#tonggang

[earnmoneyonline21]

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[aliworldtrade]

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[blackytabby]

Kalau tk serik masih buat perangai baik tk payah jmpa lagi senang. Menyusahkan and memalukan.

Malu laa nk jmpa orang mcm ni apa ntah lagi nk berkawan. Kalau orang mcm ni tkpayah dekt pun tkpe tk luak pun.

Ntah apa dia heran sngt nk dekt dengan bini orng pun tk tahu. Bini kat rumah tonggang terbalik nafkah enth ke mana ada hati nk orng lain puihh la.

Dah laa buat game bodoh, cakap orang mcm2 ada hati nk dekat dengan orang dh diri sendiri hina kita laki bini leps tu nk rapat mcm tkder pape ibarat jilat ludah sendiri euww tk malu ke?? Kalau sedar tkpe ni tk sedar.

Sedarlah kalau tk sedar jugak ingt Allah Maha melihat dan Maha mengatahui even sebesar hama pun mana mau lari kalau Allah melihat malah mendengar. Terpulang apaa mau buat janji ingt Allah ada. Ingat janji Allah pasti tk dapat kat kau keturunan kau yg kena dan kalau tk di dunia pasti ada balasan di akhirat, nk buat orang ingt apa kita buat mcm tu kita akan dpt balik. Setiap kejahatan pasti ada balasan walaupun sekecil zarah tapi kalau buat kebaikan sekecil zarah pun pahala akan dapat.

Tapi malu laaa dh buat mcm tu kt orng lepas tu nk menyendeng. Kalau aku laa haihh jmpa pun tknk yelaa maluuuu rasaa maluu terlalu malu sbb dh buat orng mcm2 and orng dh maafkan dh segala perbuatan tp masih buat lagi. Ni kalau tk sedar tk thu laaa sorry to say laa aku sendiri malu tngok perangai mcm ni dh bg peluang ubah tknk.

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

The Master of Deception “Of all the campaigns Wang Yangming directed, we have the most detailed information concerning his tactics for negotiating with, manipulating, coercing, deceiving, enticing, and maneuvering among the parties involved in his suppression of the bandits of Litou. Accounts suggest that, behind the scenes and prior to his campaigns, the grand coordinator was extraordinarily adept at slipping himself into local conflicts and tensions (and politics) to gain the upper hand, as well as using ploys to deceive his enemies. It was probably for this reason, among others, that he was able within three months to rein in this festering problem officials had failed to control for years. 

Wang Yangming’s effort “to defeat the enemy in advance” began long before troops marched into Upper, Middle, and Lower Litou on February 16, 1518. Even prior to taking on the armed disturbances in Nan’an Prefecture during the fall of 1517, he had sent out an offer of amnesty to the powerful lineages ensconced in northern Guangdong, in a deliberate move to prevent further attacks. The goal, as he told the court, was to “check and drive a wedge between [the adherents of] his [Chi Zhongrong’s] gang.” The powerfully worded proclamation he addressed to them stated in no uncertain terms just why he had good reason to annihilate them and why others throughout the region likewise had good reason to harbor enmity towards them. It explained that he nonetheless fully understood that there might be mitigating circumstances leading them to behave as they had, as well as spelling those out so as to make them feel understood. Lastly, it concluded with a demonstration of largesse, by letting them know how deeply troubled he was by the thought of having to annihilate them and offering them the chance to come forward and reform.

The proclamation, sent out shortly before his campaign against the She bandits, achieved its intended effect. After Wang Yangming dispatched a licentiate and an honorary commoner from his yamen in Ganzhou to carry the offer along with gifts of silver and cloth, they journeyed south to the fortified settlements around Litou, and indeed succeeded in bringing back a number of headmen. The grand coordinator treated these men with great honor, pardoned them of all crimes, and took advantage of their offer to requite with the service of killing bandits. In no time, the headman Huang Jinchao and five hundred men accompanying him were assembled into a contingent, and would serve in armies that campaigned in Hengshui. The Chi men, however, were not won over by the proclamation, and refused to come in. Wang imagined they would have reasoned in private conversation: “It has not been for merely a year that we have engaged in banditry, and there has been more than one occasion when officials have come to offer amnesty, so how could we believe this?” For this reason, Wang surmised, they chose to remain in Litou and observe how other local leaders were being received and treated. Noting how they served under him during the Hengshui campaigns, and alarmed by the rapidity with which the She bandits were eradicated, Chi Zhongrong, in consultation with other leaders, chose to send his younger brother Chi Zhong’an 池仲安with a small contingent of men to surrender and offer service to the military superintendent. By this time, however, Wang Yangming had already made up his mind that the Chi kinsmen were, as others had been telling him, “crafty, cunning, savage, and ferocious.” He thus viewed the arrival of a Chi brother as nothing more than subterfuge, an attempt on the part of these ringleaders to spy on his movements and serve as infiltrators.179 “To guard against any trouble from them,” he explained to the Ming court, “while maintaining vigilance in preparation for defensive action, I put on the appearance of offering generous treatment, to put their minds at ease.”180 Chi Zhong’an and his men were also allowed to serve in the battle at Tonggang, but deployed in such a way as to prevent them from returning quickly to their settlements.

After that campaign concluded and Wang had returned to Nankang on December 27, 1517, his strategizing continued apace, especially because Chi Zhongrong and his supporters in Litou had continued to prepare themselves against an attack. A key element of Wang’s strategy was to build connections with local enemies of the Chi lineage and their allies. Prior to the campaign in Tonggang, the grand coordinator had already dispatched a summons to people living in neighboring counties who claimed to have suffered harm from these men. He asked them to come to his military headquarters and strategize with him. Several dozen arrived, and their advice to Wang was that he should call up a large army of native troops from outside the area, in preparation for a massive assault. But as before, Wang rejected this plan, for the lesson he had learned from previous campaigns of a similar nature was that the bandits knew how to melt away as the slow, cumbersome armies assembled and deployed. After formulating an initial battle plan that would rely heavily on the element of surprise and local support, he asked these men to return home, assemble militias, and at such time as armies were to advance, occupy all passes and intercept the bandits. Of more immediate significance would be the assistance Wang received from two powerful leaders of local families from Longchuan County. The headmen Lu Ke, Zheng Zhigao, and others were said to be “resettled outlaws” who had earlier accepted an offer of amnesty from Wang Yangming. These local leaders of some three thousand people had been engaged in feuding with the Chi for some time, and Wang intended to exploit this to his advantage, by feigning to support the Chi lineage against them. The success at Tonggang gave the leaders at Litou more cause for concern, something Wang Yangming suspected when he dispatched someone to bring them bulls and wine, offer reassurances, and spy on their movements. The Litou bandits justified their ongoing defensive preparations by saying they feared reprisals from the Lu and Zheng clans (who, they claimed, were raising armies). Wang pretended to believe their explanation, even dispatching a military communication to regional officials ordering a complete investigation of the latter. Ever the actor, he also sent a message to Chi Zhongrong to tell him to prepare to a clear a path for his troops to pass through should he need to lead a punitive campaign against those rival clans. On December 27, Lu Ke and Zheng Zhigao called on Wang Yangming at his military headquarters in Nankang, presenting a written complaint listing the crimes committed by Chi Zhongrong and his accomplices, including virtually everything Wang had already heard from regional officials. Wang explained the ensuing series of events to the court: 

I had already gathered intelligence concerning this matter, and when Ke and others arrived, I pretended to be very angry, accusing them of raising an army on their own authority and killing for revenge individuals whom had planned to or already surrendered. For their crimes [I informed them] they should be executed. Now they are manufacturing baseless accusations and taking advantage of the situation to frame [their adversaries]. Furthermore, Chi Zhongrong has just sent his younger brother to lead troops and requite with service, sincerely to submit and change, so how could this be? I then bound up Ke and the others and prepared to execute them. At the time Chi Zhong’an and those under him were present at my headquarters, and seeing Ke enter and inform against them, became alarmed and afraid. But after [seeing how I acted], they were pleased, lining up and calling out, competing with each other to denounce Ke and the others for their wicked crimes. In response I ordered them to compose a written complaint, and stated I would detain [Ke’s] dependents and slaughter them.

While all of this transpired, Wang Yangming secretly let Lu Ke and the other headmen know this was all an act, including the light thirty lashings they would receive as well as their temporary imprisonment. His younger brother was secretly sent back to Longchuan to continue assembling a force in preparation for the impending campaign. While staging this show in Nankang, Wang continued the offensive in Litou. He dispatched two men to bribe Chi Zhongrong’s confidantes and have them convince him to come to his headquarters and levy charges against Lu Ke and Zheng Zhigao. On January 1, the grand coordinator returned to the censorate seat at Ganzhou with the now imprisoned enemies of the Chi kinsmen. While his envoys were bringing gifts to and warning Chi Zhongrong that failure to come forward and put the final nail in the coffin of their local adversaries might lead the grand coordinator to suspect there may be some merit to their case, Wang Yangming staged another show at the prefectural seat. To celebrate recent victories in Nan’an and prepare for the New Year, after issuing proclamations announcing victory and the restoration of order, he ordered troops feasted and dispersed, lanterns hung throughout the city, music, and other festivities. And should the Chi brothers have harbored residual doubts, the younger brother Zhong’an was ordered to return to assist his brother in defensive preparations, something they should not relax at a time when factions of the now imprisoned Lu Ke and Zheng Zhigao might seek revenge. Wang Yangming successfully used many such measures born of the “way of deception” throughout all of his campaigns, and this stratagem was no exception. Once again, his ploy achieved its goal: “On February 3, 1518, Chi Zhongrong and [forty] others arrived in Ganzhou, and seeing that the regiments of troops had dispersed and returned home, and that all around the streets and marketplaces lanterns were hung and plays were being staged for a celebration, they believed troops would not be called up again.” Apparently, Chi Zhongrong even bribed a prison guard to allow them to see if Lu Ke was shackled and imprisoned. Seeing that this was indeed the case, he became so excited he dispatched someone home with the message “only now are our plans fully assured.” Little did he know that that night Wang freed Lu and the others, as they were to return home in preparation for the impending assault.

Once the headmen had departed their settlements in Litou, Wang began secret preparations for a campaign that was to commence on February 16. Needing to buy further time for mobilization, Wang feasted his unwitting adversaries and convinced them to stay over at a local temple and enjoy the New Year’s festivities. But just what exactly transpired during the next few days is difficult to say. On the one hand, based on what Wang Yangming recounted in his victory memorial, it would seem that his perpetuation of the hoax was purely a strategy to gain time: as soon as the armies were ready for deployment, the Chi brothers would be executed. Nonetheless, the Chronological Biography suggests something more than pure cunning was at stake here for Wang Yangming. After settling “Zhongrong and his gang of ninety-­three” in Xiangfu Temple, the grand coordinator ordered several in his company to supervise them, give them qingyi and greased boots (common Han clothing), and teach them ritual etiquette. The goal here was “to observe their intentions.” For this he received a barrage of criticism from local scholars and commoners, some of whom were telling him, “This is nothing more than to cultivate bandits and leave behind a calamity in the making.” Wang apparently agreed: “Observing their covetousness and savagery and that in the end they could not possibly be changed,” states the Biography, “master again determined that the bandit chieftains must be annihilated.” Therefore, as his victory memorial narrates the events, “On the third [of the first month], surmising Lu [Ke and the others] had returned home and soldiers had assembled in large numbers in their respective counties and prepared for deployment, I set up a feast in my hall, and concealed armed officers in preparation for an ambush. Zhongrong was invited in with his gang, and all were captured. I produced the written complaint originally composed by Lu [Ke], interrogated them, bound them, and placed them in prison. On that day, Chi Zhongrong and his accomplices were all slaughtered in what must have been something of a bloodbath, and apparently much to Wang’s disappointment: “Master [Wang] believed it a great shame he was unable in the end to reform them; it was already after three in the afternoon, he had not yet eaten, became dizzy, and vomited.”” - G.L. Israel, Doing Good and Ridding Evil in Ming China: The Political Career of Wang Yangming. Leiden: Brill, 2014. pp. 92-97.  

[nurhananaaila]

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[b0ringasfuck]

There are two major differences between migrant workers and the workers at Tonggang. First of all, workers at Tonggang are also residents in the workers’ community which formed when Tonggang was founded in 1958. People in the workers’ community usually know each other so it is easy for people to communicate with each other and to get organized. The development of Tonggang is relevant for almost everyone in the community. In contrast, migrant workers are highly mobile, since their jobs are unstable; also, migrant workers have to go back to their hometowns if they cannot afford the high living costs in urban areas. Thus it is difficult for migrant workers to form a workers’ community like Tonggang. Second, retired workers at Tonggang all experienced both the Maoist era and the reform era. Middle-aged workers who started working in the 1980s also witnessed the legacies of the Maoist era and the social change. This kind of experience, as I discussed earlier, promoted workers’ struggle at Tonggang. In contrast, migrant workers have almost no experience of factory life in the Maoist era; thus the contrast between the Maoist era and the reform era is less sharp for migrant workers. As a result, struggles of migrant workers usually are aimed at forcing private capitalists to obey the Labour Law, instead of challenging the foundation of the capitalist relations of production. ... From the perspective of China’s capital accumulation, however, the outbreak of the global crisis in 2007 seems to be a turning point for the power structural between capital and labour. Since 2007, the labour share has stopped declining and started rising. Also, the struggle at Tonggang and a series of struggles of migrant workers took place in the post-2007 period. More importantly, in order to become more competitive in the crisis, capitals began to flow from coastal areas to central and western areas of China for cheaper migrant workers as well as other favourable conditions (land, for instance). However, state-owned enterprises play a more important role in the economy of central and western regions of China. Thus this relocation of capital provides some conditions for interaction between the struggles of the state-owned sector and the struggles of migrant workers. With the development of the contradictions of China’s capital accumulation process and the continuous struggles of workers, the Chinese working class is approaching a new era.

Hao Qi, Assistant professor at School of Economics, Remin University (Distribution and Social Transition at Tonggang: China’s Workers under Socialism, under ‘Reform’, and Today)

[tengkubutang]

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[adamidyrazlan]

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[aliworldtrade]

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[fazlyrahmat]

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[if-you-fan-a-fire]

On the Origins of and the Quelling of Banditry “On May 27, 1517, and again on June 16, Wang Yangming memorialized the court requesting full discretionary power to act as conditions required without interference from other authorities, and greater authority to dispense rewards an punishments during campaigns. He pointed out that the Ministry of War had already granted previous grand coordinators the authority to move decisively against “outlaws of the marsh.” Indeed, upon first arriving at his headquarters in Ganzhou, he had such orders copied onto a thousand sheets and distributed to all his subordinates. As a result, he informed the emperor, he was able to report some successful campaigns. But conditions throughout southern Jiangxi remained dire. The summary report Commissioner Yang submitted to Wang Yangming described several particularly troublesome areas inflamed by a long list of well­-known ringleaders, who appeared to be allying with each other and planning to lead a potentially serious uprising. So serious were conditions throughout the region that the supreme commander of Huguang had already memorialized and received permission to begin mobilization for a massive coordinated campaign involv­ing forces from Guangdong, Huguang, and Jiangxi. Wang would soon argue for a series of campaigns on a smaller scale directed at what he believed to be three distinguishable hot spots, each of which could be dealt with separately, strategically speaking. The grand coordinator’s first campaign, initiated in November 1517, was directed against strongholds of what are routinely referred to as “She bandits (She zei 畲賊)” located primarily in Shangyou County 上猶縣, Nan’an Prefecture. Wang’s communications list dozens of settlements located in three critical areas that he deemed legitimate targets of attack that he would eventually occupy and destroy. These areas, all located in mountain ranges in the western half of the prefecture, were Tonggang 桶岡, Hengshui 橫水, and Zuoxi 左溪, the latter two referring to tributaries of the Gan River. In concluding a later victory memorial, Wang reported that eighty­four settlements (“lairs”) were destroyed and over six thousand people killed or captured. These numbers obviously suggest something more going on here than brigandry. In a petition requesting establishment of a county, local elites claimed that these “She bandits” were originally migrants from Guangdong who had been given permission by a previous grand coordinator to settle in these areas of the prefecture. Initially, they chopped down trees in the mountains and planted crops, settling into their livelihoods and growing in number. Over time, they came into increasing conflict with local residents, and began to plunder villages throughout the region, followed by county and prefectural town seats. As these elites saw it, part of the reason the population grew to—in their estimate—ten thousand, was that others were continually joining these migrants. Some were vagrants from other counties in the province fleeing taxation and labor service; others were craftsmen wishing to ply their trades. So unbridled had these She peoples become, the petition stated, “they appointed regional commanders and usurped the title of king.” The petitioners believed creating a new county in this area would prevent this problem from recurring, for by that time the grand coordinator had, as they saw it, “captured the principal evildoers, and eliminated the evil ether.” But it would take time to eliminate this mixed bag of migrants and marginal mountain dwellers that had apparently coalesced into a coherent group with a degree of solidarity vis­à­vis the local registered populations. Upon returning from Fujian in late May, Wang Yangming could already report some early successes in the campaigns led by Commissioner Yang and other local officials. According to the commissioner, after Wang assumed office in early 1517 and ordered the formation of militias, the She bandits sent their dependents and possessions to fortresses located deep in the densely forested mountains, only permitting stalwarts to emerge during daylight hours in order to tend to the fields. Thereafter, during the spring, bands of She numbering in the hundreds repeatedly appeared in the area and plundered the stockaded villages of local residents. In addition, reports by local officials indicated that a key leader by the name of Xie Zhishan had not only assumed the title of “King Pacifying the South,” but also appeared to be planning to link up with a Yao chieftain who had been plundering northern Guangdong. They were, it was suspected, manufacturing weapons and planning to attack the county seat of Nankang 南康. Afterwards—the report claimed—they planned to enter Guangdong and, with government forces away fighting recalcitrant ethnic groups off to the west, maraud over a much larger territory. Even by this time, Wang Yangming had already given Yang Zhang and his commanders the go­-head to clean out and pacify the area, making sure “not to leave a soul behind.” He too was becoming convinced that, as he told the court, a “treacherous plot” was astir. The brazenness with which these outlaws were illegally bestowing phony titles upon themselves and the turmoil they were causing was only further evidence.97 That is why he was pleased to report that on July 8, 1517, several contingents set out to strike numerous settlements in Nan’an Prefecture, some of which contained only a few dozen bandits who had remained behind to guard them. When charged at, they were alarmed and routed, some fatally wounded by arrows and poison crossbows, others falling off cliffs. Other settlements to which these men and their dependents had retreated were located in even more inaccessible mountainous areas. These were surrounded and burned to the ground. At daybreak, commanders reported, all that remained were charred remains and indistinguishable seared faces, making counting heads a difficult task. Diehards Xie Zhishan and Lan Tianfeng were among those remaining main culprits whose heads were not yet on display as a warning to those who would  persist in evildoing. When the grand coordinator memorialized on September 13 with his plan for a coordinated attack on what he perceived to be one of the “roots” of banditry in the region, he cited Commissioner Yang’s report that, even after these initial campaigns, Xie twice led bands numbering nearly two thousand to attack the prefectural seat of Nan’an:

[The aforementioned ringleaders] are ignorant, violent, and poisonous, rely on places of difficult access to do evil, usurp the title of king, appoint phony commanders, gather mobs with the likes of themselves numbering in the thousands, and wantonly spread their poison over three provinces. [They have] attacked and laid siege to Nan’an Prefecture and Nankang County’s walls and moats, killing a guard commander, assistant magistrate, and other officials. [They] roamed around and plundered Guiyang and Yizhang in Huguang Province, as well as such counties of Longchuan, Wan’an, Taihe, and Yongxin in Ji’an Prefecture. The children of law-­abiding subjects were enslaved and slaughtered by them, and their residences and granaries were burned down. The area of those roads and fields lying in fallow because obstructed or occupied by them amount to seventy thousand qing. . . . The powerful outlaw leaders Xie Zhishan and Lan Tianfeng refer to themselves as the grandchildren of Pan Huang. They have in their possession a precious seal with a portrait on it supposed to have been passed down to them, deceiving masses of bandits, who come under their influence.

When Wang Yangming provided the rationale legitimating his call for military campaigns, he relied on damning reports like these, confidently informing the emperor that the men listed as killed or captured had for over ten years up to the present “occupied over one thousand li and wreaked utter havoc over several prefectures, usurping the title of king, plotting rebellion, laying the foundation for a catastrophe, and planting the seeds of wickedness, their fiercely burning torturous blaze already for years afflicting the area with great suffering.” The unidentifiable charred remains of those considered “She bandits” are perhaps a fitting symbol for just how difficult it is to describe She identity. It is also difficult to determine the extent to which the label “She 畲” was of ethnic import at this time, as opposed to merely indicating unregistered or unruly peoples of the hills made up of migrants and vagrant Han outsiders. Wing­-Hoi Chan believes distinct ethnic differentiation was primarily a late­ or post-­Ming political development based on a small percentage of She who maintained surname endogamy and common descent myths. Noting that weak state presence and large numbers of vagrants are a common feature of reports of “She bandits” up to the Ming, Chan believes that throughout the Ming the term “She” was not used as an ethnic category but rather “locally or popularly to refer to vagrants of Jiangxi or Tingzhou [Fujian].” For him, these were primarily migrant populations later joined by marginal elements. Indeed, we do find in Wang’s official communications repeated reference to tax evaders, vagabonds, unregistered men and their families, and others seeking to practice their trades entering the She settlements so as to pursue their livelihoods, what Wang described as “joining the She and becoming a thief.” Chan also believes the reason Wang Yangming had nothing to say about cultural difference was because there was none, that any ethno­cultural distinctiveness is in fact absent from descriptions in other contemporary sources as well. Such a conclusion does, however, leave unaddressed the question as to just why these resettled migrants from Guangdong, as records in the Nan’an Prefectural Gazetteer state, repeatedly referred to themselves as “She” and claimed descent from Panhu. To explain their shared Panhu symbolism and obvious group solidarity, Chan proposes a combination of political opportunism and socio­economic tensions between registered local populations and migrant and marginal populations living on the fringes. Modern She, who sometimes refer to themselves as “sojourners of the mountains,” consist of a small number of intermarrying surnames sharing myths of common ancestry going back to Panhu. According to legend, this founding ancestor and his descendents were, for service to the emperor, granted exemption from taxation and free occupation of a mountainous region. This myth was found among both She and other ethnic groups—especially Yao—inhabiting the region, and could serve not only as a basis for forging ties locally but also for negotiating relations with the Ming state. Although Chan believes this myth and associated descent claims might be traceable to certain populations—indigenous or otherwise—located in the larger region Wang was assigned to govern, he reads the evidence for She ethnicity in Nan’an Prefecture altogether situationally. That is, it may have been nothing more than the adoption of Panhu symbolism by migrants and vagrants who were in conflict with local populations and seeking ties or political alliances with populations recognized as “Yao” in neighboring Huguang and Guangdong. Indeed, numerous references to cooperation and sympathies between populations in southern Jiangxi and Yao chieftains in these areas can be found in Wang Yangming’s and Supreme Commander Qin Jin’s communications. That was why it was necessary to mobilize forces in all of the provinces and to plan a concerted attack on what Wang Yangming on occasional refers to as thousands of “Yao” spread across the three provinces. Chan too underlines that for the most part Wang Yangming’s communications lack the language that might have suggested he saw many ethnic differences in these people. This was not the case during later campaigns when he was dealing with ethnic groups in Guangxi. What seems more likely was that when he used ethnic appellations to identify sub-­ethnic or marginal elements of the Han population, he was implying that they were savages simply for reason of their unacceptable conduct. Their behavior suggested they were the “other,” the uncivilized, throwing them into the broader category of “barbarians” that existed in neighboring territories in similarly marginal areas. Certainly, this way of thinking was characteristic of Ming officials. In particular, what Wang saw as wicked and therefore “savage” were certain forms of behavior especially offensive to representatives of the state: conflict with law­abiding populations, attacks on the state and anything symbolizing such, and attempts to turn the world upside down by usurping imperial and official titles. Such undermining of the state’s authority in fact suggests that these “savages” felt they had a rightful claim to the promise of justice held out by the powers that be. This failure on the part of the state could become a rallying point for the kind of fearsome resistance state representatives interpreted as recalcitrance and savagery. That there were social tensions between locals and migrants is clear, and it does not take much imagination to suspect a great deal of inflammatory injustice and accept the conclusion reached by Chan: “The marginal place these peoples occupied may have freed them from registration and corvée labor, but it also created a situation in which they were forced to become rebels.” Social historians have studied migration patterns in this region during the Ming, as well as how conflicts erupted between migrants, local registered subjects, non­-Han ethnic groups, and the state over land, loans, leases, taxes, and rent. The overall conclusion reached by James Tong—that banditry flourished in areas of weak state control—applied first and foremost to this region. Although Wang Yangming informed the court that his investigations proved these “bandits were utterly brimming over with wickedness,” and could be likened to ulcers which, should they fail to be aggressively treated, would destroy other internal organs, it is true that in other cases he understood that among them were otherwise decent people who, finding themselves in circumstances outside their control, were forced into a life of crime. Where such was the case, it was incumbent upon the state to take compassionate action designed to ameliorate these factors. In his instructions for a community covenant, a kind of blueprint for grassroots local organization aimed at reducing social tensions in and integrating communities, Wang insisted that the reason some engage in criminal activity is that “the government did not govern them properly or teach them in the right way.” In addition, parents had failed to teach and discipline their children, and fellow villagers had failed to positively influence each other. As a result, he notes, minor conflicts often lead some to join bandits to exact revenge, and even outlaws who have been resettled are often treated badly, and thus return to their old ways. He also pointed out that government corruption and class tensions sparked unrest. Should there be anyone abusing the power they have through political connections by, for instance, descending on communities to demand gifts, elected covenant officers were to petition to have them investigated. These might be government clerks, local military officers, honored commoners, village elders, or tithing heads. Likewise, Wang noted in a letter to the Minister of War Wang Qiong that should he raise taxes in the region it would only lead commoners to flee to the bandits. Finally, Wang underlined how the predatory lending practices of local powerful families forced poor farmers to sell off their land “to the point that the poor people have no place to take their grievances, depart, and become thieves.” Nonetheless, in the case of the so­-called She bandits of Nan’an, Wang apparently believed he had exhausted all options and had no reason to view them as victims gone astray; he could therefore with a clean conscience employ the military instrument and eradicate them. In an official communication to Supreme Commander Qin Jin 秦金, in fact, he proposed having officials survey the settlements under their jurisdiction and draw up a map differentiating “lairs” and law­abiding villages. He also ordered subordinates to obtain written pledges from local village leaders stating they would not harbor bandits or collaborate in any way, at risk of collective prosecution. Under the principle of “avoiding burning both pearl and stone as the root and trunk of banditry are uprooted,” the grand coordinator also ordered other measures to encourage outlaws to surrender. Wang’s overall approach is documented in an analysis of conditions he sent to the emperor in the spring. Based on consultations with officials and village elders, he could only conclude that the reason banditry had increased was that too often authorities were giving in to bandits’ demands. Connecting this with his request for greater military authority, Wang linked such excessive appeasement measures to a weak military presence in the region, and the weak military presence to an ineffectively applied reward and punishment system for both officers and the rank and file. Nothing more clearly suggests Wang had adopted the essentially hard­line approach to problems in the region first formulated by Jiangxi’s surveillance commissioner, Yang Zhang, who concluded that bringing order to the region required formally elaborating the statutes for military administration of the Ming legal code and backing them up with real action. Wang begins with his claim that while appeasement works when dealing with mostly coerced innocents capable of reform, such an approach only further emboldens hardened criminals. That is what had taken place in southern Jiangxi where, owing to officials’ hands­off policy, law­abiding subjects found themselves without recourse, and therefore had no choice but to cooperate with the bandits: “In the beginning they were merely trying to avoid calamity, but in the end they joined and positively benefited them.” Wang presented what amounts to a picture of a lawless frontier controlled in large measure by gangs of bandits holding local populations hostage, which is why he wanted armies “sufficient to eradicate the rebel leaders and clean out their lairs and haunts, so the people’s anger will be avenged and the danger to the area removed.” How had appeasement practically become the norm? Wang asserted that officials were complicit in this snowballing lawlessness, sacrificing the local population to avoid tarnishing their reputations, because they were powerless to confront the powerful bandit leaders. He pointed out to the court that it was far easier to appease and sit on the sidelines than to deploy force. Should they fail in doing so, political adversaries would smear and impeach them, and they would be forced “to atone for their crimes by killing bandits.” In other words, officials had every reason to avoid involvement: “They would rather afflict the people with great suffering than dare to dispatch just one soldier to fight against a spreading enemy. They would rather allow the orphaned and widowed to cry out, those in distress and suffering hardship to have no place to turn to, than risk offending appeased bandits by raising one division.” Why was the military presence in the region insufficient, leaving officials with no choice but to tolerate the intolerable? For Wang Yangming, the problem was a failure of leadership. Those with the authority to reward and punish must wield it to revive military institutions. For him, success in war was largely a matter of timing and discipline, and neither was in good order in the region. The bandits always had the upper hand because, whenever officials mobilized forces, this invariably transpired so slowly that they had ample time to make themselves invisible. Yet even more significant was the issue of motivation among the troops stationed in southern Jiangxi. Wang quoted the ancient military strategist Wu Qi for his court audience stating, “‘If laws and orders are not clear, rewards and punishments not trusted, then even if you had one million men, of what use would they be?’ As for the soldiers’ state of mind, should they fear me they won’t fear the enemy, but should they fear the enemy they won’t fear me.” It was just such misplaced fear that was at the root of the problem: “The troops of Nan’an and Ganzhou are yet sufficient to number in the thousands, so how could it possibly be the case that they are of no use for deployment? Yet when the gong is struck they don’t stop, and when the drums are beat they don’t advance; even before they see the enemy they are defeated, and before they engage in battle they run away.” That was why the grand coordinator wanted greater discretionary power to reward and punish: “To advance and serve with one’s life without being motivated by the promise of rank and reward and to withdraw and flee without threat of execution is to be assured of death should one advance but possibly receive the great fortune of surviving should one draw back—why should they bring upon themselves the calamity of a sure death?” On October 1, 1517, in response to his two petitions, Wang was granted the additional title of military superintendent (tidu junwu 提督軍務), greater discretionary power (bianyi xingshi 便宜行事), as well as the banner and card (qi pai 旗牌). This signified what amounted to virtually unlimited power to act on his own authority without outside interference. According to Okada Takehiko, his request for broad powers under such circumstances was unprecedented and politically risky, and it was only with the support of the Minister of War Wang Qiong that concerns at court were overcome. In fact, throughout the year, Wang had been dispatching letters to the minister, explaining how “multiple lines of command” were the principal causes of the ineffective response to disorder in the region. He emphasized that “in the matter of military campaigns, what is to be treasured is concentration of authority as well as avoiding insofar as possible control from a distance;” otherwise, regional officials would not understand that they must follow orders and discipline will fail to be instilled. In short, as he would also explain to the emperor, “Through the handles of rewards and punishments, the spiritedness of the Three Armies will be bolstered; with the clout of the card and banner, soldiers near and far will be summoned; with the authority of the superintendent of military affairs, the officials of eight prefectures and one sub-prefecture will be controlled.” Thus, having received these orders, Wang immediately circulated the emperor’s accompanying imperial command­ant to all of his subordinates, in preparation for the next series of campaigns.”  - G.L. Israel, Doing Good and Ridding Evil in Ming China: The Political Career of Wang Yangming. Leiden: Brill, 2014. pp. 64-79..  

[ex-twsicheng-blog]

I n t r o *:･ﾟ✧

Hi everyone! Thank you for welcoming me into the directory. Please love kermit the frog here because I have a lot in store for him. I have a plot page in the works but, until then, feel free hmu on my aim r.bbit or here on tumblr messenger. To help get a better feel for Sicheng I have a quick tldr below!

- Was the prince of Tonggang until the royal court saw him unfit for the position because he fell in love with his servant.  - the court went behind the king’s back and had the palace shaman turn him into a frog  - fled to a neighboring kingdom because he was too scared to face anyone in the palace  - contrary to the mundy tale, Sicheng only turned back into a human temporarily when the princess showed pure hatred/disgust towards him and tried to kill him - she tried to take it back though when she saw him, and he told her that if she said anything, he would give her the same fate.  - after he returned to his natural state, he wandered around the new kingdom and collected news of his own empire from the locals while tried to stay low  - he ultimately found out about The Adversary that way -Henry catches news eventually and finds him but the moment he touches Sicheng, the prince turns back into a frog  - to protect the legacy of the empire and the people he cares for, Sicheng flees to the mundy world but quickly begins to doubt that his home survived the turmoil and if the people he cares about are still alive - now lives in the cloud kingdom and tries to blend in as a local waiter who can bake a mean cherry pie. ( don’t doubt his pie skills )

[cybitmedia]

20 November 2017 | Parti Tonggang-Langgang, Ada Hati Urus Negara Top Dog Pakatan, Tun M meyerbu pejabat KDN di Putrajaya kerana tak puas hati kenyataan Jabatan Pendaftaran Pertubuhan bahawa parti cap bunga itu boleh diharamkan kerana melanggar perlembagaan parti. Tiga kesalahan teruk yang mencemarkan imej parti cap bunga raya ialah tidak mengadakan Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan, menubuhkan Sayap Pemuda dikenali Armada dan menangguhkan Mesyuarat Tahunan tanpa peruntukan dalam parti. Peliknya, parti itu boleh pula mengadakan sambutan ulang tahun pertama pada 14 September lalu di Muar, semata-mata untuk membina persepsi umum bahawa semuanya dalam keadaan baik. Realitinya parti cap bunga raya itu tonggang-langgang kerana kelemahan Presiden Muhyiddin Yassin dan timbalannya Muhriz yang sibuk menjaja cerita fitnah. Tun M tidak boleh dipersalahkan kerana dia sudah terlalu tua untuk uruskan parti. Walaupun partinya tonggang-langgang, Tun M masih ada hati mendesak ROS percepat pendaftaran Pakatan Harapan. Kalau parti sendiri tak mampu urus, inikan pula ada hati menguruskan sebuah negara. #Meroyanmelampau #TolakPakatanPRU14 Penafian : https://goo.gl/m2H63G

[lifeisarandompapadom]

El Tonggang Thorbalik

[suzhoutongdeli]

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