#offensive manouevres

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

“Huns Take Villers Bretonneux and Hangard; Rest of Line Maintained,” Sault Star. April 25, 1918. Page 1. ---- Heavy Attacks by Germans At Many Points Were Checked ---- NEW ASSAULT IN NORTHERN SALIENT ---- Attack British and French Around Bailleul Yesterday and Today ---- London, April 25— Heavy fighting continues on the sector east of Amiens Reuter's correspondent at British army headquarters reports. The Germans obtained a footing in Duquenne wood west of Villers-Bretonneaux. The British counterattacked and drove them back to the fringe of the wood. At several places, the British have retaken ground and their position has improved considerably. Both British and German tanks participated in the fighting. At Villere-Bretonneux, two British tanks, the correspondent says, got among a mass of Germans and did good execution. 

The Germans made a determined attempt to rush toward Kemmel hill yesterday but without appreciable effect The French counterattacked and recovered the position.

At two o’clock this morning, the Germans put down an intense gas barrage on the Anglo-French front in Flanders and two hours later deep waves of Infantry delivered an assault. Fighting still is In progress. 

Three Attacks Repulsed London, April 15— Three attacks made by the Germans on the British positions east of Amiens have been repulsed, it is announced officially. On the Flanders front, late yesterday, the Germans attacked the French positions northeast of Bailleul and were repulsed. This morning after an intense bombardment they renewed their attacks in this sector and against the British positions further east.

The British regained ground around Villers-Bretonneux by counterattacks and took prisoners. Severe lighting was In progress all night in and round Villers-Bretonneux and still continues. Heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy. 

On the Bailleul sector the battle Is continuing over a wide front.

The official statement follows: “Heavy lighting took place all night in and around Villers-Bretonneux and still continues. Our troops regained ground by counterattacks and have taken a number of prisoners. Fighting yesterday on the whole of this front was most severe and heavy casualties were Inflicted on the enemy by artillery infantry and tanks.

North of the Villers-Brctonneux-St Quentin road the enemy three times attacked our positions and on each occasion was repulsed with loss During this lighting the enemy made use of a few tanks. 

"Late yesterday evening the enemy also attacked French positions northeast of Bailleul and was repulsed. Early this morning the enemy renewed his attacked in this sector and on the British positions farther east after an intense bombardment. Fighting continues in this sector on a wide front

"A raid attempted by the enemy during the night in the neighborhood of Bucquoy was repulsed. Hostile artillery has been active during the night In the Festubert and Rohecq sectors of the front." 

Hangard Falls Paris April 25— The Germans have captured the village of Hangard on the front southeast of Amiens, the War Office announced today. The battle continued with violence through the night in this sector The French lost Hangard recaptured It and finally were again forced out of the town but are holding ground immediately aronnd it The official statement follows: 

"The battle continued with violence around the village of Hangard on which the Germans concentrated their efforts during the night. The French troops resisted valiantly and counter attacked several times with success. The village was lost then retaken by the French and finally remained in the hands of the Germans at the cost of heavy losses. The French are holding the immediate outskirts of Hangard and the Germans have not been successful so far.

[mostly-history]

Russia's provisional government, too, was faced with monstrous problems.  It was being financed and generously supplied by the British and French but was increasingly unable to keep either its armies intact or its home front under control.  On April 11th, and All-Russian Conference of Soviets voted to support a continuation of the war, but it also called for negotiations aimed at achieving peace without annexations or indemnities on either side.  On April 15th, tens of thousands of Russian troops came out of their trenches to join with their German and Austrian adversaries in impromptu and nearly mutinous Easter celebrations.  On the following day Lenin arrived in Petrograd from his long exile in Switzerland; Ludendorff, hoping to foment further disruption inside Russia, had approved his travel by rail from Switzerland via Frankfurt, Berlin, Stockholm, and Helsinki.  Upon his arrival the Bolshevik leader began manouevring his followers into an anti-war stance calculated to take advantage of public discontent. The Russians had promised a May 1st attack in support of the Nivelle Offensive and had assembled a massive force for the purpose.  The offensive proved impossible, however, to carry out.  The troops had become ungovernable, and not enough coal could be found to operate the necessary trains.  On May 2nd, Kerensky became leader of the provisional government.  He tried to address the army's problems, but everything he did ended up making them worse.  When he released all men over age forty-three from military service, a transportation system that was already on the verge of collapse found itself mobbed by middle-aged veterans desperate to get to their homes.  When he abolished the death penalty for desertion, a million soldiers threw down their weapons.  Many were drawn homeward by the hope of getting a piece of land when the great estates of the aristocracy were distributed to the people.  Many were simply sick of war.

“A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918”

[autodidact-adventures]

World War I (Part 59): More Politics

After the February Revolution and the Battle of Arras & Nivelle Offensive, political turmoil increased once again, with struggles for power erupting in Russia, Germany and Berlin.

Russia

In Russia, the tsar's regime had been toppled; the tsar's ministers were under arrest and rival factions battled for control of the provisional government.  The politicians had to decide what form of government to use, and how to organize its worsening economy.

For the first half of 1917, there was still strong support for continuing the war.  Minster of Justice Alexander Kerensky claimed that the revolution had been partially an angry reaction to rumours that the Romanov government might settle for a separate peace.  He and the general staff were preparing a summer campaign, one that was smaller than the late 1916 Chantilly one.

But resistance against the war was growing, especially among the army and industrial workforce, which was where the most support was needed.  By May, over 35,000 troops were deserting each month.  On the home front, the situation was still volatile.  Soviets had been recently formed, representing soldiers, sailors and workers; they were very skeptical about what Kerensky was doing.  Lenin had returned from exile and was now in charge of the Communist Party's Bolshevik faction, which was stirring up opposition and becoming more & more bold in doing so.

Germany

In Germany, the struggle was simpler, focusing on who would be in control of the government.  Nearly all the elite of German society were united against any meaningful reform, and their only real opposition was Chancellor Bethmann von Hollweg.  The kaiser floated between both camps, and was overall a fence-sitter.  He often agreed with Bethmann – for example, in 1917 he issued an Easter message endorsing his proposals for electoral reform.  But he knew that he was being increasingly overshadowed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

These two blamed Bethmann for pretty much everything.  They claimed that his failure to keep control over domestic policies was lessening the Reichstag's loyalty.  Trying to arrange peace negotiations was making Germany look weak, and also encouraging the Entente nations to keep fighting.  When strikes broke out in Berlin, they blamed him for that, too.

A standoff between them and Bethmann was lasting for months.  A conference was held on April 23rd, where Hindenburg & Luidendorff demanded a war aims memorandum be approved – one that declared Germany's intentions to annex parts of Belgium and France, and large parts of the Balkans.  Bethmann didn't resist, but a week later he placed a note in the files, in which he stated that he viewed the memorandum as meaningless – it implied Germany's ability to dictate peace terms to the Entente, which was completely unrealistic.  He wrote, “I have co-signed the protocol because it would be laughable to depart over fantasies.”

On May 15th, he gave a speech to the Reichstag, declaring himself to be “in complete accord” with the generals on war aims, but also willing to offer Russia a settlement “founded on mutually honourable understanding.”  These two things contradicted each other, of course, and caused Bethmann to lose potential support in the Reichstag – there was a growing number of Reichstag members who realized that the U-boat campaign was failing and wanted a negotiated settlement.  On the other hand, Ludendorff became even more hostile towards Bethmann because of the peace-with-Russia section.

There were two sources of support for Hindenburg and Ludendorff – the first was their success as generals going all the way back to the Battle of Tannenberg.  The second was from the most powerful & conservative parts of German society.  This elite believed that only victory could prevent the ordinary people from demanding reform of the entire system after the war finished.

Pressure began to grow for Bethmann to be dismissed.  The kaiser resisted strongly (to a surprising degree), because he realized that the new chancellor would be Ludendorff's pawn, which would cause the end of Bismarck's system.  But the pressure was great – even his wife and son (the Crown Prince Wilhelm) took part.  And the generals were willing to do almost anything to get what they wanted, whereas the kaiser was not.

Britain

Here, as in Germany, the struggle was between the head of the government (PM David Lloyd George) and the general staff, but apart from that there were few similarities.  Unlike in Germany, a military-based challenge to government control of policy was impossible.  The struggle was only over control of the BEF, but was still very intense.

Lloyd George faced off against Douglas Haig and General Sir William Robertson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and based in London). As the summer of 1917 began [June], the question of what to do with the BEF was paramount.  Lloyd George's government had began shakily, but now had solid public support; he was very skeptical about the generals' tactics and strategies (with good reason).  Any inclination he might have previously had to leave military things to the military, had been destroyed with the failures at Arras and the Chemin des Dames.  He insisted that they wait for a great number of American troops to arrive before launching any more large offensives. He pushed for an Italian offensive while the French and Russians recovered & rested, and the Americans got an army ready.

There was actually no guarantee that America would send a whole lot of troops into the field.  After Wilson's declaration of war, it wasn't certain that they were going to do anything more than send money, equipment and ships to their new allies.  The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee declared that “Congress will not permit American soldiers to be sent to Europe,” but Wilson quickly proved him wrong on that.  However, America didn't have much of an army yet – until a gradual buildup was authorized in late 1916, their regular army had only 130,000 men (barely putting them among the 20 biggest armies in the world).  They had no tanks, almost no aircraft, and very few machine-guns (even though the machine-gun was an American invention).  The general staff was legally limited to only 55 officers, with only 29 being allowed to be based in Washington – the country distrusted military establishments.

Also, their largest army unit was a regiment – there were no divisions.  The military quickly organized a First Division and sent it to France to show theyr were serious.  It was led by General John Persing, who had begun his career in fighting against the Native Americans.  On July 4th, it marched through the streets of Paris to an enthusiastic reception.  But it was much too small to be of any importance, and wasn't ready for combat.  There weren't any other divisions ready yet.

The first draft since the Civil War was authorized.  By mid-1917, every male from 21-31yrs was registered (it would later be 21-45yrs). 32 training camps were built within two months, each covering 8,000 – 12,000 acres (32.4 – 48.5 square km), and with 1,500 buildings capable of holding 40,000 men.

Nearly every noncom in the regular army was commissioned.  New schools (with specialties from gunnery to baking) were established along the East Coast.  The Entente sent veterans over to America to train American instructors in modern war.  The French specialized in artillery, tactics, liaison and fortifications; the British specialized in mortars, machine-guns, sniping, bayonets and gas.

In order to manage all this, the War Department and general staff had to be greatly expanded and restructured.  But even with all this expansion, Washington was not prepared for Pershing's estimate of how many troops he would require within a year.  Soon after he arrived in France, he reported, “It is evident that a force of about one million is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced and independent fighting organization.  Plans for the future should be based...on three times this force – i.e., at least three million men.”

Battle of Messines

Douglas Haig was still obsessed with Flanders, believing he could make a breakthrough at Ypres.  The Royal Navy leaders agreed with him – on the Belgian coast, their naval guns could support the infantry; and it was a strategic objective that they had to take. The Admiralty had been working on plans for an amphibious invasion of the region since 1915.  By spring [March-May] 1917, they were building huge floating docks that could land infantry and tanks.

Haig and his staff decided to seize this opportunity.  With his staff, he worked out a plan to combine a new offensive out of the Ypres salient with an amphibious landing.  They would thus be attacking Germany from two different directions, and force them to give up the Belgian coast.  They might even be able to drive Germany out of Belgium entirely, by giving them no room to manouevre.  And with their flank exposed, they might be forced back from the Hindenburg Line.

At the very least, the British would capture the Belgian ports of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Blankenberge.  Germany would lose the ports that they were using to send some of their smaller submarines out from into the Channel – and this would strengthen Britain's position when it came to any peace negotiations.

But although the amphibious landing was a new idea, the Ypres offensive would be the same old strategy that had just failed in the Nivelle Offensive – a massive artillery bombardment followed by an infantry attack, supposedly leading to a breakthrough that the cavalry could exploit.  Lloyd George was angry when he heard about it; and the amphibious landing wouldn't be possible until this supposed breakthrough had been achieved.

Haig attempted to placate Lloyd George by laying down a specific definition of the breakthrough – it would be counted as real once they'd captured the town of Roulers (11.3km into German territory), and then they would start the amphibious landing.  Lloyd George, however, believed that Roulers was out of reach for them.  Haig and Robertson believed he was being presumptuous to have an opinion on such things.

Weather was a very important factor in western Belgium.  The region of Flanders is extremely flat, with scattered farmhouses, small villages and some patches of trees, but very little else.  The ridges and hills of the Great War battles are barely noticeable today as more than wrinkles.

Flanders is also a very low part of the northern Europe's great coastal plain.  The inhabitants spent centuries installing drains, canals and dikes so that it could be farmed, as previously it was practically an extension of the sea.  Even today, it is the wettest a terrain can be without being an estuary.

Even in “dry” weather, you only have to dig a few spadesful of earth to strike water.  It almost always rains heavily in late summer [August], and the whole area turns into mud.  Because of the soil composition, it turns into a bottomless, gluey mess.

Haig was warned about this.  Actually, the summers of 1915 & 1916 had been very dry for Flanders, unusually so.  However, his staff looked at records going back to the 1830's, and reported that usually “in Flanders the weather broke early each August with the regularity of the Indian monsoon.”  The London Times military correspondent was a retired Lieutenant Colonel, and he warned Haig against trying to launch a major offensive in late summer: “You can fight in mountains and deserts, but no one can fight in mud and when the water is let out against you.  At the best, you are restricted to the narrow fronts on the higher ground, which are very unfavourable with modern weapons.”

“When the water is let out against you” would be referring to the Belgians in 1914, when they'd opened their dikes to flood the countryside east of the Yser River to hold back the Germans.  The Germans would have learned from that, and might also use it against the British.  Furthermore, heavy bombardment might wreck the fragile drainage system & cause flooding.

Haig didn't completely ignore these warnings, but he carried on anyway – he was impatient to begin while the Flanders region was still dry.  As soon as the Battle of Arras was finished, he began building up an attack force at Ypres.  Lloyd George hadn't given approval for this, and Pétain had warned Haig that this plan had no chance of success (this warning wasn't passed on to Lloyd George.)

For preparation, Haig wanted to establish a new strongpoint on the salient's edge, which could be an anchor for troops moving outwards. And he had a perfect way to do this, thanks to General Sir Herbert Plumer, who had been commander of the Second Army on the salient's edge for the past two years (during that time, ¼ of Britain's casualties had been at Ypres).

In 1915, Plumer had ordered tunnels to be dug towards the German positions opposite his line.  In 1916, he expanded these tunnels into the biggest mining operation of the whole war – there were 20 shafts, some almost 800m long, and many over 30m deep to escape detection.  They were drained by generator-driven pumps.  The tunnels were extended towards the Germans, eventually reaching to below the Messines Ridge, which had been an excellent vantage point for German military spotters to survey the region.  One of the mines was discovered & destroyed by the Germans, but the other 19 were finished and packed with explosives without the enemy finding out.

The Battle of Messines began with a week-long artillery bombardment, with the heaviest concentration of artillery of the whole war so far (one gun for every 7m of front).  Then on June 7th, at 3:10am, the mines were detonated.  They exploded nearly at the same time, blowing up the entire ridge into the air.  Tremors were felt as far away as London, and David Lloyd George heard a faint boom at 10 Downing Street, where he was working through the night.

A lieutenant with a machine-gun corps later said, “When I heard the first deep rumble I turned to the men and shouted, 'Come on, let's go.'  A fraction of a second later a terrific roar and the whole earth seemed to rock and sway.  The concussion was terrible, several of the men and myself being thrown down violently.  It seemed to be several minutes before the earth stood still again though it may not really have been more than a few seconds.  Flames rose to a great height – silhouetted against the flames I saw huge blocks of earth that seemed to be as big as houses falling back to the ground.  Small chunks and dirt fell all around.  I saw a man flung out from behind a huge block of debris silhouetted against the sheet of flame. Presumably some poor devil of a Boche.  It was awful, a sort of inferno.

A member of a tank crew said, “We got out of the tank and walked over to this huge crater.  You'd never seen anything like the size of it, you'd never believe that explosives could do it.  I saw about 150 Germans lying there dead, all in different positions, some as if throwing a bomb, some still with a gun on their shoulder.  The mine had killed them all.  The crew stood there for about five minutes and looked.  It made us think.  That mine had won the battle before it started.  We looked at each other as we came away and the sight of it remained with you always.  To see them all lying there with their eyes open.”

All that was left was a line of 21m-deep craters – the ridge had been destroyed, with very few British casualties.  They'd penetrated about 3.2km into the German lines (at their farthest point), but Haig didn't want to advance any further at the moment.  He'd achieved his objective; he didn't want to Second Army so far ahead that the artillery couldn't protect it; and he wanted to dig in before the Germans could counterattack.  For a few hours, there was an opportunity to break deeply into the German lines, and possibly even through their broken defences, and it wasn't taken advantage of. Plumer was a capable commander, and perhaps the most important part of this battle was that he saw the advantages of a limited attack.

Lloyd George, however, still doubted Haig, and Haig still didn't have approval for the main attack.  On June 19th, Lloyd George summoned Haig to a meeting with his recently-formed Cabinet Committee on War Policy.  Haig was to explain his plans in detail, and Robertson also attended.

William “Wully” Robertson was born in 1860, the son of a tailor & postmaster; he was educated at the local church school and later became a pupil-teacher there.  He joined the army at 1917, despite his mother's shame, and spent 10yrs in the ranks.  A commission changed him from the army's youngest sergeant major to its oldest lieutenant.  He served for a long time in India, learning several languages there.  He served with distinction in the Boer War (1899-1902) and then returned to England.

After his return, he was a reform-minded authority on military training, and also an expert on the German army.  He is the only English private soldier to have risen to the rank of Field Marshal (he was given that rank at his retirement, and also a baronetcy). Throughout his career, he made no attempt to get rid of his rough Lincolnshire accent.

Robertson had been focused on victory on the Western Front from early on in the war – he'd opposed alternatives such as the Dardanelles Campaign.  In December 1915, he'd been appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and become Haig's most important supporter. Because of this, Lloyd George distrusted him as well.

The June 19th London conference lasted three days.  Haig laid out his plans and what he expected to achieve; Lloyd George questioned him constantly.  He wanted to know: why they thought a Flanders offensive could succeed this time; what they thought the casualties would be; how the German forces were arranged; what the consequences of failure might be.  He wasn't satisfied with the answers, and he made that very clear.

The Royal Navy was brought in, and they sided with Haig & Robertson.  Admiral John Jellicoe (the sort-of hero of the Battle of Jutland) stated that Britain wouldn't be able to continue the war for much more than a year unless they captured the Belgian coast.  This was actually unlikely – Germany only had a small number of smaller submarines going out from those ports.  But Lloyd George couldn't prove them wrong because the claim was so completely speculative. The army & navy representatives were impatient with Lloyd George and his meddling (as they saw it).

Eventually, Lloyd George had to give in.  By the end of the discussion, he only had one other committee member firmly on his side.  The Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law was also doubtful about Haig & Robertson's claims, but he said that he didn't think the committee could “overrule the military and naval authorities on a question of strategy” (which was pretty much what Bethmann had said 5 months earlier about the unrestricted submarine warfare issue).

Lloyd George knew that if he overruled Haig & Robertson without strong support (from both Liberal & Conservative members) then he would be exposed and vulnerable in the House of Commons.  And Haig promised that if his plans didn't succeed quickly, then they'd be called off (like Nivelle had falsely promised).  Lloyd George was still very much against the plan, but he told Haig to proceed with preparations while he waited for the final approval.

While the generals had won their case, this situation showed the strength of the British political system.  Haig and Robertson hadn't won control of strategy overall – they'd only got permission for one more attack, and this permission had been granted by the civil government, whose authority was not diminished in any way.  The PM had insisted on the conference, and it had been held, and he had had the last word.  Everyone knew & accepted (if reluctantly in some cases) that Lloyd George and his committee had the ultimate authority, even if they'd given in.  The constitution remained intact.

Germany's constitution was supposed to work in the same way, but it didn't.  The chancellor was supposed to be in control – when Bismarck was chancellor, this had been the case, even though the kaiser was allowed to dismiss him at any time, and did so in the end. But the government leaders had no actual power base of their own – they weren't chosen by the legislature (as they were in Britain), and so the complications and problems caused by a lengthy war were causing the chancellor to lose his grip on control.  Eventually, the system broke down, and a new one had to be improvised.

Hindenburg could have improvised the new system (he was the one person whom nearly all of Germany trusted) but he had no interest in it.  So it fell to Ludendorff, who had been elected by no-one, and whom the kaiser greatly disliked.  The war turned Germany's political system into a true military dictatorship, the first time that Germany had really had one.

Russia

The Russian authorities were struggling to hold their forces together.  Rudolf Hess, who would be one of Hitler's top henchmen during WW2, was a newly-commissioned officer commanding troops opposite the Russians, and had recently returned from being wounded in action.  In a letter to his parents, he described the chaos among the Russian troops:

Yesterday we saw heavy fighting, but only among the Russians themselves.  A Russian officer came over and gave himself up.  He spoke perfect German.  He was born in Baden but is a Russian citizen. He told us that whole battles are going on behind their lines. Their officers are shooting each other and the soldiers are doing the same.  He found it all too ridiculous.  They can all get lost as far as he's concerned.  We invited him to eat with us and he thanked us. He ate well and drank plenty of tea before going off.  There was a lot of noise coming from the Russian side yesterday.  They were fighting each other in the trenches.  We also heard shots coming from their infantry but they were fighting at each other.  Charming!”

But on July 1st, Kerensky launched his promised offensive (the Kerensky Offensive).  Not enough troops were available for it to be as big as what had been promised before the revolution, but it had over 200,000 men and over 1,300 guns on a 48km-wide front.  General Brusilov, now Commander-in-Chief, was in charge.  It took place in Galicia – this was where Brusilov had had his earlier successes; Russian forces were more organized here & had better morale than in the north; and nearly half the enemy was Austrian rather than German.  They were also well-equipped in artillery & aircraft thanks to their allies.

The offensive went very well at first – the initial bombardment destroyed much of the enemy's forward defences, and the infantry attack took a lot of territory.  But the Russians didn't know that even the Austrians were using Ludendorff's new defensive system, and when the counterattack came, it was the final straw for the troops. They didn't even desert – they just quit the war on the spot, refusing to obey any more orders.  They shot dead officers who attempted to restore order.

Only July 8th, the Russian Eighth Army basically ceased to exist.  On the 18th, Brusilov was relieved of command. (He had had misgivings right from the start, but Kerensky had ordered him to carry out the offensive.)  By July 19th, the Germans were driving a disorderly mob of Russians before them.  Max Hoffmann (now Chief of Staff on the Eastern Front) was in command. Wherever the Germans advanced, the Russians fled; they even fled from the Austrians when they joined in.

This was basically the end of the war in the east.  Russia had suffered only 17,000 casualties (including missing & wounded), which was relatively low compared to the last 3yrs.  But the general collapse meant that they were finished.  The Germans would attack again later in the north, but success there would be extremely easy. This was also the end of the provisional government – the way was cleared for the Bolsheviks.

Germany

Their success in routing Russia on the Eastern Front emboldened Hindenburg & Ludendorff even further, and they were determined to settle the political struggle in Berlin in their favour.

On July 6th, Matthias Erzberger had delivered a speech that shocked the nation.  He was the leader of Germany's Catholic Centre Party, a moderate and a monarchist.  In his speech, Erzberger showed that the submarine campaign had failed (he used information from international contacts who had been made available by the Vatican).  He demanded reform and a stronger role in government for the Reichstag.  He also insisted that Germany renounce territorial gains to secure a “peace of reconciliation”.

At this point, there was great struggle for control over policy (with many factions & many different positions).  Erzberger's speech outraged the conservatives, and those who believed the Reichstag should be annexed attacked Bethmann.  But the kaiser continued to support him.

Until Hindenburg & Ludendorff played their final card.  On July 12th, a telegram arrived from their headquarters announcing their resignations.  It stated that other resignations from the general staff were sure to happen as well, and that the reason was the impossibility of working with Bethmann.

The kaiser was angry, but could do nothing.  (In Britain or France, these blackmail resignations would have been accepted without comment.)  He asked Hindenburg & Ludendorff to come to Berlin to see him.  Bethmann resigned.

The timing of this was not good.  Monsignor Eugenio Pacelli (who would become Pope Pius XII in 1939) had spoken to Bethmann shortly before his resignation, and presented an offer made by Pope Benedict XV – the pope would mediate between the warring sides to try and end the war.  Pacelli said that the first step would have to be for Germany to declare their intentions with regards to Belgium.  Unless Germany was willing to restore Belgium's prewar borders, peace talks would be impossible, and the Vatican realized this.

The kaiser had long insisted that they needed to control at least part of Belgium, if they were to keep the country secure.  But even he understood by now that it wasn't realistic.  Bethmann had told Pacelli that Germany would agree to restoring Belgium's prewar borders if Britain & France also did so (he didn't ask the army for their agreement on this).  He even talked about dealing with the Alsace-Lorraine issue to mutual satisfaction.

The Reichstag had a liberal majority, and that majority was growing. If they'd been given the opportunity, they would almost certainly have supported Bethmann.  But now there was no such opportunity, and the Vatican's attempt came to nothing.

Factions put forward their candidates for the a new chancellor, but were rejected.  Eventually, Georg Michaelis was chosen.  He was an obscure bureaucrat whom the kaiser had never even heard of.  He would prove to be a useless choice – he lacked experience, good judgment and strength of character, and even Ludendorff (whom he was eager to please) would soon be disappointed in him.

Ludendorff didn't actually want to be a dictator (suggestions he should become chancellor were ridiculed), but found himself responsible for everything, with no-one of any importance or any use to help him with the politics or diplomacy.  Neither he, nor his agents, nor Michaelis managed to bring the Reichstag under control.

On July 19th, a large majority of the Reichstag approved a resolution that declared, “The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of peoples.  Forced territorial acquisitions and political, economic or financial oppressions are irreconcilable with such a peace.”  This infuriated the conservatives, and the government remained at war with itself.

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

“British Train For Invasion of Reich,” Montreal Gazette. August 6, 1941. Page 11. ---- British troops are shown in offensive manouevres preparing for the time when they will attack and smash the enemy. Recently hints of the invasion of the continent by Britain have been growing. At the top men of the Suffolks practice getting over barbed wire defences by means of a ladder while at the right one of the men clears a tussock during a seashore exercise.

[autodidact-adventures]

World War I (Part 19): To the Marne

The famous First Battle of the Marne is known as the fight that saved Paris, but the result was really from one side's decision not to fight.  It wasn't just a single large battle – more a series of manouevres over several weeks, with millions of troops stretched over vast areas of territory.  Its starting date is usually given as September 5th; however, the events leading up to it began during the end of August, while the Germans were thrashing the Russian Second Army in East Prussia.

As August ended, the French & German armies were arranged in the same line-up they'd had at the start of the war, although of course in different places.  Kluck's First Army was the right flank of the Schlieffen wheel, and now he was well south of Belgium as the German line swung down towards Paris.

On the German left, south of Verdun and along the French-German border, they were also advancing on Paris.  However, they were moving much more slowly.

On their left, Lanzerac's Fifth Army and the BEF continued to retreat, pursued by the Germans.  Very little actual fighting was happening.  They were all moving towards Paris, which was by now fortified with a nearly 100km-wide perimeter of defensive walls, and artillery.

When Bülow's Second Army got there, it was supposed to besiege the city, while Kluck's First Army swung around it.  It wasn't certain if Bülow would be able to get there; or if he could actually take the city when he arrived.  During the Franco-Prussian War, Germany had besieged Paris but hadn't managed to get inside.

Schlieffen had predicted that a great battle would happen on (or about) the 40th day of mobilization.  The troops, as they got closer to the city, were increasingly exhausted.  It seemed as though a climax of some kind had to happen soon.

The German supreme headquarters had moved westward from Berlin to Koblenz, and then to Luxembourg, as their armies advanced.  Kluck & Bülow's progress was cause for celebration for many, but not for Moltke.  His contact with the forces was getting worse (radio was still new and very unreliable), and he knew that he had little idea of what was really going on at the front.  So he became unwilling to issue orders, knowing that without enough information he really couldn't direct the campaign properly.  Everything was confusing and uncertain.  Kluck's army was run-down and outrunning its lines of supply – would they be able to circle around Paris and still be capable of attacking the French?  Perhaps the best chances were actually in Alsace and Lorraine, where the French defenses were reported to be vulnerable; perhaps they should focus on that area.

Despite the Grand Retreat, Joffre was actually achieving important things.  His left had little chance of winning a battle at the moment, and he was preventing the Germans from closing in on it.  And the retreat was being carried out in excellent order – armies were fully under control; they remained in formation; routes and timetables were being followed; headquarters were carefully planning and co-ordinating every move.  The conditions the troops were under could easily have led to chaos, but it was going well.

They couldn't keep retreating forever, of course.  They would have to stop and make a stand at some point, unless they were going to march past Paris and abandon it.  It was unclear whether this would be possible, though; it was also unclear where & when it would happen if it was possible.  Joffre was sharing his plans with no-one (if he had any).

Lanzerac was becoming increasingly pessimistic.  JF thought it was likely that France had already lost the war, and was talking about saving the BEF by pulling it out of the line, or even sending it home.

Kluck's army was moving forward aggressively, but this was having a negative effect on his troops.  They were moving 32km a day (on average), each man with his 5kg rifle, and about 30kg of gear.  The summer was hot and dry, and the men were short on food.  Often at the end of the day, they hade to spread out and forage for meat and vegetables (which, fortunately for them, were being harvested at this point).  They moved 100km past the furthest points their railroad support could reach, and then over 120km.  The horses began to collapse, and the supply problems threatened to become unmanageable.

The German cavalry were finding it very hard-going because of the terrain – rivers and canals, woods, and other landscape features were slowing them down and making movement complicated.  And when the cavalry fought French troops, they were no match for machine-guns and magazine-fed rifles. Artillery was a problem, too – moving it was incredibly labour-intensive, and the thousands of shells had to be moved too.

The British & French faced these sort of problems, too.  But the closer they got to Paris, the closer they were to supplies and reinforcements.  They could make more & more use of the railroad network that was centred on the city.  Unlike the Germans, things were getting easier, the further they moved.

In Paris, people were terrified.  Politicians asked if Joffre was intending to retreat further, got no answer, and called for him to be dismissed.

The BEF (on Lanzerac's left) were retreating so fast that the infantry were given only 4hrs of rest a day (and the cavalry even less than that).  The consequence of this was that the Germans no longer knew where they were, or if they were still a major force to be reckoned with.  Also, the British were leaving Lanzerac's left flank exposed.

The Germans, too, were having trouble keeping their armies aligned.  Kluck was ahead of Bülow, and beginning to realize that Lanzerac's exposed left flank was ahead of him: a perfect target.  But on August 27th, he'd received instructions from Moltke, repeating that his mission was still the same as it always had been – to encircle Paris and then move east.

However, by this time, Moltke was receiving shaky reports of a buildup of French forces near Paris.  This was the beginnings of the French Sixth Army, which Joffre was letting Gallieni have for the city's defense. Moltke realized that this new army was a threat to his right wing.

So on the 28th, he sent new orders.  Kluck was to stay just behind Bülow, rather than in line with him (the military term is “in echelon”).  But he didn't tell Kluck anything about new threat of the Sixth Army, and so Kluck didn't see how these new instructions made any sense.  If he was to put himself in echelon with Bülow, he'd have to stop his advance for a day ore more, and maybe even have to turn around.  This would throw away an opportunity to attack Lanzerac, which could maybe begin to unravel the French left & thus win the war.

Kluck figured out a compromise.  His army would keep moving forward, but shift towards the south-east, so that they were closer to Bülow's Second Army. They would keep pursuing Lanzerac's exposed army.  If they destroyed it, or at the very least pushed it eastwards out of Bülow's path and away from Paris, that would surely fulfil the spirit of the instructions, if not the letter.

On September 3rd, the First Army crossed the River Marne and pushed on.  Kluck felt free to do this because a) he didn't know about the new Sixth Army being formed to the west, and b) he incorrectly believed that the disappearance of the BEF meant they were no longer an effective fighting force.

Joffre needed to get the BEF back into the war.  But JF had decided that the French were unreliable and doomed.  So Joffre ordered Lanzerac to attack Bülow's Second Army near the towns of St. Quentin and Guise.  This might block the German advance, and hopefully regain JF's confidence in him.  Lanzerac was unwilling to do this, so Joffre went to the Fifth Army headquarters to confront him in person.  Lanzerac continued to refuse, and Joffre threatened to dismiss him.  He was reported to say, “If you refuse to carry out my orders, I'll have you shot!”

Next, Joffre went to the BEF headquarters at Compiègne, where a grand château had been turned into a base of operations for their staff.  He asked (almost begged) JF to turn the BEF around, promising him that he'd be protected on his left by the new Sixth Army, and on his right by the Fifth.  But JF refused, saying that his army was in too bad shape for that.  He had to take it south of Paris for 10 days of refitting & recuperation.

Meanwhile, Lanzerac's Fifth Army had begun the offensive as they'd been ordered, and it was not going well.  On their left, they were being overwhelmed by Bülow's Second Army, as Lanzerac had warned.  But it wasn't quite as bad on their right, at Guise, where the battle was going back and forth in terms of who was prevailing, and the French were able to hold.

General Louis Franchet d'Esperey was a flamboyant character, greatly admired by the BEF (who called him Desperate Frankie).  At a critical point in the battle, he led a counterattack on horseback, sword held overhead, with regimental banners and a band playing La Marseillaise.

The Germans had their moment of glory as well, when the Prussian First Food Guards (one of the most elite army units) was thrown back and seemed in danger of falling apart.  Prince Eitel Friedrich was the kaiser's second-eldest son, and he took command.  He rallied the troops, beating on a drum, and led a successful counterattack.

The prince survived the counter-offensive, but the guard corps commander's son was killed.  Most of the French & German generals were in their 50's or 60's, and many of them had sons in the army.  As the fighting went on, losses among the junior officers responsible for leading attacks & organizing defenses continued to be heavy.  It became commonplace news that another general's son had been killed.

But even though it was going better than over at St. Quentin, Lanzerac's Guise flanks were so exposed that he had to withdraw.  Bülow declared to Moltke that they were victorious, but his forces had suffered heavy casualties, and he decided to halt for a day.  He asked Kluck to move closer eastwards to support him, and Kluck agreed.  Joffre had no choice but to accept the retreat – they didn't have enough manpower to make a stand, because they didn't have the BEF.

JF was doing what Kitchener had told him – keeping his army independent, and being careful to look after it.  But the situation wasn't really as terrible as he seemed to be thinking.  Yes, Smith-Dorrien's corps was no longer fully functional, as it had done most of the fighting at Mons and then at Le Cateau.  But Haig's corps had seen little hard fighting, so it was doing very well.  In fact, Haig had agreed to move his forces north and join the fighting at Guise, but JF had forbidden him to do so.  This made Lanzerac feel more betrayed.

JF's reports to London had gone on a lot about his lack of confidence in the French, but said little about his own movements and plans.  The cabinet had to learn from other sources that he'd denied Joffre's urgent request for help, about his decision to withdraw south of Paris, and the fact that he was considering withdrawing to the coast.  Kitchener telegraphed him, asking him to explain.  JF confirmed that he was considering withdrawing south of the River Seine.  He said that “my confidence in the ability of the leaders of the French Army to carry this campaign to a successful conclusion is fast waning.”

Kitchener informed him that he was expected to “as far as possible conform to the plans of General Joffre for the conduct of the campaign.”  JF replied with more disdain for the French, and emphasized how unready his troops were for more combat.  He said (rather haughtily), “I think you had better trust me to watch the situation and act according to circumstances.”  That night, Kitchener put on his field marshal's uniform and crossed the Channel on a destroyer.

The next afternoon, there was a meeting between Kitchener, JF and Joffre at the British embassy in Paris.  Joffre said that he had heaps of troops coming in from the east, which were being used to form the Sixth Army at Paris, and also an Eighth Army, which would probably be placed immediately east of the Fifth Army.  The Germans would probably not know of these new armies, and almost certainly wouldn't know there was a new army on their right.  It might now be possible to turn things around, if the BEF would come forward.

JF argued against this.  He was insulted that Kitchener had come wearing his field marshal uniform, believing that it was a deliberate tactic to undermine him, as Kitchener should be there as a government representative.  Kitchener took JF into another room to talk to him. It's not known what was said there – JF said later that he put Kitchener in his place, but this is unlikely.  After their conversation, JF was prepared to bring the BEF forward, as Joffre asked.

Joffre went to the Fifth Army headquarters and took Lanzerac off for a walk in a nearby schoolyard, where he relieved him of command.  Lanzerac and JF hated each other, and Joffre wanted relations with the British to go well. He claimed that Lanzerac was too worn down to be able to act decisively.  He replaced him with Franchet d'Esperey.

On the French-German border, the German 3rd to 7th Armies were attacking the French 1st to 4th Armies.  They were repulsed and thrown back, and the French counter-attacked in their turn.

Joffre was firing generals all over the place.  By September 6th, he would have replaced the commanders of two armies, seven corps, 20 infantry divisions, and 4 cavalry divisions.  Ferdinand Foch had performed well as a corps commander in Lorraine at the start of the war, and been heroic during the retreat that followed.  Joffre promoted him to command the new Ninth Army (which seems to be the same as the promised Eighth Army).  Henri Philippe Pétain's brigade had done very well under Lanzerac's command when fighting in Belgium, and he was given a division to command.

The French government left Paris and moved to Bordeaux, on the coast.  People were panicking, but Joffre remained calm.  He made sure his routine was never disturbed – he went to bed at 9pm and was back at work at 5am, took a nap after lunch, and always had a good lunch and dinner. Apart from that, he was always on the move.  He travelled in a big touring car, driven by a Grand Prix racing champion, and made constant visits to his generals, especially those on the left.  In this way, he was able to inform himself of what was going on, and observe his subordinates in action.  However, he said very little during these visits.  Some of the men decided he was quite useless, and that his only use was for keeping people calm.

Joffre has also been described as “viciously political” and self-serving.  He has been accused of firing subordinates because they proved him wrong (as Lanzerac did), or for becoming potential rivals.

But despite all this, Joffre was certainly a very capable commander.  He made the decision to take troops from his right wing and send them west by train, thus increasing their numbers on the left by a lot.  Every 24hrs, another 32 trains arrived at Paris with troops and guns from the east.  On August 23rd, they had 17.5 divisions against the German right; by September 6th, it was 41 divisions. This was during & after Moltke had removed troops from his right, to send them to his left and to East Prussia.  Also, he sent reinforcements to his left, which was in no danger, instead of to the right wing, where they were greatly needed.  Apparently, this decision was because of the Belgians' destruction of important railways.

But even so, Joffre couldn't see any way of stopping the Grand Retreat yet.  On September 3rd, he wrote to the Minister of War, “A natural reluctance to abandon even provisionally more of our national territory must not make us engage too early in a general battle that might be launched in unpropititious circumstances.”

And now, Moltke made a new move, one that basically ended the Schlieffen Plan.  He ordered Kluck and Bülow to stop, stand in place, and face west against whatever forces the French were gathering against them. Meanwhile, all the other German armies were to return to the attack. The Third Army was to fight its way to the River Seine.  The Fourth & Fifth Armies were to advance west of Verdun.  The Sixth & Seventh Armies were to cross the Moselle River.

The two pairs of armies (excluding the Third) were to break through on their fronts, link up, and then encircle the French right wing in the region around Verdun.  This would be a massive encirclement, even greater than at Tannenberg – in fact, there had never been one on this scale.  And it wasn't certain that it would even be possible.  The German left wing would need to fight past the massive fortifications that the Schlieffen Plan was supposed to avoid.

Moltke's change of plan may have been because he expected this new strategy to work, or because he believed the Schlieffen Plan wouldn't work. Certainly, he didn't believe the reports of victory that were coming into headquarters.  He told a member of the government, “We must not deceive ourselves.  We have had successes, but we have not had victory.  Victory means annihilation of the enemy's power of resistance.  When armies of millions of men are opposed, the victor has prisoners.  Where are ours?...The relatively small numbers of captured guns shows me that the French have withdrawn in good order and according to plan.  The hardest work is still to be done.”

[autodidact-adventures]

World War I (Part 12): Germany’s Military Situation

During most of the July crisis, Moltke had actually urged restraint.  When Russia mobilized, he insisted on military action, but this was not out of aggression or dreams of victory, but fear.  He believed, like many others in the top levels of Germany's civil & military administration, that Germany was surrounded by enemies who were quickly growing stronger.  If they delayed fighting them, then they might have no hope of winning, or even surviving.

Moltke didn't believe that victory would be quick and easy: he said that if war came, it would be “a long weary struggle with a country that will not acknowledge defeat until the whole strength of its people is broken, a war that even if we should be the victors will push our own people, too, to the limits of exhaustion.”  He would be right.

Moltke was a very pessimistic person in general, and the kaiser had joked about it for a long time.  He wasn't confident in his own abilities, either.  In 1905, when it was beginning to seem that he would be promoted to Chief of General Staff (over more capable & experienced men), he said to the current Chancellor that he saw himself as “too reflective, too scrupulous, and, if you like, too conscientious for such a post.”  He said that he didn't have “the capacity for risking it all on a single throw”, which great commanders always had.

He was quite unlike the usual Junkers who made up Germany's military elite.  He was an intellectual, a bookish, introspective man, who took books by Goethe on military manouevres (raising many eyebrows among the Prussians).  He had many non-military interests – he played the cello, and was involved in occult practices with his wife. “Art is the only thing I live for,” he had once said.

Moltke had inherited the Schlieffen Plan from the previous Chief of General Staff – Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913), who had retired in 1906.  This plan focused on a lightning-fast victory over France (contrary to Moltke's predictions on how war would go).

The Franco-Russian Entente had been solidified in 1894, and Schlieffen's plan was a response to this.  Because of this alliance, it was likely that if war came, Germany would have to fight on two fronts – France in the west, and Russia in the east.  Even with Austria-Hungary fighting as well, Germany couldn't expect to win a long, drawn-out war against both these enemies.  Also, because Russia was so huge, they couldn't expect a quick, decisive victory against them (as Napoléon had found out in 1812).  But Russia wouldn't be able to mobilize rapidly, and that would work in Germany's favour. Germany had to crush France before Russia was able to mount an offensive against them.  Then, after that, they could shift their forces to the east and deal with Russia.

So Moltke got the plan from Schlieffen, and between 1906 and 1914, he made large changes to it.  Because of that, he's gone down in history as a fool, unable to put into practice the fruits of Schlieffen's genius.  This is not quite fair to Moltke, because the European situation changed so much between Schlieffen's time and WW1.  (And it's ridiculous to think that Moltke shouldn't have changed anything in the plan.)

When Schlieffen handed his plan over to Moltke, Russia was still recovering from the Russo-Japanese War, and had just had a major uprising – the country was weaker than it had been in a long time, and at that point, it was reasonable to assume that the Russians wouldn't be able to get their armies into action quickly or effectively.

But in 1914, the Russian government had been spending 1/3 of its revenues on the army & navy for the last 5yrs.  Their Grand Program had begun in 1913 – 585,000 men would be added to the army each year, and each recruit would stay on active duty for 3yrs.  In 1914, Russia had 1.4 million troops, and several million more reservists available.  With all these troops, Russia could field as many as 150 divisions.

Industrially, Russia had been advancing greatly.  With the French supporting them financially, they were radically improving their rail system, in ways that were directly threatening to Germany.  As for France, they were growing both in strength and in confidence.  Now, unlike in 1906, it was entirely possible that Russia might get to Berlin before Germany reached Paris.

Moltke's uncle and namesake, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, was also Chief of General Staff, from 1871-88.  (He was succeeded by Alfred von Waldersee; after him was Schlieffen, and then Moltke the Younger.)  It was under him that Germany had beaten Austria and France, in the Austro-Prussian War and Franco-Prussian War.

He had had a totally different idea of what they should do if war broke out.  In a two-front war, he believed, Germany should stand on the defensive in the west (against France).  In the east (against Russia), they should attack only enough to drive the Russians out of Poland, and then stand on the defensive again.  They should then allow their enemies to throw themselves against walls of fire and steel, which would wreck their armies.  This strategy wouldn't end in victory, but in a negotiated peace when their enemies were exhausted – and that was all they should hope for.

In 1879, he'd said that, “We should exploit in the West the great advantages which the Rhine and our powerful fortifications offer to the defensive, and should apply all the fighting forces which are not absolutely indispensable for an imposing offensive against the east.” Moltke the Elder's strategy was what Germany planned to do until Schlieffen came along.

Schlieffen was an austere, solitary man, with few non-military interests.  He gradually put Moltke the Elder's thinking aside, but even so, he wasn't completely certain of his plan.  In the years after his retirement, he continued to comment on it, and shared these commentaries with the general staff.

The Schlieffen Plan relied completely on a concentrated, extremely strong right wing, which would contain 7/8 of their western front soldiers. It would move through the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg (all three were neutral countries), turning like a wheel first west, and then south into France.  It would overrun any enemy forces who attacked them, and encircle & cut off Paris.  Finally, the right wing would swing east, back towards Germany, and attack what remained of the French army in the rear & destroy it.

It was a bold plan, but there were many problems – and not all of these problem were military.  The invasion of the three neutral countries was sensible military-wise, because the German forces could a) avoid the chain of French fortresses that were just west of the French-German border, in rough hill country; and b) it took them across the flat, open northern coastal plain, which made movement far easier.

But politically, it was not a good idea.  Violating the neutrality treaties meant that Britain might intervene, but Schlieffen had given no thought to that – or if he did, he obviously thought it was an acceptable risk to take.  Britain's army was small, and Bismarck had once joked that if it ever invaded Germany, he'd have it arrested. And if Germany could crush France on schedule, Britain wouldn't have time to get involved, anyway.

The French general staff were also aware of the military advantages of using Belgian territory to invade Germany.  But they didn't have the independence that Schlieffen & Moltke the Younger had, which allowed them to plan without consulting anyone.  France was wary of placing too much authority over strategy in the military's hand, because of their previous experience with two Bonapartist empires.

In 1913, the Supreme War Council had been exploring the possibility of invading Germany through Belgium, but they had to keep the government informed.  France and Britain were planning joint operations together, and the government was determined to make sure that Britain would fight with them if war broke out.  So they asked London about what they thought of the Belgium idea.  France's friends on Britain's General Staff warned them off it immediately – if France invaded Belgium, then there was no way Britain would support them.  So the War Council dropped the idea.

The German government wouldn't dream of getting involved in such a way. Wilhelm II had dismissed Bismarck in 1890, and since then no chancellor had tried to question or challenge the general staff's war planning.  Chancellor Bethmann wrote after the war, “for the civilian side to have tried to foil a thoroughly thought-out military plan described as absolutely essential would have entailed an intolerable responsibility.  In the event of a subsequent failure, such a policy would have been considered its sole cause.”

Even when the political risks were severe, the German government didn't dare interfere.  The government machinery created by Bismarck was simply incapable of dealing with the reality of the 1900's, now that Bismarck was no longer in control.

Schlieffen assumed that Germany's enemies didn't want to just defeat them, but destroy them.  Because of this, Germany's military planners believed they were justified in doing things that under less serious circumstances would have been unthinkable.  They had to seize the Netherlands' & Belgium's railways & roads, because otherwise they were placing themselves in danger.

Schlieffen wrote that, “If we were to attack along the entire Belfort-Montmédy front [along the fortress chain] with blind faith in the sanctity of neutrality, we would soon be effectively enveloped on our right flank by a realistic and unscrupulous enemy advancing through southern Belgium and Luxembourg.”  I.e., France would take advantage of Belgium's terrain if Germany didn't.

So much for political concerns.  Military-wise, the Schlieffen plan wasn't foolproof either.  The outer edge of the right wing would have to travel over 320km on its way to Paris, taking no more than 40 days to do so, and defeating any enemies along the way.  The infantry would be travelling mostly on foot, each carrying at least 30kg of equipment.  The horse-drawn artillery had to keep up; and the huge quantities of food, fodder, ammunition and replacements had to be always close by.  If any of this failed, then the entire campaign would collapse.

In 1905, the German army had about 60 divisions, but Schlieffen calculated that they'd need 90 divisions.  And if the right wing did manage to reach Paris, it would have run out of strength and mobility, and the final swing to the east wouldn't be possible. While working on the plan, he wrote, “Before the Germans reach the Somme or the Oise, they will have realized, like other conquerors before them, that they are too weak for the whole enterprise.”

Even after he retired, Schlieffen kept worrying about the plan and its weaknesses.  It's said that as he was dying in January 1913, he became conscious long enough to say, “It must come to a fight. Only keep the right wing strong!”

Moltke the Younger inherited not only the plan, but Schlieffen's obsession with it.  By 1911, he'd decided not to invade the Netherlands – they couldn't afford the time to defeat the Dutch army before advancing on France; nor could they allow it to stand undefeated on the northern edge of the route to Paris.  Also, they'd need that neutral country as a “windpipe”, to have access to supplies.  But a campaign lasting only 40 days wouldn't need a “windpipe” – this decision exposed again his doubts about the whole plan.

This decision made the right wing's “wheeling” even more difficult. It compressed the right wing's huge forces of over 500,000 men (with artillery and equipment) into a passage that was only 19-20km wide, between the Netherlands to the north, and the Ardennes Forest to the south.  They would have far fewer roads and railways, which would cause problems with transport and supply.

And worse still, the Germany army wouldn't be able to go around the great Belgian network of fortresses at Liège, just inside the Belgian-German border.  Now, with the changed route, they had to attack and destroy them.  Because of this, German mobilization required an immediate invasion of Belgium – Belgium mustn't be allowed any time to get their Liège defenses ready, or the whole thing would fail.  Moltke said that the Schlieffen Plan itself “will hardly be possible unless Liège is in our hands.  The fortress must therefore be taken at once...the possession of Liège is the sine qua non of our advance.”

More changes to the plan – Moltke decided that they couldn't afford to concentrate 7/8 of their western-front troops in the right wing. Over the years, he changed the concentration, giving them only ¾ (a change from 87.5% to 75%).

Schlieffen had put 59 divisions to the north of Metz, a fortified Germany city which was directly east of Paris.  This was the right wing.  He'd given only 9 divisions to the left wing, south of Metz, in a defensive position.

Moltke had more divisions available to him.  In 1914, he put 55 divisions into the right wing, and 23 divisions in the left.

This change has been seen as quite controversial, but it was actually a sensible decision.  Since 1910, the French army had been far stronger than in Schlieffen's time – it was bigger, more professional, better-equipped, and better led.  Certainly it would be ready with an offensive of its own, and Germany couldn't afford to ignore that in favour of the right wing.  Moltke and his staff guessed (correctly) that France's offensive would be concentrated somewhere south of Belgium, opposite the German left wing.  And if France managed to advance into Germany, they might then swing north and cut the right wing off from its home base.

Despite Moltke's changes and his uncertainty about the plan, there is no evidence that he seriously considered not using it, or using his uncle's old defensive strategy.  (Doing that would force France to attack Germany if it wanted a war.)  There was an alternative plan for war against only Russia, which his staff updated regularly, but in 1913 he abandoned it.  They only had the one option now.

It's possible that Moltke was unable to work out the ramifications of the strategic situation in Europe at the time – for example, Britain would never have joined WW1 if France had attacked Germany.  But the most likely reason was the belief in the “cult of the offensive”, which all European military planners were obsessed with, leading up to WW1.  The French especially were obsessed with it, but the Germans and others were as well, albeit to a lesser extent.

The “cult of the offensive” was the belief that the only way to win a war was to attack as quickly as possible, and keep attacking no matter what.  This lesson was taken from the Franco-Prussian war (in which many of the most senior generals of 1914 had taken part, at the beginning of their careers).  Napoléon III's forces had allowed the Prussians to seize the initiative and keep it, and they had lost the war as a result.

So this central military belief probably was part of the reason for Moltke's decision to keep the Schlieffen Plan, and wage offensive war rather than the defensive war his uncle had wanted.

In the 30 days following the beginning of the war, mobilization increased the German army from 761,000 men to just over 2 million. They were organized into 87 infantry divisions (with 18,000 men each on average), and 11 cavalry division.  The divisions were divided into 8 field armies, each one commanded by a full general.  Seven field armies lined up along the western border, and the eighth was sent to East Prussia, to hold off Russia.

South of East Prussia was Russian Poland, and south of that was Austria-Hungary, whose initial mobilized force was 1.3 million men. They were divided in 49 infantry divisions, and 11 cavalry divisions, under Conrad von Hötzendorf.

South of Austria-Hungary was Serbia.  Serbia's army was only about 250,000 troops (in 12.5 divisions), but they were tough, experienced, and almost fanatically dedicated.

Russia had 3.5 million troops.  They were divided into 114 infantry divisions, and 36 cavalry divisions.  Because their country was so huge, the army could grow even larger.

France, 30 days after mobilization, had 1.8 million men, divided into 80 infantry divisions, and 10 cavalry divisions.  Volunteers and conscripts would soon massively increase their numbers.

Even without taking Britain and Belgium's armies into account, Germany and Austria-Hungary were at a severe disadvantage in the east, and in the west, their armies were at most equal to France's.  As Germany's right wing wheeled towards Paris, they would be facing the only army in the world that was comparable to them not only in size, but in capability.  France's army was a huge modern army, and its generals had a secret plan of their own for a swift, decisive victory.

[autodidact-adventures]

100 Documents: The Art of War

The Art of War ( 孫子兵法, Sun Zi Bing Fa) is the greatest of China’s Seven Military Classics.  Its origins are uncertain - Sun Tzu may not even have existed, and the ideas may have been collected and modified by various people over a long period of time.  It is definitely an ancient work, however - the Yinqueshan Han Slips (206 BC - 220 BC) are an almost-complete bamboo scroll copy of The Art of War, nearly identical to modern editions.

The Yinqueshan Han Slips.

The Art of War has 13 chapters, each concerning a key aspect of warfare:

Laying Plans

Waging War

Planning Offensives

Disposition of the Army

Forces

Weaknesses and Strengths

Military Manouevres

Variations and Adaptability

Movement and Development of Troops

Terrain

The Nine Battlegrounds

Incendiary Attacks

Intelligence and Espionage

The chapters are written in simple, clear terms.  Rules such as “He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces” are given.

Sun Tzu considers war an necessary evil, to be avoided wherever possible.  Wars should be fought swiftly, or the army’s morale will drop, and the nation’s resources will be strained.  “There is no instance of a country having benefitted from prolonged warfare.”

He explains that all warfare is based on deception - that the army must seem incapable when it is capable; inactive when it is active; far away when it is close, and close when it is far away.

The 6 main “calamities” are flight, insubordination, collapse, ruin, disorganization, and rout.

Sun Tzu states that a great general will be skilled at “estimating the adversary; of controlling the forces of victory; and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances.”

Military commanders throughout history have benefitted from The Art of War, and have credited it for some of their successes.  They include Napoléon Bonaparte, General Võ Nguyên Giáp (Vietnam People’s Army) and General Norman Schwarzkopf (Gulf War).