#Portugal 2030

[tuxedosaiyan]

Al-Andaluz hosts of the 2030 World Cup!

[arts-publisher]

[azulpressagadir]

Morocco, Portugal and Spain Officially FIFA 2030 World Cup Hosts

Zurich – Morocco, Portugal and Spain have officially been appointed as host countries for the 2030 FIFA World Cup by the FIFA Congress, gathered Wednesday in an extraordinary session by videoconference. During the same session, chaired by FIFA president Gianni Infantino from Zurich, Congress members also approved awarding the three centenary matches to Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay, while…

[mgouijjane]

(via "Morocco, Spain and Portugal 2030" Classic T-Shirt for Sale by USAPride2)

[l8news]

Vienes o voy: El comité del Mundial de Futbol de 2030 en España, Portugal y Marruecos anunció que el evento tendrá como nombre y logo el lema "Yalla Vamos 2030". Yalla significa "vamos" en árabe. [x]

[biglisbonnews]

Moroccan, Portuguese and Spanish FA bosses meet to progress 2030 World Cup bid By Paul NicholsonSeptember 18 – The Spain, Portugal, and Morocco joint bid for the 2030 World Cup took another step forward over the weekend with the acting president of the Royal Spanish Football Federation, Pedro Rocha, hosting a meeting with his Portuguese and Moroccan counterparts.With the Spanish federation having hit the headlines for all the wrong reasons over the behaviour of former president Luis Rubiales at the presentation ceremony of the Women’s World Cup, Read more …The post Moroccan, Portuguese and Spanish FA bosses meet to progress 2030 World Cup bid appeared first on Inside World Football. https://www.insideworldfootball.com/2023/09/18/moroccan-portuguese-spanish-fa-bosses-meet-progress-2030-world-cup-bid/

[afadaily]

IT’S OFFICIAL: Argentina 🇦🇷, Paraguay 🇵🇾 & Uruguay 🇺🇾 will host the 2030 World Cup inaugural matches 🏆

Spain 🇪🇸. Portugal 🇵🇹 and Morocco 🇲🇦 will host the closing matches.

[mchiti]

WORLD CUP 2030 IN MOROCCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

- and spain and portugal but step aside you two, you’re not the main character

MOROCCO SECOND AFRICAN COUNTRY TO HOST IT EVER!!!!!

DIMA MGHREB BTCHESSSSSS

MACHALLAH mgharba 3alam tbarkallah 🇲🇦���️

[blueiscoool]

The Oldest Known Ancient Egyptian Mummy that is Covered with Gold Discovered 

An ancient Egyptian mummy is the oldest covered with gold, but it's not the oldest ancient Egyptian mummy on record.

Archaeologists in Egypt have uncovered a series of tombs dating back around 4,300 years at Saqqara, including a sarcophagus holding the oldest known ancient Egyptian mummy that is covered with gold.

The record-breaking tomb had a sealed sarcophagus containing the mummy of a man that a hieroglyphic inscription identifies as Hekashepes, and whose remains were found covered with gold.

"When the sarcophagus was examined, it was found to be completely sealed with mortar, just as the ancient Egyptians had left it 4300 years ago. When the lid was raised, we found the mummy of a man covered with gold leaf," the team said in a statement posted on the Facebook page of Zahi Hawass, a former minister of antiquities who led the team that made the discoveries.

However, while other news outlets are reporting that this is the oldest Egyptian mummy known to archaeologists, that's not the case. Rather, "This mummy is the oldest complete mummy covered with gold," Hawass said in an email.

Many Egyptologists agree Egypt became unified around 3100 B.C., when the pharaonic state started. However, humans lived in the region as far back as 400,000 years ago. The oldest embalmed mummy in Egypt predates the pharaohs; the remains of a man who was placed in a fetal pose about 6,000 years ago. Meanwhile, the oldest known mummy in the world may be the 8,000-year-old remains of a man found in Portugal.

There is little information about Hekashepes, but it appears that "he was wealthy," Hawass said. Hekashepes' mummy was mummified using artificial methods, is intact and is covered with gold. There are older ancient Egyptian mummies — such as several mummies that date back more than 5,000 years at the site of Gebelein, about 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of ancient Thebes (modern-day Luxor) — but those are not covered with gold.

According to images posted online of Hekashepes' remains, it appears that his mummy is wearing clothes and doesn't have bandages, Francesco Tiradritti, an Egyptology professor at the Kore University of Enna in Italy who was not involved with these excavations, said in an email. The deceased seems like he was buried wearing a tunic with a belt and large necklace. This may be an attempt "to preserve as much as the living appearance of the deceased," Triadritti said, something that might shine light on religious beliefs at the time this man died.

Tomb with paintings

Another important tomb belongs to a man named "Khnumdjedef" who was an "inspector of the officials," who served the pharaoh Unas (ruled circa 2353 B.C. to 2323 B.C.), according to hieroglyphic inscriptions found in the tomb. His tomb was decorated with wall paintings depicting "scenes of daily life," the statement said. One painting depicts five jars lined up on top of what looks like a table.

From a released photo, it appears that some of the paintings were drawn with "elongated proportions," Tiradritti said. Paintings with elongated proportions became popular long after Khnumdjedef lived, during the First Intermediate Period (circa 2150 B.C. to 2030 B.C.), Tiradritti said. During the First Intermediate Period, a transitional time between the Old Kingdom and the Middle Kingdom, the region experienced a major drought, the central government in Egypt collapsed and the political structure changed.

The newly found paintings "are interesting to understand the evolution of [Egyptian art]," Tiradritti said.

More tombs

Another tomb found in the cemetery belonged to an official named "Meri," whose hieroglyphic inscriptions say held a number of titles, including "keeper of the secrets" and "assistant of the great leader of the palace."

Another tomb belongs to a priest, whose name may have been "Messi," alongside his wife. It contains nine statues, some of which represent servants and one that represents the priest and his wife.

Additionally, the archaeologists found a shaft 33 feet (10 meters) deep that had a stone sarcophagus belonging to a man named "Fetek" at the bottom. He was buried along with three stone statues depicting him as well as an offering table.

Royal transition

From the information released so far, "it looks like the Egyptian mission found a necropolis that can be related to the pyramid of [Unas] and his cult," Tiradritti said. Unas was the last king of the fifth dynasty and it's possible that the newly found tomb may shed light on the transition between the fifth and sixth dynasties of Egypt, Tiradritti said.

After Unas died, a pharaoh named Teti (circa 2323 B.C. to 2291 B.C.), who was not a son of Unas and may have married into the royal family, came to the throne, starting the sixth dynasty. "The reasons for a changing in the royal line is still only a matter of guess," Tiradritti said. The tombs may also help understand Egypt's economy at this time, Tiradritti added, noting that Egyptologists usually see this as being a time of economic decline for Egypt.

By Owen Jarus.

[judesbelligoal]

I just want 2 things for 2026. Neymar to be in the Brazil team and for them to win the World Cup. If not Brazil, Portugal because a Ronaldo win would be good. But I feel like Ronaldo is probably not gonna retire until he gets that World Cup lol, we might be seeing him in 2030

Hope he’s fit in 2026 cause u never know with neymar🥴 as a madridista, a cr7. World Cup win would mean the world to me

[elkoko]

!VUELVE NARANJITO!

España, Portugal y Marruecos organizaran el Mundial 2030.

#naranjito #Mundial2030

[azulpressagadir]

FIFA: Mondial-2030, La candidature Maroc-Espagne-Portugal se caractérise par “sa qualité d’ensemble”, dépasse “les exigences minimales d’organisation requises”

La candidature conjointe du Maroc, de l’Espagne et du Portugal pour l’organisation de la Coupe du Monde 2030, unique dossier en lice, se caractérise par “sa qualité d’ensemble” et dépasse “les exigences minimales d’organisation” requises dans l’évaluation technique, indique la Fédération internationale de football (FIFA) dans son rapport d’évaluation des candidatures. Au-delà des symboles, la…

[armatofu]

Señoras y señores, con ustedes, las POSIBLES sedes europeas y africanas del Mundial 2030, repartidas entre Marruecos, España y Portugal.

Recordemos que los partidos iniciales de la Copa del Mundo de los 100 años se llevarán adelante en Argentina, Paraguay y Uruguay.

[female-malice]

At the start of February, Ørsted, the world’s largest offshore wind developer, announced a major scaling back of its operations, exiting wind markets in Portugal, Spain and Norway and cutting both its dividend and its 2030 target for the number of new installations. The announcement followed the firm’s shock decision last November to back out of two major wind projects in New Jersey. Last week, it agreed to sell stakes in four US onshore wind farms for around $300m.

But Ørsted’s troubles are hardly unique. In September 2023, the UK government’s offshore wind auction failed to secure a single project from developers, who argued that the government-guaranteed prices on offer were too low in the face of rising costs. Two months before that, Vattenfall pulled out of a major wind UK development for the same reason. And in February, the German energy giant RWE – which provides 15 per cent of the UK’s power – warned that without more money on offer, the UK’s next auction, opening this month, might just fail again.

These cases are only a handful among many and have come as jarring setbacks for an industry grown accustomed to triumphalism: headlines over recent years have routinely celebrated the plunging cost of renewables and the seemingly unrelenting transition to clean energy advancing around the world. A quick Google of “renewable energy deployment” yields no shortage of charts with impressive upward slopes.

Much of this enthusiasm has centred on a metric called the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE), which represents the average cost per unit of electricity generated over the lifetime of a generator, be it a wind farm or a gas power station. The LCOE has something of a cult status among industry analysts, journalists and even the International Energy Agency as the definitive marker of the transition to clean energy. When the LCOE of renewables falls below that of traditional fossil fuel sources, the logic goes, the transition to clean energy will be unstoppable. If only it was that simple, argues the economic geographer Brett Christophers in his latest book The Price is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet.

As Christophers writes: “Everyone, seemingly, has gravitated to the view that, now they are cheaper/cheapest, renewables are primed for an unprecedented golden growth era” that will see them supplant fossil fuels. Doing so will be no mean feat. Despite the vertiginous growth of new renewable capacity in recent years, renewables have scarcely made a dent in the proportion of global power that comes from fossil fuels. The overall share of fossil fuel power in the energy mix has remained broadly stagnant for an astonishing four decades, from 64 per cent in 1985 to 61 per cent in 2022. Critically, the absolute amount of fossil fuel power generated each year – the figure that ultimately matters for the climate – has continued to rise.

In large part, this stems from overall growth in electricity consumption, which will continue apace in the coming decades as millions around the world gain access to electricity and as we race to electrify the economy. Thus, for all their upward momentum, global electricity consumption is still growing faster than solar and wind power is coming online, meaning the gap is widening. To close it, by the IEA’s estimates, the world needs to install 600 GW (gigawatts) of solar and 340 GW of wind capacity every year between 2030 and 2050. By comparison, the UK’s current total installed wind capacity is approximately 30GW, the sixth largest in the world, while Germany’s domestic transition plan implies installing the equivalent of 43 football pitches of solar panels every day to 2050. In short: the task is immense – almost unimaginably so. It is similarly urgent.

Where will the momentum needed to build this clean energy future come from? As Christophers documents in detail, the industry has thus far relied on an array of subsidy and support around the world. Extensive state support is hardly unique to clean energy, much as detractors and climate deniers may like to highlight it: the fossil fuel industry benefited from tax breaks and direct subsidy to the tune of £5.5trn in 2022 according to the IMF. The declining LCOE of renewable energy has been increasingly viewed as an argument for unwinding this government-backed support. As Christophers shows, however, in practice this has proven a near-impossibility. The question he therefore asks is why, in the face of declining costs, subsidies continue to be necessary, and what this tells us about whether the current approach to decarbonisation is fit for purpose.

The answer, Christophers argues, is that we’ve got it all upside down. When it comes to investment in renewable energy, as in anything else, it’s not cheapness that matters. Just take it from the investors themselves, he notes, citing one former JPMorgan investor who described the LCOE as a “practical irrelevance”. What matters instead is profit, and expectations of it.

Despite its simplicity, Christophers’s account is a quietly radical one that contravenes the received wisdom of not only the technocrats, mainstream economists and free marketeers who tout the wonders of the market, but also many on the left, for whom the problem with profits is typically their being far too high. Instead, as he demonstrates, the trouble is that renewable energy is nowhere near profitable enough, and certainly not reliably so, for the market to deliver it with anything like the pace, scale or certainty that is needed.

If the costs of renewables are indeed so low, one might ask, and profits are equal to revenues minus costs, then surely plunging costs should mean higher profits. But Christophers shows that low and unreliable profits are the definitive obstacle to the decarbonisation of the electricity system and, by extension, the wider economy.

The precise answer as to why low costs don’t necessarily translate into high and steady profits in this sector is technically complex and multifaceted, deftly handled by Christophers, a reformed management consultant, over nearly 400 pages of fine detail drawn from company documents, interviews and dense sectoral reports from global energy agencies. Put simply, the core of the problem is that the very features of markets so celebrated by mainstream economics – mediation via the price signal, increasing competition and private investment – are the undoing of a private-sector led transition to clean energy.

For Christophers, the commitment to marketisation in electricity systems is increasingly self-defeating. At the heart of this problem is the so-called “wholesale market” that prevails in many parts of the US and Europe, including the UK. Under this system, generators are paid a single price per unit of electricity for a given period, regardless of whether it is derived from a wind turbine or a coal plant. This price is based on what’s called a “merit order”, with the cheapest sources – generally renewables – being deployed first, followed by as many sources as are needed in order of escalating price. The wholesale is set by the last unit of energy needed to meet demand. In the UK, this is typically gas.

The defining feature of this wholesale pricing system, cast in sharp relief over the period of sky-high energy prices in 2021-2022, is volatility. With a host of factors potentially feeding into the price – from the balance of supply and demand through to global gas prices and geographic location – the swings can be enormous, regularly spiking from double to triple digit prices and back again within a matter of hours. In times of crisis, the figures can become outlandish, with the price of electricity in Texas during the state’s 2021 shock winter storms reaching $9,000 per MWh.

For Christophers, this volatility is nothing short of “an existential threat” to the “bankability” of a renewable project – that is, its ability to secure financing – because it makes profitability so uncertain. Worse still, within a competitive wholesale market, as the proportion of renewable generation in the market grows, and by extension the proportion of time in which renewables drive the wholesale price, the more frequently and strongly prices swing to the lower extreme, a phenomenon known as “price cannibalisation”.

The energy industry and governments rely on an impressive array of methods to circumvent these problems, from financial hedging to feed-in-tariffs, and from mega corporate Power Purchase Agreements with the likes of Amazon and Google to the UK’s “contracts-for-difference”. As Christophers writes: the reality of ���liberalised electricity systems such as Europe’s is that, to secure financing, renewables developers ordinarily do everything they can… to avoid selling their output at the market price.”

Thus, despite ultra-high wholesale prices over 2021-2022, many renewables generators failed to enjoy correspondingly high profits, because they had traded the possibility of these certainties in the face of intolerable market volatility. For Christophers, this is the “signal feature” of the liberalised electricity market: that “the hallowed market price… is the one price that renewables operators endeavour not to sell at.”

It is in explaining this apparent contradiction that the book offers its most radical suggestion. Borrowing Karl Polanyi’s concept of a “fictitious commodity”, Christophers ultimately contends that electricity – like land, labour and money, Polanyi’s original trio – is not a commodity in the conventional sense of having been created for sale, and is therefore ill-suited to market exchange and coordination. This incompatibility sits at the root of the spiralling complexity of interventions that policymakers are obligated to make in the name of upholding the freedom of the “market”. The result, in the words of the energy expert Meredith Angwin, is that today’s electricity markets are less market and more “bureaucratic thicket”.

Thankfully, if the forces of capitalism, defined in terms of private ownership and the profit imperative, are fundamentally ill-equipped for this task, then we are not for want of alternatives. Public ownership and financing of energy, if freed from a faux market and the straitjacket of the profit motive, seems an obvious one. Christophers writes that the state is the only actor with “both the financial wherewithal and the logistical and administrative capacity” to take on the challenge of decarbonisation. The trouble though, when all you have is a hammer, is that everything looks like a nail. Thus, in the face of irreconcilable market failures, most policymakers seem only to offer more market-based fudges.

In this context, the tremors in renewable energy investment that we have seen with increasing frequency over the past several months are more than just a blip. They represent a potentially fatal flaw in the prevailing approach to the task of decarbonisation. From the perspective of the climate, every tonne of carbon matters, and every delay is significant. To continue to leave the future of electricity, and by extension global decarbonisation, to the whims of profit-motivated firms, is an intolerable risk. Rome is already burning, and there’s no time left to fiddle.

[l8news]

FIFA dijo "I need Spain": España, Portugal, y Marruecos serán la sede triple del Mundial de Fútbol de 2030 (con 3 partidos inaugurales en Uruguay, Argentina, y Paraguay para celebrar 100 años del torneo). Los GIF de arriba muestran como era Madrid la última vez que España fue sede en 1982... o al menos así se veía en un segmento de Fútbol en acción, la serie de TV de la icónica mascota Naranjito. [x]