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India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability
India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability In a significant development in India-China relations, the two nations have reached an agreement to disengage their troops and establish new patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This decision, announced by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, marks a crucial…
#Asian Geopolitics#Border Tensions#Demchok Dispute#Depsang Plains Issue#Diplomatic Negotiations#Eastern Ladakh Conflict#Galwan Valley Clash#India and China Agree on Disengagement#India-China Border Dispute#India-China Relations#Line of Actual Control (LAC)#Military Disengagement#Pangong Tso Standoff#Peace Talks#S. Jaishankar#Sino-Indian Dialogue#Vikram Misri
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India-China Agree to Disengage at Ladakh Border: MEA
India-China Agree to Disengage Troops in Ladakh: In a significant step towards easing tensions along their disputed Himalayan border, India Monday announced on that it has reached a mutual agreement with China to disengage their troops from several friction points in the Ladakh region. The decision, based on a statement made by India’s External Affairs Secretary, Vikram Misri, marks a crucial…
#Indian Army#Galwan Valley Clash#India China Agree to Disengage Troops#India China Border Dispute#MEA#PLA#Vikram Misri
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Activist calls for border march in Ladakh to mark land lost to China
The march would be taken out in the north and south banks of Pangong Tso lake, Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control with China; two dates are shortlisted — March 27 and April 7
Around 10,000 people from Ladakh will march to the border along China this month to showcase how much land has been lost to the neighbouring country, climate activist and education reformer Sonam Wangchuk said on Tuesday.
Mr. Wangchuk has been protesting in open in sub-zero temperature in Leh, surviving only on salt and water for the past 14 days, to demand constitutional safeguards for the Union Territory.
“We know from the shepherds that they are not allowed [anymore] to go to the places that they always used to go. In particular areas, they are stopped kilometres before where they used to go earlier. We will go and show whether land has been lost or not,” Mr. Wangchuk said.
The march would be taken out in Finger area (north and south bank of Pangong Tso), Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
He said two dates have been shortlisted for the march — March 27 and April 7.
“The march will also highlight the areas, prime pasture lands, that are being turned into solar parks. On one hand, nomads are losing their land to corporates who are coming to set up their plants, maybe mining in future. Nomads will lose 150,000 sq km of prime pasture land, on the other hand they are losing pasture land to China which is encroaching from the north, the Chinese have captured huge chunks of land in the last few years,” he said.
After the June 15, 2020 incident in Galwan where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, several rounds of talks between the two armies have taken place leading to disengagement and creation of buffer zones or no-go areas. These areas in eastern Ladakh were regularly patrolled before April 2020 when China started amassing troops close to the LAC. At least 26 patrolling points out of total 65 PPs in Eastern Ladakh are not being patrolled due to the border dispute.
At the centre of Mr. Wangchuk’s protest that has received huge support from the locals is the failure of talks between Ladakh civil society leaders and Union Home Minister Amit Shah on March 4.
The members of Leh Apex Body (LAB) and Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) representing the Buddhist majority and Shia Muslim dominated regions respectively in Ladakh, are jointly protesting for Statehood for Ladakh, inclusion of Ladakh in the sixth schedule of the constitution thus giving it a tribal status, job reservation for locals and a parliamentary seat each for Leh and Kargil.
Though ministry officials had in previous rounds of meetings agreed to examine how the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution can be implemented in Ladakh’s context, the meeting with Mr. Shah “did not result in any positive outcome”.
“Government has been declining to keep their promise on Sixth Schedule. The Home Minister said we cannot give this but we will give you some constitutional safeguard,” Mr. Wangchuk said adding that he wants to awaken the people of India to this “breach of trust”.
“People are disillusioned, disenchanted and angry. There is no chance BJP will win a seat here in the upcoming elections. But this is not only for Ladakh, am trying to awaken the nation, if this is how election promises are honoured, then elections are a joke. Why did we vote this party to power twice?” he said. Ladakh’s only parliamentary seat was won by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 and 2019.
After the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution was revoked by the Parliament on August 5, 2019, Ladakh was turned into a Union Territory without any legislative assembly.
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India says it has lodged a "strong protest" with China over a new map that lays claim to its territory.
Indian media have reported that the map shows the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as China's territory.
It was released by China's ministry of natural resources on Monday.
"We reject these claims as they have no basis," India's foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said.
He added that such steps by China "only complicate the resolution of the boundary question".
Beijing has not officially responded yet.
India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar also called China's claim "absurd".
"China has even in the past put out maps which claim the territories which are not China's, which belong to other countries. This is an old habit of theirs," he told TV channel NDTV on Tuesday.
India's protest comes days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the sidelines of the Brics summit in South Africa. An Indian official said afterwards that the two countries had agreed to "intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation" along the disputed border.
Shadow of 60-year-old war at India-China flashpoint
The Indian monastery town coveted by China
India has often reacted angrily to China's attempts to stake claim to its territory.
The source of the tension between the neighbours is a disputed 3,440km (2,100 mile)-long de facto border along the Himalayas - called the Line of Actual Control, or LAC - which is poorly demarcated. The presence of rivers, lakes and snowcaps means the line can shift in places.
Soldiers on either side come face to face at many points, which can spark tensions - the last time being in December when Indian and Chinese troops clashed along the border in the town of Tawang.
China says it considers the whole of Arunachal Pradesh its territory, calling it "South Tibet" - a claim India firmly rejects. India claims the Aksai Chin plateau in the Himalayas, which is controlled by China.
In April, Delhi reacted sharply to China's attempts to rename 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the state would always be "an "integral and inalienable part of India".
Relations between India and China have worsened since 2020, when their troops were involved in a deadly clash at the Galwan valley in Ladakh - it was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.
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During the recent G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi got up from the banquet table to shake hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and have a brief conversation—their first in-person exchange in three years. Although both sides remain tight-lipped about the interaction, it nonetheless raised hopes among observers of a breakthrough in their 30-month border crisis, which began with a deadly clash in Ladakh in 2020. But any resolution that might emerge will not dispel the challenge posed by massive changes at the border undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
This marks the third straight winter that around 50,000 Indian reinforcements will spend in Ladakh’s inhospitable terrain in the northern Himalayas, warding off an equal number of Chinese troops stationed a few miles away. Despite intermittent dialogue between the two militaries, Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Pande recently confirmed that China has not reduced its forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese infrastructure construction along the border is “going on unabated,” he said—confirmed by independent satellite imagery and echoed by the latest U.S. Defense Department report on China. Pande said the situation is “stable but unpredictable.” That unpredictability has become structural.
India and China have so far held 16 rounds of border talks between senior military commanders as well as numerous diplomatic and political engagements, but an agreement on actions to reduce the tensions in Ladakh has been slow to materialize. Of the seven areas in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese soldiers have faced one another since 2020, two have seen no change while the rest have seen each side take a limited step back. The challenge for India is becoming more concerning on the eastern part of the LAC—between the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet—where China has an infrastructure and military advantage, putting New Delhi on the defensive.
The widening power gap between India and China—military, technological, economic, and diplomatic—now constrains New Delhi’s options on the border. It also raises tough questions for India’s geopolitical partnerships, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), and its aggressive approach toward Pakistan. The border crisis will hang over India’s decision-making for the foreseeable future.
In October, the Chinese Communist Party held its 20th National Congress, and Xi assumed an unprecedented third term as leader. Among the images broadcasted at the Great Hall of the People minutes before Xi ascended the stage was a video from the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where at least 20 Indian soldiers and 4 PLA soldiers died in a clash in June 2020. The videos showed PLA regiment commander Qi Fabao standing with his arms outstretched to stop Indian soldiers from advancing. Qi was selected to be a delegate to the Party Congress, underlining the importance of the border crisis to the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative. Harnessing nationalism, the party wants to convey that it will protect what it considers Chinese territory at all costs.
India’s military and political leaders now confront a reality at the border that should have jolted them into serious action: China has a distinct advantage over India, which it has consolidated since 2020. By investing in a long-term military presence in one of the most remote places on Earth, the PLA has considerably reduced the time it would need to launch a military operation against India. New military garrisons, roads, and bridges would allow for rapid deployment and make clear that Beijing is not considering a broader retreat. The Indian military has responded by diverting certain forces intended for the border with Pakistan toward its disputed border with China. It has deployed additional ground forces to prevent further PLA ingress in Ladakh and constructed supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s political leadership is conspicuous in its silence, projecting a sense of normalcy.
Beijing refuses to discuss two of the areas in Ladakh, where its forces have blocked Indian patrols since 2020. In five other areas, Chinese troops have stepped back by a few miles but asked India to do the same and create a no-patrolling zone. This move denies India its right to patrol areas as planned before the border crisis began. The PLA has flatly refused to discuss de-escalation, in which both armies would pull back by a substantive distance. The question of each side withdrawing its additional troops from Ladakh is not even on the agenda. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson rejected any demand to restore the situation along the LAC as it existed before May 2020. The PLA continues to downplay the severity of the situation, instead emphasizing stability in its ties with India.
If the situation in Ladakh is “stable but unpredictable,” Indian military leaders have told Foreign Policy that major stretches of the LAC’s eastern sector—2,500 kilometers (or 1,553 miles) away—are an even bigger cause of concern. In 1962, this area was the site of a humiliating defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the PLA. Today, massive Chinese infrastructure development and troop buildup closer to the LAC has placed India at a military disadvantage. In September, Pande said when it comes to infrastructure in the area, “there is lots to be desired to be done.” Recent reports suggest at least three additional PLA brigades remain deployed in the area even after the Party Congress, further worrying Indian military planners.
China officially claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, which includes the Tawang Monastery where the sixth Dalai Lama was born in 1683. Tawang was historically a part of Tibet; Chinese officials, such as Dai Bingguo, who served as China’s boundary negotiator with India from 2003 to 2013, have publicly stated that it would be nonnegotiable in a permanent settlement of the disputed border. As questions arise over the succession of the current Dalai Lama, who is 87 years old, Chinese sensitivities about Tawang will intensify—even more so when linked to its internal security problems in Tibet. In the coming years, it is likely to become a higher priority for China.
Still, it is in Ladakh that the Chinese have built up infrastructure at a frenetic pace, with only military operations in mind: roads, bridges, airfields, heliports, accommodations for troops, and storage and communication infrastructure. Pande noted that one of the biggest developments is the G695 highway, which runs parallel to the LAC and gives the PLA the ability to quickly move from one valley to another. Flatter terrain on the Chinese side already gives Beijing an advantage, now further bolstered by infrastructure—an extensive network of new roads, bridges, and heliports.
In the 1960s, the PLA needed one full summer season to mobilize and launch military operations in Ladakh for the next summer. Now, it would need a couple of weeks to undertake the same operation. Indian military planners must live with this scenario, even if the current border crisis is resolved.
Modi approaching Xi in Bali recalled a short exchange between the two leaders on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, in 2017. Then, their conversation sparked diplomatic communications between New Delhi and Beijing that aimed to resolve a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at Doklam in Bhutan, which China claims as its territory. The talks led to disengagement, but the Chinese only stepped back a few hundred yards. They have since consolidated their military deployment and undertaken massive infrastructure development in Doklam, such as roads, helipads, and a military garrison. Even if an immediate crisis was averted, the status quo was permanently altered in China’s favor in Doklam.
A similar resolution of the Ladakh border crisis would carry bigger risks for India. Unlike in Doklam, China has entered areas in Ladakh that Indian troops regularly patrolled until 2020. Reinforcing the LAC over the vast span of Ladakh would require enhanced deployment of Indian ground forces. This permanent instability would put the Indian military under further pressure. With an already limited defense budget—China’s is more than four times as large—shifting more troops to the border would also divert resources from the Indian Navy, where multilateral cooperation with Quad partners to contest China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region is an absolute imperative.
Fearing escalation, India is forsaking even limited offensive options, such as launching a quid pro quo military operation to capture some territory in Tibet to arrive at the negotiating table with a strong hand. New Delhi’s defensive position instead seems to acknowledge its widening gap with Beijing; due to this power differential, it is unable to even use economic or diplomatic instruments to target China. After all, India’s bilateral trade with China—its biggest trading partner—reached record levels this year, with an all-time high trade deficit in Beijing’s favor. The U.S. Defense Department report on China reveals that Beijing has warned U.S. officials not to interfere with its relationship with New Delhi; Kenneth Juster, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said New Delhi doesn’t want Washington to mention Beijing’s border aggression.
India’s defensive posture plays out in its approach to diplomatic engagement and security cooperation. Unlike its Quad partners, India abstained from voting against China on the Xinjiang issue at the United Nations Human Rights Council meeting in October, and its comments on China’s crackdown in Hong Kong or aggression toward Taiwan have been guarded. Modi participated in both the BRICS summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit this year, along with Xi; Chinese delegations are still regularly invited to New Delhi for multilateral events. And an Indian military contingent participated with a PLA contingent in a military exercise in Russia this year.
The current situation along the LAC, both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, as well as China’s refusal to discuss issues on India’s agenda for resolving the crisis have added to the structural instability in their relationship. Chinese infrastructure development and the widening gap in power means that this instability will become permanent, even with a solution to the immediate crisis. India’s military will remain under pressure and on guard. Pande made this implicit when discussing future Indian plans on the border in November. “We need to very carefully calibrate our actions on the LAC [so as] to be able to safeguard both our interests and sensitivities … and be prepared to deal with all types of contingencies,” he said.
The risk of an accidental military escalation between Asia’s most populous countries—both nuclear powers—has increased significantly since 2020. This will continue unless Modi and Xi find a new modus vivendi. Establishing guardrails in the relationship will require political imagination and an honest appraisal of relative strengths; failing that, New Delhi faces tough geopolitical choices. It has so far eschewed any security-centric step with the Quad that could provoke Beijing, but murmurs from its partners about reticent Indian policy are bound to get louder. Meanwhile, India’s reliance on Russia for military equipment and ammunition now falls under a cloud of suspicion. And an unstable border with China prevents India from targeting Pakistan, a tactic that has proved politically rewarding for Modi.
The fundamentals of Indian foreign policy that have held steady since the years of former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—namely, strategic autonomy and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty—will come under greater stress as the border crisis looms over New Delhi. Modi boasts of great ambitions for India as a “Vishwa Guru,” or master to the world—a euphemism for a global superpower. But questions raised by the situation at the border with China continue to limit him.
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[ad_1] In a significant development aimed at de-escalating tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian and Chinese armies have agreed to conduct coordinated weekly patrols in the Demchok and Depsang areas of eastern Ladakh. This decision follows the successful completion of disengagement between the two sides in these areas in late October. The patrols, which are part of efforts to maintain peace and stability, will see both sides conducting one patrol each per week in these strategically sensitive regions. Indian troops will carry out one patrol, while the Chinese military will conduct the other. The patrols were initiated in the first week of November, marking the first round of coordinated efforts since disengagement began, as per an ANI report. The agreement comes after multiple rounds of military, diplomatic, and political talks between India and China, which resulted in the disengagement process in Demchok and Depsang Plains. Following the disengagement, verification patrols were carried out to ensure compliance with the terms agreed upon by both sides. These coordinated patrols are part of an ongoing effort to ensure peaceful coexistence in the disputed border areas. As part of the arrangement, ground commanders from both sides will continue holding regular engagement meetings to monitor the situation and prevent any escalation. The India-China military standoff in eastern Ladakh, which began in May 2020, had been marked by tensions following a violent clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. This confrontation resulted in the loss of lives and was one of the most serious military conflicts between the two nations in decades. Click here for Latest Fact Checked News On NewsMobile WhatsApp Channel For viral videos and Latest trends subscribe to NewsMobile YouTube Channel and Follow us on Instagram [ad_2] Source link
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[ad_1] In a significant development aimed at de-escalating tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Indian and Chinese armies have agreed to conduct coordinated weekly patrols in the Demchok and Depsang areas of eastern Ladakh. This decision follows the successful completion of disengagement between the two sides in these areas in late October. The patrols, which are part of efforts to maintain peace and stability, will see both sides conducting one patrol each per week in these strategically sensitive regions. Indian troops will carry out one patrol, while the Chinese military will conduct the other. The patrols were initiated in the first week of November, marking the first round of coordinated efforts since disengagement began, as per an ANI report. The agreement comes after multiple rounds of military, diplomatic, and political talks between India and China, which resulted in the disengagement process in Demchok and Depsang Plains. Following the disengagement, verification patrols were carried out to ensure compliance with the terms agreed upon by both sides. These coordinated patrols are part of an ongoing effort to ensure peaceful coexistence in the disputed border areas. As part of the arrangement, ground commanders from both sides will continue holding regular engagement meetings to monitor the situation and prevent any escalation. The India-China military standoff in eastern Ladakh, which began in May 2020, had been marked by tensions following a violent clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020. This confrontation resulted in the loss of lives and was one of the most serious military conflicts between the two nations in decades. Click here for Latest Fact Checked News On NewsMobile WhatsApp Channel For viral videos and Latest trends subscribe to NewsMobile YouTube Channel and Follow us on Instagram [ad_2] Source link
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Today's News 26th October 2024
The US Was Inadvertently Responsible For The Sino-Indo Border De-Escalation Deal The US Was Inadvertently Responsible For The Sino-Indo Border De-Escalation Deal Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack, India announced earlier this week that it and China agreed to patrol their disputed border area in the way that it was before June 2020’s lethal Galwan River Valley clashes. This was made…
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India and China held multiple rounds of talks on their disputed border since 2020, but no breakthrough had occurred until Indo-US ties became characterized by distrust as a result of summer 2023’s scandal and all that followed, especially in recent months.
India announced earlier this week that it and China agreed to patrol their disputed border area in the way that it was before June 2020’s lethal Galwan River Valley clashes. This was made possible by China finally complying with India’s long-standing request, which in turn paved the way for their leaders to hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of this week’s BRICS Summit in Kazan. What many don’t realize, however, is that the US was inadvertently responsible for facilitating their deal.
This analysis here from early May explains how summer 2023’s scandal about an alleged Indian assassination attempt against a Delhi-designated terrorist-separatist with dual American citizenship on US soil was a turning point in their ties. The US then continued with its good cop, bad cop game against India prior to pushing Canada to escalate its related dispute with India earlier this month. Even before the latest developments, however, Indo-US ties had already noticeably soured over this issue.
India and China held multiple rounds of talks on their disputed border since 2020, but no breakthrough had occurred until Indo-US ties became characterized by distrust as a result of summer 2023’s scandal and all that followed. China realized that those two’s previous level of trust will never return, which assuaged its concerns that India is playing a leading role in the US’ containment policy. It was this shift in perceptions that then led to China reconsidering its informal policy towards their border dispute.
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LAC Tensions Ease with Landmark Deal
The significant agreement reached between India and China this week to resolve one of the longest military standoffs in recent history received formal approval on Wednesday from PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. This bilateral meeting at the BRICS Summit marked their first encounter in five years, during which they endorsed the deal. According to the Indian side, this endorsement from the highest level is expected to further alleviate tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
During their 50-minute discussion in Kazan, the leaders agreed to promptly hold Special Representatives (SRs) talks on the India-China boundary issue, which has not occurred since 2019. They emphasized the need to advance relations from a “strategic and long-term perspective,” enhance strategic communication and explore collaborative efforts to tackle developmental challenges.
The Special Representatives, Ajit Doval, and Wang Yi have met multiple times on the sidelines of various multilateral events, including a meeting last month in St. Petersburg, but not within the formal SR talks framework.
In the Indian readout, Modi expressed his support for the agreement concerning complete disengagement and the resolution of issues that emerged in 2020 in eastern Ladakh, which included the deadly Galwan clash that year. He stressed the importance of properly managing differences and disputes to maintain peace and tranquility.
Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that Modi also expressed India’s full support for China’s presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2025. China characterized the meeting as constructive and of great significance. Read More-https://24x7newsroom.com/pm-modi-and-xi-finalize-lac-agreement-committing-to-restore-relations/
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PM, Xi To Hold Bilateral Meet At BRICS, Days After Border Breakthrough
New Delhi: Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold a bilateral meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping — their first since the 2020 Galwan clash — on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia on Tuesday, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has said. The meet will underscore the upturn in the India-China relation following a consensus on patrolling arrangement along the Line of Actual Control that had…
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Can India trust China amid talks over disengagement along LAC? What experts say
In a major diplomatic breakthrough, the government on Monday announced that India and China have reached an agreement to resume patrolling at the remaining friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, where tensions have persisted since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. In a press briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said the agreement marks a significant step…
#India china#India China Border Standoff#india china disengagement#india china lac#modi xi jinping meeting
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Neighbor victimization: India's revealed secrets
Have you ever thought about how complex India’s relationships with its neighbors really are? It’s like a tangled web of history, politics, and strategy. Take the border disputes, for instance. With China, it’s been a long-standing issue, especially in the Himalayas. Remember the Galwan Valley clash in 2020? That really escalated things. And then there’s Pakistan and Kashmir—since 1947, it’s been a rollercoaster of wars and skirmishes. Now, let’s talk about India’s growing influence. While it’s great to see India taking the lead in South Asia, it can sometimes rub neighbors the wrong way. Countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka feel like they’re caught in the middle of a power play, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative competing for attention. Building dams over international rivers and not sharing with Bangladesh. And don’t get me started on the strategic alliances with Western powers. They can seem more like a containment strategy than a partnership. All of this creates a perception that India is making more enemies than friends. It’s a delicate balance, and one misstep could tip the scales
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Geopolitical newslinks shared by a friend on Whatsapp
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_FMeErjXbw Galwan And After: Reality Check On India-China Relations | #galwan #india #china #indiachina StratNewsGlobal 13 MAY 2024 Four years after the Galwan clash and the military standoff between India and China that continues to this day, what lessons can one draw from it? Is there a way forward? Will China continue its belligerent course or does a recent…
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[ad_1] Ties between India and China nosedived significantly following the Galwan clash.New Delhi: Over 68,000 Army soldiers, around 90 tanks and other weapon systems were airlifted by the Indian Air Force to eastern Ladakh from across the country for rapid deployment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) after the deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley, top sources in defence and security establishment said.The IAF deployed its Su-30 MKI and Jaguar jets in the region for round-the-clock surveillance and intelligence gathering on the enemy build-up, apart from putting several squadrons of combat aircraft in "offensive posturing" in the wake of the clashes on June 15, 2020, that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades, they said.The troops and weapons were ferried by the transport fleet of the IAF within a "very short period of time" for quick deployment in various inhospitable areas along the LAC under a special operation, the sources said while highlighting how the force's strategic airlift capability has increased over the years.In view of the escalating tensions, the IAF had also deployed a sizeable number of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) in the region to keep a hawk-eye vigil on Chinese activities, they said.The IAF aircraft airlifted multiple divisions of the Indian Army, totalling over 68,000 troops, more than 90 tanks, nearly 330 BMP infantry combat vehicles, radar systems, artillery guns and many other equipments, they said.The total load carried by the transport fleet of the IAF, which included C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft, was 9,000 tonnes and displayed the IAF's increasing strategic airlift capabilities, they added.Following the clashes, a plethora of fighter jets, including Rafale and Mig-29 aircraft, were deployed for combat air patrol while various helicopters of the IAF were pressed into service for the transport of prefabricated structures, ammunition and spares of military equipment to mountainous bases.The sources said the range of surveillance by Su-30 MKI and Jaguar fighter jets was around 50 km and they ensured that the positions and movements of Chinese troops were accurately monitored.The IAF also quickly enhanced its air defence capabilities and combat readiness by installing various radars and bringing a range of surface-to-air guided weapons to frontline bases along the LAC in the region, they said.The strategy was to strengthen military posture, maintain credible forces and monitor the enemy build-up to effectively deal with any situation, the sources said, referring to India's overall approach.The IAF platforms operated in extremely difficult circumstances and accomplished all their mission goals, said a source without sharing further details.The overall operation demonstrated the IAF's growing airlift capability compared to what it was during 'Operation Parakram', said another source.Following the terrorist attack on Parliament in December 2001, India had launched the 'Operation Parakram' under which it mobilised a huge number of troops along the Line of Control.The government has been giving a major push to infrastructure development along the nearly 3,500 km long LAC following the eastern Ladakh faceoff.The Army has also taken a series of measures since the Galwan Valley clashes to enhance its combat capabilities. It has already deployed a significant number of easily transportable M-777 ultra-light howitzers in mountainous regions along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.The M-777 can be transported quickly in Chinook helicopters and the Army now has the flexibility of quickly moving them from one place to another based on operational requirements.The Army has also powered its units in Arunachal Pradesh with a sizeable number of US-manufactured all-terrain vehicles, 7.62MM Negev Light Machine Guns from Israel and various other lethal weapons.The Indian and Chinese troops are still locked in the over three-year confrontation in certain friction points in eastern Ladakh even as the two sides completed disengagement from several areas following extensive diplomatic and military talks.The ties between India and China nosedived significantly following the fierce confrontation in the Galwan Valley.Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the region.A fresh round of high-level military talks between the two sides is scheduled to take place on Monday.In the dialogue, India is set to press for early disengagement of troops from the remaining friction points.On July 24, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi on the sidelines of a meeting of the five-nation grouping BRICS in Johannesburg.The eastern Ladakh border standoff erupted on May 5, 2020, following a violent clash in the Pangong Lake area.(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)Featured Video Of The DayChatGPT Maker May Go Bankrupt In 2024: Report [ad_2]
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China’s cultural, admin footprint in border areas growing
Last week marked three years since the Galwan clash but when viewed along with the critical reporting on India by China’s official media, there appears little likelihood of a change in China’s attitude towards India. Look at how, over the past year, the leadership of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) has been sensitising the population settled in border areas and taking steps to strengthen…
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