#Shi’ism

[teenageascetic]

“And the same chain of narrators that he Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "Verily, Allah the Great and Almighty has a pillar of ruby, the top of which is under the Throne, and the bottom of which is on the back of the fish which swims in the Seventh lowest Earth. When a servant of Allah says `there is no god but Allah’, the Throne trembles, and both the pillar and fish move. So Allah, the Blessed and the Most High says: `O Throne of Mine! Remain calm!’ Then it replies, `How shall I remain calm, when you have not forgiven the one who uttered those words?’ Then Allah, Blessed and Exalted be He, announces: `Bear witness, O inhabitants of My Heavens, that indeed I have pardoned the one who has uttered these words!’"

-Al-Tawhīd book 2 chapter 1 verse 20.

[nanshe-of-nina]

Favorite History Books || Iran Under the Safavids by Roger Savory ★★★★☆

The announcement by Shāh Ismāʿīl at Tabriz in 1501 that the Ithnā ‘Asharī, or “Twelver”, form of Shi‘ism was to be the official religion of the newly established but not yet consolidated Safavid state was the single most important decision taken by Ismāʿīl. As previously noticed, Ithnä ‘Asharī Shi‘ism lay at the heart of one of the bases of the power of the Safavid leaders, namely, their claim to be the representatives on earth of the 12th Imam or Mahdl (if not the Imäm himself) ; the cult of ‘Alī had been inextricably bound up with the development of Iran of Sufism, or Islamic esotericism, from at least the thirteenth century, and the position of murshid-i kämil, or perfect spiritual director, was the second basis of the power of the Safavid leaders; finally, by asserting that ‘Alī’s younger son, Husayn, married the daughter of Yazdigird III, the last of the Sasanid kings, Shī ‘īs had linked the family of ‘Alī with the ancient Iranian monarchical tradition, and the divine right of the Iranian kings, deriving from their possession of the “kingly glory”, was the third basis of the power of the Safavid shahs. Ithnā ‘Asharī Shi‘ism was therefore the most important element in Safavid religious propaganda and political ideology. … What were the benefits deriving from Ismāʿīl’s action? First, it harnessed the driving power of a dynamic religious ideology in the service of the new state, and thus gave the latter the strength to surmount its initial problems, and the momentum to carry it through the serious crises which faced the state after the death of Shāh Ismāʿīl I in 1524. Second, it clearly differentiated the Safavid state from the Sunnī Ottoman empire, the major power in the Islamic world in the sixteenth century, and thus gave it territorial and political identity. It can, of course, be argued that the establishment of a militant Shī‘ī state on the Ottoman border was an act of provocation which made conflict with the Ottomans inevitable, and to that extent militated against the interests of Iran. It is improbable, however, that Ottoman imperialist aspirations would not have embraced Iran during the sixteenth century, the period of the greatest expansion of the Ottoman empire, whether or not the Safavid revolution had succeeded; the fact that it did succeed gave the Safavid state at least a chance of survival against the most formidable military machine ever seen in the world of Islam. In short, the imposition by the Safavids of Ithnā ‘Asharī Shi’ism as the official religion of the state had the effect of producing a greater awareness of national identity, and thus of creating a stronger and more centralised government.

[zendoe]

The stage of super-imperialism resulted in barely mitigated disaster for the entire socialist world. After the counterrevolutions of 1989, the proletariat in socialist states faced a hard choice: either give up state power or endure a period of tremendous hardship. Ruling communist parties in Cambodia, Mongolia, Angola, and much of the Eastern Bloc abandoned Marxism-Leninism. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) gave up their independence. A few others—in China, Laos, and Vietnam—weathered the storm by submitting to integration with the global capitalist economy, giving up many of the gains of the revolution and allowing a degree of exploitation by foreign and domestic capitalists as the price of retaining political authority. The DPRK and Cuba, who alone refused either course, suffered the most. Deprived of their largest trading partner and source of development aid, they experienced famine and economic crisis throughout the 1990s as the economic siege of their countries reached a level of total encirclement. In much of the former socialist bloc, Marxist groups were banned and Marxists were persecuted and sometimes executed or massacred by the new comprador elites. […]

In Mao Zedong’s lectures on protracted war, he identified three distinct stages of conflict:

The first stage covers the period of the enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.

As of this writing, with the exception of the CPN-M, not one self-appellated Maoist insurgency has reached even the second stage since the fall of the Soviet Union. It cannot be said that any such surviving organization does not have the will to fight. When viewed in the context of the current stage of imperialism, their lack of progress is instead quite explicable: they must make do without an external supply of needed resources. […]

Overall, religion has replaced Marxism as the most vital anti-imperialist ideology, which sometimes obscures the class struggle to the advantage of the petit bourgeoisie and to the detriment of the proletariat, as it has within Iran, even as it provides the proletariat with the most practical avenue for resistance. Revolutionary Shi’ism forms the basis of both Ansarallah and Hezbollah, and the PFLP’s current orientation in the struggle for Palestinian liberation is as a subordinate partner to Hamas—which given the current balance of anti-imperialist forces, is the only path available to it. […]

Even where these ideologies are a progressive force against neocolonialism and the weight of the super-empire, they are not sufficient to liberate the working class. Materially, they are closest to the popular front model—i.e., based on class collaboration with the petit and national bourgeoisie, and subject to all the instability, contradiction, and class antagonism such an alliance entails. Proceeding to the next highest stage in Marxist terms—proletarian control of the state—requires a global unification of resistance that in the past was provided only by an already-existing bloc of proletarian states ready to support others in revolution.

In fact, without a vital socialist bloc—i.e. a return to the Cold War stage—even the creation of new anti-imperialist states of a bourgeois character has become extraordinarily more difficult. Between 1989 and 2022, Nkrumah’s dream of a united Africa drifted further from realization than it had been during his lifetime. Neocolonialism was restored in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Libya one way or another; ethno-religious conflict exacerbated by comprador governments and imperialist finance split Sudan and has recently threatened to split Ethiopia. The trend has been toward division and not unity, and until a sufficient counterbalance or disruption to the super-empire’s mechanisms of control exists, the reversal of this trend is unlikely.

Why the World Needs China by Kyle Ferrana

[heretic-child]

“While there are many sub-groups among Alevis, the community tends to close ranks when it comes to the Sunni world, employing an “us” versus “them” approach and emphasizing its position as a marginalized religious/ethnic minority.

Following severe persecution and massacres by the Ottomans which lasted into the 18th century, Alevis went underground pretending to be Sunnis to conceal their faith and survive in a hostile environment. Isolated from both the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi’a Safavids, the Alevis developed traditions, practices, and doctrines that by the early 17th century marked them as a closed, autonomous religious community, opposed to all forms of external religion.

Unlike Sunnism and mainline Shi’ism, Alevism does not possess a tradition of authoritative religious scholarship and official carriers of formal learning. Rather, it is more “a flowing together of various related movements, doctrines, ideas, rituals and traditions in a flexible synthesis, its strength lying in shared local traditions and esoteric interpretations of Islamic belief and practice.”

Some other differences distinguishing Alevis from Sunnis: the use of wine for religious ceremonial functions; non-observance of the five daily prayers and prostrations (they only bow twice in the presence of their spiritual leader), Ramadan, and the Haj (they consider the pilgrimage to Mecca an external pretense, the real pilgrimage being internal in one’s heart); and non-attendance of mosques.

To prevent penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy, which eventually made them into a quasi-ethnic group. Alevi taboos limited interaction with the dominant Sunni political-religious centre. Excommunication was the ultimate punishment threatening those who married outsiders, cooperated with outsiders economically, or ate with outsiders. It was also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts.”

[holycartoonwarrior]

Microdosing on Shi’ism is like *burst of grief* *burst of grief* *burst of grief*

[loverandservantoftheahlulbayt]

🍃🕊🍃 Question 37: Imamate at Childhood

Question: How is it possible for some of the Imams to reach Imamate while still children?

🍃 Brief Answer

According to the undisputed belief of Imami Shi’ism taken from numerous verses and Prophetic traditions, the Imamate is a Divine position. So if it is established that someone has been divinely appointed to this position a Muslim must submit to his command and authority without question obeying Allah (awj) as He says, “Allah best knows where to place His messengership.”

There are several ways to ascertain whether Allah (awj) has appointed a particular person to this position:

1. Prophetic traditions.

2. Being introduced and specified by other Imams, particularly the previous Imam.

3. Possessing the other conditions of Imamate, such as inherent knowledge, more knowledge than anyone of their time, infallibility, soundness and moderation of body and spirit, and ability to perform miracles and extraordinary deeds.

The Shi’as contemporary to young Imams—that is, Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع) at eight years, Imam ‘Ali b Muhammad al-Naqi (ع) at nine years, and Imam al-Mahdi (ع) at five years—were not unaware of these things, and it was after great searching and effort that they attained certainty about their Imamate and submitted to their authority. Later generations in turn rely on research, historical records, and traditions. On the other hand, the position of Imamate, unseen Divine endorsement, and manifestation of extraordinary deeds at the hands of these personages prevent them from being compared to normal human beings.

In addition, for a Muslim who believes in the Qur`an, the granting of a Divine station on the basis of Divine wisdom, knowledge, and grace to someone of young age should not be surprising, since the prophethood of ‘Isa (ع), Yahya (ع), and Sulayman (ع) also took place at a young age. This is why the noble verses that indicate this point were frequently cited by the Imams (ع).

🍃 Detailed Answer

Imamate, in the view of Imami Shi’as, is the practice by the Wali (Divinely appointed authority) of his authority over people (wilayah); in other words, Imamate is a Divinely-appointed station for managing the people’s worldly and religious affairs as well as guiding them to the peak of felicity and humanity. Thus, the Imam cannot be determined or selected by the people, since inherent knowledge and inner infallibility are unseen qualities which no one but Allah (awj) knows, and these are the two most important qualities of the Divinely-appointed Wali.

A monotheist who has submitted to Divine authority over him or herself is wholly obedient to the commands and prohibitions of his or her Allah (awj). Thus, in accepting the authority of the leaders appointed by Him as well, he or she must be fully obedient, submit to their authority, and avoid comparing them to others or baselessly second-guessing their appointment. There are several ways to recognize the divinely appointed Imam/Wali (guardian):

1. Studying their conduct and actions.

2. Referring to the attributes and signs that the previous Wali has mentioned for the succeeding Wali.

3. Seeking miracles and verifying the presence of the conditions and necessary corollaries of Imamate

It is possible to find out about their lives and character by referring to books of history and biography, and by looking at collections of traditions one can find the traditions that have come down from the Prophet (ص); and finally by examining at the traditions of each Imam, one can come to recognize the next Imam. The Imams (ع) performed miracles both in their lifetimes and after their martyrdoms. The occurrence of such extraordinary deeds for those who sought recourse to them is so frequent that it is beyond reckoning, and it is something that everyone searching for truth can experience.

So there is no specific age necessary to attain the station of Imamate. The spiritual, intellectual, and mental maturity required for the position can be granted by Allah (awj) from the day of his birth. This fact is one of the extraordinary phenomena that prove their Imamate, it does not detract from it. Obviously, from a superficial and shortsighted viewpoint, it appears difficult for prominent personalities, scholars and the old and young to submit to the authority of a boy; for ordinary people accepting such an authority would not be as easy as accepting older Wali.

The contemporaries to the young Imams—that is, Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع) who became Imam at the age of eight, Imam ‘Ali b. Muhammad al-Naqi (ع) who attained the Imamate at the age of nine, and Imam al-Mahdi (ع) who became Imam at the age of five—were no exceptions to this rule, and they posed this very question to Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع).

For example, there are the following traditions: It has been narrated from Hasan ibn Jahm that he was in the presence of Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع). Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع), still a child, was also present. After a long conversation Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع) said to me, “Hasan! If I tell you this child is to be your Imam, what would you say?” I said, “May I be your ransom! Whatever you say, I say the same thing.” The Imam (ع) said, “You speak the truth.” Then Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع) exposed the shoulder of Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع) and showed me a symbol that was similar to two fingers, and he said, “A comparable symbol was in the same place in the body of Imam Musa b. Ja’far al-Kazim (ع).”1

It has also been narrated from al-Mahmudi that he said, ‘I was in Tus (an area in Central Asia near present-day Mashhad) in the presence of Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع). One of his companions said, “If something were to happen to the Imam, who would be the divinely chosen Imam after him? The Imam (ع) turned to him and said, “Regarding the issue of Imamate, after me refer to my son Jawad (Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع)).” He (al-Mahmudi) said, “He is still a child!” Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (ع) replied, “Allah chose ‘Isa (ع) as His messenger though he was younger than Imam Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Taqi (ع).”2

In spite of these traditions some of Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida’s (ع) followers out of anxiety still went in search of his successor. “Some of them went after ‘Abdullah ibn Musa, the brother of the eighth Imam (ع). Since they weren’t willing to accept anyone’s Imamate without evidence, they presented to him some questions, and when they found him unable to answer they forsook him.” This is because what was important to them was the manifestation of this divine aspect in the Imams’ knowledge. This is also why they would apply this principle to all the Imams and subject them to various questions, and only when they felt that they were able to answer them (along with the textual declarations of their Imamate) would the Imami Shi’as recognize them as infallible Imams. The young Imams were no exceptions to this rule; the leaders of the Shi’as would examine them to become certain of their level of knowledge and ability to perform clear miracles.

On the other hand, the enemies of the Imams, who were always waiting for an opportunity to marginalize the Imams and disperse the Shi’as from around them, did not sit by idly. Arranging intellectual gatherings and the like they strove to make the young age of these Imams an excuse to altogether marginalize them from society. But the more effort they made, the more they debased themselves, and the superior knowledge of the Imams stood out to their knowledgeable contemporaries.

In addition, it is obvious to those familiar with the Qur`an and stories of the prophets that several of them reached the station of prophethood, messengership and even Imamate at a young age, like ‘Isa (ع)3, Yahya (ع)4 etc. The majority of prophets reached this stage, however, at the age of forty or older.

In sum this issue should be referred to the Divine wisdom and knowledge, and as in all judgments one should make use of all available contexts, evidences, and proofs. As Allah (awj) says

“Say, O Lord! Yours is the dominion of the sky and the earth; You give the kingdom to whom You please and take it from whom You please, and You grant honor to whom You please and debase whom You please. All good is in Your hands. Verily You have power over all things.”5

Allah (awj) explains similar objections of the Tribes of Israel and replies in these words:

“The Prophet told them, Verily Allah has made Talut your king. They said how can he be king, while we are more worthy of kingship than he, and he is lacking in wealth? He [their prophet] said Allah has chosen him over you and has granted him intellectual and physical abilities, and Allah gives His kingdom to whomever He pleases, and Allah is all-encompassing, all-knowing. And the prophet said to them, Verily the sign of His kingdom is that there shall come to you the chest in which there is tranquility from your Lord and residue of the relics of what the children of Musa and the children of Harun have left, the angels bearing it”6

🍃🌺🍃~*~⛲️~*~🍃🌺🍃

🍃🕊🍃 Sources 🍃🕊🍃

1. Mowsu‘ah al-Imam al-Jawad,

(vol. 1, pg. 137)

وَرُوِيَ عَنْ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ الْجَهْمِ قَالَ: دَخَلْتُ عَلى الرِّضَا ( ع) وَأَبُو جَعْفَرٍ ( ع) صَغِيْرٌ بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ فَقَالَ لِيْ بَعْدَ كَلاَمٍ طَوِيْلٍ جَرى لَوْ قُلْتُ لَكَ يَا حُسَيْنُ إنَّ هَذَا إِمَامٌ مَا كُنْتَ تَقُوْلُ؟ قَالَ: قُلْتُ: مَا تَقُوْلُ لَ��ُ لِيْ جُعِلْتُ فِدَاكَ. قَالَ: أَصَبْتَ، ثُمَّ كَشَفَ عَنْ كَتِفِ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ ( ع) فَأَرَانِيْ مِثْلَ رَمْزِ إِصْبَعَيْنِ فَقَالَ لِيْ: مِثْلُ هَذَا كَانَ فِي مِثْلِ هَذَا الْمَوْضِعِ مِنْ أَبِي مُوْسى صَلَوَاتُ اللهِ عَلَيْهِ.

2. Dala’il al-Imamah, (pg. 388)

عَنِ الْمَحْمُودِي قَالَ: كُنْتُ وَاقِفاً عَلى رَأْسِ الرِّضَا ( ع) بِطُوسِ فَقَالَ لَهُ بَعْضُ أَصْحَابِهِ: إِنْ حَدَثَ حَدَثٌ فَإِلـى مَنْ؟ قَالَ: إِلـى ابْنِي أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ. قَالَ: فَإِنِ اسْتَصْغَرَ سِنُّهُ؟ فَقَالَ لَهُ أَبُو الْحَسَنِ: إِنَّ اللٌّهَ بَعَثَ عِيسى بْنَ مَرْيَمَ قَائِماً بِشَرِيعَتِهِ فِي دُوْنِ السِّنِّ الَّتِي يَقُوْمُ فِيْهَا أَبُو جَعْفَرٍ عَلى شَرِيْعَتِهِ.

3. Surat Maryam (19), (Verses 29-30)

فَأَشَارَتْ إِلَيْهِ قَالُوا كَيْفَ نُكَلِّمُ مَنْ كَانَ فِي الْمَهْدِ صَبِيًّا. قَالَ إِنِّي عَبْدُ اللٌّهِ آتَانِيَ الْكِتَابَ وَجَعَلَنِي نَبِيًّا...

4. Ibid., (Verse 12)

يَا يَحْيَى خُذِ الْكِتَابَ بِقُوَّةٍ وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْحُكْمَ صَبِيًّا

5. Surat Ali-’Imran (3), (Verse 26)

قُلِ اللٌّهُمَّ مَالِكَ الْمُلْكِ تُؤْتِي الْمُلْكَ مَنْ تَشَآءُ وَتَنْزِعُ الْمُلْكَ مِمَّنْ تَشَآءُ وَتُعِزُّ مَنْ تَشَآءُ وَتُذِلُّ مَنْ تَشَآءُ بِيَدِكَ الْخَيْرُ إِنَّكَ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ

6. Surat al-Baqarah (2), (Verse 247)

وَقَالَ لَهُمْ نَبِيُّهُمْ إِنَّ اللٌّهَ قَدْ بَعَثَ لَكُمْ طَالُوتَ مَلِكًا قَالُوا أَنَّى يَكُونُ لَهُ الْمُلْكُ عَلَيْنَا وَنَحْنُ أَحَقُّ بِالْمُلْكِ مِنْهُ وَلَمْ يُؤْتَ سَعَةً مِنَ الْمَالِ قَالَ إِنَّ اللٌّهَ اصْطَفَاهُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَزَادَهُ بَسْطَةً فِي الْعِلْمِ وَالْجِسْمِ وَاللٌّهُ يُؤْتِي مُلْكَهُ مَنْ يَشَآءُ وَاللٌّهُ وَاسِعٌ عَلِيمٌ

🍃🌺🍃~*~⛲️~*~🍃🌺🍃

🍃🕊🍃 al-Islam.org 🍃🕊🍃

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[5secondsofsumaa]

hey quick q i’m looking into shi’ism but i’m confused. why do you mourn husayn ra’s death but not the prophet ﷺ’s death ? :/

we mourn both of them!

with imam husayn (as), the battle of karbala was a significant moment in islamic history. it symbolizes the struggle for justice and resistance against oppression.

additionally, the ahlul-bayt went through awful things for months after the battle. they were paraded around cities, with the women not wearing their hijabs (and/ veils), and everyone was chained up. there’s definitely more things but it’s not coming to mind rn

as for the Prophet (pbuh), we mourn him as well on his islamic death date. our mourning practices for everyone else aren’t as elaborate due to the event of the time. but, shias do hold a deep reverence for the Prophet and commemorate his life and teachings during various occasions.

i hope that helped but also feel free to dm me :)

[mithliya]

bro this is why westerners need to stfu about islam how u gonna say “wahhabism is objectively pro-trans” when they’ll literally kill u for that shit in saudi

[tamamita]

Hi today i learned that multi level marketing schemes are explicitly banned in Islam, how does it feel to be of a faith that just keeps winning

You should see the companions of Imam Ali (a) and how they actually were martyred because there were Arab kings who stole money from the community and used them to erect palaces and etc. Like the entire point of Shi’ism is how far greed and power can corrupt people and to what extent they will go to achieve this.

In fact, it wasn’t even a Non-Muslim who killed the Prophet’s family (a), they were all Muslims, who were so concerned for materialism, they killed each member of the Prophet’s family (pbuh&hf)

[lover-of-ar-rahmaan]

So many emotions tonight but this is what Shi’ism does to a person..

[labbaik-ya-hussain-as]

For the first time, the most cherished and blessed Hadith books of Shi’ism have been translated to English and uploaded on the website for absolutely FREE! | https://bit.ly/3AlIuvD

More books in English:

Bihar Al-Anwaar: https://bit.ly/2X61EaG

Mafatih Al-Jinan: https://bit.ly/3jP9xZV

Kitab Al-Ghayba: https://bit.ly/3s2Jli8

English Series/ Movies:

Mukhtar Namah: https://bit.ly/3xt0X7H

Imam Ali Series: https://bit.ly/3AnGbZa

Iranian Revolution: https://bit.ly/37ymqBv

Salman Al-Farsi Movie: https://bit.ly/3jrYSUE

Imam Jawad Series: https://bit.ly/3iv4G0r

Imam Reza Series: https://bit.ly/3jxBUeM

Shaykh Mufeed Series: https://bit.ly/2Vy0TX4

Men of Angelos: https://bit.ly/3isdfca

Imam Mahdi (ATFS) from Shia/ Sunni Narrations:

https://bit.ly/3xv8Yt0

Oppression of Syeda Zahra (AS) from Shia/ Sunni Narrations:

https://bit.ly/2VBhQA3

[hazardous-waste-containment]

“The Islamic State’s “offensive jihad” is directed mainly against the region’s Shi‘a. Apart from theology, the perception that the Shi’a have expansionist designs on the Middle East necessitates fighting them. The Shi’ite project, so it is believed, aims at a “Shi’ite crescent extending from Tehran to Beirut.” The Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Asad regime in Syria all form part of this “crescent.” Iran’s leaders are aiming “to turn Iraq into a Shi’ite state,” and the United States is complicit in their plan. According to the Islamic State, Iraq’s recent historical transition from a Sunni to a Shi’ite majority is evidence of a creeping “Shi’itization.” As Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi once asserted, it was only in the last 50 to 70 years that Sunni conversion to Shi’ism began. Before then, Iraq was a Sunni country.”

— “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” Cole Bunzel

[ibnkhomeini]

دين الامامية هو الاقرار بتوحيد الله تعالى ذكره، ونفي التشبيه عنه، وتنزيهه عما لا يليق به، والاقرار بأنبياء الله ورسله وحججه وملائكته وكتبه، والاقرار بأن محمدا (صلى الله عليه وآله) هو سيد الانبياء والمرسلين، وأنه أفضل منهم ومن جميع الملائكة المقربين، وأنه خاتم النبيين، فلا نبي بعده إلى يوم القيامة، وأنجميع الانبياء والرسل والائمة (عليهم السلام) أفضل من الملائكة، وأنهم معصومون مطهرون من كل دنس ورجس، لا يهمون بذنب صغير ولا كبير ولا يرتكبونه، وأنهم أمان لاهل الارض كما أن النجوم أمان لاهل السماء. 

The Imami religion is the affirmation of the tawhid of Allah, exalted be His mention, and the negation of similarity (tashbeeh) (i.e. to His creation) for Him, and His exclusion from what is not suitable for Him. And (it is) the affirmation of the prophets of Allah and His messengers and His hujaj and His angels and His books. And the affirmation that Muhammad صلى الله عليه وآله is the master of the prophets, and that he is superior to them and (superior to) all of the angels of proximity, and that he is the seal of the prophets. So there is no prophet after him until the day of the resurrection. And that all of the prophets and the messengers and the Imams عليهمالسلام are superior to the angels. And they are ma`sumeen, purified from every uncleanliness and filth, they do not consider to do neither the minor sin nor the major, nor do they commit it, and they are a safeguard for the people of the Earth as the stars are a safeguard for the people of heaven.

— Sheikh Saduq’s (ra) summary of Shi’ism in his Amali. 

[blog1984705]

Lecture 10: Mulla Sadra Shirazi

This blog will entail parts of the tenth lecture of my course in Middle Eastern philosophy and will be mainly about Mulla Sadra Shirazi  from the philosophical school of Isfahan. The Isfahan School of Philosophy is recognized as one of the first modern Islamic philosophical movements. It is both a philosophical and mystical (See my blog about lecture 7) movement. The three key philosophers of this movement were Mir Damad, Baha al-Din Amili and previously mentioned Mulla Sadra Shirazi. 

The first part of the lecture our lecturer spoke a lot about why Arabic philosophy has not died after Avicenna, as most western academia suggest nowadays. On the contrary, most text that were written by Arabic philosophers were way more elaborate and progressive than western philosophy in the same time. However these assumptions are based on academia who themselves can’t even read Arabic scriptures, so that they base their opinions on the one out of twenty texts that are being translated to English. 

As one is able to read the texts correctly one will be able to unveil the hidden meanings and truths in the text. In this way one is able to return to the original hidden essence of the text and therefore disclose these philosophical essences of the text. Unfortunately language becomes a big barrier between our understanding of truth within philosophical texts.

Mulla Sadra Shiraza was arguably one of the most significant Islamic philosophers after Avicenna. He fused different streams together namely, Islamic theology, mystical intuition, peripatetic philosophy, neoplatonism and shi’ism. He however abandons foregoing traditional methods of philosophy. He things of philosophy of mapping out an intellectual inquiry upon the journey of the soul. It helps us understand this journey in several ways.

According to Shiraza there are four journeys our soul attends. The first journey is from the world to God, it provides the seeker with intellectual principles for the understanding of philosophy. The second journey is the one in God, with God. This is his discourse on God where he states things about the attributes in the same way that for example Al ‘Arabi and Maimonides had done. The third journey is the journey from God back to the world. This is about the relationship between God and the world, the relationship we have with nature and time, it’s about the creation and he also talks about other ontological categories. The fourth journey is in the world with God and is mainly about human psychology, soteriology and eschatology. All these journeys are about awakening parts within ourselves that lead to philosophy. The first journey for example awakes us to find the need for philosophy. The second journey awakes our awareness of the existence of God and what God actually is. The third for example makes us aware of being the bridge between the world and God. The fourth journey is the philosopher being in the world with the awareness of God and has to spread this to others, so that they can become aware as well. They somewhat act like a prophet or preacher in a way that they try to spread their teachings.

Shiraza defines philosophy as a process of curing ignorant sick souls. He also describes it as being explicitly metaphysical. Therefore one gains knowledge of being, one will understand essences and it goes beyond phenomena of deception. He states that knowledge will develop through judgements, corroborated by the Aristotelian demonstration.  Philosophy disdains imitation and requires analysis and demonstration, it has to lead to new things rather than copying predecessors. He also thinks that knowledge is not unlimited, not for the sake of knowledge, but because it is limited by the human nature. The perfection of philosophy is to strike resemblance with the Creator, this last statement is also an important part within Sufism.

Mulla Sadra also asserts some things about being and existence. His analysis of existence commences with distinction the necessary and contingent beings. He also things that every being has existence and essence. He thinks that existence is all-encompassing but also acts of existence in being.

He thereby asserts that existence is a concept innately grasped in the mind, something that a western philosopher working on metaphysics such as Kant would probably agree with. Second he thinks that existence requires neither definition nor description of any kind. This is something I have not seen before within philosophy. This goes together with the first assertion of the mind grasping existing things in the mind. He says that the term existence is the greatest term or group to describe things. One can for example say that Mercedes is a car brand, but it falls in the group of cars. As where cars fall into the group of vehicles and so on. He states that existence therefore is a special kind of predication.

Third Mulla Sadra thinks that existence is secondary intelligible. It is logically abstracted in the mind. Existence is also predicated homonymously of its referents. However it is a special case of homonymy, known as tashkik, which can be translated as a modulation of being.

The key properties of tashkik are priority, precedence, intensity and debilitation. He states that existence is a real predicate, because existence is a property of essence found in extra-mental reality. Existence is real because if something existing is true, it will refer back into reality. If existence was not a predicate, things that are not in reality would be meaningless.

Existence is according to Mulla Sadra a single, simple reality having neither genus nor differentia, nor a definition or a demonstration or a definiens. It only admits of degrees by perfection and deficiency, by priority and posteriority and at last by independence and dependence. He thinks all multiplicity is false, what is real is singular and unified.

[saqrqa3d]

The Ahl al-Bayt are free from Shi’ism just like

‘Issa ‘alayhi salam is free from Christianity

[zamancollective]

Sarchal: The Forgotten History of Tehran’s Jewish Ghetto

By Kyle Newman

To reminisce is to remember with pleasure, to recollect past events while indulging in the enjoyment of nostalgic return. It would be too simplistic to say that the Jews of Iran reminisce blissfully about their past in a country with a fraught history of antisemitism, yet too harsh to conclude that the calamities they endured ought to completely overshadow their 2500 years of rich history. Memories of Sarchal, the Jewish ghetto of Tehran, serve as living manifestations of this ambivalent train of thought. A dynamic community that was forced to adapt to the ebb and flow of life under monarchical Shi’a regimes, Sarchal was much more than a physical location that housed Iran’s urban Jews from the dawn of the Safavid dynasty through to the troughs of a new Islamic Republic. 

In 1588 CE, the Safavid Shah Abbas I revived the Persian empire after centuries of Mongol and Turkic governance. Fairly benign in policy during the first half of his rule, Shah Abbas I reversed his friendly attitude towards the Jewish population when a convert from the city of Lar impelled a royal edict that would force Jews to wear distinctive badges and headgear. Under this edict, Jews were now formally categorized as najjes (ritually impure) under the empire’s Shi’a theocratic law, and ghettoization would begin with the forced expulsion of Jews from Esfahan who refused to convert to Islam. Those who did convert were forced to practice Judaism secretly until 1661, when an edict would allow them to conditionally return to Judaism through payment of the jizya (a tax levied on religious minorities) and wearing their designated badge. 

Conditions worsened for Jews during the Safavid era until one of the last kings of the dynasty, Nadir Shah, came to power in 1736 and abolished Shi’ism as the empire’s official religion. This action enabled Jews in cities like Mashhad, who had previously been subject to forced conversion, to reestablish and regrow their communities. Still, neither prosperity nor persecution were experienced by Jews in a linear fashion: the rise of the Qajar dynasty in 1794 spelled the onset of tightening oppression. The Romanian Jewish traveler and historian J.J. Benjamin wrote about the horrid conditions of Jewish life in Qajar Iran in an account from the mid-19th century: 

“They are obliged to live in a separate part of town; for they are considered as unclean creatures… Under the pretext of their being unclean, they are treated with the greatest severity and should they enter a street, inhabited by Mussulmans, they are pelted by the boys and mobs with stones and dirt… For the same reason, they are prohibited to go out when it rains; for it is said the rain would wash dirt off them, which would sully the feet of the Mussulmans.”

Given the Jews’ status as a najjes group, the most straightforward way to limit physical contact between Muslims and Jews was to segregate them geographically. In Iranian cities with high Jewish populations like Esfahan, Kashan, Tehran, and Hamadan, Jews were segregated into designated neighborhoods, sometimes within the main city walls and sometimes outside of them. The internal layout of each mahaleh (ghetto) played an important role in distinguishing Jewish life in Iran from the history of other ethno-religious communities.  

One such mahaleh was Sarchal, the Jewish quarter of Tehran. Sarchal was different from other Jewish ghettos in Iran given its location in the nation’s capital city of Tehran, an especially volatile and ever-transforming urban enclave since its founding by Qajar King Agha Mohammad Khan in 1786. Unlike the ghettos of Esfahan and other cities, Sarchal was located within Tehran’s old city walls. It is also unique in its oxymoronic overlap with a network of mosques and its proximity to a center of commerce, Tehran’s grand bazaar. Jews and Muslims in Tehran therefore must have interacted very frequently despite the Qajar regime’s heavy-handed, active efforts to quarantine and suppress Jewish life under their rule. 

Sarchal is situated in the southeast corner of old Tehran, contemporarily known as the 12th district. It is directly west of Emamzadeh Yahya, or the birthplace of Imam Yahya, north of Tehran’s grand bazaar, east of Pamenar Bazaar, and south of the Qajar era Masoudieh palace (Map 1). I have also included below a map in Farsi created by Eshaq Shaoul that highlights landmarks, religious structures, and other important sites in the ghetto (Map 2). I have translated his map and included a key identifying the aforementioned sites in English (Map 3). 

Map 3 Key:

1. Tamadon School

2. House of Seyed

3. Pamenar Gym (zoorkhaneh)

4. Midwife Zivar’s house 

5. Mosque

6. Eshagh Bathhouse

7. Reza Goli Khan Mosque

8. Birthplace of Imam Yahya (Emamzadeh Yahya)

9. Mosque

10. Sepir Hospital

11. Midwife Sabia’s house

12. Mullah Haninah Synagogue

13. Aghajan Bakhshi’s house

14. Chaim Golabgir’s house

15. Ayatollah Behbahani’s house

16. Mosque

17. Ezra Mikhail Synagogue

18. Bookstore

19. Fereshteh Pharmacy

20. Seven Synagogue Alley

21. Eshagh’s second house

22. Sarchal Bathhouse

23. Sarchal Plaza

24. Mosque

25. Morteza Navi Butchershop

26. Hakim Moshiah Bathhouse

27. Hakim Synagogue

28. Torbati Pharmacy

29. Ezra Yaghoub Synagogue

30. Eshagh’s birthhouse

31. Dekhantal house

32. Dardashti’s house

33. Bakery

34. Yogurt Maker

35. Tekiyeh Mosque

36. Zoorkhaneh

Very few of Sarchal’s original structures remain intact today. The “Seven Synagogue Alley,” an alley literally surrounded by seven synagogues behind Sarchal’s main plaza, is now nowhere to be found. All the old Jewish hammams (bathhouses), which were built because Jews and Muslims were not allowed to use the same public baths, are gone, as are the Jewish butcher shops, bakeries, and zoorkhanehah (gymnasiums). The Ezra Yaghoub and Mullah Haninah synagogues are still standing, along with Sapir hospital, Pamenar Mosque (dating to the late Sasanian period), Abol Hassan Mosque, Haj Ali Khan Mosque, and Ayatollah Shah Abadi Mosque. 

Street names were also changed following the Islamic Republic regime’s campaign to erase historical and cultural remnants of the Pahlavi era, often replacing them with the names of Shi’a religious and revolutionary martyrs. Cheragh Bargh Street is now Amir Kabir Street, Siroos (Cyrus) Street is now Mostafa Khomeini Street (commemorating Khomeini’s son who died before the 1979 revolution), while Pamenar Bazaar street endured little change and is now Pamenar street (Map 4). 

Map 4 Key:

5. Ayatollah Shah Abadi Mosque

8. Birthplace of Imam Yahya (Emamzadeh Yahya)

10. Sepir Hospital

12. Mullah Haninah Synagogue

16. Abol Hassan Mosque

23. Sarchal Plaza

24. Pamenar Mosque

29. Ezra Yaghoub Synagogue

Sarchal originally included every necessity for Iranian Jews to conduct Jewish life in an incredibly small quarter with an area of less than one square mile. On an average day, one could stop by the bakery to pick up bread, visit the yogurt maker or butcher to prepare a meal, exercise at the zoorkhaneh, pray and study at one of nine synagogues, buy medication from either of two local pharmacies, and engage in scholarly life by buying a book from the bookstore. Reminders of a bygone era of Jewish life in the ghetto are echoed in prominent family names like Dardashti, Torbati, Elghanyan, and Hakim that originated in Sarchal, as well as the titles of surviving architectural spaces: “rag seller and tailor” alleyway, “welder’s bazaar,” and “cannonball storage facility.”

Slowly but surely, the massive discrimination of Iranian Jews that kept them ever close to one another in the confines of the mahaleh would reduce to subtlety after Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power in 1925. The official categorization of Jews and other religious minorities as najjes would be abolished, and the political power of the Shi’a clergy greatly weakened, ushering in a new zeitgeist marked by relative religious tolerance, which the Iranian Jewish historian Habib Levy would call “The Golden Age of Iranian Jewry.” Beginning in the 1940s and bleeding into the 1950s, the last remaining Jewish families of the mahalehs of many Iranian cities left their communities of origin for better jobs and assimilation in Northern Tehran. The Jewish communities of Iran-- and with them, Sarchal-- would eventually see their quasi-extinction after the 1979 Revolution, when the vast majority of Jews were compelled or forced to flee their home of 2500 years due to the new wave of institutionalized antisemitism established by the world’s first parliamentary theocracy, The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Whether you read The Proverbs of John Heywood from 1562 or listened to Snoop Dogg’s album “I Wanna Thank Me” from 2019, we are all well aware of the phrase “let bygones be bygones,” but to what degree does this sentiment merit acceptance in the context of Iranian sociopolitical history? As far as Jewish Iranians like me are concerned, forgetting the past can be detrimental to the continuation of our existence. There is a stigma surrounding the word Sarchal; many Persian Jews are reluctant to admit our history of poverty and ghettoization. But anything short of active remembrance would serve as a disrespectful gesture to the rag sellers, fabric dealers, grocers, midwives, homemakers, rabbis, butchers, dairymen, and tailors that made life in ghettoes like Sarchal sustainable and even vibrant, not to mention the Muslim business owners and civilians who continued to associate with Jewish communities despite institutional restrictions that prohibited them from doing so. 

Jewish Iranians’ eventual outmigration from the mahalehs was surely a turning point that bolstered their financial success in later years and decades, but our escape from oppression should not negate our responsibility to honor our ancestors who built lives within its confines. In fact, we have much to learn from the Sarchalis who managed to raise families, provide for their community as a whole, and motivate Jewish life in less than one square mile-- with all the odds stacked against them.

References

Bentley, Jerry H, and Herbert F. Ziegler. Traditions & Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011. Print.

Fischel, Walter J. “The Jews of Persia, 1795-1940.” Jewish Social Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, 1950, pp. 119–160. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4464868. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020.

Foltz, Richard (2015). Iran in World History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Levy, Habib (1999). Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.

Lewis, Bernard. The Jews of Islam: Updated Edition. REV - Revised ed., Princeton University Press, 1984. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wq0nq. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020.

Sanasarian, Eliz (2000). Religious Minorities in Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shaoul, Eshagh. “Sarechal.com.... Come Home to the Place You Came From.” Welcome to Sarechal, Eshagh Shaoul, http://sarechal.com/.

Tsadik, Daniel. “JUDEO-PERSIAN COMMUNITIES v. QAJAR PERIOD (1).” Encyclopædia Iranica, XV/1, pp. 108-112 and XV/2, pp. 113-117, available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/judeo-persian-communities-v-qajar-period. Accessed 10 Jan. 2020.

Vladimir Minorsky. "The Turks, Iran and the Caucasus in the Middle Ages." Variorum Reprints, 1978.

Published on January 10th, 2020.