#i.w.a.

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[if-you-fan-a-fire]

"By the 1930s a considerable state apparatus had emerged to monitor and regulate industrial conflict. At both federal and provincial levels labour codes had come about, in part, to forestall direct workers’ actions and allow capital time to prepare for strikes. Thus labour legislation from the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 up to the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act of 1948 increasingly hedged in the rights of unionization and collective bargaining, while simultaneously attempting to solve capital-labour conflicts by means of an innovative “soft” approach. The state central and subcentral units embedded industrial relations in a massive legal structure designed to prevent or delay strikes and lockouts by means of an investigation and conciliation process. As Panitch notes (1977, 19)

This places such tremendous strategy restriction on labour and gives such a large role for the law and the courts to play, that the legitimation aspect of labour legislation in Canada’s case seems at least balanced if not actually overshadowed by the coercive aspect.

Yet, the state sought legitimacy of its policies. It attempted to carve out an autonomous sphere for itself in the arbitration of industry and in so doing secured consent from fractions of capital and sections of the trade union movement. Unlike earlier periods, by the mid-thirties, the state was not an artifice; it was able to mount counteroffensives with its own adjudicative machinery, and it had established a fragile legitimacy to counterbalance its coercive features.

In understanding state intervention in the Blubber Bay dispute a number of preliminary points should be noted:

The autonomy of the state, exercised vis-a-vis its arbitrator role, was highly limited. Even in its moment of conciliation, the state acted to safeguard capital and circumscribe labour.

Labour slowly diagnosed the situation, insisted upon its rights to unionize, fought back against the employer, and in the process the class character of the state became transparent.

Unable to resolve the dispute through bureaucratic means, the state resorted to coercive means; the use of police, courts, and prisons, against labour. That is, criminal justice was differentially applied in order to further weaken the labour movement.

...

From the onset, police, courts, and state departments operated in a visibly instrumental pro-company manner. Police constables enforced illegal eviction notices against Chinese workers so that the company could accommodate strike-breakers. They actively supported company blacklisting by directly recruiting a labour force of strike-breakers for the company. One constable recruited twenty new men by threatening to cut them off relief. The police further aided the employer by seldom enforcing public access regulations to telephone and telegraph service that were located on company property. Civil rights were not protected, indeed they were abused by illegal intimidation and arrest, and police violence against strikers. Some three months into the strike, and before the major riot in September, the community, the I.W.A., [International Woodworkers of America] and an opposition political party were calling for a government investigation into the activities of the police. Some twenty affidavits alleged police wrongdoings. Thus through commission and omission the police protected the property interests of the employer and ensured the maintenance of their operations.

Arrest charges are a further area revealing the instrumentality of the criminal justice system. In a minor fracas (separate from the riot to be discussed later) between police, strikers, company officials and strike-breakers, thirteen charges were laid (by the police) against the pickets, two against picket sympathizers, and none against the strike-breakers. It took the police six days to lay the charges. They were assisted in this by the company time-keeper, who was a party in the dispute, and four charges were against top union officials. Ten of the thirteen pickets were convicted of either obstruction or assault (three were top union officials), the two sympathizers were acquitted, and in the one case where the union charged the manager of the company with assault, he was not tried by a stipendiary magistrate, but by a nonprofessional, and was acquitted on the basis of police and company testimony (Burnell 1980, Ch. 4).

The judiciary itself was manipulated in favour of the company. In the aftermath of the riot in September, twenty-three strikers were arrested and charged, fifteen went to trial, three were acquitted, and twelve were convicted (eight for unlawful assembly and four for unlawful assembly and riot). Twenty-three strike-breakers were also charged; ten had hearings, but none went to trial. All were acquitted. The sole police constable facing legal procedures was, however, prosecuted and convicted. The differential outcomes are a result of direct intervention in the criminal justice process (Burnell 1980, Ch. 4). First, the Attorney-General’s office appointed judges and prosecutors in such a manner as to secure convictions against the union. They appointed competent lawyers as prosecutors, and selected the father of the Assistant District Prosecutor as trial judge. In the cases of the strike-breakers, they made sure (by order-in-council) that an “anti-strike” judge handled the hearing, and they appointed an elderly, ineffectual lawyer as the prosecutor. Second, they ordered the trials in a sequence that would maximize convictions of union members while minimizing the likelihood that strike-breakers would have to be tried. By having the strikers tried first, then the police constable, and finally preliminary hearings for strike-breakers, they were able to use police testimony (which was a large part of the prosecution’s case) before it became suspect. Moreover, by having the strikers prosecuted first, the defense at the preliminary hearings of strike-breakers could present the strikers’ testimony as unreliable (since they were convicted) and justify acquittals of all (Burnell 1980, Ch. 4). Third, the Attorney-General refused the request to try the strikers en masse or individually. Instead they opted for multiple trials by three’s or four’s which allowed frequent repetition of details of participation and grouping of easy convictions with the more problematic. Finally, the summing up of evidence favoured the police position. In the case of the first and only striker tried alone, the judge omitted recounting evidence of police “showdowns” and bolstered the moral character of the force.

... the police, Canada’s representatives of law and order, were faced with a serious situation at Blubber Bay... . If we had a venal police a corrupt one, or one so cowardly that it would not be prepared to take its life in its hands, then there would be no rule in Canada.

Moreover the same judge stated that the basic fact was whether the strikers were there at the time of the riot. He charged the jury that they should not be concerned with the context or aftermath.

It’s not important to decide who struck the first blow.... The testimony on ambushes does not belong here. . . .

In contrast, the hearings of strike-breakers did not find against them because they were on the wharf at the time of the riot. On the contrary, the judge provided the context of self-defence:

Company men did nothing to start trouble when they arrived. The disturbance was provoked by the strikers, and when it began the employees went to the assistance of the police, as it was their duty to do so.

To conclude, the judiciary reinforced the police and the company. Despite a multitude of charges of police misconduct, no summons were issued against them and attempted judicial enquiries were stymied. As Premier Pattullo put it:

What sort of force would we have if every time they took action they were met by irresponsible affidavits. We are not going to destroy their morale by having a threat held over their heads of a judicial enquiry over everything that may happen.

- John L. McMullan and R.S. Ratner, “State, Labour, and Justice in British Columbia,” in Thomas Fleming & L.A. Visano, Deviant Designations: Crime, Law and Deviance in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983. p. 30-33.

[thefree-online]

New Strikes and Protests in Russia 

The Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-Syndicalists (CRAS) is a working class initiative that takes the position of the anarchist labor movement. Section of the International Workers’ Association (I.W.A.) in the Russian region. Source in Russian here. [Machine translation] No matter how hard the Russian ruling classes try to achieve “national unity” under the pretext of a […]New Strikes and…

[beerpub-ishii]

本年もよろしくおねがいします good sleep baker のユミさんにお手伝いしていただきます https://ift.tt/2aXvynh ベアードブルーイング:ライジングサンペールエール 忽布古丹醸造:furafura IPA 星野製作所(麦):ドウンケルヴァイツェン ノースアイランドビール:鏡餅 I.W.A 以上からのスタートです 待機樽は以下�� 鬼伝説地ビール:ヌプルペッペールエール 志賀高原ビール:ミヤマブロンド サンクトガーレン:ヨコハマXPA お待ちしております https://ift.tt/39EqgJl

[oldfartgamer-blog]

А вы помните свою первую стратегию? Лично для меня самой первой игрой в жанре пошаговая стратегия (да и стратегией вообще) стала малоизвестная игра на #zxspectrum - #zuluwars также известная ещё и как просто Zulu War. Помнится, попалась она мне на одной из самых первых дискет, которые я взял поиграть у друга детства. И тогда я надолго в неё залип. Честно признаться на #sinclair она так и остаётся единственной стратегией в которую я вообще играл с удовольствием - никакие Arnhem или Waterloo меня так и не заинтересовали. Да и стратегии на ПК меня не особо привлекают, кроме олдовых частей HoMM, Stronghold Crusader и Warcraft. А игра издана в далёком 1987 году компанией Cases Computer Simulations Ltd за авторством Astros Productions (Peter Karboulonis, George Karboulonis), I.W.A. В игре нам предстоит поучаствовать в Англо-зулусской войне 1879 года. В игре две части, симулирующие битвы у Улунди и на Умлалаци. Мы же представляем генерала британской армии Фредерика Аугустуса Тезигера, второго барона Челмсфорда, и должны восстановить свой авторитет и авторитет британской армии после позорного поражения от зулусов в битве при Изандлване. Игра не отличается ни графикой, ни музыкой и вообще смотрится весьма кисло, но лично мне всё-равно нравится. Вполне играбельная штука. Мы лишь двигаем полки по очереди и указываем им на��равление для стрельбы. Британские войска имеют четкое разделение на отряды, конницей можно давить врага, использовать препятствия на местности. Зулусы же лезут стадом и берут только своим количеством, правда и победа им достанется лишь когда они убьют генерала. А вот если б игра вышла в 21 веке, учитывая царящие всюду толерастию и геноцид белого населения планеты, полюбасу пришлось бы играть за этих черных аборигенов. #8bit #sinclair #zxspectrum48k #retrogames #retrogaming #tbs #синклер #ретроигры #8бит (at Nizhnevartovsk) https://www.instagram.com/p/Bs96J7fFXns/?utm_source=ig_tumblr_share&igshid=27ukk4xp5vzi

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Happy birthday Lance Von Erich! (he's the one in the Speedo)

[littletroubledgrrrl]

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

"Blubber Bay is an isolated single-resource hinterland town, located on the northern end of Texada Island. In 1937-38, the town as well as much of the island was dominated by one source of employment — the sawmill and lime quarry owned by Pacific Lime Company, an affiliate of Kingsley Navigation Company and a subsidiary (97 percent owned) of the New York multinational Niagara Alkali. By the mid-thirties, the paternalism of this company town industry was in marked decline. Poor export markets, price fluctuations, a surplus labour population, new militant unionism (C.I.O.) under communist leadership and the rise to political prominence of the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) led to wage cuts, layoffs, deterioration of working conditions, and aggressive labour-capital conflicts over union recognition and rights (Jamieson 1968, Ch.V). Earlier company policies of rotating the labour force from quarry to sawmill, providing extra work through freight handling and general clean-up, and rewarding seniority, had produced a loyal and relatively harmonious labour force. By the mid-thirties 80 percent of 150 employees had been on the payroll for at least five years, 10 percent for over fifteen years, only 6 employees were with the company for less than a year (Burnell 1980, 7). But by 1936-37, a change of management to a “dedicated anti-unionist” group further deteriorated already poor health and safety conditions in the pit, fostered a growing antagonism towards workers and again reduced wages (Bergren 1966, 116). The labour force in Blubber Bay responded by reorganizing itself on an industrial basis, integrating lumbering, longshoring and quarry-working within one umbrella union — the Federation of Woodworkers, later to be called (July 1937) the International Woodworkers of America (I.W.A.). Decidedly militant, this new union affiliated with the C.I.O. and was met with forceful resistance from employers, other labour organizations (i.e., T.L.C. in Canada) and the state. The Blubber Bay strikes of 1937 and 1938 were the first tests of the new union (Jamieson 1968, 264-266).

The first dispute occurred over wage levels, working conditions in the pits, and recognition of the union as the legitimate bargaining agency for the work force (Bergren 1966, 117-120). The company refused to negotiate with the union committee and a strike ensued which lasted for seven weeks. There was no arbitration, but a settlement was arrived at which improved wages and provided guarantees that (1) no new employees would be hired before the reinstatement of all employees on the 23 July payroll (the first day of the strike), and (2) there would be no discrimination against any employee for union activity. Furthermore, the company agreed to collective bargaining with its labour force through a committee elected by its own employees, but the company did not agree to recognize any union affiliation. Between September 1937 and January 1938 a series of violations of the settlement clauses by the company on rehiring policies fueled a combative climate. By the end of January, the company had decided on a course of action. They attempted to form a company union. This failed and the union applied to the provincial minister of labour for a conciliation commissioner to investigate the company’s attempt “to force upon the men a negotiating committee unacceptable to the majority of the employees” (Burnell 1980,14).

This was the first application for a review under the newly passed Industrial, Conciliation and Arbitration Act. This legislation was an extension of the earlier Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. It conceded labour the right to organize and be protected from employers’ intimidation and discrimination. It also added to the conciliation “cooling off period” by adding an extra stage. The new act required a conciliation commission to investigate and seek a solution in advance of a conciliation board appointment (ICA Act 1937, 93-94). Yet, it was highly ambiguous on entrenching trade union rights. While it did recognize collective bargaining through a committee of the workers’ choice, it did not explicitly compel negotiation with an established trade union (Phillips 1967, 115). This opened the door to an array of competing bargaining agents and the company union.

The conciliator investigating the union’s complaint found against the company, had the election of the I.W.A. committee ratified by a new ballot, and requested that the company recognize the union committee as the bona fide representative of the employees. The company did not respond favourably. They refused negotiations with the union, did not reemploy all old employees (they did not reinstate fourteen employees) and hired new workers from Vancouver. Once again, the union applied to the labour minister for a conciliation commissioner claiming that the company was effectively blacklisting its members by refusing to rehire laid-off men.

However, before the conciliator arrived, the company fired a union stalwart and a one-day wildcat protest strike ensued. Upon reaching Blubber Bay, the conciliator persuaded the company to reinstate the fired employee and open negotiations with the union committee. The strikers returned promptly to work. Negotiations commenced but broke down three weeks later when the company attempted to enforce its agreement (rejected by the employees) on individual workers under threat of dismissal. The workers committee applied for a conciliation-board arbitration. Before the board met, the company fired nine Chinese employees and replaced them with twenty new men recruited by the local provincial police constable. This triggered a political crisis and the minister of labour intervened and ordered the men reinstated (Burnell 1980, Ch. 2).

....

The conflicts between labour and capital were intense. During both strikes, the Pacific Lime Company hired Chinese labourers as strike-breakers, illegally evicted workers from their bunkhouses, denied free access to employees to the post and telegraph offices located on company property, and attempted to establish a new committee of nonstriking employees. Within two months, over 80 percent of the workers and their families had been evicted, some forcibly and with provincial police assistance. The union responded with blacklists of company products, boycotts, picketing and industrial sabotage (i.e., destruction of finished lumber and water supply line). Physical violence between strikebreakers, company officials, strikers, and police occurred on several occasions. Arrests, prosecutions, hearings, trials, fines, convictions, and prison sentences resulted. Altogether thirty-eight strikers were charged with either obstruction, assault, unlawful assembly, or rioting. (Four were charged with unlawful assembly and rioting; twenty-three strike-breakers — some of these apparently company officials — were charged with unlawful assembly, and one company official and a police constable were charged with assault.)

Throughout the strike, charges of illegal police intimidation, disorderly conduct, illegal arrests, and provoking a riot were made. Some twenty affidavits were gathered against police practices, a judicial investigation was considered by the Attorney-General, but was overruled by the Premier. Bias in the administration of justice was also evident. Complaints were voiced that the Department of Labour, the Attorney-General’s department, the Courts, and the Premier’s Office were committed to manipulating legal proceedings in order to obtain a favourable outcome for the company. Certainly the sentencing outcomes were revealing. No strike-breakers or company officials were convicted of any charges, one police constable received a six-month sentence for grievous bodily assault and twenty-two strikers were convicted with sentences ranging from “20 or 30 Days” to six months’ hard labour.

After the police interventions and the subsequent court hearings, trials, and results, union morale was low. Donations did not cover costs and the expenses of legal proceedings, transportation, food, and the length of the strike, severely weakened the union’s financial position. Indeed, by the end of the eleven-month dispute IL.W.A. membership had dropped from around 3,500 (in B.C.) in 1937 to below 300 a year later (Bergren 1966, 125). The strike ended in May 1939 and production resumed to full capacity, there was no union recognition, and what happened to striking employees is not known. However, the strikes of 1937-38 did have an impact on the state. Labour organizations pressured both federal and provincial governments to amend their labour codes to prevent companies from interfering with the rights of labour to organize and to force companies to recognize unions. The I.C.A. was amended in 1943 to accommodate these reforms. The forestry magnates reluctantly acceded to labour’s demands particularly in the favourable circumstances of the war economy and labour shortages (Jamieson 1968, 266). Labour itself was slow to recover. The strike almost destroyed the I.W.A. organization in British Columbia and set back the militant unionism of the C.I.O. The labour movement formally split. The C.I.O. and its affiliates were expelled. Strikes declined in frequency, size, and time loss (Jamieson 1968, 266-269). In the case of the lumberworkers they altered strategies. The main forces of their activities centred around rebuilding their ranks through policy and programs, not in Blubber Bay but in the Queen Charlotte’s and Lake Cowichan regions (Bergren 1966, 128-132). However, the events of Blubber Bay did affect, more generally, the activities and policies of organized labour. They deepened labour’s mistrust of the state as an oppressor, made apparent the ineffectiveness of conciliatory compariy unionism, fostered the promotion of an autonomist labour ideology, encouraged a contempt for the law as an entity designed to protect property rather than the person, and made for difficult bargaining in the years after World War II."

- John L. McMullan and R.S. Ratner, "State, Labour, and Justice in British Columbia," in Thomas Fleming & L.A. Visano, Deviant Designations: Crime, Law and Deviance in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983. p. 21-25.

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