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memecucker · 2 years ago

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@doombrigade

1988

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26 September 1988: The novel is published in the UK.

Khushwant Singh, while reviewing the book in Illustrated Weekly, proposed a ban on The Satanic Verses, apprehending the reaction it may evoke among people.[citation needed]

5 October 1988: India bans the novel's importation, after Indian parliamentarian and editor of the monthly magazine Muslim India Syed Shahabuddin petitioned the government of Rajiv Gandhi to ban the book.[127][128][129] In 1993, Syed Shahabuddin tried unsuccessfully to ban another book (Ram Swarup's Hindu View of Christianity and Islam).[130][131]

October 1988: Death threats against Rushdie compel him to cancel trips and sometimes take a bodyguard. Letter writing campaign to Viking Press in America brings "tens of thousands of menacing letters".[132]

20 October 1988: Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK writes the British government pressing for a ban of The Satanic Verse on grounds of blasphemy.[133]

21 November 1988: Grand sheik of Egypt Al-Azhar calls on Islamic organisations in Britain to take legal action to prevent the novel's distribution.

24 November 1988: The novel is banned in South Africa and Pakistan; bans follow within weeks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, Bangladesh, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Qatar.

2 December 1988: First book burning of The Satanic Verses in UK. 7000 Muslims attend rally burning the book in Bolton,[134] though the event is barely noticed by the media.[135]

1989

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14 January 1989: A copy of the book is burned in Bradford. Extensive media coverage and debate. Some support from non-Muslims.[134]

January 1989: Islamic Defense Council demands that Penguin Books apologise, withdraw the novel, destroy any extant copies, and never reprint it.

February 1989: The first copies of the United States edition appear in bookstores, along with book reviews in the US press.

12 February 1989: Six people are killed and 100 injured when 10,000 attack the American Cultural Center in Islamabad, Pakistan protesting against Rushdie and his book.[136]

13 February 1989: One person is killed and over 100 injured in anti-Rushdie riots in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir.[137][138]

14 February 1989: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran issues a fatwa calling on all Muslims to execute all those involved in the publication of the novel; the 15 Khordad Foundation, an Iranian religious foundation or bonyad, offers a reward of $US1 million or 200 million rials for the murder of Rushdie, $3 million if done by an Iranian.

16 February 1989: Armed Islamist groups, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp and Hezbollah of Lebanon, express their enthusiasm to "carry out the Imam's decree".[139] Rushdie enters the protection programme of the British government. The bounty on his head is raised to $6 million.[39]

17 February 1989: Iranian president Ali Khamenei says Rushdie could be pardoned if he apologises.[140]

17 February 1989: Book store chains including B. Dalton, Barnes & Noble, Waldenbooks, and Coles Book Stores say that they will no longer sell the book.[141]

18 February 1989: Rushdie apologizes as President Khamenei suggested; initially, IRNA (the official Iranian news agency) says Rushdie's statement "is generally seen as sufficient enough to warrant his pardon".[142]

19 February 1989: Ayatollah Khomeini issues edict saying no apology or contrition by Rushdie could lift his death sentence.

22 February 1989: The novel is published in the US; major bookstore chains Barnes & Noble and Waldenbooks, under threat, remove the novel from one-third of the nation's bookstores.

24 February 1989: Twelve people die and 40 are wounded when a large anti-Rushdie riot in Bombay, Maharashtra, India starts to cause considerable property damage and police open fire.[143]

28 February 1989: Bookstores, including Cody's and Waldenbooks in Berkeley, California, USA, are firebombed for selling the novel.[144]

28 February 1989: 1989 firebombing of the Riverdale Press: The offices of the Riverdale Press, a weekly newspaper in the Bronx, is destroyed by firebombs. A caller to 911 says the bombing was in retaliation for an editorial defending the right to read the novel and criticising the chain stores that stopped selling it.[145]

7 March 1989: Iran breaks diplomatic relations with Britain.

March 1989: Independent book stores including Cody's in Berkeley, California, United States and Powell's in Portland, Oregon, United States continue to sell the book.[146]

March 1989: The Organisation of the Islamic Conference calls on its 46 member governments to prohibit the novel. The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar sets the punishment for possession of the book as three years in prison and a fine of $2,500; in Malaysia, three years in prison and a fine of $7,400; in Indonesia, a month in prison or a fine. The only nation with a predominantly Muslim population where the novel remains legal is Turkey. Several nations with large Muslim minorities, including Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Tanzania, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, also impose penalties for possessing the novel.

May 1989: Musician Yusuf Islam (formerly known as Cat Stevens) indicates his support for the fatwa and states during a British television documentary, according to The New York Times, that if Rushdie shows up at his door, he "might ring somebody who might do more damage to him than he would like... I'd try to phone the Ayatollah Khomeini and tell him exactly where this man is".[147] Yusuf Islam later denied giving support to the fatwa. For more on this topic see Cat Stevens' comments about Salman Rushdie.

27 May 1989: 15,000 to 20,000 Muslims gather in Parliament Square in London burning Rushdie in effigy and calling for the novel's banning.[148]

3 June 1989: Khomeini dies. Former president Khamenei takes over as the new Supreme Leader.

31 July 1989: The BBC broadcasts Tony Harrison's film-poem The Blasphemers' Banquet in which Harrison defends Rushdie by likening him to Molière, Voltaire, Omar Khayyam and Byron.

Following the broadcast of his film-poem, Harrison published a poem titled The Satanic Verses in The Observer in which he wrote:[149]

I shall not cease from mental strife

nor shall my pen sleep in my hand

till Rushdie has a right to life

and books aren't burned or banned

3 August 1989: A man using the alias Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh accidentally blew himself up along with two floors of a central London hotel while preparing a bomb intended to kill Rushdie.[150]

Kerstin Ekman and Lars Gyllensten, members of the Swedish Academy (which awards the Nobel Prize in Literature), stopped participating in the Academy's work in protest at the Academy's refusal to support an appeal to the Swedish cabinet in support for Rushdie.[151][152] Gyllensten dies in 2006, while Ekman leaves in 2018 after the Academy changed its rules, permitting resignations.[153]

1990

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1990: Rushdie apologises to Muslims.

1990: Rushdie publishes an essay on Khomeini's death, "In Good Faith", to appease his critics and issues an apology in which he seems to reaffirm his respect for Islam; however, Iranian clerics do not retract the fatwa.

1990: Five bombings target bookstores in England.

24 December 1990: Rushdie signs a declaration affirming his Islamic faith and calls for Viking-Penguin, the publisher of The Satanic Verses, neither to issue the book in paperback nor to allow it to be translated.[91]

1991

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11 July 1991: Hitoshi Igarashi, the novel's Japanese translator, is stabbed to death;[154] and Ettore Capriolo, its Italian translator, is seriously wounded.

1993–1994

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2 July 1993: Thirty-seven Turkish intellectuals and locals participating in the Pir Sultan Abdal Literary Festival die when the conference hotel in Sivas, Turkey, is burnt down by a mob of radical islamists. Participating in the conference was Aziz Nesin, who had previously announced that he was going to get the book translated and published. The mob demanded he be handed over for summary execution. The mob set the hotel alight when Nesin was not turned over. Nesin escaped the fire and survived.[155]

11 August 1993: Rushdie makes a rare public appearance at U2's concert in Wembley Stadium on their Zoo TV Tour in London. Bono, donned as stage character/devil Mr. MacPhisto, placed a call to Rushdie only to find himself face to face with Rushdie on stage. Rushdie told Bono that "real devils don't wear horns".

October 1993: The novel's Norwegian publisher, William Nygaard, is shot and seriously injured.

1997–1998

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1997: The bounty is doubled, to $600,000.

1998: Iranian government publicly declares that it will "neither support nor hinder assassination operations on Rushdie".[63] This is announced as part of a wider agreement to normalise relations between Iran and the United Kingdom. Rushdie subsequently declares that he will stop living in hiding, and that he is not, in fact, religious. According to some of Iran's leading clerics, despite the death of Khomeini and the Iranian government's official declaration, the fatwa remains in force. Iran's foreign minister Kamal Kharazi stated,

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention, nor is it going to take any action whatsoever, to threaten the life of the author of The Satanic Verses or anybody associated with his work, nor will it encourage or assist anybody to do so".[2]

1999

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1999: An Iranian foundation places a $2.8 million bounty on Rushdie's life.

14 February 1999: on the tenth anniversary of the ruling against Rushdie, more than half of the deputies in (Iranian) Parliament sign a statement declaring, "The verdict on Rushdie, the blasphemer, is death, both today and tomorrow, and to burn in hell for all eternity".[156]

2000–2004

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14 February 2000: Ayatollah Hassan Saneii, the head of the 15th of Khordad Foundation, reiterates that the death sentence remains valid and the foundation's $2.8 million reward will be paid with interest to Rushdie's assassins. Persians take this news with some scepticism as the foundation is "widely known" to be bankrupt.[156]

January 2002: South Africa lifts its ban on The Satanic Verses.[157]

16 February 2003: Iran's Revolutionary Guards reiterate the call for the assassination of Rushdie. As reported by the Sunday Herald, "Ayatollah Hassan Saneii, head of the semi-official Khordad Foundation that has placed a $2.8 million bounty on Rushdie's head, was quoted by the Jomhuri Islami newspaper as saying that his foundation would now pay $3 million to anyone who kills Rushdie".[158]

2005–2007

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Early 2005: Khomeini's fatwa against Rushdie is reaffirmed by Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a message to Muslim pilgrims making the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Iran has rejected requests to withdraw the fatwa on the basis that only the person who issued it may withdraw it.

14 February 2006: Iran's official state news agency reports on the anniversary of the decree that the government-run Martyrs Foundation has announced, "The fatwā by Imam Khomeini in regard to the apostate Salman Rushdie will be in effect forever", and that one of Iran's state bonyad, or foundations, has offered a $2.8 million bounty on his life.[3]

15 June 2007: Rushdie receives knighthood for services to literature sparking an outcry from Islamic groups. Several groups invoking The Satanic Verses controversy renew calls for his death.

29 June 2007: Bombs planted in central London may have been linked to the Knighthood of Salman Rushdie.[159]

2008–2012

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24 January 2012: The vice-chancellor of Darul Uloom Deoband, an Islamic school in India, issued a demand that Rushdie be denied a visa for his scheduled appearance at the Jaipur Literature Festival at the end of January. The Indian government replied that there were no plans to bar Rushdie from entering the country, and that Rushdie, who had visited India several times in the past, did not need a visa because he held a Persons of Indian Origin Card "that entitles holders to travel to the country of their origin without other documentation".[160] Rushdie ultimately decided not to attend the festival, citing reports of possible assassination attempts.[161] Rushdie investigated police reports of paid assassins and suggested that the police might have lied.[162] Meanwhile, police were seeking Ruchir Joshi, Jeet Thayil, Hari Kunzru and Amitava Kumar who fled Jaipur on the advice of officials at the Jaipur Literature Festival after reading excerpts from The Satanic Verses, which is banned in India.[163] A proposed video link session between Rushdie and the Jaipur Literature Festival ran into difficulty after the government pressured the festival to stop it.[162]

17 September 2012: Rushdie expressed doubt that The Satanic Verses would be published today because of a climate of "fear and nervousness".[164]

2016

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22 February 2016: A group of forty state-run media organisations in Iran raised $600,000 to add to the Fatwa on Rushdie.[165]

24 March: In a press release, the Swedish Academy, who awards the Nobel Prize in Literature, condemns the death sentence for Rushdie for the first time, saying:

"The death sentence and the reward money are flagrant breaches of international law and rules of civilised interaction within the world community and therefore can in no way be compatible with normalisation.

The fact that the death sentence has been passed as punishment for a work of literature also implies a serious violation of free speech. The principle of the independence of literature from political control is of fundamental importance for civilisation and must be defended against attacks by avengers and the adherents of censorship.

The Swedish Academy decries the retention of the death sentence for Salman Rushdie and that state-controlled media are permitted to encourage violence directed at a writer."[166]

2022

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Main article: Stabbing of Salman Rushdie

12 August 2022: Rushdie was stabbed in the neck and abdomen when he was set to give a lecture in Chautauqua, New York.[167][168] Commenting on the extent of his injuries, Rushdie's agent said that he had likely lost an eye, in addition to sustaining liver damage and severed nerves in one arm.[169][170] Rushdie was placed on a ventilator the day of the attack, but within 48 hours, he was taken off of it and reportedly able to speak.[171]

14 August 2022: Two days after Rushdie's stabbing, the government-run newspaper of Iran called the attack an "implementation of divine decree".[172]

“A guy who has an open bounty placed on him for decades which has resulted in a near fatal stabbing as well as the murders of people connected to him and the bombing of a hotel building is a lot like people on the internet saying JK Rowling is transphobic”

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wolfliving · 5 years ago

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Chinese Artificial Intelligence vs US Artificial Intelligence

http://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-The-Question-of-Comparative-Advantage-in-Artificial-Intelligence-1.pdf

....Since Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE were added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List,15 China’s determination to pursue indigenous innovation has only intensified.16

In cases where the United States has stymied Chinese advances with unilateral export controls but substitute options remain available, China has typically managed to find workarounds or substitute components within a short timeframe.17 The challenge will be for China to replicate core innovations in semiconductor technology where no comparable substitute exists.

China’s model of development through state subsidies appears ill-suited for the semiconductor industry, which is fast moving and requires both business acumen and sizable technical expertise.18 Nearly 20 years after PRC science and technology leaders set out to develop a competitor to the x86 processor, Chinese alternatives remain limited and significantly behind U.S. counterparts. State-led pushes in the 1990s to establish a foothold in the chip fabrication market failed to produce commercially viable firms capable of keeping up with foreign leaders. China’s most successful fab, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), kept PRC’s S&T officials at arm’s length during its early development.19 The current state drive, led by the

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 7

National Integrated Circuit Fund, attempts to learn from prior mistakes and introduces more market mechanisms than in the past. However, many experts are skeptical that this state-led push will be sufficient to wean China off foreign chips.20

Regardless of the Chinese model’s efficiency, the reality is that China is building its manufacturing capacity to compete in semiconductors as the United States loses indigenous capability and outsources semiconductor manufacturing to foundries elsewhere.21 Technological trends may also play out in China’s favor. As Moore’s Law reaches its end, squeezing additional computing power out of chips will require new materials and specialized AI chip architectures.22 The United States enjoys a dominant market share in leading-edge GPU (Graphics Processing Units) and FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) design, as well as many of the top AI-relevant ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits). For the time being, China’s leading AI chip designs often incorporate U.S. and allied designs. Yet as technological progress slows and evolves, China may have an easier time catching up.

Chinese players are starting to break into the AI chip space on some fronts. China’s AI chip unicorns Cambricon and Horizon Robotics, for example, have attained multi-billion-dollar valuations within just a few years.23 Huawei has launched its own AI chip, Ascend 910, designed to process efficiently the massive amounts of data often required to train algorithms.24 Alibaba has also created a new AI chip, known as the Hanguang 800, which it claims possesses the computing capabilities of 10 GPUs.25 Alibaba’s chip subsidiary Pingtouge (平头哥) open-sourced its microcontroller design platform on GitHub in order to make chip design more accessible.26 So far, however, PRC AI chips have primarily achieved successes in “inference,” the process of running existing neural networks; the process of training continues to rely primarily on GPUs produced by NVIDIA.27 Whether Chinese companies like Huawei can compete with NVIDIA in the AI training space remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1 K. A. Konrad, “Dynamic Contests and the Discouragement Effect,” Revue d'Économie Politique (2012); C. Harris and J. Vickers, “Racing with Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies 54, 1 (1987); I. K. Wang, L. Qian, and M. Lehrer, “From Technology Race to Technology Marathon: A Behavioral Explanation of Technology Advancement,” European Management Journal 35, Issue 2 (April 2017): 187-197.

2 This policy brief is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather proposes a framework for assessing relevant data and measures that bear on current debates in AI. We are indebted to the robust research and existing literature in the field. See, e.g., Michael C. Horowitz, Gregory Allen, Elsa Kania, and Paul Scharre, “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for a New American Security, July 2018, 8.

3 Deborah J. Jackson, “What is an innovation ecosystem,” National Science Foundation, 1, 2011. On AI in particular, see “AI is a national security priority — here’s how we cultivate it,” The Hill, February 20, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/430765-ai-is-a- national-security-priority-heres-how-we-cultivate-it; For another excellent evaluation of the importance of the overall ecosystem to AI development, see: Lindsey R. Sheppard and Andrew Philip Hunter, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security: The Importance of the AI Ecosystem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 5, 2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security-importance-ai- ecosystem.

4 Andrew Imbrie, “Mapping the Terrain: AI Governance and the Future of Power,” Survival (blog), December 17, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival- blog/2019/12/mapping-the-terrain-ai-governance.

5 See, e.g., Andrew Imbrie, “Artificial Intelligence Meets Bureaucratic Politics,” War on the Rocks, August 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/artificial-intelligence-meets- bureaucratic-politics/; Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn, “The AI Literacy Gap Hobbling American Officialdom,” War on the Rocks, January 14, 2020,https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-ai-literacy-gap-hobbling-american- officialdom/.

6 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

7 We define “AI chips” to include GPUs (Graphics Processing Units), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Array), and ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) specialized for high speed and efficiency for AI algorithms, among others.

8 See, e.g., “Re: ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies (BIS- 2018-0024),” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019-01-10-Dept-of-Commerce-GU-

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 36

CSET-ANPRM-on-Export-Controls-for-AI.pdf. For a recent example, see Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration pressed Dutch hard to cancel China chip-equipment sale: sources,” Reuters, January 6, 2020,https://www.reuters.com/article/asml-holding-usa-china/rpt-insight-trump-administration- pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSL1N29802U.

9 “Trade war forces Chinese chipmaker Fujian Jinhua to halt output,” Financial Times, January, 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/87b5580c-22bf-11e9-8ce6- 5db4543da632.

10 For one prominent example, see the case of Fujian Jinhua. Paul Mozur, “Inside a Heist of American Chip Designs, as China Bids for Tech Power,” New York Times, June 22, 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/technology/china-micron-chips-theft.html.

11 Some U.S. firms made the move abroad in response to export controls. See “U.S.-based chip-tech group moving to Switzerland over trade curb fears,” Reuters, November 28, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-semiconductors-insight/u-s-based-chip- tech-group-moving-to-switzerland-over-trade-curb-fears-idUSKBN1XZ16L.

12 Chris Gillis, “US exporters attempt to head off new content restrictions,” American Shipper, December 9, 2019, https://www.freightwaves.com/news/us-exporters-attempt-to-head- off-new-content-restrictions.

13 Timothy P. Morgan, “Huawei Jumps into the Arms Server Chip Fray,” The Next Platform, January 8, 2019. See also Saif Khan, “Maintaining the AI Chip Advantage of the United States and its Allies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Maintaining-the-AI-Chip- Competitive-Advantage-of-the-United-States-and-its-Allies-20191206.pdf.

14 “Winning the Future: A Blueprint for Sustained U.S. Leadership in Semiconductor Technology,” Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2019,https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FINAL-SIA-Blueprint- for-web.pdf.

15 ZTE was later removed from this list. “BIS Adds ZTE Corporation and Three Affiliated Entities to the Entity List,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce,https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/oee/9-bis/carousel/1011-bis-adds-zte-corporation-and- three-affiliated-entities-to-the-entity-list; “China’s Huawei, 70 affiliates placed on U.S. trade blacklist,” Reuters, May 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china- huaweitech/chinas-huawei-70-affiliates-placed-on-us-trade-blacklist-idUSKCN1SL2W4.

16 Lorand Laskai, “Why Blacklisting Huawei Could Backfire,” Foreign Affairs, June 19, 2019,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-19/why-blacklisting-huawei- could-backfire.

17 Jason Matheny and Carrick Flynn, “ANPRM on Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 10, 2019,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 37

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JDDQaWlU- u90VAl6h9sdQb_c_7EB9ftrYDOEqu12nEk/edit.

19 Doug Fuller, Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and Political Economy of China’s Technological Development (Oxford University Press, 2016), 131.

20 Junko Yoshida, “China Must Go Beyond Big Fund,” EE Times, November 11, 2019,https://www.eetimes.com/china-must-go-beyond-big-fund/#.

21 “The Decline in Semiconductor Manufacturing in the United States,” Center for Public Policy Innovation, June 2010, https://www.cppionline.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/The-Decline-of-Semiconductor-Manufacturing.pdf.

22 Will Knight, “China has never had a real chip industry. Making AI chips could change that,” MIT Technology Review, December 14, 2018,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612569/china-has-never-had-a-real-chip- industry-making-ai-chips-could-change-that/.

23 While valuations are likely inflated due in part to the influence of state-driven investments, these start-ups have achieved notable progress nonetheless. “Chinese AI chip maker Horizon Robotics raises $600 million from SK Hynix, others,” Reuters, February 27, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tech-semiconductors/chinese-ai-chip-maker- horizon-robotics-raises-600-million-from-sk-hynix-others-idUSKCN1QG0HW.

24 Dan Strumpf, “Huawei Launches AI Chip in Push to Unseat U.S. Makers,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-launches-ai-chip-in-push- to-unseat-u-s-makers-11566556836.

25 “Alibaba’s New AI Chip Can Process Nearly 80K Images Per Second,” Synced, September 25, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/09/25/alibabas-new-ai-chip- can-process-nearly-80k-images-per-second/. Arjun Kharpal, “Alibaba unveils its first A.I. chip as China pushes for its own semiconductor technology,” CNBC, September 25, 2019,https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/25/alibaba-unveils-its-first-ai-chip-called-the- hanguang-800.html.

26 “Alibaba Open-Sources Its MCU to Boost AI Research,” Synced, October 23, 2019,

https://syncedreview.com/2019/10/23/alibaba-open-sources-its-mcu-to-boost-ai- research/.

27 Lorand Laskai and Helen Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base?”, DigiChina, November 4, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/can-china-grow-its-own-ai-tech-base/.

On the obstacles to indigenizing a semiconductor industry in China, see Douglas B. Fuller,

“Growth, Upgrading, and Limited Catch-up in China’s Semiconductor Industry,” in Loren

Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., Policy, Regulation and Innovation in China’s Electricity

and Telecom Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

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28 See, e.g., Data.gov, https://www.data.gov/open-gov/; “Project Open Data,” https://project-open-data.cio.gov.

30 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Vintage, 2011), 6.

31 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Random House Audio, 2018).

32 Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Military Needs Better Data on Itself to Exploit AI,” Breaking Defense, December 12, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/us-military-needs- better-data-on-itself-to-exploit-ai/.

33 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “EXCLUSIVE Pentagon’s AI Problem Is ‘Dirty’ Data: Lt. Gen. Shanahan,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019,https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/exclusive-pentagons-ai-problem-is-dirty-data-lt- gen-shanahan/.

34 “The New Racetrack for Artificial Intelligence: China-U.S. Competition” [人工智能新赛场 -中美对比], CCID, May 2017.

35 For an instructive framework on this issue, see Matt Sheehan, “Much Ado About Data: How America and China Stack Up,” MacroPolo, July 16, 2019,https://macropolo.org/ai-data-us-china/.

36 Celia Chen and Iris Deng, “Tencent seeks to kill silo culture that gave it WeChat as it expands into AI, big data,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2018,https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2172967/tencent-seeks-kill-silo- culture-gave-it-wechat-it-expands-ai-big.

37 Emily Feng, “In China, A New Call To Protect Data Privacy,” NPR, January 5, 2020,

https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/793014617/in-china-a-new-call-to-protect-data- privacy.

38 “Navigating China’s Data Maze: How Regulations Affect U.S. Companies,” The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, May 2019, https://www.amcham- shanghai.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Viewpoint%20- %20Data%20%28May%202019%29.pdf.

39 “Interpretation of the Work Plan on Promoting the Development of the Artificial Intelligence Industry through the Opening of Public Data” [关于通过公共数据开放促进人工智能产业发展的工作方案》政策解读], November 4, 2019,http://jxj.beijing.gov.cn/zcjd/zcjdlb/201912/t20191212_1088931.html.

Based on analysis of monthly user data of most valuable U.S. and Chinese tech

companies.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 39

40 For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities that big data presents for defense mobilization, see Li Ching [李庆], “Looking at the National Defense Mobilization Big Data Construction” [冷眼看国防动员大数据建设], China National Defense News [中国国防报], October 24, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/defense/2018- 10/24/c_1123606679.htm.

41 “China Tech Talk 76: US vs China—AI asymmetries with Jeffrey Ding,” technode, April 16, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/04/16/china-tech-talk-76-us-vs-china-ai- asymmetries-with-jeffrey-ding/.

42 “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,”https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

43 Ibid., 18.44

45 Noam Brown and Tuomas Sandholm, “Superhuman AI for heads-up no-limit poker: Libratus beats top professionals,” Science 359, no. 6374 (2018): 418-424. Alan Blair and Abdallah Saffidine, “AI surpasses humans at six-player poker,” Science 365, no. 6456 (2019): 864-865.

46 Raymond Perrault, Yoav Shoham, Erik Brynjolfsson, Jack Clark, John Etchemendy, Barbara Grosz, Terah Lyons, James Manyika, Saurabh Mishra, and Juan Carlos Niebles, “The AI Index 2019 Annual Report,” AI Index Steering Committee, Human-Centered AI Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, December 2019; Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

47 Field Cady and Oren Etzione, “China May Overtake the US in AI Research,” Medium, March 13, 2019, https://medium.com/ai2-blog/china-to-overtake-us-in-ai-research- 8b6b1fe30595.

48 Karen White, “Publications Output: U.S. Trends and International Comparisons,” Science & Engineering Indicators, December 17, 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20206.

49 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface news [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

50 China accounts for 17 of the top 20 academic institutions that have been involved in patenting AI, with particular strength in deep learning, according to a study from the World Intellectual Property Organization. See “WIPO’s First ‘Technology Trends’ Study Probes

David Silver, Thomas Hubert, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Matthew Lai, Arthur

Guez, Marc Lanctot et al., “A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess,

shogi, and Go through self-play,” Science 362, no. 6419 (2018): 1140-1144.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 40

Artificial Intelligence: IBM and Microsoft are Leaders Amid Recent Global Upsurge in AI Inventive Activity,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0001.html; “WIPO Technology Trends 2019, Artificial Intelligence,” World Intellectual Property Organization,https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1055.pdf.

51 Sarah O’Meara, “Will China Lead the World in AI by 2030,” Nature, August 21, 2019,https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02360-7.

52 “Robust Vision Challenge,”http://www.robustvision.net/leaderboard.php?benchmark=stereo.

53 Yu Sun, Shuohuan Wang, Yukun Li, Shikun Feng, Xuyi Chen, Han Zhang, Xin Tian, Danxiang Zhu, Hao Tian, and Hua Wu, “ERNIE: Enhanced Representation through Knowledge Integration,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.09223 (2019).

54 “Baidu’s Pre-training Model ERNIE Achieves New NLP Benchmark Record,” Synced, December 11, 2019, https://syncedreview.com/2019/12/11/baidus-pre-training- model-ernie-achieves-new-nlp-benchmark-record/.

55 See, e.g., “Global AI Talent Report 2019,” jfgagne, https://jfgagne.ai/talent-2019/.

56 “AAAI-17 Accepted Papers,”http://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/2017/aaai17accepted-papers.pdf; Sarah Zhang, “China’s Artificial-Intelligence Boom,” The Atlantic, February 16, 2017,https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/china-artificial- intelligence/516615/.

57 “Artificial Intelligence Index,” 87,https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10986/f/ai_index_2019_report.pdf.

58 Remco Zwetsloot, Roxanne Heston, and Zachary Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_US_AI_Workforce.pdf.

59 Remco Zwetsloot, James Dunham, Zachary Arnold, and Tina Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States: Findings and Policy Options for International Graduate Student Retention,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Keeping-Top-AI-Talent-in-the-United-States.pdf.

60 Ibid.

61 Elias G. Carayannis and David FJ Campbell, eds., Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, and Use in Innovation Networks and Knowledge Clusters: A Comparative Systems Approach Across the United States, Europe, and Asia (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006); “Rapid Rise of China’s STEM Workforce Charted by National Science Board Report,” American Institute of Physics, January 31, 2018.

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62 Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

63 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

64 Zwetsloot, Dunham, Arnold, and Huang, “Keeping Top Talent in the United States.”

65 China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

66 Ibid.

67 Joy D. Ma, “China’s AI Talent Base Is Growing, and then Leaving,” MacroPolo, July 30, 2019, https://macropolo.org/chinas-ai-talent-base-is-growing-and-then-leaving/. By one initial estimate, of the 12,500 AI graduates from Chinese universities to date, reportedly only 31 percent have stayed in China, whereas 62 percent instead departed to the United States. Wang Cong, “AI race shifts to talent in battle for dominance,” Global Times, March 19, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142700.shtml.

68 Ministry of Education, “Artificial Intelligence Innovation Action Plan for Institutions of Higher Learning” [高等学校人工智能创新行动计划], April 4, 2018,http://www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A16/s7062/201804/t20180410_332722.html. For commentary on the topic, see Elsa Kania, “China’s AI talent ‘arms race,” The Strategist, April 23, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-ai-talent-arms-race/.

69 “This year, colleges and universities have added these specialties: artificial intelligence and big data are the hottest” [今年高校新增这些专业:人工智能与大数据最火], June 12, 2019, http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2019-06-12/doc-ihvhiews8390284.shtml.

70 “Cross National Comparisons of R&D Performance,” National Science Board,

https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/research-and- development-u-s-trends-and-international-comparisons/cross-national-comparisons-of-r-d- performance.

71 “2016–2019 Progress Report: Advancing Artificial Intelligence R&D,” November 2019,

https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/AI-Research-and-Development-Progress-Report-2016- 2019.pdf; Melissa Flagg, “America’s Future Lies in Technical Alliances,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (blog), January 8, 2020,https://cset.georgetown.edu/2020/01/08/americas-future-lies-in-technical-alliances/.

72 “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” Interim Report, November 2019,https://www.nscai.gov/about/reports-to-congress.

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 42

73 Ibid.

74 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

75 Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson, Jump-starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

76 Charlotte Yang, “Chart of the Day: Another Record Year for China R&D Spending, Caixin, October 10, 2018, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-10-10/chart-of-the-day- another-record-year-for-china-rd-spending-101333479.html. See also “Is China a global leader in research and development,” China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china- research-and-development-rnd/l; Dennis Normile, “China narrows U.S. lead in R&D spending,” Science, October 19, 2018,https://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6412/276.

77 “China’s R&D expenditure is close to two trillion yuan. Which cities have more research investment?” [中国研发经费接近两万亿，哪些城市科研投入多?], CCTV, September 13, 2019,http://news.cctv.com/2019/09/13/ARTIwBtFsNMhTHQ8DXpFQHJR190913.shtml.

78 Teddy Ng and Jane Cai, “China’s funding for science and research to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2019,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2189427/chinas-funding-science- and-research-reach-25-cent-gdp-2019.

79 “Atlas of national key R & D plan funding allocation” [国家重点研发计划经费分配图谱浮现], Economic Reference [经济参考报], October 14, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2019-10/14/c_1125100297.htm.

80 Ashwin Acharya and Zachary Arnold, “Chinese Public AI R&D Spending: Provisional Findings,” CSET Issue Brief, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/Chinese-Public-AI-RD-Spending-Provisional-Findings-2.pdf.

81 For instance, i

“Tianjin established a new generation of artificial intelligence industry fund with a scale of 100 billion RMB” [天津设新一代人工智

能产业基金，规模为1000亿人民币], May 16, 2018,https://m.pedaily.cn/news/431332.

82 “The National “863” Plan Computer Subject’s Thirty-Year Anniversary: Leapfrog-Style Development and the Realm of Necessity” [

n May 2018, the city of Tianjin announced the New Generation Artificial

Intelligence Industry Fund, which amounts to 100 billion RMB ($16 billion), based on a

combination of state and venture capital funding.

国家“863”计划计算机主题30年拾遗:跨

越式发展与必然王国], Science Net, February 8, 2017,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 43

“863 Plan” [

83 Ibid. “863 Plan” [ 84 “Our Nation Launched Four Major Science Research Programs” [我国启动四项重大科

学研究计划], Science and Technology Daily, November 16, 2006.

85 “The national key R&D plan for next year is basically determined! These industries are the most noteworthy” [国家明年重点研发计划基本确定!这几个产业最值得关注], October 28, 2019.

86 “National Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan Outline” (2006-2020) [国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要], Ministry of Science and Technology, February 9, 2006,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774_9.ht m.

https://www.itu.int/en/ITU- D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf.

87 See estimates from the Allen Institute.

88 “2021-2035 National Medium- and Long-term Scientific and Technological Development Plan Basic Science Development Strategy Research Project Launched in Beijing” [2021- 2035年国家中长期科技发展规划基础科学发展战略研究专题在京启动], Ministry of Science and Technology Website, May 3, 2019, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019- 05/03/content_5388386.htm.

89 Elsa B. Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center for a New American Security, November 28, 2017,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence- military-revolution-and-chinas-future-military-power.

90 Jeffrey Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, March 2018, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf.

91 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知]. “MIIT’s Notice Regarding the Release of the Three Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New-Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018-2020) [工业和信息化部关于印发《促进新一代人工智能产业发展三年行动计划(2018-2020年)》的通], December 14, 2017,http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5960820/co ntent.html.

For an English translation of this plan, see Paul Triolo, Elsa Kania, and Graham Webster (translators), “Translation: Chinese government outlines AI ambitions through 2020,”

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/2/367416.shtm. See also

计划], China Education and Research Network, http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

See also

http://www.edu.cn/html/rd/b/bls.shtml.

863计划], China Education and Research Network,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 44

863

DigiChina, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity- initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinese-government-outlines-ai-ambitions-through- 2020/.

92 “Ministry of Science and Technology Notice Regarding the Issuance of National Key R&D Plan Transformative Technologies and Crux Scientific Problems Key Topic 2017 Program Application Guidelines” [科技部关于发布国家重点研发计划变革性技术关键科学问题重点专项2017年度项目申报指南的通知], Ministry of Science and Technology, September 27, 2017,http://www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2017/201710/t20171 009_135224.htm.

93 There might be some debate about the best translations for the terms “重大工程” and“重大项目,” each of which could be rendered major/mega project/program. See National Development and Reform Commission Office Releases Notice Regarding the Implementation of the 2018 “Internet Plus,” Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development, and Digital Economy Experimental Mega-Project Notice [国家发展改革委办公厅关于组织实施2018年“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程的通知], National Development and Reform Commission, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/t20171013_863534.html.

94 “AI Innovation and Development Major Project Application Requirements” [人工智能创新发展重大工程申报要求], NDRC, October 11, 2017,http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201710/W020171013599553259770.pdf.

95 “56 projects selected as major projects for the ‘Internet Plus,’ Artificial Intelligence Innovation Development and Digital Economy Pilot Megaprojects” [56个项目入选“互联网+”、人工智能创新发展和数字经济试点重大工程], January 22, 2018, Xinhua,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-01/22/content_5259438.htm.

96 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知].

97 For examples, see “SDIC’s National Emerging Industry Venture Capital Guidance Fund raised a total of 17.85 billion yuan” [国投创合国家新兴产业创业投资引导基金募集规模达178.5亿元], May 10, 2017,https://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/zxzx/gsyw/2017/06/09/webinfo/phone14959552641 37396.htm.

“Guohua Military-Civil Fusion Industrial Development Fund Established” [国华军民融合产业发展基金创立],National Defense Science and Industry Bureau, September 7, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/07/content_5106111.htm.

98 Paul Triolo, “AI in China: Cutting Through the Hype,” Eurasia Group, December 6, 2017,https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/ai-in-china-cutting-through-the-hype.

99 See the Party’s report from the fourth plenum: “Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” [中国共产党第十九届中

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 45

央委员会第四次全体会议公报], Xinhua, October 31, 2019,http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/31/c_1125178024.htm.

100 “The United States of Artificial Intelligence Startups, CBInsights, November 26, 2019,https://www.cbinsights.com/research/artificial-intelligence-startup-us-map/.

101 Ibid.

102 Joanna Glasner, “AI Companies Raise More Money Across Fewer Rounds,” Crunchbase News, September 9, 2019, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/ai-companies-raise-more- money-across-fewer-rounds/.

103 For one historical perspective, see Linda Weiss, America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

104 Rachel Olney, “The Rift Between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon is Economic, not Moral,” War on the Rocks, January 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the- rift-between-silicon-valley-and-the-pentagon-is-economic-not-moral/.

105 “The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition,” Ronald Reagan Institute, December 2019,https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355312/the_contest_for_innovation_report.p df.

106 Ibid.

107 The levels of funding are high enough that the founder of one Chinese AI start-up characterized this as a negative. As he remarked to one of the authors, there is “too much money chasing too few good ideas.”

108 “China Is Starting To Edge Out The US In AI Investment,” CB Insights, February 12, 2019,

https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups- tech/.

109 Jing Shuiyu, “AI startups see record financing in H1,” China Daily, August 3, 2017,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/tech/2017-08/03/content_30340585.htm.

110 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined.

111 “China VC investment hits record high in 2018: Report,” Xinhua, February 1, 2019,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/01/WS5c53e434a3106c65c34e7cb2.html.

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112 See, e.g., “Used cars and AI come out on top as China's startup funding slumps,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 3, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Used-cars-and- AI-come-out-on-top-as-China-s-startup-funding-slumps.

113 “China recruits Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent to AI ‘national team,’” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2120913/china-recruits-baidu-alibaba-and-tencent-ai-national-team.

114 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “AI “national team” Xiong’nn Debut! Will Change Your Life” [人工智能“国家队”雄安登场!将改变你的生活], Xiong’an, November 30, 2017, http://www.xiongan.gov.cn/2017- 11/30/c_129766243.htm.

115 “Rise Of China’s Big Tech In AI: What Baidu, Alibaba, And Tencent Are Working On,” CB Insights, April 26, 2018, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-baidu-alibaba- tencent-artificial-intelligence-dominance/.

116 Patrick Foulis, “Across the West powerful firms are becoming even more powerful,” The Economist, November 15, 2018, https://www.economist.com/special- report/2018/11/15/across-the-west-powerful-firms-are-becoming-even-more-powerful; John Mauldin, “America Has a Monopoly Problem,” Forbes, April 11, 2019,https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/04/11/america-has-a-monopoly- problem/; Jonathan Tepper, The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition (John Wiley & Sons, 2018).

117 Mark Z. Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

118 Martin Kenney and Urs Von Burg, “Technology, entrepreneurship and path dependence: industrial clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128.” Industrial and corporate change 8, no. 1 (1999): 67-103; Aaron Chatterji, Edward Glaeser, and William Kerr, “Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation,” Innovation Policy and the Economy 14, no. 1 (2014): 129-166.

119 Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/future-american- power.

120

121 MIT Committee to Evaluate the Innovation Deficit, “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit,” April 2015,https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf.

Mariana Mazzucato, “The entrepreneurial state,” Soundings 49, no. 49 (2011): 131-

142.

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122 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

123 For a good analysis on the topic, see Yukon Huang and Jeremy Smith, “China’s Record on Intellectual Property Rights Is Getting Better and Better,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/16/china-intellectual-property-theft- progress/.

124 “State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Support Platforms” [国务院关于加快构建大众创业万众创新支撑平台的指导意见], September 25, 2016,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-09/26/content_10183.htm.

125 “The China New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Strategic Research Academy released two heavyweight reports” [中国新一代人工智能发展战略研究院发布两份重量级报告], Interface News [界面新闻], May 18, 2019,https://xw.qq.com/partner/wcsbzst/20190518A0EB05/20190518A0EB0500?ADTA G=undefined&pgv_ref=undefined. Estimates often vary depending on what is defined as an “AI enterprise.”

126 Minghe Hu and Zen Soo, “China’s reliance on US-origin platforms for deep learning raises questions about country’s AI push,” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2019,https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3038772/chinas-reliance-us-origin- platforms-deep-learning-raises-questions.

127 “Artificial Intelligence Open Platform, Have you Joined?” [人工智能开放平台，你加入了吗-中新网”], China News, December 13, 2018,http://www.chinanews.com/it/2018/10-08/8643974.shtml; “Five Major National-Level Open Innovation Platforms Revealed” [五大国家级人工智能开放创新平台将集体亮相 “], January 18, 2019. See also “Ten Major National New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platforms Released in Shanghai [十大国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台在沪发布], Science Network, August 29, 2019,http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2019/8/429964.shtm.

128 Ministry of Science and Technology Notice on the Publication of the Guidance on National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platform Construction Work [科技部关于印发《国家新一代人工智能开放创新平台建设工作指引》的通知], September 17, 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Ministry-and- Science-and-Technology-Notice-on-Publication-of-Guidance-1.pdf.

129 Laskai and Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base.”

130 For updates on its capabilities, see, e.g. “Baidu PaddlePaddle Releases 21 New Capabilities to Accelerate Industry-Grade Model Development,” November 14, 2019,http://research.baidu.com/Blog/index-view?id=126.

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131 Chris Udemans, “Alibaba Cloud opens source code for machine-learning platform Alink,” technode, November 28, 2019, https://technode.com/2019/11/28/alibaba-cloud- machine-learning-platform-open-source/.

132 “CSRankings: Computer Science Rankings,” http://csrankings.org/#/index?all. 133 Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of

False Prophecies (New York: Liveright., 2013), 172-188.

134 John Timmer, “US computer science grads outperforming those in other key nations,” ArsTechnica, March 23, 2019, https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/03/us-computer- science-grads-outperforming-those-in-other-key-nations/.

135

Journal of Education and Work

136 Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012).

137 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Adams B. Nager and Robert D. Atkinson, “Ten Myths of High-Skilled Immigration,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, April 2015, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2015,0420-Atkinson.pdf.

138 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Falling Behind? Boom, Bust, and the Global Race for Scientific Talent (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014),https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10208.html.

139 Cary Funk and Kim Parker, “Most Americans evaluate STEM education as middling compared with other developed nations,” Pew Research Center, January 9, 2018,https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/09/5-most-americans-evaluate-stem- education-as-middling-compared-with-other-developed-nations/.

140 “Research Reveals Boys’ Interest in STEM Careers Declining; Girls’ Interest Unchanged,” Junior Achievement USA, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja-usa/press- releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/research-reveals-boys’-interest-in- stem-careers-declining-girls’-interest-unchanged; “Survey: Teen Girls’ Interest in STEM Careers Declines,” Junior Achievement, https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja- usa/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/UmcVLQOLGie9/content/survey-teen-girls’- interest-in-stem-careers-declines.

141 Ibid.

142 Normile, Dennis, “One in Three Chinese Children Faces an Education Apocalypse. An

Ambitious Experiment Hopes to Save Them,” Science 21 (2017).143

Adam Gamoran and Sarah K. Bruch, “Educational inequality in the United States: can we

reverse the tide?”

“Chapter 4: Shanghai and Hong Kong: Two Distinct Examples of Education Reform in

China,” in Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA for

30, no. 7 (2017): 777-792.

the United States, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 49

http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3343,en_2649_35845621_46538637_1_1_1

_1,00.html.

144 “Chinese university graduates rise exponentially, have diverse career options,” Xinhua, June 24, 2019,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/24/WS5d1080bca3103dbf14329e9f.html.

145 For a good overview, see “Seizing the laurels: Tsinghua University may soon top the world league in science research,” The Economist, November 17, 201,https://www.economist.com/china/2018/11/17/tsinghua-university-may-soon-top-the- world-league-in-science-research.

146 For a comparative perspective, see

147 Ricky Ye, “While US STEM education market declines, China invests heavily,” The Next Web, June 19, 2017, https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2017/06/19/us-stem- education-market-declines-china-invests-heavily/.

148 See initial results reported in a survey from Tsinghua University. China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University, “China AI Development Report 2018,” Tsinghua University, July 2018,http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn/eWebEditor/UploadFile/China_AI_development_repo rt_2018.pdf.

149 Yi-Ling Liu, “China’s AI Dreams Aren’t for Everyone,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2019,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/13/china-artificial-intelligence-dreams-arent-for- everyone-data-privacy-economic-inequality/.

150 iFlytek, Deeply Ploughing Education for Fifteen Years” [科大讯飞深耕教育15年] November 21, 2019, Beijing Report [新京报], https://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2019-11- 21/doc-iihnzahi2260676.shtml.

151 Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

152 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”153 Ibid., 5.

154 “Fewer foreign students coming to the United States for the second year in row, survey finds,” Reuters, November 13, 2018,https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/fewer-foreign-students-coming-united- states-second-year-row-survey-n935701; Zachary Arnold, Roxanne Heston, Remco Zwetsloot, and Tina Huang, “Immigration Policy and the U.S. AI Sector: A Preliminary

Wang, Yan, Jari Lavonen, and Kirsi Tirri, “Aims for

learning 21st century competencies in national primary science curricula in China and

Finland,” Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science & Technology Education (2018).

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Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019, 2-4,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET_Immigration_Policy_and_AI.pdf.

155 Ibid., Section 3.

156 Alana Semeuls, “Tech Companies Say It’s Too Hard to Hire High-Skilled Immigrants in the U.S. — So They're Growing in Canada Instead,” Time, July 25, 2019,https://time.com/5634351/canada-high-skilled-labor-immigrants/.

157 Zwetsloot, Heston, and Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce.”

158 At present, China’s fertility rates are below replacement levels, and even the recent changes to the one-child policy won’t compensate for these adverse trends. See also Nicholas Eberstadt, “With Great Demographics Comes Great Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-06-11/great- demographics-comes-great-power.

159 Ding, “Deciphering China’s AI Dream.”

160 William Hannas and Huey-meei Chang, “China’s Access to Foreign AI Technology: An Assessment,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019,https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/CSET_China_Access_To_Foreign_Technology.pdf.

161 Meng Jing, “Chinese firms fight to lure top artificial intelligence talent from Silicon Valley,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/tech/china- tech/article/2084171/chinese-firms-fight-lure-top-artificial-intelligence-talent-silicon.

162 Remco Zwetsloot and Dahlia Peterson, “The US-China Tech Wars: China’s Immigration Disadvantage,” The Diplomat, December 31, 2019,https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-us-china-tech-wars-chinas-immigration- disadvantage/.

163 See MIT’s description of these engagements: Adam Conner-Simons, “CSAIL launches new five-year collaboration with iFlyTek,” MIT News, https://news.mit.edu/2018/csail- launches-five-year-collaboration-with-iflytek-0615.

164 Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” Parameters 47, Issue 2 (Summer 2017): 15-30.

165 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). See also Niall Ferguson, “The False Prophecy of Hyperconnection,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/false-prophecy-hyperconnection; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Organization 63, Issue 3 (July 2009): 559-592,https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/network- analysis-for-international-relations/DE2910979C1B5C44C4CC13F336C5DE97.

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166 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/americas-edge.

167 Ibid.

168 James Carse, Finite and Infinite Games (New York: Free Press, 1986); Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).

169 “China AI Development Report 2018,” China Institute for Science and Technology Policy at Tsinghua University.

170 See, e.g., Felicia Schwartz and Dov Lieber, “Chinese Investment in Israel Raises Security Fears,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese- investment-in-israel-raises-security-fears-11549881000.

171 “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf.

172 For context, see “CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews,” Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019,https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf.

173 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” January 2018,https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.

174 China and the Philippines established a “Data port” in September 2018. China also initiated the Digital Silk Road International Industry Alliance. For more information, see “China's big data companies embark on the “Belt and Road”” [中国大数据企业走上“一带一路”], Xinhua, December 14, 2018, http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018- 12/14/c_137663769.html; “Digital Economy and Digital Silk Road International Conference proposes to jointly build digital silk road,” Zhejiang Daily, September 19, 2018.

175 See, e.g., “BRI helps participating countries with technological innovation,” People’s Daily, April 26, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0426/c90000-9572518.html.

176 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-04-17/chinas-new-revolution.

177 “China and France’s top universities build ‘AI Alliance’ to promote artificial intelligence international cooperation,” Xinhua, January 18, 2018.

178 “AI, Another Breakthrough in Sino-UK Innovation Cooperation” [ 人工智能中英创新合作又一风口], People’s Daily, November 3, 2018,http://world.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/1103/c1002-30380012.html.

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179 “China and Russia big data base will be built in Harbin at the end of the year” [中俄大数据基地年底将在哈尔滨建成], Harbin Daily, March 11, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/https://zj.zjol.com.cn/news.html?id=890364.

The project has been successfully supported by the 2017 National Development and Reform Commission Digital Economy Pilot Major Project. a major project of Heilongjiang Province

180 “Lecture Series on “China-Russia Economic and Trade Cooperation Database and Russian-Chinese Intelligent Integrated Service Platform”” [“中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台”项目系列讲座中俄经贸合作数据库及俄汉语智能化综合服务平台], November 1, 2018,https://web.archive.org/save/http://yuyanziyuan.blcu.edu.cn/info/1066/1259.htm.

181 Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Preventing, and Mitigation,” February 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07228.pdf.

182 Andrew Imbrie and Elsa B. Kania, “AI Safety, Security, and Stability Among Great Powers: Options, Challenges, and Lessons Learned for Pragmatic Engagement,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp- content/uploads/AI-Safety-Security-and-Stability-Among-the-Great-Powers.pdf.

183 William J. Burns, “The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2019; Ronan Farrow, War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).

184 Elsa B. Kania,” The Right to Speak: Discourse and Chinese Power,” Center for Advanced China Research, 27, 2018. See also Joel Wuthnow, “The concept of soft power in China’s strategic discourse,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 1-28.

185 Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, “People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations,” Center for a New American Security, May 14, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peoples-republic-of-the- united-nations.

186 See, e.g., Elsa B. Kania, “China’s play for global 5G dominance—standards and the ‘Digital Silk Road’,” The Strategist, ASPI, June 27, 2018,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-play-for-global-5g-dominance-standards-and- the-digital-silk-road/.

187 Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “China’s Plan to Lead in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America, August 1, 2017,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose- prospects-and-problems/.

188 For authoritative reporting on these issues, see Paul Mozur, “One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority,” New York Times, April 14, 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial- intelligence-racial-profiling.html.

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189 “Beijing AI Principles,” May 29, https://www.baai.ac.cn/blog/beijing-ai-principles. See also “China Hosts Conference to Promote Ethical AI Standards,” China Daily, June 19, 2019,http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/19/WS5d098cdfa3103dbf14329084.html; Will Knight, “Why Does Beijing Suddenly Care About AI Ethics?” MIT Technology Review,https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613610/why-does-china-suddenly-care-about-ai- ethics-and-privacy/.

190 See, e.g., “World Artificial Intelligence Conference,”http://www.worldaic.com.cn/portal/en/index.html; “Global Artificial Intelligence Conference,” https://gaitc.caai.cn/en.

191 See, e.g., “Countering High-Tech Illiberalism,” https://www.cnas.org/press/press- release/countering-high-tech-illiberalism. See also Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism. For a policy brief on the topic, see Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting digital authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190826_digital_authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole .pdf.

192 Samantha Hoffman, “Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China,” in Nicholas D. Wright, ed., AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives, A Strategic Multiyear Assessment Periodic Publication, 2018, 42, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/AI-China-Russia-Global-WP_FINAL.pdf.

193 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016.

194 However, the realization of this potential advantage requires the effective use of this data.195 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower.” 196 Ibid.

197 Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower”; Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security, 43, Issue 3 (Winter 2018/19): 141-189.

198 “Costs of War,” Watson Institute, Brown University,https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/.

199 See the Defense Innovation Board’s project and report on the topic: “Software is Never Done: Refactoring the Acquisition Code for Competitive Advantage,” May 13, 2019. “Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) Study,”https://innovation.defense.gov/software/.

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200 “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, September 2018,https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND- STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE- AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.

201 Xi Jinping Discusses Military-Civil Fusion” [习近平谈军民融合], Seeking Truth [求是], October 16, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/rdjj/2018- 10/16/c_1123565364.htm. See also Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to Innovate,” The Strategy Bridge, August 27, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil- fusion-china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate.

202 Ibid.

203 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in Artificial Intelligence,” Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2019,https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/chinese-military-innovation- in-artificial-intelligence.

204 CETC Military-Civil Fusion Network Information Systems Appear at Zhuhai Airshow [中国电科军民融合的网络信息体系亮相珠海航展], February 25, 2019,http://www.cetcd.cn/html/2019-02/7435.html.

205 Ibid.206 Ibid.

207 State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation AI Development Plan” [国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知], July 20, 2017,http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm; Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “Full Translation: China's ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017),” New America,https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation- chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/; “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” White House, February 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining- american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/.

208 For an excellent resource on the topic, see the 2019 AI Index Report. This Index provides tools and datasets to evaluate progress in AI, which is available through Stanford’s initiative on Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. For more information, see “Artificial Intelligence Index: 2019 Annual Report,” https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2019.

209 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (Ayer Company Publishers, 1995).

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210 Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Vol. 1 (Anthem Press, 2015).

211 For context, see “DARPA Electronics Resurgence Initiative,”https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/electronics-resurgence-initiative.

212 Such an initiative could build upon antecedents. See “Public-Private Partnerships for Semiconductor Research,” https://www.nist.gov/industry-impacts/public-private- partnerships-semiconductor-research.

213 See future research forthcoming from CSET by Remco Zwetsloot et al. that will provide a more detailed analysis of this policy issue.

214 Eliezer Geisler and Wagdy Abdallah, The Metrics of Science and Technology (Quorum Books, 2000); OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Outlook, 2014 (OECD Publishing, 2014).

215 For an excellent overview of this issue, see “Campaign for an AI Ready Force,”

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204191/-1/- 1/0/CAMPAIGN_FOR_AN_AI_READY_FORCE.PDF.

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