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osmarjun · 1 month ago

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A BATALHA DO BULGE - Histórias da Segunda Guerra Mundial - Parte 2

Nota do Autor do Blog: Conforme escrevi no post anterior e é sabido por todos os leitores e estudiosos das batalhas da Segunda Guerra Mundial, a Batalha em questão foi considerada uma das maiores da história, se eu fosse abordá-la aqui por inteiro, seriam necessárias muitas postagens, sugiro aos que se interessaram em saber mais detalhes depois de lerem estas duas partes resumidas que procurem em livros ou na internet pois encontrarão muitas coisas mais para completarem as informações sobre este fato.

ALGUNS ASPECTOS DA BATALHA

Planejamento

O Oberkomando decidiu em meados de setembro, por insistência de Hitler, que a ofensiva seria montada nas Ardenas, como foi feito em 1940. Em 1940, as forças alemãs passaram pelas Ardenas em três dias antes de envolver o inimigo, mas o plano de 1944 pedia a batalha na própria floresta. As principais forças iriam avançar para o oeste no rio Meuse, em seguida, virar para noroeste até Antuérpia e Bruxelas. O terreno próximo das Ardenas dificultaria o movimento rápido, embora o terreno aberto além do Meuse oferecesse a perspectiva de uma corrida bem-sucedida à costa. Quatro exércitos foram selecionados para a operação. Adolf Hitler selecionou pessoalmente para a contra-ofensiva no lado norte da frente ocidental as melhores tropas disponíveis e oficiais em quem confiava. O papel principal no ataque foi dado ao 6º Exército Panzer, comandado pelo SS Oberstgruppenfhrer Sepp Dietrich. Incluía a formação mais experiente da Waffen-SS: a 1ª Divisão Panzer SS Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. Também continha a 12ª Divisão Panzer SS de Hitlerjugend. Eles receberam prioridade para o fornecimento e equipamento e atribuíram a rota mais curta para o objetivo principal da ofensiva, Antuérpia, a partir do ponto mais ao norte na frente de batalha pretendida, mais perto do importante centro da rede rodoviária de Monschau. O Quinto Exército Panzer sob o General Hasso von Manteuffel foi designado para o setor médio com o objetivo de capturar Bruxelas. O Sétimo Exército, sob o General Erich Brandenberger, foi designado para o setor mais meridional, perto da cidade luxemburguesa de Echternach, com a tarefa de proteger o flanco. Este exército era composto de apenas quatro divisões de infantaria, sem formações de armadura em grande escala para usar como uma unidade de ponta de lança. Como resultado, eles fizeram pouco progresso durante a batalha.

Para que a ofensiva fosse bem-sucedida, quatro critérios foram considerados críticos: o ataque teria que ser uma surpresa completa; as condições climáticas tinham que ser pobres para neutralizar a superioridade aérea aliada e os danos que poderia infligir à ofensiva alemã e suas linhas de abastecimento; o progresso tinha que ser rápido - o rio Meuse, a meio caminho de Antuérpia, teria que ser alcançado até o dia 4; e os suprimentos de combustível aliados teriam que ser capturados intactos. O Estado-Maior estimou que eles só tinham combustível suficiente para cobrir um terço da metade do caminho para Antuérpia em condições de combate pesadas.

O abastecimento de combustível alemão era precário – esses materiais e suprimentos que não podiam ser transportados diretamente pela ferrovia, tinham que ser puxados por cavalos para economizar combustível, e as divisões mecanizadas e panzers dependeriam fortemente do combustível capturado. Como resultado, o início da ofensiva foi adiado de 27 de novembro até 16 de dezembro. Antes da ofensiva, os Aliados estavam praticamente cegos para o movimento de tropas alemãs. Durante a libertação da França, a extensa rede da Resistência Francesa tinha fornecido informações valiosas sobre as disposições alemãs. Quando chegaram à fronteira alemã, essa fonte secou. Na França, as ordens foram transmitidas dentro do exército alemão usando mensagens de rádio codificadas pela máquina Enigma, e estas poderiam ser recolhidas e descriptografadas por decifradores de códigos aliados com sede em Bletchley Park, na Inglaterra.

As unidades alemãs que se reuniram utilizavam carvão em vez de madeira para cozinhar para reduzir a fumaça e reduzir as chances de observadores aliados deduzir que um acúmulo de tropas estava em andamento. Por estas razões, o Alto Comando Aliado considerou as Ardenas um setor silencioso, contando com avaliações de seus serviços de inteligência e que os alemães não conseguiriam lançar nenhuma grande operação ofensiva no final da guerra. Eles levaram os Aliados a acreditarem precisamente no que os alemães queriam que eles acreditassem, que os preparativos estavam sendo realizados apenas para operações defensivas, não ofensivas. Os Aliados confiaram demais na máquina de decodificar códigos inglesa Ultra, não no reconhecimento humano. Na verdade, por causa dos esforços dos alemães, os Aliados foram levados a acreditar que um novo exército defensivo estava sendo formado em torno de Dusseldorf, no norte da Renânia, possivelmente para se defender contra o ataque britânico.

Deslocamentos de Tropas Alemãs

Essas previsões foram amplamente descartadas pelos americanos e embora ao 12º Grupo de Exércitos, Strong havia informado em dezembro de suas suspeitas. Bedell Smith então enviou Strong para avisar o Tenente-General Omar Bradley, o comandante do 12º Grupo de Exércitos, do perigo. A resposta de Bradley foi sucinta: "Deixe-os vir." O historiador Patrick K. O'Donnell escreve que em 8 de dezembro de 1944 os Rangers, com grande custo, tomaram a Colina 400 durante a Batalha da Floresta de Hertgen.

Como as Ardenas eram consideradas um setor tranquilo, levaram-na a ser usada como um campo de treinamento para novas unidades e uma área de descanso para unidades que tinham vindo de combates difíceis. As unidades americanas deixadas nas Ardenas eram, portanto, uma mistura de tropas inexperientes e tropas endurecidas por batalhas enviadas para esse setor para se recuperar. Duas grandes operações especiais alemãs foram planejadas para a ofensiva. Em outubro, foi decidido que Otto Skorzeny, o SS-Commando que havia resgatado o ex-ditador italiano Benito Mussolini, lideraria uma força-tarefa de soldados alemães de língua inglesa na Operação Greif. Esses soldados deveriam estar vestidos com uniformes americanos e britânicos e usar etiquetas tiradas de cadáveres e prisioneiros de guerra. Seu trabalho era ir atrás das linhas americanas e mudar as placas de sinalização, direcionar o tráfego, geralmente causar perturbações e tomar pontes através do rio Meuse. No final de novembro, outra operação especial ambiciosa foi adicionada. Friedrich August von der Heydte lideraria um Fallschirmjoger - Kampfgruppe (grupo de combate paraquedista) na Operação Stússer, um lançamento de para-quedistas à noite atrás das linhas aliadas destinadas a capturar um cruzamento de estrada vital perto de Malmedy.

Massacres de Malmedy

As 4:30 da manhã de 17 de dezembro de 1944, a 1ª Divisão Panzer SS estava aproximadamente 16 horas atrasada quando os comboios partiram da aldeia de Lanzerath, a caminho do oeste, para a cidade de Honsfeld. Depois de capturar Honsfeld, Peiper desviou de sua rota designada para apreender um pequeno depósito de combustível em Bollingen, onde a infantaria Waffen-SS executou sumariamente dezenas de soldados americanos. Depois, Peiper avançou para o oeste, em direção ao rio Meuse e capturou Ligneuville, contornando as cidades de Medersheid, Schoppen, Ondenval e Thirimont. O terreno e a má qualidade das estradas dificultaram o avanço do Kampfgruppe Peiper; na saída para a aldeia de Thirimont, a ponta de lança blindada foi incapaz de percorrer a estrada diretamente para Ligneuville, e Peiper desviou-se da rota planejada, e em vez de virar para a esquerda, a ponta de lança blindada virou-se para a direita, e avançou em direção às encruzilhadas de Baugnez, que era equidistante da cidade de Waimes de Ligne.

No dia 17 de dezembro, às 12h30, o Kampfgruppe Peiper estava perto da aldeia de Baugnez, na altura a meio caminho entre a cidade de Malmedy e Ligneuville, quando encontraram elementos do 285º Batalhão de Observação de Artilharia de Campo, a 7ª Divisão Blindada Americana. Depois de uma breve batalha, os americanos levemente armados se renderam. Eles foram desarmados e, com alguns outros americanos capturados anteriormente (aproximadamente 150 homens), enviados para ficar em um campo perto da encruzilhada. Cerca de quinze minutos depois que a guarda avançada de Peiper passou, um Corpo de Soldados sob o comando da SS- Sturmbannf-hrer Werner Ptschke chegou. Os soldados da SS de repente abriram fogo contra os prisioneiros. Assim que o tiroteio começou, os prisioneiros entraram em pânico. A maioria foi baleada onde estavam, embora alguns conseguiram fugir. Os relatos do assassinato variam, mas pelo menos 84 dos prisioneiros de guerra foram assassinados. Alguns sobreviveram, e as notícias dos assassinatos de prisioneiros de guerra se espalharam pelas linhas aliadas. Após o fim da guerra, soldados e oficiais de Kampfgruppe Peiper, incluindo Peiper e o General da SS Dietrich, foram julgados pelo incidente no julgamento do massacre de Malmedy.

Massacre de Malmedy

Wereth

Outro massacre menor foi cometido em Wereth, na Bélgica, aproximadamente 6,5 milhas (10,5 km) a nordeste de Saint-Vith em 17 de dezembro de 1944. Onze soldados negros americanos foram torturados depois de se renderem e depois baleados por homens da 1ª Divisão Panzer da SS pertencentes ao Schnellgruppe Knittel. Alguns dos ferimentos sofridos antes da morte incluíam ferimentos de baioneta na cabeça, pernas quebradas e seus dedos cortados. Os perpetradores nunca foram punidos por este crime. Em 2001, um grupo de pessoas começou a trabalhar em uma homenagem aos onze soldados negros americanos para lembrar seus sacrifícios.

OUTRAS AÇÕES ALEMÃS

O Kampfgruppe Peiper chegou em frente a Stavelot. As forças de Peiper já estavam atrasadas em seu cronograma por causa da forte resistência americana que recuou, seus engenheiros explodiram pontes e esvaziaram depósitos de combustíveis. Eles levaram 36 horas para avançar da região de Eifel para Stavelot, enquanto o mesmo avanço exigia nove horas em 1940. O Kampfgruppe Peiper atacou Stavelot em 18 de dezembro, mas não foi capaz de capturar a cidade antes que os americanos evacuassem um grande depósito de combustível. Três tanques tentaram pegar a ponte, mas o veículo foi desativado por uma mina. Depois disso, 60 granadeiros avançaram, mas foram parados por fogo defensivo americano concentrado. Depois de uma feroz batalha de tanques no dia seguinte, os alemães finalmente entraram na cidade quando os engenheiros americanos não conseguiram explodir a ponte.

Os americanos da 99ª Divisão de Infantaria, superada em número de cinco para um, infligiu baixas na proporção de 18 para um. A divisão perdeu cerca de 20% de sua força efetiva, incluindo 465 mortos e 2.524 evacuados devido a ferimentos, fadiga ou pé de trincheira. As perdas alemãs foram muito maiores. No setor norte oposto ao 99ª mais de 4.000 mortes e a destruição de 60 tanques e grandes armas:

O historiador John S. D. A. Eisenhower escreveu:"... a ação da 2ª e 99ª Divisões no lado norte poderia ser considerada a mais decisiva da campanha das Ardenas."

A defesa americana rígida impediu os alemães de alcançar a vasta gama de suprimentos perto das cidades belgas de Liége e Spa e da rede rodoviária a oeste da Cordilheira Elsenborn, levando ao rio Meuse. Depois de mais de 10 dias de intensa batalha, eles expulsaram os americanos das aldeias, mas foram incapazes de desalocá-los do cume, onde elementos do V Corpo do Exército Americano impediu as forças alemãs de chegar à rede rodoviária para oeste.

Massacre de Chenogne

Após o massacre de Malmedy, no dia de Ano Novo de 1945, depois de ter recebido anteriormente ordens para não fazer prisioneiros, soldados americanos executaram cerca de sessenta prisioneiros de guerra alemães perto da aldeia belga de Chenogne (8 km de Bastogne).

Pontes do Rio Meuse

Para proteger as travessias do rio no Meuse em Givet, Dinant e Namur, Montgomery ordenou que essas poucas unidades disponíveis mantivessem as pontes em 19 de dezembro. Isso levou a uma força reunida às pressas, incluindo tropas de alto escalão, policiais militares e pessoal da Força Aérea do Exército. A 29ª Brigada Blindada Britânica da 11ª Divisão Blindada Britânica, que havia entregue seus tanques para reequipar, foi orientada a recuperar seus tanques e ir para a área. O British XXX Corps. foi significativamente reforçado para este esforço. As unidades do corpo que lutaram nas Ardenas foram as 51ª (Highland) e a 53ª Divisões de Infantaria (galesa), a 6ª Divisão Aerotransportada Britânica, as 29ª e 33ª Brigadas Blindadas e a 34ª Brigada de Tanques.

O Cerco de Bastogne

Altos comandantes aliados se reuniram em um bunker em Verdun em 19 de dezembro. O Gen. Eisenhower, percebendo que os Aliados poderiam destruir as forças alemãs muito mais facilmente quando estavam a céu aberto e na ofensiva do que se estivessem na defensiva, disse a seus generais:

"A situação atual deve ser considerada como uma oportunidade para nós e não de desastre. Haverá apenas rostos alegres nesta mesa.”

Patton, percebendo o que Eisenhower sugeriu, respondeu:

"Inferno, vamos ter a coragem de deixar os bastardos irem até Paris. Então, vamos cortá-los e mastigá-los."

Eisenhower, depois de dizer que não estava tão otimista, perguntou a Patton quanto tempo levaria para transportar seu Terceiro Exército, localizado no nordeste da França, para contra-atacar. Para a descrença dos outros generais presentes, Patton respondeu que ele poderia atacar com duas divisões dentro de 48 horas. Desconhecido por outros oficiais presentes, antes de sair, Patton ordenou que sua equipe preparasse três planos de contingência para uma virada para o norte, pelo menos, força. No momento em que Eisenhower perguntou-lhe quanto tempo levaria, o movimento já estava em andamento. Em 20 de dezembro, Eisenhower removeu o primeiro e o nono exércitos norte-americanos. O 12º Grupo de Exércitos do Gen. Omar Bradley foi deslocado para o 21º Grupo de Exércitos de Montgomery.

Em 21 de dezembro, os alemães cercaram Bastogne, que foi defendida pela 101ª Divisão Aerotransportada, o 969º Batalhão de Artilharia Afro-Americano e o Comando de Combate B da 10ª Divisão Blindada. As condições dentro do perímetro eram difíceis, a maioria dos suprimentos médicos e o pessoal médico havia sido capturado. A comida era escassa e, em 22 de dezembro, a munição de artilharia era restrita a 10 cartuchos por arma por dia. O tempo limpou no dia seguinte e os suprimentos (principalmente munição) foram lançados em quatro dos cinco dias seguintes. A temperatura durante esse mês de janeiro foi extremamente baixa, o que exigia que as armas fossem mantidas aquecidas e os motores de caminhões ligados a cada meia hora para evitar que seu óleo se congelasse. A ofensiva avançou independentemente disso.

Pensamentos de Hitler O plano e o momento para o ataque de Ardenas surgiram da mente de Adolf Hitler. Ele acreditava que existia uma linha de falha crítica entre os comandos militares britânicos e americanos, e que um duro golpe na Frente Ocidental iria quebrar esta aliança. O planejamento para a ofensiva "Watch on the Rhine" enfatizou o sigilo e o compromisso de força esmagadora, através de comunicações terrestres dentro da Alemanha, corredores motorizados carregando ordens, e ameaças draconianas de Hitler.

Infelizmente para os planos alemães as forças empregadas não resultaram em sucesso.

PERDAS

A Batalha do Bulge foi a batalha mais sangrenta para as forças dos USA durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Um relatório preliminar do Exército restrito ao Primeiro e Terceiro Exécitos dos USA listaram 75.482 vítimas (8.407 mortos, 46.170 feridos e 20.905 desaparecidos). As perdas britânicas do XXX Corpo até 17 de janeiro de 1945 foram registradas como 1.408 (200 mortos, 969 feridos e 239 desaparecidos). Dupuy, David Bongard e Richard Anderson listam as vítimas nessas unidades de combate em 1.462, incluindo 222 mortos, 977 feridos e 263 desaparecidos até 16 de janeiro de 1945.

As baixas entre as divisões americanas (excluindo elementos anexados, corpo e apoio de combate ao nível do exército e pessoal da área traseira) totalizaram 62.439 de 16 de dezembro de 1944 a 16 de janeiro de 1945, inclusive: 6.238 mortos, 32712 feridos e 23.399 desaparecidos. O historiador Charles B. MacDonald lista 81.000 vítimas americanas, 41.315 durante a fase defensiva e 39.672 durante o esforço para achatar o "Bulge" até 28 de janeiro.

Um relatório oficial do Departamento do Exército dos Estados Unidos lista 105.102 baixas para toda a campanha "Ardenas-Alsácia", incluindo 19.246 mortos, 62.489 feridos e 26.612 mortos ou desaparecidos; este número incorpora perdas não apenas para a Batalha do Bulge, mas também todas as perdas sofridas durante o período por unidades com o crédito de batalha "Ardenas-Alsace" (todos os USA). Primeiro, Terceiro e Sétimo Exércitos, que inclui perdas sofridas durante a ofensiva alemã na Alsácia, Operação Nordwind, bem como forças envolvidas nas campanhas do Sarre e Lorena, e a Batalha da Floresta de Fortrgen durante esse período de tempo. Para o período de dezembro de 1944 - janeiro de 1945 em toda a frente ocidental, Forrest Pogue dá um total de 28.178 militares dos USA capturados.

O Alto Comando alemão estimou que eles perderam entre 81.834 e 98.024 homens na Frente Ocidental entre 16 de dezembro de 1944 e 25 de janeiro de 1945; o número aceito foi de 81.834, dos quais 12.652 foram mortos, 38.600 foram feridos e 30.582 estavam desaparecidos. As estimativas aliadas sobre as baixas alemãs variam de 81.000 a 103.900. As estimativas de Dupuy baseadas em registros alemães fragmentados e testemunhos orais sugerem que as baixas entre divisões e brigadas sozinhas (excluindo elementos anexados, corpo e apoio de combate ao nível do exército e pessoal da área traseira) totalizaram 75.459 de 16 de dezembro de 1944 a 16 de janeiro de 1945, inclusive: 11.048 mortos, 34.168 feridos e 29.243 desaparecidos. O historiador alemão Hermann Jung lista 67.675 baixas de 16 de dezembro de 1944 até o final de janeiro de 1945 para os três exércitos alemães que participaram da ofensiva. Os relatórios de vítimas alemãs para os exércitos envolvidos contam com 63.222 derrotas de 10 de dezembro de 1944 a 31 de janeiro de 1945. Os números oficiais do Centro de Exército dos Estados Unidos da História Militar são 75.000 vítimas americanas e 100.000 vítimas alemãs.

Soldados Prisioneiros Americanos na região das batalhas

Soldados Aliados em deslocamento pela floresta gelada

Resultado

Embora os alemães tenham conseguido começar sua ofensiva com total surpresa e tenham desfrutado de alguns sucessos iniciais, eles não conseguiram aproveitar a iniciativa na Frente Ocidental. Embora o comando alemão não tenha alcançado seus objetivos, a Operação Ardenas infligiu pesadas perdas e atrasou a invasão aliada da Alemanha por várias semanas. O Alto Comando das forças aliadas tinha planejado retomar a ofensiva no início de janeiro de 1945, após as chuvas da estação chuvosa e geadas severas, mas esses planos tiveram que ser adiados até 29 de janeiro de 1945 em conexão com as mudanças inesperadas na frente.

As derrotas alemãs na batalha foram especialmente críticas: suas últimas reservas já haviam desaparecido, a Luftwaffe havia sido quebrada e as forças remanescentes em todo o Ocidente estavam sendo empurradas para trás para defender a Linha Siegfried.

Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a maioria dos soldados negros dos USA ainda serviam apenas em cargos de manutenção ou serviços, ou em unidades segregadas. Por causa da escassez de tropas durante a Batalha do Bulge, Eisenhower decidiu integrar o serviço pela primeira vez. Este foi um passo importante para um exército desagregado dos Estados Unidos. Mais de 2.000 soldados negros se ofereceram para ir para a frente. Um total de 708 negros americanos foram mortos em combate durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Créditos de Batalha

Após o fim da guerra o Exército Americano emitiu crédito de batalha na forma da citação da campanha Ardenas-Alsace para unidades e indivíduos que participaram de operações no noroeste da Europa. A citação cobriu as tropas no setor de Ardenas, onde a principal batalha ocorreu, bem como unidades mais ao sul no setor, incluindo aquelas no norte da Alsácia que preencheram o vácuo criado pelo exército americano.

RESUMO DA EVOLUÇÃO DA BATALHA Entre idas e vindas os avanços e retrocessos de ambas as partes elevaram ainda mais o tempo de conflito. Os próprios desentendimentos entre o Alto Comando Alemão sugerindo à Hitler mudanças nos planos que este não quis fazê-lo. Entre os Aliados as brigas entre os seus Generais Americanos e Ingleses pelas preferências e vaidades sobre prioridades e abastecimentos principalmente, atrasaram muito o encerramento desta batalha.

No momento preciso o Gen. Eisenhower Comandante em Chefe do SHAEF acabou colocando Montgomery, Patton e Bradley nos lugares corretos pela preferência no fornecimento.

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No próximo post o início de um novo trabalho.

Até lá!

Forte Abraço

Osmarjun

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peiperpotts · 3 years ago

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me drinking my 3rd coffee, trying to convince myself that THIS ONE will surely help me waking up

#max wünsche #sepp dietrich

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blackswaneuroparedux · 4 years ago

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The Desert Fox: Separating the myth and the man of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, and brains saves both.

- Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

War hero or Nazi villain? Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is, to this day, the subject of heated debate. He was the “Desert Fox,” revered by Allied Forces for his supposed chivalry, and allegedly implicated in the “Valkyrie” plot to assassinate Hitler.

But present day historians have increasingly come to re-examine the life and the legend of this most iconic of World War Two generals.

I first became interested in this question after reading Corelli Barnett’s magisterial account ‘The Desert Generals’ back when I was in Sandhurst. I read other World War Two books before then of course but it was only at Sandhurst did I first give serious consideration towards Rommel as ‘the Good German’ general. I read other books too like General Sir David Fraser’s ‘Knight’s Cross: a life of Field Marshal Rommel’ as a stand out one on military stuff but a very cursory examination of his early life and beliefs.

Rommel was a legend in the making.

Whichever side of the debate one falls on there is no doubt that Erwin Rommel, was one of the most celebrated and respected generals of the Second World War and indeed, some even say one of the greatest generals of all time. His prowess on the battlefield earned him more than a battlefield earned him the admiration of both his men and his enemies alike, with adversaries lining up to pay tribute to their greatest foe in the field.

“We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general,” said no less than Winston Churchill himself of Rommel, just after the war ended in his book on the conflict, The Second World War.

When Churchill came under fire in the press for praising a man seen as a Nazi, he doubled down, commenting “He also deserves our respect because, although a loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works, and took part in the conspiracy to rescue Germany by displacing the maniac and tyrant.

For this, Rommel paid the forfeit of his life. In the sombre wars of modern democracy, chivalry finds no place… Still, I do not regret or retract the tribute I paid to Rommel, unfashionable though it was judged.”

Indeed, the extent to which Rommel was a Nazi is one of the great questions that has been asked since the war and one that is debated to this day. Rommel, while respected by those who fought him from afar as generals and indeed, thought of a genius to many of those who fought beneath him in the Wehrmacht, has often faced criticism of his tactics and his decision making, with some post-war writers holding him up as a man prone to erratic behaviour on the battlefield and a great sufferer from the stresses of the job.

“Rommel was jumpy, wanted to do everything at once, then lost interest. Rommel was my superior in command in Normandy. I cannot say Rommel wasn’t a good general. When successful, he was good; during reverses, he became depressed,” said Sepp Dietrich, who fought under Rommel in France and ended the war as the most senior figure in the Waffen-SS.

A similar sentiment was expressed by Luftwaffe field marshal Albert Kesselring, a contemporary of Rommel’s and an officer of similar rank, who later wrote: “He was the best leader of fast-moving troops but only up to army level. Above that level it was too much for him. Rommel was given too much responsibility. He was a good commander for a corps of army but he was too moody, too changeable. One moment he would be enthusiastic, next moment depressed.”

Who was this great man then? We know him today as a great tactician, a charismatic leader, a respected general and the last German participant in the so-called “clean war”. But how true are those assessments? Was the Desert Fox as chivalrous as his enemies thought him to be?

Rommel was far from just a Second World War hero – he distinguished himself in World War One too.

Rommel graduated from the military academy in Gdansk – then known as Danzig and an integral part of Germany – in 1912 and was immediately posted back to his home region of Baden-Württemberg.

When war broke out in 1914, Rommel was ready to face his first major conflict posting. As a battery commander within the 124th division of the German army, he would distinguish himself and gain his first recognition from the higher-ups.

Erwin saw his first action at the age of 23 on August 22, 1914, near the French town of Verdun. Rommel led his platoon into a French garrison, catching them by surprise and personally leading the charge ahead of the rest of his men, earning credits for bravery and ingenuity. He would be awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class, for his actions, a promotion to First Lieutenant and a transfer into the Royal Württemberg Mounted Battalion as a company – rather than platoon – commander.

Rommel would go on to fight in the German campaigns in Italy and Romania, with particular note being taken by the German Army hierarchy of his conduct in the Italian campaign. The Royal Württemberg Mounted Battalion fought at the Battle of Caporetto, the twelfth battle to be fought along the Isonzo River in modern-day Slovenia, and one that would go down as probably the largest military defeat in the history of Italy.

Rommel would play a central role, leading the Royal Württemberg, with just 150 men, to capture an estimated 9,000 Italians, complete with all their guns, for a cost of just 6 of his own men.

The young Rommel used the challenging, mountainous terrain of Caporetto – now known as Kobarid – to outflank the Italians and convince them that they were totally encircled by Germans, when in fact there was just one battalion. Fearing that they were surrounded, the Italians surrendered en masse and were surprised to find that so few men were able to capture them.

The efforts of the German Army to break into the Italian Front through the Slovenian Alps – at the time, part of Italy – were vital in furthering an advance towards Venice, though the Germans were eventually stopped and turned back.

Rommel was awarded the Pour Le Merite award by the Kaiser for his leadership at Caporetto, but also gained the respect and loyalty of his men, who were not only impressed by the way in which his tactics had won the battle, but also by the way that he had stood up to the German Army high command and argued for more and better food for his men. The legend of Rommel was growing apace.

Rommel was an effective teacher as well as a military leader.

It shouldn’t be too surprising that Rommel was a capable teacher: his father had been a headmaster, while the ability to communicate his ideas effectively in the field would lead to some of his most enduring military victories. There was no point coming up with a revolutionary tactic to win a battle if you couldn’t then inform and inspire your men well enough for them to then go and carry it out.

At the end of the First World War, Rommel was entering his late 20s and had already been widely feted for his military prowess. While it might have seemed a little dull compared to the derring-do on the Isonzo, the role of the Royal Württenberg Mountain Battalion lay much closer to home, with German society slowly disintegrating into civil wars between, on the left, socialists who wanted Germany to undergo a revolution similar to that which had recently occurred in Russia, and on the right, groups such as the Freikorps, disgruntled ex-soldiers and nationalist, anti-communist paramilitaries that would go on to form the kernel of the Nazi Party.

Rommel, recently promoted again to the rank of Captain, was ordered to use his soldiers in a policing capacity, putting down insurrections all over southern Germany. It was during this period that he showed some of the sense of restraint that would distinguish his conduct in North Africa during World War Two, trying to avoid the use of force against crowds of civilians where possible.

After the Weimar Republic took hold, however, the country somewhat stabilised and Rommel found himself in Dresden, teaching new recruits. He had been promoted in turn to Major, then Lieutenant Colonel, placing him in the very highest echelons of the Treaty of Versailles-reduced German Army.

He was recognised as one of the prime instructors in that army and wrote a book, “Infantry Attacks”, that furthered his theories on warfare and explained his experiences in the Izonzo – it sold incredibly well and increased Rommel’s personal fame, as well as bringing him to the attention of Adolf Hitler, who was known to have read the book.

Rommel met Hitler in Goslar, Germany in 1934, while Rommel was posted as battalion commander. Hitler’s charisma and promises to reestablish Germany as a world power after the crippling results of World War I inspired Rommel to become a fervent supporter of the Nazi Party.

The two men had several encounters following this, and Rommel rose through the ranks on Hitler’s personal recommendation. But it was ultimately Hitler’s liking for Rommel’s book Infantry Attacks that led to his becoming the commander of Hitler’s personal guards during his tour of the Sudetenland.

By the 1930s with Hitler fully secured in power, the German Army, for whom Rommel worked, and the Nazi state were more and more inseparable. It would be this coming together that prompted a major dilemma for the career soldiers such as Rommel: did the duty lie to their country, and whoever might be governing it, or to the party, that was coming to define what that country was about?

Rommel was a committed Nazi and not the “decent face” of the German Army.

Rommel’s antagonism wasn’t so much against Nazism as it was towards the Nazis in leadership who led it. His committment to Nazism eroded as the war took a wrong turn and as Hitler increasingly became erratic in his military decision making that Rommel grew increasingly frustrated.

Just how much of a Nazi Rommel was is one of the biggest questions that is debated about him to this day. It is largely due to the Rommel myth that was perpetuated by the likes of Winston Churchill after the war that Rommel was taken by the victorious Allies as “the good Nazi”, or the honest general who happened to be being ordered about by the Nazis, merely a career soldier who followed orders and stayed out of politics.

Let’s put that one to bed, here and now. Rommel was an early adopter of the Nazi Party and a committed believer in the ideals of National Socialism, while also being an officer who regularly disobeyed orders – making both commonly held assumptions wrong.

That said, he is one of the few figures of that period who is still revered in Germany, who still has streets named after him and memorials in his honour. It seems that the myth persists in his homeland too, despite countless books and articles to the contrary.

One such author attempting to shake this idea from the public consciousness is Wolfgang Proske, a historian and history professor from Rommel’s hometown on Heidenheim, who has written 16 books about his town’s most famous son. “Rommel was a deeply convinced Nazi and, contrary to popular opinion, he was also an anti-Semite. It is not only the Germans who have fallen into the trap of believing that Rommel was chivalrous. The British have been convinced by these stories as well,” he told British newspaper The Independent in 2011 when a new memorial to the Field Marshal was unveiled.

“At the time when Rommel marched into Tripoli, more than a quarter of the city’s population were Jews,” Proske continued, “There is evidence which shows that Rommel forbad his troops to buy anything from Jewish traders. Later on, he used the Jews as slave laborers. Some of them were even used as so-called ��mine dogs’ who were ordered to walk over minefields ahead of his advancing troops.”

While Rommel was never a member of the Nazi Party, it is widely known that Wehrmacht figures, particularly high-ranking ones such as Rommel, welcomed Hitler coming to power. Those, like Rommel, whose backgrounds had shut them off from the highest ranks of the Kaiser’s forces, saw the new government as one that would see them move to the top of the tree and as such were generally in favor of it.

Goebbels himself wrote in 1942, when Rommel was in the running for the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, that the Field Marshal was ”ideologically sound, is not just sympathetic to the National Socialists. He is a National Socialist; he is a troop leader with a gift for improvisation, personally courageous and extraordinarily inventive. These are the kinds of soldiers we need.”

Rommel owes a large part of his fame to the fact that he made fools of opposing general - well almost (Patton would disagree).

Rommel’s prowess as a general is unquestioned. On the back of his heroics as a low-level officer in World War One added to by his role teaching at the forefront of modern military tactics, he was perfectly positioned to lead the Nazi war machine into the second conflict.

When the war began, he was leading Hitler’s personal protection battalion – so much for a man who kept a distance from the center of Nazi power – and thus was privy to the highest levels of discussions regarding tactics, particularly the way in which to use mechanized infantry such as tanks. After the early successes in Poland, Rommel moved with the front to France and commanded Panzer units, before distinguishing himself against the British at Arras and leading the drive towards Dunkirk.

With the British regrouping on the other side of the Channel after a crushing defeat – which, lest we forget, Dunkirk was – the focus turned to North Africa, where Rommel would lead the newly-established Afrika Korps. He was the superstar of the German Army, a reputation largely built on his ability to vanquish the British, whom he would now face again in the desert. It was at this time that his nickname, The Desert Fox, was coined by the British press, who sought to create a figure against which the war could be fought.

The legacy of Rommel as the acceptable Nazi could be seen to stem from this point when the media in Britain saw fit to create a worthy adversary for their troops to combat. Rommel was thought to be an old-style soldier rather than an out-and-out Nazi: though we have seen that he was a Nazi, and he had arguably committed war crimes by summarily executing prisoners in France just weeks before.

Come the victory of the British at Tobruk and El Alamein, the British propaganda machine had even more than a noble adversary. They had a noble adversary against whom they had lost in Europe and then subsequently defeated: when the characters of the British side, Auchinleck and Montgomery, were spoken of, they needed someone of equal weight to make their victories seem even more heroic, a role that fit Rommel perfectly.

With morale at home low after the Dunkirk evacuation, the victories in North Africa were vital to keeping spirits up, and a glorious victory against an equally glorious enemy sounded even better. Churchill himself called Rommel an “extraordinary bold and clever opponent” and a “great field commander” in the House of Commons in 1942 – after he had just been defeated.

Rommel’s reputation for chivalry in North Africa might not just be down to his own intentions.

Of course, some aspects the Allied propaganda about Rommel – that he was a fair fighter, that he respected the ideals of chivalry when other Germans didn’t – were generally true.

It is undoubted that, by and large, Rommel adhered to the rules of war when plenty of Nazi generals didn’t, but it bears mentioning that the reason that so many German generals were so callous is that they were ordered to be like that. Orders within the Nazi war machine came down from high and were often brutal in their nature: summary execution of prisoners, rounding up of Jews and other minorities, scorched earth policies. That was just the orders aimed at enemies: often generals would be ordered to stand their ground to the death when all military logic told them to make a tactical retreat.

Rommel’s dedication to upholding the “war without hate” as he called the more traditional methods of war is up for debate, but certainly, he did take measure to negate the harsher aspects. That said, there are other factors that question whether his commitment to the “war without hate” was intentional, circumstantial or ideologically-driven.

When most German generals were likely to commit acts of ethnic cleansing, Rommel was not generally faced with the question. North Africa, where this reputation was developed, had hardly any Jews, for example, and other potential targets for Nazi aggression were protected by being citizens of Italy and Rommel was wary of standing on the toes of their allies. That said, many within the North African Jewish community are reported as having felt that they were spared from the horrors suffered by Jews in Europe by the actions of the Afrika Korps, led by Rommel.

It is also widely accepted that he refused to execute captured Jewish prisoners and hated the use of slave labour. As far as his own troops were concerned, Rommel repeatedly refused orders directly from Hitler. When, at the end of the second Battle of El Alamein, Hitler commanded him directly not to retreat and to show his soldiers “no other road than that to victory or death.”

Knowing that it was impossible for him to defeat the advancing British, who massively outnumbered his forces, Rommel chose to ignore the letter from the Fuhrer and fled all the way across North Africa to Tunisia rather than face death in the sand. While he was way too politically powerful to be censured by Hitler, actions such as this were contributory to a wider feeling among the Nazi hierarchy that Rommel was not one of them.

He was a PR superstar in Germany, but was both respected and later suspected by the Nazi leadership.

Rommel’s reputation within Germany might well have made him untouchable for the Nazi hierarchy, even when he did things that were in direct contradiction of the ideological and military strategy of the regime. They had invested so much time and so much weight in making him the poster boy of their propaganda regime that, when Rommel turned out to be less than what they had hoped for, they could not easily dispose of him.

On paper, he was the perfect fit for their media machine: he was an early adopter of Nazism, already a hero from the First World War and an excellent general, with victories aplenty. Moreover, they could cite the Allies reverence for him in their favor, and Rommel himself was comfortable in the spotlight and relished the attention.

Hitler was always wary of building up any one single figure too far – lest he be challenged himself – but Goebbels, the chief propagandist, knew an opportunity when he saw it and Rommel could not be passed up. As Rommel’s media image grew and grew, he became the darling of the public back home, but in the corridors of power in Berlin, there were plenty of higher-ups who were less convinced of his powers.

Even from the early days of the war in 1941, when Rommel was in France, some of those who fought alongside him were doubting just how effective he actually was a general. By the time that the war in North Africa had turned against him in 1943, the German furthest expansions were contracting: the Battle of Stalingrad had been lost in February and Rommel departed Tunisia in May.

It might have made sense if the Nazis had thought Rommel their best general, to send him to the Eastern Front where the war was being lost. Perhaps, too, the brutal nature of the war on the Ostfront was seen as beyond Rommel’s nature: this was not the time or place for “war without hate”, in the eyes of the Nazi leadership.

Instead, he was dispatched to Italy. As Italy fell, Rommel was demoted from the head of the campaign to second in command to Albert Kesselring, alongside whom he had served throughout the North Africa campaigns.

Later in France, Rommel was the man in charge of building the Atlantic Wall that would protect Nazi-occupied France from Allied invasion: though he had warned heavily that his experiences in North Africa had taught him that land and sea defences would be nothing if air supremacy allowed the Allies to destroy the Nazi army from above, Rommel was ignored.

After the defeat in North Africa, the retreat through Greece and Italy and the failure to stop the D-Day invasions, his reputation as a superstar general back home was in tatters.

Rommel’s reputation got a huge boost because of a 1951 film.

If Rommel’s reputation as a great leader was undermined by the catastrophic defeats on the African, Italian and Western Fronts in the last two years of the war, why was it that the so-called “Rommel Myth” was so pervasive after the war? The theories are numerous, but one major contributing factor must be the success of the 1951 film, The Desert Fox. Rommel was played by the iconic actor James Mason who won critical acclaim for his role.

Rommel was a well-known figure in Allied countries and in 1950, the first biography of the “good German” was released in the UK. Written by Desmond Young, a British brigadier-general who had himself been captured by Rommel during the war, “Rommel: The Desert Fox” was incredibly popular in Britain and cemented the position of the vanquished general as the acceptable enemy.

His later involvement in the 1944 plot against Hitler did a lot to wash Rommel of the stain of Nazism – conveniently forgetting the decade or so that he had spent close to the top of the regime – and his position as the general who was beaten “fair and square” endeared him to a British audience. After all, it’s much easier to build heroes of your own generals when they have beaten a general that you also respect.

The 1951 film of The Desert Fox further spread the myth and was widely popular in the UK. The narrative of Rommel, the good German, being defeated by the heroic British in the clean war in North Africa was a far more palatable one in the burgeoning Cold War than one that emphasised the horrible destruction that had come through the Soviet victory in the East.

There could be little appetite for a war with Russia when people were constantly being reminded of the horrific images that had emerged from the Eastern Front. Thus, the clean general of the fair fight in North Africa was an enticing idea.

The Germans, too, were all too pleased to go along with Rommel as their figurehead. Their army had been severely curtailed after their defeat, but there was a clamour to de-Nazify the Wehrmacht and remove the stigma from the German armed forces. The Bundeswehr, the new German army, was more palatable to a post-war world when it could be seen as the legacy of good soldiers lead by bad politicians rather than an integral and vital part of the Nazi war machine.

Thus, the idea of The Desert Fox was created and, to a large extent, still persists. He remains the only Nazi to be lionised within Germany: public squares and streets bear his name, as does the largest barracks of the Bundeswehr. Whether such a status is deserved, however, is still a question about which historians continue to argue.

During the first half of 2020 many countries have been reconsidering the roles of their historical figures - remembered in statue form - due to their controversial views or actions from today’s point of view. In Britain, France and Belgium, statues of figures associated with the colonial past have become the target of public criticism in some quarters. In the United States, not only statues of Confederate figures who defended slavery during the American Civil War were destroyed or even demolished, but also, for example, the discoverer of America, Christopher Columbus.

In Germany a similar process was also underway. The monument to the Wehrmacht Marshal Erwin Rommel in Heidenheim came under severe renewed scrutiny.

Germany's memorial to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is perched on a hillside overlooking the middle-class town of Heidenheim an der Brenz where he was born 120 years ago. The words inscribed on the white limestone monument describe the legendary Second World War general as "chivalrous", "brave" and as a "victim of tyranny"

The monument, which was built in 1961 by the German Afrikakorps Association, aroused long-term controversy and in the past was repeatedly damaged by inscriptions that called Rommel a Nazi. In 2014, Heidenheim City Hall expressed its intention to contrast the monument with another memorial building. By 2020 those calls took on a greater momentum.

The German artist Rainer Jooss was brought in by the municipal authorities to re-interpret the existing monument without having to destroy it completely. Jooss took as his starting point to focus on other parts of Rommel’s legacy. It was little known that Rommel had large minefields laid during the campaign of German troops in North Africa during World War II. In Libya and Tunisia alone, at least 3,300 people have lost their legs and another 7,500 have been maimed since the statistics were kept in the 1980s. So Jooss designed black silhouette cut out of a maimed child victim of war to complement the monument.

“The monument does not represent the truth, but encourages us to look for it,” said Bernhard Ilg, Mayor of Baden-Württemberg, at the presentation of the monument’s design unveiling in July 2020. Jooss was more stoic. Joos believed it would be a mistake to remove the Rommel monument altogether,"If we let grass grow over it, that would mean the end of the important task of dealing with history.”

The artist behind the modification to the Heidenheim monument said his statue was purposefully made to look small next to the impressive limestone bloc."I wanted to confront the monumental (features) of the original memorial with the fragility of a land mine victim.” Jooss wanted and hoped that it was up to “the next generations to make a picture of themselves based on factual histography.”

Yet eminent historians have since dismissed the fresh silhouette plaque as a transparent attempt to avoid addressing the deep seated questions about Rommel. Indeed Rommel’s privileged position to being seen as the ideal role model for the Bundeswehr (the unified armed forces of Germany and their civil administration and procurement authorities). While recognising his great talents as a commander, they point out several problems: such as Rommel's involvement with a criminal regime and his political naivete. However, there are also many supporters of the continued commemoration of Rommel by the Bundeswehr, and there remains military buildings and streets named after him and portraits of him displayed.

The politician scientist Ralph Rotte called for his replacement with Manfred von Richthofen. Historian Cornelia Hecht opined that whatever judgement history will pass on Rommel – who was the idol of World War II as well as the integration figure of the post-war Republic – it was now the time in which the Bundeswehr should rely on its own history and tradition, and not any Wehrmacht commander. Jürgen Heiducoff, a retired Bundeswehr officer, had written that the maintenance of the Rommel barracks' names and the definition of Rommel as a German resistance fighter are capitulation before neo-Nazi tendencies. Heiducoff agreed with Bundeswehr generals that Rommel was one of the greatest strategists and tacticians, both in theory and practice, and a victim of contemporary jealous colleagues, but argued that such a talent for aggressive, destructive warfare was not a suitable model for the Bundeswehr, a primarily defensive army. Heiducoff criticised those Bundeswehr generals for pressuring the Federal Ministry of Defence into making decisions in favour of the man who they openly admire.

Rommel has had his supporters from this avalanche of revisionist criticism. Historian Michael Wolffsohn supported the Ministry of Defense's decision to continue recognition of Rommel, although he thought the focus should be put on the later stage of Rommel's life, when he began thinking more seriously about war and politics, and broke with the regime. Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR) reported that, "Wolffsohn declares the Bundeswehr wants to have politically thoughtful, responsible officers from the beginning, thus a tradition of 'swashbuckler' and 'humane rogue' is not intended".

According to authors like Ulrich vom Hagen and Sandra Mass though, the Bundeswehr (as well as NATO) deliberately endorses the ideas of chivalrous warfare and apolitical soldiering associated with Rommel. At a German Ministry conference soliciting input on the matter, Dutch general Ton van Loon advised the German Ministry that, although there can be historical abuses hidden under the guise of military tradition, tradition is still essential for the esprit de corps, and part of that tradition should be the leadership and achievements of Rommel. Historian Christian Hartmann opined that not only Rommel's legacy was worthy of tradition but the Bundeswehr "urgently needs to become more Rommel".

There are other historians who have tried to take a middle path on the continued controversy of Rommel’s legacy. Historian Johannes Hürter believed that instead of being the symbol for an alternative Germany, Rommel should be the symbol for the willingness of the military elites to become instrumentalised by the Nazi authorities. As for whether he can be treated as a military role model, Hürter writes that each soldier can decide on that matter for themselves. Historian Ernst Piper argued that it was totally conceivable that the Resistance saw Rommel as someone with whom they could build a new Germany. According to Piper though, Rommel was a loyal national socialist without crime rather than a democrat, thus unsuitable to hold a central place among role models, although he should be integrated as a major military leader.

Whether one is for and against Rommel such debates take place because he is dead in conveniently ambiguous circumstances.

Recovering from skull fractures in hospital, he missed the main event - the 20 July Bomb Plot 1944 - insitigated by other senior German army officers. Hitler survived the blast, and immediately set about executing the plotters.

While Rommel had lots of contact with many key conspirators and was generally aware of the movement(s) to assassinate Hitler, there is no direct evidence that he knew about the July 20th plot in advance, let alone was involved in any detailed planning. Several conspirators allegedly confessed during interrogation that he was involved and, like Speer, his name was found on Goerdeler’s list of possible participants in a new German government.

Rommel was listed among various possibilities for Reich President. Unfortunately for him, there was no question mark or other notation, as in Speer’s case, which indicated that he was unaware of the designation.

He maintained his innocence when confronted by General Burgdorff on the day he died and also told his wife and son that he had played no part in the events of July 20th. But ultimately, there’s no way to know what he was or was not aware of. He took that with him to the grave.

The list of members of the 20 July plot doesn´t name Rommel as part of the attempt to kill Adolf Hitler. But: Rommel was blamed of having known of plans to do so. So he was forced to commit suicide.

On 19 th October 1944 Rommel met two german generals at his home. They showed him pretended evidence about his paticipation in “operation valkyrie”, which he denied to be true. They accompanied him away from his home, where he swallowed a capsule filled with potassium cyanide and died. The two generals Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel , members of german court of military honour, who had handed over the capsule to Rommel, drove back to his home and contended that Rommel had died because of ramifications of an injury he received on 17th of July during an allied bombardement.

Given a choice between a trial, involving his disgrace, execution and his family’s impoverishment - and suicide - he chose the latter.

The story given to the public was that he’d died of wounds sustained in the air attack. He was named a “german hero”, was “honoured” with a state funeral an d buried in Herrlingen, Germany.

Had he lived who knows what his real fate might have been at the hands of the Allies. At the main Nuremberg trials, the two army generals prosecuted were Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and General Alfred Jodl. Both were accused of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. Both were convicted on all four charges and hanged.

The principal charge against Keitel was the infamous 13 May 1941 Barbarossa Decree, which condemned captured prisoners and ensured a high level of brutality by German soldiers against Soviet civilians. Jodl was the author of the Commando decree – ordering that any Allied commandos encountered in Europe and Africa should be killed immediately without trial, even if in proper uniforms or if they attempted to surrender.

General Heinz Guderian is an example of a prominent German general who did survive the war but was not prosecuted for war crimes.

Another prominent example is Field Marshall Kesselring, who had commanded the defence of Italy after the Allies invaded. Kesselring was not prosecuted at Nuremburg, but did face a British military court in Italy. The Moscow declaration of October 1943 had stated that those accused of war crimes would be prosecuted in the country where they had committed their crimes. Although the trial was conducted in Italy, Italian judges did not participate as Italy was not considered an ally. Kesselring was prosecuted for the shooting of hundreds of Italian prisoners in retaliation for attacks on German soldiers. Kesselring was found guilty and condemned to death. British General Alexander, who had run the Italian campaign, and Winston Churchill pleaded for the sentence to be commuted - which it was. Kesselring was released in 1952 and lived until 1970.

By comparison Rommel was never accused of issuing similar decrees. Many felt that he was an honourable soldier. Nor was he ever accused of shooting prisoners in the way Kesselring was. Rommel’s military reputation is that of a highly professional soldier who carried out his duties according to a military code of ethics. His record is untainted by atrocities or unsavoury tactics against the enemy or civilian populations. He tended to live a charmed life early in the war.

Had he lived one can only speculate as to his fate and his legacy. Speculation regarding a possible role for him in the rebuilding of German forces for NATO, had he survived, is unrealistic. Rommel was never a strategically-minded commander. Indeed it is well known that Quartermasters hated him for his habit of outrunning his supplies on the battlefield.

The likelihood is he might well have been allowed to live without any kind of Allied retribution for war crimes as he was never guilty of any such departures from a strict military code of behaviour. But in trial - he would surely would have been put on trial even if he would be found not guilty - the messy details of his involvement with the Nazi regime would come to light. It would show that Rommel certainly benefited from the regime he served, and I think would have been considered guilty by association, even if his enthusiasm for Hitler waned in his final days.

Post-war, it would not have surprised me at all if the Allies had sought to build a West German government around Rommel. Staunchly anti-Communist, he nevertheless was seen widely as honourable and pro-West. But what role he would have been given - or what role the allies might have been able to make palatable to a war ravaged population - can only be speculated.

I suspect he would have served in some official capacity within the Bundeswehr before retiring to write his highly expected memoirs. It’s telling that Rommel’s chief of staff, Hans Speidel, drove the creation of the Bundeswehr and was the first to be named a generaloberst in that force. Later he was Supreme Commander of all NATO ground forces in Central Europe (which was almost all of it). It’s an intriguiing thought what Rommel might have played in a post-war Cold War Germany and Europe. Speidel and Rommel were inseparable and cut from the same bolt of cloth. Indeed it was Hans Speidel, who had been involved in the July 20 plot, wrote after the war that Rommel was a member of the resistance, (for which there is no evidence) that contributed towards Rommel and ‘The Good German’ Myth.

Given all that was “overlooked” by both the Allies and the German people after World War Two. There’s no logical reason to think that Rommel would not have been as honoured, if not more so, after the war. After all, one of the main Bundeswehr barracks continues to be named after him in 1965.

To me he was a great general rightly lauded by his peers and military historians - but not the best. Rommel was a highly competent tactical commander, but there were many such commanders in the Wehrmacht. His prominence is due to a number of things. Firstly, he was always Hitler favourite; secondly Goebbels played him up in his propaganda; and thirdly he fought the British and Americans and thus received much more attention in the Western press and historians after the War than the German commanders fighting the Soviets.

Indeed an argument can be made that by fighting in the Western Desert in a sector that the British had logistical and material superiority (and thus difficult to defeat), Rommel essentially taught the British and the Americans Blitzkrieg tactics - essentially modern warfare. His very inflated legacy saved the British from admitting their military performance in North Africa was abysmal until the Axis forces overextended their supply lines and the American supply of goods was able to compensate for substandard British equipment.

It’s also forgotten that Rommel also oversaw the building of Hitler’s Atlantic Wall which was essentially a fiction when he took over. Immense resources were poured into the project. The impact was to delay the Anglo-Americn invasion about 5 hours and only on one beach (Omaha).

And no matter how humane and honourable he was, Rommel was ultimately a weak man who chose to look away when it was convenient to his career to do so. Indeed I agree with many historians today that he was primarily bent on serving Hitler to advance his career. He was a man who believed he was serving a king and realises too late that he was a devil. I have little doubt that he was conflicted by that especially as it grew during the seven months of his life leading up to his death. Perhaps the best tactical military manoeuvre he made was to take the poison forced upon him and thereby save his family but also secure his legacy, even if that legacy remains mostly intact if a little more tarnished to this day.

#rommel #nazism #nazi #german history #war #second world war #battle #soldier #general #erwin rommel #allies #germany #afrikacorps #statues #culture #society #history #military #military history

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warpicshistory · 4 years ago

Photo

SS-Obergruppenführer & General of the SS Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, 1942 by Walter Frentz. https://www.instagram.com/p/CJV520-JqXj/?igshid=bb991xhasc0y

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greatworldwar2 · 4 years ago

Text

• 1st SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler

The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler", short LSSAH, began as Adolf Hitler's personal bodyguard, responsible for guarding the Führer's person, offices, and residences. Initially the size of a regiment, the LSSAH eventually grew into an elite division-sized unit during World War II.

In the early days of the Nazi Party (NSDAP), the leadership realized that a bodyguard unit composed of reliable men was needed. Adolf Hitler in early 1923, ordered the formation of a small separate bodyguard dedicated to his service rather than "a suspect mass", such as the the Sturmabteilung (SA) under Ernst Röhm. Originally the unit was composed of only eight men, commanded by Julius Schreck and Joseph Berchtold. It was designated the Stabswache (staff guard). The Stabswache were issued unique badges, but at this point was still under SA control. In May 1923, the unit was renamed Stoßtrupp (Shock Troop)–Hitler. The unit numbered no more than 20 members at that time. On November 9th, 1923, the Stoßtrupp, along with the SA and several other Nazi paramilitary units, took part in the abortive Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. In the aftermath, Hitler was imprisoned and his party and all associated formations, including the Stoßtrupp, were disbanded. Later in 1925, Hitler ordered the formation of a new bodyguard unit, the Schutzkommando (protection command). The unit was renamed the Sturmstaffel (assault squadron) and in November was renamed the Schutzstaffel, abbreviated to SS. By 1933 the SS had grown from a small bodyguard unit to a formation of over 50,000 men. The decision was made to form a new bodyguard unit, again called the Stabswache, which was mostly made up of men from the 1st SS-Standarte. By 1933 this unit was placed under the command of Sepp Dietrich, who selected 117 men to form the SS-Stabswache Berlin on March 17th, 1933. The unit replaced the army guards at the Reich Chancellery.

Out of this initial group, three eventually became divisional commanders, at least eight would become regimental commanders, fifteen became battalion commanders, and over thirty became company commanders in the Waffen-SS. Later in 1933, two further training units were formed: SS-Sonderkommando Zossen on 10 May, and a second unit, designated SS-Sonderkommando Jüterbog in July. These were the only SS units to receive military training at that time. Most of the training staff came from the ranks of the army. On September 3rd, 1933 the two Sonderkommando merged into the SS-Sonderkommando Berlin under Dietrich's command. Most of their duties involved providing outer security for Hitler at his residences, public appearances and guard duty at the Reich Chancellery. In November 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch, the Sonderkommando took part in the rally and memorial service for the NSDAP members who had been killed during the putsch. During the ceremony, the members of the Sonderkommando swore personal allegiance to Hitler. At the conclusion the unit received the new title, "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LAH). The term Leibstandarte was derived partly from Leibgarde, a somewhat archaic German translation of "Guard of Corps" or personal bodyguard of a military leader. On April 13th, 1934, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler ordered the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) to be renamed "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" (LSSAH). Himmler inserted the SS initials into the name to make it clear that the unit was independent from the army. Although nominally under Himmler, Dietrich was the real commander and handled day-to-day administration. Hitler ordered all SA leaders to attend a meeting at the Hanselbauer Hotel in Bad Wiessee, near Munich. Hitler along with Sepp Dietrich and a unit from the LSSAH travelled to Bad Wiessee to personally oversee Röhm's arrest on June 30th. Later at around 17:00 hours, Dietrich received orders from Hitler for the LSSAH to form an "execution squad" and go to Stadelheim prison where certain SA leaders were being held. There in the prison courtyard, the LSSAH firing squad shot five SA generals and an SA colonel. This action succeeded in effectively decapitating the SA and removing Röhm's threat to Hitler's leadership. In recognition of their actions, both the LSSAH and the Landespolizeigruppe General Göring were expanded to regimental size and motorized. In addition, the SS became an independent organization, no longer part of the SA.

The LSSAH provided the honor guard at many of the Nuremberg Rallies, and in 1935 took part in the reoccupation of the Saarland. On June 6th, 1935, the LSSAH officially adopted a field-grey uniform to identify itself more with the army, which wore a similar uniform. The LSSAH was later in the vanguard of the march into Austria as part of the Anschluss, and in 1938 the unit took part in the occupation of the Sudetenland. By 1939, the LSSAH was a full infantry regiment with three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and anti-tank, reconnaissance and engineer sub-units. Soon after its involvement in the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, the LSSAH was redesignated "Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (mot.)". When Hitler ordered the formation of an SS division in mid-1939, the Leibstandarte was designated to form its own unit. The Polish crisis of August 1939 put these plans on hold, and the LSSAH was ordered to join XIII. Armeekorps, a part of Army Group South, which was preparing for the attack on Poland. The Leibstandarte division's symbol was a skeleton key, in honor of its first commander, Josef "Sepp" Dietrich (Dietrich is German for skeleton key or lock pick); it was retained and modified to later serve as the symbol for I SS Panzer Corps. During the initial stages of the invasion of Poland, the LSSAH was attached to the 17.Infanterie-Division and tasked with providing flank protection for the southern pincer. The regiment was involved in several battles against Polish cavalry brigades attempting to hit the flanks of the German advance. At Pabianice, a town near Łódź, the LSSAH fought elements of the Polish 28th Infantry Division and the Wołyńska Cavalry Brigade in close combat. Throughout the campaign, the unit was notorious for burning villages. In addition, members of the LSSAH committed atrocities in numerous Polish towns, including the murder of 50 Jews in Błonie and the massacre of 200 civilians, including children, who were machine gunned in Złoczew. After the success at Pabianice, the LSSAH was sent to the area near Warsaw and attached to the 4.Panzer-Division under then Generalmajor (brigadier general) Georg-Hans Reinhardt. The unit saw action preventing encircled Polish units from escaping, and repelling several attempts by other Polish troops to break through. In spite of the swift military victory over Poland, the regular army had reservations about the performance of the LSSAH due to their higher casualty rate than the army units.

In early 1940 the LSSAH was expanded into a full independent motorized infantry regiment and a Sturmgeschütz (Assault Gun) battery was added to their establishment. The regiment was shifted to the Dutch border for the launch of Fall Gelb. It was to form the vanguard of the ground advance into the Netherlands, tasked with capturing a vital bridge over the IJssel, attacking the main line of defense at the Grebbeberg (the Grebbeline), and linking up with the Fallschirmjäger of Generaloberst Kurt Student's airborne forces, the 7.Flieger-Division. On May 10th, 1940 the LSSAH crossed the Dutch border, covered over 75 kilometres (47 mi), and secured a crossing over the IJssel near Zutphen after discovering that their target bridge had been destroyed. Over the next four days, the LSSAH covered over 215 kilometres (134 mi), and upon entering Rotterdam, several of its soldiers accidentally shot at and seriously wounded General Student. After the surrender of Rotterdam, the LSSAH left for the Hague, which they reached on May 15th, after capturing 3,500 Dutch soldiers as prisoners of war. After the surrender of the Netherlands on May 15th, the regiment was then moved south to France. After the British counterattack at Arras, the LSSAH, along with the SS-Verfügungs-Division, were moved to hold the perimeter around Dunkirk and reduce the size of the pocket containing the encircled British Expeditionary Force and French forces. The LSSAH took up a position 15 miles south west of Dunkirk along the line of the Aa Canal, facing the Allied defensive line near Watten. However, on the following day of May 25th, in defiance of Hitler's orders, Dietrich ordered his 3rd battalion to cross the canal and take the Wattenberg Heights beyond, where British artillery observers were putting the regiment at risk. They assaulted the heights and drove the observers off. Instead of being censured for his act of defiance, Dietrich was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. On May 26th the German advance resumed. By the 28th the LSSAH had taken the village of Wormhout, only ten miles from Dunkirk. After their surrender, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, along with some other units (including French soldiers) were taken to a barn in La Plaine au Bois near Wormhout and Esquelbecq. It was there that troops of the LSSAH 2nd battalion, under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Mohnke committed the Wormhoudt massacre, where 80 British and French prisoners of war were killed. After the conclusion of the Western campaign on June 22nd, 1940, the LSSAH spent six months in Metz (Moselle). It was expanded to brigade size (6,500 men). A 'Flak battalion' and a StuG Batterie were among the units added to the LSSAH. A new flag was presented by Heinrich Himmler in September 1940.

During the later months of 1940, the regiment trained in amphibious assaults on the Moselle River in preparation for Operation Seelöwe, the invasion of England. After the Luftwaffe's failure in the Battle of Britain and the cancellation of the planned invasion, the LSSAH was shifted to Bulgaria in February 1941 in preparation for Operation Marita, part of the planned invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia. The operation was launched on April 6th, 1941 by aerial bombings of central-southern Yugoslavia, specially over Belgrade causing enormous destructions and thousands of victims and woundeds. After the LSSAH entered on April 12th into the Yugoslavian capital, then to follow the route of the 9.Panzer-Division. The LSSAH crossed the border near Bitola and was soon deep in Greek territory. The LSSAH captured Vevi on April 10th. LSSAH was tasked with clearing resistance from the Kleisoura Pass south-west of Vevi and driving through to the Kastoria area to cut off retreating Greek and British Commonwealth forces. The brigade participated in the clearing the Klidi Pass just south of Vevi, which was defended by a "scratch force" of Greek, Australian, British and New Zealand troops. With the fall of the two passes the main line of resistance of the Greek Epirus army was broken, and the campaign became a battle to prevent the escape of the enemy. On April 20th, following a pitched battle in the 5,000-foot-high (1,500 m) Metsovon Pass in the Pindus Mountains, the commander of the Greek Epirus army surrendered the entire force to Dietrich. By April 30th, the last British Commonwealth troops had either been captured or escaped. The LSSAH occupied a position of honor in the victory parade through Athens. After Operation Marita, the LSSAH was ordered north to join the forces of Army Group South massing for the launch of Operation Barbarossa.

Following LSSAH's outstanding performance during Marita, Himmler ordered that it should be upgraded to divisional status. The regiment, already the size of a reinforced brigade, was to be given motorized transport and redesignated "SS-Division (mot.) Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler". It was moved to Czechoslovakia in mid May for reorganization until being ordered to assemble in Poland for Operation Barbarossa, as part of Gerd von Rundstedt's, Army Group South. There was not enough time to deliver all its equipment and refit it to full divisional status before the launch of the invasion of the Soviet Union, so the new "division" remained the size of a reinforced brigade, even though its expansion and development was of concern. Through July it was attached to III Panzer Corps before finishing August as part of XLVIII Panzer Corps. During this time, the LSSAH was involved in the Battle of Uman and the subsequent capture of Kiev. In early September, the division was shifted to LIV Army Corps, as part of the 11th Army, during the advance east after the fall of Kiev. Hoping to capitalize on the collapse of the Red Army defense on the Dnepr River the reconnaissance battalion of LSSAH was tasked with making a speedy advance to capture the strategically vital choke point of the Perekop Isthmus but were rebuffed by entrenched defenders at the town of Perekop. In October, the LSSAH was transferred back north to help solidify the Axis line against fresh Soviet attacks against the Romanian 3rd Army and later took part in the heavy fighting for the city of Rostov-on-Don, which was captured in late November; there, the LSSAH took over 10,000 Red Army prisoners. However by the end of the year, the German advance faltered as Soviet resistance grew stronger. Under pressure from heavy Soviet counterattacks during the winter, the LSSAH and Army Group South retreated from Rostov to defensive lines on the river Mius.[47] After the spring rasputitsa (seasonal mud) had cleared, the division joined in Fall Blau, participating in the fighting to retake Rostov-on-Don, which fell in late July 1942. Severely understrength, the LSSAH was transferred to the Normandy region of occupied France to join the newly formed SS Panzer Corps and to be reformed as a Panzergrenadier division. The LSSAH spent the remainder of 1942 refitting as a panzergrenadier division.

This meant that the SS Panzergrenadier divisions were full-strength Panzer divisions in all but name. The division also received nine Tiger 1 tanks, and these were formed into the 13th (schwere) Company/1st SS Panzer Regiment. The collapse of the front around Stalingrad and the encirclement of the German Sixth Army created a threat to General Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein's Army Group Don. Manstein requested reinforcements to halt the Soviet attack near Kharkov. The SS Panzer Corps was then ordered east to join Manstein's forces. Arriving at the front in late January 1943, the LSSAH was engaged in fighting in and around Kharkov as a part of Hausser's SS Panzer Corps. In March 1943 the division participated in the recapture of Kharkov. On March 12th, 1943, the LSSAH made progress into the city's center by breaking through the Soviet defenses in the northern suburbs. By the end of the day, the division had reached a position just two blocks north of Dzerzhinsky Square. Despite the declaration that the city had fallen, fighting continued on the 15th and 16th March, as German units cleared the remnants of resistance in the tractor works factory complex, in the southern outskirts of the city. While in Kharkov, troops of the LSSAH engaged in the murder of wounded Soviet soldiers that were located in the city's military hospital; several hundred were killed. Additionally, captured Soviet officers and commissars were routinely executed. The division was pulled back to rest and refit. Division commander Sepp Dietrich was promoted to form a new Corps, the 1st SS Panzer Corps Leibstandarte, and the LSSAH was to supply all the senior officers for the new headquarters. At the same time a new SS division would be formed from members of the Hitler Youth and the LSSAH would supply all of the regimental, battalion and most of the company commanders. Elements of LSSAH took part in Fabrikaktion "factory action" a/k/a/ Großaktion Juden "Major Action (on) Jews", an operation to capture remaining German Jews that worked in the arms industry. Men of the LSSAH helped the Gestapo round up Jews in Berlin; people were taken from their jobs and herded in to cattle wagons on February 27th,1943. Most of the captured perished either in Auschwitz or other camps in the East. The division, re-equipped with vehicles, arrived on the Po River Plain on August 8th, 1943. The LSSAH was given the task of guarding several vital road and rail junctions in the area of Trento-Verona. After several weeks, the division was moved to the Parma-Reggio area. During this period, the Leibstandarte was involved in several skirmishes with partisans. With Italy having announced an armistice with the Allies of September 8th, 1943, the division was ordered to begin disarming nearby Italian units. This went smoothly, with the exception of brief, bloody fights with Italian troops stationed in Parma, Cremona and Piacenza on September 9th. While on rear security duties in Italy, LSSAH men murdered 49 Jewish refugees near Lake Maggiore, in the Lake Maggiore massacres, who had fled there after the German takeover.

The LSSAH was sent to the Istria Peninsula and was engaged in several anti-partisan operations as part of Nazi security warfare. During its period in Italy, the LSSAH was reformed as a full panzer division, and redesignated 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. In early November, the division was ordered back to the Eastern Front. The division was assigned to XLVIII Panzer Corps, a part of 4th Panzer Army, which was struggling to hold the line near Zhitomir. The division was transferred to the Cherkassy area at the end of January, where it was assigned to the III Panzer Corps, part of 1st Panzer Army. As part of the corps, the division took part in the relief attempt of German forces of Army Group South encircled in the Korsun Pocket in January–February 1944. The majority of the LSSAH, which amounted to 41 officers and 1,188 men, were withdrawn to Belgium for rest and refit, however a Kampfgruppe was left behind. On March 25th, the 1st Panzer Army was encircled in the Kamenets Podolsky pocket. The battle group took part in the fighting to escape the encirclement, forming a part of the spearhead which linked up with the II SS Panzer Corps near Buczacz on April 6th. The LSSAH Division was reformed in Belgium and was at full strength by April 1944. The division was transferred again as part of the I SS Panzer Corps which at this time consisted of the 101 SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, SS Division Hitlerjugend, SS Division Götz von Berlichingen and the Panzer Lehr Division. The LSSAH had been positioned north of the River Seine to counter any possible landing in the area of the Pas de Calais so the first units did not arrive in Normandy until after the Allied invasion there on June 6th, 1944. The first action they were involved in was the defense of Carpiquet village and airfield in the Allied Operation Windsor. There then followed a number of Allied attacks Operations Charnwood and Jupiter. On July 12th the LSSAH was holding the Caen south sector from Maltot in the west to the Caen – Falaise road in the east. On July 25th, 1944, US forces under General Omar Bradley succeeded in breaking through the German defenses as part of Operation Cobra and entered Brittany. Hitler forbade any retreat, and ordered a counteroffensive, codenamed Operation Lüttich, by the XLVII Panzer Corps, consisting of the 2nd Panzer Division, part of the LSSAH, the SS Division Das Reich and the 116th Panzer Division. The plan for the attack to hit the 30th Infantry Division east of Mortain, then cut through American defenses to reach the coast. The US response was aided by Ultra intelligence, which had revealed the plans for Operation Lüttich by August 4th. As a result, Bradley was able to obtain air support. The LSSAH and other divisions went on the attack on August 7th, the weather was not suitable for flying that morning, which disadvantaged the Allies. The SS Division Das Reich recaptured Mortain, and an armored battle group under Joachim Peiper reached Bourlopin, but had to halt due to US counterattacks and air strikes. The much-reduced division was encircled in the Falaise pocket by US, Canadian, and Polish forces. Some LSSAH units broke out of the pocket on August 22nd, leaving behind all their tanks and artillery. The division sustained 5,000 casualties during the Normandy campaign. The LSSAH would later participate in the Battle of the Bulge.

During March 1945 elements of the LSSAH were called for Operation Spring Awakening which was the last major German offensive launched during World War II. It began in great secrecy on March 6th, 1945. The German forces launched attacks in Hungary near Lake Balaton. This area included some of the last oil reserves still available to the Axis. The operation involved many German units withdrawn from the failed Ardennes Offensive on the Western Front, including the 6th SS Panzer Army and the LSSAH. Operation Spring Awakening was a failure for the German side. Within a week, the early gains were halted by massive counter attacks by Soviet forces. After the failure of Operation Spring Awakening, Sepp Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army retreated in stages to the Vienna area. The Germans prepared defensive positions in an attempt to hold the city against the fast arriving Red Army, in what become known as the Vienna Offensive. The Germans could not hold Vienna, which fell to the Soviet forces on April 13th. Part of the LSSAH ended the war fighting in Berlin. On April 23rd, 1945, Hitler appointed Brigadeführer Mohnke the commander for the central government district (Zitadelle sector) that included the Reich Chancellery and Führerbunker. Mohnke's command post was under the Reich Chancellery in the bunkers therein. He formed Kampfgruppe Mohnke which was divided into two weak regiments made up of approximately 2,000 men. After Hitler's suicide, they received orders to break out. Prior to the attempt, Mohnke briefed all commanders who could be reached within the Zitadelle sector about Hitler's death and the planned break out. It started at 2300 hours on May 1st. Mohnke led the first of ten small groups. Several very small groups managed to reach the Americans at the Elbe's west bank, but most, including Mohnke's group, could not get through the Soviet lines. Many were taken prisoner and some committed suicide. On May 2nd hostilities officially ended. After Vienna was captured, the LSSAH had fewer than 1,600 men and 16 tanks. Apart from the remains of Berlin Guard Battalion, the LSSAH surrendered to US forces in the Steyr area on May 8th, 1945.

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gunrunnerhell · 5 years ago

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German Fake Taxi

The photo is just for reference but it reminded me of a bit of history in a book I’m reading. During WWII on the Eastern Front, SS Colonel Joachim Peiper recalled how they were shorthanded on tank mechanics as they pushed deeper into Russia. So they had brought along a couple of British POW’s on their next deployment. One of the POW’s was a former police officer, the other a cab driver from London who joined the war effort.

One day, the division commander, SS General Sepp Dietrich made a surprise visit to the front and saw the two mechanics working hard on a damaged tank. He was so impressed by their work ethic that he walked over and introduced himself, thinking they were German. Needless to say once he found out they were British he lost all admiration for them. The POW’s were sent back to Germany from the Eastern Front and asked if they wanted to join a unit composed of traitors from the U.S, England, New Zealand and Canada and go fight off the Soviets. Their reply was simple...

“We’d already been there. Russia had plenty of dirt, lice and sudden death - but no girls!”

What happened to the two POW’s who were turned into temporary tank mechanics is unknown, but would be funny to think that the taxi driver returned back to London with an interesting story to tell.

#gunblr #war #world war II #WWII #history

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tesserariuss · 5 years ago

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Perhaps it didn’t matter what you did in life provided you did it as well as you were able to and provided you did it happily.

Sepp Dietrich

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aiiaiiiyo · 5 years ago

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Sepp Dietrich during the Battle of the Bulge (circa January 1945) 800x450 Check this blog!

#NakedCallWriter #historyporn #history

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nwobhmjp · 6 years ago

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Papa-Sepp Josef Dietrich

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lili-marlene1939-1945 · 6 years ago

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LES ENNEMIS DES NAZIS : LES COMMUNISTES, LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LES JUIFS

Les Allemands qui adhéraient au régime National-Socialiste -- ou mieux connus comme Nazis -- ont mis sur pied une formation politique dictatorial, en s’inspirant des Chemises Noires italiennes de MUSSOLINI. Cependant, contrairement aux Italiens, le régime Allemand était fondé et bâti sur une idéologie qui allait teinter tous leurs faits et gestes. Cette idéologie est le Social-darwinisme qui était, depuis le XIXè siècle, “dans l’air du temps”, comme l’avortement et l’euthanasie le sont pour nous aujourd’hui. Le social-darwinisme est tout simplement l’affirmation que le plus fort survit et le plus faible meurt. Cependant, Darwin faisait référence au règne animal ; mais il avait un cousin, Francis GALTON qui lui, a appliqué cela à l’humanité. Ensuite, dans les décennies qui allaient suivre, différents auteurs, médecins ou autres allaient ajouter leur petite brique à cette infâme et dangereuse pyramide : LAPOUGE, TREITSCHKE, BALFOUR, FISCHER, ou le Comte GOBINEAU pour n’en citer que quelques-uns. C’est ainsi que pour les Nazis, les gènes déterminent tout pour un individu : voleur, prostituée, pauvres, handicapés, criminels... on le devient de père en fils, et il faut éradiquer cette faiblesse qui est transmise à l’humanité. L’extermination est donc la solution. C’est ainsi que les sbires de HITLER mirent en oeuvre l’holocauste qui exterminera dans des camps les Juifs, certes, mais aussi les homosexuels, les Gypsies, les membres de sectes tels les Témoins de Jéhovah et les Communistes.

Mais pour mener à bien cette tâche, il leur fallait d’abord avoir les coudées franches, sans être entravé par cette “chose” qu’est la démocratie et qui demande beaucoup trop de pourparlers, de négociations, de tractations et en somme, de temps !

Ainsi, en arrivant au pouvoir, HITLER avait déjà décidé de mettre à bas la démocratie, et il n’eut pas de difficulté : les Allemands, par conviction pour la plupart, étaient contre celle-ci, ayant toujours connu un régime autocrate avec le Kaiser, mais qui leur laissait quand même une certaine liberté. Le régime hitlérien, quant à lui, était extrémiste, et ça, les Allemands ne l’avaient pas vu venir. Il allait intervenir dans tous les aspects de leur vie quotidienne, et à toute heure du jour ou de la nuit, la SS risquait de défoncer une porte, kidnapper une personne jugée obstacle au régime, et la faire disparaître dans les entrailles d’un camp de concentration -- ou plus tard, pendant la guerre, d’extermination.

Cet article propose au lecteur de voir comment les Nazis se débarrassèrent des Communistes, de la démocratie et en définitive, des Juifs. Il incite le lecteur à réfléchir au fait que la démocratie est fragile, et qu’il est facile de la détruire petit à petit, sans qu’une population industrialisée, intelligente et moderne ne s’en rende compte avant qu’il ne soit trop tard. Un pays occidental et avancé n’est pas à l’abri d’un type insignifiant, élu à la tête d’un État important, qui déciderait de se maintenir au pouvoir en discréditant les médias, en usant de propagande, en agitant l’épouvantail du racisme et de la haine pour diviser, et qui se débrouillerait pour se maintenir au pouvoir de façon indéfinie, soit en abolissant les institutions démocratique et ses piliers ou encore en agissant de façon plus hypocrite en truquant les élections.

I- LES COMMUNISTES

1.1- Les précédents

Ce fut l’agitation communiste, débutée à Kiel en 1918, dès avant la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, qui précipita les autorités militaires et politiques allemande à demander un armistice afin que cessent les hostilités. Une fois celle-ci signée, l’agitation avait gagné toute l’Allemagne, la Prusse et ses provinces où les adeptes de Lénine avaient essayé d’instaurer des Républiques Soviétiques ou « Conseils de Soviets », dont les principaux instigateurs étaient Rosa LUXEMBOURG et Karl LIEBNACHT, et les Forces Armées allemandes, gagnées en partie à cette nouvelle idéologie, perdirent la confiance du gouvernement pourtant Socialiste de EBERT, qui leur préféra des milices populaires, les « Casques d’acier » ou Stahlhelm, pour combattre ces nids d’agitation. Une véritable guerre civile s’ensuivit; le gouvernement remporta la bataille, et la République de Weimar pu vivre — du moins quelques années. Plusieurs de ces Casques d’Acier, tels Heinrich HIMMLER et Rudolf HESS, pour ne citer que quelques exemples, deviendront de fervents adeptes du National socialisme ou « Nazisme », parti dirigé par HITLER dès le début des années 20.

Lorsque HITLER faisait ses discours dans les différentes brasseries de Munich, à plusieurs reprises des Communistes l’avaient injurié; lui avaient lancé des bock de bière, des chaises ou tout autre objet qui leur tombaient sous la main. Le futur dictateur avait donc mis sur pied une première organisation paramilitaire populaire payée pour davantage semer la zizanie lors de ces manifestations de foule et déclencher des bagarres qui servaient bien ses objectifs politiques. C’est la Sturm Arbeitlung ou « SA » chapeauté par Ernst RÖHM, qui se chargeait de ces basses besognes. Toutefois, il était évident pour tous, au sein du parti Nazi, que Hitler risquait sa vie dans ce genre d’échauffourée, et c’est la raison pour laquelle, en 1922, une seconde organisation paramilitaire était mise sur pied, celle-ci momentanément dirigée par Josef « Sepp » DIETRICH, puis par Heinrich HIMMLER en 1929 : la Schützstaffeln ou « SS » dont le premier bataillon fut précisément les gardes du corps du dictateur, la Leibstandarte Adolf-Hitler ou « Garde du corps Adolf-Hitler ».

Une fois arrivé au pouvoir, après sa nomination du 30 janvier 1933, HITLER envoya ses sbires — SS et SA — chasser les Communistes partout où ils étaient, perquisitionner leurs bureaux, et même tuer plusieurs d’entre eux. Les premières chansons du National-socialisme, d’ailleurs, rappellent ces «exploits», dont celle intitulée « Horst Wessel Lied » ou « chanson de Hörst WESSEL »⁠1qui allait devenir l’hymne Nazi par excellence.

Bien sûr, cette « chasse au Communiste » par les Nazis déplaisait fort à ceux-là même qui pourtant, étaient pour la plupart organisé en un parti qui avait été dûment reconnu lors de la République de Weimar, c’est à dire le KPD ou Kommunistische Deutsch Partei (Parti Communiste Allemand) que les Nazis essayaient par tous les moyens d’anéantir.

Cette réprobation gagna non seulement l’intérieur de l’Allemagne, mais elle se manifesta également hors de ses frontières. Et l’un des fervent Communiste à avoir emmagasiné cette haine pour les Nazis était Hollandais d’origine et se nommait Marinus Van DER LUBBE. Il avait 25 ans, et allait, bien malgré lui précipiter l’Allemagne dans la dictature et servir de prétexte pour les Nazis de se débarrasser de ce qu’ils considéraient comme des obstacles à leurs desseins : les Communistes, la démocratie et les Juifs.

1.2- L’incendie du Reichstag, 27 février 1933

Marines Van DER LUBBE était d’obédience communiste depuis déjà plusieurs années, et avait appartenu aux Jeunesses Communistes des Pays-Bas. Trop enthousiaste, et surtout trop plein d’initiative, il s’était attiré les foudres des siens en 1931, puis plus tard lorsqu’il avait essayé de passer frauduleusement la frontière de la Russie cette même année. Frustré, pauvre, et surtout n’ayant plus rien à perdre, le jeune homme arrive à Berlin le 25 février 1933, et acheta plusieurs petites boîtes d’allume-charbon, avec le dessein d’incendier différents édifices gouvernementaux important de la capitale allemande. Son premier objectif fut la mairie, mais le feu ne prit pas. Il s’essaya sur l’ancien château de l’empereur mais n’eut guère plus de succès. Toutefois, le 27 février, il parvint à s’introduire par un soupirail du Reichstag, il y entra, et en fit le tour en prenant bien soin d’allumer différents feux dans différents bureaux, mais son « coup de maître » fut d’allumer le bois sec des vieilles boiseries de la salle du Conseil, ainsi que les rideaux qui se trouvaient derrière la chaire du Président. Rapidement, la pièce s’enflamma, ce qui fit éclater le dôme constitué de verre et d’acier, et cela créa un « effet cheminée » qui cette fois, embrasa tout le bâtiment. En voulant fuir, Van DER LUBBE se fit attraper et remettre aux mains de la police⁠ [Ian Kershaw, p. 648] .

Pendant ce temps, les hauts dirigeants Nazis, dont HITLER et GÖRING, étaient invités à dîner chez GOEBBELS, à l’autre bout de la ville. Ernst « Putzi » HÄNFSTANGEL, bailleur de fonds du régime Nazi; quasi créateur de l’image hitlérienne et mentor du Führer aurait dû, lui aussi, se trouver chez GOEBBELS, mais une mauvaise grippe l’avait contraint à garder le lit dans la résidence officielle de GÖRING, qui se situaient en face du Reichstag, et il fut aux premières loges pour apercevoir le feu sortir du dôme, vers 20h, ce soir là. Aussitôt il téléphona chez GOEBBELS et lança l’alerte. Très rapidement, tous les chefs Nazis se précipitèrent sur la Place du Reichstag, et Hitler se mit à paniquer, fort de son expérience de 1918 et des Conseils des Soviets, convaincu que cet incendie était en fait le point de départ d’un soulèvement général des forces Communistes dans tout Berlin — voire toute l’Allemagne⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 249]. Comme pour de le conforter dans cette analyse pour le moins fausse, des tracts furent retrouvés dans les bâtiments où se trouvaient les quartiers-généraux du KPD et du SPD, demandant à la population de se soulever. Aussitôt GÖRING réagit le premier lors d’un communiqué de presse, annonçant aux citoyens que l’Allemagne allait bientôt sombrer dans le chaos bolcheviste⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 650]. Il fallait, selon lui, faire usage des armes à feu sans restriction ; la police devait être mise en état d’alerte sans précédent.

Toutefois, Rudolf DIELS, premier chef de la Gestapo⁠ 2, qui avait interrogé Van DER LUBBE, assura HITLER que ce dernier avait agi seul⁠ 3, et que c’était simplement l’oeuvre d’un détraqué (Eminem Verrückten). Mais HITLER n’en finissait pas de croire à un complot ourdi de longue date visant, de façon ultime, sa destitution, voire son assassinat. Cela le poussa donc à prendre différentes mesures, par lesquelles il biffa d’un seul coup la démocratie de Weimar, l’existence des Communistes ainsi qu’un durcissement des persécutions des Juifs. Voyons maintenant ces processus.

II – LA FIN DE LA DÉMOCRATIE

“C’est un signe de Dieu, Herr vice Chancelier! Si ce feu est l’oeuvre de communistes, il faut écraser cette peste meurtrière d’une poigne de fer!” Hurla HITLER à von PAPEN, sitôt arrivé sur les lieux, vers 22h30, le soir de l’incendie, tandis que les pompiers s’affairaient à sauver les murs extérieurs du Parlement⁠ [KERSHAW, p. 651]. Aussitôt, le Chancelier donna des ordres pour que soient perquisitionnés les quartiers-généraux du parti social-démocrate (SPD) et des Communistes (KPD). Des tracts y furent retrouvés, appelant la population à se soulever contre ce gouvernement qui persécutait la gauche sans vergogne ⁠[KERSHAW, P. 651]. Les bâtiments furent barricadés, et ceux qui s’y trouvaient, arrêtés et emprisonnés. Plus tard, en mars, le tout premier camp de concentration, Dachau, situé à proximité de Munich, ouvrit et les dizaines de milliers de Communistes arrêtés y furent transférés.La toute première mesure que prit HITLER, le soir même de l’incendie, fut de se rendre chez HINDENBURG, qui était toujours le Président du Reich, au Ministère Prussien de l’Intérieur et lui faire signer un décret d’urgence lui permettant d’arrêter séance tenante toute personne soupçonnée d’appartenir aux « ennemis de l’État », c’est à dire, bien sûr, les Communistes, mais également les Juifs et autres obstacles qui se présentaient sur le chemin de Hitler vers la dictature ⁠[KERSHAW, P. 651].

La seconde étape — et non la moindre — fut de demander au Ministre de l’Intérieur du Reich d’adopter un projet de décret intitulé Pour La protection du peuple et de l’État qui étendait les mesures d’urgence adoptées la veille au soir par la Prusse, au reste des provinces allemandes⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 652]. Ce décret permettait d’une part à HITLER de gouverner aussi les provinces, et pour ce faire, il mit sur pied un système par lequel les Gauleiters⁠[KERSHAW, P. 666-667] ou « chefs de province » seraient responsable chacun d’une province, et devraient se rapporter uniquement à GOEBBELS, qui devenait par le fait même leur chef, ainsi que le Gauleiters de la région berlinoise. Ainsi Hitler fit-il ce que plusieurs avant lui — même BISMARCK — n’avaient pas réussi à faire, c’est à dire unifier l’Allemagne pour la première fois de son histoire, et surtout en acquérir le contrôle total et complet du pays. Ce décret ne donnait pas le pouvoir à la Reichswehr, c’est à dire aux Forces Armées — ce qui aurait limité les pouvoirs de Hitler — mais au Ministère de l’Intérieur du Reich. De surcroît, ce décret suspendait⁠4 les libertés individuelles, les libertés d’association ; la liberté de presse ; le caractère privé des conversations téléphoniques et postales. Quiconque pouvait désormais être emprisonné sans explications, accusations ; sans que sa peine d’emprisonnement (ou de camp de concentration dans les pires cas) ne soit limitée dans le temps ou même déterminée par un tribunal ou un juge. L’État, pour « sa protection » pouvait infliger des peines de mort sans procès et tout cela, bien sûr, sans l’aide ou le concours d’un avocat⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 652-653].

Contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait croire, cette mesure fut bien acceptée par la population générale, qui applaudissait à l’initiative de leur chancelier. Nul encore ne se doutait qu’il allait se retrouver bientôt citoyen dans un pays où la dictature allait devenir une réalité oppressante et dure. Mais il restait une dernière étape pour se débarrasser officiellement de la démocratie : le 23 mars, à l’Opéra Kroll où se tenait désormais les séances du Reichstag, HITLER proposa sa Loi d’habilitation à laquelle il tenait depuis 1932⁠ 5.

Cette Loi lui permettrait désormais de gouverner par décret, c’est à dire de ne plus être obligé de convoquer le Parlement et d’y faire approuver sa législation et ses décisions⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 661-665]. Avec la Loi sur la Protection du Peuple et de l’État, il s’agissait du dernier clou sur le cercueil de la démocratie. Weimar était officiellement morte.

Il serait néanmoins intéressant de voir brièvement le processus par lequel la Loi d’habilitation fut adoptée, car elle représente l’injure ultime à la démocratie : le 23 mars 1933, les SS, SA et Casques d’Acier furent tous conviés au bâtiment désormais appelé « Reichstag », c’est à dire l’Opéra Kroll, et on leur ordonna de garder toutes les issues. Les 81 députés Communistes avaient depuis quelques semaines, été tous arrêtés et emprisonnés — les plus avisés d’entre eux avaient fui le pays — et cela garantissait la majorité à HITLER. Mais pour ce type de Loi, la majorité des deux-tiers était essentielle, et FRICK avait assuré HITLER qu’il suffisait de 378 voix et non plus 432 pour atteindre cette majorité, et pour ce faire, GÖRING suggéra alors de faire expulser les sociaux-démocrates (SPD). Les Conservateurs, quant à eux, n’y virent aucune objection, même quand ils surent que les Nazis avaient l’intention de manipuler la procédure pour arriver à leurs fins⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 665]. C’est ainsi que la fonction de Président, toujours détenue par HINDENBURG, devint pratiquement une farce, voire une mascotte, et HITLER avait presque entre les mains un pouvoir absolu. De façon effective, il le détenait. Cependant, il restait encore au vieil héros de la Première Guerre mondiale de disparaître — ce qui arriva le 2 août 1934. HINDENBURG fut enterré avec les honneurs, et dès le lendemain, HITLER devint le Führer, c’est à dire l’impitoyable Chef Nazi que le monde allait connaître. La démocratie allemande était morte. Elle devrait attendre plus de 50 ans avant de renaître de ses cendres. Il est époustouflant de voir à quelle vitesse, et surtout comment elle a pu être démolie dans un grand pays occidental industrialisé, à la fine pointe de la technologie, de la médecine, des arts et des sciences; un pays hautement civilisé et qui aurait sans nul doute pris la place qu’occupent de nos jours les États-Unis — et plus récemment la Chine — comme géant international et excellant dans tout, si seulement Adolf HITLER n’avait pas réussi à s’en rendre maître pendant 12 ans. L’ampleur de la chose n’est pas apparu tout de suite aux citoyens germaniques, étant donné qu’il aura fallu aux Nazis toute une pléiade de petites étapes pour faire d’une démocratie une impitoyable dictature, et quand ils le réalisèrent, il était déjà trop tard. Cela doit nous rappeler que la démocratie, quoique nous la croyions acquise, ne doit jamais être perdue de vue, et surtout, nous devons être conscients que des pays comme le Canada ou les États-Unis ne sont pas à l’abris d’un nouveau HITLER qui grâce à celle-ci pourra toujours arriver au pouvoir, mais par la suite utiliser cette dernière pour la piétiner, comme le dictateur allemand l’a fait avec l’aide de la Loi d’habilitation. Aux États-Unis comme au Canada, il existe dans la Constitution — qui garantit pourtant la démocratie — des clauses d’exception qu’un Premier Ministre ou un Président peut toujours utiliser pour exiger du Parlement, de la Chambre des Représentants ou celle des Députés que lui soit permis de gouverner en renvoyant ces derniers qui alors n’ont plus leur mot à dire sur les actes du chef d’État concerné, qui peut alors se transformer en dictateur et en tyran, et cela, en toute légalité. D’ailleurs, aux États-Unis, le Président Donald TRUMP a des propensions de dictateur, et jusqu’à maintenant son cheminement rappelle étrangement celui de HITLER : tout d’abord, discréditer les médias en enfonçant dans la tête du peuple que ceux-ci abusent de leur confiance et publient des “fausses nouvelles”. Ainsi, le Président est en mesure de passer sans obstacle son message de propagande : ce sont les étrangers (autres races) qui sont des criminels et abusent des bontés de la nation. Les tensions ainsi obtenues isoles les groupes sociaux et entretiennent la haine dont a besoin le dictateur pour parvenir à ses fins politiques. Ensuite, petit à petit gruger la Constitution en nommant à des postes clés (procureur général, juges de la Cour suprême, responsable des communications, chefs d’État-Major) des gens qui le suivent aveuglément et sont prêts à tout pour lui. Ces gens servirons par la suite a opiner lorsque le Président passera des décrets qui autrement n’auraient jamais été acceptés : renvoi des étrangers hors du pays, criminalisation de l’avortement, emprisonnement d’enfants étrangers, etc. Et tout comme à l’époque HITLER s’est acoquiné avec d’autres dictateurs (MUSSOLINI, ANTONESCU, FRANCO) TRUMP en fait autant : Kim JONG UN, XI JINPING, POUTINE et apprend d’eux comment amener une démocratie effective en une démocratie de façade, comme en Russie où des élections se tiennent aux 4 ans, mais sont truquées pour assurer à POUTINE une réélection garantie avec au-dessus de 98% des voies (ce qui est statistiquement impossible dans de véritables élections). Certes, un Président Américain ne peut se présenter pour un troisième mandat, et ce depuis le vingt-deuxième amendement de la Constitution qui a eu lieu au Congrès le 22 mars 1947 et fut ratifié en 1951. Beaucoup de Présidents ont essayé de faire disparaître cette clause (TRUMAN, CLINTON, REAGAN) mais n’y sont pas parvenus. Nous pensons que TRUMP sera sans aucun doute celui qui abolira cette clause et s’installera à la Maison Blanche pour plusieurs mandats, probablement réélu dans des élections manipulées.

C’est ce qui s’est passé en Allemagne, et même si ce dernier exemple nous semble lointain tant dans les circonstances et dans le temps, c’est ce qui peut également se passer dans tout pays occidental démocratique. Nous ne devons jamais baisser la garde, et surtout tout faire pour que ces Lois d’exception ne soient jamais utilisées à mauvais escient, sous prétexte de « terrorisme » — un argument qu’avait également utilisé HITLER. L’Histoire ne cesse de nous donner des leçons ; à nous de les retenir et d’encourager les générations futures à ne pas les oublier... Le désintérêt de la culture général pour les jeunes générations est probablement la plus grande menace qui pèse sur la liberté de chacun d’entre nous.

III - LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS

Une fois les Communistes mis hors d’état de nuire, les Nazis détournèrent alors leur attention sur les Juifs, ces autres « ennemis de l’État » qui « menaçaient la survie du Reich ». En mars 1933, un décret de HITLER ordonna aux plus grands industriels, tels Porscheet Krupp à renvoyer tout employé, homme d’affaire ou membre de la direction qui fut Juif⁠ [KERSHAW, P. 640-641]. Le 1er mai 1933, un boycotte général des magasins Juifs fut promulgué, et quiconque persistait à s’y aventurer pouvait subir les foudres des jeunes SA qui ne demandaient qu’à se battre. L’exemple de ce directeur de théâtre, qui le 12 mars 1933 fut poursuivi par des membres de cette formation paramilitaire, déshabillé, puis roué de coups de matraques et de bâton, qui finit par se suicider peu après l’attaque, est éloquent ⁠[KERSHAW, P. 669-670].

Mais tout cela n’était encore qu’un début, car bien pire attendait le peuple Juif pourtant établi en Allemagne depuis la nuit des temps. À moyen terme, la promulgation des Lois de Nuremberg (1935) et la Kristallnachtou « Nuit de Cristal » (1938) était pour leur donner un sérieux avertissement pour l’avenir, où ils finiraient par être physiquement exterminés. Six millions d’entre eux finirent violemment leur vie dans le processus de ce qui a été appelé la Shoah ou Holocauste. Le chemin d’Auschwitz débuta donc dès 1933. Voyons d’un peu plus près ce processus.

3.1- Les Lois de Nuremberg, septembre 1935

3.1.1- L’Antisémitisme en Allemagne

Les Juifs ayant été les « déicides », le Haut clergé chrétien leur en tint rigueur et ne cessa de médire ces derniers. À titre d’exemple — probablement le plus fameux — le Pape dira que les Juifs avaient empoisonné les puits pour expliquer la grande Peste de 1347 [WEINDLING, P.48]. Au cours des siècles qui suivirent, les Juifs d’Europe furent victimes de plusieurs pogroms de tout acabit, et ils furent toujours considérés comme citoyens de seconde zone — du moins jusqu’au XIXè siècle où la plupart des pays en firent des citoyens à part entière et levèrent les mesures contre ces dernier[7]. Mais l’antisémitisme, tout comme les crises économiques, semble cyclique, et il renaîtra en Allemagne à la fin du XIXè siècle. Le siècle suivant, quoique plus civilisé que l’époque médiévale, verra culminer cette judéophobie jusqu’au point de devenir un génocide industrialisé et de grande ampleur.

3.1.2- Brève histoire de l’antisémitisme allemand

Comme nous l’avons précédemment vu, le XIXè siècle voit se parachever la révolution industrielle, qui provoqua l’exode rural et favorisa dans les villes, vu le surpeuplement et les conditions difficiles, des maux sociaux — tels la prostitution, le jeu, l’alcoolisme, la pauvreté, le crime etc — et médecins et généticiens argumenteront que ce que devient un individu est profondément ancré dans ses gènes, et croiront qu’ainsi, l’environnement dans lequel baigne cet individu n’a aucun effet sur son comportement — ce que nous savons bien sûr être faux de nos jours. Ces gènes déficients devaient être éradiqués pour empêcher leur transmission à la génération suivante sans quoi l’humanité entrerait dans une phase de dégénérescence fatale qui la conduirait à sa perte. Mais il n’y avait pas que les crimes ou le fait d’être pauvre qui rendait un individu dégénéré : il y avait également la Race. Effectivement, les thèses de GOBINEAU, LAPOUGE et HAECKEL affirment d’une part que le métissage est l’origine de la dégénérescence humaine[PICHOT, P. 311] et plus un peuple était pâle, et plus il était de « race supérieure[8] ».

Nous sommes donc en droit de nous demander comment cela se fait-il que les Juifs, des Blancs, se soient retrouvés être la cible des eugénistes et comment se retrouvèrent-ils au coeur du plus grand génocide de l’humanité sous des prétextes de « pureté des gènes » ? Tout d’abord, l’antisémitisme biologique n’est pas issu de la hiérarchisation des races dont nous venons de parler. Comme nous l’avons énoncé ci-haut, il se fonde sur l’antisémitisme traditionnel (les Juifs déicides) puis s’aggrava dans le contexte du marasme économique suite à la Crise économique de 1929; de politique instable des années 20, et enfin, dans le malstrom social des années qui suivirent la défaite allemande de la guerre 14-18 et de la République de Weimar.

À une époque où les jeunes Allemands apprenaient que la Nation était moins une entité politique qu’une entité collective de sang, de langue et de race[9], il était normal que les étrangers fussent regardés comme intrus et vilipendés en public. Ainsi, lorsque des étudiants Juifs des pays de l’Est[MASSIN, préface dans WEINDLING, p.9]débarquèrent en masse pour étudier dans les facultés de médecine allemandes, il n’en fallut pas plus pour que les idées sociales-darwiniennes déjà fortement incrustées dans les mentalités ne se saisissent de cet antisémitisme pour faire du Juif un être dégénéré[PICHOT, P. 394-395]].Ces thèses furent publiées dans des revues spécialisées, des colloques, des Sociétés philanthropiques, des conférences, si bien qu’elles entrèrent dans «l’aire du temps » et le quidam Allemand commun y croyait dur comme fer.

Ne manquait plus qu’un gouvernement pour faire du social-darwinisme la pierre angulaire de son pouvoir, et ce dernier se hissa au pouvoir le 30 janvier 1933, et il devint une « biocratie » pour reprendre les termes de Weindling[WEINDLING, P.45], qui allait s’appuyer presque entièrement sur l’expertise des médecins pour tenter de « purifier » la nation de tous les « dégénérés » en les exterminant : les Juifs allaient devenir numériquement les plus grandes victimes du carnage que HITLER et ses médecins allaient entreprendre. Mais dans les débuts du régime, il n’était pas encore question d’élimination physique des Juifs. Le but, au départ, était simplement de leur enlever toute possibilité d’influence et tout moyen de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans la Nation germanique, et sur un plan eugéniste, on voulait qu’il leur soit impossible de « corrompre » les gènes des « bons Allemands » à naître en interdisant les mariages mixtes, et cela voulait dire empêcher un(e) Allemand(e) « aryen(ne) » d’épouser un(e) Juif ou juive. À partir de 1935, Hitler et les siens commencent à mettre des mesures en place, et pour débuter ce dessein, sa toute première action en la matière fut de promulguer les célèbres Lois de Nuremberg. Voyons comment cela s’est fait.

3.1.3- Le contexte antisémite en Allemagne - 1933-1935

Tout d’abord, il faut savoir que dans les années vingt, l’extrême droite en Allemagne, peu importe le parti, faisait ses choux gras de l’antisémitisme. Le parti National Socialiste des Travailleurs Allemands n’y échappait pas. Ainsi, lorsque Anton DREXLER, chef et fondateur du Parti céda sa place à Adolf HITLER, en 1920, quatre articles de son programme en 25 points concerne les Juifs :

« (…) 4) Seul peut être citoyen un frère de race; seul est un frère de race celui qui est de sangAllemand sans considération de confession. Aucun Juif ne peut donc être un frèrede race.5) Qui n’est pas citoyen ne peut vivre en Allemagne que comme hôte et doit être soumis à la réglementation sur les étrangers. 6) Le droit de décider de la direction et des Lois de l’État ne peut appartenir qu’à des Citoyens. Nous demandons donc que toutes les fonctions officielles (…) aussi bienDans le Reich que dans les Länder et les communes soient exercées uniquement parDes citoyens. Toute nouvelle entrée de non-Allemands est interdite. Nous demandonsDonc que tous les non allemands entrés en Allemagne depuis le 2 août 1914 soit Forcés de quitter immédiatement le Reich allemand (…) »[HILBERG, vol 1 p.35].[10]

Au printemps de l’année 1935, cela faisait déjà un peu plus de deux ans que Hitler était au pouvoir. Une nouvelle vague de violences antisémites avaient eu lieu partout au pays entre mai et septembre : en Franconie, le Gauleiters Julius STREICHER se fit rapporter des incidents par ses subordonnés dont le suicide de Juifs pris à partie par les SA. À Berlin, dans un cinéma où l’on présentait un film antisémite, des Juifs dans la salle protestèrent et eurent droit à la matraque une fois sortis de l’établissement[KERSHAW, P. 791-792]. Le chef de police, Herr LEVETZOW, que les Nazis trouvaient trop coulant, fut renvoyé par GOEBBELS, Gauleiters de la capital et ministre de la Propagande, et fut remplacé par un ancien chef de la SA, Wolf Heinrich Graf VON HELDORFF un antisémite convaincu qui une fois au pouvoir, fit fermer tous les magasins dont les propriétaires étaient Juifs dans la Kürfurtendammstrasse[11]. Dans les rues, des pancartes antisémites étaient apparues un peu partout, dont l’une des plus célèbre reprenait les paroles d’un journaliste tout aussi célèbre, Heinrich von TREITSCHKE«Juden sind unser Unglück » ou en Français « Les Juifs sont notre malheur! ». Des journaux, tels Der Stürmerde Streicher, Der Angriffde GOEBBELS excitaient également l’antisémitisme de part et d’autres[KERSHAW, p. 796-797]. Le 1er mai 1933, un boycotte d’ampleur national des magasins Juifs avait été organisé, ce qui donna lieu à d’autres violences, ainsi qu’à du pillage et du vandalisme.À titre de protestations, les dockers de New-York arrachèrent le drapeau rouge Nazi frappé de la Croix gammée installé sur les mats du Liner à vapeur Bremen, ce qui déclencha un incident diplomatique entre l’Allemagne et les États-Unis : HITLER ne se priva point pour attribuer la chose à ses ennemis de prédilection, c’est à dire le judéo-bolchevisme[KERSHAW, P. 806-807]. Suite à tous ces incidents, des Juifs avaient cru plus prudent de quitter l’Allemagne, tandis qu’ils le pouvaient encore, mais étant donné que pour les Jeux Olympiques de 1936 le Reich allemand avait momentanément cessé ses brimades judéophobes pour une question d’image internationale, certains Juifs avaient cru bon revenir en Allemagne, leur pays natal depuis souvent plusieurs générations, convaincus que le pire était derrière eux. Mais ils se trompaient[KERSHAW, P. 794].

IV- LES LOIS DE NUREMBERG SEPTEMBRE 1935

4.1- Une législation pour calmer les esprits

Partout au pays, des violences s’étaient déchaînées, et HITLER et son parti n’étaient pas étrangers à cela, puisque dans ses discours, entre 1919 et 1932, celui qui était devenu le Führer avait toujours encouragé ses fidèles à casser du Juif. Cependant, une fois celui-ci devenu chef d’État, ces excès de violences ne l’arrangeaient plus. Il y avait désormais des impératifs de relations internationales qui étaient apparues sur l’échiquier du dictateur, et il ne pouvait en faire fi — probablement à son plus grand regret. Il fallait donc régler le problème, c’est à dire empêcher le simple citoyen de s’en prendre à son homologue juif. Cependant, il ne faut pas rêver : HITLER ne faisait pas cela par pure bonté d’âme : comme on vient de le mentionner, il y avait des impératifs d’ordre internationaux, mais également d’ordre économiques.

4.2 - Les torts causés à l’économie par l’antisémitisme

Le 20 août 1935 une conférence interministérielle eut lieu au bureau du directeur de la Reichsbank, SACHSCHT où étaient présents les ministres des finances; de l’éducation; de la justice; le ministre d’État Bavarois qui représentait le parti, et autres plénipotentiaires du régime. Le directeur de la banque du Reich prévenait l’assemblée que si les violences contre les Juifs se poursuivaient, il ne pourrait assurer son rôle de pivot dans l’économie du réarmement que HITLER avait poursuivi sitôt arrivé au pouvoir[12]. Le boycotte instigué par STREICHER avait fait en sorte que des biens non juifs avaient été détruits, et des pays étrangers avaient décrété des sanctions économiques à l’Allemagne en protestation. Le licenciement de Juifs, sous les instances du parti, avait provoqué d’importantes pertes financières, comme par exemple en Égypte où un agent juif des assurances Allienz avait dû démissionner suite à des pressions politiques, en amenant avec lui tous ses clients. Embauché dans une société britannique, c’est au final cette dernière qui profita grassement de l’antisémite allemand[HILBERG, P. 40]. L’interdiction faite aux Juifs d’accéder aux bains publics valut au gouvernement des protestations lors de la Foire Internationale prévue peu après. Des firmes allemandes, tel Bosch perdirent de gros contrats à l’étranger. Et les exemples étaient encore légion. WAGNER, représentant du parti Nazi, affirma à SCHASCHT regretter les actions sauvages, mais que celles-ci ne cesseraient qu’une fois que le parti aurait légiféré sur le sujet. Ainsi, seulement les citoyens ne poseraient plus de gestes regrettables, puisque soutenus par l’État[HILBERG, P. 41]. Tous les participants à cette réunion se mirent d’accord pour conclure que seule la certitude qu’apporterait une Loi viendrait à bout des incertitudes qui plombaient l’économie.

4.3 - Un rattrapage politique

Le 8 août, HITLER fit un discours radiodiffusé et interdit purement et simplement toute action individuelle posée contre les Juifs. Rudolf HESS, numéro deux du régime, fit un rapport, et le distribua dans tous les organes du parti dont il était directeur. Les Conservateurs voulaient des mesures implacables contre les Juifs, et ils ne comprenaient pas que soudain, HITLER interdise ce qu’il avait passé des années à encourager. Le dictateur était pris entre l’arbre et l’écorce[KERSHAW, P. 797-798]. Chez les activistes du parti, un rapport de la Gestapo résumait ainsi le sentiment qui prévalait chez les fanatiques Nationaux-socialistes :

C’est à nous, la base, de mettre en branle la solution au problème juif et ainsi d’obliger les gouvernements à suivre! »[KERSHAW, P. 794-795]

Effectivement, de part et d’autres, on avait le sentiment que malgré les belles promesses, HITLER et les siens n’avaient rien fait pour extirper les Juifs de la société allemande, malgré les promesses qu’il avait fait au cours des années, et rien n’avait été fait pour éliminer leur influence. La Gestapo, débordée, exigeait des mesures discriminatoires afin de savoir clairement à quoi s’en tenir. De son propre chef, elle interdit aux Juifs d’arborer le drapeau Nazi à croix gammée, et quiconque passait outre se retrouvait en camps de concentration ou dans ses geôles de Berlin[KERSHAW, P. 795]. HITLER commençait à sentir l’urgence, pressé de toutes parts.

4.4 - Une question eugénique et biologique

Comme on l’a mentionné ci-haut, le régime nazi était un régime dont l’idéologie « mère » était le social-darwinisme, et avec lui, l’eugénisme[13]. Les Juifs par amalgame étant considérés comme « le nec plus ultra » des gènes dégénérés par HITLER et les siens, l’inquiétude était donc d’ordre biologique : il fallait avant tout les empêcher de procréer.C’est dans cet esprit que le chef de l’Association des Médecins Nationaux-socialistes ou National Socialistische Deutsch Ärtz Bund ou NSDÄB, le docteur Gerhardt WAGNER ne cessait de prôner l’interdiction des mariages entre Aryens et Juifs[KERSHAW, P. 799]depuis 1933. En septembre 1934, il avait fait un discours devant ses membres qui participaient au Congrès de Nuremberg, et il avait exigé de FRICK un châtiment plus lourd pour toute tentative de contact sexuel entre Allemand et Juifs. Il en avait appelé à une Loi pour protéger le sang allemand afin d’empêcher “l’abâtardissement du peuple allemand[KERSHAW, P. 799]”. C’est à ce prix seulement, disait-il, qu’il serait possible de défendre la pureté de la Race et d’empêcher les Juifs de polluer et empoisonner le sang allemand[KERSHAW, P. 800]. Le docteur WAGNER et autres nationaux-socialistes suggérèrent un châtiment plus lourd — jusque’ à la peine de mort, pour certains — pour quiconque de Juif tenterait un contact sexuel avec un « pur Allemand ». Début août suivant, GOEBBELS annonça que les mariages mixtes allaient être interdits par la Loi. Cependant, ce fut plus facile à dire qu’à faire : qu’est-ce qu’un juif ? Telle était la question sur laquelle les juristes du Reich bloquaient : était-ce quelqu’un dont les deux grands-parents étaient Juifs[14]? Était-ce selon le sang qui coulait dans les veines d’un individu ? Ainsi, un Juif qui aurait du sang juif mais qui se serait converti serait-il toujours un juif ? En désespoir de cause, les avocats s’en tinrent-ils à la confession pour affirmer qu’un individu était Juif. Sur papier, cela faisait très bien, mais dans les faits, on peut facilement imaginer des descendants « d’Aryens » purs qui se seraient convertis au judaïsme qui se retrouvaient dès lors considérés comme des Juifs de Race! Totalement absurde[KERSHAW, P. 810-811]! Néanmoins, nous pouvons constater que l’idée d’une législation, même un an avant la promulgation des fameuses Lois de Nuremberg, commençait à faire son chemin. Et elle n’allait pas s’arrêter là.

4.5 - Les Lois de Nuremberg

HITLER reçut le procès-verbal de la réunion qui se tint chez le directeur de la Banque du Reich, ainsi que le rapport que le secrétaire d’État aux Affaires Étrangères en avait fait :

“Il est ressorti des discussions que le programme général du parti à l’égard des Juifs était largement respecté mais que les méthodes employés étaient critiquables. Il convient d’arrêter par des mesures légales l’expansion débridée des activités antisémites dans tous les domaines de la vie possibles et inimaginables de la part d’organisations ou de particuliers irresponsables (…) Les juifs doivent être assujettis à une législation spéciale dans certaines sphères (…) essentiellement économiques; à part cela ils doivent conserver leur liberté de mouvement. (…) La question juive faisait obstacle à l’accomplissement de leurs devoirs politiques. (…) le parti a justifié la nécessité d’une action radicale contre les Juifs par des considérations politico-émotionnelles (…)”[KERSHAW, P. 801]

Cela fut soumis à HITLER le 9 septembre 1935, et le lendemain, il devait se rendre au Congrès de Nuremberg qui, comme à tous les ans, se tenait dans la première semaine de septembre. Il n’était alors pas dans son intention de promulguer les Lois discriminatoires, mais comme la pression lui parvenait de toutes part et de tous un chacun, il se rendit aux désirs des siens[KERSHAW, P. 802-803]. De plus, cela lui fournit une excellente occasion de propagande. Ainsi, mandata-t-il le docteur Lösener, le 14 septembre, pour se rendre dans la ville des Maîtres chanteurs, accompagné de son second, Franz Albrecht MÉDICUS, pour légiférer contre les unions entre Aryens et non-aryens. La préparation des Lois fut chaotiques selon les termes de l’historien Ian KERSHAW puisque les premières versions étaient jugées par Hitler trop clémentes; les secondes trop dures. Ne perdons pas de vue que le Führer devait alors tenir compte de l’opinion internationale afin de ne pas voir l’Allemagne frappée de sanctions économiques — d’autant plus que les Jeux Olympiques étaient programmés pour l’année suivante. En définitive, HITLER retint la version la plus clémente, puis une autre encore plus clémente… qui ne servit qu’à donner à la presse internationale, mais dont il n’avait aucune intentions de mettre en pratique. Le 15 septembre, la législation était définie, et le chef Nazi en fit un discours du haut de son estrade du palais des Congrès de Nuremberg[KERSHAW, P. 806-807]. Il appela cette législation Loi sur la protection du sang allemand et de l'honneur allemand. Cette législation était constituée de 7 articles :

1) Interdiction de mariage entre Juifs et citoyens du Reich; si de tels mariages avaient été célébrés, ils étaient à partir de cette date déclarés nuls, même si ils avaient été faits à l’étranger

2) Les relations sexuelles entre Juifs et Aryens étaient interdites3) Il était interdit pour un Juif d’employer un Allemand âgé de moins de 45 ans comme employé de maison. Un Juif ne peut arborer le drapeau Nazi ou Allemand, mais étaient autorisés à porter les « couleurs juives » (!!!)

4) Le droit de porter les « couleurs juives » était garanti par l’État

5) Établissement des peines si les 4 premiers articles étaient enfreints

6) Établissement des mesures pouvant être prises par les autorités pour faire respecter la législation

7) La loi entrait en vigueur dès le moment de sa promulgation, soit le 15 septembre 1935.

En conclusion, il faut bien garder à l’esprit que ce n’étaient pas tous les Allemands qui étaient antisémites, et selon certaines enquêtes faites après la guerre, l’antisémitisme virulent était surtout la chose des membres du Parti Nazi ou de ses organisations connexes (SS, SA, BDM, NSDÄB, etc). Les gens ordinaires ne respectaient pas nécessairement les jours de boycotte des magasins juifs — sauf bien sûr lorsqu’un SA fanatique se tenait devant la porte prêt à tirer ou frapper quiconque passerait la porte dans un sens comme dans l’autre — et même lorsque les médecins se virent retirés le droit de traiter des Allemands, en 1938, la plupart de leurs patients leur restèrent fidèles jusqu’à ce que ceux-ci soient déportés dans les camps de la mort à partir de 1942. Cette législation est certes la mesure la moins dangereuse qui fut prise par les Nazis contre les Juifs, mais il ne faut pas la regarder en vertu de son risque mais plutôt en vertu du fait que ce fut la première mesure prise contre le peuple d’Israël, dans un plan beaucoup plus vaste qui à cette étape se contentait de retourner la Loi contre eux. Les Lois de Nuremberg ne furent qu’un point de départ dans une entreprise de destruction, pour reprendre les termes du sociologue et historien Raul HILBERG, sommité dans le champ historiographique de l’holocauste. L’expropriation fut la seconde étape, et comme celle des Lois de Nuremberg, elle fut exécutée par des fonctionnaires Allemands qui travaillaient presque à la chaîne pour marginaliser une large partie de leurs concitoyens, ce qui les empêchait chacun de voir l’ampleur de la chose, comme le dira Adolf EICHMANN, chef du Bureau IV-B-4 de la Gestapo, c’est à dire « Affaires Juives », lors de son procès à Jérusalem en 1960. Après l’expropriation, ce fut la concentration — dans les différents Ghettos pendant la guerre — et enfin, l’ultime étape, vint l’extermination physique pure et simple. Encore ici, le travail fut fait à la chaîne, tout comme l’industrialisation, qui n’avait alors pas tout à fait 150 ans, avait montré à le faire. Responsabilité diluée même pour les bourreaux; six millions de personnes et plus tuée de façon industrielle avec le concours des médecins qui furent les piliers de l’holocauste puisque présent d’un bout à l’autre du processus, alors que par leur serment ils auraient dû soigner plutôt que tuer.Les Lois de Nuremberg n’étaient qu’un début. Et c’est véritablement en cela qu’elles furent monstrueuses.

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NOTES DE FIN DE DOCUMENT :

1) Hörst WESSEL était un chef SA qui est mort lors d’une bataille contre les communistes le 23 février 1930. (réf: Jean-Luc Leleu, La Waffen SS, tome 1

2) C’est Reinhardt Heydrich, de sinistre mémoire, qui allait le remplacer quelques années plus tard. Heydrich incorpora la Gestapo au Services de Sécurité, chapeauté par la SS, et son supérieur direct allait être Himmler lui-même. Heydrich allait se démarquer dans sa chasse aux Nazis (il serait même celui qui a lancé officiellement la Solution finalequi conduisit 6 millions de Juifs aux fours crématoires); il mit sur pied les Einszatsgruppen ou selon l’historien Raul Hilberg « les Groupes mobiles de tuerie » qui allaient sillonner l’Est et tuer les Juifs dans d’immenses fosses communes dont la plus célèbre demeure Babi-Yar, en 1942. Protecteur de Bohème-Moravie, Heydrich allait également s’attaquer aux Résistants, mais quelques uns d’entre eux, soutenus par Londres, allaient le tuer dans un attentat qui manqua d’échouer, en juin 1942.

3) Cette question, encore de nos jours, constitue l’une des querelle les plus actives parmi les historiens universitaire. La thèse la plus couramment défendu est celle qui affirme que ce serait les Nazis eux-mêmes qui auraient mis le feu au Reichstag afin de se donner une bonne raison pour suspendre les libertés et droits civiques; toutefois, depuis le début des années 2000, plusieurs historiens — dont Kershaw et Broszat — affirment qu’un tel complot n’a jamais existé que dans la tête de certains de leurs confrères et ils affirment dans leurs monographies respectives que c’est bel et bien Van der Lubbe qui a mis le feu au Reichstag. Lors du procès de Nuremberg, Hermann Göring (qui a pourtant admis l’existence de certains complots Nazis tel celui qui fut le prétexte au déclenchement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, « l’incident de Gleiwitz » alors que des membres de la SS se déguisèrent en Polonais pour attaquer une radio allemande afin de faire croire que des membres de l’armée polonaise avaient attaqué des Allemands sans provocation) a nié être impliqué — lui-même ou des membres de son parti — dans l’incendie du Reichstag. Il n’avait donc aucune raison de mentir. Cela nous incite à nous ranger du côté de la thèse de Kershaw et Broszats , à savoir que les Nazis ne sont en rien impliqués dans cet incident qui néanmoins, les a bien servis.

4) Le mot « suspendre » employé par les Nazis ici reflète l’hypocrisie du régime car en fait, c’était purement et simplement une abolition en bonne et due forme, car ce décret ne fut levé qu’avec la fin de la guerre et du régime Nazi, en 1945.

5) Il s’agit d’une Lot des Pleins pouvoirs, ou en Allemand la Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich vom 24. März 1933.

6) De nos jours nous savons que la Peste se transmet à l’Homme par les rats qui en sont les vecteurs. Cependant, au Moyen-âge, l’épidémiologie n’existait pas encore et il faudra attendre Louis Pasteur au XIX è siècle pour débuter une base de connaissances sur le sujet.

7) Pour une histoire plus détaillée, voir Saul Friländer, Histoire de l’antisémitisme publié en 2 volumes dans la « collection point Histoire ».

8) Haeckel disait que les Méditerranéens (il entendait par là la Race Blanche) étaient constitués de 4 races : 1) les Indo-germain (ce qui incluait les Anglo-saxons, c’est à dire les peuples les plus avancés de l’industrialisation) 2) les Sémites (les Juifs et les Maures) — on voit donc ici que de prime abord, les Juifs n’étaient pas considérés par les eugénistes comme inférieurs — 3) les Caucasiens, 4) les Basques. (Réf: A. Pichot, op.cit, p. 394)

9) Ce qui fut le point de départ de la fameuse « Weltanchauung », c’est à dire la « conception du monde » selon laquelle l’Allemagne, en tant que nation supérieure avait le devoir de coloniser le reste du monde. C’est cette même conception du monde qui fut le ciment idéologique qui contribua à lancer les Allemands dans la Première Guerre mondiale avec enthousiasme et joie, et à garantir à l’État Major qu’il était dans son bon droit. Guillaume II s’en servit pour harasser les foules.

10) L’anecdote a de quoi susciter le sourire de notre lecteur : Hitler, en 1920, n’était pas citoyen allemand puisqu’il était Autrichien de naissance. Il faisait donc techniquement parti des « étrangers » dont son programme parlait. Il ne sera fait citoyen Allemand qu’une fois la guerre débutée. Les autorités allemandes auraient donc pu théoriquement le jeter dehors. Lors de son service militaire dans un régiment Bavarois, le Régiment de List, l’Autriche le rechercha pour désertion, mais des cafouillages de l’administration empêcha ces derniers de mettre la main sur lui. Il fut simplement dénaturalisé en (il perdit donc sa citoyenneté autrichienne) guise de sanction. Si seulement les fonctionnaires de l’Autriche auraient fait leur travail correctement, on ne peut s’empêcher de songer qu’ils auraient sauvé plus de 60 millions de personnes! L’Histoire parfois ne tient qu’à très peu de choses…

11) Équivalent pour Berlin des Champs-Élysées en France.

12) Notons au passage que c’est faux de prétendre que ce furent les Nazis qui débutèrent l’armement du Reich — en totale illégalité des clauses du Traité de Versailles, rappelons-le — puisque le gouvernement de la République de Weimar prit l’initiative dans ce domaine dix ans plus tôt.

13) Rappelons que le social-darwinisme ne devient eugénisme seulement lorsqu’il y a législation de la part d’un gouvernement afin de promulguer des Lois en accord avec le social-darwinisme. Ces Lois peuvent être positives — c’est à dire lorsqu’on encourage la propagation des « bons gènes » : allocation pour ceux qui ont le plus d’enfants; etc. — ou négatives — par exemple, empêcher le mariage de deux personnes que l’on juge être « de mauvais gènes » etc.( Cf: A. Pichot, op.cit)

14) Un mythe tenace affirme que Hitler aurait eu une grand-mère juive. Les historiens ont pu déterminer que cela est peu probable, et la rumeur tient du fait que du côté paternel, le grand-père de Hitler, Nepomuk Hiedler aurait eu Aloïs, le père du Führer, avec une femme inconnue qui aurait été la servante de Nepomuk, Maria Schiklgrüber. Lorsque le père de Hitler naquit, Nepomuk disparut de sa vie pendant plus de 40 ans, avant de revenir et de reconnaître officiellement la paternité d’Aloïs, et avait entre temps changé son nom de Hiedler pour Hitler (en allemand, la prononciation est la même puisque les voyelles devant une consonne ne se prononce pas). Voir Ian Kershaw Hitler 1889-1936 pour plus de détails à ce sujet et un arbre généalogique plus complet.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE :

1) PICHOT, André., La société pure de Darwin à Hitler

2) HILBERG, Raul., La destruction des Juifs d’Europe, vol 1.

3) KERSHAW, Ian, Hitler - 1889-1936 Némésis, Vol 1.

4) WEINDLING, Paul., L’hygiène de la Race : Hygiène raciale et eugénisme médical en Allemagne 1870-1933,

2 notes · View notes