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catdotjpeg · 6 months ago

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LOOK: Multisectoral groups marched along Commonwealth Avenue earlier today as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. delivered his third State of the Nation Address (SONA) at the Batasang Pambansa to assail his failed promise of a Bagong Pilipinas [trans. New Philippines]. For the groups, Marcos’s Bagong Pilipinas is a grand sham. Amid promises of better living conditions, 46 percent of Filipinos rated their families as food poor—the highest since 2008—according to the latest survey of Social Weather Stations. “[H]inaharap [ng ating mga kababayan] ang realidad na mataas ang presyo ng mga bilihin, lalo na ng pagkain—lalo’t higit, ng bigas,” said Marcos in his speech earlier, affirming bleak realities on the ground. On top of a cost of living crisis are poverty wages that fail to meet the family living wage of P1,190, as estimated by economic think tank IBON Foundation, the P35 wage hike in the National Capital Region (NCR) enacted last week was dismissed as an “insult to minimum wage workers” by Leticia Castillo of human rights alliance Defend NCR. Such wage hike is far from the P150 raise being lobbied in Congress by labor groups under the National Wage Coalition. Castillo also decried the persistence of red-tagging and vilification of activists perpetrated by the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict. From July 2022 to June 2024, 3,419,044 cases of threat, harassment, and intimidation were recorded by human rights group Karapatan. The number of political prisoners also climbed to 755 as of last month. These human rights violations run contrary to Marcos’s establishment of a Special Committee on Human Rights, which was labeled “toothless” by Human Rights Watch. Marcos’s claim of a bloodless drug war is also inconsistent with the 359 drug-related killings—34.3 percent of which were committed by state agents—recorded during his second year in office by research project Dahas. Moreover, despite claims of an independent foreign policy, the Philippines under Marcos remains dependent on the US and its unequal treaties, said Liza Maza of MAKABAYAN. Last year, Marcos announced the creation of four new US military bases in the country under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US. Such treaties with the US have been criticized for intensifying tensions with China and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Clarice Palce of Gabriela and Ronnel Arambulo of Pamalakaya raised their worries of the Philippines being dragged into a stand off between two global superpowers which will only worsen the poor living conditions of Filipinos. The program ended with a symbolic destruction of the effigies of Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte. The broken UniTeam will be challenged by the Makabayan Coalition which will field a complete senatorial slate including ACT Teachers Party-list Representative France Castro and Gabriela Women’s Party Representative Arlene Brosas in the 2025 midterm elections. Photos by AJ Dela Cruz, Marcus Azcarraga, Audrey Sanchez, and Sarah Gates

-- Philippine Collegian, 22 Jul 2024 9:45pm PHT

#philippines #anti imperialism #human rights #labor rights #political prisoners #palestine

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somerabbitholes · 9 months ago

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Books you would recommend on this topic? Colonial, post colonial, and Cold War Asia are topics that really interest me. (Essentially all of the 1900s)

Hello! An entire century is huge and I don't quite know what exactly you're looking for, but here we are, with a few books I like. I've tried organising them, but so many of these things bleed into each other so it's a bit of a jumble

Cold War

1971 by Srinath Raghavan: about the Bangladesh Liberation War within the context of the Cold War, US-Soviet rivalry, and the US-China axis in South Asia

Cold War in South Asia by Paul McGarr: largely focuses on India and Pakistan, and how the Cold War aggravated this rivalry; also how the existing tension added to the Cold War; also the transition from British dominance to US-Soviet contest

Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World by Robert B. Rakove: on the US' ties with the Nonaligned countries during decolonisation and in the early years of the Cold War; how US policy dealt with containment, other strategic choices etc

South Asia's Cold War by Rajesh Basrur: specifically about nuclear buildup, armament and the Indo-Pak rivalry within the larger context of the Cold War, arms race, and disarmament movements

Colonialism

India's War by Srinath Raghavan: about India's involvement in World War II and generally what the war meant for South Asia politically, economically and in terms of defense strategies

The Coolie's Great War by Radhika Singha: about coolie labour (non-combatant forces) in the first World War that was transported from India to battlefronts in Europe, Asia and Africa

Unruly Waters by Sunil Amrith: an environmental history of South Asia through British colonial attempts of organising the flow of rivers and the region's coastlines

Underground Revolutionaries by Tim Harper: about revolutionary freedom fighters in Asia and how they met, encountered and borrowed from each other

Imperial Connections by Thomas R. Metcalf: about how the British Empire in the Indian Ocean was mapped out and governed from the Indian peninsula

Decolonisation/Postcolonial Asia

Army and Nation by Steven Wilkinson: a comparative look at civilian-army relations in post-Independence India and Pakistan; it tries to excavate why Pakistan went the way it did with an overwhelmingly powerful Army and a coup-prone democracy while India didn't, even though they inherited basically the same military structure

Muslim Zion by Faisal Devji: a history of the idea of Pakistan and its bearing on the nation-building project in the country

The South Asian Century by Joya Chatterji: it's a huge book on 20th century South Asia; looks at how the subcontinental landmass became three/four separate countries, and what means for history and culture and the people on the landmass

India Against Itself by Sanjib Baruah: about insurgency and statebuilding in Assam and the erstwhile NEFA in India's Northeast. Also see his In the Name of the Nation.

I hope this helps!

#anonymous #answered #book recs #india #south asia #historyblr

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mehilaiselokuva · 1 year ago

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Finnish words by unusual language of origin

*note: this does not list all the languages that the word was borrowed from, only the oldest known origin of it

*also: if you've never seen a word on this list, please don't doxx me. These are all real words. I don't spread misinformation. Why do I still need to put this in my posts

Job: Ammatti (from proto-celtic *ambaxtos) Fun Fact: this is the same root that forms the english word “Ambassador”!

Wagon: Kärry (from proto-celtic *karros) Fun Fact: This is the root that forms the English word “Car”!

Poem: Runo (from proto-celtic *rūnā) Fun Fact: This is the root that forms the English word “Rune”!

Hikikomori: Hikky (from Japanese hikikomori 引き籠もり)

Clam: Simpukka (from Mandarin zhēnzhū 珍珠)

Goods: Tavara (from proto-turkic *tabar) Fun Fact: words descended from this root can be found as far as China and Siberia!

Dungeon, jail: Tyrmä (from proto-turkic *türmä) Fun Fact: This toot extends to Azerbaijan and even Yiddish!

Rauma (city name) (from proto germanic *straumaz meaning stream)

Cherry: Kirsikka (from ancient creek kerasós κερασός which might also have older forms) Fun Fact: this word is widespread, even appearing in Arabic.

God: Jumala (possibly from proto-indo-iranian) Fun Fact: This word could be related to Sanskrit dyumna द्युम्न if it is from proto-indo-iranian

#finnish #langblr #langblog #language #study blog #suomen kieli #finnish language #finnish langblr #word roots #proto-celtic #proto-turkic #germanic #celtic #indo-iranian

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rrcraft-and-lore · 8 months ago

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The Monkey King - Sun Wukong who first appears in Chinese stories (Journey to the West) during the Ming Dynasty period 1368 to 1644 CE, well after the introduction of Buddhism to China in about 206-220 CE.

But, was he inspired by another Monkey hero/character of myth?

The prevailing and dominant theory among Asian scholars is ...yeah, likely.

That character, Hanuman, king of the monkeys (the monkey people -Vanaras- of Vedic myth!).

The story follows a Buddhist monk who is accompanied by Sun Wukong and others to travel west to India to obtain sacred Buddhist sutras. Many of their powers and personality traits are similar as well.

We know that Vedic god such as Indra have made their way as far as Japan to take root and be worshipped because of the spread of Buddhism.

As I've talked about before and is shown in texts such as the journey's of Ibn Battuta / Ibn Fadlan, storytelling was a weapon and powerful tool for idea transfer--propagation. Philosophy was huge in the old world - and places such as Nalanda - the first residential university in the world - invited scholars from all over such as Greeks from the west, and the Japanese. Buddhism became a vehicle for trading things such as: martial arts information, medicine, sciences, and of course, myths and stories.

However, as with stories, people usually altered/coopted elements and molded them to better suit their cultures and fancy. That's a thing as old as time. I've shared how the panchatantra stories and jatka tales are thought to be the inspiration for nearly 30-50 percent of all nursery rhymes, ballads, "fairy tales".

Anyways back to this theory - Chinese Indologist Professor Liu Anwu of Peking University has dedicated chapters to the comparisons (in one of his works) to further break down this theory focusing on consistent and or similar depictions of beats in Journey to the West that of Rama's story in Ramayama and the Buddhist sutras.

Even though today the story of Sun Wukong is a wholly Chinese story - it's important to note the power of oral storytelling and how it travelled evolved over thousands of years, and, just as important, the vehicles it used to do so. Not just storytellers and philosophers and travelers but religion! Philosophy!

This is a theme heavily commented on and shown in Tales of Tremaine, which is my love letter and sort of self PhD. in comparative storytelling, mythology, and story foundry through an Asiatic lens (hence a silk road analog) stretching along a similar route the silk road did from damn near as far as you can east (complete with the oceanic routes) to as west as old venezia, portugal, and spain.

Also note: this is the most popular theory atm, but the operative word is theory. Experts likely far better than you, Internet, so chill before you comment, are still debating this. I know last week some of you were doctors in sociopolitical relations, the music industry before that, and then you were leading virologists before that. Spare us simpler folks from your mighty genius just now and sit down.

The point here is the beauty of stories and their ability to travel and morph and comment on themes/points ideologies important to cultures while being entertaining and showing that humans like certain universal moments, beats, archetypes, tropes, and progressions in tales.

Now, is that because we've naturally been predisposed liking them, or the opposite in that everyone went, yo, i dig this, took it home and someone else went, this is cool but needs to be more US (insert culture) and retold it. And thus...timemachine noises speed up. Here we are today?

You might not know that about 35,000 Chinese words ( I said this instead of Mandarin because they don't just show up in one language) are derived from Sanskrit as well as Pali (a Middle Indo-Aryan Liturgical Language -- meaning language of sacredness/religious use, in this case connected to sacred Buddhist texts). It is important to make the distinction, because, Internet!

Sanskrit did not SHAPE the Chinese languages. They evolved on their own. This is just a commentary on how words/stories shaped over travel in this case strongly through the spread of Buddhism.

Religion was the mover.

Back from quick bathroom break. Going to add again - INSPIRED is the keyword here.

INSPIRED.

Sun Wukong is his own mythos/character. Influence doesn't nor can claim dominion over everything in a later tale. Sun Wukong has gone on himself to inspire legends and characters Outside of China - re: most famously and legendary?

Son Goku - who is openly a Sun Wukong inspired character.

...hell, tbh, he might be the most famous monkey inspired super powered character now. Dude makes soccer stadiums air his fights. @_@.

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mariacallous · 5 months ago

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When Donald Trump first ran for the U.S. presidency in 2016, a wave of writing suggested that he was a realist. In this framing, Democratic Party candidate Hillary Clinton was presented as a neoconservative hawk who would start wars. Trump, by contrast, would balance U.S. commitments with its resources. He would avoid foreign conflicts and quagmires. He would be less ideological in his approach to nondemocratic states.

In 2024, this thinking has returned. Some realist voices are again suggesting that Trump is one of them. Trump’s desire to end the war in Ukraine—even though he simply intends to let Russia win—is taken as evidence of this. So is the selection of Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance as his vice presidential candidate. Vance has famously said that he does not care what happens to Ukraine. Conversely, he is a China hawk who seems to believe the United States cannot support both Taiwan and Ukraine simultaneously.

The notion that U.S. support for Taiwan and Ukraine is a trade-off is the most controversial component of the Trump realist position. Former Defense Department official Elbridge Colby, for example, has argued prominently that U.S. support for Ukraine undercuts its ability to help Taiwan, and that Europe should be almost exclusively responsible for helping Ukraine (or not).

But these hopes are badly misplaced. A second Trump term may well take an entirely different tack on China from the hawks—and even if he wants to move against Beijing, he lacks the discipline and ability to do so.

There is far more in Trump’s first term to suggest indiscipline, showboating, and influence-peddling than the clear-eyed, bloodless calculation of national interest that realists aspire to.

On China, Trump was undisciplined and sloppy. Yes, he turned against China in 2020, during the final year of his term, but that was more to deflect blame for COVID-19 than out of any realist or strategic reappraisal of U.S.-China relations. COVID-19 suddenly became the “kung flu” in Trump’s vernacular in an openly racist bid to change the subject.

Trump also undercut any ostensible focus on China by picking unnecessary fights with the United States’ regional partners. U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Australia relations, for example, sank to their lowest point in years as Trump picked fights with their leaders because he wanted a payoff for the U.S. alliance guarantees.

Realism values allies for their ability to share burdens, project power, and generate global coalitions. Trump does not seem to grasp that at all. When Trump backed off his criticism of Japan, the turning point was apparently then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s relentless flattery, including giving Trump a gold-plated golf club, rather than any strategic reevaluation by Trump or his team. Such frippery is exactly the opposite of the cold calculation that we associate with realism.

Trump also sank the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and all but dropped earlier U.S. rhetoric about a pivot or rebalance to Asia. Were China a threat that Trump took seriously, then building a tighter trade area among the United States’ Asian partners would be a smart move to pool local allied economic power and build patterns of administrative coordination among those partners. Indeed, that was the rationale behind TPP and the “pivot” to increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific when it was proposed by the Barack Obama administration. Trump did not see that, either; he is obsessed with imposing tariffs, even against allies, which violates the realist tenets that concern allied power accumulation and coordination against shared threats.

Finally, Trump’s admiration for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s autocracy was blatant, and Trump has once again recently praised Xi as his “good friend.” The former U.S. president has spoken approvingly of China’s crackdowns in Tiananmen Square, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. He solicited Chinese help in the 2020 election, and China happily channeled money to Trump’s family and his properties during his presidency.

Trump clearly craves authoritarian powers at home and is happy to take China’s money. He was happy to pardon Republican lobbyist Elliott Broidy, who was convicted for illicitly acting on Beijing’s behalf. It stretches credulity to suggest that Trump will lead the United States, much less an Indo-Pacific coalition, in a major shift against a power that he admires. China will probably just throw money at him if he is reelected—especially after seeing his U-turn on a TikTok ban, a policy that he backed in his first term but failed to deliver on, after facing pressure from billionaire TikTok investor Jeff Yass.

Little else in Trump’s first term suggests s a thoughtful, realist weighing of priorities: Trump’s most important first-term foreign-policy venture was the attempted denuclearization of North Korea. Unsurprisingly, that effort was amateurish, sloppy, and unplanned—and it failed.

There is a realist argument for reaching out to Pyongyang. The United States’ long-standing policy of containment and deterrence has not changed North Korea, nor did it prevent its nuclearization. North Korea is now a direct nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland. A realistic foreign policy would accept that as an unchangeable fact and react to it. Perhaps a bold move by a risk-taking statesman could break the logjam.

Trump might have had the chance to pull this off, but he failed due to his own lack of discipline. Trump did not prepare for his meetings with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un; instead, he simply walked off the plane and thought his New York tough guy shtick would somehow bowl over a man raised in the crucible of North Korea’s lethal family politics. There was no interagency process to build proposals ahead of time, nor any kind of realistic, measured deal that could have won over Pyongyang.

According to John Bolton, then Trump’s national security advisor, the president did not even read in preparation for the summits. Instead, Trump demanded the complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament of North Korea in exchange for sanctions removal, then walked out of the Hanoi summit when Pyongyang predictably rejected this wildly unbalanced so-called deal. Talks collapsed because Trump had not prepared and had no idea how to bargain on the issues when his first offer was rejected.

But Trump did get what he really wanted—lots and lots of publicity. His hugely hyped—and criminally underprepared—first summit with Kim in Singapore brought a week of nonstop news coverage. His later trip to the Demilitarized Zone, which included briefly walking inside North Korea, brought another wave of coverage. Trump even demanded that he receive the Nobel Peace Prize. This is showboating, not strategy.

The big issue in the realist case for Trump and Vance is that they will put Taiwan explicitly ahead of Ukraine in a ruthless prioritization of U.S. interests. As Andrew Byers and Randall Schweller write, Trump “understands the limits of American power.” From this perspective, the United States cannot reasonably hope to fight Russia and China simultaneously, much less a coordinated “axis” of those countries working with rogues such as Iran and North Korea. This notion is particularly connected with Vance, who has explicitly advocated abandoning Ukraine.

Yet Trump himself does not think this way. Trump’s supposed policy positions emerge on the fly as he speaks. He is lazy. He is not capable of the strategic thinking that realists want to attribute to him; one must only listen to his campaign speeches this year to see this. He routinely lies, makes up stories, and speaks in indecipherable word-salads. When Trump has spoken on Taiwan, he makes it clear that he sees it as just another free-riding ally that owes the U.S. protection money. In an interview with Bloomberg, Trump said the United States was “no different than an insurance company” and that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything.”

It stretches psychological credulity to suggest that the United States under Trump will ruthlessly abandon a struggling, nascent democracy under threat by a fascist imperialist, but then abruptly fight for another new democracy under threat by an ever more powerful fascist imperialist. The prioritization of Taiwan over Ukraine misses the obvious precursor that the Middle East, in turn, is less valuable than Ukraine. But instead of reevaluating the United States’ position in the Middle East, Trump will almost certainly deepen U.S. involvement in the region because of the ideological fixations of his Christianist base.

The strategic case for elevating Taiwan over Ukraine is also far more mixed than Vance and Trumpian realists suggest.

First, China is much more powerful than Russia. So, a conflict with it would be far more destructive. The Russia-Ukraine war has been locally contained and, despite Russian bluster, not escalated to nuclear confrontation. That seems less likely in an open, U.S.-China war. It is an odd “realist” recommendation to suggest that the United States should take a provocative line against a stronger power, which increases the risk of great-power war, but not push its preferences on a weaker opponent where U.S. involvement is limited to a lower-risk proxy war.

Second, the U.S. commitment to Ukraine is much less costly than a parallel commitment to Taiwan. The United States is not fighting directly to defend Ukraine. It would have to do so to defend Taiwan. Taiwan defense would require the United States to project enormous force over a huge distance of open water at great expense—plus, there would be combat losses of major U.S. platforms, such as ships and aircraft.

By contrast, U.S. aid to Ukraine has mostly come in the form of money and midsized, ground-based platforms, totaling around $175 billion over two-and-a-half years. This is small and easily manageable because of NATO’s propinquity. U.S. national security spending is approximately $1 trillion annually; the country’s annual economic production is approximately $25 trillion. Notions that U.S. aid to Ukraine is an unsustainable overstretch, or that it is bolstering another “forever war,” are simply not correct.

In Ukraine, the United States is also using intelligence assets and coordination relationships with NATO allies that have long been in place—and resources that have little relevance to a Taiwan conflict. Washington is not going to engage the Chinese army in ground conflict, just as it does not need U.S. aircraft carriers to help Ukraine. As a specific example of a possible trade-off, Vance has suggested the United States lacks the artillery shell production capacity to meet both national defense needs and those of Ukraine. But that argument implies abandoning Ukraine today for an unidentifiable but apparently imminent U.S. ground war tomorrow.

Realist hopes for Trump and Vance assume an intellectual discipline that both men lack and elevate geopolitical trade-offs that are less acute than realists admit., Trump is lazy, unread, venal, easily bought, susceptible to autocrats’ flattery, captive to the ideological fixations of his domestic coalition, ignorant of U.S. strategic interests, and dismissive of alliances that amplify U.S. power. Vance is ostensibly more clear-eyed, but he is a foreign-policy neophyte in the pocket of Silicon Valley donors, including his mentor Peter Thiel. He has been a senator for less than two years, before which he was a financier and author whose interests were local.

The fiscal space to reorient U.S. defense spending is there. If Vance and Trump were truly serious about confronting China, they would not be proposing yet another massive Republican tax cut, for example. The traditional liberal internationalism Vice President Kamala Harris and President Joe Biden represent is far more likely to build a durable global coalition against Chinese and Russian revisionism than the venal caprice masquerading as strategy that Trump would bring back to the White House.

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indra69 · 4 months ago

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Borneo is the largest island in Asia, with a rich history and diverse ethnic groups such as Dayak, Malay, Bajau, Kedayan, Banjar, Kadazandusun and many more.

Borneo, a land blessed with wildlife and unparalleled natural beauty as well as abundant natural resources.

At an estimated 130 million years old, Borneo's rainforest is two times as old as the Amazon rainforest in South America.

Evidence for prehistoric human occupation of Borneo has been found at Neah Cave in Sarawak, including fossil bones, stone tools, and wall and ceiling paintings. Borneo is first mentioned in Ptolemy’s Guide to Geography of about 150 CE. Roman trade beads and Indo-Javanese artifacts have been discovered that give evidence of a flourishing civilization dating to the 2nd or 3rd century CE. Three rough foundation stones with an inscription recording a gift to a Brahman priest dated from the early 5th century, found at Kutai, provide evidence of a Hindu kingdom in eastern Kalimantan. Brahmanic and Buddhist images in the Gupta style have been found in the valleys of the Kapuas and other rivers in western Kalimantan. Later Kalimantan rulers were probably feudatories of the Majapahit empire of eastern Java (c. 1293–1520). With the arrival of Islam early in the 16th century, a number of Muslim kingdoms were founded, including the Banjarmasin, Sambas, Sukadana, and Landak. The Sukadana rulers owed allegiance to the Muslim Mataram kingdom of Java.

Modern European knowledge of Borneo dates from travelers who passed through Southeast Asia in the 14th century. The first recorded European visitor was the Franciscan friar Odoric of Pordenone, who visited Talamasim on his way from India to China in 1330. The Portuguese, followed by the Spanish, established trading relations on the island early in the 16th century. At the beginning of the 17th century the Portuguese and Spanish trade monopoly was broken by the Dutch, who, intervening in the affairs of the Muslim kingdoms, succeeded in replacing Mataram influence with their own. The coastal strip along the South China and Sulu seas was long oriented toward the Philippines to the northeast and was often raided by Sulu pirates. British interests, particularly in the north and west, diminished that of the Dutch. The Brunei sultanate was an Islamic kingdom that at one time had controlled the whole island but by the 19th century ruled only in the north and northwest. In 1841 Sarawak was split away on the southwest, becoming an independent kingdom ruled by the Brooke Raj. North Borneo (later Sabah) to the northeast was obtained by a British company to promote trade and suppress piracy, but it was not demarcated until 1912. Those losses left a much-reduced Brunei, which became a British protectorate in 1888.

During World War II the Japanese invasions of Borneo (1941–42) quickly eliminated the token British and Dutch forces on the island, which was not retaken until 1945. In July 1946 both Sarawak and North Borneo were made British crown colonies. In Dutch Borneo a strong nationalist sentiment developed and led to fighting between Indonesian and Dutch forces as the latter attempted to reimpose Netherlands control. Sovereignty passed to the Indonesians in 1949, and in 1950 a new constitution proclaimed Dutch Borneo part of the Republic of Indonesia.

The British government relinquished its sovereignty over Sabah and Sarawak in 1963, when those territories joined the Malaysian federation. That marked the commencement of Indonesian hostilities in the form of guerrilla raids across the border. Those raids ceased by agreement in 1966. Except for the period of Japanese occupation, Brunei remained a British protectorate until 1983. It became fully independent on January 1, 1984.

BORNEO, 1 Island, 3 Countries

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fuckyeahmarxismleninism · 8 months ago

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By Vijay Prashad

During Balikatan, the defense ministers of the four main nations met in Honolulu, Hawaii to discuss the political implications of these military exercises off the coast of China. Australia’s Richard Marles, Japan’s Kihara Minoru, the Philippines’ Gilberto Teodoro, and the United States’ Lloyd Austin met for their second meeting to discuss their collaboration in the region that they call the Indo-Pacific. It was at the edges of this meeting that the public relations teams of these ministers began to float the term “Squad” to refer to these four countries. While they did not formally announce the creation of a new bloc in East Asia, this new nickname intends to provide a de facto announcement of its existence.

#China #New Cold War #imperialism #pivot to Asia #antiwar #Philippines #war games #Balikatan #Japan #Australia #Struggle La Lucha

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simply-ivanka · 9 months ago

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Trump Was Good for America’s Alliances

He pushed NATO to spend more on defense, expanded the Quad and facilitated the Abraham Accords.

By Alexander B. Gray Wall Street Journal April 3, 2024

Foreign-policy experts are predictably fretting over Donald Trump’s re-election campaign. They fear that the former president threatens the alliances and partnerships that have sustained global peace since 1945. Should Mr. Trump return to the White House, the thinking goes, he will be unconstrained by the guardrails that prevented him from torpedoing America’s alliances in his first term and will permanently damage both U.S. security and the international order.

This narrative concedes a point that undermines its premise: The U.S. alliance system didn’t crumble during Mr. Trump’s first term. On the contrary, the Trump administration strengthened relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the Mideast. Anyone who believes that Mr. Trump was once bound by conventional wisdom but won’t be again—and will wreak havoc on the global order he ostensibly detests—hasn’t been paying attention.

To understand Mr. Trump’s record, recall what he inherited. The Obama administration’s disastrous “red line” in Syria, its ill-conceived Iranian nuclear deal, its failure to deter or respond adequately to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine, its toleration of Chinese malign activity in the South and East China seas, and its promise of a “new model of great-power relations” with Beijing had brought U.S. relations with allies and partners like Japan, Taiwan, Israel, the Gulf Arab states and much of Eastern Europe to a historic low point. Much of Mr. Trump’s tenure was spent not simply repairing those relationships but expanding them in innovative ways.

Mr. Trump appalled many foreign-policy veterans, who thought his rhetoric threatened the world order. In one sense, that fear was absurd: Nearly every American administration has publicly scolded North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries for shirking their defense-spending commitments. Mr. Trump did likewise—and, perhaps unlike his predecessors, was seen as willing to take decisive action to secure change. Through public and private cajoling—also known as diplomacy—he secured a commitment from NATO members to beef up their contributions. From 2017 through 2021, nearly every signatory raised defense spending, contributing substantially to the alliance’s ability to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

These efforts resulted in a significant redistribution of U.S. forces from legacy bases in Germany to facilities in Poland and the Baltic states, where they are far better positioned to deter Moscow. Along with NATO allies, Mr. Trump provided long-sought Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine, imposed sanctions against malign Russian actors, and worked with partners to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have increased European allies’ energy dependence on Russia. These weren’t the acts of a retrograde isolationist; they were the work of a pragmatist seeking novel solutions to 21st-century challenges.

The administration’s goal of strengthening America’s standing in the world bore fruit, including the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states, a significant upgrade to the Quad alliance among the U.S., India, Australia and Japan, stronger diplomatic relations with Taiwan thanks to unprecedented cabinet-level visits and record arms sales, and an unexpected deal between Serbia and Kosovo.

At each step, Mr. Trump asked his staff to think of creative ways to resolve issues that had bedeviled their predecessors for decades. Doing the same things over and over and expecting different results rightly struck the president as insane.

After three years of press adulation over America’s supposed return to the world stage under President Biden, one might ask: What have Americans and the world gotten from a supposedly more alliance-friendly U.S. president? So far, a catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan, the failure of American deterrence in Ukraine, an Iranian nuclear breakout inching ever closer, and an accelerating Chinese threat toward Taiwan. Allies in the Mideast, Eastern Europe, and Asia have begun to chart their own course in the face of an uncertain U.S. trumpet.

The global foreign-policy elite is sowing needless fear around the world by willfully misrepresenting Mr. Trump’s first term and scare-mongering about a second. Should Mr. Trump return to the White House, there will doubtless be sighs of relief among officials in friendly capitals who remember his time in office. It isn’t difficult to understand why: Mr. Trump’s language may make diplomats uncomfortable, but his actions strike fear among those who matter most to American security: our adversaries.

Mr. Gray is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He served as chief of staff of the White House National Security Council, 2019-21.

#trump #president trump #trump 2024 #repost #america first

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