#Galwan clash

[jasminewilson143]

India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability

India and China Agree on Disengagement and Patrolling Arrangements Along LAC: A Step Towards Border Stability In a significant development in India-China relations, the two nations have reached an agreement to disengage their troops and establish new patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This decision, announced by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, marks a crucial…

[merisarkar]

India-China Agree to Disengage at Ladakh Border: MEA

India-China Agree to Disengage Troops in Ladakh: In a significant step towards easing tensions along their disputed Himalayan border, India Monday announced on that it has reached a mutual agreement with China to disengage their troops from several friction points in the Ladakh region. The decision, based on a statement made by India’s External Affairs Secretary, Vikram Misri, marks a crucial…

[nohkalikai]

full text:

Activist calls for border march in Ladakh to mark land lost to China

The march would be taken out in the north and south banks of Pangong Tso lake, Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control with China; two dates are shortlisted — March 27 and April 7

Around 10,000 people from Ladakh will march to the border along China this month to showcase how much land has been lost to the neighbouring country, climate activist and education reformer Sonam Wangchuk said on Tuesday.

Mr. Wangchuk has been protesting in open in sub-zero temperature in Leh, surviving only on salt and water for the past 14 days, to demand constitutional safeguards for the Union Territory.

“We know from the shepherds that they are not allowed [anymore] to go to the places that they always used to go. In particular areas, they are stopped kilometres before where they used to go earlier. We will go and show whether land has been lost or not,” Mr. Wangchuk said.

The march would be taken out in Finger area (north and south bank of Pangong Tso), Demchok, Chushul among others along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

He said two dates have been shortlisted for the march — March 27 and April 7.

“The march will also highlight the areas, prime pasture lands, that are being turned into solar parks. On one hand, nomads are losing their land to corporates who are coming to set up their plants, maybe mining in future. Nomads will lose 150,000 sq km of prime pasture land, on the other hand they are losing pasture land to China which is encroaching from the north, the Chinese have captured huge chunks of land in the last few years,” he said.

After the June 15, 2020 incident in Galwan where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in violent clashes with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, several rounds of talks between the two armies have taken place leading to disengagement and creation of buffer zones or no-go areas. These areas in eastern Ladakh were regularly patrolled before April 2020 when China started amassing troops close to the LAC. At least 26 patrolling points out of total 65 PPs in Eastern Ladakh are not being patrolled due to the border dispute.

At the centre of Mr. Wangchuk’s protest that has received huge support from the locals is the failure of talks between Ladakh civil society leaders and Union Home Minister Amit Shah on March 4.

The members of Leh Apex Body (LAB) and Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) representing the Buddhist majority and Shia Muslim dominated regions respectively in Ladakh, are jointly protesting for Statehood for Ladakh, inclusion of Ladakh in the sixth schedule of the constitution thus giving it a tribal status, job reservation for locals and a parliamentary seat each for Leh and Kargil.

Though ministry officials had in previous rounds of meetings agreed to examine how the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution can be implemented in Ladakh’s context, the meeting with Mr. Shah “did not result in any positive outcome”.

“Government has been declining to keep their promise on Sixth Schedule. The Home Minister said we cannot give this but we will give you some constitutional safeguard,” Mr. Wangchuk said adding that he wants to awaken the people of India to this “breach of trust”.

“People are disillusioned, disenchanted and angry. There is no chance BJP will win a seat here in the upcoming elections. But this is not only for Ladakh, am trying to awaken the nation, if this is how election promises are honoured, then elections are a joke. Why did we vote this party to power twice?” he said. Ladakh’s only parliamentary seat was won by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 and 2019.

After the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution was revoked by the Parliament on August 5, 2019, Ladakh was turned into a Union Territory without any legislative assembly.

[beardedmrbean]

India says it has lodged a "strong protest" with China over a new map that lays claim to its territory.

Indian media have reported that the map shows the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as China's territory.

It was released by China's ministry of natural resources on Monday.

"We reject these claims as they have no basis," India's foreign ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said.

He added that such steps by China "only complicate the resolution of the boundary question".

Beijing has not officially responded yet.

India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar also called China's claim "absurd".

"China has even in the past put out maps which claim the territories which are not China's, which belong to other countries. This is an old habit of theirs," he told TV channel NDTV on Tuesday.

India's protest comes days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the sidelines of the Brics summit in South Africa. An Indian official said afterwards that the two countries had agreed to "intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation" along the disputed border.

Shadow of 60-year-old war at India-China flashpoint

The Indian monastery town coveted by China

India has often reacted angrily to China's attempts to stake claim to its territory.

The source of the tension between the neighbours is a disputed 3,440km (2,100 mile)-long de facto border along the Himalayas - called the Line of Actual Control, or LAC - which is poorly demarcated. The presence of rivers, lakes and snowcaps means the line can shift in places.

Soldiers on either side come face to face at many points, which can spark tensions - the last time being in December when Indian and Chinese troops clashed along the border in the town of Tawang.

China says it considers the whole of Arunachal Pradesh its territory, calling it "South Tibet" - a claim India firmly rejects. India claims the Aksai Chin plateau in the Himalayas, which is controlled by China.

In April, Delhi reacted sharply to China's attempts to rename 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the state would always be "an "integral and inalienable part of India".

Relations between India and China have worsened since 2020, when their troops were involved in a deadly clash at the Galwan valley in Ladakh - it was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.

[mariacallous]

During the recent G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi got up from the banquet table to shake hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and have a brief conversation—their first in-person exchange in three years. Although both sides remain tight-lipped about the interaction, it nonetheless raised hopes among observers of a breakthrough in their 30-month border crisis, which began with a deadly clash in Ladakh in 2020. But any resolution that might emerge will not dispel the challenge posed by massive changes at the border undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

This marks the third straight winter that around 50,000 Indian reinforcements will spend in Ladakh’s inhospitable terrain in the northern Himalayas, warding off an equal number of Chinese troops stationed a few miles away. Despite intermittent dialogue between the two militaries, Indian Army Chief Gen. Manoj Pande recently confirmed that China has not reduced its forces at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese infrastructure construction along the border is “going on unabated,” he said—confirmed by independent satellite imagery and echoed by the latest U.S. Defense Department report on China. Pande said the situation is “stable but unpredictable.” That unpredictability has become structural.

India and China have so far held 16 rounds of border talks between senior military commanders as well as numerous diplomatic and political engagements, but an agreement on actions to reduce the tensions in Ladakh has been slow to materialize. Of the seven areas in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese soldiers have faced one another since 2020, two have seen no change while the rest have seen each side take a limited step back. The challenge for India is becoming more concerning on the eastern part of the LAC—between the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet—where China has an infrastructure and military advantage, putting New Delhi on the defensive.

The widening power gap between India and China—military, technological, economic, and diplomatic—now constrains New Delhi’s options on the border. It also raises tough questions for India’s geopolitical partnerships, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), and its aggressive approach toward Pakistan. The border crisis will hang over India’s decision-making for the foreseeable future.

In October, the Chinese Communist Party held its 20th National Congress, and Xi assumed an unprecedented third term as leader. Among the images broadcasted at the Great Hall of the People minutes before Xi ascended the stage was a video from the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where at least 20 Indian soldiers and 4 PLA soldiers died in a clash in June 2020. The videos showed PLA regiment commander Qi Fabao standing with his arms outstretched to stop Indian soldiers from advancing. Qi was selected to be a delegate to the Party Congress, underlining the importance of the border crisis to the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative. Harnessing nationalism, the party wants to convey that it will protect what it considers Chinese territory at all costs.

India’s military and political leaders now confront a reality at the border that should have jolted them into serious action: China has a distinct advantage over India, which it has consolidated since 2020. By investing in a long-term military presence in one of the most remote places on Earth, the PLA has considerably reduced the time it would need to launch a military operation against India. New military garrisons, roads, and bridges would allow for rapid deployment and make clear that Beijing is not considering a broader retreat. The Indian military has responded by diverting certain forces intended for the border with Pakistan toward its disputed border with China. It has deployed additional ground forces to prevent further PLA ingress in Ladakh and constructed supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s political leadership is conspicuous in its silence, projecting a sense of normalcy.

Beijing refuses to discuss two of the areas in Ladakh, where its forces have blocked Indian patrols since 2020. In five other areas, Chinese troops have stepped back by a few miles but asked India to do the same and create a no-patrolling zone. This move denies India its right to patrol areas as planned before the border crisis began. The PLA has flatly refused to discuss de-escalation, in which both armies would pull back by a substantive distance. The question of each side withdrawing its additional troops from Ladakh is not even on the agenda. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson rejected any demand to restore the situation along the LAC as it existed before May 2020. The PLA continues to downplay the severity of the situation, instead emphasizing stability in its ties with India.

If the situation in Ladakh is “stable but unpredictable,” Indian military leaders have told Foreign Policy that major stretches of the LAC’s eastern sector—2,500 kilometers (or 1,553 miles) away—are an even bigger cause of concern. In 1962, this area was the site of a humiliating defeat of the Indian Army at the hands of the PLA. Today, massive Chinese infrastructure development and troop buildup closer to the LAC has placed India at a military disadvantage. In September, Pande said when it comes to infrastructure in the area, “there is lots to be desired to be done.” Recent reports suggest at least three additional PLA brigades remain deployed in the area even after the Party Congress, further worrying Indian military planners.

China officially claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, which includes the Tawang Monastery where the sixth Dalai Lama was born in 1683. Tawang was historically a part of Tibet; Chinese officials, such as Dai Bingguo, who served as China’s boundary negotiator with India from 2003 to 2013, have publicly stated that it would be nonnegotiable in a permanent settlement of the disputed border. As questions arise over the succession of the current Dalai Lama, who is 87 years old, Chinese sensitivities about Tawang will intensify—even more so when linked to its internal security problems in Tibet. In the coming years, it is likely to become a higher priority for China.

Still, it is in Ladakh that the Chinese have built up infrastructure at a frenetic pace, with only military operations in mind: roads, bridges, airfields, heliports, accommodations for troops, and storage and communication infrastructure. Pande noted that one of the biggest developments is the G695 highway, which runs parallel to the LAC and gives the PLA the ability to quickly move from one valley to another. Flatter terrain on the Chinese side already gives Beijing an advantage, now further bolstered by infrastructure—an extensive network of new roads, bridges, and heliports.

In the 1960s, the PLA needed one full summer season to mobilize and launch military operations in Ladakh for the next summer. Now, it would need a couple of weeks to undertake the same operation. Indian military planners must live with this scenario, even if the current border crisis is resolved.

Modi approaching Xi in Bali recalled a short exchange between the two leaders on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, in 2017. Then, their conversation sparked diplomatic communications between New Delhi and Beijing that aimed to resolve a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at Doklam in Bhutan, which China claims as its territory. The talks led to disengagement, but the Chinese only stepped back a few hundred yards. They have since consolidated their military deployment and undertaken massive infrastructure development in Doklam, such as roads, helipads, and a military garrison. Even if an immediate crisis was averted, the status quo was permanently altered in China’s favor in Doklam.

A similar resolution of the Ladakh border crisis would carry bigger risks for India. Unlike in Doklam, China has entered areas in Ladakh that Indian troops regularly patrolled until 2020. Reinforcing the LAC over the vast span of Ladakh would require enhanced deployment of Indian ground forces. This permanent instability would put the Indian military under further pressure. With an already limited defense budget—China’s is more than four times as large—shifting more troops to the border would also divert resources from the Indian Navy, where multilateral cooperation with Quad partners to contest China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region is an absolute imperative.

Fearing escalation, India is forsaking even limited offensive options, such as launching a quid pro quo military operation to capture some territory in Tibet to arrive at the negotiating table with a strong hand. New Delhi’s defensive position instead seems to acknowledge its widening gap with Beijing; due to this power differential, it is unable to even use economic or diplomatic instruments to target China. After all, India’s bilateral trade with China—its biggest trading partner—reached record levels this year, with an all-time high trade deficit in Beijing’s favor. The U.S. Defense Department report on China reveals that Beijing has warned U.S. officials not to interfere with its relationship with New Delhi; Kenneth Juster, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said New Delhi doesn’t want Washington to mention Beijing’s border aggression.

India’s defensive posture plays out in its approach to diplomatic engagement and security cooperation. Unlike its Quad partners, India abstained from voting against China on the Xinjiang issue at the United Nations Human Rights Council meeting in October, and its comments on China’s crackdown in Hong Kong or aggression toward Taiwan have been guarded. Modi participated in both the BRICS summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit this year, along with Xi; Chinese delegations are still regularly invited to New Delhi for multilateral events. And an Indian military contingent participated with a PLA contingent in a military exercise in Russia this year.

The current situation along the LAC, both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, as well as China’s refusal to discuss issues on India’s agenda for resolving the crisis have added to the structural instability in their relationship. Chinese infrastructure development and the widening gap in power means that this instability will become permanent, even with a solution to the immediate crisis. India’s military will remain under pressure and on guard. Pande made this implicit when discussing future Indian plans on the border in November. “We need to very carefully calibrate our actions on the LAC [so as] to be able to safeguard both our interests and sensitivities … and be prepared to deal with all types of contingencies,” he said.

The risk of an accidental military escalation between Asia’s most populous countries��both nuclear powers—has increased significantly since 2020. This will continue unless Modi and Xi find a new modus vivendi. Establishing guardrails in the relationship will require political imagination and an honest appraisal of relative strengths; failing that, New Delhi faces tough geopolitical choices. It has so far eschewed any security-centric step with the Quad that could provoke Beijing, but murmurs from its partners about reticent Indian policy are bound to get louder. Meanwhile, India’s reliance on Russia for military equipment and ammunition now falls under a cloud of suspicion. And an unstable border with China prevents India from targeting Pakistan, a tactic that has proved politically rewarding for Modi.

The fundamentals of Indian foreign policy that have held steady since the years of former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—namely, strategic autonomy and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty—will come under greater stress as the border crisis looms over New Delhi. Modi boasts of great ambitions for India as a “Vishwa Guru,” or master to the world—a euphemism for a global superpower. But questions raised by the situation at the border with China continue to limit him.

[news365timesindia]

[ad_1] Paromita Das GG News Bureau New Delhi, 26th October. The recent meeting between Bharatiya Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in Kazan comes at a critical juncture for Sino-Bharatiya relations. This meeting, following a five-year hiatus in formal talks, underscores the intent of both leaders to address pressing issues, especially the prolonged border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that have defined much of their recent interactions. While a comprehensive resolution remains unlikely in the short term, this renewed dialogue could offer a path to de-escalation and confidence-building between two of the world’s largest economies. Background and Context The Sino-Bharatiya relationship has been historically fraught, particularly due to unresolved border disputes that date back to the 1962 Sino-Bharatiya War. The situation further intensified with the 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley, a confrontation that highlighted the need for a clear strategy to prevent military escalation. Besides military tensions, economic policies have also strained the relationship: Bharat has imposed scrutiny on Chinese investments and slowed the issuance of visas for Chinese nationals, while China remains cautious about Bharatiya strategic intentions. Key Outcomes of the Kazan Meeting Renewed Commitment to Dialogue The Kazan meeting underscores both leaders’ recognition of the need for continued dialogue despite the inherent complexities. After years of tense interactions and diplomatic standoffs, the willingness of Modi and Xi to sit down and discuss critical issues signals a commitment to peaceful negotiations as a tool for managing bilateral differences. This step forward is significant in reducing the potential for future military escalations along the border. The Border Issue: Managing Unresolved Tensions Although a full resolution of the border dispute remains elusive, Modi and Xi’s meeting in Kazan brought attention to an urgent need for military de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Reports suggest that both leaders expressed a willingness to explore confidence-building measures, a crucial move in a region where even minor missteps can escalate into significant confrontations. Mutual agreements on patrol limits and the creation of buffer zones could be instrumental in managing this sensitive issue, setting the stage for a less militarized and more stable border. Prospects for Economic Cooperation One of the most promising outcomes of the Kazan meeting is the discussion on potential Chinese investment in Bharat. As Bharat aims to establish itself as a global manufacturing hub, foreign investment will be essential. Chinese investments, specifically in infrastructure and industrial development, could serve Bharat’s economic goals. However, the country must weigh this opportunity against concerns over security, especially in sectors considered sensitive, such as telecommunications and energy. Diplomatic Nuances and Mixed Signals Despite the positive signals from Kazan, the diplomatic path between Bharat and China remains fraught with nuance and ambiguity. Past interactions, including the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2022, saw both countries issuing divergent statements about their discussions. This inconsistency reflects a deeper, systemic distrust between the two nations and underscores the challenge of building transparent, trust-based communication channels that can withstand political pressures. Strategic Implications for Asia and Beyond Impact on Regional Stability Stability in Sino-Bharatiya relations is critical not only for Asia but for the world at large. Both countries have significant influence in various international arenas and organizations, including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the G20. A cooperative relationship could foster a more stable and predictable Asia, but continued tensions could disrupt regional harmony and stymie multilateral cooperation in trade and security.

China’s Position in Bharatiya Foreign Policy The Modi-Xi meeting presents a chance for Bharat to redefine its approach to China within its broader foreign policy. Bharat’s growing alignment with Western democracies, particularly the United States, has added complexity to its relationship with China. While the West views Bharat as a counterweight to China, Modi’s administration has consistently indicated its preference for strategic autonomy. The Kazan meeting serves as a reminder that Bharat remains committed to an independent foreign policy that balances its interests with multiple global powers. Economic Rebalancing and Trade Relations China is Bharat’s largest trading partner, and despite diplomatic challenges, trade continues to thrive. The Kazan meeting highlighted a shared interest in enhancing economic relations, which could lead to renewed investments and expanded trade agreements. Nonetheless, Bharat’s approach to Chinese investments remains cautious, particularly in sectors impacting national security. How Bharat balances economic engagement with security concerns will be crucial in shaping the future of Sino-Bharatiya trade. Challenges and Roadblocks Ahead in Bharat-China Relations The recent dialogue between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit marks a hopeful step forward, yet the path to lasting cooperation remains complex. Here are key challenges and roadblocks that could impede progress: Deep-Rooted Mistrust The Galwan Valley clash of 2020, which led to casualties on both sides, has left a lasting impact on public sentiment and diplomatic trust. For meaningful progress, both nations must work to build confidence, yet past experiences and unresolved border disputes continue to cast a shadow over current efforts. Domestic Political Pressures Both leaders face significant expectations at home to protect their national interests. Prime Minister Modi is expected to maintain a firm stance on territorial integrity, while President Xi must uphold China’s claim to contested regions. These domestic pressures can limit diplomatic flexibility and make concessions politically sensitive. Balancing Economic Cooperation with Security Concerns Economic interdependence could drive collaboration, especially as Bharat seeks foreign investment in its infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. However, China’s involvement in key areas raises security concerns for Bharat, particularly in technology, infrastructure, and data-sensitive industries. Striking a balance between economic gains and security risks will be challenging. Diverging Global Alliances Bharat’s growing alignment with Western democracies, particularly the United States, places it in a delicate position. While New Delhi values strategic autonomy, its partnerships with Western powers often appear as counterweights to Chinese influence. This complicates efforts at bilateral cooperation and can lead to misperceptions or unintended escalations. Diplomatic Ambiguities and Mixed Signals In past interactions, both nations have issued statements that diverged in tone or content, reflecting underlying mistrust and differing interpretations. This ambiguity can strain diplomatic exchanges, making it difficult to establish clear, consistent communication that would build confidence over time. Conclusion The Modi-Xi meeting at the BRICS Summit in Kazan represents a cautious but meaningful step toward de-escalation and mutual understanding. Though the road to a fully normalized relationship remains fraught with challenges, this dialogue is a constructive move toward managing tensions and exploring economic synergies. For Bharat, the challenge lies in balancing economic cooperation with strategic autonomy, while for China, it means fostering trust in a region where its intentions are often viewed with suspicion. The success of this renewed engagement could mark a turning point in regional dynamics, with global implications as both nations navigate a changing world order.

The Kazan meeting is a much-needed reset for both nations. It shows that Bharat and China can engage pragmatically, focusing on areas of mutual benefit while acknowledging areas of contention. This practical approach might not resolve every issue, but it can prevent tensions from derailing progress. As the world watches, this careful but progressive engagement offers a hopeful prospect for both regional stability and long-term collaboration between Asia’s two largest powers.   The post Modi and Xi’s BRICS Summit Meeting Signals New Phase in Bharat-China Relations appeared first on Global Governance News- Asia's First Bilingual News portal for Global News and Updates. [ad_2] Source link

[news365times]

[ad_1] Paromita Das GG News Bureau New Delhi, 26th October. The recent meeting between Bharatiya Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in Kazan comes at a critical juncture for Sino-Bharatiya relations. This meeting, following a five-year hiatus in formal talks, underscores the intent of both leaders to address pressing issues, especially the prolonged border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that have defined much of their recent interactions. While a comprehensive resolution remains unlikely in the short term, this renewed dialogue could offer a path to de-escalation and confidence-building between two of the world’s largest economies. Background and Context The Sino-Bharatiya relationship has been historically fraught, particularly due to unresolved border disputes that date back to the 1962 Sino-Bharatiya War. The situation further intensified with the 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley, a confrontation that highlighted the need for a clear strategy to prevent military escalation. Besides military tensions, economic policies have also strained the relationship: Bharat has imposed scrutiny on Chinese investments and slowed the issuance of visas for Chinese nationals, while China remains cautious about Bharatiya strategic intentions. Key Outcomes of the Kazan Meeting Renewed Commitment to Dialogue The Kazan meeting underscores both leaders’ recognition of the need for continued dialogue despite the inherent complexities. After years of tense interactions and diplomatic standoffs, the willingness of Modi and Xi to sit down and discuss critical issues signals a commitment to peaceful negotiations as a tool for managing bilateral differences. This step forward is significant in reducing the potential for future military escalations along the border. The Border Issue: Managing Unresolved Tensions Although a full resolution of the border dispute remains elusive, Modi and Xi’s meeting in Kazan brought attention to an urgent need for military de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Reports suggest that both leaders expressed a willingness to explore confidence-building measures, a crucial move in a region where even minor missteps can escalate into significant confrontations. Mutual agreements on patrol limits and the creation of buffer zones could be instrumental in managing this sensitive issue, setting the stage for a less militarized and more stable border. Prospects for Economic Cooperation One of the most promising outcomes of the Kazan meeting is the discussion on potential Chinese investment in Bharat. As Bharat aims to establish itself as a global manufacturing hub, foreign investment will be essential. Chinese investments, specifically in infrastructure and industrial development, could serve Bharat’s economic goals. However, the country must weigh this opportunity against concerns over security, especially in sectors considered sensitive, such as telecommunications and energy. Diplomatic Nuances and Mixed Signals Despite the positive signals from Kazan, the diplomatic path between Bharat and China remains fraught with nuance and ambiguity. Past interactions, including the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2022, saw both countries issuing divergent statements about their discussions. This inconsistency reflects a deeper, systemic distrust between the two nations and underscores the challenge of building transparent, trust-based communication channels that can withstand political pressures. Strategic Implications for Asia and Beyond Impact on Regional Stability Stability in Sino-Bharatiya relations is critical not only for Asia but for the world at large. Both countries have significant influence in various international arenas and organizations, including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the G20. A cooperative relationship could foster a more stable and predictable Asia, but continued tensions could disrupt regional harmony and stymie multilateral cooperation in trade and security.

China’s Position in Bharatiya Foreign Policy The Modi-Xi meeting presents a chance for Bharat to redefine its approach to China within its broader foreign policy. Bharat’s growing alignment with Western democracies, particularly the United States, has added complexity to its relationship with China. While the West views Bharat as a counterweight to China, Modi’s administration has consistently indicated its preference for strategic autonomy. The Kazan meeting serves as a reminder that Bharat remains committed to an independent foreign policy that balances its interests with multiple global powers. Economic Rebalancing and Trade Relations China is Bharat’s largest trading partner, and despite diplomatic challenges, trade continues to thrive. The Kazan meeting highlighted a shared interest in enhancing economic relations, which could lead to renewed investments and expanded trade agreements. Nonetheless, Bharat’s approach to Chinese investments remains cautious, particularly in sectors impacting national security. How Bharat balances economic engagement with security concerns will be crucial in shaping the future of Sino-Bharatiya trade. Challenges and Roadblocks Ahead in Bharat-China Relations The recent dialogue between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit marks a hopeful step forward, yet the path to lasting cooperation remains complex. Here are key challenges and roadblocks that could impede progress: Deep-Rooted Mistrust The Galwan Valley clash of 2020, which led to casualties on both sides, has left a lasting impact on public sentiment and diplomatic trust. For meaningful progress, both nations must work to build confidence, yet past experiences and unresolved border disputes continue to cast a shadow over current efforts. Domestic Political Pressures Both leaders face significant expectations at home to protect their national interests. Prime Minister Modi is expected to maintain a firm stance on territorial integrity, while President Xi must uphold China’s claim to contested regions. These domestic pressures can limit diplomatic flexibility and make concessions politically sensitive. Balancing Economic Cooperation with Security Concerns Economic interdependence could drive collaboration, especially as Bharat seeks foreign investment in its infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. However, China’s involvement in key areas raises security concerns for Bharat, particularly in technology, infrastructure, and data-sensitive industries. Striking a balance between economic gains and security risks will be challenging. Diverging Global Alliances Bharat’s growing alignment with Western democracies, particularly the United States, places it in a delicate position. While New Delhi values strategic autonomy, its partnerships with Western powers often appear as counterweights to Chinese influence. This complicates efforts at bilateral cooperation and can lead to misperceptions or unintended escalations. Diplomatic Ambiguities and Mixed Signals In past interactions, both nations have issued statements that diverged in tone or content, reflecting underlying mistrust and differing interpretations. This ambiguity can strain diplomatic exchanges, making it difficult to establish clear, consistent communication that would build confidence over time. Conclusion The Modi-Xi meeting at the BRICS Summit in Kazan represents a cautious but meaningful step toward de-escalation and mutual understanding. Though the road to a fully normalized relationship remains fraught with challenges, this dialogue is a constructive move toward managing tensions and exploring economic synergies. For Bharat, the challenge lies in balancing economic cooperation with strategic autonomy, while for China, it means fostering trust in a region where its intentions are often viewed with suspicion. The success of this renewed engagement could mark a turning point in regional dynamics, with global implications as both nations navigate a changing world order.

The Kazan meeting is a much-needed reset for both nations. It shows that Bharat and China can engage pragmatically, focusing on areas of mutual benefit while acknowledging areas of contention. This practical approach might not resolve every issue, but it can prevent tensions from derailing progress. As the world watches, this careful but progressive engagement offers a hopeful prospect for both regional stability and long-term collaboration between Asia’s two largest powers.   The post Modi and Xi’s BRICS Summit Meeting Signals New Phase in Bharat-China Relations appeared first on Global Governance News- Asia's First Bilingual News portal for Global News and Updates. [ad_2] Source link

[the100th-monkey]

Today's News 26th October 2024

The US Was Inadvertently Responsible For The Sino-Indo Border De-Escalation Deal The US Was Inadvertently Responsible For The Sino-Indo Border De-Escalation Deal Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack, India announced earlier this week that it and China agreed to patrol their disputed border area in the way that it was before June 2020’s lethal Galwan River Valley clashes. This was made…

[darkmaga-returns]

India and China held multiple rounds of talks on their disputed border since 2020, but no breakthrough had occurred until Indo-US ties became characterized by distrust as a result of summer 2023’s scandal and all that followed, especially in recent months.

India announced earlier this week that it and China agreed to patrol their disputed border area in the way that it was before June 2020’s lethal Galwan River Valley clashes. This was made possible by China finally complying with India’s long-standing request, which in turn paved the way for their leaders to hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of this week’s BRICS Summit in Kazan. What many don’t realize, however, is that the US was inadvertently responsible for facilitating their deal.

This analysis here from early May explains how summer 2023’s scandal about an alleged Indian assassination attempt against a Delhi-designated terrorist-separatist with dual American citizenship on US soil was a turning point in their ties. The US then continued with its good cop, bad cop game against India prior to pushing Canada to escalate its related dispute with India earlier this month. Even before the latest developments, however, Indo-US ties had already noticeably soured over this issue.  

India and China held multiple rounds of talks on their disputed border since 2020, but no breakthrough had occurred until Indo-US ties became characterized by distrust as a result of summer 2023’s scandal and all that followed. China realized that those two’s previous level of trust will never return, which assuaged its concerns that India is playing a leading role in the US’ containment policy. It was this shift in perceptions that then led to China reconsidering its informal policy towards their border dispute.

[24x7newsroom]

LAC Tensions Ease with Landmark Deal

The significant agreement reached between India and China this week to resolve one of the longest military standoffs in recent history received formal approval on Wednesday from PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. This bilateral meeting at the BRICS Summit marked their first encounter in five years, during which they endorsed the deal. According to the Indian side, this endorsement from the highest level is expected to further alleviate tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

During their 50-minute discussion in Kazan, the leaders agreed to promptly hold Special Representatives (SRs) talks on the India-China boundary issue, which has not occurred since 2019. They emphasized the need to advance relations from a “strategic and long-term perspective,” enhance strategic communication and explore collaborative efforts to tackle developmental challenges.

The Special Representatives, Ajit Doval, and Wang Yi have met multiple times on the sidelines of various multilateral events, including a meeting last month in St. Petersburg, but not within the formal SR talks framework.

In the Indian readout, Modi expressed his support for the agreement concerning complete disengagement and the resolution of issues that emerged in 2020 in eastern Ladakh, which included the deadly Galwan clash that year. He stressed the importance of properly managing differences and disputes to maintain peace and tranquility.

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that Modi also expressed India’s full support for China’s presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2025. China characterized the meeting as constructive and of great significance. Read More-https://24x7newsroom.com/pm-modi-and-xi-finalize-lac-agreement-committing-to-restore-relations/

[tfgadgets]

PM, Xi To Hold Bilateral Meet At BRICS, Days After Border Breakthrough

New Delhi: Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold a bilateral meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping — their first since the 2020 Galwan clash — on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia on Tuesday, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has said. The meet will underscore the upturn in the India-China relation following a consensus on patrolling arrangement along the Line of Actual Control that had…

[todayworldnews2k21]

Can India trust China amid talks over disengagement along LAC? What experts say

In a major diplomatic breakthrough, the government on Monday announced that India and China have reached an agreement to resume patrolling at the remaining friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, where tensions have persisted since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. In a press briefing, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said the agreement marks a significant step…

[ebelal56-blog]

Neighbor victimization: India's revealed secrets

Have you ever thought about how complex India’s relationships with its neighbors really are? It’s like a tangled web of history, politics, and strategy. Take the border disputes, for instance. With China, it’s been a long-standing issue, especially in the Himalayas. Remember the Galwan Valley clash in 2020? That really escalated things. And then there’s Pakistan and Kashmir—since 1947, it’s been a rollercoaster of wars and skirmishes. Now, let’s talk about India’s growing influence. While it’s great to see India taking the lead in South Asia, it can sometimes rub neighbors the wrong way. Countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka feel like they’re caught in the middle of a power play, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative competing for attention. Building dams over international rivers and not sharing with Bangladesh. And don’t get me started on the strategic alliances with Western powers. They can seem more like a containment strategy than a partnership. All of this creates a perception that India is making more enemies than friends. It’s a delicate balance, and one misstep could tip the scales

[thedhananjayaparkhe]

Geopolitical newslinks shared by a friend on Whatsapp

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_FMeErjXbw Galwan And After: Reality Check On India-China Relations | #galwan #india #china #indiachina StratNewsGlobal 13 MAY 2024 Four years after the Galwan clash and the military standoff between India and China that continues to this day, what lessons can one draw from it? Is there a way forward?  Will China continue its belligerent course or does a recent…

[werindialive]

Chinese mouthpiece lauds India, says ‘India a major power, strategically confident’

Highlighting the achievements of New Delhi in the past 4 years, Chinese news daily Global Times on Tuesday released an entire article. Penned by Shanghai's Fudan University scholar the article called India ‘more strategically confident’ and ‘proactive’ in developing a ‘Bharat narrative’.

Further praising the economic, social, governance, and foreign policy development under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, the article talked about the ongoing tension between the two nations since the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes.

As per PTI reports, the article written by the director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Shanghai's Fudan University Mr. Zhang Jiadong talks about the achievements of India in the recent past.

“India is indeed a major power, and rapid changes in internal and external strategies pose challenges to both itself and the international community. It appears that a transformed, stronger, and more assertive India has become a new geopolitical factor that many countries need to consider," Jiadong said in his article.

The article highlights how India used to focus on the measures taken by Beijing to reduce trade imbalance but now its focus has shifted to increasing its export potential. It also talked about India's shift from focusing on its democratic consensus with the Western world to highlighting the ‘Indian feature’ of democratic politics.

"Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power, he has advocated for a multi-alignment strategy, promoting India's relations with the US, Japan, Russia and other countries and regional organizations," the article stated.

For more international news India in Hindi subscribe to our newsletter.

[news365timesindia]

[ad_1] Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other world leaders posed for a family photo on Wednesday at the Kazan Expo Center, during the 16th BRICS Summit.  In the family photo of leaders of the countries of the BRICS grouping, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, Russian President Vladimir Putin is flanked on either side by PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. #WATCH | Russia: Prime Minister Narendra Modi and UAE’s President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan seen interacting after the family photo at Kazan Expo Center. (Video: Host Broadcaster via Reuters) pic.twitter.com/t6TUp8f7dr — ANI (@ANI) October 23, 2024 Prime Minister Modi and UAE’s President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan were seen interacting after the photo session. The Plenary Session of the BRICS Summit began with Russian President Putin’s address to the world leaders. Later today, PM Modi is set to have a bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit. The meeting in Tatarstan’s capital marks the first formal interaction between the two leaders in five years. It follows the two countries’ agreement on resuming regular patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.  Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said at a media briefing on Tuesday, “I can confirm that there will be a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit.”  Modi met with Xi last in October 2019 in Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu, months before the June 2020 clashes in Galwan that led to a military standoff.  The two leaders met during the Group of 20 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in 2022 and then in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2023.  On October 21, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) announced that an agreement had been reached regarding patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border area. Foreign Secretary Misri told the media that the agreement “is the outcome of extensive discussions over the past several weeks with Chinese interlocutors at both diplomatic and military levels. “He noted that military commanders have been involved in negotiations aimed at addressing the tensions that have persisted since 2020. On Tuesday, China also said it had reached a resolution with India on resolving their border conflict and will work to implement solutions. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, in a regular press briefing, said, “We have reached a resolution on the relevant matter, and will work with the Indian side to implement the solution. We are in close communication through diplomatic and military channels.” The highly anticipated meeting between PM Modi (/topic/pm-modi) and President Xi in Kazan is expected to be a pivotal moment in India-China relations. The two leaders will likely discuss the recent agreement on patrolling along the LAC and other areas of shared interest like trade. Trade so that the trade increases but at the same time, the deficit decreases,” he said.  [ad_2] Source link