#hermann von tschirschky

[autodidact-adventures]

World War I (Part 7): July 25th-28th

Saturday, July 25th, 1914

Serbia presented their response 48hrs (almost to the minute) after they'd received Austria's note, and they agreed outright to only half of the demands.  Gieslingen had been instructed to find this unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations immediately.  His bags had already been packed, and within half an hour he was on a train; less than 10min later that train crossed the Hungarian border.

Serbia and Austria announced that they were mobilizing (Serbia had begun hours earlier).  Russia announced a Period Preparatory to War (a pre-mobilization) – army units on summer manouevres were recalled to barracks; officers on leave were recalled; Kazan, Kiev, Moscow and Odessa's military districts were ordered to get ready. (These were the districts closest to Austria-Hungary.)

Secret preparations were also made in St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw's military districts.  It was important to keep this secret, as these districts threatened Germany directly.

Serbia's response was “the most brilliant example of diplomatic skill I have ever known,” as an annoyed Berchtold called it.  It was very long, and its tone was respectful and almost submissive. The response said that Serbia could only agree unconditionally to some of the demands, and had questions about the others – not refusals.

They were only unable the demand about Austria's direct involvement in the assassination investigation: “The Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and the law of criminal procedure.  Nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.”

Part of the reason Serbia didn't give in to Austria was that they were receiving false information from Russia.  France's ambassador to St. Petersburg, Maurice Paléologue, was manipulating Serbia's ambassador to Russia, and telling him that Russia wanted Serbia to stand firm.  In fact, the Tsar didn't actually want a major war, because the social & economic problems it would cause might lead to revolution.  (They did.)

Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov was of the same mind.  Both he and the tsar believed that Russia was still years away from being fully ready to fight Germany.  They were expanding their army, and building a huge network of railways with France's help, but these projects wouldn't be ready until 1917 at least.  However, Sazonov still believed that Germany was the mastermind behind Austria's actions, and that Germany was determined to begin a preventive war.  Russia could only protect itself if it reacted both forcefully and quickly.

Another part of the reason was that Nikola Pasic had prepared the response, and he definitely needed to conceal his actions from both Serbia and Austria.  Austria couldn't be allowed to know how much he'd known about the plot, and how little he'd done to stop it; Serbia couldn't be allowed to know that he had tried to stop it (this could have been even worse for him).  And because he was in the middle of an election, he had to show his willingness to stand up to Austria.  It was a terribly complicated situation for him, and one that was never going to end well.

The Austrian mobilization plan put 20 divisions (about 300,000 soldiers) on the Serbian border, a few miles from Belgrade.  This left 28 divisions for Galicia (to the north), where they would have to fight if Russia entered the war.

This worried the German general staff very much.  Because Conrad had deployed so many troops to Serbia, they wouldn't be supporting Germany against Russia in the east as much as he'd led them to believe.  Conrad did this because he still believed that Russia was going to stay out of it, and he could thrash the Serbs like he'd been wanting to for years.

Russia's Period Prepatory to War made it so they could get their troops more quickly into action if/when they mobilized.  But these “preparatory” steps weren't minor ones.  1.1 million troops were gathered in those four districts near Austria-Hungary.

Serbia's mobilization was based on the belief that Austria was going to attack within the next few days (this was incorrect).  Because of this belief, they also began moving the government out of Belgrade (so that it was away from the border).

A hundred years ago, mobilization meant not going to war, but not too far off it.  It was a huge affair, but differed between nations, and this caused problems if you wanted to imply something through mobilization.

In Russia, reserves were called up, and this was incredibly difficult in a nation where there were still few railways, and some men had to travel hundreds of miles to report for duty.  Divisions and armies were organized into their assigned positions, and prepared to advance or face an enemy advance.  Russia's mobilization plan didn't involve an invasion of enemy territory – even after mobilization, they could still be flexible.  Their armies could be kept in the country without getting them into a terrible muddle.

Austria-Hungary's transport problems weren't as bad as Russia's, and they also had some flexibility.  Conrad had divided the forces into three groups – one for Serbia and one for Galicia, and the third group to go either direction as it was needed.  He sent it to Serbia, which is how he was able to muster 20 divisions for that front.

Germany was the most modern European country, and they could mobilize far more quickly than either Austria or Russia.  France and Russia had first become allies in 1894, and ever since then, Germany's war planners had been convinced that war with one would mean war with both, and their survival depended on speed.

They assumed that they couldn't win a long drawn-out war against both France and Russia, so their mobilization plan was focused on one objective – to knock France out of the war in 6 weeks at most, before Russia was able to organize a major attack.  So Germany's mobilization plan included a drive on Paris, i.e. an invasion of enemy territory, which would be logistically impossible to stop once it had started.  So for Germany, mobilization meant war.

However, even apart from that, mobilization was always a threatening move, even if it only done by the smallest great European power against a tiny nation.  You couldn't expect no response from anyone.

Field Marshal Radomir Putnik, chief of the Serbian army staff, was actually on the way home from a holiday, and when Austria began mobilizing, he was in the Austrian province of Bohemia.  The Budapest authorities detained him, but the Emperor insisted that he be allowed to return to Belgrade on a special train provided for his use.

Sunday, July 26th, 1914

Mobilization continued on the 26th.  Austria and Russia were trying to send out specific implications with their mobilization and hoping the others would understand them.

There were two reasons for Austria's mobilization.  The first was practical – to begin the process that would take 16 days to get the army ready.  The second was to signal that the situation was serious, and that if France and Britain wanted to avoid it becoming more than just another localized Balkan problem, they'd better restrain Russia.

France mattered because Russia would be reluctant (or even unwilling) to fight Austria-Hungary and Germany without them.  Britain mattered because even though its army was small, it was allied with France & Russia (albeit loosely & informally), and it was certain to want to avoid a big war.

But this second reason was not going to work.  Poincaré was still at sea, and Germany was trying to jam radio transmissions – so he wasn't going to get the message!  Sir Edward Grey (Britain's Foreign Secretary) felt unable to do anything, because of the divisions in the government.  Grey told the cabinet that German dominance in Europe was the greatest threat to British security, and that if Austria & Russia went to war, leading to war between Germany & France, they would have to side with France.  But this didn't mean he wanted war.  At any rate, France and Britain weren't going to be doing any restraining of Russia.

Grey told the German ambassador in London, Prince Karl Lichnowsky, of his concerns, and suggested that Britain, France, Germany and Italy hold a conference to deal with the crisis.  Lichnowsky's position in London allowed him to see that Britain would almost certainly oppose Germany if war happened, and he agreed with the suggestion.  He telegraphed Berlin, saying “I would like to call your attention to the significance of Grey's proposal of a mediation à quatre between Austria and Russia.  I see in it the only possibility of avoiding a world war, in which for us there would be everything to lose and nothing to gain.”

Russia's reason for the Period Preparatory to War was to make Austria reconsider.  Sazonov told the Tsar that they faced not just a dispute over Serbia, but “a question of the balance of power in Europe, which is seriously threatened.”

They also wanted to make sure Germany didn't feel threatened (hence the secret preparations in those three districts), but German intelligence soon found out that Russia was doing more than they were saying.  It was getting very close to an undeclared mobilization. But when the German military attaché in St. Petersburg made enquiries, he was lied to.  Germany grew more & more nervous as they learned about how much Russia was actually doing, and as Russia continued to pretend to them.  They became less willing to accept their assurances of goodwill.

Maurice Paléologue knew of Russia's actual actions, but he didn't tell France, or remind Russia that under the terms of their Entente they had a responsibility to let them know in advance of their mobilization plans.  He seemed to have not wanted to do anything that might restrain the Russians or discourage them from acting.

Hermann von Tschirschky was doing the same thing in Vienna – encouraging the Austrians without doing so openly.

Prince Heinrich of Prussia (the kaiser's younger brother) was in England, and today he was at the annual yacht races at Cowes.  He had lunch with his first cousin, King George I.  After lunch, he sent a message to Berlin, saying that “Georgie” had given him the impression that London wanted to stay neutral.  George I had little say in British foreign policy, though.

Ambassador Lichnowsky's warnings contradicted what the Prince, a naval officer who had a reputation for being an unreliable reporter, was saying.  But the German foreign ministry was more inclined to believe the prince over Lichnowsky, whom they had never taken seriously, seing him as a gullible English-lover who had got his position because he was friends with the kaiser.

So, to sum up: Austria was mobilizing, and sending signals that no-one was receiving.  Russia was in the first stages of mobilizing but pretending not to be, and Germany was beginning to feel directly threatened.  France's ambassador was urging on the Russians and Serbians, and Germany's ambassador was urging on the Austrians. Britain was sending out confusing messages, and Germany & France were basically leaderless for the time being.

Monday, July 27th, 1914

On Monday, the Austro-Hungarian council of ministers met secretly and voted to declare war on Serbia, which was quite a strange decision, as they were still over two weeks away from full mobilization.  Even Conrad questioned the decision.  But Berchtold wanted to get things going properly before Germany softened, or Britain's mediation proposals could take effect, and he persuaded Conrad to agree.  The declaration of war would be announced the next day.

It required the approval of the Emperor.  But when Berchtold & Conrad went to see him, he was reluctant to agree, so they told him lies about attacks from Serbia (all that had happened was a brief exchange of gunfire at a small border town).  So Franz Joseph signed, trembling so badly as he prepared to do so that he had trouble putting on his glasses.

Edward Grey read Serbia's response to Austria's note and found it promising.  He met again with Lichnowsky, and repeated his suggestion of a four-way conference.  Lichnowsky again passed on the message to Germany, and urged that they agree.

Chancellor Hollweg didn't like the proposal, but he didn't want to offend Britain.  So he explained to Austria's ambassador in Berlin “in the most decided way” that the German government didn't want anything to do with the suggestion, “that on the contrary it advises to disregard them, but that it must pass them on to satisfy the English.”

The conference certainly wouldn't go the way Germany and Austria wanted it to.  France and Italy would have little sympathy for Austria's complaints, and Britain probably wouldn't do anything to help them & thus damage their relationship with France and Russia.  And at best, it would lead to a debate over the wording of the note and Serbia's response, nothing would happen, and Serbia would avoid the consequences yet again.

Also, mobilization was expensive, and they didn't want to be mobilizing year after year with nothing to show for it.  Conrad had never received enough money to keep the army up-to-date with equipment or technology, and they'd mobilized for both Balkan Wars, wasting a lot of money.

On Monday afternoon, the kaiser returned home.  Chancellor Bethmann and Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow were not pleased with this, worrying that he would interfere.  However, they weren't a good pair to be leading Germany through the crisis, anyway.

Bethmann was a career civil servant, and he had become Chancellor 5yrs ago, without any experience in foreign affairs.  Wilhelm disliked him – at one point, he complained, “He was always lecturing me, and pretends to know everything.”  Bethmann, like many Germans, was terrified by Germany's position among enemies, and believed that they would only get more vulnerable in future.

Jagow was a frail hypochondriac.  He'd used his elder brother's connections to get himself into the foreign service, and then to get a series of cosy assignments in Rome and other places.  Eventually, he was recalled back to Germany to lead the foreign ministry, despite his attempts to avoid it.  He said despairingly, “Nothing has helped.  I am appointed.”

Late that night, Austria sent word to Germany of their decision to declare war.  Bethmann and Jagow weren't shocked – they'd been urging Austria to do this right from the start.  They didn't make any effort to inform the kaiser: it was what he wanted as well, after all.

Tuesday, July 28th, 1914

Despite the disability to his left arm, Wilhelm had become a skilled horseman as a boy.  He claimed to be more comfortable in a saddle than in a normal seat, and so he had a saddle-chair in his office. This was where he was sitting to catch up on what had happened while he was away.

He read the most recent telegram from Lichnowsky, which quoted Grey in saying that an Austrian attack on Serbia would have disastrous consequences, but that Serbia's response to the note seemed to provide a starting-point for negotiations.

Next, he read Serbia's response.  Wilhelm tended to agree with the last opinion he'd heard or read, and this may have influenced him to have a similar response to Grey.  “The was more than one could have expected.  A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl might have remained quietly in Belgrade.  On this strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization!”

Wilhelm immediately sent a handwritten note to Jagow, declaring the Serbian response “a capitulation of the most humiliating kind,” so that “every cause for war falls to the ground!”  He ordered Jagow to send a message to Vienna in his name, informing them that there was now a basis for using mediation to resolve the crisis, and that he was prepared to help.

He also added an idea that his military staff had suggested to him earlier that day.  It would come to be called the “Stop-in-Belgrade” proposal.  Wilhelm believed that the Serbs couldn't be trusted, because they were “Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters and masters of evasion.”  So Austria should send the army across the border to occupy Belgrade, but no further.  This would give them an advantage in the mediation talks, and it was similar to what had ended the Franco-Prussian War (the German armies had stayed in France until their terms were met, and then paraded through Paris' streets and returned home).  Soon Grey would be suggesting this as well.

But the kaiser still didn't know that Austria was about to declare war – he assumed that it would be a couple of weeks away, if at all.  Bethmann and Jagow prepared the message as ordered, but delayed 12hrs in sending it, so that Vienna would receive it after they'd declared war.

Wilhelm was, they believed, too unpredictable and mercurial.  It was a fair judgement – the kaiser was arrogant in a childish way, often reversed his decisions, and even broke down in the middle of crises (which he had done in 1908, 1911, and early 1914, when he'd had to be talked out of abdicating the throne).  They had a better understanding of the situation than he did (although mostly because they'd been keeping information from him), and they probably thought they were doing what he would want anyway.

In the middle of the afternoon, Austria declared war.  Berchtold knew that Serbia's government had withdrawn to the interior, but he didn't know how to make contact with them.  He sent an uncoded telegram (in French) to Pasic through the Serbian army headquarters, informing him that a state of war now existed between the two countries.  But not long afterwards, he sent another telegram (with the same wording) to Pasic through the Serbian foreign minister.  They went through Romania and reached Pasic separately.

Pasic was at lunch in a provincial hotel when the first telegram reached him.  He read it, stood up, and addressed the room: “Austria has declared war on us.  Our cause is just.  God will help us.” The second telegram arrived not long afterwards, and Pasic got suspicious, thinking that it could be a hoax.  He asked the German ambassador, but the ambassador knew nothing about any declaration of war, as he hadn't been informed in advance either.

However, it didn't take long to confirm that the telegrams were indeed genuine.  The news set off anti-Serbian demonstrations in Vienna and Berlin.  Conrad began shelling Belgrade from across the border in Bosnia, but the Austrian troops didn't move.

After he learned what had happened, Wilhelm met with Berchtold and spoke to him.  Berchtold was visibly unhappy after that meeting, and quickly changed his course.  He wrote a long telegram to Tschirschky (German ambassador in Vienna) in which he blamed Austria for Germany's actions.  He claimed that the Austro-Hungarian government “has left us in the dark concerning its intentions, despite repeated interrogations” and that the declaration of war had put them in “an extraordinarily difficult position” that could cause them to “incur the odium of having been responsible for a world war.”  He told Tschirschky to encourage the Austrians to respond positively to the Stop-in-Belgrade proposal, which Grey was now backing.

Some of this was true – Austria had definitely concealed information from Germany.  But much of it was just blame-shifting, and Tschirschky was confused and surprised – after all, he'd been told off earlier for urging caution.  Berchtold had the same reaction, but even more so – Germany had been urging them on for three weeks now, and he was finally taking action – and now they were saying to stop?

Russia's ambassador to Austria had been waiting since the previous day to meet with Berchtold, and now he was able to.  But the meeting just ended in confusion and miscommunication.  He wanted to discuss several ideas that had been passing through the various capitals, including Grey's suggestion that Serbia's response be used as a starting point for negotiations; and Sazonov's suggestion that he and Austria's ambassador to St. Petersburg review Austria's note, and see if it could be changed enough so that Serbia would accept it.

But everyone was distracted and exhausted, and Berchtold & the ambassador lost track of what they were talking about.  When the meeting was over, Berchtold thought he'd told him that he wouldn't negotiate with Serbia, but he would with Russia.  The ambassador thought he'd said that he wouldn't negotiate with Russia at all, and he told Sazonov that.

Austria's declaration of war had convinced Sazonov that they were mobilizing to destroy Serbia, not just to emphasize its grievances (which was pretty much the truth).  Russia had sped up its preparations for war, and Sazonov now believed that Austria was refusing to negotiate with them, and so war was even more likely to be inevitable.

France's ambassador Paléologue was telling Sazonov that France wanted Russia to stand firm; Germany's ambassador Friedrich von Pourtalès was telling him that if Russia kept on with their military preparations, Germany would have to mobilize as well.  Serbia's ambassador was reporting that Austria was bombing Belgrade, and Russia's generals were saying that Germany was preparing for war, and they had to do the same.

Paléologue, though, was giving out false information again.  The French Prime Minister, René Viviani, was on the ship returning from St. Petersburg with Poincaré, and he'd sent Paléologue a telegram instructing him to do everything possible to resolve the crisis without war.

Paléologue was notoriously excitable, and very pessimistic, seeing the worst in every situation.  Because of this, he was widely distrusted (he'd got this position because he was friends with Poincaré.  Even before July, he'd been warning that a European war was inevitable before the year was out.  He worried that if France didn't show that they'd fully support Russia, then Russia would abandon the alliance with them, and try to ally with Germany.  He believed he was protecting France's security.

[autodidact-adventures]

World War I (Part 5): Austria Reacts

The archduke was shot on July 28th, and on the 29th, crowds of non-Serb Bosnians (mostly Muslim & Catholic Croats, who were the majority of Bosnia's population) marched through Sarajevo. They carried Hungarian flags, and pictures of the archduke and Sophie.

That was the more peaceful demonstration.  Meanwhile, people were attacking buildings of the Bosnian Serb community – they vandalized schools, newspaper offices, and a hotel; they also broke the windows of Sarajevo's leading Orthodox priest's home.  About 50 people were injured, and one was killed.

There were also demonstrations in other Austro-Hungarian cities, and in Munich and Berlin.  However, these ones were smaller and non-violent, and they didn't last long.

Even in Sarajevo, though, the furore died down after a few hours. The Vienna government announced that the victims would be compensated.  However, the Belgrade newspapers were “behaving shamefully” according to a British diplomat, wildly exaggerating the events and claiming that Serbian women were being subjected to “outrages” and that 10,000 of Austro-Hungarian Serbs had been injured or killed.

The Serbians had their own reactions to the archduke's murder.  One Austrian diplomat reported that they were falling “into one another's arms in delight”.  Crowds were disorderly, and as the newspapers spun their tales, they became angry.  But the Serbian government did their best to discourage all of this.

In Vienna, things returned to normal quite quickly.  Franz Ferdinand had been quite cold and stiff, and therefore wasn't popular among the public.  One observer said that “The event almost failed to make any impression whatever.  On Sunday and Monday, the crowds in Vienna listened to music and drank wine as if nothing had happened.” Sophie and the archduke were interred at the country estate, but with little fuss made about it.  Franz Ferdinand's friends were offended at this, and the Emperor had to explain his failure to do more than he had.

Austria was determined to take action against Serbia, but they weren't ready to do so yet.  For the next two days after the assassination, many meetings were held, with Conrad, Berchtold, the Emperor, and the Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza attending them.  However, nothing was fully agreed upon.  Conrad and Berchtold wanted to attack Serbia, and soon, but the Emperor was uncertain, and Tisza against it completely.  They all did agree, though, that certain preliminaries had to be carried out before anything could be done.

The first of these preliminaries was to make sure of Germany's support – they couldn't do anything without it.  If Austria acted against Serbia, then Russia would get involved, and they weren't powerful enough to deter Russia (or fight their army if they invaded) on their own.

Also, Hungary had to agree.  Whether they won or lost the war, the Hungarians wouldn't be happy about the potential consequences, as they didn't want the Slavs to become a major part of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

The army had to be mobilized.  A hundred years ago, with no instant communication or fast transport, this was a cumbersome and expensive process.  100,000's of reserve troupes had to be called up; entire national railway systems had to be taken over to transport soldiers & supplies.  The timetables for mobilization were so complicated that years had been spent developing them.

Austria actually had two plans for mobilization (which was unusual) – one for attacking Serbia, and the other for attacking Serbia and Russia, with Germany alongside them.  Either one would take weeks to implement.  Thousands of soldiers had been sent home, as it was summer, to help with the harvest (this was common before the mechanization of agriculture).  Conrad was worried that calling them back earlier than usual would put Serbia and Russia on alert.

And that wasn't the only obstacle.  The French President Raymond Poincaré was scheduled to pay a state visit to St. Petersburg (Russia's capital at the time) from July 20th-23rd. If they got wind of Austria's intentions, they would have the perfect opportunity for France and Russia to cement their alliance, and co-ordinate their actions.

So because of these factors (slow mobilization, the harvest, Poincaré's visit), the army wouldn't be ready until mid-August – one and a half months after the assassination.  Any international sympathy Austria had would have disappeared by then.

Germany's support was readily given.  The archduke had understood the dangers of the Balkans and was more restrained than Conrad, and the Kaiser had liked & admired him.  Germany needed Austria as an ally, and thus needed to help defend them against Balkan nationalism. They hadn't been very supportive in the Balkan Wars, and they knew that their enemies around them were growing stronger.

Kaiser Wilhelm had been racing his new sailboat, the Meteor V, off the Norwegian coast when he heard about the assassination.  He returned quickly to his Potsdam palace (outside Berlin), and began to keep an eye on events, although not much was happening.

Wilhelm easily flew into belligerent moods, and when the news came that the assassins were Bosnian Serbs who had been prepared in Belgrade, he went into one of them.  He often wrote notes in the margins of diplomatic dispatches as he read them – a way of letting the foreign office know his opinions, and of playing the role of the military leader in a blustering fashion.  At the beginning of July, the German ambassador to Vienna, Hermann von Tschirschky sent a telegram saying that he'd urged the Austrians not to move too quickly against Serbia.  Wilhelm was angry, and wrote on it, “Who authorized him to act that way?  Serbia must be disposed of, and that right soon!”

News of his reaction reached Vienna, and they were very pleased about it.  Berlin was also sending messages of support through other channels.  Tschirschky (a member of the old Prussian aristocracy) did a quick about-turn, which suited his beliefs that Germany's position in Europe was becoming unsteady (many of the Prussian aristocrats believed this), and that Austria-Hungary was declining and becoming useless.  In one of his dispatches, he wrote, “How often I have asked myself whether it really is worthwhile to commit ourselves to this state, creaking in all its joints, and to continue the dreary work of dragging it along.”

On July 5th and 6th, Wilhelm and the Deputy Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann met separately with emissaries from Vienna.  Wilhelm didn't specifically tell them what to do, but told them that something had to be done about Serbia, that it should be done soon, and that Germany would support them not matter what they decided.  This was what Austria wanted to hear.

Immediately meeting with Wilhelm, the Austrian ambassador said that “It was his opinion that this action must not be delayed.  Russia's attitude will no doubt be hostile, but for this he had been for years prepared, and should a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia be unavoidable, we might be convinced that Germany, our old faithful ally, would stand at our side.  Russia at the present time was in no way prepared for war, and would think twice before it appealed to arms.”  This report became famous as the “blank check assurance” – that Germany would support Austria, no matter what.

But the Austrians hadn't yet decided what to do, or talked properly to Germany about it.  Zimmermann and Wilhelm didn't ask – it's probable that the Germans didn't think the situation was serious enough.  War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn was briefed on the meetings, a letter from Franz Joseph, and an accompanying memo from Berchtold (the latter two were mostly about Austria's long-term plans for changing the balance of power in the Balkans by using Bulgaria to prise Romania out of its alliance with Russia).  Falkenhayn said that what he had learned “did not succeed in convincing me that the Vienna Government had taken any firm resolution.”  I.e., Germany believed that Austria would have to be pushed into taking action, rather than taking the initiative.

But now that they had Germany's support, Austria was going ahead on their own, without informing them of events or plans.  They hadn't even explained that they couldn't take action until after Poincaré had left Russia.  Germany continued to assume that Austria was planning to attack Serbia at once, and after that, they'd be free to move all their forces to the Russian border.

At this time, the Kaiser and his closest associates saw little possibility of a European war.  Most Germans doubted Austria's ability to save itself – and, unfortunately, they doubted Russia, too.  Russia had been ineffective in the last decade, and Germany believed that that would not change.

After meeting with the Austrians, Falkenhayn asked Wilhelm if military preparations were necessary, but was told no.  Wilhelm soon returned to his boat, telling one of his admirals that “I don't believe we are headed for a great war.  In this case the tsar's views would not be on the side of the prince's murderer.  Besides this, France and Russia are not ready for war.”

Chancellor Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg went off on holiday.  Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke was still at a spa, recovering from a bronchial infection, and hadn't even been recalled to Berlin.  The head of the navy went off to another spa.  So the main people in the government & military were scattered about the place, unable to co-ordinate or respond effectively, or even keep themselves properly informed of developments.  At the meetings, they'd been more interested in the Bulgaria-Romania-Russia plan than anything else.

So Germany was sorted – now they had to get Hungary to agree. Count Tisza didn't care about the Hapsburg Empire beyond what benefitted Hungary, and definitely didn't want to attack Serbia.  At one point, he'd warned the Emperor that it would lead to civil war in Hungary.  Conrad had responded by saying that after they'd thrashed the Serbians, they'd probably have to thrash the Hungarians as well.

On July 7th, Berchtold called a meeting of the Austro-Hungarian council of ministers, to discuss measures to “put an end to Serbia's intrigues once and for all.”  Tisza didn't want any of this, and tried to shift the topic to the Bulgaria-Romania-Russia scheme.  But everyone else had lost interest in a long-term plan such as that, so he tried to slow things down, saying that he had to write a memo to the Emperor, explaining his objections.  (The Emperor was away at this summer retreat.)  The others had to agree, because of the way the dual monarchy worked.

The meeting focused on the idea that they should present Serbia with a list of demands, and whether they should make them too much for Serbia to be able to accept.  Tisza was the sole dissenter on the latter point, saying “Our exactions may be hard, but not such that they cannot be complied with.  If Serbia accepted them, we should have a splendid diplomatic success.”  This success “would decidedly improve our situation and give a chance of initiating an advantageous policy in the Balkans.”  He warned the others that not sticking to diplomacy could lead to “the terrible calamity of a European war.”

The Austro-Hungarian War Minister replied that “a diplomatic success would be of no use at all” and would be “interpreted as weakness”.  A summary of the meeting reported that, except for Tisza, everyone agreed that “a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless.” Therefore, “such stringent demands must be addressed to Serbia” that their refusal would be “almost certain”.

They all assumed that they would defeat Serbia, and discussed what they would do with it.  Tisza said that “by a war we could reduce the size of Serbia, but we could not completely annihilate it” because “Russia would fight to the death before allowing this.” For once, they agreed with him – Russia would certainly react that way.  So they decided to reduce Serbia's size, giving parts of it to Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.  The rest would be an officially-autonomous state, but would really become an Austro-Hungarian satellite.  Berchtold believed that by framing their intentions in this way, they could destroy Serbia while promising Russia (and the world) that Austria didn't want any Serbian territory.

The summary of the meeting shows that the men were desparate, and frightened that if they didn't destroy Serbia, they wouldn't be able to keep the South Slav population of Austria-Hungary from revolting against the Hapsburgs.

What wasn't discussed was how the other great powers (even Germany) might react.  At the beginning of the meeting, Berchtold had said that a “decisive stroke...cannot be dealt without previous diplomatic preparation.”  But he was referring only to German support, which they already had.  They didn't think of needing to keep Germany informed.

Nor did they consider Russia, except for assuming that Russia wouldn't intervene if Austria didn't try to absorb Serbia. They were being secretive and deceitful, and keeping their plans and true intentions hidden.  Not even Germany would be told of their decision to break up most of Serbia after seizing it.  Austria would continue to assure the other great powers that they didn't want any Serbian territory.

Even Tisza began to go along with the idea.  Later in the meeting, he said that he “was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Serbia should be hard indeed, but not so much as to make our intention of raising unacceptable terms clear to everybody else.”  I.e., that the demands would be unacceptable (contrary to his first insistence), but that they wouldn't seem to be deliberately unacceptable to anybody else.

This was all a very bad idea.  Germany wouldn't know what Austria was really doing until it was nearly too late.  And as for Russia, they would panic, and see themselves as having been betrayed.

Not much happened for a while after the meeting, because of the need for secrecy.  Tisza was still not happy, and the next day, he wrote to Franz Joseph, warning that attacking Serbia “would, as far as can humanly be forseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence to a world war.”  He also changed his mind again about the demands, saying that they should be “stiff but not impossible to meet, and that further action should be taken only if Serbia refuses.” Berchtold was busy drafting these demands, and ignored Tisza.

By July 13th, Austria's ambassador in Berlin was reporting that Germany was growing nervous about their lack of action, but Berchtold ignored this, too.

On July 14th, Tisza objected to the use of the term “ultimatum” for the demands.  So Berchtold changed it to a “note with time limit” instead, which sounded better (but was really the same thing).  Serbia would be given 48hrs in which to respond, and would be told nothing about what Austria was planning to do if they refused.  Austria's ambassadors were told to assure Russia and Germany they they weren't doing anything to cause concern.

On July 19th, the council of ministers met again in Vienna.  They reviewed Berchtold's draft, and approved it.  There were 10 demands, and while at least half were reasonable, some of them could be interpreted as compromising Serbia's sovereignty.  The worst of them demanded that Serbia had to let Austria be directly involved in the handling of the assassination investigation, and internal matters related to it.  Of course they were not going to agree to that.

The council agreed that the note would be delivered to Pasic in Belgrade on July 23rd, directly after Poincaré had left St. Petersburg.  Tisza was no longer objecting by this time – Germany had promised support, and he was also beginning to see that the Balkan issues were threatening Hungary as well.  In particular, Serbia's friendly relations with Romania were a threat to their control of Transylvania, which had a large Romanian population that wanted to reunite with its true homeland.

The note was delivered on the evening of Thursday, July 23rd. But Pasic wasn't in Belgrade (he had been told that a communication from Vienna was coming, so this may not have been coincidence).  He was on an electioneering trip into Serbia's newest provinces.  The Foreign Minister was told to expect an important visit from the Austrian ambassador at 6pm, and he tried to telegraph Pasic, but got no answer.

The Viennese ambassador was Baron Giesl von Gieslingen.  Like many other Austrian officials, he saw war with Serbia as inevitable and also desirable.  When he arrived, he was taken to meet the Foreign Minister, who had an interpreter with him, as he didn't speak French or German.

Gieslingen began to read the note.  It was a very long document, and its introduction was a complaint that Serbia's behaviour had been intolerable, and would no longer be tolerated.  Gieslingen read slowly, pausing for the interpreter.  The Foreign Minister became more & more alarmed, and kept interrupting, saying that only Pasic could accepta communication of such importance.  Gieslingen said that if that was the case, he could only leave the note and go, and he did so, saying that Austria would only be satisfied with unconditional acceptance, and that they had to respond by Saturday.

Only Russia took much notice of these events.  Britain's government was dealing with an Irish Home Rule crisis.  The London newspapers had never been friendly towards Serbia, and they described the demands as being appropriate and responsible.  The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, suggested that the deadline should be extended, but that was all.

In France, even less notice was taken.  Poincaré was at sea, somewhere between Russia and France.  The public and government were dealing with a scandal where a former PM's wife had shot a newspaper editor dead.

The Kaiser only learned about it through the Norwegian newspapers, as he was still on holiday.  He was angry that the foreign office hadn't informed him of what had happened, and for the first time he began to be seriously concerned.  He suggested that the German High Seas Fleet's planned visit to Scandinavia be cancelled, but was persuaded against it.  Chancellor Hollweg urged him not to interrupt his holiday, but the Kaiser returned home anyway.

But at this point, he didn't even know what the note to Serbia had said.  Berlin had requested a copy, and the Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow had received one on the evening of July 22nd (less than 24hrs before it was delivered to Serbia).  But it was an incomplete copy, and gave no indication that Austria was planning to reject Serbia's response.  Chancellor Hollweg didn't even bother to read it.

There was no more time for discussion or objections, and the Kaiser knew even less than the other Germans did – which Berchtold had probably intended, as he was determined not to let any more obstacles stand in his way.  But it had negative consequences for Austria.

Russia had been completely unprepared for the harshness of the note – in fact, the Austrian ambassadors (as they'd been ordered) had led the government to expect something very different.  Berchtold had done nothing to explain to European newspapers why Austria was taking action at last, and therefore the European public had no idea why they were doing this.  Very little had been publicized about the fact that the assassination plot had been traced back to Belgrade, and that therefore it was likely that Serbian officials had been involved.  And Austria hadn't made any public complaints about Serbia's failure to investigate the assassination.

So when news of the note to Serbia broke across Europe, people were very surprised – more so than if Austria had just invaded straight away after the assassination.  By July 23rd, when the note was delivered, it was 3.5 weeks after the assassination, and things had calmed down.  People were no longer likely to see a military response as being a reasonable reaction to the archduke's murder.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov flew into a rage at the news.  He'd been deceived, he said; Russia couldn't possibly stand by while Serbia was humiliated, and Austria couldn't have sent the note without Germany's approval and support.  (Of course, that last one was incorrect.)  Germany and Austria-Hungary must be plotting to drive Russia out of the Balkans!  “You are setting fire to Europe!” he told the Austrian ambassador.

Meanwhile, the Prince Regent of Serbia was sending urgent telegrams to the Tsar, asking for help.  And Russia had to help, this time.  They'd failed the Slavs too many times, and the Tsar was told that his people wouldn't stand for it to happen again.  Russia would be disgraced, he was told; they'd have no more friends in the Balkans, and no respect in Europe.  In fact, it might set off another revolution, worse than the one in 1905.

But if Russia showed themselves to be firm, then Austria might hold back.  By Friday, July 24th, Sazonov was telling the army's Chief of Staff to get ready for mobilization.  And it was at that point that the Balkan crisis became a European crisis.