throughout World War II. The Yamamoto signal was sent in the new JN-25D variant, but that didn’t stop American cryptanalysts from deciphering it in less than a day.Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. With typical spleen, Pacific Fleet commander William “Bull” Halsey issued his own unambiguous message: “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”Yet getting Yamamoto was easier said than done. Navy and Marine fighters like the F4F Wildcat and F4U Corsair didn’t have the range to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft over Bougainville, four hundred miles from the nearest American air base on Guadalcanal. The only fighter with long enough legs was the U.S. Army Air Forces’ twin-engined Lockheed P-38G Lightning.But even the P-38s faced a difficult task. To avoid detection, American planners wanted them to fly “at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at fifty feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation,” according to a history of the Thirteenth Fighter Command, the parent organization of the 339th Fighter Squadron that flew the mission.Even worse, the Lightnings had no AWACS radar aircraft or land-based radar to guide them to the target, or even to tell them where Yamamoto’s plane was. Nor could the U.S. aircraft loiter over Bougainville in the midst of numerous Japanese fighter bases. They would essentially have to intercept Yamamoto where and when he was scheduled to be.However, by calculating the speed of the Japanese G4M Betty bomber that would carry Yamamoto, probable wind speed, the enemy’s probable flight path, and assuming that Yamamoto would be as punctual as he was reputed to be, American planners estimated the intercept would occur at 9:35 a.m.The Americans assigned eighteen P-38s for the mission, of which a flight of four would pounce on Yamamoto’s plane, while the remainder would climb above as top cover against Japanese fighters. Two Lightnings aborted on the way to Bougainville, leaving just sixteen to perform the mission.That the Americans arrived just a minute early, at 9:34, was remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the Japanese appeared on time a minute later. Flying at 4,500 feet were two Betty bombers, one carrying Yamamoto and the other his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. They were escorted by six A6M Zero fighters keeping watch 1,500 feet above them.Still undetected, twelve Lightnings climbed to eighteen thousand feet. The remaining four attacked the Bettys, with the first pair, flown by Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. and Lt. Rex Barber, closing in for the kill. As the two bombers dived to evade the interceptors, the American pilots couldn’t even be sure which one carried Yamamoto.Lanphier engaged the escorts while Barber pursued the two bombers. Barber’s cannon shells and bullets slammed into the first Betty, an aircraft model notorious for being fragile and flammable. With its left engine damaged, it slammed into the jungle. Then the second Betty, attacked by three of the P-38s, crashed into the water. The Americans had lucked out again: the Betty that crashed into the jungle, killing its crew and passengers, had carried Yamamoto. From the Betty that hit the water, Admiral Ugaki survived (hours after Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Ugaki took off in a kamikaze and was never heard from again).A Japanese search party hacked through the jungle until they found Yamamoto’s plane. “Afterward the Admiral’s body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes,” recounts the Thirteenth Fighter Command history. “His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war.”Yamamoto’s remains were returned to Japan aboard the super battleship Musashi in May 1943 for a state funeral that drew a million mourners. For the Americans, euphoria and satisfaction were dogged by postwar controversy that lasted for sixty years over who actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane: Barber and Lanphier were credited with a half kill apiece, though many critics said Barber should have received full credit.The irony was that Yamamoto was not the worst of America’s enemies. He was no pacifist, but nor was he as militaristic as the hard-core Japanese hard-liners. Yamamoto opposed the 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany, which he feared would drag Japan into a ruinous war. While he didn’t oppose war as a means of saving Japan from a crippling U.S. oil embargo in 1941 (his depiction as a peacemonger in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! is wrong), he did warn Japanese leaders that “in the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”Did Yamamoto’s death affect the war? His Pearl Harbor operation was audacious and brilliant, but his poor strategy at Midway six months later destroyed Japan’s elite aircraft carrier force (ironically, it was also U.S. codebreaking that set the stage for the Midway disaster). By 1943, he was a sick and exhausted man. Perhaps he might have come up with a better late-war naval strategy than the disastrous battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Yet not even the architect of Pearl Harbor could save Japan from defeat.Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft. This is nothing new. In 1942, British commandos unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Rommel, and modern militaries devote great efforts to locating enemy headquarters to kill commanders and staffs.But what’s really interesting is that compared with the controversy over today’s targeted assassinations, there was remarkably little fuss made over the decision to kill Yamamoto. The U.S. military treated it as a purely military matter that didn’t need civilian approval. Admiral Nimitz authorized the interception, and the orders were passed down the military chain of command. There was no presidential decision nor Justice Department review. It’s hard to imagine that the killing of a top Al Qaeda leader, let alone a top Russian, Chinese or North Korean commander, would be treated so routinely.Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.Image: Creative Commons

from Yahoo News - Latest News & Headlines

Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. Some sixty-eight years before U.S. special forces killed Osama bin Laden, America conducted an assassination of another kind.This time, the target wasn’t a terrorist. It was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor operation. But the motive was the same: payback for a sneak attack on the United States.(This article originally appeared last year.)Recommended: America Has Military Options for North Korea (but They're All Bad)Recommended: 1,700 Planes Ready for War: Everything You Need To Know About China's Air ForceRecommended: Stealth vs. North Korea’s Air Defenses: Who Wins? In early 1943, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, was one of the most hated men in America. He was seen as the Asian Devil in naval dress, the fiend who treacherously struck peaceful, sleeping America. And when the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation. Hence a code name unmistakable in its intent: Operation Vengeance.As with today’s drone strikes, the operation began with an intercepted message. Except it wasn’t a call from a cell phone, but rather a routine military radio signal. In the spring of 1943, Japan was in trouble: the Americans had captured Guadalcanal despite a terrible sacrifice of Japanese ships and aircraft. Stung by criticism that senior commanders were not visiting the front to ascertain the situation, Yamamoto resolved to visit naval air units on the South Pacific island of Bougainville.As was customary, a coded signal was sent on April 13, 1943, to the various Japanese commands in the area, listing the admiral’s itinerary as well as the number of transport planes and fighter escorts in his party. But American codebreakers had been reading Japanese diplomatic and military messages for years, including those in the JN-25 code, used in various forms by the Imperial Navy throughout World War II. The Yamamoto signal was sent in the new JN-25D variant, but that didn’t stop American cryptanalysts from deciphering it in less than a day.Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. With typical spleen, Pacific Fleet commander William “Bull” Halsey issued his own unambiguous message: “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”Yet getting Yamamoto was easier said than done. Navy and Marine fighters like the F4F Wildcat and F4U Corsair didn’t have the range to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft over Bougainville, four hundred miles from the nearest American air base on Guadalcanal. The only fighter with long enough legs was the U.S. Army Air Forces’ twin-engined Lockheed P-38G Lightning.But even the P-38s faced a difficult task. To avoid detection, American planners wanted them to fly “at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at fifty feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation,” according to a history of the Thirteenth Fighter Command, the parent organization of the 339th Fighter Squadron that flew the mission.Even worse, the Lightnings had no AWACS radar aircraft or land-based radar to guide them to the target, or even to tell them where Yamamoto’s plane was. Nor could the U.S. aircraft loiter over Bougainville in the midst of numerous Japanese fighter bases. They would essentially have to intercept Yamamoto where and when he was scheduled to be.However, by calculating the speed of the Japanese G4M Betty bomber that would carry Yamamoto, probable wind speed, the enemy’s probable flight path, and assuming that Yamamoto would be as punctual as he was reputed to be, American planners estimated the intercept would occur at 9:35 a.m.The Americans assigned eighteen P-38s for the mission, of which a flight of four would pounce on Yamamoto’s plane, while the remainder would climb above as top cover against Japanese fighters. Two Lightnings aborted on the way to Bougainville, leaving just sixteen to perform the mission.That the Americans arrived just a minute early, at 9:34, was remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the Japanese appeared on time a minute later. Flying at 4,500 feet were two Betty bombers, one carrying Yamamoto and the other his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. They were escorted by six A6M Zero fighters keeping watch 1,500 feet above them.Still undetected, twelve Lightnings climbed to eighteen thousand feet. The remaining four attacked the Bettys, with the first pair, flown by Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. and Lt. Rex Barber, closing in for the kill. As the two bombers dived to evade the interceptors, the American pilots couldn’t even be sure which one carried Yamamoto.Lanphier engaged the escorts while Barber pursued the two bombers. Barber’s cannon shells and bullets slammed into the first Betty, an aircraft model notorious for being fragile and flammable. With its left engine damaged, it slammed into the jungle. Then the second Betty, attacked by three of the P-38s, crashed into the water. The Americans had lucked out again: the Betty that crashed into the jungle, killing its crew and passengers, had carried Yamamoto. From the Betty that hit the water, Admiral Ugaki survived (hours after Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Ugaki took off in a kamikaze and was never heard from again).A Japanese search party hacked through the jungle until they found Yamamoto’s plane. “Afterward the Admiral’s body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes,” recounts the Thirteenth Fighter Command history. “His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war.”Yamamoto’s remains were returned to Japan aboard the super battleship Musashi in May 1943 for a state funeral that drew a million mourners. For the Americans, euphoria and satisfaction were dogged by postwar controversy that lasted for sixty years over who actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane: Barber and Lanphier were credited with a half kill apiece, though many critics said Barber should have received full credit.The irony was that Yamamoto was not the worst of America’s enemies. He was no pacifist, but nor was he as militaristic as the hard-core Japanese hard-liners. Yamamoto opposed the 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany, which he feared would drag Japan into a ruinous war. While he didn’t oppose war as a means of saving Japan from a crippling U.S. oil embargo in 1941 (his depiction as a peacemonger in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! is wrong), he did warn Japanese leaders that “in the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”Did Yamamoto’s death affect the war? His Pearl Harbor operation was audacious and brilliant, but his poor strategy at Midway six months later destroyed Japan’s elite aircraft carrier force (ironically, it was also U.S. codebreaking that set the stage for the Midway disaster). By 1943, he was a sick and exhausted man. Perhaps he might have come up with a better late-war naval strategy than the disastrous battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Yet not even the architect of Pearl Harbor could save Japan from defeat.Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft. This is nothing new. In 1942, British commandos unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Rommel, and modern militaries devote great efforts to locating enemy headquarters to kill commanders and staffs.But what’s really interesting is that compared with the controversy over today’s targeted assassinations, there was remarkably little fuss made over the decision to kill Yamamoto. The U.S. military treated it as a purely military matter that didn’t need civilian approval. Admiral Nimitz authorized the interception, and the orders were passed down the military chain of command. There was no presidential decision nor Justice Department review. It’s hard to imagine that the killing of a top Al Qaeda leader, let alone a top Russian, Chinese or North Korean commander, would be treated so routinely.Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.Image: Creative Commons

August 29, 2019 at 08:00AM via IFTTT

[usafphantom2]

Willard Womack Following

Norh Amerian P-51 D

P-51 #4-14070 of the 339th Fighter Group, 504 Squadron. Based at Fowlmere England.

[dirjoh-blog]

Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet, was the Harvard-educated, poker-playing mastermind of the December 7, 1941, attack.

  On April 14, 1943, naval intelligence scored another code-breaking coup. The message began: “On April 18 CINC Combined Fleet will visit RXZ, R–, and RXP in accordance with the following schedule . . .” Adm. Isokoru Yamamoto was planning an inspection visit of Japanese bases in the upper Solomon Islands. The information immediately went from Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz

to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox who delivered the news to President Franklin Roosevelt. Reportedly, the president’s response was, “Get Yamamoto.” Regardless of whether or not the president actually said those words, the order was given: kill the mastermind of the Pearl Harbor raid.

        As Yamamoto was viewed as the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to give the mission the highest priority.

Consulting with Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, Commander South Pacific Forces and South Pacific Area, Nimitz ordered planning to move forward. Based on the intercepted information, it was known that on April 18 Yamamoto would be flying from Rabaul, New Britain to Ballale Airfield on an island near Bougainville.

Though only 400 miles from Allied bases on Guadalcanal, the distance presented a problem as American aircraft would need to fly a 600-mile roundabout course to the intercept to avoid detection, making the total flight 1,000 miles. This precluded the use of the Navy and Marine Corps’ F4F Wildcats or F4U Corsairs. As a result, the mission was assigned to the US Army’s 339th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter Group, Thirteenth Air Force which flew P-38G Lightnings. Equipped with two drop tanks, the P-38G was capable of reaching Bougainville, executing the mission, and returning to base.

Overseen by the squadron’s commander, Major John W. Mitchell,

  planning moved forward with the assistance of Marine Lieutenant Colonel Luther S. Moore. At Mitchell’s request, Moore had the 339th’s aircraft fitted with ship’s compasses to aid in navigation. Utilizing the departure and arrival times contained in the intercepted message, Mitchell devised a precise flight plan that called for his fighters to intercept Yamamoto’s flight at 9:35 AM as it began its descent to Ballale.

Knowing that Yamamoto’s aircraft was to be escorted by six A6M Zero fighters, Mitchell intended to use eighteen aircraft for the mission.While four aircraft were tasked as the “killer” group, the remainder was to climb to 18,000 feet to serve as top cover to deal with enemy fighters arriving on scene after the attack. Though the mission was to be conducted by the 339th, ten of the pilots were drawn from other squadrons in the 347th Fighter Group. Briefing his men, Mitchell provided a cover story that the intelligence had been provided by a coastwatcher who saw a high ranking officer boarding an aircraft in Rabaul.

Departing Guadalcanal at 7:25 AM on April 18, Mitchell quickly lost two aircraft from his killer group due to mechanical issues. Replacing them from his cover group, he led the squadron west out over the water before turning north towards Bougainville.

Flying at no higher than 50 feet and in radio silence to avoid detection, the 339th arrived at the intercept point a minute early. Earlier that morning, despite the warnings of local commanders who feared an ambush, Yamamoto’s flight departed Rabaul. Proceeding over Bougainville, his G4M “Betty” and that of his chief of staff, were covered by two groups of three Zeros

Mitchell’s flight of four led the squadron at low altitude, with the killer flight, now consisting of Lanphier, Barber, and spares 1st Lt. Besby F. Holmes and 1st Lt. Raymond K. Hine, immediately behind. Mitchell, fighting off drowsiness, navigated by flight plan and dead reckoning. This proved to be the longest fighter-intercept mission of the war and was so skillfully executed by Mitchell that his force arrived at the intercept point one minute early, at 09:34, just as Yamamoto’s aircraft descended into view in a light haze. The P-38s jettisoned the auxiliary tanks, turned to the right to parallel the bombers, and began a full power climb to intercept them.

The tanks on Holmes’s P-38 did not detach and his element turned back toward the sea. Mitchell radioed Lanphier and Barber to engage, and they climbed toward the eight aircraft. The nearest escort fighters dropped their own tanks and dived toward the pair of P-38s. Lanphier, in a sound tactical move, immediately turned head-on and climbed towards the escorts while Barber chased the diving bomber transports. Barber banked steeply to turn in behind the bombers and momentarily lost sight of them, but when he regained contact, he was immediately behind one and began firing into its right engine, rear fuselage, and empennage. When Barber hit its left engine, the bomber began to trail heavy black smoke. The Betty rolled violently to the left and Barber narrowly avoided a mid-air collision. Looking back, he saw a column of black smoke and assumed the Betty had crashed into the jungle. Barber headed towards the coast at treetop level, searching for the second bomber, not knowing which one carried the targeted high-ranking officer.

 Barber spotted the second bomber, carrying Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki and part of Yamamoto’s staff, low over the water off Moila Point, trying to evade an attack by Holmes, whose wing tanks had finally come off. Holmes damaged the right engine of the Betty, which emitted a white vapor trail, but his closure speed carried him and his wingman Hine past the damaged bomber. Barber attacked the crippled bomber and his bullet strikes caused it to shed metal debris that damaged his own aircraft. The bomber descended and crash-landed in the water. Ugaki and two others survived the crash and were later rescued. Barber, Holmes and Hine were attacked by Zeros, Barber’s P-38 receiving 104 hits. Holmes and Barber each claimed a Zero shot down during this melee, although Japanese records show that no Zeros were lost. The top cover briefly engaged reacting Zeros without making any kills. Mitchell observed the column of smoke from Yamamoto’s crashed bomber. Hine’s P-38 had disappeared by this point, presumably crashed into the water.

Running close to minimum fuel levels for return to base, the P-38s broke off contact, with Holmes so short of fuel that he was forced to land in the Russell Islands. Hine was the only pilot who did not return. Lanphier’s actions during the battle are unclear as his account was later disputed by other participants, including the Japanese fighter pilots. As he approached Henderson Field, Lanphier radioed the fighter director on Guadalcanal that “That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House”, breaching security. Immediately on landing (his plane was so short on fuel that one engine quit during the landing rollout) he put in a claim for shooting down Yamamoto.

A success, Operation Vengeance saw the American fighters down both Japanese bombers, killing 19, including Yamamoto. In exchange, the 339th lost Hines and one aircraft. Searching the jungle, the Japanese found Yamamoto’s body near the crash site. Thrown clear of the wreckage, he had been hit twice in the fighting.

Lieutenant Hamasuna noted Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane’s wreckage, his white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of his katana sword, his body still upright in his seat under a tree. Hamasuna said Yamamoto was instantly recognizable, his head tilted down as if deep in thought. A post-mortem of Yamamoto’s body indicated two bullet wounds, one to the back of his left shoulder, and a separate bullet wound to his left lower jaw, that appeared to exit above his right eye. The Japanese navy doctor examining Yamamoto’s body determined the head wound killed Yamamoto. (These more violent details of Yamamoto’s death were hidden from the Japanese public, and the medical report whitewashed, this secrecy “on orders from above.

Cremated at nearby Buin, his ashes were returned to Japan aboard the battleship Musashi.

He was replaced by Admiral Mineichi Koga.

Several controversies quickly brewed following the mission. Despite the security attached to the mission and the Magic program, operational details soon leaked out. This began with Lanphier announcing upon landing that “I got Yamamoto!” This breach of security led to a second controversy over who actually shot down Yamamoto. Lanphier claimed that after engaging the fighters he banked around and shot a wing off the lead Betty. This led to an initial belief that three bombers had been downed. Though given credit, other members of the 339th were skeptical.

Though Mitchell and the members of the killer group were initially recommended for the Medal of Honor, this was downgraded to the Navy Cross in the wake of the security issues. Debate continued over credit for the kill. When it was ascertained that only two bombers were downed, Lanphier and Barber were each given half kills for Yamamoto’s plane. Though Lanphier later claimed full credit in an unpublished manuscript, the testimony of the lone Japanese survivor of the battle and the work of other scholars supports Barber’s claim.

  Operation Vengeance-Revenge for Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet, was the Harvard-educated, poker-playing mastermind of the December 7, 1941, attack.

[airmanisr]

Norh Amerian P-51 D by Willard Womack Via Flickr: P-51 #4-14070 of the 339th Fighter Group, 504 Squadron. Based at Fowlmere England.

[aviationgeek71]

P-51D Mustang 339th Fighter Group, 503rd Fighter Squadron, England.